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Current Issues The
Iraqi Precipice
E-Brief: Online Only issued 17 September 2002,
updated 26 September 2002, 20 December 2002
Michael Ong,
Analysis and Policy
Ann Rann,
Information/E-link
Andrew Chin,
Information/E-link
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group
The current United States
policy on Iraq
can be traced to the Gulf War, caused by Iraq's invasion
and annexation of Kuwaitin August 1990, and the events of
September 11, which destroyed the World Trade Center and
part of the Pentagon. The latter has been blamed on the
decentralised Al
Qaeda organisation,
led by Saudi national, Usama
bin Laden.
Gulf War and its aftermath
As a consequence of the
invasion, the United Nations Security Council, (UNSC),
passed several Resolutions,
UNSCR 660
(1990) called for ‘full withdrawal’, 661
(1990) imposed a trade embargo and economic sanctions and
678
(1990), authorised the states cooperating with Kuwait to
use ‘all necessary means to uphold Resolution
660’. The United States, supported by both Arab and
non-Arab countries, including Australia, launched ‘Operation
Desert Storm’ in January 1991, ending with the
liberation of Kuwait on 27 February. The allied forces,
since they were not authorised, did not proceed into Iraq.
UNSCR 687
(1991) also required Iraq to destroy its weapons
of mass destruction(WMD)
under UN
Supervision. UN inspectors
withdrew in 1998 citing lack of co-operation by Iraq,
following Iraq's expulsion of US members in the UN team,
who were accused by Iraq of spying.
UN
economic sanctions against
Iraq also had a serious effect upon the economies of Turkey
and Jordan and have been criticised on humanitarian
grounds. These were partially lifted by several UNSCRs
e.g. 712
in 1991 and 986
in April 1995, allowing Iraqto sell oil to buy food and
medicine, the ‘oil for
food programme’.
Apart from the lack of UN
authorisation, the general concern in 1991 was that Iraq,
without Saddam
Hussein, would fracture,
leading to instability in the region. Iraqis divided into
three parts, the Kurds
in the north, the Marsh Arabs(sixty per cent of the Iraqi
population) who are Shia
Muslims, a minor sect of Islam, in the south and the Sunni
Muslimsin the middle. The
Kurds, as the result of imperial rivalry and treaties,
between France and Britain, are concentrated at the
confluence of four states, Iraq, Iran, Turkeyand Syria,
and have been fighting for their own state of
'Kurdistan'.
Since 1979 Saddam Hussein,
as President, Head of the ruling Baath Party and a Sunni,
has ruled the country, through his family and the a-Bu
Nasir tribe from the Tikrit region in the
north-west, with an iron fist. During the indecisive Iran-Iraq
War 1980-88, over disputed borders, in spite of Iraq's
use of chemical weapons, the US
actively supported Saddam
to prevent Iraq's defeat (Seattle Times, 18
August 2002). The context was that US ally, the Shah of
Iran, was overthrown in 1979 by the Ayatollah Khomeni,
resulting in the (Shia) Islamic Republic of Iran and the
subsequent 440 days confinement of US hostages by Iran.
The US feared the effects of Iraq's defeat on allies such
as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
Saddam has survived many
attempts on his life and has shown no mercy to his
enemies, which have included close relatives. Poison gas
was also used against the Kurds in Halabjah in 1988 and Congressional
moves to sanction Iraq
were blocked by President Reagan. The Iraqi
Opposition, consisting of various Kurdish and Shia
groups, self-declared democrats, liberals, exiled
military officers and communists, has been suppressed
internally, and externally are divided, ineffective and
in some cases, infiltrated by Iraqi agents. Some of these
have been supported, off and on, by the US and under its
sponsorship, met in August
and September 2002 to formulate a common policy.
Following the end of the
Gulf War, in March and April 1991, Saddam suppressed
internal revolts by the divided Iraqi Kurds and the Marsh
Arabs. The USinitially supported the Kurds but later
abandoned them to Saddam's forces. The Marsh Arabs are
seen to be potential allies of their co-religionists in Iran
and action against them included draining of the Marshes.
