Background Note Index

Background Note

Climate change policy: Brazil, China, India and Russia

Online only 25 February 2009

Contents

Introduction

Despite being amongst the highest emitters of greenhouse gases (GHG) per head, Australia was responsible for only about 1.5 per cent of the world’s total annual emissions of such gases in 2005.[1] Though welcome, any reduction in Australia’s GHG emissions, of itself, will not have a significant impact on the overall level of GHG in the atmosphere.

This point only underlines the importance of the need for an effective global agreement to reduce GHG emissions and to stabilize the concentrations of such gases in the atmosphere at an acceptable level. The effectiveness of such an agreement depends on the participation of both developed and developing nations. This latter group has not been required to reduce their GHG emissions under the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change during its first commitment period (2008 – 2012).

The lack of a commitment by developing countries under the Kyoto Protocol to reduce their GHG emissions has been cited as a reason for some developed countries not to ratify the protocol, though all such countries acknowledge the need to reduce GHG emissions.[2] The need to include the developing countries in any new global agreement is seen as a very important issue for both government and opposition in Australia.[3] Generally, without successful efforts to curb GHG emissions, developing nations will be responsible for 90 per cent of the growth in such emissions over the next two decades.[4] The bulk of this growth will come from India and China.

To control global GHG emissions, developing countries need to be participants in any global emissions reduction agreement. There are some who suggest that if large developing countries do not make significant commitments to reduce their GHG emissions then developed countries, such as Australia, should not commit to large reductions in their emissions. This notion seems to be reflected in the recent Government White Paper on the proposed Australian emissions trading scheme which stated that Australia’s GHG emissions reduction target would be 5 per cent compared to emissions in 2000, absent any international agreement.[5] Critics do not regard this to be an effective target.[6]

The BRIC countries

Individually the largest developing countries are Brazil, India and China. Russia is regarded as a developed country (albeit a country in transition from a planned to a capitalist economy). However, Russia is commonly included with Brazil, India and China when discussing world economic development. Together, these countries are known as the BRIC group.

Projected economic growth

Generally, those developing countries with the highest projected rates of economic growth and energy consumption are most likely to increase there GHG emissions at the fastest rates. The following table shows estimated annual percentage changes in gross domestic product for various countries and groups between 2008 and 2013.

Table 1: Estimated economic growth rates - GDP at constant prices annual % change 2008–2013

Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2008 (accessed January 2009)

No doubt such figures have been revised downwards as the current economic malaise worsens. However, it is the comparative position of such countries that is important and it is clear that, all other things being equal, the BRIC countries, especially China, may experience higher rates of economic growth than many other countries or regions. A meaningful commitment by these countries to restrict their GHG emissions may be seen as fundamental to the successful conclusion of any new global environmental agreement and the permanent reduction in global GHG emissions.

Projected emissions trajectories

The importance of including developing nations in any new global agreement to reduce GHG emissions is highlighted by projections of the rates of growth of such emissions from these countries. This is sometimes known as the trajectory of GHG emissions. The importance of developing countries’ contribution to global GHG emissions can be seen from the following table.

Table 2: Estimated global GHG emissions by county/region 2005–2050 (Gt CO₂e)[7]

Source: Treasury

The above table was drawn from information contained in the Commonwealth Treasury’s recent emissions trading scheme modelling. Its data is drawn from its reference case scenario; that is projected GHG emissions outcomes in the absence of any co-ordinated action to reduce emissions.[8] The term CRI refers to total emissions from China, Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States and India. These trends (including Brazil’s projected GHG emissions not shown above) have been presented graphically by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

Figure 1: Historical GHG Emissions Trends

Source: OECD[9]

The graph shows the BRIC countries’ share of total global emissions rises, as does the Rest of the World’s; while the OECD’s share increases at a far lesser rate. If a significant reduction of global GHG emissions are to be achieved it is obviously very important to include the BRIC countries in any global agreement.

