Current Issues Brief 15 2000-01

Queensland Election 2001

Scott Bennett, Politics and Public Administration Group
Gerard Newman, Statistics Group
3 April 2001

Contents

A postscript to the Queensland election-the by-election in Ryan
Endnotes
Appendix 1: Voter support 1998-2001
Appendix 2: One Nation MLAs elected 1998
Appendix 3: Results
Table 1 Legislative Assembly: State Summary
Table 2a Legislative Assembly: First Preference Votes, District Summary - Number
Table 2b Legislative Assembly: First Preference Votes, District Summary - Per cent
Table 3 Legislative Assembly: District Detail
Table 4 Legislative Assembly: Two Candidate Preferred Vote
Table 5 Legislative Assembly: Electoral Pendulum
Table 6 Legislative Assembly By-elections 1998-2000
Table 7 Legislative Assembly Elections 1950-2001

Major Issues

Premier Beattie's first Queensland Government lived on a knife edge after narrowly winning office in 1998. It had won 44 of the 89 Assembly seats, with a first preference vote of only 38.9 per cent. The Government's position was eased slightly when it gained an additional seat in a December 1998 by-election. Because of the 'electoral rorts' affair, Beattie came under pressure to call an election early in 2001. Although he could have waited until September 2001, Beattie set the Queensland election date for 24 February 2001: 'It may not be in my best interests for there to be an early election but it is in the best interests of Queenslanders'. The election was conducted using electoral boundaries drawn up during 1998 and 1999.

Labor's biggest asset appeared to be Peter Beattie. Beattie had long enjoyed a high opinion poll rating among the six Premiers, and it showed no sign of waning prior to the election.

Neither the Nationals, led by former Premier Rob Borbidge, nor the Liberals, led by David Watson, had been able to make any long-term inroad into Labor's support. This position did not seem to alter during the election. Between 1998 and 2001, Borbidge's approval rating remained significantly below that of the Premier.

The Coalition parties were not free from tensions. The Nationals were split over the issue of dealing with One Nation for their preferences, and some appeared to be angling for Borbidge's position. Meanwhile, a number of Liberals were publicly less than impressed with the performance of their leader, David Watson.

A key factor seemed to be the re-emergence of One Nation as a genuine electoral force in the Western Australian election held a week earlier, where the party gained a Legislative Assembly vote of 9.6 per cent, together with three upper house seats. One Nation appeared likely to do at least as well in Queensland. Although it had only 39 nominations, this was enough for the major parties to be concerned about their possible impact on particular electorate results.

Labor's campaign was dominated by the Premier, with the general instruction to voters of 'Just vote 1'. His opponents were disunited and appeared to have trouble in making themselves heard, and, in fact, on a number of occasions Borbidge seemed to be conceding victory to Labor.

The result of the election was never in doubt on election night-the ABC commentary team had given the result to Labor within minutes of the start of the television coverage of the counting. Labor won 66 of the 89 seats, the Coalition won 15 (Nationals 12, Liberals 3), One Nation won 3 and 5 independents were successful, two of whom were MLAs who had won their seats under the One Nation banner in 1998.

Among the interesting figures:

• Labor's 66 seats represented 74.2 per cent of the Legislative Assembly, equalling the party's best-ever result in 1935
• the National Party vote was its lowest on record. Its 12 seats equalled its lowest total gained in 1944, and the earlier figure was in an Assembly of 62
• the Liberal Party's vote was its lowest since the party first contested Queensland elections in 1950. Its three seats represent the lowest number it has ever won in the Assembly
• the combined major party (ALP/LIB/NP) vote of 77.4 per cent was the second lowest on record in a Queensland election
• the Greens and Australian Democrats improved their electorate-level vote, but in the electorates they both contested, no Democrat finished ahead of a Green rival
• in 25 of 89 electorates (28.1 per cent) one of the final two candidates in the count did not come from a major party. For this reason the term 'two-party-preferred' is not used in this paper, and the term 'two-candidate-preferred' is used in its place
• in fifteen electorates, the One Nation candidate was one of the final two left in the count when the two-candidate-preferred vote was ascertained, and
• in the electorate of Nicklin the final two candidates in the two-candidate-preferred count were an independent and a One Nation candidate-no major party candidate remained at that stage. As far as can be ascertained, this is the only instance of this occurring since preferential elections have been given full counts in each electorate.

Among the relevant factors explaining the result, the strength and unity of Labor's leadership, the lacklustre Coalition effort in Opposition, the disunity in Coalition ranks and the intrusion of federal factors are highlighted.

The paper concludes with a brief summary of the subsequent Commonwealth by-election in Ryan.

Introduction

The 2001 Western Australian and Queensland elections produced two remarkable results that helped turn a time of apparent electoral calm into one of electoral volatility. In the West, the Court Coalition Government failed in its bid for a third term. Labor gained its largest haul of seats since the election of 1911, winning office in a fashion that few commentators had believed likely. ⁽¹⁾ One week later, Queensland voters increased Labor's Legislative Assembly numbers to a level that equalled the party's best-ever result in that State, achieved in 1935. It was also remarkable that many voters maintained the clear decline in support for major parties in Australian elections that is increasingly being commented upon by many observers. These two elections, together with the by-election for the Commonwealth electorate of Ryan, have left parties and observers wondering what this might presage for the forthcoming Commonwealth election.

The Beattie Government-living on a knife edge

In June 1998 the Beattie Government had won office as a minority government only after securing the support of the independent MLA for Nicklin, Peter Wellington. The Independent MLA for Gladstone, Liz Cunningham, gave Labor support on their budget and confidence issues. Premier Beattie's first Government lived on a knife edge. It had won only 44 of the 89 Assembly seats, with its first preference vote of 38.9 per cent being over 11 per cent lower than the party had secured under the leadership of Wayne Goss in 1989. The Government's position was eased slightly in December 1998, when a by-election for the seat of Mulgrave held by Pauline Hanson's One Nation (hereafter referred to as 'One Nation'), was won for the Government by Warren Pitt. Premier Beattie now had just over half of the Legislative Assembly seats.

The parliamentary advantage thus gained was overshadowed by the various crises that battered the Government, including:

• ongoing battles with the Australian Workers' Union over various union and Labor Party issues
• controversy over Lang Park football stadium being chosen as the venue for a new 60 000 seat sports stadium
• the Netbet affair where the Government awarded an online gambling licence to a company linked to ALP figures, including former deputy leader, Bill D'Arcy.
• the resignation, trial and gaoling of Bill D'Arcy for child sex offences. This included public criticism of the size of D'Arcy's superannuation payout, and
• the decision of accident-prone Treasurer, David Hamill, not to recontest his seat at the next election.

