Current Issues Brief no.32 2002-03
Conflict
in Aceh: A Military Solution?
Dr Stephen Sherlock
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group
23 June 2003
Contents
Introduction
The Conflict in Aceh: History Repeats Itself
Efforts
for Peace after the Fall of Soeharto
The 'Humanitarian
Pause' and 'Special Autonomy'
The Ceasefire
of December 2002
Why did the
Ceasefire Collapse?
The Military: Reluctant Participants
GAM: the Quest for Legitimacy
Is GAM an Islamic Extremist
Organisation?
Megawati's Government: Looking
to the Next Election?
Implications
for Australia
Conclusion: Future Prospects
Endnotes
A promising period of relative peace in the Indonesian
province of Aceh
has spiralled back into violent struggle. On 19
May 2003, the Indonesian security forces launched an all-out
military offensive against the pro-independence Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan
Aceh Merdeka (GAM)), following the final collapse of a ceasefire
agreement that had commenced in December 2002. President
Megawati Sukarnoputri
issued a decree declaring a state of emergency in the province, authorising
the military to take responsibility for security and beginning an operation
involving up to 50,000 troops against a few thousand GAM guerrillas.(1)
The offensive marks the failure of a series of efforts
by successive Indonesian governments since the fall of Soeharto in 1998
to reach a negotiated settlement to the problem of Acehnese separatism.
It is also a victory for the Indonesian military (Tentara
Nasional Indonesia (TNI)), which consistently opposed any policy
of conciliation towards GAM. Despite TNI's failure to defeat the separatist
movement for more than twenty years, it has continued to argue that
it could achieve victory if only it was allowed a free hand.
This brief provides a background analysis of the conflict
in Aceh and examines the motivations of the three key players in that
latest turn of eventsTNI, GAM and the government of President
Megawati. It discusses the question
of whether GAM should be understood as part of Islamic extremism in
the region and the implications of the problem of Aceh for Australia's
relations with Indonesia.
The conflict in Aceh is not a recent story but originates
in the politics of the long struggle against Dutch colonialism and in
the distinct history of the province. Although the modern Republic
of Indonesia covers the entire
territory of the former Dutch East Indies whose
history extends back to the 16th century, Dutch control over many parts
of the archipelago was actually only quite brief. Bali,
for example, was not conquered until 1906 after a long and bitter struggle.(2)
Aceh held out for thirty years and was not colonised until the first
decade of the 20th century, after which time the Dutch faced
sporadic resistance right up to the time of their surrender to the Japanese
in 1942.(3)
Aceh's sense of separation from the colonial experience
of other regions, such as Java and the 'spice islands' of eastern Indonesia,
reinforced a tradition of distinct identity. Aceh was one of the first
regions to be converted to Islam (from the 13th century or even before)
and the Kingdom of Aceh
had a long history of commercial and cultural links with the Islamic
world of the Middle East and India.
Today it retains a deeper attachment to Islamic culture than most parts
of Indonesia.
During the Indonesian war of independence against the Dutch in the late
1940s, Acehnese forces played a key military role, but many Acehnese
nationalists had a different, more Islamic-inspired vision of a post-independence
Indonesia
than the mainly secularist leaders based in Java. But despite discontent
about both the lack of autonomy for Aceh and about the non-Islamic character
of Indonesia
as a whole, the region became part of the unitary Republic
of Indonesia in 1950.(4)
A few years after independence, opposition to the constitutional
and political character of the Indonesian state began to re-emerge in
Aceh, reaching a peak when President Sukarno
began to ally himself with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in the
late 1950s. Non-Islamist leaders in Aceh were angered when the separate
province of Aceh
was abolished and merged into North Sumatra.
From 1953, a movement to overthrow the central government developed
in Aceh, linking up with the Dar'ul Islam rebellion, a diverse collection
of insurrectionist Islamic groups throughout parts of Sumatra,
Sulawesi and Java. The leaders of this rebellion
'had no intention of separating the region from Indonesia
but envisaged it as an autonomous province'.(5) By 1962,
however, Dar'ul Islam, both within and outside Aceh,
had been defeated by central government military campaigns. The movement
had been politically undermined when the central government granted
Aceh 'special region' (daerah
istimewa) status in 1959, providing for local autonomy over religion,
customary law and education.(6)
Aceh was free of conflict for many years, but problems
started when President Soeharto's
New Order regime began to intensify centralised rule from Jakarta.
Islamic organisations across Indonesia
were subject to suspicion or outright repression and there was little
room for local political forces. Matters worsened when the discovery
of large petroleum resources in northern Aceh in 1971 brought an even
tighter grip over the local economy and politics by outside elements.
