Whilst the population of Darfur is Muslim, it has never been ethnically homogeneous and includes Arabs and Arabic-speaking people (‘camel nomads’, mainly Zaghawa in the north and ‘cattle nomads’, the Baqqara in the south) and non-Arab farmers (mostly Fur, Masalit and others in the central zone).⁽²³⁾ One of the main causes of conflict has been the pressure on resources as increasing desertification in the north has led to the competition between the nomadic (mainly Arab) groups and the farming communities for water and land for grazing. The second cause for conflict is the belief that the Khartoum government has discriminated against and marginalised the African communities in Darfur besides providing support to the Janjaweed (this is a term originally used to describe bandits but which now refers to the Arab militia) to suppress non-Arabs. As the ICG has argued, policies introduced in the mid-1980s ‘manipulated ethnicity in the interests of central politicians and their allies. The current ethnic war is the culmination of two decades of misguided policies by successive central governments’.⁽²⁴⁾

According to Mohamed I. Khalil, a former Speaker of the Sudan Constituent Assembly and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Justice, ‘three factors have exacerbated the situation in Darfur: the drought of the 1980s, the disruption of the tribal administrative system, and the use of militias as a proxy instrument of war’. While the drought in the 1980s led to an increase in disputes between the nomadic Arabs and the non-Arab farmers, ‘the native administration machinery, including the tribal conciliation councils, satisfactorily settled them.’ This process ensured the maintenance of law and order, collection of taxes and dispute resolution.⁽²⁵⁾

The administrative system changed in the mid-1990s. A ‘pseudo-federal’ system of administration was created, dividing Sudan into some 20 states, three of which constitute the region of Darfur. Khalil has written that:

The Western Darfur State was split into 24 administrative units, of which 19 went to Arab tribes and only five to the African tribes. The head of each unit is an emir, or governor, chosen more for his faithfulness to the regime than his ability or knowledge of local conditions. With little funding coming from the central treasury, governors are left to fend for themselves. Meanwhile, the traditional tribal chiefs are deprived of all legislative, judicial, and tax-collecting powers. The enfeeblement of the tribal chiefs … crippled the traditional system of dispute settlement …

The third and most pernicious supervening factor was the regime’s recourse to the use of militias as a proxy instrument of war. This was first began (sic) in 1985 when the Transitional Military Government … armed the youth of the Arab tribes of Southern Kordofan and Darfur on the pretext of enabling them to fend off attacks by the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) forces. The level of training and arming was raised by the present government, which went to the extent of creating a People’s Defense Force that acts parallel with and independently of the Armed Forces. In addition, the government … armed bands of young men from among the Arabs of Northern Darfur, now known as the janjaweed. ⁽²⁶⁾

The Darfur crisis: 2003–04

As mentioned earlier, the current round of conflict began in early 2003 when the SLA and the JEM attacked government military facilities. This was also a time when the government was under international pressure to end the north-south conflict and attention was focused on the IGAD process towards resolution. As a response to the rebels’ initial successes, the government encouraged retaliation by the Janjaweed militias supported by its regular forces.

This retaliation took the form of attacks on villages inhabited by the Fur, Massaleit and Zaghawa groups whose members support and comprise the SLA and JEM forces. There are also reports that link the SLA rebellion to the SPLA, which is said to have provided material assistance as well as public support. The SPLA is also said to have made it clear that in the event of it signing a peace agreement with the government, it will not fight the rebels. There have also been some suggestions that the system of governance agreed for the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile could be relevant to Darfur. The government of Sudan initially appeared to suggest that the Darfur issue could be resolved after the resolution of outstanding issues on southern Sudan with SPLA.⁽²⁷⁾

Chad, a country on the western border of Sudan, tried unsuccessfully to mediate a ceasefire between the Khartoum government and the rebels in the second half of 2003. One motivating factor could have been that the Darfur crisis has the potential to threaten the stability of Chad itself. According to the International Crisis Group:

Several Chadian ethnic militias are involved on both sides of the conflict, including within the Janjaweed. Khartoum has taken a tough approach, both actively cajoling (President Idris) Deby’s government to block the flow of arms and rebel movements across the border and covertly supporting Chadian Arab militias that want to use Darfur as a springboard for taking power at home. ⁽²⁸⁾

Tensions between Sudan and Chad increased sharply following clashes between the Chadian army and the Janjaweed in May and June 2004 prompting senior Chadian officials to warn that the raids risked destabilising the entire region. The incursions immediately subsided.⁽²⁹⁾