The Premier's major problem, however, seemed to be the emergence of the 'electoral rorts' affair. This became national news with the gaoling in August 2000 of Karen Ehrmann, a former State Labor candidate, for electoral fraud. ⁽²⁾ In the aftermath of this, a Queensland Criminal Justice Commission inquiry was established to investigate Labor Party electoral practices from 1993 to 1997, while the Commonwealth Parliament's Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters also began an inquiry.

As information emerged concerning doubtful practices that appeared to be long entrenched in the Labor Party, Premier Beattie moved to cauterise the problem. Changes were announced to the way in which Labor would henceforth hold party pre-selections, and over thirty party workers were forced to leave the party, pushed by Beattie's chosen 'hard-headed son-of-a-bitch', Terry Mackenroth. ⁽³⁾ Of greater possible significance electorally, were the forced resignations of three MLAs, including Deputy Premier, Jim Elder (Capalaba), Grant Musgrove (Springwood) and former State Secretary, Mike Kaiser (Woodridge). Beattie made a strong effort to suggest that rorting was not widespread, and that swift action would eradicate the problem from the party:

The success of this tactic was felt to be uncertain, but the Bulletin , at least, was impressed, describing the Premier's handling of the affair as 'masterful' and the weeding-out of members as 'brutal'. ⁽⁴⁾

Despite the effort to lessen the impact of this issue, the Premier seemed increasingly under threat. Wellington's withdrawal of support for the Government, and the Premier's closing down of Parliament, seemed symptomatic of a government whose days were numbered. The Leader of the Opposition, Rob Borbidge, accused the Premier of avoiding facing the public and called for an election to 'clear the air'. Eventually Borbidge got his way.

Queensland goes to the polls

Although he could have waited until as late as September 2001, Beattie set the Queensland election date for 17 February 2001. Interestingly, by the time that the date was settled, the opinion poll standing of the Premier and his party was higher than might have been expected if the electoral rorts affair was to be a factor in the election outcome. The Premier's reneging on an earlier promise of going full term seemed not likely to hurt his chances, though he suggested the early election was not necessarily the best outcome for his party: 'It may not be in my best interests for there to be an early election but it is in the best interests of Queenslanders'. ⁽⁵⁾

The 2001 Queensland election was conducted using electoral boundaries drawn up as a consequence of a redistribution in 1998 and 1999. About three-quarters of all electorates had their boundaries altered: ⁽⁶⁾

• the number of seats remained at 89 (the 2001 election was the sixth since this number was established prior to the 1986 election)
• two Brisbane seats (Chermside and Kedron) held by the ALP, were merged to form Stafford
• two western seats (Western Downs and Crows Nest) held by the National Party, were merged to form Darling Downs
• Gaven was created on the Gold Coast, and Glass House created on the Sunshine Coast
• nine other electorate names were new: Algester (based on Archerfield), Kawana (Mooloolah), Mudgeeraba (Nerang), Nanango (Barambah), Pumicestone (Caboolture), Robina (Merrimac), Southern Downs (Warwick), Stretton (Sunnybank) and Yeerongpilly (Yeronga).

Among long-standing Members of the Parliament who were not re-contesting were Tony Elliott (Cunningham, NP, MLA since 1977), Len Stephan (Gympie, NP, 1979), Brian Littleproud (Western Downs, NP, 1983), and David Hamill (Ipswich, ALP, 1983, former Treasurer under Beattie). Russell Cooper, former Premier (September-December 1989) (NP, Crows Nest, 1983) was also departing. Since the 1998 election, former Labor Ministers, Bob Gibbs (Bundamba, 1977) and Bill D'Arcy (Woodridge, 1977) had also left the Parliament, the former to take up a government position in Los Angeles, the latter to face a court case and 14 years in gaol.

The major party contest

Labor

As has become the norm in modern State elections, the Premier dominated the Labor campaign to such an extent that it was difficult to tell who else was in the Government team. Premiers such as Wran (NSW), Bjelke-Petersen (Qld) and Kennett (Vic) have all done so, and Beattie was acknowledging both the way the media covers modern elections, as well as his apparent 'clean-skin' standing in regard to the 'electoral rorts' controversy. The Beattie website (Beattie2001.com) with its linking of only the Premier's name with the election, was a reminder of the Kennett-dominated site (jeff.com) during the 1999 Victorian State election. ⁽⁷⁾ In such a climate, there was little focus upon policies, even though the parties kept making announcements throughout the campaign. Professor John Wanna has noted that as the parties said very similar things about policy, the effect was 'to neutralise policy as a campaign issue'. ⁽⁸⁾ Beattie did spend a lot of time criticising the Commonwealth Government for its policies that, he claimed, were hurting his State. This also is part and parcel of State elections, for Premiers often believe an anti-Commonwealth stance does them no harm in the ballot box.

Since 1992, Queensland elections have used optional preferential voting (OPV). To cast a valid vote, only a first preference vote need be marked, though the voter may mark more than a single preference. The Labor Party decided that its how-to-vote instructions to voters would be simple: 'Just vote 1'. In other words, Labor voters should give the party their first preference, and no preferences should be given to any other candidate. In seeking to take advantage of OPV in this way, Labor sought to minimise the impact of the exchange of preferences that might favour Coalition candidates. It also hoped that many One Nation voters would stop after casting a first preference. The Coalition parties tried to make an issue of Labor's tactic, but it seemed to be no more controversial with voters than when the Wran Labor Government followed the same tactic in the New South Wales election of 1981.

The Coalition

The Opposition was not united in its efforts. The parties issued various policies, but seemed distracted by internal problems:

• the issue of whether or not to put One Nation ahead of Labor on how-to-vote cards divided the Nationals. Despite the existence of much support for putting Labor last, early in the campaign Rob Borbidge claimed that no Nationals would put One Nation ahead of Labor. His position in the party was weakened, however, by his being forced to accept that many National candidates would ignore his words. As David Moore, the party's candidate in Mundingburra, put it, directing preferences to the ALP ahead of One Nation might work in Brisbane, but 'makes no sense in the north'. Despite at least 19 of the party's 50 candidates eventually favouring One Nation, State Director, Ken Crooke, denied that party members were at odds with their leader, but Borbidge himself saw this as a setback. ⁽⁹⁾
• Borbidge probably earned no friends within the Coalition for his acknowledgment on several occasions that the Labor Party would probably win the election. In talking of the Premier, he was even prepared to acknowledge: 'you have got to concede his [i.e. Beattie's] popularity'. ⁽¹⁰⁾
• these matters were presumably among the reasons for the emergence during the campaign of media stories suggesting that various Nationals were angling for Borbidge's position as party leader. ⁽¹¹⁾
• the One Nation preferences issue also caused tensions between many Nationals and the Liberal Party. The Liberals had been hurt by their dalliance with One Nation in the 1998 Queensland election, and the party's leader, David Watson, was determined that the same would not occur on this occasion: 'we believe the cancer of extremism has to be resisted' ⁽¹²⁾
• the Liberal leadership was criticised for its less-than-dynamic campaigning and was said to be in some danger of becoming 'an ineffectual sideshow to public life in Queensland' ⁽¹³⁾
• by early 2000 the three-cornered contest, that running sore of Coalition relations, had re-appeared, with each party expressing its opposition to the other's intentions ⁽¹⁴⁾
• if these problems were not enough to seriously weaken the Coalition, the leaders at times sounded desperate in their attacks on the Labor Party. In one example that was redolent of the Bjelke-Petersen period, Borbidge promised that a Coalition government would 'go back to basics on core issues and core values'. To make his point, he claimed that Queensland schools needed to teach about the career of Winston Churchill rather than that of Ho Chi Minh. Borbidge also followed the federal Coalition's line that a vote for One Nation was a vote for Labor, a claim that may have been too subtle for voters, who were also hearing National politicians calling for an exchange of preferences with One Nation. Watson picked up the same theme, asserting that the no preference policy was Labor 'climbing into bed' with a 'racist rabble'. ⁽¹⁵⁾

