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Acceptable Transport Safety
Matthew L James
Science, Technology, Environment and Resources Group
Tables and figures
All transport activities involve some risk but while the community may not
know whether safety levels are acceptable or not, governments are left to
regulate against potentially dangerous practices. Statistics do suggest
that Australia's transport safety standards and accident levels are reasonable
although transport accidents cost around $6.6 billion every year. Motor
vehicle accidents lead the rates found among transport modes and they also
contribute the greatest economic costs to the nation of around $6.1 billion
annually.
Calculation of accident costs and safety benefits help to identify relative
risk management strategies for each mode of transport. These assist decisions
on relative safety and accident hazard risk. However, common safety practice
across all modes also provides some useful insights as it is the cost,
severity and frequency of accidents that matter to travellers - not the
mode. By analysing all of these aspects, it is possible to assess acceptable
transport safety levels.
International air safety has greatly improved during this century with
advanced technology providing much assistance to counter the main accident
cause - human error. Australia has a tripartite structure of Commonwealth
agencies to manage air safety matters but on the whole the industry has
tended to lag behind international practice. Keeping air safety investigation
agencies apart from regulatory agencies has been a key factor overseas,
while just as important here is the harmonious development of a cooperative
aviation industry.
Australia's major airlines such as Qantas and Ansett can maintain their
exemplary safety record with jet-powered aircraft. The impact of government
on air safety has been the subject of a Parliamentary inquiry that may
continue. This inquiry has not found evidence of any deterioration in
overall air safety, except for the charter flights sector. In 1993, the
latest year for which data is available, the total community cost of 320
aviation accidents in Australia was $76 million.
Road accidents remain a major costly problem to the whole community
accounting for about 15 per cent of years of productive life losses. Australia's
record could still improve although our death rate per hundred-million
vehicle kilometres of 1.4 is not far behind the United States, Canada
or Britain. Individual responsibility for accident prevention is often
lacking. Road safety management remains divided between Federal, State
and Local Government agencies, with a new national strategy and plan offering
some coordination and goals. Their imposition of safety restrictions on
the driving community sometimes meets strong resistance, suggesting that
some innovative technological solutions may be more effective.
Reflecting the scattered nature of rail operations in Australia, rail
safety has developed in an ad hoc manner, largely through the application
of industry standards. New State rail safety regulations have received
some national acceptance but there remains no national rail safety agency.
Given the Federal policy for open access to rail infrastructure nationwide,
there is a need for more action towards achieving uniform national safety
and operating standards. Note that Australia averages around 100 rail
accidents annually that in turn average around $1 million each in terms
of cost to the community.
International shipping safety remains a problem due mainly to commercial
pressures on unregulated operators. Australia observes international conventions
directed towards improving sea safety and has taken some action to ensure
compliance by visiting ships. Private small boat safety remains largely
a State or local issue without national coordination. Each year in Australia,
some 1 000 marine accidents occur involving serious injury or death on
board boats or ships, costing the nation over $300 million.
Transportation safety investigation of accidents varies around the world
but recent American practice favours a joint transport mode approach to
the issue. Australia has instead pursued an ad hoc approach involving
separate safety agencies with no clear separation between investigative
and regulatory bodies. Combining our agencies into one independent organisation
may offer new perspectives on and efficiencies in transport accident analysis.
Through the information that it provides, analysts will be better able
to determine for each mode just what are the levels of acceptable transport
safety.
Such an independent organisation of around 100 staff, with annual funding
of $9 million, would investigate around 1 300 air, rail and sea accidents
annually that cost the community $476 million in 1993. Including 90 road
safety program staff with a budget of $8 million plus program costs may
provide cost efficiencies in addressing the problem of an annual $6.1
billion in road accident costs facing the Australian community. This seems
to be a very small price to pay towards helping to improve transport safety
in Australia but moreover would constitute a committed, national approach
to our accident problems.
When Australian entrepreneur Dick Smith promoted the term "affordable
safety" for airlines, many people in air transport scoffed at the idea.
Nonetheless, the concept of paying for air safety is an issue. This extends
to the wider transport sector too, as in fact the community as a whole must
bear the cost of road or rail accidents, marine disasters and air crashes.
Questions arise as to what limit the community is prepared to accept such
incidents and whether it is possible to improve transport safety to higher
levels.
Almost all human activities involve some risk, so public policies have
to balance possible extra risks against ascertainable benefits (Withers
1988, 4). This assessment may evaluate expenditures on risk mitigation
and whether certain activities should occur or not. The concept of a risk
threshold or "acceptable risk" arises, based on the assumption
that there is a non-zero probability of occurrence below which the public
is willing to accept the risk.
Thus acceptable safety is a level where the advantages of increased
safety are not worth the extra costs of reducing risk. By implication,
this is also a level of affordable safety, although this terminology implies
a direct cost measure of risk management actions. On the other hand, acceptable
transport safety involves a qualitative judgement of the community's willingness
to accept a certain level and consequence of accidents without any action.
In this sense, risk is a measure of both hazard level and public outrage.