According to the Los Angeles Times, at that stage the US and Britain were reluctant to actively canvass the issue at the UN ‘for fear of riling the Sudanese government and upsetting the delicate north-south peace talks that seemed poised for resolution’.⁽³⁰⁾ Humanitarian agencies were effectively banned from Darfur for about four months during October 2003 to February 2004. Human Rights Watch has observed that, as deadlines were missed during the negotiations, ‘Darfur began to overshadow Naivasha [the IGAD sponsored talks] as the scope of the human rights and humanitarian crisis began to shake public opinion’.⁽³¹⁾

On 8 April 2004, a ceasefire mediated by Chad with the involvement of the AU, the UN and several western countries, was signed in Chad’s capital, N’djamena, by the Sudan government and the two Darfur rebel groups but it never came into effect. On 28 May, all sides agreed to the mandates of the Ceasefire Commission. The Ceasefire Commission was to include some 130 military observers at six locations, five in Darfur and one in Chad. Eighty observers would come from AU countries and others from various parties including the European Union (EU) and US. According to the ICG, the agreement itself was badly flawed, ‘neither comprehensive nor professionally negotiated’. In a report released on 23 August 2004, Darfur Deadline: A New International Action Plan, the ICG states that:

… monitoring was stretched too thinly. Fighting still occurs between the government and the two insurgent groups, while the Janjaweed continue to target civilians. Government forces and the Janjaweed have burned dozens of villages since the ceasefire was signed, and the ethnic cleansing campaign is ongoing despite repeated high-level visits to the region.⁽³²⁾

On 3 July 2004, the UN and the Khartoum government signed a joint communiqué in which Sudan pledged to impose a ‘moratorium on restrictions’ on humanitarian work in Darfur, improve human rights protection, protect Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), disarm the Janjaweed and pursue a political settlement.⁽³³⁾ In early July the Peace and Security Council of the AU decided to deploy the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS), a force of 308 soldiers. It was eventually clarified that the mandate of this force would be not only to protect the observers but also, within its capacity, the civilian population. As the ICG has observed however, while this ‘force may be able to change the dynamic where it is actually deployed, it is far too small to patrol an area the size of France and protect more than one million IDPs’.⁽³⁴⁾

On 30 July 2004, after weeks of negotiations and compromise, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1556.⁽³⁵⁾ The resolution imposed an arms ban on all non-state actors (the SLA, JEM and the Janjaweed), pledged support for the AU efforts and urged all parties to resume negotiations. The central demand of the resolution (paragraph 6) was that the government disarm the Janjaweed militias and hold accountable those responsible for human rights and international human rights law abuses. The Secretary General was to report on progress made in this regard to the Security Council in 30 days.

The report by the Secretary General to the Security Council on 30 August 2004 stated that while some progress had been made, much remained to be achieved.⁽³⁶⁾ Sudan had not met some of its core commitments and attacks against civilians were continuing. A majority of the militias had not been disarmed and humanitarian agencies continued to encounter difficulties. The report also emphasised that a ‘substantially increased international presence in Darfur is required as quickly as possible’. This view was supported by Colin Powell in his remarks to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 9 September 2004. Concluding that genocide had been committed in Darfur, he stated that ‘the most practical contribution we can make to the security of Darfur in the short-term is to increase the number of African Union monitors.’⁽³⁷⁾

Apart from the activities of the Janjaweed, clashes are still being reported between government forces and the SLA. Negotiations between the SLA, JEM and the government, brokered by the AU and being held in Abuja, Nigeria are still stalled over security and disarmament issues.⁽³⁸⁾ On 17 September they were adjourned for a month.⁽³⁹⁾ The various parties met again in October without success and negotiations were postponed again.⁽⁴⁰⁾ There were also accusations of further air raids by government forces.⁽⁴¹⁾

One complicating factor is that the SLA and the JEM do not necessarily share the same agenda. As Francis Deng, a Sudan scholar and until recently, the UN Secretary-General’s Representative on IDPs, has observed, the SLA and JEM do not entirely share the same vision. With a history of cooperation in the past, the SLA is closer to the SPLA than it is to the JEM. On the other hand, the ‘JEM’s vision is still tied to some sort of an Islamic agenda … these are some of the details of the contradictions that the country’s going through. If we were to come to an agreement, it would have to be comprehensive.’⁽⁴²⁾