On balance, if there was support to be won or lost because of party campaigns, the advantages seemed to lie with the Labor Party.

Minor parties

As is usual, the focus of the media was largely upon the three major parties. In such a setting, it was therefore difficult for the minor parties, including the Greens and Australian Democrats, to gain a hearing. Only in the final week of the campaign did Pauline Hanson, fresh from One Nation's upper house success in Western Australia, manage to break through the domination of the media enjoyed by Labor, National and Liberal Parties. After the election, the leader of the City Country Alliance (CCA), Bill Feldman, acknowledged the difficulties that are usually experienced by the minor players in an election:

Despite the late entry of One Nation into the contest, its Western Australian performance persuaded some commentators that One Nation voters, past and present, would be crucial to the election outcome. ⁽¹⁷⁾

The result

The result of the 2001 Queensland election was never in doubt on election night-the ABC's Antony Green had given the result to Labor within minutes of the start of the television coverage of the counting. Labor won comfortably (for full figures, see Appendix 3).

Source: Electoral Commission of Queensland

For the first time a substantial number of women was elected to the Legislative Assembly. From having the second lowest Assembly percentage of women in any State Parliament (18.3 per cent), Queensland now has the highest: 37.1 per cent. In the Queensland ALP Caucus 40.9 per cent are women.

The major party vote

In the last two Queensland elections (1998 and 2001) the combined major party (ALP/LIB/NP) vote has averaged 73.8 per cent. By contrast, the eight elections between 1974 and 1995 averaged 95.2 per cent. Thus continues the decline in the major party vote that has been noted elsewhere. ⁽¹⁸⁾ In 25 of 89 electorates (28.1 per cent), one of the final two candidates in the count did not come from a major party. For this reason, the term 'two-party-preferred' is not used in this paper, with the term 'two-candidate-preferred' being used in its place. Perhaps the most startling detail of all, however, came in the electorate of Nicklin. In this contest, the final two candidates in the two-candidate-preferred count were an independent and a One Nation candidate-no major party candidate remained. This is possibly the only instance of this occurring in a Commonwealth, State or Territory election in the past 50 years.

Labor

Labor's primary vote of 48.9 per cent was 10 percentage points higher than its 1998 return. The 18 Labor victories since the election of 1912 have produced an average vote of 48.8 per cent. The Government's 66 seats represent 74.2 per cent of the Legislative Assembly, equalling the party's best-ever result, achieved in a house of 62 after the election of 1935. Labor contested all 89 electorates. According to the ABC's Antony Green, Labor's vote rose over 11 per cent in South East of the State, with eight of nine Gold Coast electorates garnered. Its vote climbed 9.5 per cent in regional cities and over six per cent in rural areas. The party won unlikely victories in electorates such as Indooroopilly in Brisbane and Burdekin in the North. ⁽¹⁹⁾

A possible measure of the electoral rorts issue was Labor's vote in the three electorates where the sitting members had felt it necessary to resign after the Shepherdson Inquiry had begun its work. In Springwood, Labor's 1998 vote of 38.2 per cent jumped to 45.6 per cent. In Woodridge, Labor's 1998 vote of 51.7 per cent had risen in the 2000 by-election to 56.5 per cent, and it climbed further in 2001 to 57.3 per cent. Only in Capalaba, was Labor's 1998 vote (54.9%) not sustained. Analysis of the returns, however, suggest that Labor's 43.6 per cent in that electorate was due largely to the campaigns of two strong independents, whose combined vote totalled more than 29 per cent. In two Townsville electorates, where the rorts affair come to prominence, the Labor vote rose by 7.4 per cent in Townsville, and 4.2 per cent in Mundingburra .

National

The National Party won 14.2 per cent of the Queensland vote, though it contested only 45 electorates. In the previous election it contested one fewer electorate and won one per cent more of the first preference vote. The 14.2 per cent is the party's lowest State-wide vote on record. Its 12 seats equalled its lowest total gained in 1944, and the earlier figure was in an Assembly of 62. It now holds just 13.5 per cent of the Assembly seats. The fact that the party finished behind a One Nation candidate on first preferences in 11 electorates is another measure of the decline in the fortunes of a party that dominated non-Labor politics for so long. Among Nationals to be defeated were Allan Grice (Broadwater), Rob Mitchell (Charters Towers) and Doug Slack (Burnett).

Liberal

The Liberal Party's effort of 14.3 per cent was 1.8 per cent lower than in 1998-when it also contested three fewer electorates. In fact, the vote was the party's lowest since it first contested Queensland elections in 1950. Its previous lowest return had been 14.9 percent in 1983. Its three seats represent its lowest number in the Assembly (it had won 9 in each of 1989, 1992 and 1998), and opened the question of whether it ought to receive the type of resource allocation in Parliament normally granted the largest parties. The Liberals lost Santo Santoro (Clayfield), John Goss (Aspley) and Denver Beanland (Indooroopilly), and for some days it was thought that its leader, David Watson, and former leader, Joan Sheldon, had been defeated. Each eventually managed to retain their seat.

Pauline Hanson's One Nation

For a long time, the severe implosion in the One Nation Party had suggested that it would have difficulty in restoring the electoral credibility that it had earned in 1998. The figures in Appendix 1 indicate that for much of the period 1999-2000 many voters were unprepared to express their support for the party. Before the end of the first year of the Parliament, six of the eleven MLAs had left the party, and the other five resigned in late 1999. Some of these chose to sit as members of the newly-formed City Country Alliance, some declared their independence from parties, and one left the Parliament. The members cited the absence of democratic and accountable structures within the party as the main reason for their defection, though Wanna has also pointed to clashes of personality and claims of dishonesty within the party (for a summary of the fate of the eleven One Nation MLAs elected in 1998, see Appendix 2). ⁽²⁰⁾ In addition to these defections, the party was found to have been fraudulently registered at the time of the 1998 election. After a struggle to raise funds, more than $500 000 of public funding given to One Nation by the Electoral Commission of Queensland was repaid.