There is often not as much public concern about transport deaths such
as on the roads compared to those occurring at fixed installations such
as factories. This is possibly due to lack of a geographical focal point
with the former, a relatively low social risk and general acceptance of
road transport systems particularly.
This paper examines the statistical and historical cost records of accidents
in each of the main transport modes in Australia and contrasts them with
some comparable countries. It outlines the regulatory arrangements and
policy options available for safety programs. It concentrates on the matter
of transportation safety investigation and notes different possible arrangements.
Finally, the paper considers the establishment of a multi-modal transportation
safety investigation agency. With public acceptance of such an agency,
safety regulations would receive better awareness, understanding and acceptance.
Accident statistics provide some information on safety but do not directly
measure it unless there is a statistical relationship over time (HORSC 1995a,
30). The frequency of accidents is not by itself a complete measure of safety,
especially as the events that safety management seeks to eliminate have
already occurred in the statistics. Also, the number of accidents is usually
small compared to total activity and is subject to fluctuations of chance.
The Reason Model of Systems Safety conceives of an organisational accident
in which latent failures, arising mainly in the managerial and organisational
spheres, combine adversely with local triggering events (weather, location,
etc), and with the active failures of individuals at the sharp end (errors
and procedural violations) (HORSC 1995a, 71). Together, these all combine
to cause accidents, so safety becomes a complex matter.
It is possible to assess the adequacy of existing safety standards in
general terms by comparing the published requirements and standards of
the world's regulatory authorities. There are two issues to consider in
order to assess the adequacy of standards, namely, whether existing standards
are adequate or if the process for establishing them is suitable (ibid,
91).
Australia follows accepted international standards for transport safety.
The responsibilities for compliance with legislation and regulations rest
with the transport industry and users.
The role of government regulation in transport safety has been to guard
against actions that are potentially detrimental to society. Although
commercial transport operations may ensure safe operations in the long
term, in the short term a sufficiently high and consistent degree of safety
may not prevail. Accident statistics show that private operators may not
maintain sufficient safety standards despite their best intentions. Government
regulation protects the public and operators alike, but needs to achieve
a balance of acceptability.
The World Health Organisation (WHO) provides standardised classifications
for mortality and morbidity, the science of nosology. The WHO International
Classification of Diseases defines a transport accident as 'any accident
involving a device primarily for, or being used at the time primarily for,
conveying persons or goods from one place to another' (BTCE 1992, 89). This
provides a basis for statistical analysis of transport accident records,
but before doing so, readers should take caution before drawing immediate
conclusions.
Different measures of risk can sometimes provide quite different impressions.
As an example, the number of accidental deaths per million tons of coal
mined in the United States has decreased steadily over time, indicating
a safer industry. However, the rate of accidents per one thousand coal-mine
employees has increased over the same time (Mayo & Hollander 1991,
52). Mortality rates also fail to reflect the fact that some hazards cause
death at much earlier ages than do others. In this regard, the fatality
statistics shown for a range of activities in Table 1 should not be viewed
as the last word. Nonetheless, they provide a guide to relative risks,
in this case in the United States. Another way of viewing this matter
is to calculate the average loss of life expectancy due to the exposure
to the hazard based on deaths distributed as a function of age. Table
1 also shows these figures. An indication of uncertainty in these assessments
as well as the costs and benefits of available options would be useful
for more balanced assessments. Nonetheless Table 1 holds few surprises.
Table 1. Mortality due to risk in the United
States
Risk category Fatality rate Days of life
per 100 000 people lost per person
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Motorcycling 2000
Aerial acrobatics 500
Smoking (all causes) 300 2250
Parachuting 200
Smoking (cancer) 120 980
Firefighting 80 300
Hang gliding 80
Coal mining 63 1100
Farming 36
Motor vehicle accident 24 207
Police work 22
Boating 5
Rodeo performer 3
Hunting 3
Fires 2.8
Marine accident 0.08
Aircraft accident 0.075
Floods 0.06
Lightning 0.05
Rail accident 0.051
Meteorite 0.000006
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Sources Mayo & Hollander 1991, p.53; Sabey & Taylor 1980.
While some accidents kill only one person at a time, others can kill hundreds
or more at once. In this sense, air crashes are infrequent and high consequence
events compared with frequent and perceived lower consequence events in
which single individuals die each time. People may view infrequent hazards
as unlikely but their effects may be much more devastating. As an example,
if a comet or fragment hit the Earth, the immediate and long-term effects
on the planet would be extensive and immutable. Yet few people can conceive
of this event, despite the fact that just such an incident apparently wiped
out the dinosaurs in the past and is predicted to occur again.
The social cost of transport accidents in Australia, including road, rail,
aviation and marine events, includes the costs of lost earnings, foregone
contributions, pain and suffering, property damage, insurance administration,
delays, medical and legal expenses and accident investigation. A conservative
estimate of the cost to Australian society of transport accidents in 1988
was $6.6 billion (BTCE 1992, xiii). Of this, road accidents contributed
$6.1 billion, aviation $64 million, rail $94 million and sea $264 million.
The largest cost components were property damage of $2 billion, pain and
suffering at $1.4 billion and lost earnings of $1 billion.