Although the province experienced rapid economic growth from petroleum
production, many Acehnese felt they received no benefit or even were
worse off when they lost land and forest resources to make way for industrial,
plantation and forestry developments. Newcomers from other regions of
the country were seen as taking most new jobs, while generals, politicians
and well-connected businessmen from Java creamed off all the profits.
The regrowth of separatist feeling led to the foundation
of the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)) in 1976 by Hasan
M. di Tiro,
a member of the old Acehnese aristocracy.(7) For many years
GAM was fairly ineffective as a political or military force, but repressive
actions by TNI gradually led more Acehnese to its banner. In 1989 GAM
re-emerged with a campaign of attacks on police and military installations
and government facilities.
The Soeharto government's response to the resurgence
of separatist activities was to launch a military offensive. From 1989,
Aceh was declared a Military Operations Zone (Daerah Operasi Militer (DOM)), an acronym which became synonymous
with a time of violence and unrestrained and unaccountable military
actions. There were allegations of atrocities and human rights abuses
by both sides in the conflict. During the ten years of the declaration
of a DOM, from 1989 to 1998, most estimates put the number of people
killed in the conflict at around 2000 mostly civilians. Reports of
intimidation, beatings, rapes and torture were numerous and an unknown
number of people 'disappeared' or were otherwise unaccounted for.(8)
The population of Aceh (numbering about 4.5 million out of Indonesia's
total population of 210 million) has been left traumatised and desperate
for some sort of solution.(9)
When President Soeharto
resigned in May 1998, there was a general tide of sentiment that the
abuses of his New Order regime should be exposed and recompense made.
Soeharto's successor, President B.
J. Habibie,
lifted the DOM in August 1998. The new democratically elected President,
Abdurrahman Wahid,
called for a new approach of reconciliation and negotiation. Soon after
he came to office in October 1999 he established an Independent Commission
to Investigate Violence in Aceh and a number of junior officers and
soldiers were convicted over some cases of killings of civilians. Both
Habibie and the then Minister of Defence and head of TNI, General Wiranto,
apologised for abuses committed by members of the security forces. Megawati
Sukarnoputri, both as Vice President
and President (from July 2001), strongly supported a new approach to
the Aceh problem, once famously declaring that 'not one drop of the
people's blood' should be shed in the province.(10)
On the Acehnese side, the end of the New Order created
expectations not only that they would be freed from the heavy hand of
TNI but that they would be given the opportunity to express their true
feelings about the future of their province. In November 1999, a huge
rally in capital of Aceh,
Banda
Aceh, claimed to be over a million
people, called for a referendum on independence and an end to military
violence.(11) The referendum in East Timor
in August 1999 was taken up as a precedent for Aceh. The freer political
environment also lead to the growth of non-government organisations
(NGOs), some campaigning for a referendum, and others taking up human
rights, humanitarian and developmental issues in the province. Many
of these entered into direct competition with GAM, whose actual support
amongst the Acehnese remains unclear. Opposition to the central government
and TNI is not necessarily the same as support for GAM.
President Wahid's
government undertook two important initiatives in 2000 and 2001: the
'Humanitarian Pause' of June 2000 and the passing of a law for 'Special
Autonomy' for Aceh in July 2001. The
Humanitarian Pause was a ceasefire, a three-month accord designed to
both break the cycle of fighting and to allow the distribution of humanitarian
assistance to the people of Aceh. The Pause was extended several times
in different forms over the next year. The Special Autonomy law provided
for the introduction of certain elements of sharia(12)
law in local courts, increased oil and gas revenues for the province
and direct election of the province's Governor and district heads in
2004.
The ceasefire, together with the Special Autonomy law,
created the impression outside the province that real progress was being
made. The reality on the ground, however, was that most Acehnese concluded
that little had changed. Although the Humanitarian Pause initially brought
a lull in fighting, both TNI and GAM seemed to regard it as little more
than an opportunity to regroup and re-arm. Outside observers and local
NGOs reported that violence had returned to the pre-Pause levels by
the end of 2001.(13)
Special Autonomy, at least as it was structured under
the 2001 law, garnered little support because the law did not provide
for immediate provincial and gubernatorial elections, thus denying the
much called-for expression of Acehnese opinion. Instead, it allowed
the increased resource revenue to pass into the hands of the corrupt
provincial government still dominated by pro-Jakarta elements from Golkar,
the old ruling party. The law did not clarify how sharia
law would be implemented or how Special Autonomy would be implemented
in conjunction with the decentralisation of government that was occurring
across Indonesia.