A second problem is the ruling party in Sudan, the National Congress Party (NCP) itself. As mentioned earlier, it faces both internal divisions and opposition from other political groups. In 2004 alone, the government has thrice accused its opponents in the Popular National Congress (PNC) of attempting to overthrow it. Many of the PNC’s leaders, including its chief, Hassan al-Turabi, a former ally of President Omar al-Bashir, are under arrest.⁽⁴³⁾ In early October, amidst further signs of divisions within the government on how to handle the Darfur situation, Bashir sacked one of his top aides, Mubarak al-Fadil al-Mahdi.⁽⁴⁴⁾ Recently, the government accused the JEM, the militarily small but politically more potent of the two Darfur groups, of involvement in one of the failed coup attempts but maintained it would not refuse to negotiate with them.⁽⁴⁵⁾ It has also accused the JEM of being the armed wing of Turabi’s PNC. To complicate matters further, ‘the government has begun a third negotiating track, with the umbrella opposition body, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA)’, of which both the SPLA and the SLA are members.⁽⁴⁶⁾

Future directions

Immediate

Besides the human tragedy and the monumental efforts required to avert more deaths, the immediate requirement is for an expanded mandate and an increase in the number of AU monitors. According to a spokesperson for the UN Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS), the need is for ‘a mandate that allows the AU to be more proactive … to be everywhere it should be in all areas’.⁽⁴⁷⁾

By early September 2004, the US had introduced a draft resolution to the UN Security Council which covered, among other things, various sanctions, including on Sudan’s oil industry, and advocated an expanded AU monitoring force with an extended mandate.⁽⁴⁸⁾ As Gareth Evans, President of the ICG, has observed, ‘it is difficult to believe … that fighter jet contracts in the case of Russia and oil concessions in the case of China have no link with their reluctance so far to take tough action’.⁽⁴⁹⁾ China is not only the largest shareholder in Sudan’s national oil company, it has also built the country’s refineries and oil pipelines. It is also a major investor in the country’s hydroelectric power sector. (See Appendix for a note on Sudan’s oil industry.) It should be noted that China and Pakistan, both importers of Sudan’s oil, abstained from the vote on Resolution 1556.

On 18 September 2004, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1564 (2004) by a vote of 11 to 0 with Algeria, China, Pakistan and Russia abstaining. Both Pakistan and Russia maintained that the threat of sanctions would be ‘counterproductive’ while China insisted that sanctions could ‘complicate matters’. Resolution 1564:

• welcomes the AU’s intention to enlarge its monitoring force and urges Member States to support these efforts
• calls on all parties to stop human rights violations and reach a political solution
• demands that the Government of Sudan submit the names of militiamen and others arrested for human rights abuses
• requests the Secretary-General to establish a commission of inquiry to determine ‘whether or not acts of genocide have occurred’, and
• threatens ‘additional measures … such as actions to affect Sudan’s petroleum sector and the Government of Sudan or individual members of the Government of Sudan’ if it does not comply with the resolution. ⁽⁵⁰⁾

A key omission in this resolution was a ban on arms trade with Sudan, in which China and Russia are the two main suppliers.⁽⁵¹⁾

In any event, UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, had already sent the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, and the newly appointed Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Juan Mendez, to Sudan on a fact-finding mission. The resolution is also the first time in the history of the Security Council that article 8 of the Genocide Convention has been invoked. On 7 October 2004, Kofi Annan appointed a five-member panel headed by Italian judge, Antonio Cassese, to investigate allegations of genocide.⁽⁵²⁾

In late October 2004, the Security Council decided to hold a two-day meeting on the situation in Sudan on 18-19 November in Nairobi.⁽⁵³⁾ On 19 November, Council members witnessed the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Government of Sudan and the SPLA committing them to reach a comprehensive peace agreement by 31 December 2004. The Security Council also adopted Resolution 1574 (2004) which urges donors ‘to continue their efforts to prepare for the rapid delivery of an assistance package for the reconstruction and economic development of Sudan, including official development assistance, possible debt relief and trade access’ once the peace agreement is signed and implementation begins.⁽⁵⁴⁾

The Resolution was criticised by Human Rights Watch as representing a retreat by the Security Council from its earlier stance of holding the Sudanese government accountable for the ongoing human rights abuses in Darfur:

While (the) resolution recalls prior Security Council resolutions passed in July and September, it leaves out the explicit demand in those resolutions for Khartoum to disarm and prosecute the government-backed Janjaweed militias.