Table 2 provides the latest updates of these cost estimates showing
that both accident rates and costs have declined in all categories except
for marine accidents. Surface transport data shows that, of the total
domestic freight task of 266 billion tonne kilometres, road takes 34 per
cent, rail 29 per cent and sea 36 per cent. Later discussion will consider
each of these transport mode categories in turn.
Table 2. Costs of Accidents in Australia
Accident type Person
and year fatalities Person Injury (Numbers) Cost to the Community
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hospital Medical Minor Nominal($m) 1993($m)
--------------------------- ----------------------
1988 Air 70 44 55 461 64.0 80
1993 Air 67 57 64 438 76.0 76
1988 Rail 96 154 61 1111 94.5 120
1993 Rail 49 88 113 488 69.0 69
1988 Road 2875 25187 71760 83291 6100.0 7746
1993 Road 1732 17000+ 47000+ n.a. 6100.0+ 6100
1988 Sea 69 680 264.0 318
1993 Sea 73 901 316.0 316
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sources BTCE 1994, 1995a, 1995c, 1995d.
A maximum value on safety expenditure may be equivalent to the Value of
Life (VoL) or the amount of money society is prepared to spend to avoid
a single fatality. British Rail (Railtrack) currently places a value of
$4 million on VoL while the United Kingdom Department of Transport places
a value of only $1.5 million on VoL (ibid, 13). In considering remedial
measures to improve transport safety such agencies may also consider other
risks such as environmental effects, business success, economic changes
and political implications. Note that some people criticise the valuation
of life and injury done in this way.
The affordable safety argument concerns the appropriate manufacturing
standards for transport vehicles and the cost benefit analysis of manufacture,
operation and maintenance. If the costs of imposing safety standards are
too high, fewer people will travel due to higher charges and more people
may use less safe transport. This is a matter of assessing the relative
safety of some transport vehicles compared to others, based on safety
resource allocation. The following section discusses cost benefit analysis
before turning to risk management practices that ensure a logical flow
of resources among modes and activities.
Cost benefit analysis (CBA) provides a framework in which risk evaluators
can make rational decisions about alternative options in a consistent manner.
CBA involves quantification and possible valuation of the costs and benefits
associated with various options and the estimation of the present value
of their net benefits spread over time. The costs and benefits are those
that society bears and include time savings, safety and environmental effects
even though these may have no identifiable market price (Spiro & Parfitt
1995, 215). CBA helps decision makers establish whether the expected benefits
of a scheme justify the costs and to deploy resources in a way that maximises
net benefits.
Public sector investment decisions often utilise CBA, such as in road
investments in which safety-related benefits and costs arise. CBA has
also arisen in road safety schemes such as the compulsory wearing of seat-belts.
However, other modes have not often utilised such economic safety appraisal
techniques although safety authorities in the USA and Canada have used
CBA. It provides better definition of objectives, options, costs and benefits
but involves problems of estimating risks, the value of life, human and
accident factors (ibid, 217).
The costs of measures to prevent or ameliorate the consequences of accidents
include:
- Industry: capital equipment costs, operating costs, reduced revenue,
extra training and lost time; and
- Government: administrative costs, support equipment costs, enforcement
and research expenses.
The potential benefits from safety measures include (Spiro & Parfitt
1995, 218):
- Individuals: reduction of risk (willingness-to-pay), savings in expenses,
health impacts, VoL;
- Property: reduction in unit loss and damage, avoidance of damage to
installations and cargo;
- Users: reduced delays, avoiding loss of commercial reputation (plus
national image); and
- Environmental: cleanup savings, damage repair, industry effects, values
placed on amenity, etc.
Arguments about safety are often actually about risk management. Such a
case arises in the study of simultaneous independent operations on intersecting
runways at Sydney Airport (SSC 1995, E13). The study found that accidents
arise under any airport operating mode and so air traffic controllers must
include safety margins according to the chosen mode of operation. The real
issue is one of relative safety or hazard risk. Risk is the probability
or likelihood of a hazard accident event happening, multiplied by its consequences.
This is a measurable quantity when there are numerous well-documented instances
of the adverse consequences of an event and with a well-defined exposed
population. However, risk is not so easily ascertained in the case of high
consequence, low-probability events where estimates become uncertain or
misunderstood by the public.
Risk management means considering the potential for accidents to occur,
as well as their individual cost and severity (Hyndman et al. 1994, 133).
It may be a set of formal methods and procedures used to advance safety,
through systematic analysis of occurrences and their cause and effect
relationships. Risk management provides a framework for assessing large
amounts of data and allocation of limited resources for review (ibid,
42) by CBA methods. CBA provides a range of outcomes within risk and sensitivity
analysis considerations. It may also be necessary to add the level of
public outrage to risk analyses.