Domestic policy as a pointer to readiness to take additional international action

As noted above, Brazil, China and India do not have a formal obligation under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the associated Kyoto Protocol to reduce their GHG emissions. However, they are still required to take actions to encourage such reductions. The state of their domestic GHG emissions policies may indicate their readiness to undertake further binding commitments.

Russia has a formal commitment to reduce its GHG emissions under the Kyoto Protocol. However, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and subsequent economic decline, it will have no trouble meeting these commitments. The main question is: will it undertake additional actions in the context of any new international agreement?

Domestic policies

Brazil

Brazil is the eighth largest emitter of greenhouse gases, and the third largest emitter in the developing world after China and India, according to 2000 World Resources Institute figures.[10] However, the majority of its power comes from hydro electricity.[11] Consequently, Brazil's energy sector contributes little to its GHG emissions. Unsustainable land use, large livestock numbers, large scale use of fossil fuels in its mineral processing industries and deforestation are the major GHG emissions sources. Conversely, Brazil is the world's largest producer and consumer of ethanol, which it has added to gasoline, or used as a fuel in its own right, since the 1970s. This has reduced both greenhouse gas emissions and pollution in urban centres.[12]

International stance

Until recently, Brazil’s position on climate change was driven more by the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere than by yearly emissions. It argued that yearly emissions data generally overestimate developing countries' contributions to climate change, and underestimate that of developed countries. In Brazil’s view, since the accumulation was principally the fault of the developed countries they must take the majority of necessary actions to reduce the stock of GHGs in the atmosphere.  Brazil had maintained that it would not limit its greenhouse gas emissions until the middle of the 21^st century and has sought further commitments from developed countries to reduce the overall level of GHG emissions.[13]

This stance may have changed due to Brazil experiencing a series of natural disasters, starting with an Atlantic hurricane crossing the Brazilian coast for the first time in recorded weather records in 2004. Further, the Amazonian regions experienced a severe drought in 2005 that generally caused food shortages and other economic havoc. A series of scientific reports, including the fourth report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 2007 has also emphasised Brazil’s vulnerability to climate change.[14]

Domestic policy

In 2007 the Brazilian government began to reformulate its response to climate change. The result was the ‘National Plan on Climate Change’ finalised in December 2008. Its overall goal is to achieve sustainable economic and social development. Its main points include:

• increasing energy efficiency leading to a decrease in electricity consumption by 10 per cent in 2030, compared to current levels
• maintaining a high proportion of Brazil’s electricity supply from renewable sources (Brazil sourced about 77 per cent of its electricity from renewable sources, mainly hydropower, in 2007). Overall, about 45 per cent of its energy comes from renewable sources
• encouraging the increased use of biofuels in the transport sector (the proportion of biofuel use is already high) and work towards a sustainable international market for such fuels
• sustained reduction in de-forestation rates, particularly in the Amazon region. The aim is to reduce the rate of de-forestation by 70 per cent by 2017 in gradual stages
• increasing research and development to precisely identify environmental impacts and minimise the costs of adaptation, and
• eliminating net loss of forest coverage by 2015 through re-forestation and establishment of forest plantations.

A note on the Amazon forests

It should be noted that de-forestation will continue for some time yet when this policy is implemented. Achieving this target will depend on generating the necessary funds – not just domestically, but internationally through overseas sourced contributions to the Amazon Fund.

The following graph shows the projected rate of deforestation in the Amazon region once this policy is in place.

Figure 2: Trends in deforestation rate in the Amazon

Source: Brazil National Plan on Climate Change[15]

Brazil has identified the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) as the main avenue for international cooperation on climate change matters; though the national action plan noted that changes to the CDM regime may need to be made.[16] This strategy comes on top of extensive existing measures that are either aimed at mitigating climate change or have that outcome (see Attachment 1 for a list of existing policies).

Brazil’s plan marks a significant departure from its previous stance.[17] Though it is not without its critics, it may signal an increased willingness on Brazil’s part to agree to binding commitments in the context of a global GHG emissions control agreement. In the recent National Plan Brazil’s willingness to do more in the context of an international environmental agreement was emphasised.[18] However, it appears that Brazil’s further commitments are dependent on developed countries providing new financial and technical resources to Brazil as well as meeting their own GHG emissions reduction obligations.