In addition, the new resolution omits language in the Resolutions 1556 and 1564 that specifically threatened ‘further measures’, including the possibility of sanctions. Instead, it includes a much milder warning to ‘take appropriate action against any party failing to fulfill its commitments’.⁽⁵⁵⁾

US Ambassador to the UN, John Danforth defended the changed emphasis in Resolution 1574. On 2 December 2004, he said that imposing international sanctions on the Government of Sudan is ‘not a real option’. He maintained that even if they were approved, ‘would sanctions work? The US unilateral sanctions have certainly not influenced the behaviour of Sudan’. Danforth also added that even though Resolutions 1556 and 1564 ‘certainly pointed the finger at the Government of Sudan—and they deserve to have the finger pointed at them—nobody’s hands are clean. The government and the rebels in Darfur have each been complicit in creating this terrible tragedy, and it’s time to end it.’⁽⁵⁶⁾

Meanwhile there have been calls for a large-scale military intervention to alleviate the situation in Darfur by deploying a ‘peacekeeping’ force and avoiding ‘another Rwanda’. There are at least two drawbacks in such suggestions. First, there is an acute international shortage of peacekeepers. This fact was recognised by President George W. Bush in his address to the UN General Assembly on 21 September 2004. He spoke of plans by the G8 group of industrialised countries to train 75 000 peacekeepers, ‘initially from Africa so that they can conduct operations in that continent and elsewhere. The countries of the G-8 will help this peacekeeping force with deployment and logistical needs’.⁽⁵⁷⁾ As the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guehenno has pointed out, the UN now has some 50,000 peacekeepers deployed in eight African operations (in Burundi, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Congo, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Sierra Leone and Western Sahara), double the number five years ago. Even these troops are overstretched.⁽⁵⁸⁾ Briefing the Fourth Committee of the UN recently, he made it clear that current peacekeeping demands exceed what the UN or any other regional organisation by itself could meet.⁽⁵⁹⁾ This obviously includes the AU itself. Then there is the question whether a peacekeeping/intervention force could actually achieve the desired results given the complexity and size of the problem. US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, acknowledged this dilemma when he commented:

Khartoum certainly has to do a lot more. It’s a very difficult thing to calibrate and I have to deal with this every day. How much pressure can you apply without the pressure starting to become counterproductive because the regime in Khartoum says, ‘Okay. We’re not going to do any more. Darfur is all yours. No[w] you do it’. Or do you just keep applying pressure to make them respond?⁽⁶⁰⁾

There are also questions of state sovereignty. If a large-scale intervention led by western countries were to be proposed (assuming this was politically and logistically possible, given the commitment that a number of countries have in Iraq), this could create more problems. As Professor Ramesh Thakur has argued, such an intervention could be viewed as ‘yet another assault on Arabs and Muslims … [T]hen there is the moral hazard of encouraging rebel groups everywhere to internationalise their crisis by intensifying violence’. He also makes the point that if developing countries do not want outside interference ‘they must accept the burden of responsibility for ending atrocities by one of their own’.⁽⁶¹⁾

Rather than a large-scale, western-led and dominated intervention force, efforts have recently been made to deploy an African monitoring force in an attempt to promote stabilisation. In late September 2004, Nigeria’s president and Chairman of the African Union, Olusegun Obasinjo, indicated that he expected an AMIS force of 3000 to 5000 troops to be ready by October, but added that ‘millions of dollars’ were needed to deploy it.⁽⁶²⁾ On 1 October, Sudan agreed in principle to an AU proposal providing for the deployment of some 3500 more soldiers and 800 more police.

On 6 October2004, during the first visit to Sudan by a serving British Prime Minister since its independence in 1956, the Sudanese Government agreed to a five-point peace plan which includes cooperating with the expanded AU mission, facilitating humanitarian assistance and a commitment to reach a comprehensive peace agreement with the south (the IGAD process) by the end of 2004.⁽⁶³⁾

A fortnight later, on 20 October 2004, the AU agreed to increase the numbers of its force to 3320 troops and civilian police. (This will include 1700 armed troops, 641 unarmed troops, 450 unarmed military observers, 815 civilian police and 164 civilian staff). Their deployment began in November and the $220 million, one-year operation will be funded mainly by the EU and the US.⁽⁶⁴⁾ It has been reported that it may take until February 2005 or later for the force to reach its full strength.⁽⁶⁵⁾

The medium term

As the ICG has pointed out, there are two views on how to bring peace to Sudan: to continue with both the Darfur and IGAD peace processes concerning the conflict in the south, relying on the Darfur process becoming easier after an IGAD agreement is concluded, or alternatively, to resolve the Darfur crisis before finalising the IGAD negotiations.