A key factor in the re-emergence of One Nation as a genuine electoral force seems to have been the Western Australian election held a week earlier. The party contested this State on the back of its 10.4 per cent vote in the 1998 Senate election. Spurred on by a flurry of publicity for Pauline Hanson when she campaigned around that State, the party's Legislative Assembly vote was 9.6 per cent. In the Legislative Council, the party did even better, gaining 9.9 per cent and three upper house seats, two more than was managed by the National Party (2.9 per cent of the vote).

In Queensland, the party had been deregistered for some time. Its late re-registration, shortly before the deadline for the nomination of candidates, meant that only 39 nominations were lodged, but it was a large enough number for the major parties to be concerned about their possible impact on particular electorate results. It certainly produced much discussion about deals for the party's preferences. Hanson stated that the party would direct preferences on a seat-by-seat basis, though it was also likely to direct preferences against sitting members, as it had done in Western Australia.

With only 39 candidates, 40 fewer than in 1998, it was unrealistic to imagine that One Nation's remarkable 22.7 per cent of the State-wide vote would be repeated. However, despite the small number of candidates, and the party' late entry into the campaign, it managed to average 20.3 per cent of first preferences in those 39 electorates, and secured the election of three candidates in Gympie, Lockyer and Tablelands. One indication of the breadth of support for One Nation can be seen in the fact that in fifteen electorates, the One Nation candidate was one of the final two left in the count when the two-candidate-preferred figure was established.

Overall, though, its vote per seat did decline. In 1998, its first preference vote averaged 25.4 per cent in the seats it contested, and it topped 40 per cent in three seats (Barambah, Maryborough, Tablelands). In 2001, however, it could manage just three electorates with a vote in excess of 30 per cent. ⁽²¹⁾ Newman has drawn attention to the fact that One Nation's 1998 vote was higher outside of Brisbane than in the capital, and this was also the case in 2001. ⁽²²⁾

One Nation first preferences were higher than Labor first preferences in five electorates, were higher than Liberal first preferences in seven electorates, and higher than National Party first preferences in eleven electorates. With the National and Liberal votes falling in 2001, presumably Labor was the major beneficiary of the fourteen per cent drop in the One Nation State-wide figure.

The City Country Alliance

Five of the former One Nation party MPs contested the election as members of the CCA, along with 20 other candidates. Bill Feldman offered to campaign 'alongside' One Nation candidates who had similar goals to CCA, but Hanson rejected the offer. ⁽²³⁾ None of the CCA candidates was successful, including its five sitting members. Although the CCA averaged only 8.5 per cent in the electorates it contested, Jeff Knuth managed 20.9 per cent in Burdekin, David Dalgleish 18.5 per cent in Hervey Bay and Feldman 15.5 per cent in Pumicestone. Six other candidates received at least 10 per cent of first preferences.

How much combined support was there for One Nation and the CCA? Because they did not contest all electorates, this is impossible to answer, but even with this limitation, we can at least point to their aggregate vote being 11.1 per cent State-wide. Some electorates revealed a great deal of support: in the 11 electorates contested by both, the average first preference vote was 31.9 per cent. In Lockyer (46.3 per cent) and in Burdekin (40.6 per cent) the One Nation/CCA vote topped 40 per cent. Even in Ipswich (22.2 per cent) and Cunningham (22.9 per cent) over one-fifth of voters cast ballots for one or the other.

Greens versus Australian Democrats

One contest which some people claimed had national overtones, was that between the Greens and the Australian Democrats, despite the fact that both had been almost invisible during the campaign. The Greens ran 31 candidates, a drop of 15 on the 1998 figure, while Democrat candidates almost disappeared, with just six candidates compared with 42 in the previous election.

Both parties improved their electorate-level vote, but overall the Greens overshadowed the Australian Democrats. The Green average first preference vote was seven per cent (4.4 per cent in 1998), while the Democrats averaged 4.8 per cent (3.4 per cent in 1998). In the Brisbane electorates of Mount Coot-tha (11.9 per cent) and Indooroopilly (10.1 per cent) the Green vote topped 10 per cent. In the six electorates contested by both, the Greens comfortably won the head-to-head contest, leading the Australian Democrats in all, with 8.3 per cent to 4.8 per cent of first preferences.

These two parties were very much on the fringe of the election action, and their votes were tiny by comparison with those already discussed, but it has not stopped partisans from drawing federal implications from them. Just how much basis the claims may have is a matter of interpretation. Senator Bob Brown (Tas, TG), for instance, spoke of the Green vote being a good springboard for the Greens winning a Senate seat in Queensland. ⁽²⁴⁾ Assuming that this State result is relevant to the forthcoming Commonwealth contest, it can be noted that in 1993 Dee Margetts won a Western Australian Senate position with a Green first preference vote of 5.5 per cent, while Brown himself entered the Senate on a Tasmanian Green vote of 8.7 per cent. A 2001 figure in this range might leave the party in a tight fight with the Australian Democrats and One Nation for the final Senate seat later in the year.

For their part the Australian Democrats talked down the Green claim. National Campaign Director, Jim Downey, noted that the party's State election results were invariably higher than in Commonwealth elections, while Meg Lees noted that the Australian Democrats had never had 'much of a profile in Queensland state politics'. ⁽²⁵⁾ The Democrats won seats in each of the last two Queensland Senate contests with first preference votes of 13.2 per cent (1996) and 7.8 per cent (1998).

Independents

Six MLAs stood as independents. Apart from Liz Cunningham (Gladstone) and Peter Wellington (Nicklin), former One Nation parliamentarians, John Kingston (Maryborough), Dorothy (Dolly) Pratt (Barambah, now Nanango), Shaun Nelson (Tablelands) and Ken Turner (Thuringowa) had left their party and had sat as independents (see Appendix 2). There were also a number of prominent local independent candidates, including Toni Bowler, Murray Elliott (both Capalaba), Sno Bonneau (Barron River) and Ray Hopper (Darling Downs).

In the event, Cunningham, Wellington, Kingston and Pratt (the latter supported by Joh Bjelke-Petersen) were all re-elected. Only Kingston (33.5 per cent) had a struggle, with the other three all well ahead on first preferences. Cunningham won her third election, this time with an absolute majority, her vote having risen on the two occasions she has re-contested the electorate. These four were joined by local dairy farmer, Ray Hopper, in Darling Downs, an electorate that the National Party had expected to win.