China

Depending on the figures used, China is now either the largest or second largest individual contributor to GHG emissions in the world, behind or near the total GHG emissions of the United States of America. The following graph illustrates the comparative sources of China’s GHG emissions in 2005.

Figure 3: Comparative sources of China’s GHG emissions 2005

Source: US Congressional Research Service graph from IEA estimates, extracted 8 July 2008.[20]

Over the past five years or so, China has demonstrated an increasing realization that it has ownership in the outcomes of a warming world. As China grows, it recognizes that it too will bear the potential costs of increasing storm intensity, rising sea levels, shifting water availability and agricultural productivity, as well as changing disease migration.[21] Indeed, China has identified that climate changes due to global warming are already occurring in its territory.[22]

International stance

Chinese negotiators adhere to the principle of ‘common but differentiated’ responsibilities, agreed in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. They argue that emissions per person in China are low and that raising incomes must be their highest priority. Like Brazil, China also argues that that industrialized countries bear primary responsibility for the historical build-up of GHGs and should thus lead in mitigating emissions domestically. Industrialized countries also, China argues, should assist developing countries to mitigate emissions and adapt to coming climate related changes.[23]

However, this stance has not prevented China from taking significant domestic action to reduce its own GHG emissions and to participate in the CDM regime.

Domestic policy

In June 2007, China released its National Climate Change Program. The program outlines activities both to mitigate GHG emissions and to adapt to the consequences of potential climate change. Within the Program, perhaps most challenging is China’s goal to lower its energy intensity[24] by 20 per cent by 2010.

Related goals include more than doubling renewable energy use by 2020, expansion of both nuclear, gas and renewable generated power to displace the use of coal fired power, closure of inefficient industrial facilities, tightened efficiency standards for buildings and appliances, and forest coverage expanded to 20 per cent.[25] However, it is a notable feature of this policy that it rejects mandatory limits on emissions.

Specific programs

Some of the policies and programs now being followed by the Chinese government include:

• an economy-wide energy efficiency target. As noted above, China has set a target that mandates a 20 per cent reduction in energy intensity between 2005 and 2010. This sets up milestones of 4 per cent reductions in each year, against which the Chinese government has been measuring performance
• the renewable energy law. Effective since February 2005, the law mandates that 16 per cent of all energy is to come from wind, biomass, solar, and hydro-power energy by 2020
• promoting nuclear power. One of China’s main concerns is to promote the development of nuclear power as part of its national energy strategy. In 2008, the National Energy Administration raised its target to 5 per cent of installed capacity by 2020
• improving power sector efficiency. China has ambitious goals to decommission small, inefficient power generators and to accelerate the deployment of very advanced power-plant technology (e.g., ‘supercritical’ and ‘ultra-supercritical’ combustion technology)
• development of a coal-bed methane industry. Capturing methane (CH4) released during coal production and using it as a fuel both reduces emissions and substitutes for other fuel use and emissions
• top 1,000 Enterprise Efficiency Program. China’s industry is dominated by large, state-owned enterprises. These enterprises consume one-third of the country’s energy and emit the bulk of China’s GHG pollution. The Top 1,000 Enterprise Efficiency Program was established in 2006, and aims to reduce energy use of China’s 1,000 most energy-intensive enterprises
• national building codes. The non-military building sector accounts for some 28 per cent of national energy consumption. New buildings constructed from 2006 to 2010 are subject to a design standard that would improve energy conservation by 50 per cent; in major cities (e.g., Beijing), buildings are subject to a 65 per cent energy-saving standard
• appliance efficiency standards. China makes more consumer appliances than any other country. In order to cut electricity growth and greenhouse gas emissions, China established energy efficiency standards and labels for lighting, air conditioners, and home appliances. The standards set a target of reducing residential electricity use by 10 per cent by 2010
• fuel economy standards and taxes for motor vehicles. The average Chinese passenger vehicle is required to meet a 36 miles per gallon requirement in 2008. In addition, the Chinese Ministry of Finance adopted a ‘gas-guzzler’ structure for taxes on new vehicles, effective 1 September 2008, doubling taxes on large vehicles while reducing them on small vehicles. More specifically, purchasers of cars with engines above 4-litre capacity will pay a tax of 40 per cent. The tax on vehicles with engines between 3 and 4 litres will rise from 15 per cent to 25 per cent of the purchase price. In contrast, the tax on automobiles with engines less than 1-litre engine capacity will be reduced from 3 per cent to 1 per cent, and
• closing inefficient industrial facilities. In 2006, China announced the decommissioning of hundreds of small, old, industrial plants. Many of the plants were in the cement and steel sectors, but other chemical, refining, and manufacturing facilities were slated for closure as well.[26]