A ‘Darfur first’ approach would allow the solution to be included in a new constitution and underline the fact that the reasons for Sudan’s conflicts have been ‘structural and national, not simply North-South’. Resolving the conflict would also reduce the possibility of it spilling over to other parts of the country, sustain international engagement and maintain donor support. A shortcoming of this approach is that it could be interpreted by other disenfranchised communities as suggesting that ‘armed revolt is the only mechanism available … for securing rights and freedoms’.⁽⁶⁶⁾

Supporters of a separate IGAD agreement first maintain that after its conclusion, the SPLA, ‘which is friendly to the Darfur insurgents, would join the central government and become a catalyst for new policies in Khartoum that would create momentum for a solution in Darfur’. What is being attempted in the South, it is argued, is an effort to resolve 21 years of civil war and it is too risky to include Darfur.⁽⁶⁷⁾

In a briefing to the Security Council on 2 September 2004, Jan Pronk, Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Sudan made some perceptive observations regarding the search for a ‘comprehensive solution’ to the problems facing Sudan:

• the Darfur crisis cannot be viewed in isolation. A solution to the crisis in Sudan requires an enduring peace between the government and the SPLA. Given Sudan’s history of stalled talks and broken promises, a successful conclusion of the IGAD peace talks could serve as a model for Darfur. This would include decentralisation, power sharing, regional autonomy and coexistence of different groups in one country
• the constitutional changes resulting from this process would provide a negotiating framework for the government as well as instil confidence regarding negotiations among the rebels, and
• making the IGAD process conditional on an end to the crisis in Darfur could lead to further instability and prolong the crisis itself.⁽⁶⁸⁾

Broadly, these have also been the views of UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan and Secretary of State Powell.⁽⁶⁹⁾ Resolution 1574 passed on 19 November 2004 confirms that the UN prefers a successful conclusion of the IGAD negotiations.

An indication of the commitment of western countries was a meeting of the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) in Nairobi in early September 2004 and the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) in Oslo on 27–28 September.

Co-sponsored by the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program, the JAM includes representatives of the Sudanese Government, the SPLA and IGAD. It is responsible for assessing Sudan’s rehabilitation and recovery needs and for drafting a framework for reconstruction for the period up to 2010.⁽⁷⁰⁾ The IPF reviewed progress on the JAM in preparation for the donor conference scheduled to take place in Oslo after the conclusion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Donors have expressed a commitment to support the peace process in the aftermath of the peace agreement for a six-year, interim period.⁽⁷¹⁾

Consequently, while there is at least one positive aspect of the crisis in Sudan—political will as well as a commitment of resources by the international and regional interlocutors—the situation on the ground appears seemingly intractable. On 4 November 2004, Special Representative, Jan Pronk, told the Security Council:

Darfur may easily enter a state of anarchy: a total collapse of law and order. The conflict is changing in character. The government does not control its own forces fully. It co-opted para-military forces and now cannot count on their obedience. The spirit is out of the bottle and cannot be pushed back .… Within the rebel movements, there is a leadership crisis. There are splits. Some commanders provoke their adversaries by stealing, hijacking and killing, some seem to have begun acting for their own private gain.⁽⁷²⁾

He went on to add that the situation could only be reversed by a three–pronged approach:

First, deployment of a third party force—the AU—to effectively deter violations. Second, there must be a speeding up of all negotiation processes. Third, political leaders—the official ones as well as the self-selected ones—must be held accountable for ongoing violations of agreements and further human misery.⁽⁷³⁾

Humanitarian and emergency assistance

By September 2004, a UN appeal for US$531 million to enable it to carry out its humanitarian work in Darfur and Chad had raised US$276 million, leaving a shortfall of US$255 million.⁽⁷⁴⁾

As of September 2004, the World Food Program was able to feed only 78 per cent of the targeted 1.2 million people. The sheer scale of the problem and logistical difficulties in transporting supplies have made it an extremely formidable task.⁽⁷⁵⁾

Australian assistance

Australia has provided A$20 million in humanitarian aid for the crisis in Sudan and has indicated its willingness to consider further assistance.⁽⁷⁶⁾ On 21 September 2004, AU chief spokesman, Assane Ba, called on Australia to provide financial and logistical assistance to the AU monitoring force. He told an Australian journalist, ‘Australia has not contributed and has not shown any interest’. In response, a spokesman for Foreign Minister Downer said that the Government would soon announce details of the ‘actual logistical contribution’ to be made to the AU effort. ‘We have some proposals under consideration … this has been discussed at senior levels in government’, he added.⁽⁷⁷⁾

In October 2004, it was reported that Australia had offered to deploy two Australian C-130 Hercules transport aircraft along with support personnel to the Darfur region to provide logistics support for the AU mission. This would be the largest Australian military contingent to be sent to Africa since troops were sent to Rwanda in 1994 as part of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).⁽⁷⁸⁾

Summing up

In trying to address the question whether the Darfur crisis can be resolved in the short to medium term, the main problems faced by interested parties are:

• a divided government in Khartoum and long-term tension and hostilities in Darfur
• uncertainty and unpredictability in the government’s negotiations with the rebels
• political difficulties confronting efforts to influence the Sudanese Government, and
• limited capabilities of the AU—or indeed the availability of any other—monitoring force.