Voting methods factors

Preference flows

In Western Australia, One Nation's policy of targeting sitting members hurt the Liberal Party more than Labor, though not by a large margin. Newman's figures suggest that Labor may have done marginally better (51.8 per cent) than the Coalition (48.2 per cent) from One Nation preferences. ⁽²⁶⁾ This suggests that One Nation might not be able to control its preferences as tightly as the more experienced parties. The Electoral Commission of Queensland is now not releasing full count figures until at least June 2001, so this paper is unable to make any assessment of either One Nation or Green preference flows.

'Just Vote 1'

For a similar reason, it is not possible at this stage to make any statistical analysis of the Labor Party's 'Just vote 1' tactic, though John Wanna has called it 'the most impressive and masterful tactic of the campaign', and 'a major turning point'! ⁽²⁷⁾

Three-cornered contests

Three-cornered contests produce a lot of heat in Coalition relations, particularly when the Liberal Party is seen to be intruding in an electorate that the National Party regards as one of its natural constituencies. The claim that such contests essentially do more harm than good is hard to sustain, for it is possible to find many electorates where the tactic has probably increased the total vote for the Coalition parties-which is the original reason for the emergence of this tactic many years ago. Worthington has noted, for example, that in the 1996 Western Australian election, the tactic certainly aided the parties, and helped the Liberals win the seat of Ningaloo from the ALP. ⁽²⁸⁾ At the same time, one reason why Labor introduced OPV in Queensland was to lessen the impact of three-cornered contests. Coalition opponents therefore argue that three-cornered contests are pointless if OPV is the voting method. It is also said that they can cause more trouble than they are worth, on the grounds that they are often interpreted in the media as an indication of Coalition tensions.

During 2000 the Liberal and National Parties had argued over this issue, especially in relation to the electorates of Albert, Cunningham and Springwood, with neither prepared to back down. In the event, three-cornered contests occurred in six electorates, including these three. Because the two parties performed so weakly across the State, however, it is not possible to argue that the tactic had any deleterious impact on the overall Coalition effort. In Cunningham, the one electorate where the Coalition had a realistic chance of winning, the Nationals actually took the electorate, so that the three-cornered tactic certainly did not prevent this victory. ⁽²⁹⁾

Three-cornered contests

Source: Electoral Commission of Queensland.

The verdict

Government stability

Within six months of narrowly winning office in 1998, the Premier had the satisfaction of seeing his Government's support climb approximately ten percentage points in opinion polling conducted by Newspoll. Apart from a brief period in late 2000 when the party seemed to lose support, though not its lead over the Coalition parties, Labor maintained remarkably even support across the State (see Appendix 1). To a large extent, the 2001 Labor victory may have been won by early 1999. Certainly Newspoll's Sol Lebovic believed that the electorate had made up its mind well before polling day. ⁽³⁰⁾ In summary, it was Labor's very healthy and continuing support that was probably the key factor to explaining the electoral outcome.

This was probably aided by the electorate's perception of Premier Beattie, who appeared to be Labor's biggest asset. Before the announcement of the premature election, the Premier had attempted to suggest that there had been a sea-change in the party. Beattie did his best to convince voters that the 'rorters' had been expelled, and that electoral rorting was a thing of the past. In January he travelled to Barcaldine to stand under the Tree of Knowledge, a place of importance to Labor's Queensland history, where he announced a series of reforms to Labor's internal processes that he labelled 'a rebirth, a renewal, a fresh start for the Labor Party'. ⁽³¹⁾ Beattie also embarked on a two week 'listening tour', where he claimed to have met 'real people'. He explained that this was the only way he could break a commitment to Peter Wellington that he would not go to an election before May 2001. ⁽³²⁾ Despite the Australian labelling such a claim as 'rubbish', suggesting that it was more to do with seeking to protect his team from the dangers associated with the recall of Parliament, it seemed not to hurt his party's chances. It may well have been seen as the Premier trying to do the correct thing by his party and the public. ⁽³³⁾

Labor's electoral position seems therefore to have been given strength by a perception of Beattie as likely to give stability and safety for Queensland, unlike the divided Coalition (see below). The Courier-Mail could see weaknesses in the Government's performance, but the newspaper may well have summed up the prevailing mood in its last words on the Premier:

The Courier-Mail believed, therefore, that Labor had earned voter support. ⁽³⁴⁾ The Townsville Bulletin expressed a similar view, though it noted that this was as much by default as through any clear strengths that Labor possessed. ⁽³⁵⁾ Quite remarkably, Beattie even entered the election with the ninety-year old Joh Bjelke-Petersen praising his efforts. ⁽³⁶⁾

The issue of government stability was possibly given emphasis by the uncertainty caused by the late entry of One Nation into the campaign. A number of observers, including Antony Green, claimed that as voters were leaving Labor for independent candidates, 'the most likely result is a hung Parliament'. ⁽³⁷⁾ Even such experienced commentators as John Wanna (Griffith University) and Paul Reynolds (University of Queensland) believed the result would be close. Wanna spoke of a possible five seat margin to the ALP, while Reynolds surmised that Labor's seeming comfortable margin prior to One Nation's re-emergence was now likely to have disappeared, though he still predicted a narrow Labor win. ⁽³⁸⁾ Peter Botsman of the University of Queensland predicted a Coalition victory. ⁽³⁹⁾ In such an atmosphere, the leadership issue and the question of governmental stability might have helped persuade doubtful voters. Both Beattie and Borbidge warned of the dangers of minority government and the need for stability-if voters were concerned about this, presumably Beattie gave the better chance of delivering it.

Ineffectiveness of the Opposition

The continued strong voter support for Labor meant that neither the Nationals nor the Liberals was able to make any obvious inroad into Labor's support. A number of newspapers spoke of the challenge this gave the parties, especially as their leadership team was seen as having been decidedly 'lacklustre' in its performance since the 1998 election. The Coalition was also criticised for its policy inertia. The Townsville Bulletin , for instance, took it to task for 'more than two years of sitting on its hands'. ⁽⁴⁰⁾ Even when Labor's popularity seemed to waver in late 2000, the Newspoll findings (Appendix 1) suggested that the apparent shifting from the Government that occurred in late 2000, may have been voters by-passing the Coalition as they looked for alternatives to the major parties.

As a measure of the Opposition's ineffectual performance, Borbidge's approval rating remained significantly lower than that of the Premier throughout the period between the two elections. In a poll published three days before polling day, the advantage was shown starkly, when Newspoll suggested a 'satisfaction with leaders' gap of 40 percentage points in Brisbane (69:29 per cent). Even outside of the capital, among voters not normally friendly towards Labor, there was a gap of 34 percentage points (54:20 per cent). ⁽⁴¹⁾ Anecdotal evidence suggested voter disenchantment with Borbidge's negativity since losing the Premiership. At the announcement of the election date, he seemed to suggest that such criticism had hit home, when he promised voters:

By then it was probably far too late for him to reach voters.