The above list contains the main policies now in force in China. Apparently, there are 52 separate policies aimed at controlling GHG emissions. Attachment 1 gives a separate list of such policies.

It is important to note that China is an active participant in the CDM, accounting for over 40 per cent of the global emissions credits arising from such projects.[27] This may be a pointer to its preferred way of participating in any new global GHG emissions control agreement.

Recent developments

On 9 June 2008, China's central bank released a tentative outline for a domestic emissions trading scheme that could cover everything from greenhouse gases to water pollutants, and speed the country's push for ‘greener’ growth. Nevertheless, the introduction of a more comprehensive national scheme is likely to be some way off, not least because policymakers are only starting to grapple with the complicated issues.[28]

India

India is now the world’s fourth largest emitter of GHG gases. Between 1990 and 2004, emissions increased by 97 per cent—one of the highest rates of increase in the world.[29] The following graph illustrates the major sources of India’s GHG emissions.

Figure 4: India’s GHG Emissions by sector (2004)

Source: Pew Centre on Global Climate Change[30]

The Fourth Assessment Report from the IPCC suggests that monsoonal changes, Himalayan glacier retreat, and sea level rise around the low-lying coastal metropolises of Mumbai and Chennai all threaten India’s growing population.[31] Indeed, Hurricane Nargis’ devastating impact in Myanmar in May 2008 was presented in the Indian press as illustrative of this threat.[32]

On 30 June 2008, the Indian Prime Ministers Council on Climate Change released India's National Action Plan on Climate Change .[33] This document primarily offers a list of eight technological efforts, the pride of place being given to research and development of solar energy. But the report does not set any numerical goals for emission reductions or for energy intensity.

This document also lists both new and existing policies. Many of these policies are already being implemented as part of the centralised economic plan drawn up by India’s Planning Commission. The current plan, the 11^th, covers the years from 2007–2012. Individual Indian ministries were to submit action plans in response to this document by December 2008.[34]

India is concerned to further develop its economy and continue its policies aimed towards poverty alleviation and appears determined to peruse these goals in addition to any policies aimed at reducing its GHG emissions.

International stance

In common with other developing countries India considers that the solution to the world’s climate change problems is primarily the responsibility of the developed industrialised world. It has resisted efforts for a limit to be placed on its own GHG emissions.

Nevertheless, India is a participant in the Kyoto Protocol and is the second largest source of CDM emission credits after China. However, like China it has reportedly rejected the imposition on any binding limits on its GHG emissions.[35]

Domestic policies

Indian GHG emissions policy, until recently, did not appear to be the specific product of a concern about the environment. However, the following policies do potentially reduce the amount of India’s GHG emissions. These measures are being implemented under the current 11^th - 5 year plan.

Measures in relation to power generation in India include:

• increasing renewable energy to 10 per cent of total electricity generation capacity
  • solar power to receive government financial assistance
• closing inefficient coal fired power generation and development of ‘Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle’ coal fired power plants
• developing coal bed methane electricity generation by providing ‘liberal’ financial assistance, and
• expanding the nuclear power industry.

Energy efficiency and conservation measures include:

• efficiency labelling for electrical appliances

• mandatory energy audits for large energy consuming industries
• developing energy demand programs for large energy users
• replacement of all incandescent light bulbs with compact fluorescent lamps
• establishment of an energy efficient building code for large commercial buildings, and
• a higher electricity tariff for large scale electricity users.

