Biosecurity

Broadly speaking, biosecurity means protecting animals, plants and people against diseases or other biological threats, such as introduced species. It involves ensuring that effective quarantine is maintained. Recent examples where Australia’s biosecurity has been compromised and there has been a potential threat to its primary industries include: the equine influenza epidemic, a virus infection of abalone along the south-west Victorian coastline, imported raw prawns carrying exotic diseases, and fruit fly larvae discovered in Queensland fruit on sale in Tasmania.

CSIRO estimates the costs of alien pests to be at least $7 billion dollars a year and suggests that ‘25 per cent of costs to consumers associated with food products are due to invasive weeds, pests and diseases’. A Senate committee estimated in 2004: ‘The economic impact of weeds and 11 key vertebrate pest animals has been calculated at $4 billion and $720 million per annum respectively’. The true cost of the equine influenza epidemic has yet to be calculated

The World Trade Organisation (WTO) has voiced concerns about the strictness of Australia’s biosecurity regime. There is a fine line here. Australia must be vigilant about its biosecurity, but must also adhere to its free trade obligations. For example, Australia must comply with the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures (SPS Agreement) to which it is a party. Under the agreement, biosecurity arguments may be challenged as non-tariff trade barriers.

Current international trade disputes that carry biosecurity risks include:

• Pig meat—Australia has notified the WTO about the Productivity Commission’s accelerated inquiry into the impacts of imports of pig meat on the Australian pork industry. The commission must report to the government by 14 December 2007. It will examine ‘whether conditions are such that safeguard measures would be justified under the WTO Agreements’. The likelihood of introducing Post-Weaning Multi-Systemic Wasting Syndrome to Australia, should measures be eased, is a concern.
• Apples—New Zealand is challenging Australia’s biosecurity arrangements for apples at the WTO. A recent Senate committee had concerns that the arrangements carried a risk for the importation of ‘fire blight’. Local growers are also concerned that the current blight-free status of their product could be compromised.
• Bananas—The Philippines sees Australia’s biosecurity restrictions on imported bananas as being too severe. A WTO challenge is possible. Australian growers questioned Biosecurity Australia’s recent draft analysis that would allow the importation of bananas from areas that have low levels of pests and diseases.
• Raw prawns—Several Asian countries argue that Australia’s quarantine measures for raw prawns are a trade barrier. The measures were introduced in July 2007 because of biosecurity concerns about Australia’s fisheries and aquaculture. Affected countries may take Australia to a WTO disputes panel.

Australia has biosecurity management plans in place, and these are tested on occasion. Examples include the recent evaluation of Australia’s preparedness for a human influenza pandemic (Exercise Eleusis), which was a simulation of an avian influenza outbreak in 2005, and Exercise Minotaur, which was a simulation of a Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreak in 2002.

The recent equine influenza epidemic put the country’s preparedness to the test. Treasury estimated that the potential liability from the outbreak could not be quantified should the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry be found negligent in the Australian Government’s current Commission of Inquiry. In total, the government has now set aside over $200 million to help those suffering hardship.

The cost of the equine influenza epidemic will pale in comparison with costs should Australia’s economically important cattle and sheep industries be compromised by an introduced disease. In 2002, Animal Health Australia chairman Roly Nieper estimated that a major, widespread outbreak of a disease such as FMD would cost Australia $5.8 billion in trade ‘overnight’. In such an event, Australia would not have enough veterinarians to cope. A Queensland Department of Primary Industry 2002 modelling study estimated that an FMD outbreak would cost Queensland $9.5 billion over 15 years.

At least 70 per cent of all emerging human infectious diseases are thought to arise from animals. The possibility of pandemic bird flu is currently a particular concern. Cross-border disease outbreaks may occur because of deliberate infringement of national quarantine regulations—whether by fishing boats illegally entering domestic waters with inappropriate animals and plants on board, or passengers ignoring quarantine regulations. There can also be inadvertent introduction of disease. Preventing disease entry requires constant surveillance—a difficult and resource-intensive task.

Biosecurity Australia, a prescribed agency due for review in 2008, develops Australia’s quarantine policies. The Australian Quarantine Inspection Service implements those policies. According to the Natural Resources Management Ministerial Council, an Intergovernmental Agreement will develop approaches for improving the management of Australia’s existing biosecurity administration under the auspices of AusBIOSEC (the Australian Biosecurity System for Primary Production and the Environment).

Existing national approaches include the National System for the Prevention and Management of Introduced Marine Pest Incursions, the Australian Pest Animal Strategy, the National Animal Health Information System, the Northern Australia Quarantine Strategy, the Australian Wildlife Health Network and the Australian Weed Strategy. The National Transmissible Spongiform Surveillance Program tests for diseases such as mad cow disease. There is also national surveillance of avian influenza viruses in wild birds.