In April, the UN approved a 'no-fly'
zone, above the 36th parallel, to protect
the Kurds in northern Iraqand in August a 'no-fly' zone
for Iraqi planes was established in the South. In 1996,
this was extended to the 33rd parallel, just
south of Baghdad. The zones, covering 62 per cent of Iraq
are patrolled by the US and Britain.
Since 1991, US
military operations and
build-ups in the Gulf region have cost approximately
US$13 billion. Sporadic US actions include attacking an Iraqi
intelligence centre near Baghdad in June 1993, in
retaliation for an attempted assassination of President
Bush during a visit to Kuwait in April and, following the
expulsion of UN Inspectors, ‘Operation
Desert Fox’ during which military and other
centres were attacked. Since 1997 the US has advocated
the replacement of Saddam but has not acted on this
policy. His survival is thus seen as the 'unfinished
business' left by then President Bush to his son. Until
September 11, the US had implemented a policy, working
largely through UNSC resolutions, of containment via air
and naval operations. The most recent action was on the
15 September 2002 when British
and US jets bombed targets in
southern Iraq (Washington Post, 16
September).
September 11 and After
September 11 resulted in
President Bush declaring a 'War
on Terrorism' and
though aimed primarily at those responsible for the
attack i.e. Al Qaeda, the War is open ended and has
extended to other issues. Bush stressed that the War is
not aimed at Muslims or Islam though Usama bin Laden has
used Islam as a rallying point. There has however been a
backlash experienced by some Muslim communities. Apart
from military and other actions, the US has yet to deal
with the issues and grievances, that have given rise to
‘militant Islamic’ and other terrorist groups,
some of which have been the result of US
foreign policy.
The War received
widespread international
support and co-operation, including from Russia with
its unresolved Chechen conflict, and intelligence
co-operation with China and India. The US-led action in Afghanistan
is aimed primarily at destroying the bases of Al Qaeda,
provided by the then Pakistan
supported Taliban Government. Though successful in
replacing the Taliban, the new government headed by President
Hamid Kazai still faces enormous security and other
challenges. It is not known if Usama has been killed, but
his supporters have since been blamed for acts committed
both in and outside Afghanistan.
The US has also supported
or renewed relations with governments in oil and gas rich
Central Asia. These include establishing military bases
in Uzbekistan
and Kyrgyzstan
(elements of the Royal Australian Air Force are in the
Manas Airbase in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan) and limited landing
rights in Kazakhstan
and Tajikistan.
In South Asia, Pakistan, having abandoned the Taliban, is
now the front line ally in the fight against terrorism in
Afghanistan and for the first time the US conducted joint
military exercises with India. In Southeast Asia the US
has renewed some aid ties with the Indonesian military
and has sent 600 troops and advisers to the Southern
Philippines aimed at the Muslim-based Abu
Sayyaf, responsible for the murder of one of
its citizens, as well as strengthening ties with
Malaysia. There are expressed fears that the US
will repeat practices used in the Cold War in supporting
states, which have abused Human Rights but which publicly
support the US on ‘terrorism’. Within the US,
some legislation,
while popular with the majority of citizens, has alarmed civil
liberties groups.
'Axis
of Evil' and 'regime change' in Iraq
The US focus on Iraq,
which with Iran and North Korea was termed by Bush in his
State
of the Union address, as an ‘Axis of Evil’,
is an extension of the War on Terrorism. These regimes
with WMD have been accused of supporting US perceived
‘terrorist groups’ and the US fears that they
could supply them to terrorists. In contrast to its
policy on Iraq, the active policy of the US towards Iran
and North Korea are different. With Iran there is a 'dual-track'
policy, while condemning Iranian
support for Palestinian groups, which Iran justifies as
legitimate against Israeli occupation, there is dialogue
between officials under the umbrella of the UN in
Afghanistan. Iran
has accused the US of ‘taking advantage
of the September 11 events to impose its illogical views
on other countries’ (Washington Times, 22 May
2002). The US, according to Iran Supreme leader,
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei aims ultimately to control the
entire Middle
East and ‘to capture all vital
resources in this part of the world’ (Reuters
News, 15 September 2002). In the case of North Korea,
which is equally if not more brutal than Saddam's regime,
and possesses nuclear capacity and delivery systems, the
US has actively sought to negotiate with that regime on
its nuclear capacity in the recent past. The US has told
Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi,
prior to his visit that country during September 2002,
that it is prepared to resume
talks.