Under the national fuel policy (2003) the following measures are being implemented:

• new four wheel vehicles are to meet European emissions standards by 2010
• conversion of public transport and taxies to compressed natural gas fuel
• expansion of urban mass transport systems, and
• expansion of ethanol–blended gasoline sales.

In addition the government is seeking to expand the amount of forest cover in India by 1 per cent a year through to 2012.[36]

Recent developments

As noted above, India has recently released a National Action Plan on Climate Change. Though details are as yet unclear the main themes of this plan are:

• further expansion of solar power generation
• further increases in energy efficiency
• measures to sustain India’s environmental and water assets
• further expansion of forests for carbon sink purposes
• sustainable agriculture, and
• developing a knowledge base for dealing with climate change issues.

As can be seen these themes echo in large part components of India’s

Russia

The Russian Federation was the world’s third highest GHG emitter in 2004.[37] Unlike the above nations, Russia is an Annex 1 country in the Kyoto Protocol and consequently has a formal obligation to reduce its GHG emissions. Significant amounts of Russia’s GHG emissions come from its large petroleum industry, particularly its natural gas industry.[38] Due to both the size and geographic diversity of Russia, global climate change is expected to have some positive effects such an increase in productive agricultural land and short less severe winters. However, these gains are more than counterbalanced by the anticipated negative effects over most of its territory.[39]

International stance

In October 2004, the Russian Parliament (Duma) ratified that country’s signature of the Kyoto Protocol. Annex B of the Protocol set limits to Russia's GHG emissions by the end of the Protocol’s first commitment period (2008-2012) at the level of country’s emissions in 1990. Between that year and about 2002 Russia’s GHG emissions fell dramatically due to the significant economic contraction and dislocation associated with the ending of the former Soviet Union and its replacement with the Commonwealth of Independent States. As noted above, Russia has no difficulty in meeting its formal commitments under the Protocol, without taking any specific actions to limit emissions.

This has left Russia with a surplus of transferable emissions credits under the Kyoto Protocol.[40] This is the so called ‘hot air’ problem, where Russia may choose to sell these surplus credits, or use them against future emissions reduction obligations, without needing to actually reduce its overall level of GHG emissions.[41] As a result, one view of Russia’s involvement in the Protocol is that it is an ‘investment activity’, aimed at generating profits for business and government, rather than for taking effective international action to reduce global GHG emissions.[42]

It appears that Russia’s stance in relation to any post 2012 international agreement will be governed more by its perceived national economic interests rather than any desire to make a meaningful contribution to reduce global GHG emissions.[43] This view still prevailed at the recent United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change meeting in Poland during December 2008. Given its participation in the Kyoto Protocol’s project based mechanisms, Russia is unlikely to oppose the adoption of global market based arrangements in any new global GHG emissions control agreement.[44]

Domestic policy

Some commentators have taken a rather grim view of Russia’s overall domestic policies responding to climate change.[45] However, the following table illustrates Russia’s current domestic policies specifically responding to climate change.

Table 3: Russian domestic policies in force specifically addressing climate change

Source: International Energy Agency, Policies Addressing Climate Change Database[46]

To the above list must also be added Russia’s substantial participation in the Joint Implementation Mechanism (JI) projects under the Kyoto Protocol and its actions addressing deforestation in its territory.[47] But it should be recognised that Russia is undertaking JI projects as much for their capacity to provide investment funds as for their environmental benefits.