Critically, the law did not allow for the establishment of local political
parties,(14) thus providing no incentive for GAM to participate
in a legal political process or for new non-GAM elements to emerge.(15)
The gradual disintegration of the Humanitarian Pause
and the failure of efforts to revive the peace process during 2001 and
2002 came about because neither side appeared to be really committed
to a negotiated settlement. Nevertheless, through the mediation of the
Geneva-based Henri Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC), the
parties were brought together again for a series of talks during 2002.
With the assistance of three foreign 'wise men'(16) a Cessation
of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) was signed in Geneva
on 9 December 2002. The first intention
of the COHA was to bring about another ceasefire, but the two parties
also agreed to a framework that was designed to lead to disengagement
and disarmament and to negotiation over the issues of principle at stake.
After a two-month confidence-building stage, a series
of 'peace zones' was to be established, where GAM would 'begin a phased
placement' of its arms and from which TNI would be 'relocated'.(17)
A team of monitors (50 nominated by the Indonesian government, 50 by
GAM and 50 from overseas by HDC) would oversee the process. A so-called
All-Inclusive Dialogue of all elements of Acehnese society would 'review'
the law on Special Autonomy. Each side proved to have a different understanding
of what was meant by 'review', including whether there could be discussion
about the principles of either autonomy or independence. The elections
in 2004 would lead to a democratically elected provincial assembly and
provincial government.
Most reports indicate that the COHA was greeted with
enthusiasm and relief amongst the population in Aceh and the level of
violence dropped dramatically.(18) By the end of January
2003 the first 'peace zone' was established and more were being planned.
Many of the peace monitors had been deployed throughout the province
and their reports on violations of the ceasefire placed pressure on
both parties to keep to the Agreement.
By February 2003, however, Indonesian military leaders
began accusing GAM of failing to meet the deadline for the 'placement'
of arms and of using the ceasefire to strengthen their forces. They
also said the GAM's holding rallies for independence violated the principle
of acceptance of the law on Special Autonomy. Armed clashes between
the two sides began to increase again, with each side blaming the other
for violations of the ceasefire. GAM was accused of recommencing their
attacks on government facilities and personnel and TNI was accused of
attacking alleged GAM supporters, either directly or through armed militias.
In April 2003, 50 people were reportedly killed during that month alone
and most of the monitors had withdrawn from the field into the provincial
capital due to threats to their security.
By the end of April
the situation was reaching a crisis, both on the ground in Aceh and
in negotiations in Geneva.
When talks planned to take place in Geneva
on 28 April failed to materialise, the Indonesian government gave GAM
a two-week deadline to initiate negotiations or face a renewed military
offensive. The Security Coordinating Minister, Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono,
declared that peace talks could continue only if GAM accepted the law
on Special Autonomy and guaranteed to surrender its weapons. Last minute
talks in Tokyo on 18 May
failed to produce a compromise and the next day Megawati signed an emergency
decree and TNI began an all-out operation against GAM.
The COHA of December 2002 was seen by many observers
as the last chance for a peaceful resolution to the Aceh conflict. Given
the gravity of what was at stake for all sides, why did they seem to
treat the Agreement so lightly? What were the motivations and calculations
of the three main parties, TNI, GAM and the Indonesia
government, in signing the COHA and in their subsequent actions?
Leading elements in the Indonesian military have consistently
argued for a forcible solution to the problem of Aceh and were opposed
to the COHA because they saw the Agreement as implicit recognition of
forces which threatened the territorial integrity of Indonesia. Since independence, TNI has regarded itself
as the guarantor of the country's unity and has seen what is usually called
the 'security approach' as the only appropriate response to separatism,
whether in Aceh, East Timor, West Papua
or elsewhere. One senior officer, Lt. Gen. Kiki
Syahnakri, attacked the COHA as allowing
GAM a 'golden opportunity' to campaign 'nakedly and freely'. He said that
unless negotiations were strengthened by 'military action and security
operations' they would fail to reach a final solution.(19)
TNI's opposition to a negotiated settlement goes to
the heart of the military's efforts to maintain a key role for itself
in post-Soeharto Indonesia.
The public image of TNI suffered a major blow from perceptions of human
rights abuses before and during the fall of the New Order in 1998. Since
that time its political power has been reduced, with the removal of
its representation in parliament (to take effect after the 2004 election)
and the greatly diminished role of military officers in the civil administration
at all levels of government. Separation of the police from the military
was also a setback for TNI because it meant that responsibility for
internal security was officially transferred from the army to the police.