Saddam is generally
recognised to be a brutal dictator. However, the fact
remains that Iraq has been contained by existing US
policy and there is, as yet, no published evidence,
despite allegations, of any link between Al Qaeda and
Saddam. Usama bin Laden has condemned Saddam as an
‘apostate’, according to a policy
brief by the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace. The Ansar
al-Islam, a
group similar to and admiring of Al Qaeda, is currently
operating in northern Iraq and is fighting against local
Kurds. Allegations have been made that this group has
links with Saddam. The British Foreign Minister, Jack
Straw, has claimed that it
will provide proof that Saddam has trained Al Qaeda
operatives.
Iraqi Weapons
UN inspectors had
destroyed most, but not all, of Iraq's stock of, and
capacity to produce WMD before they left in 1998. Given a
lack of credible intelligence, it has been alleged by the
US, Britain and Australia that Saddam has continued to
develop them in secret. His refusal, until 17 September
2002, to accept inspections, is seen as evidence. While
Iraq's interest in WMD is well known, whether it has
actual stock is at best, a ‘guesstimate’. The
British International Institute of Strategic Studies
Dossier
(9 September 2002) states that Iraq probably has chemical
and biological weapons. On nuclear weapons, it said that
Iraq does not have the facilities to produce nuclear
weapons without extensive foreign assistance over several
years, to produce fissile materials. Iraq ‘could,
however, assemble nuclear weapons within months if
fissile material from foreign sources were
obtained’. Apart from developing and possessing such
a weapon, Iraq does not have the capacity to produce
long-range missiles. It is thought to possess an
estimated 12 al-Hussein
missiles, with a range of 650 kms and if armed with
chemical or biological weapons these could reach cities
in five neighbouring countries. The UNSCR has limited
Iraq to possess weapons with a range of not more than 150
kms. While dangerous, these do not pose an imminent
danger to the US.
The US also claimed that
Saddam could supply WMD to terrorists. This has been
disputed by Richard Butler, former head of UN weapons
inspection, during congressional
hearings on Iraq. He noted that this would be
irrational for Saddam and claimed that renewed
inspections could prevent holdings of significant
arsenals of them.
The
US Rationale for Action
Observers and analysts
have provided several explanations for the US singling
out Iraq for action.
- Saddam provides a real target, unlike the
frustrating campaign
against the shadowy and decentralised Al Qaeda
and as noted above, the US has 'unfinished
business' with him.
- The risk of keeping Saddam in a box and
developing nuclear weapons is too high.
- Bush and his supporters have argued that by
replacing Saddam and establishing democracy, this
could deter other regimes' support for anti-US
groups and also act as a catalyst for democratic
change in the other Arab states.
- US relations with Saudi Arabia, the major world
supplier of oil, since September 11, have been
strained and should relations deteriorate further
or there be a change in regime, control of Iraqi
oil reserves, the second largest in the world, is
seen by some analysts as being crucial. While the
US, the major consumer of oil in the world, has
decreased its dependence on oil through
efficiencies since the Gulf War, it has recently
increased its strategic reserves and is exploring
sources from former Soviet countries in Central
Asia.
International
Reactions
International
support for ‘regime change’ in Iraq, unlike
the ‘War on Terrorism’, has not yet been
forthcoming. The Bush claim to ‘the right of pre-emptive
strike’ has alarmed many countries since it
will, contrary to international law, establish a
dangerous precedent for other countries such as India in
its conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir.
Any unilateral action on
Iraq by the US raises questions of its inconsistent
policy towards several countries, which already possess
nuclear weapons and have threatened regional security.