Russia’s polices do not appear to be as comprehensive as the policies adopted by the other three countries mentioned in this paper. Appendix 1 gives a fuller list of such policies as compiled by the International Energy Agency. That said, it should be remembered that Russia formally ratified the Kyoto Protocol only in 2005, where the other three countries have been ratified signatories to this Protocol since the 1990s. Simply put, they have had more time to dev

Concluding comments

An emerging common theme amongst the policies of Brazil, China and India is the growing realisation of the potential severity of the impact of climate change upon them. This appears to have led to increased efforts on their part to meet these challenges. This is a positive sign for their undertaking increased commitments to reduce their GHG emissions in the context of any new international agreement. Indeed, developing countries generally committed to undertaking ‘nationally appropriate mitigation actions…in the context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner’ at the United Nations Bali Climate Change Conference in late 2007.[48]

Yet, these countries still appear to insist on a firmer commitment by developed countries, including Australia, to reduce emissions before they will commit to setting a formal target for their GHG emissions. As the above conference decision indicates this commitment may depend the willingness of the developed world to assist in this task via financing emissions control measures in the developing world and appropriate technology transfer.

Since the Bali meeting some progress has been made towards meeting these apparent developing country requirements. The Poznań UN Climate Change Conference established an enhanced Climate Change Adaptation Fund to assist developing countries. Further proposals on extending the extent of the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development, and Joint Implementation Mechanisms were put forward. Other funding proposals were suggested but not adopted (to the intense disappointment of developing country participants).[49] This is not rapid progress, but it is progress nonetheless.

Further, the developed countries appear to be making those firmer commitments. The new United States Administration has committed to establishing an emissions trading scheme. Australia has officially stated its commitment to reduce its GHG emissions by 60 per cent over 2000 levels and published a white paper outlining the proposed Australian Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme. The European Union has undertaken, in the absence of any global agreement, to reduce its own GHG emissions by 20 per cent and take other mitigation measures.

These developments may encourage developing counties to undertake additional commitments to reduce their own GHG emissions. But it is still questionable whether these additional commitments will include participation in any global emissions trading scheme or the setting of binding targets on their own GHG emissions. The best that may be expected is for developing countries to intensify their own mitigation efforts as outlined above.[50] This would still constitute a substantial change from their previous positions.

However, the willingness of Russia to undertake additional commitments in the context of a new global GHG emissions agreement seems questionable. Its stance still appears to be based on a narrow perception of its own short term economic interest, despite the potentially serious impact of climate change upon its territory. That said, any new international agreement that offered significant commercial advantages to Russia would meet with its approval.

Attachment 1: Policies in force - Brazil, China and India

Following are extracts from the International Energy Agency’s Policy database in early February 2009 showing the climate change policies currently in force in Brazil, China and India. However, they are not a complete list of policies be pursued by these countries. The purpose of these tables is to illustrate some of the policies currently in force in these countries addressing climate change issues.

Table 4: Brazil

Table 5: China

Table 6: India

[1].    Garnaut Climate Change Review, Draft Report, June 2008, p. 99 (http://www.garnautreview.org.au/CA25734E0016A131/pages/all-reports--resources-draft-report accessed 12 February 2009).

[2].    The rational for the previous United States Administration not ratifying the Kyoto Protocol was partly based on the lack of commitment to GHG emissions reduction by developing nations. P. Tulkens and H. Tulkens, ‘The White House and the Kyoto Protocol: Double standards on uncertainties and their consequences’, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Nota Di Lavoro 89.2006, June 2006, p. 2 (http://www.feem.it/NR/rdonlyres/4D9DD593-4098-4989-B70A-2AAFF2695216/2036/8906.pdf accessed 12 February 2009).  Australia’s position was similar. See ‘Kyoto Protocol next to useless’, Sydney Morning Herald, On-Line, 16 February 2005 (http://www.smh.com.au/news/Environment/Kyoto-Protocol-next-to-useless-PM/2005/02/16/1108500136426.html accessed 12 February 2009).

[3].    Senator the Hon. Penny Wong, Minister for Climate Change and Water, Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme – Green Paper, Canberra, July 2008, pp 8-9 (http://www.climatechange.gov.au/greenpaper/index.html accessed 12 February 2009); The Hon. Malcolm Turnbull MP, Leader of the Opposition, ‘Taxation and Climate Change’, Sydney Papers, Vol. 20(2), Autumn 2008, p. 48.

[4].    Garnaut Climate Change Review, Final Report, Canberra, October 2008, p. xxxvi (http://www.garnautreview.org.au/index.htm accessed 12 February 2009).