The President's declaration of a state of emergency, in which the military
took back the internal security role in Aceh for three months, was seen
as demonstrating that only TNI had the operational capability to deal
with internal disturbances and to defend the unity of the nation.
But TNI also has direct material interests in maintaining
a presence in Aceh. The official budget for TNI has never covered more
than about a third of the military's real operating costs.(20)
The remainder is made up through officers' official and unofficial involvement
in private and government-owned business activities and by contributions
from wealthy business people. These activities also include illegal
trade, unofficial levies on local interests and sheer extortion. Regions
of conflict like Aceh have regularly provided the best cover for the
more lucrative (and usually corrupt and illegal) fund-raising activities.
An operational posting is highly desirable for many TNI officers because
it presents the best opportunities for personal enrichment. It is an
open secret that TNI officers have been involved in illegal logging,
drug smuggling, extortion and other illegal activities in Aceh.(21)
When progress in the COHA faltered in March 2003 and
GAM stuck to its determination to push for independence rather than
autonomy, TNI began to undermine the agreement by orchestrating demonstrations
against the international monitors and by making preparations for renewed
military action. There were a number of attacks on monitors, their vehicles
and offices, attacks which were linked to anti-independence militias
organised by the military.(22) As the military began moving
reinforcements into Aceh, with Megawati's apparent approval, it became
clear that proponents of a negotiated solution were being 'overwhelmed
by the demands of the military hardliners for a military offensive'.(23)
In the eyes of most TNI officers, the COHA was a first
step along the road to legitimacy and recognition for GAM and ultimately
to a repetition of the disaster and humiliation of East Timor.
For them, the last time civilian politicians were allowed to handle
a problem of separatism was in East Timor in
1999, Indonesia
lost a province which the military had shed its blood to defend. The
resumption of military operations is thus, for the generals, a return
to the 'proper way' to deal with threats to the country's territorial
integrity.
While there has been a sense of separate identity amongst
the Acehnese for many decades, GAM and its insurrectionary strategy
for independence has only become a leading force in the province's politics
in recent years. It is not entirely clear how many people actually support
GAM: sentiment in favour of some sort of special status for Aceh does
not always translate into support for independence or support for GAM
itself. But heavy-handed repression by TNI and the corrupt reputation
of its officers has been GAM's best source of recruitment. The military's
pursuit of a one-track strategy of armed conflict has also had the paradoxical
effect of making it impossible for non-GAM political parties or non-government
organisations (NGOs), including human rights groups, to operate in Aceh.
There was a flowering of NGOs during the relatively peaceful period
after the fall of Soeharto in 1998, but the resurgence of conflict has
provided a cover for both TNI and GAM violence against non-aligned organisations.
While the military regards any independent Acehnese activist as subversive,
GAM often sees them as competitors. The polarisation of Acehnese politics
has played directly into GAM's hands, helping it to pose as the only
voice of the people of Aceh.
From GAM's point of view, the COHA relieved the intense
pressure of TNI repression, while providing an opportunity to strengthen
the movement's domestic and international legitimacy. GAM has never
been a very effective military force, and while TNI has never been able
to eliminate it completely, open armed confrontation has always left
GAM on the defensive and confined to scattered and remote areas. GAM
has also faced the problem that its ill-disciplined and factionalised
membership has sometimes been indistinguishable from the bandits and
stand-over men who have exploited the chaos and weakened GAM's standing.
The official leadership of GAM is a group of exiles
centred around its founder, di Tiro, who have lived
in Sweden
for many years and taken out Swedish citizenship.(24) But
the exile leadership is not always able to make Aceh-based supporters
implement agreements the leaders make in Geneva.
Some GAM groups seem to have given only half-hearted support to the
COHA, while other splinter factions have carried on with their normal
activities of attacking the operations of the central government, clashing
with the security forces and levying 'taxes' on local and foreign businesses.
GAM's implicit strategy seems to have been to provoke
an ill-disciplined TNI into atrocities which would rally the Acehnese
population to its banner and bring international attention to the struggle.
The military's behaviour has certainly hardened attitudes towards the
central government and roused support for a referendum on independence,
but GAM's factionalism and its own record of human rights abuses raises
questions about whether the majority of Acehnese see it as fit to be
an alternative government.
On the world stage, GAM has almost completely failed
to internationalise the issue. Ideas that Aceh could become the focus
of world opinion like East Timor have foundered
on the reality that the province has always been internationally recognised
as a legitimate part of Indonesia.