Probabilistic Risk Assessment, also known as Quantified Risk Assessment,
is a tool used for measuring the relative degree of safety risks resulting
from a particular mode of activity or operation within an industry. It
involves risk analysis (identification and probabilities), risk evaluation
(impacts) and risk control (measures). Risk analysis involves inspection,
brainstorming or more structured hazard identification techniques (Atkinson
& Hinds 1995, 7) such as safety audits. Risk evaluation uses CBA and
decision analysis to estimate expected value of outcomes for further sensitivity
analysis. Out of these calculations arise risk control strategies that
involve quality assurance type practices.
Such risk management aims to reduce risks and increase safety at a practical
level, given the resources and constraints involved, when balanced with
the costs of accidents. Fundamental to safety regulation is the principle
that risks should be reduced "as low as reasonably practicable"
(ibid, 12). A risk reduction measure that involves a grossly disproportionate
expenditure in relation to the risk is not reasonably practicable or for
that matter acceptable. Zero risk inferred by absolute safety is usually
not achievable or affordable. A practical guide to safety management measures
by mode is of interest here, especially as public familiarity with transport
systems directly influences their operation.
A safety factor common to all transport modes is the danger of collision
with other vehicles. Each mode has traditionally adopted different ways
of dealing with this problem, but common approaches may also be possible,
as illustrated by a familiar example. While there was a time when our roads
carried generally courteous drivers of predictable behaviour, these days
it seems to be a general free-for-all. Witness the ever present drag-off
from the traffic lights, between 'competing' cars, until they meet again
at the next light, for example, or the prevalence of impatient tail-gaters
and drivers who change lanes at every opportunity, in a ceaseless quest
to be in front of others.
One way to counter this aggressive, unsafe behaviour would be for compulsory
installation of collision avoidance equipment that would require cars
to keep a set distance behind each other according to the 'two second'
rule. This useful guide allows two seconds to lapse between consecutive
vehicles past a set point regardless of the speed of vehicles. A two second
period allows sufficient time for following vehicles to stop behind leading
ones. Any collision avoidance equipment would require an advanced computer
control system in order to judge speeds, calculate changing distances
and monitor vehicle engines. It would have to reject driver instructions
to follow at closer distances and yet maintain safety at the same time.
Just such intelligent automatic vehicle control systems are in development
under advanced highway management studies.
Traffic alert and collision avoidance systems are already used by large
jet aircraft to warn pilots of the threat of impending collision with
other planes. They utilise radar detectors and speakers to alert pilots
to the presence of approaching aircraft in their vicinity. It is left
to the pilot though to take corrective action to avoid collision. Australia's
air authorities have decided that all aircraft with over 30 seats must
have collision avoidance units installed by 1999. Similar systems could
just as well apply to ships and small boats. Many ships utilise radars
and collision warning systems to help avert disasters but few boats have
such units. Given that the majority of maritime accidents involve small
boats possibly the installation of collision avoidance equipment is a
pressing necessity.
However, the installation of such equipment in transport vehicles requires
general community acceptance of the need and cost of such measures, plus
a willingness for government agencies to regulate, monitor and enforce
them for each mode. Such a change in attitude came about when the compulsory
wearing of vehicle seatbelts began in response to road carnage. An interim
step may be for say a police crackdown on dangerous road behaviour or
greater supervised pilotage of vessels, but at a cost to the transport
system. The next few sections cover each of the transport modes in turn.
They provide a comparison of modal safety approaches used in Australia,
commencing with aviation.
Over the decades, the frequency and length of airline flights has grown
enormously while the fatalities per passenger kilometre have dropped just
as dramatically. Besides the strong industry interest in fostering air safety
are the structural conditions that foster safety, such as the fact that
political and financial elites often fly, along with the importance of past
experience (Perrow 1984, 127). With extensive experience and considerable
government support the industry has been able to maximise its approach to
safety. However this has not necessarily led to even safer practices and
noteworthy, horrific air crashes still occur.
More and more aircraft now fly faster than before often in poor weather
and with limited fuel, through the use of automated systems. These have
increased operational effectiveness but not really reduced crew workloads.
Human error remains the largest problem while aviation equipment has built-in
safety, redundancy and sensitivity to human factors. Other aircraft movements
compound the complexity of aircraft operation. Air traffic control has
to judge proper separation sometimes without total information. This ground
control actually has two conflicting functions of assuring safety and
expediting passenger service.
There are several international practices which influence transportation
safety. These range from formal multilateral conventions in the air and
marine modes to bilateral or national industry and government co-operation
for specific sectors (Hyndman et al. 1994, 12). The 1944 Chicago Convention
recognises the general principle that the regulation of air safety is
the primary responsibility of the country of registry. Current international
aircraft accident investigation regimes stem from Article 26 of the Chicago
Convention that establishes certain obligations on a country, where an
accident occurs, to analyse it. The 1951 Council of International Civil
Aviation Organisation issued an Annexe 13 to the Convention to set out
recommended procedures for investigating aircraft accidents. Even so,
the increasing complexity of the industry challenges national regulators
to keep pace.