Others have also defied UN Security Council Resolutions
with impunity e.g. Israel. On the need for 'regime
change' in Iraq and establishing democracy, US allies,
such as Saudi Arabia which has been seen by a US analyst
as ‘the
kernel of evil’ (and from where 15 of the
19 involved in September 11 come from) and Egypt, among
others, are not democratic. There is no provision under
international law for any state to determine, by force,
the leadership of another country. As noted above,
current policy has stymied Saddam's potential for action.
- Europeans, bar the United Kingdom, have largely
opposed the policy because of the lack of
evidence linking Saddam to September 11, failure
to exhaust all diplomatic measures and the
legality of the proposed action under
international law. Generally they have urged the
US against unilateral action and to seek the
sanction of the UN to legitimise its action.
- British Prime Minister Tony Blair,
Bush's strongest supporter, is facing strong
domestic opposition and has, like Australia, now
urged the UN to sanction proposed US action.
- ASEAN Parliamentarians, meeting in Hanoi
currently have expressed alarm at the prospect of
‘any
unprovoked and unjustified’ attack on
Iraq.
- The Arab League in its Beirut March Summit,
announced its "categorical rejection"
of US policy. During his March
visit to the Middle East US Vice-President
Cheney was urged by Arab leaders to deal with the
more important Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They
expressed fears of regional instability as a
consequence of such an attack and, perhaps
unsaid, of triggering unrest, which could well
threaten the security of friendly regimes.
- Egypt has undertaken to exert pressure
on Iraq.
- Some Arab leaders may privately agree, but could
not publicly support the US unilateral policy on
Iraq without UN support. Saudi Arabia's Foreign
Minister, in an interview with CNN
on the 14 September 2002, said:
that his country would be willing to allow
its territory and facilities to be used for
military action against Iraq -- but only if
such action is backed by a UN Security
Council resolution.
- In the region, only Israel supports a pre-emptive
strike by the US.
A
Shifting US Position?
The Bush Administration
believes that, based on existing UN Security Council and
Congressional Resolutions it does have a legal basis for
its proposed action on Iraq. However, given widespread
criticisms, and while still prepared to act unilaterally,
Bush has personally lobbied key leaders for support, or
at least not to cast their veto against, a yet to be made
public UNSCR, for authorisation to act against Iraq. It
is likely that such a resolution will require Saddam to
accept, within a very short time-frame, unfettered and if
necessary, armed inspections by the UN and the disarming
of his WMD. Iraq has belatedly hinted since 1 August
2002, that it is prepared to consider readmitting
inspectors under existing UNSC resolutions but these
vague responses have been dismissed as delaying tactics
by the US. On 3 September 2002 Tariq
Aziz, Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister, said
acceptance of UN inspectors would be conditional on no US
military action and the lifting of UN sanctions. The US
has made it quite clear that re-acceptance of inspectors
will not detract from their ‘regime change’
policy and Bush has said that ‘the
status quo is totally unacceptable’ (Radio
address to the Nation, 14 September 2002). The US is
concerned that any protracted arguments by Iraq will
affect the timing of its operation, which is likely to be
after the Muslim fasting month in early December and the
cooler season. There have been noted increases in US
troop and equipment movements for ‘military
exercises’ in the region.
In his UN
speech on 12 September 2002 Bush has widened
the target of terrorist groups and regimes who ‘are
plotting their war against civilisation’ and stated
that the US ‘will work on a new resolution to meet
our common enemy’. Some interpretations
of his speech suggest a new willingness to exhaust UN
options before taking direct action. His speech focused
on Saddam who is seen to constitute a real danger to the
US, his neighbours and the world, in its continual
defiance of 16 UN Security Council Resolutions,
possession and uses of WMD. According to Bush,
Saddam 'has made the case against himself' and
urged the UN to fulfil its primary objective by
supporting US action.
US
Debate on Iraq
There are ideological
divisions, from the 'realists' to 'idealists', within
the US
Administrationand Congressover
‘regime change’ in Iraq. Senior officials,
without military experience (widely referred to as 'chicken
hawks'), such as Vice-President Dick Cheney and
Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Congressional
leaders, advocate the -- unilateral if needs be--
exercise of US power to change the status quo to the
image of the US. Rumsfeld
was instrumental in re-establishing relations with Iraq
during the Iran-Iraq war and was aware then, but remained
silent, on Iraq's use of chemical weapons. To them Iraq
provides a timely opportunity for the US to change the whole
nature of the Middle East. They warned that to delay
action against Saddam and provide for him to develop
nuclear capacity is too dangerous and risky not only for
the US but also for the region. Some advocates for tough
action, including Attorney General Ashcroft, have been
linked to the conservative Christian Right in American
politics.