Unlike East Timor, the UN has never questioned Indonesian rule and the
independence movement has never had the sympathy of a foreign government
(as East Timor did with Portugal) nor the support of popular opinion
in a neighbouring country (such as Australia), or in the West in general.(25)
Since the US
declaration of its 'War on Terror', GAM's image has also struggled to
distinguish itself from Islamic extremism and terrorism.
Although GAM's image has suffered from being associated with Islamic
fundamentalism, it would be a mistake to think of the organisation as
part of an international extremist movement. GAM is one expression of
a long tradition of Acehnese regional identity which has led to recurrent
outbreaks of opposition to central government policies. And because
Islam plays a key role in Aceh's distinct self-identity, any Acehnese
separatist movement is certain to have an Islamic character, just as
Catholicism became a rallying point for pro-independence East Timorese.
Political movements in Aceh have always maintained an uneasy balance
between regional and religious sentiment. GAM's push for independence
is motivated by more than religion, in the same way as the Timorese
would surely have revolted against Indonesian rule even if they were
Muslims.
GAM has no history of association with foreign Islamic
fundamentalist movements and there is no evidence of links with Southeast
Asian Islamic terrorist networks such as Jema'ah Islamiyah, let alone
Al Qaeda.(26)
There are reports that GAM has rebuffed efforts by JI to build links
with it.(27) Some GAM operatives did receive training in
Libya
in the 1980s and 1990s, but the connection was opportunist on GAM's
part and has not been maintained.(28) It should not be forgotten
that the largest Islamic extremist group in Indonesia,
Laskar Jihad, has close links with TNI, GAM's arch-enemy.
Equally, GAM's alleged Islamic zeal has won it no sympathy
from mainstream Islamic religious leaders in Indonesia.
Leaders of the mass Islamic organisations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and
Muhamadiyah, along with independent Islamic figures, have united in
their condemnation of GAM for threatening the unity and integrity of
Indonesia.
There is also no sign that support for Jakarta's
war against GAM is any less popular amongst Muslims than other religious
groups.
When President Megawati
Sukarnoputri signed the decree of
19 May 2003 declaring a state of emergency
in Aceh, many commentators saw the move as part of her efforts to build
popular support in the lead up to Indonesia's
national elections in April 2004. Recent constitutional amendments will,
for the first time, allow Indonesians to choose their President in a
direct popular election, rather than the previous system of indirect
election through an electoral college dominated by the parliament.(29)
All indications show that there is little or no popular
sympathy for Acehnese separatism and that support for operations by
the security forces is strong, despite awareness of TNI's appalling
human rights record. Megawati was almost certainly prepared to reverse
her previous stand and allow a return to the old 'security approach'
because it might boost her image as a strong leader and defender of
national unity. But Megawati's unleashing of the military is symptomatic
of problems within her administration that are deeper than mere political
opportunism.
The efforts to find a peaceful solution in Aceh failed
to get beyond the initial stage of a ceasefire because they did not
tackle the wider issues of how to address the grievances of the Acehnese
and re-integrate the province into the mainstream of national political
life. Beyond an immediate end to insecurity and fear of extortion, intimidation
or death at the hands of TNI, GAM or militias, the people of Aceh want
recognition of past abuses and a serious attempt to bring justice to
the perpetrators. There is also widespread suffering from loss of employment
and economic opportunity, the collapse of government services and shortages
of basic items like food, clothing and medicine, all of which has been
brought about by over a decade of conflict. Finally, there is the long-standing
feeling that the unique history and culture of Aceh has been suppressed
by successive regimes in Jakarta
and that the resources of the province have been exploited for the exclusive
benefit of non-Acehnese. Meaningful (as distinct from token) autonomy
is widely seen as the only way for Aceh to exist within the framework
of the Republic of Indonesia.
Neither the Wahid nor the Megawati administrations
appear to have had the capacity to develop longer-term policy strategies
or the persistence to see existing efforts to completion. The most promising
initiative, the law on Special Autonomy for Aceh, had little effect
on the reality of life in Aceh because, as mentioned above, it did not
supplant the old Jakarta-centric power elites and provided few avenues
through which non-GAM forces could build a political alternative based
on acceptance of autonomy within Indonesia.
Most national leaders apparently thought that the mere passing of the
law would satisfy all reasonable demands. In the face of constant military
opposition and GAM's insistence of raising the question of independence,
the government caved into the force which has the most to gain by continued
conflict, the army, and reverted to the strategy that has demonstrably
failed since the 1980s.