In 1995, with an upward trend worldwide, there were just over 1 200
deaths in around 57 fatal major airline accidents globally. Of these,
589 people died in nine fatal accidents on scheduled jet-powered airline
flights. There were 365 fatalities in nine accidents involving non-scheduled
passenger aircraft. Regional and commuter airlines suffered 24 fatal accidents
in which a total of 219 people died, while 15 accidents to cargo flights
accounted for 42 aircrew deaths (Learmount 1996, 24). The majority of
these crashes resulted from aircrew error. Note that these figures exclude
greater numbers of general aviation accidents.
In Australia, 320 aviation accidents in 1993 cost the community $76 million,
or $237 500 per accident. Figure 1 shows our aviation accidents over recent
years. The average cost of the 36 major airline and general aviation fatal
accidents in 1993 was about $1.6 million, while the non fatal ones cost
around $70 000 each (HORSC 1995a, 19). The total costs of fatal accidents
of fare paying passengers on low capacity regular airline and charter is
estimated as $8 million.
Figure 1. Australian Civil Aircraft Accidents
Note: Civil Aircraft Accidents includes charter, agricultural, training,
survey, private, business and low capacity regular public transport (airline)
aviation incidents.
Source HORSC 1995a, p. 32.
Our relatively low accident rate reflects the relatively good weather
conditions, flat topography and uncongested air routes found across Australia,
when compared with northern nations. However it could still improve as
air accident rates are affected by many factors including weather, equipment
failure, system failure, human error and failure of ground aids (CASA
1995, 16). Accident rates and trends are a measure of the total system
performance including aircraft operators, maintenance, manufacturers,
airport operators, search and rescue, meteorology services and private
participants.
Many aviation industry players are active in air safety work. These
include airlines, aircraft operators, pilots and their various associations.
Also involved are manufacturers, aviation maintenance agencies and the
respective unions. It would seem that the only level of acceptable air
safety to them is for no accidents to occur at all. In Australia until
1992, the Commonwealth directly assumed financial responsibility for public
interest air safety regulation, but now the administrative arrangements
and funding have changed. A tripartite arrangement manages provision of
safe aviation services as now described.
The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) has the mission to maintain,
enhance and promote the safety of civil aviation in Australia, through
effective safety regulation and by encouraging a greater acceptance by
industry of its obligation to maintain high safety standards (CASA 1995,
5). It intends to achieve these goals by means including:
- developing and promulgating appropriate, clear and concise aviation
safety standards;
- developing effective enforcement strategies to secure compliance with
aviation safety standards;
- issuing certificates, licences, registrations and permits;
- conducting comprehensive aviation industry surveillance, particularly
safety related matters; and
- conducting regular and timely assessment of international safety developments.
The Bureau of Air Safety Investigation (BASI) is responsible for investigating
accidents and incidents involving civil aircraft operations in Australia.
BASI activities focus on promoting safe aviation, with particular interest
in fare-paying passenger operations, by examining selected occurrences
and safety deficiencies (DOT 1995, 20). With an annual budget of $6.7
million, BASI has 80 staff and publishes regular reports and information.
The safety of air navigation is the most important consideration of
AirServices Australia (ASA). The principal activities of ASA cover airspace
management, air traffic control, traffic and flight information, search
and rescue, navigation services, aeronautical information, rescue and
firefighting, as well as environment monitoring (ASA 1995, 4). A special
ASA project is implementation of The Australian Advanced Air Traffic System
due for completion in early 1998. The system will enable ASA to manage
all enroute services from two centres at Brisbane and Melbourne. ASA is
developing a risk analysis model to determine risk levels associated with
current and proposed methods of managing Australian airspace, as part
of its airway's safety work. It has a target to reduce air traffic incidents
per 100 000 aircraft movements from over six in 1994/95 to below four
in the short term, and progressively decrease them to nil (ASA 1995, 69).
The mission of the Federal Airports Corporation (FAC) is to provide
world class airport services to Australia. The FAC owns 22 primary, regional
and general aviation airports across Australia but not all such facilities
found here. In its operation of airports, the FAC has a goal to have due
regard for ensuring safe practices in airports at all times.
In the United States a policy goal of zero aircraft accidents is a shared
responsibility of government, industry and labour organisations as well
as each individual member of the aviation community (HORSC 1995a, 13). Despite
airline deregulation the aggregate safety performance of the industry has
remained exemplary although accident rates may rise with poor airline financial
performance (ibid, 54). Ongoing safety concerns arise from the financial
pressure on firms, new entrants, customer shifts and congestion (Moses &
Savage 1989, 6). The emergence of the hub travel system that channels all
flights through central hub airports for passenger transport has offered
cost economies to airlines. Overall, people travel more safely now, although
on certain lower traffic routes safety has declined on small craft, while
hub congestion is also a concern (ibid, 310-3).
The case of Canada serves as an interesting counterpoint to Australia's
difficulties in air safety administration. Until 1989, the Canadian Aviation
Safety Board (CASB) continued to report to Parliament through the Minister
of Transport. Following a major air crash in 1985, the "CASB's credibility
was so seriously compromised by internal disputes that it was effectively
destroyed as a public agency"(Hyndman et al. 1994, 5). New arrangements
then prevailed in much the same way that Australia now has two bodies
CASA and ASA.