An (anonymous) State Department official recently made a very apt observation:

The first notion anyone’s got to disabuse themselves of is that there are any good guys in this. There aren’t. The S.L.A. started this war, and now they and the Justice and Equality Movement are doing everything possible to keep it going. The S.L.A. has never stood up to the army the way the S.P.L.A. did in the south. Instead, they’ve been very content to sit back, let the village burnings go on, let the killing go on, because the more international pressure that’s brought to bear on Khartoum, the stronger their position grows.⁽⁷⁹⁾

With regard to the prospect of putting pressure on the Sudanese Government for a solution, the same official commented, ‘It’s a pretty tough position to be in … The Sudanese will bend to a certain point, but beyond that they just won’t. The real danger is that if you go too far, it derails the north-south deal, and you’re back to another 22 years of war’.⁽⁸⁰⁾

Consequently, while efforts continue to alleviate the humanitarian problems, given its history and complexity, it is not realistic to expect a comprehensive resolution of the political crisis involving issues of governance and allocation of resources in the near future.

Apart from trying to alleviate the human suffering, the immediate priority for the UN and the international community is to persist in their efforts to bring about a ceasefire among the warring parties as well as ensure the safety of the civilian population in the Darfur region. Any attempt at imposing sanctions on Sudan, the most frequently suggested option, is unlikely to succeed. The fractious nature of the Khartoum regime also injects an element of uncertainty in peace negotiations. Military or ‘humanitarian’ intervention on a large scale is not likely to be seen as a viable option given the size and complexity of the problem. In other words, a quick fix for a long–standing problem is not likely to be possible.

The expansion of the size of the AMIS monitoring force will play a vital role in the operational part of the process (the EU, US and the UK currently provide the largest support to this force). Political, financial and logistical support for the AU’s efforts would be invaluable as would a commitment by the US, UK, EU and others to stay involved in the long term if peace and stability in Sudan is to be pursued as an ultimate goal. Recent statements by the US, members of the EU, as well as the IGAD Partners Forum, suggest that such commitment exists.

Appendix

Sudan’s oil assets

Sudan’s oil industry is one of the fastest growing in the world. In an otherwise resource–poor country, it is its largest asset and easy to exploit. Oil production quadrupled between 1999 and 2003 and official estimates put the recoverable oil reserves at over 2000 million barrels.⁽⁸¹⁾ In January 2004, Sudan’s proven reserves of crude oil were estimated at 563 million barrels (more than twice the 2001 estimate) and by June 2004, oil production averaged about 345 000 barrels per day (b/d) compared to 270 000 b/d in 2003. According to Sudan’s Energy Minister Awad al-Jaz, production is expected to exceed 500 000 b/d by the end of 2005.⁽⁸²⁾

Sudan’s oil industry is also a rarity in that Western oil companies have minimal presence. This was not always the case. Chevron (US) had an exploration permit when oil was discovered in 1979 but the civil war prevented commercial exploitation. Canadian, Swedish and Austrian oil companies have also been active in the past but have withdrawn due to a combination of security concerns and pressure by human rights groups at home.

Currently, the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) dominates Sudan’s oil industry. GNPOC is mostly owned by state-owned oil companies from China, Malaysia and India. Current stakeholders in GNPOC are: the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC, China) 40 per cent, Petronas (Malaysia) 30 per cent and ONGC Videsh (India) 25 per cent. The Sudanese Government has a 5 per cent interest through the Sudanese Petroleum Corporation (Sudapet). The GNPOC also constructed a pipeline from the oilfields to a terminal at Port Sudan in 1999 and oil is exported primarily to India and China. The three foreign investors also have substantial interests in various oil exploration blocks.⁽⁸³⁾

The country’s largest oil refinery, the Khartoum refinery, built and jointly operated by CNPC is currently being upgraded at a cost of US$340 million. CNPC is also building a pipeline from oilfields in Western Kordofan to the refinery. In June 2004, the Indian Government approved a US$196 million project for ONGC Videsh to build a petroleum products export pipeline from the Khartoum refinery to Port Sudan. It is expected to be completed in late 2005.⁽⁸⁴⁾

Apart from the oil sector, China also has substantial involvement in Sudan’s hydroelectric power generation and distribution sector.⁽⁸⁵⁾

Endnotes

1. Anthony Lake and John Prendergast, ‘Stopping Sudan’s slow-motion genocide’, Boston Globe, 20 May 2004.

2. Written Remarks by the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 9 September 2004. Text: http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2004&m=September&x=20040909115958JTgnilwoD0.5094873&t=livefeeds/wf-latest.html

3. International Crisis Group, Darfur Deadline: A New International Plan, ICG Africa Report No. 83, 23 August 2004, p. 1.