Coalition disunity

The ineffectiveness of the Opposition was probably emphasised by the obvious tensions that existed within and between the Coalition parties. Apart from Borbidge's frustration over One Nation preferences, there was also some doubt about Borbidge's keenness for the leadership of his party. He had even flown a flag at one stage that he was thinking of contesting the Commonwealth electorate of Moncrieff, where the Liberals' Kathy Sullivan was rumoured to be retiring at the next Commonwealth election. The Courier-Mail expressed its amazement that, in effect, Borbidge 'saw fit to remind voters how good the Beattie Government's chances of another term are'. ⁽⁴³⁾ Nothing came of this, but it did not suggest a leader who was totally focused on the State election.

A number of Liberals were publicly less than impressed with the performance of their own leader, David Watson. Public expressions of disappointment with his leadership had been expressed during 2000 by MLAs Bruce Davidson (Noosa) and Santo Santoro (Clayfield), and in June 2000 Santoro stood down from the frontbench in protest at his leader's labelling of him as 'an ego-driven prima donna'. Elsewhere, Watson criticised 'certain colleagues...[who] lacked political credibility and acumen', and he antagonised federal colleagues by his refusal to defend Commonwealth Government petrol excise policy. ⁽⁴⁴⁾ Eventually, dissident Liberal voices were sufficiently loud for former Northern Territory Chief Minister and Queensland Liberal Party President, Paul Everingham, to call for federal intervention to 'clean up' the Queensland division. ⁽⁴⁵⁾

As long ago as 1977, Professor Don Aitkin made the claim that, 'There can be no doubt that the electorate prizes unity in its parties ... and that it is alert to any signs of party or cabinet dis unity'. ⁽⁴⁶⁾ Academic research and the experience of political practitioners would still agree with Aitkin's words. The central message of the figures in Appendix 1 is that the Beattie Government remained ahead of the Coalition partners for the entire time between the 1998 and 2001 elections. If the Premier's personal popularity was a factor, so, we might suppose, was the generally difficult relationship between the National and Liberal Parties and the intra-party bickering. As the Courier-Mail lamented in mid-2000, while the parties argued, 'the main business of government goes on without much effective contribution from them'. ⁽⁴⁷⁾ The position had not altered by polling day 2001.

Federal factors

Unpopular Commonwealth governments can make life very difficult for State parties of the same political colour. It is impossible to establish with any precision just how much this might influence voting behaviour, but it is commonly accepted that often this has to be considered as a possible factor in accounting for a State election result. ⁽⁴⁸⁾

In both the Western Australian and Queensland elections in 2001, claims were made that federal factors were of great importance. In the West, for instance, former Liberal Deputy leader, Colin Barnett, blamed the Commonwealth Government for the defeat of the Court Government, singling out Commonwealth Minister for Forestry and Conservation, Wilson Tuckey, himself a Western Australian, for particular criticism. ⁽⁴⁹⁾ Overall, however, it is clear, that there were a number of local factors that seem to have played a greater role than the popularity or otherwise of the Howard Government. ⁽⁵⁰⁾

The argument is easier to sustain in the case of Queensland, where a number of Coalition politicians certainly believed that federal factors were important. These included the Liberal Party's State Director, Graeme Jaeschke, who stated that there was no denying that federal issues helped the Labor victory, while National Senator, Ron Boswell, believed federal issues were 'at play'. Doug Slack, MLA of 14 years standing, stated 'There's no doubt if there had been a Labor government I would still be member for Burnett'. ⁽⁵¹⁾

Three aspects, at least, may have been important in giving some substance to these views:

• The election occurred at a time when the media was running many stories about the fall in voter support for the Howard Government. It was therefore clearly to the Premier's advantage to confuse federal and State matters, and some Queenslanders may have been influenced by the Premier's criticism of what he described as the unpopular policies of the Howard Government. In particular, Beattie emphasised how significant the constant increases in the price of petrol was for Queenslanders. To keep this issue in the public eye, he even nominated 10 February as a 'day of protest' against petrol prices, and he asked voters to send the Howard Government a message on the issue by voting for Labor. ⁽⁵²⁾ The fact that only two weeks before the election the latest fuel excise rise occurred, therefore played into Beattie's hands. Apart from petrol prices, Senator Boswell nominated national competition policy, and the Business Activity Statement involved in GST reporting, as important for Queensland voters. ⁽⁵³⁾ The victory in Darling Downs of the independent, Ray Hopper, was said to have been caused by opposition to dairy deregulation, something that was believed to have been a factor in a number of seats in the State. ⁽⁵⁴⁾
• The figures in Appendix 1 indicate a sharp fall in Liberal support shortly before the election. What might have caused this sudden drop? Although the local Liberal Party earned criticism for its lack of vigour, this had been a constant media refrain virtually since the 1998 election. Whether or not such criticism had any impact on voters is difficult to establish, but it seems unlikely that it would, of itself, have brought about such a sudden fall. On the other hand, it is plausible that there may have been something of a 'by-election factor' involved in voting in the Queensland State election-voters could have hit out against Commonwealth policies, despite this being a State election. Was this akin to the defeat of the Tonkin Government in Western Australia in 1974, or the unexpected near-defeat of the Dunstan Government in South Australia in 1975, when unpopular Whitlam Government policies seem to have affected the final vote in these two State elections? ⁽⁵⁵⁾
• The entry of Pauline Hanson into the campaign seemed guaranteed to keep federal issues prominent in voters' minds. Three days prior to polling day, Ms Hanson probably ensured that would be the case when she launched her party's policies in the Sunshine Coast electorate of Caloundra. Her speech was basically a criticism of the Commonwealth Government: its leader, its Treasurer, the sale of Telstra, the failure to send boat people back from whence they came, and the GST. Referring specifically to the Howard Government, she asserted she was 'there to get rid of the bastards'. ⁽⁵⁶⁾ Whether or not she was correct, such a tactic probably helped justify an anti-Coalition vote for some voters. At least one Queensland newspaper felt it necessary to warn voters that they must 'put into perspective' Hanson's 'list of federal grievances'. ⁽⁵⁷⁾

A postscript to the Queensland election-the by-election in Ryan

It would not normally be relevant to refer to a Commonwealth by-election in a study of a State general election. However, the proximity of the by-election (17 March) to the State election (17 February), the large movement of voters to the ALP in both, and the widespread assumption that together they could be read as presaging another large movement of voters in the forthcoming Commonwealth election, all suggest that a brief note on the by-election is not out of place in this paper.