The more cautious, such
as Colin Powell, Secretary of State, areconcerned with
the wider and long term repercussions. The
supporters for caution cut across party lines, and
include many experienced former senior officials (Henry
Kissinger, Brent
Scowcroft, James
Baker and Lawrence
Eagleburger) of the Bush Senior and Clinton
Administrations and Congress members. Democrat Senator Dianne
Feinstein has warned that unilateral action by the
US:
without support from our allies or the UN would
clearly identify the US as the aggressor and may well
prompt a series of potentially catastrophic actions.
Following these expressed concerns, Bush has announced
that he will seek the approval of Congress before he
acts.
Concern has also been
expressed by retired
senior military officers (The Age, 31 August
2002) both in the US and from several countries. These
include Australian Maj-Gen Alan Stretton,
British Gen Sir Michael Rose
and Field Marshall Lord Bramall,
with the lack of comprehensive planning for the
consequences of a war on Iraq. It has been noted that
unlike the Gulf War, Saddam will, apart from responding
with his WMD, concentrate his key troops in the major
cities. Casualties, both civilian and military, will be
much higher. As in the case of the Gulf War, Saddam will
attack Israel with missiles, but this time armed with
WMD, so as to link his survival with the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Given the widespread
empathy for the Palestinian cause in the Arab and Muslim
world, this could trigger intense antipathy towards not
only the US but also their own pro-US governments. It
could result in more repressive acts by moderate
governments such as Egypt and Jordan and spawn new
groups, which the ‘War on Terrorism’ is seeking
to eliminate.
The continual leakage,
deliberate or otherwise, of discussions and decisions
relating to Iraq to the media has been unprecedented, and
it is unclear whether these have been the result of
internal divisions in the US Administration or a
deliberate strategy to confuse Saddam. British military
officials (The Age, 31 August 2002), suspect
it is part of an information warfare campaign. On
balance, it would appear that those advocating action,
with or without UN support, have been more vocal. At the
same time there has been a decline
in US public support, with a majority, 56 per cent,
feeling that it was important to give the UN more time to
try and secure the return of weapons inspectors (Independent,
9 September 2002). US Gulf War
Veterans have also not supported military action in
Iraq. This could well change if action commences.
The cost of an Iraqi
campaign has been estimated, by those who advocate
caution, to be $US80 billion. The
Gulf War cost US$60 billion and US allies paid 80 per
cent of this. During that War, oil reached US$40 a barrel
and affected the economies of non-oil producing countries
and led to a worldwide recession.
Australian Reactions
Australia supported the
US during the Gulf War and has contributed naval elements
to the enforcement of UN sanctions in the Gulf since
1991. Initial reactions by Prime Minister John Howard,
Foreign Minister Alexander Downer
and Defence Minister Senator Robert Hill,
to September 11 and the ‘War on Terrorism’ have
been strong and positive, though some remarks of Downer
have been criticised by the Opposition and some of the
media. Attorney General Daryl Williams
has also acknowledged the possibility of a terrorist
threat to Australia. While strong support appears to
remain, the way views have been expressed has been
modified after public
opinion polls reveal the absence of strong
support. Both sides of Parliament now stress the need
for the US to seek UN support, though depending on the
circumstances, will still be prepared to support
unilateral US action. The Returned
Services League issued a statement on the 3 September
2002:
that Australia would be morally justified in
committing troops to assist a US ground invasion of
Iraq if certain conditions are met - yet it fervently
hopes that military action can be
avoided…Clearly, it would be preferable if a
diplomatic solution was found particularly one which
saw the departure of Saddam Hussein and his cohorts.