In essence, where the investigative agency is part of the regulatory
authority or transport department, there is a potential for conflict of
interest that casts a shadow on credibility. In the Canadian view, the
most important element of a successful air safety agency is not written
in law or administrative structure but is simply a desire for all parties
to work together in a professional manner with compromise and cooperation
(ibid, 9). Such a lesson is important for us to observe given our recent
crisis in air safety administration.
The impact of government on Australian air safety has been the subject of
a Parliamentary inquiry that may continue. This inquiry has not found evidence
of any deterioration in overall air safety, except for the charter flights
sector. The report proposes mandatory reporting of charter airline safety
records, noting that major airline safety resource allocation in Australia
exceeds the standard requirements. The report does propose the following
characteristics of a world best practice regulator of aviation safety (HORSC
1995a, 9):
- legislation that assists the regulator to perform its tasks effectively;
- clear articulation of the objectives of regulation, strategies and
performance indicators;
- special emphasis on aviation safety indicators (currently lacking
here - HORSC 1995a, 125);
- adequate information and knowledge of the aviation industry and especially
safety aspects;
- processes that can develop a good working relationship within the
air transport industry;
- a cohesive organisation of adequately trained and skilled personnel
with effective leadership; and
- adequate processes and skills in developing effective safety standards
and ensuring compliance with an effective system of accountability.
Aviation is a highly technical and regulated industry that tends to
seek out the leading advances in technological progress. With the move
towards automated air traffic control systems, collision avoidance equipment,
advanced meteorological and navigational information systems and other
innovations, safety levels should improve further. However this still
depends on proper training, regulation and enforcement controls. All of
the main regulatory agencies must perform appropriate CBA and risk management
studies.
Safety improvements for the airline industry could possibly include
a range of measures. They might restrict private aircraft operation in
the vicinity of congested main hub airports or charge landing, congestion
and control fees because airports are scarce economic resources. Further
measures could include a ticket tax for government investment in safety
and an increase in the numbers and training level of air traffic controllers
(Moses & Savage 1989, 316-20). Other techniques might police the sale
of second-hand aircraft spare parts to ensure their quality and also install
collision avoidance warning systems on all aircraft. Overall it appears
that for aviation a suitable goal for acceptable safety is for zero accidents,
despite the costs involved. At least this is the goal of most agencies
involved in the aviation industry. Given that this sector remains under
tight national control such a goal appears achievable. This is certainly
not the case as yet for the land transport sector.
People associate road accidents with a common activity that almost everyone
needs so their perception of risk is often not recognised until they are
personally affected (Sabey & Taylor 1980, 44). Accordingly, the concept
of "acceptable risk" has not applied globally to road safety so
that formal target setting lacks wide adoption. While we consider road safety
risks mostly in relation to the community as a whole, it is the risks as
seen by individuals which frequently determine the successful outcome of
countermeasures (ibid, 46). Compounding this problem is the perceived low
risk to individuals of accident and injury involved while accidents present
a major problem to the community as a whole.
Road accidents remain a major cause of death in many countries, with
around 400 000 people dying from them around the world every year (OECD
1994b, 9). The world's lowest death rates per hundred-million vehicle
kilometres are 1.2 in the United States and 1.1 in the United Kingdom,
with Australia close by at about 1.4 (Winter 1996). Figure 2 shows world
road accident trends per 100 000 population and suggests that Australia
has a reasonable ranking. Here, death rates are generally higher in rural
areas, although there is variation between states. In OECD countries,
about one to two per cent of gross national product is lost annually due
to road accidents (Zaal 1994, i). Road deaths account for almost 15 per
cent of years of productive life lost by all causes, excluding disability
injury, in Australia (FORS 1992, 1). In Australia, for each road fatality
there are over ten serious injuries which means that every year some 20
000 people require hospitalisation (ibid, 7).
Figure 2. Road Accident Fatalities per 100 000
Population in Selected Countries
Source Winter 1996, p.1 (per FORS).
Factors contributing to road accidents comes mainly from the user, secondly
from the road environment and finally from the vehicle. The road user
factors contributing to accidents arise chiefly from poor execution (speed,
following distance, behaviour), perceptual errors (judgement), impairment
or lack of skill. Adverse environment features include poor road design,
conditions, bad markings or obstructions. Vehicle factors primarily relate
to tyres, brakes, steering or lights (Sabey & Taylor 1980, 51-53).
The risk of injury stems from inadequate vehicle occupant protection and
absence of protection for pedestrians and cyclists. Road safety targets
assist agencies to achieve realistic programs, usually involving a small
percentage reduction in accident fatality or casualty rates over several
years. Agencies use prevention strategies of environment or engineering
solutions, education and enforcement.
While road traffic accidents have to an extent been acceptable to the
community in the past there are signs that unrestricted vehicle usage
is no longer an end in itself, partly for social reasons. A trend of generally
decreasing road accident rates over recent decades has now begun to stall.
It is becoming increasingly difficult to further reduce the number of
fatalities and casualties in highly motorised countries (OECD 1994b, 9).
In the twelve months to June 1994, the Australian road toll was 6.5% higher
than for the same period in 1993 (NRTAC 1995, 5). The 1995 national toll
was 4% higher than in 1994 (FORS 1996).