Ryan was created in 1949. Between then and 2001 it had just two representatives, both Liberal.The retiring member, John Moore, had held the seat since 1975. After the 1998 election it was the fifth-safest Coalition electorate in Queensland. In that election, Moore's first preference margin over Labor was 20.1 per cent, and 19.0 per cent in two-party-preferred terms. It was therefore unlikely to fall to Labor in normal circumstances. In fact, Labor's first response to the by-election was to question the wisdom of even running a candidate. According to the Leader of the Opposition, the by-election was unlikely to be an indicator 'about anything much at all'. ⁽⁵⁸⁾

Despite this early uncertainty, Labor eventually decided to contest the by-election. By the time the campaign began, the change in the fortunes of the parties saw Labor's candidate, Leonie Short, campaigning as if the seat was winnable. The Liberals' Bob Tucker certainly did not assume the result was another inevitable Liberal victory. Tucker's campaign included the mail-out of a personal video detailing his background and ideas for the future. As was the case with the State election, Tucker's discussion of such local-level matters as local crime and congestion of local roads, showed yet again how issues cross borders in a federal system-presumably this was intended to contrast him with the performance of the previous sitting member. The blurring of federal boundaries was probably exaggerated by the regular presence of Premier Beattie in the campaign.

Tucker finished 3398 first preferences ahead of Short. Labor gained a first preference swing of 8.3 per cent; the Liberal slippage was 7.2 per cent. Short eventually won the electorate on preferences, and by 0.4 per cent in two-party-preferred terms. Labor's share of the two-party-preferred vote had increased by 9.7 per cent. ⁽⁵⁹⁾

Most observers put the result down to a loss of popularity of the Howard Government rather than a positive acceptance of the Opposition's policies. The research and strategic marketing firm, Marketshare, analysed swing voters, and noted certain 'key factors associated with the primary swing to the ALP':

• where persons in the construction industry (ranging from engineers to labourers) comprised 5.5 per cent of all workers in a voting area, the swing exceeded 8 per cent
• such a movement of votes was exacerbated in any area with a high proportion of retail employees.
• age seemed important, so that the proportion of 35-55 year-olds 'was positively related to the ALP swing', and
• households in the $50 000-65 000 bracket 'were most likely to swing from Liberal to Labor'.

These findings seemed to suggest a loss of support for the Government among such categories of voter. ⁽⁶⁰⁾

Some observers, including the Prime Minister, described the Ryan result as a 'protest' vote, an interpretation implying that such voters were likely to 'come back to us in the general election'. ⁽⁶¹⁾ By contrast, others put the emphasis on Ryan as 'the beginning of the end' for a government whose days were numbered. In fact, a lot of assertions (and counter-assertions) were made about whether the Ryan result could be called another 'Bass' (1975) or 'Canberra' (1995), by-elections that gave what could later be seen as a clear indication of the terminal position of the Whitlam and Keating Governments, respectively. ⁽⁶²⁾ Such speculation is essentially futile before the event, for it would only be possible to so label Ryan if the Coalition actually lost the 2001 election. One possible protest factor that did not feature in the post-election discussion was the controversy over the Liberal Party's preselection for Ryan, which had caused public protest over the barring of a prominent candidate from the preselection ballot.

Minister for Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business, Tony Abbott, was one observer who did not believe Ryan to be any type of harbinger of inevitable electoral doom. In an address to the Sydney Institute three days after polling, he spoke of what he described as three forces in Australia 'that were driving a sense of crisis':

• 'a long standing popular disquiet' that was a product of both the pace of change in Australian society, as well as the 'human cost of economic re-structuring'
• 'elite resentment of the Howard Government's social conservatism', and
• the propensity for the Opposition to seize on bad news 'to talk Australia down'.

Giving a voice to these factors was the 'bad press' that was 'almost a "given" of Australian politics'. The result, according to the Minister, was that people who are 'essentially conservative', had become 'Labor's polling booth fodder'. The message implied in Abbott's analysis was that the Government's position could be restored, providing it could succeed in combating what he labelled the Labor- and media-inspired 'culture of despair'. ⁽⁶³⁾ Although disagreeing with much of Abbott's analysis, Leader of the Opposition, Kim Beazley, seemed to be in agreement about the value of Ryan as a predictor of the 2001 election: 'I don't read into this an ultimate election victory for the Labor Party'. ⁽⁶⁴⁾

Another possible factor was resentment at an unnecessary by-election. Writing in the Canberra Times shortly before polling day, Malcolm Mackerras asserted that a Liberal defeat would be 'the result of growing public anger at politicians resigning their seats'. ⁽⁶⁵⁾ He offered no evidence for this view. However, Newman's recent work on by-elections has suggested that voters may well react differently if a House of Representatives by-election is caused by death, rather than by a resignation. Between 1949 and 2001, the average two-party-preferred swing away from the party holding the electorate has been 2.5 per cent after a death, and 4.9 per cent after a resignation. In the past twenty years, indeed, the latter figure has been 5.8 per cent, suggesting an increasingly jaundiced electorate reacting to by-elections that could have been avoided. ⁽⁶⁶⁾ The 'voter resentment' thesis may have also been lent weight by Prime Minister Howard's claim that he had agreed to the resignation of John Moore only after commissioned polling had suggested that the Liberals would retain Ryan easily. ⁽⁶⁷⁾ If that polling was accurate, it suggests a massive shift of support in a very short time.

Whether or not Ryan is eventually seen as another 'Bass' or 'Canberra', it is likely to be remembered as a by-election that was part of a much bigger picture than just the replacement of a single MHR. Whatever the fate of the Howard Government, the State elections in Western Australia and Queensland, plus the Ryan contest, are likely to be regarded as indicators of a general loss of support for the national Government. An editorial in a rural Queensland newspaper indicated how likely this was, when, even before a vote had been cast in Ryan, the writer could assert that the Prime Minister would:

Endnotes

1. Glenn Worthington, 'Western Australian Election 2001', Current Issues Brief no. 10, 2000-01 , Department of the Parliamentary Library, Canberra.
2. John Wanna, 'A conservative debacle: the electoral rout in Queensland 2001', Austalasian Parliamentary Review , vol. 16, no. 1, Autumn 2001, pp. 36-7; Scott Bennett, 'The Ehrmann Case-Aberration or Symptom?', Research Note no. 10, 2000-01 , Department of the Parliamentary Library, Canberra.
3. Matthew Franklin, 'It helps to be an SOB', Courier-Mail , 27 November 2000.
4. Paul Syvret, 'Queensland's One Man Band', Bulletin , 6 February 2001.
5. 'ALP keeps the faith and its majority', Australian , 7 February 2000; Gold Coast Bulletin , 24 January 2001.
6. Antony Green, '1999 Queensland redistribution: analysis of final boundaries', Research Bulletin 99/9, Queensland Parliamentary Library, December 1999.
7. Scott Bennett and Gerard Newman, 'Victorian Election 1999', Research Paper no. 19, 1999-2000 , Department of the Parliamentary Library, Canberra, p. 7.
8. Wanna, op. cit., p. 40.
9. Australian , 26 January 2001, Courier-Mail , 2 February 2001; Wanna, op. cit., p. 41.
10. Paul Syvret, 'Queensland's One Man Band', Bulletin , 6 February 2001, p. 18.
11. Australian , 15 February 2001.
12. Courier-Mail , 10 February 2001.
13. 'Labor better chance to see state right', editorial, Courier-Mail , 16 February 2001.
14. See, for example, 'Showdown looms for Libs, Nats', Australian , 10 March 2000; 'Three-way contest for Albert seat', Gold Coast Bulletin, 26 May 2000; 'Liberal candidate's doubts fire Nats' fury at Coalition partner', Australian , 5 June 2000; 'Poll contest strains Lib, Nat unity', Courier-Mail , 9 October 2000.
15. Australian , 13 February 2001, Sydney Morning Herald, 1 February 2001, Australian , 9 February 2001.
16. 'Shocked Feldman vows to fight on', Courier-Mail , 19 February 2001.
17. Jacob Greber, 'Former One Nation voters hold the key;' Courier-Mail , 24 January 2001.
18. Scott Bennett, 'The Decline in Support for the Major Parties and the Prospect of Minority Government', Research Paper no. 10, 1998-99 , Department of the Parliamentary Library, Canberra; Scott Bennett and Gerard Newman, 'New South Wales Election 1999', Research Paper no. 22, 1998-99 , Department of the Parliamentary Library, Canberra, p. 6, Worthington, op. cit. , p. 18.
19. Age , 17 February 2001.
20. John Wanna, 'Queensland July to December 1999', Australian Journal of Politics and History , vol. 46, no. 2, June 2000, p. 244.
21. For the fate of the 11 One Nation MPs elected in 1998, see > Appendix 2 .
22. Gerard Newman, '1998 Queensland Election', Current Issues Brief no. 2, 1998-99 , Department of the Parliamentary Library, Canberra, p. 4.
23. Courier-Mail , 24 January 2001.
24. 'Buoyant Greens set their sights on Senate seat', Courier-Mail , 19 February 2001.
25. Jim Downey, 'Democrat vote holding in polls', Media Release, 21 February 2001; Meg Lees, 'Statement', 27 February 2001.
26. Gerard Newman, 'Western Australian Election 2001: Statistical Analysis', Current Issues Brief no. 14, 2000-01 , p. 31.
27. John Wanna to author, 17 April 2001.
28. Worthington, op. cit. , p. 5.
29. For more on three-cornered contests, see Scott Bennett, Winning and Losing , Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1996, pp. 52-3, Scott Bennett and Gerard Newman, 'New South Wales Election 1999' , Research Paper no. 22, 1998-99 , Department of the Parliamentary Library, Canberra, pp. 14-15, Scott Bennett and Gerard Newman, 'Victorian Election 1999', Research Paper no. 19, 1999-2000 , Department of the Parliamentary Library, Canberra, pp. 5-6.
30. Australian , 19 February 2001.
31. 'Beattie returns to ALP's roots for fresh start', Canberra Times , 22 January 2001.
32. Gold Coast Bulletin , 12 January 2001.
33. Australian , 16 January 2001.
34. 'Labor better chance to see state right', editorial, Courier-Mail , 16 February 2001.
35. 'State needs stability', Townsville Bulletin , 17 February 2001.
36. Australian , 12 January 2001.
37. Sydney Morning Herald , 24 January 2001.
38. Wanna quoted in Courier-Mail , 17 February 2001, Reynolds quoted in Townsville Bulletin , 17 February 2001.
39. 'Labor the analysts' favourite', Courier-Mail , 17 February 2001.
40. 'State needs stability', Townsville Bulletin , 17 February 2001; 'Fighting for his political life', Australian Financial Review , 24 January 2001.
41. Australian , 14 February 2001.
42. Australian , 25 January 2001.
43. 'Borbidge and his political opportunities', Courier-Mail , 16 June 2000.
44. Tracey Arklay, 'Queensland January to June 2000', Australian Journal of Politics and History , vol. 46, no. 4, December 2000, p. 577.
45. 'Powerbroker quits front bench in Liberal feud', Australian , 8 June 2000.
46. Don Aitkin, Stability and change in Australian politics , Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1977, p. 246.
47. 'Borbidge and his political opportunities', Courier-Mail , 16 June 2000.
48. Scott Bennett, Affairs of State. Politics in the Australian States and Territories , Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1992, pp. 192-3
49. 'Scapegoat search reaches Canberra', West Australian , 12 February 2001.
50. Worthington, op. cit. , p. 17.
51. Courier-Mail , 19 February 2001.
52. Gold Coast Bulletin , 7 February 2001; Weekend Australian , 10-11 February 2001.
53. Courier-Mail , 19 February 2001.
54. Courier-Mail , 26 February 2001; www.rayhopper.net.
55. Scott Bennett, Affairs of State , op. cit., pp. 192-3.
56. Australian , 15 February 2001.
57. 'State needs stability', Townsville Bulletin , 17 February 2001.
58. 'Labor may not contest Moore's safe seat', Australian Financial Review , 21 December 2000.
59. Figures from Australian Electoral Commission: http://www.aec.gov.au/ryan/results/post/qldryan.htm .
60. 'Construction industry and middle income earners most likely to switch from Liberal to Labor at Federal election', Marketshare News Release, 30 March 2001, p. 1.
61. 'Howard vows to woo back Ryan voters next time', Australian Financial Review , 26 March 2001.
62. For example, Dean Jaensch, 'Ryan by-election could be like Whitlam's Bass of 1975', Advertiser , 15 March 2001.
63. Tony Abbott, 'Against Roonism-Combating the Culture of Despair', speech to Sydney Institute, 20 March 2001.
64. 'Bruised but defiant Howard plots to woo Ryan swingers', Gold Coast Bulletin , 20 March 2001.
65. Malcolm Mackerras, 'Electoral anger at Liberal "rats" ', Canberra Times , 21 March 2001.
66. Gerard Newman, 'House of Representatives By-elections 1949-2001', Current Issues Brief no. 12, 2000-01 , p. 6.
67. 'Howard accepts blame for by-election loss', Age , 28 March 2001.
68. 'The State decides', Queensland Times (Ipswich), 17 March 2001.

Appendix 1: Voter support 1998-2001

'If a State election was held in Queensland today, which one of the following would you vote for?

If "uncommitted", to which one of these do you have a leaning?'

Sources: Courier-Mail , 24 January 2001, Weekend Australian , 17-18 February 2001.

Appendix 2: One Nation MLAs elected 1998

Appendix 3: Results

Table 1 Legislative Assembly: State Summary

Table 2a Legislative Assembly: First Preference Votes, District Summary
Number

Table 2b Legislative Assembly: First Preference Votes, District Summary
Per cent

Table 3 Legislative Assembly: District Detail