4. Washington Post, 15 September 2004. Also, Media Briefing, WHO, 15 October 2004. See: http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/vID/F035E0D2E4A12D1949256F3100030846?OpenDocument

5. Published by the Central Intelligence Agency. The Section on Sudan is available online at: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/su.html

6. J. D. Derbyshire and Ian Derbyshire, Political Systems of the World, Helicon, 1996, p. 402. For details of Sudan’s linguistic and cultural diversity see, http://www.ethnologue.com/show_country.asp?name=Sudan. Further resources on Sudan are accessible at: http://www-sul.stanford.edu/depts/ssrg/africa/sudan.html

7. An Australian Parliamentary delegation visited Sudan in July 1979. For details see, Report of the Australian Parliamentary Delegation to Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, Tanzania, Nigeria, Gabon and Sudan, June–July 1979.

8. Alan Philips writing in Peter Verney et.al., ‘Sudan: Conflict and Minorities’, Minority Rights Group International Report, 1996, p. 5.

9. ibid. p. 29.

10. R. S. O’Fahey, ‘A complex ethnic reality with a long history’, International Herald Tribune, 15–16 May 2004.

11. International Crisis Group, God, Oil and Country: Changing the Logic of War in Sudan, ICG Africa Report No. 39, 2002, pp.18-20.

12. ibid., p. 21.

13. ‘Sudan: Ruling party fractiousness worsens conflict’, Oxford Analytica, 17 September 2004.

14. Samantha Power, ‘Dying in Darfur’, New Yorker, 30 August 2004. See http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040830fa_fact1

15. IGAD members include Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. It has evolved into a forum for regional political, security and economic dialogue.

16. John Ryle, ‘Disaster in Darfur’, New York Review of Books, Vol. 51, No. 13, 12 August 2004. See http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17326

17. ibid.

18. John W. Donaldson, ‘Territorial issues may undermine Sudan peace agreement’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 2004, pp. 42–44.

19. Remarks to the Voice of America quoted in John Ryle, ‘Disaster in Darfur’, New York Review of Books, loc. cit.

20. IRIN News, 2 September 2004. Text: http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/813730ecce84dc94c1256f030049ebf1?OpenDocument

21. John Ryle, ‘Disaster in Darfur’, loc.cit.

22. International Crisis Group, Sudan: Now or Never in Darfur, ICG Africa Report No. 80, 23 May 2004, p. 1.

23. For a succinct synopsis of the historical roots of the conflict in Darfur see, R. S. O’Fahey, ‘A complex ethnic reality with a long history’, International Herald Tribune, 15–16 May 2004.

24. International Crisis Group, Darfur Rising: Sudan’s New Crisis, ICG Africa Report No. 76, 25 March 2004, p. 4. The report also provides an excellent summary of the background to the current conflict.

25. Mohamed I. Khalil, ‘The Darfur Tragedy’, Manuscript, Middle East Institute, 22 September 2004, p. 3. Available at: http://www.mideasti.org/articles/doc269.pdf

26. ibid., pp. 3–4.

27. For information on the SLA, JEM, Janjaweed and other details see Darfur Rising: Sudan’s New Crisis, op.cit., pp. 14–20.

28. Darfur Deadline: A New International Action Plan, op.cit., p. 12.

29. ibid., pp. 12–13.

30. 9 September 2004.

31. ‘Darfur destroyed: Ethnic cleansing by government and militia forces in Western Sudan,’ Vol. 16, No. 6 (A), May 2004, p. 50. See: http://hrw.org/reports/2004/sudan0504/sudan0504simple.pdf

32. ICG Africa Report No. 83, p. 6.

33. Joint Communique. Text: http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/vID/746B9FE7CD9B97D485256EC8001140EE?OpenDocument

34. ICG Africa Report No. 83, pp. 6–7.

35. Text: http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/446/02/PDF/N0444602.pdf?OpenElement

36. Report of the Secretary-General, 20 August 2004. Document S/2004/703 available at: http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/474/12/PDF/N0447412.pdf?OpenElement

37. Written Remarks by the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 9 September 2004. Text: http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2004&m=September&x=20040909115958JTgnilwoD0.5094873&t=livefeeds/wf-latest.html

38. UN News Centre, 14 September 2004. See, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=11907&Cr=sudan&Cr1

39. Agence France-Presse, 17 September 2004. See: http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/4d682eddc22d113949256f15001d2a85?OpenDocument

40. Xinhua, 20 October 2004.

41. The Australian, 2 November 2004.

42. Transcript, ‘The Crisis in Sudan: A Report from the Region’, briefing by The Brookings Institution, 14 September 2004. Available at: http://www.brook.edu/comm/events/20040914sudan.pdf