In Australia, road safety administration falls under the province of
many agencies. The Federal Office of Road Safety (FORS) and State traffic
authorities have planning responsibility linked to the National Road Trauma
Advisory Council and the Road Safety Council. FORS guides the development
of measures to reduce the incidence and severity of road crashes and maintains
an extensive accident database. It develops standards, policies and road
safety public education programs to improve the safety of road users and
administers motor vehicle standards for safety, emissions and noise levels
(DOT 1995, 35). FORS has around 90 staff and an annual budget of $7.7
million plus safety program running costs. Among other organisations interested
in road safety are motoring bodies, police, vehicle manufacturers, community
groups and commercial transport operators.
The 1992 National Road Safety Strategy and 1994 National Road Safety
Action Plan are a package of measures that provides a framework for local
plans and ongoing monitoring. The Strategy is the first national approach
by all levels of government as well as industry and community groups to
reduce the road toll. The Strategy involves agency coordination, commitment,
cost-effective prioritisation plus research and development (FORS 1992,
1). Victoria and New South Wales have already formally set respective
goals for 30 per cent and 25 per cent reductions in the road toll by the
year 2000. The National Strategy aims to reduce annual road deaths per
100 000 people to below 10 by the year 2001. Key priorities include alcohol
and drug abuse, speeding, vehicle occupant protection, driver fatigue,
road hazards, heavy vehicles, novice drivers and riders, plus improved
trauma management. The Action Plan involves development of codes of safety,
road audits, alcohol and drug use programs, driver education and training
measures involving police, schools and traffic agencies. Safety audits
have resulted in changes to road design standards and processes.
Separate national road safety programs include the National Bicycle
Strategy and the Black Spots Program. The latter $270 million Program
operated from 1990-91 to 1992-93 and involved 3 176 sites. The decrease
in injury crashes at sample Program sites was over two-and-a-half times
similar locations, with fatalities falling by one-third (BTCE 1995b, xix).
A Program CBA estimate of 3.9 for the overall schedule of acceptable treatments,
shows a level of good targeted returns. The Bicycle Strategy is under
implementation. Other road safety policy recommendations include (Moses
& Savage 1989, 327-9):
- through inspections, identify hazardous zones and time periods to
enable road improvements;
- establish a central computer inventory of accidents, safety violations
and property damage; and
- evaluate speed limit monitoring programs and impose better law enforcement
and penalties.
It appears that traffic law enforcement requires increased surveillance
levels and penalties. Automated enforcement devices provide the most cost-effective
means (Zaal 1994, ii) and include speed cameras, red light cameras plus
vehicle alcohol and seat belt use detectors. However, more work could
be performed in the area of risk management and CBA.
Various user, vehicle and road programs can help to reduce road accidents
and injuries. Authorities can impose regulations on users such as drinking
restrictions, speed limits and can apply more enforcement, public education,
training and legislation. Requirements for vehicle maintenance, tyre and
brake standards are feasible. Road geometry, surfaces, lighting and traffic
management may also assist, especially with a community expectation of
traffic calming and public transport measures along with integrated transport
and land use planning strategies. It is not clear where limits apply;
for instance, if a speed limit of 40 kilometres per hour applied in cities,
fewer people would die, but traffic delays and public outrage would grow.
Again, restricting car use to people over 25 years old may lower the road
toll substantially but alienate part of the community.
How safe is safe enough is a very real question though and challenges
attitudes to risk. There may exist a tendency, at political levels or
by ordinary road users to put forward attitude problems as the underlying
reason for accident occurrence (OECD 1994a, 11). This may neglect the
appropriate remedies of an often complicated or expensive nature or that
require full responsibility be taken by individual road users. Motivating
road users as well as long term behavioural work is important. More draconian
measures, such as fixing transponders on all cars to monitor their routes
and speeds, requires wide public debate. The community recognises speed,
alcohol use and driver fatigue as major safety concerns.
New programs combining ergonomic and engineering approaches are attempting
to improve road safety, transport efficiency and environmental quality.
Accepting the reality of human factor accident causation, this approach
emphasises prevention or reduction in injuries, while not restraining
personal freedom. Intelligent Transport Systems and automatic traffic
control systems may affect this freedom by providing driver information
and monitoring their performance. Such systems support may assist driver
detection and assessment of road hazards and provide guidance to deal
with specific hazards (Brookhuis & Brown 1992, 38). However, anyone
who goes driving must accept that they face a risk of death higher than
by taking a plane, bus, train or even walking instead.
Unlike the road sector, rail transport involves both public and private
operators providing the basic infrastructure and transport units. An Intergovernmental
Agreement on Rail Safety between the Commonwealth and all States and Territories
came into effect in 1995. It aims to establish a nationally consistent approach
to rail safety including the accreditation of rail owners and operators,
development of uniform technical and operating standards, together with
greater accountability and safety. In the event of a serious accident, the
owner or operator may request the appointment of an independent investigator
for a formal Board of Inquiry, independent of any Coronial Inquiry or operator
investigation. Given the open access now available to rail infrastructure,
nothing less than a national approach to rail safety is adequate to ensure
seamless utilisation across States.