This rather gloomy assessment reflects the fact that
progress in many urgent areas of governmental reform has been disappointingly
slow since the end of the Soeharto regime. The Megawati government has
been unwilling to confront vested interests, including a corrupt and
dysfunctional legal and judicial system and a civil service that is
driven by patronage and corruption, to the detriment of the delivery
of basic services like education, health and infrastructure. In the
case of Aceh, this weakness in both policy formation and implementation
meant that a version of regional autonomy, while well motivated in principle,
failed in practice because the apparatus of state could not actually
deliver the promised benefits. Because of a failure to bring about a
complete withdrawal of the military from civilian politics, the government
was susceptible to pressure from the TNI and was afraid to confront
the issue of past TNI abuses in Aceh. With attempted negotiations not
producing immediate results, the military was again being permitted
to dominate policy on the problem of Aceh.
Public opinion in Australia
has registered very little awareness of the issue of Aceh, especially
when compared to the intense interest in East Timor
or even West Papua. There is no sense of historical
connection with the people of the province and no history of Australia
involvement in the politics of the province. There has been no discernible
movement of refugees from Aceh to Australia
and geographical separation minimises the likelihood that this might
occur in the future.
This also reflects the general paucity of international
attention on Aceh. No foreign government has expressed any strong interest
or concern about events in the province and the governments of the Association
of South East Nations (ASEAN) have expressed understanding or support
for Jakarta's campaign to
defeat the rebels. This is partly due to the traditional ASEAN policy
of non-intervention in other members' affairs, but especially because
many ASEAN governments themselves face some kind of separatist movement.
Only international human rights groups such as Ammesty International(30)
and Human Rights Watch(31) have an extended history of observation
of the conflict.
For these reasons, the Australian government has not
come under any great domestic pressure to take up the Aceh issue, or
to express opposition to the actions of the military. The government's
reaction to the military offensive on 19
May 2003 was muted. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexander
Downer and the Minister for Defence,
Robert Hill,
both expressed hopes for a return to negotiations, but emphasised that
the matter was an internal Indonesian affair.(32) Mr
Downer also singled out for condemnation
the 'violence perpetrated by the separatist movement'.(33)
The Opposition called for UN intervention in the conflict and the minor
parties made comparisons with East Timor.(34)
But with such positions receiving little response amongst the public,
the government's subsequent statements became even more supportive of
the Indonesian government. While attending an ASEAN meeting in Cambodia,
Mr Downer
defended the Indonesian military against foreign criticism, attacked
'terrible acts of violence' by GAM and praised Indonesia
for allowing journalists and human rights groups into the province.(35)
Australia's
leverage over the Indonesian Government on internal issues, especially
one involving separatism, is virtually zero, as a result of continuing
resentment in Jakarta about
Australia's
role in East Timor. Perceptions of Australian
government triumphalism after the intervention in East Timor
remain especially galling to Indonesian leaders.(36) In the
words of Dr Harold
Crouch of the Australian
National University,
'The UN and Australia
are mud in Indonesia's
eyes because of East Timor'.(37) In
any case, the Australian government's desire to maintain close cooperation
with Indonesia
and other Southeast Asian countries in the fight against terrorism particularly
limits the government's capacity to take any action which the Indonesian
government would interpret as internal interference or as undermining
its struggle against violent groups within its borders.
Although the Australian Government has little or no
room to influence events in Aceh, the issue is of serious concern to
Australia's
interests. In addition to human rights and humanitarian concerns, Jakarta's
handling of the matter reveals ongoing weaknesses within the Megawati
administration. The bolstering of the military's political position
is a blow against reform and symptomatic of the administration's incapacity
to overcome the vested interests that profit from the status quo. This
is not only dangerous for Indonesia's
future as a stable democracy, but it also threatens its economic prospects
by deterring domestic and international investment. As a close neighbour
and economic partner, Australia
has a direct interest in Indonesia's
emergence from its continuing political and economic crisis. The conflict
in Aceh is both a part of that crisis and ill-handling by the Indonesian
Government is exacerbating the crisis still further.
The collapse of the COHA and the return of open armed
in Aceh could be seen as a product of failures of judgement on both
sides. On the government side, despite the singular efforts of the Security
Affairs Coordinating Minister, Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono,
the Cabinet as a whole failed to consider the wider issues involved
in a peace plan, especially the time and delicate handling that would
need to be invested in it. On the other hand, GAM overplayed its hand
by expecting that a ceasefire would bring favourable international attention
to its cause, by blatantly using the ceasefire to bolster its political
and military strength and by a mixture of intransigence and prevarication
in negotiations. The situation was made doubly difficult, of course,
because the Indonesian military openly opposed the plans of the civilian
government, lobbied for an end to the negotiations within the highest
levels of government and provoked confrontations on the ground within
Aceh.