[5].    Australian Government, Department of Climate Change, Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme – Australia’s Low Pollution Future – White Paper, Canberra, 15 December 2008, p. xix, Lii, 4-1 (http://www.climatechange.gov.au/whitepaper/report/index.html accessed 12 February 2009).

[6].    The Climate Institute, ‘Credibility deficit bankrupts climate hopes’, media release, 15 December 2008; ‘White Paper and 2020 target range – key tests’, policy brief, December 2008 (http://www.climateinstitute.org.au/index.php accessed 12 February 2009); ABC Website, ‘Governments emissions target not high enough: Garnaut’, electronic media article, (http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/12/20/2451809.htm?section=business accessed 27 January 2009).

[7].    Gt CO2e is Giga tonne of carbon dioxide or the equivalent amounts in terms of greenhouse warming potential of the 5 other greenhouse gasses mentioned in Annex 1 of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

[8].    Australian Government, Treasury, Australia’s Low Pollution Future – the economics of climate change mitigation, Canberra, October 2008, p. 31 (http://www.treasury.gov.au/lowpollutionfuture/ accessed 12 February 2009)

[9].    OECD, Environmental Outlook to 2030, Paris, 2008, p. 25 (http://dpl/Books/2008/OECD_EnvironmentalOutlook2030.pdf accessed 12 February 2009)

[10]. E. L. La Rovere and A. S. Pereira, ‘Brazil & climate change: a country profile’, Policy Brief, SciDevNet, 14 February 2007 (http://www.scidev.net/en/policy-briefs/brazil-climate-change-a-country-profile.html  accessed January 2008).

[11]. ibid.

[12]. ibid.

[13]. ibid.

[14]. ibid, and New York Times, ‘Brazil, alarmed, reconsiders policy on climate change’ press article, 31 July 2007 (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/31/world/americas/31amazon.html?_r=4 accessed 12 February 2009).

[15]. Brazilian Government, Executive Summary – National Plan on Climate Change, Brasilia, December 2008, p. 14 (http://www.mma.gov.br/estruturas/imprensa/_arquivos/96_11122008040728.pdf accessed 12 February 2009).

[16]. ibid.

[17]. Joshua Partlow, ‘Brazil’s decision on deforestation draws praise’, Washington Post Foreign Service, 6 December 2008, p. AO9 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/05/AR2008120503325.html accessed 12 February 2009.   Qualified approval for some aspects of the new plan can be found at REDD-Monitor, ‘Brazil’s national Plan on Climate Change and the Amazon Fund’, web site article, 12-18 January 2009 ( http://www.redd-monitor.org/2009/01/23/brazils-national-plan-on-climate-change-and-the-amazon-fund-%E2%80%9Cthis-plan-does-not-create-any-carbon-credits-or-right-to-emissions%E2%80%9D/ accessed 12 February 2009) 

[18]. Brazilian Government, ibid, p. 6.

[19]. Brazilian Government, Brazilian Embassy in London, Government launches climate change plan, media release, 16 December 2008.

[20]. J. A. Leggett, J. Logan and A. MacKey, China’s greenhouse gas emissions and mitigation policies, Report for Congress RL34659, US Congressional Research Service, 10 September 2008, p. 18 (http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34659_20080910.pdf accessed 12 February 2009).

[21]. ibid, pp. 2-3.

[22]. G. Heggelund, ‘China’s climate change policy: domestic and international developments’, Asian Perspective, Vol. 31, No. 2, 2007, p. 166 and Peoples Republic of China, National Development and Reform Commission, China’s National Climate Change Program, Beijing, June 2007, pp. 4 - 6.

[23]. ibid, pp. 175 -177.

[24]. Energy intensity is usually measures by the amount of energy used per unit of Gross Domestic Product.

[25]. J. A. Leggett, et al, op. cit, p. 1.

[26]. J. A. Leggett, et al, op. cit. p. 19 and following. See also The Pew Centre on Global Climate Change, ‘Climate Change Mitigation Measures in the Peoples Republic of China’, International Brief 1, April 2007 (http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/International%20Brief%20-%20China.pdf accessed 12 February 2009) .