The Australian High
Commission in Singapore has featured in captured Al Qaeda
tapes and the Singapore
government have detained 21 people under its Internal
Security Act. So far no Australian interests have
been attacked although 10 Australians were among those
killed in the World Trade Centre attack.
Australia's trade with
Iraq is dominated by wheat valued at A$829 million and
with the Middle East at A$7.89 billion (2001). Iraq had
threatened, but later rescinded, to link its purchase of
wheat to Australia's position on US policy.
Update
- 17 September 2002
The UN
Secretary-General announced that
Iraq has written in a letter to the UN, which
stated that the Iraqi Government has decided:
to allow the return of the United Nations weapons
inspectors to Iraq without conditions.
The White
House, in response, stated that the
UNSC needs to decide how to enforce its own resolutions,
which:
will require a new, effective UN Security Council
resolution that will actually deal with the threat
Saddam Hussein poses to the Iraqi people, to the
region and to the world.
It added that:
This is not a matter of inspections. It is about
disarmament of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and
the Iraqi regime's compliance with all other Security
Council resolutions.
Reaction around the world ranged from cautious acceptance
by the European and Arab countries to deep suspicion that
Iraq is merely playing for time and is seen by the
Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, as a 'diplomatic
ploy'. Former South African president Nelson Mandela
has accused the US of bullying Saddam, in dismissing
Iraq's agreement to the unconditional return of UN arms
inspectors.
On 8 November 2002 the
UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution
1441, while Iraq indicated its willingness to accept
UN inspectors, without conditions, on the 17 September
2002. It took some 2 months of negotiations among the
permanent members of the Security Council, before they
were satisfied, that the wording of the proposed
resolution did not include any 'hidden
‘triggers,’ that would have allowed the US to
commence military operations against Iraq, without
requiring a further resolution from the Council.
The agreed Resolution noted that Iraq was in material
breach of past UNSC Resolutions and offered Iraq a final
opportunity to comply with the relevant resolutions, on
pains of ‘serious consequences’. It required
Iraq to provide within 30 days a full, accurate and
complete declaration of all aspects of its weapons of
mass destruction programs. The weapons inspectors were to
be provided with immediate, unimpeded, unconditional and
unrestricted access and the right to interview all Iraqi
officials involved in any of the programs either in Iraq
or outside the country (and their families). Failure to
meet these stringent demands would be seen as a material
breach and reported ‘immediately’ by the
Inspectors to the Council, which would then convene
immediately to consider the report. UN Inspectors began
work within 45 days of the passing of the Resolution and
will update the Council in 60 days after resuming
inspections.
The UNSC gave Iraq 1 week to respond to the
Resolution, which it did. Iraq has also provided a dossier
of almost 12,000 pages as its 'Currently Accurate,
Full and Complete Declaration (CAFCD)'. The United States
and the United Kingdom have reacted sceptically and have
stated that much of the information provided is not new. Secretary
Powell (19 December 2002) has claimed
that there were ‘omissions’ as well as
‘obvious falsehoods’ in the information
provided.
The US has also continued to link Iraq with Al Qaeda
but according to the BBC (28
October 2002), ‘the links are tenuous’. At
the same time, US demand for ‘regime
change’ in Iraq has been modified to accommodate
either a ‘change by the regime’ or a
‘change of the regime’, implying that Saddam
Hussein may yet survive if he complies completely with
UNSCR 1441.
The US has continued to build up its forces in the
region and has sought the support
of allies (4 December 2002) with varying degrees of
success. It is expected that military action, despite
many uncertainties, may commence in March 2003, if not
earlier, after the submission of the Final Report of the
UN Inspectors, due on 27 February 2003.
At the behest of the US, the Iraqi
opposition in exile, despite differences, has
recently met in London (15-16 December 2002) and agreed
to form a committee of 65 notables to shape the future of
post Saddam Iraq. Despite these actions, Powell
stated on 19 December 2002, that the US will stay
‘within the UN process’.
Australia, while still supporting any potential US
unilateral action on Iraq, would prefer to operate within
the auspices of the UN. While contingency plans are being
prepared, no commitment, particularly after the Bali
Bombing in October, has been made to the US.
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