Although TNI has won a political victory within the
Indonesian state and has regained responsibility for defeating separatism
in Aceh, most observers consider there is little chance that the military
will be any more successful now than it has been in the past. GAM has
been forced into a military retreat and appears to be suffering significant
casualties. But like all guerrilla movements, it is successful so long
as it is not completely eliminated. GAM is relying on the assumption
that the conflict will cause civilian deaths and that the Acehnese population
will blame TNI for both these deaths and for the tension and disruption
to normal life brought by the military campaign. And TNI appears to
be vindicating this assumption with vigour. The cycle of violence in
Aceh since 1989 has progressively turned the people of Aceh against
the central government and the current situation can only intensify
this.
The only realistic scenario under which the current
military offensive might succeed is if it were combined with a strategy
of undermining the political position of GAM through a restoration of
government services within the province and one allowing the people
of Aceh to develop alternatives to GAM. A two-track strategy of this
kind would require TNI to keep its forces under tight discipline and
to facilitate humanitarian relief. It would only work if there were
elections for a new provincial administration in the near future and
the law on Special Autonomy was redrafted with strong Acehnese involvement.
Unfortunately, however, there is no indication that
either TNI or the central government sees the physical retreat of GAM
as an opportunity to supplant the movement politically. A mentality
of regarding assertions of regional identity as a threat to national
unity tends to cast suspicion on any independent Acehnese organisation
and on the people of the province as a whole. Special Autonomy as defined
by Jakarta is unlikely to
win credibility within Aceh and Jakarta
is unwilling to trust Aceh to develop its own formula for autonomy within
the Republic of Indonesia.
In any case, the corruption and administrative incapacity of the Indonesian
state apparatus, at both the national and provincial level, would weaken
any effort to re-establish effective government. The relapse into the
'security approach' appears to be born of a sense of exasperation and
resignation amongst the civilian politicians. The fact that it appears
to be popular with the Indonesian electorate makes it doubly tempting.
But the reality is that attempts to enforce a military solution will
probably bring nothing but an extended cycle of violence.
1.
Estimates for the military strength
of GAM vary from 10002000 to up to 5000.
2.
The recent image of Bali as a relaxed and friendly tropical paradise
is in stark contrast to the Dutch picture of the Balinese as vicious,
blood-thirsty warriors which dates from their long struggle to suppress
Balinese resistance to Dutch domination. Adrian Vickers, Bali: A
Paradise Created,
Periplus, Hong Kong, 1996.
3.
The independence of the Kingdom
of Aceh was protected by the 1824 Treaty of London,
under which Britain and the Netherlands divided their spheres of influence in the Indies. The Netherlands began its long and violent campaign to subdue
Aceh in 1873, after Britain had signed a new treaty with the Dutch in order
to forestall an increase in US influence in the region.
4.
In 1949, the Dutch were briefly
able to negotiate a settlement which created a federal Republic of the
United States of Indonesia (RUSI), which gave a degree of autonomy to
various parts of the archipelago. This arrangement lasted less than
a year, with President
Sukarno declaring the centralised, unitary Republic of Indonesia in 1950.
5.
Grayson Lloyd, 'Indonesia's Future Prospects: Separatism, Decentralisation
and the Survival of the Unitary State', Current Issues Brief no. 17, Parliamentary Library, 19992000. http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/CIB/1999-2000/2000cib17.htm#demands
6.
Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, The
Republican Revolt: A Study of the Acehnese Rebellion, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1985.
7.
Di Tiro's original organisation founded in 1976 was
called the Aceh-Sumatra Liberation Front (ASNLF). The ASNLF was quickly
crushed by the military, but was revived several years late in the form
of GAM.
8.
Human Rights Watch, Indonesia: The
War in Aceh, August
2001, Vol. 13, No. 4 (C), p. 8.
9.
Hasballah
Saad, 'Generations of Acehnese born amid war' Jakarta Post, 13 May
2003. International
Crisis Group (ICG), Aceh: A Fragile
Peace, 27 February 2003, p. 10.
10.
Kompas, 30 July 1999.
11.
The total population of Aceh
is 4.5 million.
12.
Islamic law.
13.
ICG, Aceh: A Fragile Peace, op. cit., p. 2.
14.
Under Indonesia's 1999 electoral laws, political parties cannot
contest either national or provincial elections unless they are organised
at a national level, with members and branches in a majority of provinces.
This provision was specifically designed to prevent the emergence of
provincial and regional parties which, it was feared, would fan separatist
sentiment.
15.
ICG, Aceh: A Fragile Peace, op. cit., p. 4.