[27]. Pew Centre, China, ibid.

[28]. Z. Ang, The G8 Research Group – London School of Economics(LSE)/Oxford University, ‘The G8 and Climate Change since Heiligendamm – Final compliance report for the G8 and outreach five countries’, Oxford, 20 July 2008, p. 208. (http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/oxford/g8rg-lseox-final-2007-080720.pdf accessed 12 February 2009).

[29]. United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 2007/08, New York, 2007, p. 42 and 152.

[30]. The Pew Centre on Global Climate Change, ‘Climate Change Mitigation Measures in India’, International Brief 2, September 2008 (http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/India-FactSheet-09-08.pdf accessed 12 February 2009).

[31]. For more detail see R.V Cruz, H. Harasawa, M. Lal, S. Wu, Y. Anokhin, B. Punsalmaa, Y. Honda, M. Jafari, C. Li and N. Huu Ninh, 2007: Asia. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden and C.E. Hanson, Eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 469-506.

[32]. S. Billett, J. Young and A. Sridhar, G8 Research Group LSE/Oxford, op. cit., p. 208.

[33]. Warning, this is a very large document to download!

[34]. The Pew Centre on Global Climate Change, India, ibid.

[35]. R. Ramesh, ‘Strong arm tactics to get India to agree to strict emissions cuts criticised’, The Guardian Online, (http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/feb/05/climatechange-carbonemissions accessed 10 February 2009) and A. Orlowski, China, India to escape carbon hair shirt’, The Register Online, (http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/02/04/pachauri_carbon_exemption/ accessed 10 February 2009).

[36]. The Pew Centre on Global Climate Change, India, ibid.

[37]. United Nations Development Program, ibid, p. 69.

[38]. R. Perelet, S. Pegov and M. Yulkin, ‘Climate change, Russia Country Paper’, United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 2007/2008, Human Development Report Office Occasional Paper, 2007/12, 3 June 2007, pp. 9 – 10.

[39]. R. Perelet et al, ibid, pp. 12 - 22. Also United Nations Development Program, op. cit., p. 103.

[40]. R. Perelet et al, ibid, p. 9.

[41]. It is interesting to note that the proposed Australian emissions trading scheme will not accept a countries surplus emissions credits (known as ‘Assigned Units’) under the Kyoto Protocol as a valid means of offsetting an emitter’s obligations.

[42]. I. Zharkevich, The G8 Research Group – London School of Economics/Oxford, op. cit., p. 133.

[43]. ibid, p. 134.

[44]. A. Koppoo, Senior Researcher the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, ‘Russia and the post – 2012 climate regime: foreign relations rather than environmental policy’, Briefing Paper 23, 24 November 2008, p. 3.

[45]. For example, I. Zharkevich, S. Tang, C. Wright, The G8 Research Group – LSE/Oxford, op. cit., p. 132.

[46]. International Energy Agency Database at http://www.iea.org/textbase/pm/index_clim.html (accessed 12 February 2009).

[47]. I. Zharkevich, The G8 Research Group – LSE/Oxford, op. cit., pp. 134 and following and pp 146 – 149.

[48]. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth session, held in Bali from 3 to 15 December 2007, Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its thirteenth session, Decisions adopted by the Conference of the Parties, Decision 1/CP.13, Decision 1(b)(ii), FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, 14 March 2008, p. 3 (http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/cop13/eng/06a01.pdf#page=3 accessed 13 February 2009).

[49].       Pew Global Centre on Climate Change, Summary of outcomes at Fourteenth Session of the conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and Fourth Session of the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol December 1-12, 2008 Poznań, Poland, December 2008 (http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/PewCenterCOP14Summary.pdf accessed 13 February 2009).

[50]. Zhang, Z. X, ‘How far can developing country commitments go in a post 2012 climate change regime?’, Munich Personal PeREc Archive, MPRA Paper No. 12451, 28 October 2008 (http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12451/2/MPRA_paper_12451.pdf accessed 12 February 2009).

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