43. New York Times, 27 September 2004.

44. Reuters, 7 October 2004. Text: http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/7023d07f6b6f239349256f27002301c3?OpenDocument

45. Reuters, 6 October 2004. See: http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/21bd04a263d81d6785256f2500546d5e?OpenDocument

46. International Crisis Group, Sudan’s Dual Crisis: Refocusing on IGAD, ICG Africa Briefing, 5 October 2004, pp.2–3.

47. Reuters, 8 September 2004. See http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/2a88edf0132975bec1256f09004958e7?OpenDocument

48. Guardian, 8 September 2004.

49. ‘Why nobody is doing enough for Darfur’, Financial Times, 3 August 2004.

50. UN Security Council, 18 September 2004. Text and comments available at: http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/75705559a00732b149256f150004183b?OpenDocument

51. For details see, ‘Sudan, Oil and Human Rights’, Human Rights Watch, 2003. Available at: http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/633ce4b66afe6eba85256f39005b21be?OpenDocument

52. Reuters, 7 October 2004. Cassese was the first president of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Other commission members include Mohammed Fayek, secretary-general of the Arab Organisation of Human Rights, Hani Jilani, Annan’s special representative on human rights defenders, Diego Garcia-Sayan, a former Peruvian foreign minister and justice minister, and Therese Striggner Scott, chairwoman of the Ghanian Law Reform Commission. See: http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N07252058.htm

53. UN Security Council, 26 October 2004. See, http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/633ce4b66afe6eba85256f39005b21be?OpenDocument

54. etails and text available at: http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/1a4026b6dfd92e6549256f54000c1949?OpenDocument

55. Press Release, 19 November 2004. Text: http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/fc060e15a24a966d49256f5400054f7b?OpenDocument

56. Judy Aita, ‘Naivasha Accord Key to Sudan Peace, US Envoy Says’, Washington File, 2 December 2004.

57. Text: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040921-3.html

58. ‘A continent in crying need of peacekeepers: Helping Africa help itself’, International Herald Tribune, 15 October 2004.

59. Press Release, GA/SPD/297, 25 October 2004.

60. Interview by the Cincinnati Enquirer editorial board, 6 August 2004. Quoted in ICG Africa Briefing, 5 October 2004, loc.cit., pp.10–11.

61. ‘Western medicine is no cure for Darfur’s ills’, Australian Financial Review, 31 August 2004.

62. New York Times, 24 September 2004.

63. Independent, 7 October 2004. Also Guardian, 7 October 2004.

64. Anthony Mitchell, ‘African Union to Bolster Forces in Darfur’, Washington Post, 21 October 2004. See also BBC News, 20 October 2004 at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3761120.stm

65. New York Times, 29 November 2004.

66. ICG Africa Report No. 83, p. 18.

67. ibid. p.19.

68. Press Release SC/8180, 2 September 2004. Text: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8180.doc.htm

69. See, for example, Report of the Secretary-General, 20 August 2004. Document S/2004/703, especially paragraph 67, and Colin Powell’s testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, n.2. Text: http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2004&m=September&x=20040909115958JTgnilwoD0.5094873&t=livefeeds/wf-latest.html

70. ICG Africa Briefing, 5 October 2004, loc.cit. p. 5.

71. See: http://www.emb-norway.ca/policy/News/ipfsummary.htm

72. Text: http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/infocusnewssudan.asp?NewsID=823&sID=23#

73. ibid.

74. Oxfam, 9 September 2004. See: http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/87c50884bf9f8b35c1256f0900366760?OpenDocument

75. WFP Emergency Report 37, 2004. http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/a0e40405f366051c49256f0e000a4b84?OpenDocument. For media coverage of WFP activities see http://www.wfp.org/newsroom/in_depth/frontline/2004/sudan/0405_sudan_crisis.html

76. For details see AusAID: http://www.ausaid.gov.au/hottopics/topic.cfm?Id=8118_9239_5709_3630_3046

77. The Australian, 22 September 2004.

78. The Australian, 13 October 2004.

79. Quoted in Scott Anderson, ‘How Did Darfur Happen?’, New York Times Magazine, 17 October 2004.

80. ibid.

81. MEED, 9–15 July 2004, p. 29.

82. Sudan, Country Analysis Brief, US Department of Energy, July 2004, p. 3. Available online at: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/sudan.pdf

83. ‘Sudan: Oil sector growth requires peace and stability’, Oxford Analytica, 26 March 2004.

84. Sudan, Country Analysis Brief, loc. cit. p. 5.

85. For details see ibid. pp. 6–7.

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