16.
Former Thai foreign minister,
Surin
Pitsuwan, retired US General, Anthony Zinni, and former Yugoslav foreign minister and ambassador to Indonesia, Budimir Loncar.
17.
ICG, Aceh: A Fragile Peace, op. cit., pp. 810.
18.
ICG, Aceh: A Fragile Peace, op. cit., p. 10.
19.
Kompas, 25 February 2003, cited by Edward Aspinall & Harold
Crouch, 'The Peace Process in Aceh', Paper presented
to the East-West
Center, 30 April 2003. The author would like to express appreciation
to Dr Aspinall and Dr Crouch for allowing access to this draft paper.
20.
R. William Liddle, 'Indonesia's army remains a closed corporate group', Jakarta Post, 3 May 2003.
Bob Lowry, 'Indonesian Armed Forces (Tentara
Nasional Indonesia-TNI)', Research
Paper, no. 23, Parliamentary Library 199899.
21.
'Trade your M16 for 16M[illion]',
Van Zorge Report on Indonesia,
vol. V, no. 8, 6 June 2003, p. 11.
22.
Aspinall & Crouch, 'The
Peace Process in Aceh', op. cit., p. 28.
23.
Aspinall & Crouch, 'The
Peace Process in Aceh', op. cit., p. 30.
24.
The protection accorded the
GAM leadership by Sweden has been a cause celebre in the Indonesian media, with government and parliamentary
figures attacking the Swedish government and even calling for a withdrawal
of diplomatic relations. The Swedish government's response is that the
GAM members have not committed any crime under Swedish law and have
the same rights as all Swedish citizens.
25.
Unlike Aceh, East Timor was never part of the colonial empire of the
Dutch East
Indies which comprised the territory of the independent
Republic
of Indonesia. The eastern half of the island of Timor was colonised by Portugal and three hundred years of Portuguese occupation
implanted cultural, linguistic and religious traditions that were distinct
from the experience of the Dutch-held territories. The Republic of Indonesia, of which Aceh was a part, was formed in 1949-50,
but East Timor
remained a Portuguese territory until the latter's departure in 1975.
The enforced incorporation of East
Timor into
Indonesia in 1976, after the invasion of 1975, was never
recognised by the UN. Australia was one of the few countries that extended
de jure recognition, although the incorporation
was implicitly recognised by most countries with which Indonesia had major economic or diplomatic dealings.
26.
Chris Wilson, 'Indonesia and Transnational Terrorism' Current Issues Brief, no. 6, Parliamentary
Library, 200102.
27.
Sidney
Jones, International Crisis Group, 'Update on Aceh' USINDO Open Forum,
11 June 2003
28.
The regime in Libya could not be described as Islamist and it has
provided training to a wide range of nationalist and separatist groups,
including the Irish Republican Army.
29.
For an analysis of the previous electoral system
and the politics of Megawati's election as President see: Stephen Sherlock, 'Indonesia's Dangerous Transition: The Politics of Recovery
and Democratisation' Research
Paper no. 18, Parliamentary Library, 199899. http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/1998-99/99rp18.htm
Stephen Sherlock, 'Indonesia's New President: Continuity, Change and the
Problems Ahead', Current Issues
Brief, no. 10, Parliamentary Library, 19992000. http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/CIB/1999-2000/2000cib10.htm
Stephen Sherlock, 'Indonesia's New Government: Stability at Last?', Current Issues Brief, no. 4, Parliamentary Library,
200102, http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/CIB/2001-02/02cib04.pdf
30.
http://web.amnesty.org/library/eng-idn/news
31.
http://www.hrw.org/asia/indonesia.php
32.
Sydney Morning Herald,
21 May
2003, p. 9;
Canberra Times,
21 May
2003, p. 2;
The Age, 21 May 2003, p. 13.
33.
Sydney Morning Herald,
21 May
2003, p. 9.
34.
Canberra Times,
20 May
2003, p. 2.
35.
Sydney Morning Herald,
19 June
2003, p. 11;
The Age, 20 June 2003, p. 13. In fact, the Indonesian government
has introduced strict controls over the entry of journalists and human
rights observers into the province. The government has also emulated
the US by controlling media coverage by 'embedding'
journalists amongst operational military forces. Following a TNI attack
on a German tourist couple, resulting in the death of one and the injury
of the other, all tourists have been banned from entering Aceh.
36.
Anthony Milner, 'Balancing "Asia"
against Australian Values', in James Cotton & John Ravenhill, The
National Interest in a Global Era, OUP, 2001.
37.
The Australian, 21 May 2003, p. 7.
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