A significant new operator, the National Rail Corporation Limited (NRC)
has a mission to provide competitive, profitable and commercially sustainable
rail freight transport services in Australia. A principal aim in establishing
NRC in 1991/92 was to reform the interstate rail freight business to provide
world-class levels of customer services and eliminate publicly funded
losses (NRC 1995, 16). A new organisation, Track Australia, should have
responsibility for providing interstate rail infrastructure access, maintenance
and control. Both organisations coexist with state and private rail authorities
with a mission to increase rail freight usage. If rail captured the entire
intercity freight growth by 2016, the road toll would drop by only 0.3
per cent (NTPT 1994, 27). Rail accidents average 100 annually.
An executive-level Risk and Safety Committee began in 1995 to assist
in giving direction to the management of safety for NRC. The requirement
for safety accreditation is a condition for operations in a number of
States. An independent standards organisation performed a safety audit
of NRC in 1995 to determine that its operations were safe. The recent
completion of the new Inter-governmental Agreement on Rail Safety accreditation,
together with supporting Australian standards for rail equipment and operations,
should establish a framework for mutual recognition of accreditation between
states (NRC 1995, 21). There is no international, national or uniform
State based reporting system for railway accidents so rail bodies generally
compile data for their own purposes (BTCE 1992, 51).
Proper risk management focuses on safety risk rather than monitoring
incidents. Railways tend to follow a set of recommended practices governing
design and maintenance of equipment. However, new rail safety regulations
in New South Wales took effect in late 1993 and have received wide acceptance
by other State and Federal rail authorities. The regulations cover matters
of operations, rolling stock, the environment, infrastructure and administration.
Rail authorities perform hazard safety audits and risk analysis. It would
seem then that they believe that no accidents are acceptable in their
industry, regardless of the cost and, given the low prevailing rate of
incidents, such a goal is not unreasonable.
Marine accidents include collisions, groundings and explosions and have
not decreased in recent times. New technology has raised production pressures
to increase efficiency but not safety (Perrow 1984, 171). Much of the marine
system is of low status, unorganised and unregulated so that improvements
are slow. Maritime accidents and injuries span a wide variety of vessel
types and situations ranging from ship sinkings to small dinghy damage.
Most events arise from operator error, particularly by the captain, production
pressures and nature itself. While incidents are common, manoeuvring to
avoid accident is usually possible. Nationwide, there is an annual average
of around 1 000 marine accidents involving serious injury or death on boats
or ships. Worldwide, in 1994 some 118 ships and 1478 lives were lost at
sea (HORSC 1995b, 2) as shown in Figure 3. Figure 4 presents figures for
Australia that also include small craft accidents and show a growing trend.
Australia has had problems with safety levels on foreign ships calling
here. Some vessels, particularly bulk carriers, have sunk in our waters
and/or have damaged our environment. Some ships are actually unseaworthy,
others have poorly trained and managed crews and many have poor safety
equipment or standards (HORSC 1992, ix). The major factor affecting this
state of affairs is commercial pressure on ship operations and ships'
masters, smaller crews, ageing vessels and multi-national crewing practices.
This requires international pressure and cooperation to remedy, especially
given the peculiar nature of an industry that has its operators subject
directly to market forces around the world.
Through the operation of worldwide conventions, the International Maritime
Organisation (IMO) influences the construction and operation of vessels,
but the enforcement of operating standards rests generally with the flag
state. The IMO International Safety Management Code requires shipowners
to establish and operate a safety management system. The International
Labour Organisation has various conventions for preventing shipboard accidents
and encouraging occupational health and safety. The Organisation's Convention
147 came into force in 1981 to require signatories to establish laws setting
minimal international crew standards.
Figure 3. Total Shipping Casualties and Incidents
1990-1994
Source AMSA 1995, p. 5; HORSC 1995b, p.2.
Figure 4. Australian Maritime Accident Casualties
1988 & 1993
Source BTCE 1995d.
The Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) is a mainly self-funded
safety agency with the charter of enhancing efficiency in the delivery
of safety and other services to the maritime industry sector. AMSA has
six key areas of operation (AMSA 1995, 6):
- Navigational Services: provision of marine navigation aids network
and navigation safety policy;
- Ship and Personnel Safety Services: survey and certification of ships,
safety standards, inspection of foreign ships, safe handling of seaborne
cargo and qualification of seafarers;
- Maritime Safety Services: coordination of marine search and rescue
through the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre, operation of the Australian
Ship Reporting System, operation of the "COSPAS/SARSAT" satellite
ship distress system and safety communications;
- Marine Environment Protection Services: provision of planning and
response capability appropriate to the threat of marine pollution from
shipping in the Australian region;
- Strategic Development: corporate and strategic planning, the secretariat
for Australia's involvement in world maritime forums, legal, public
relation or sea safety marketing; and
- Corporate and Commercial Services: provision of financial management,
staff resources, information technology systems, property services,
ship registration and crew employment services, to support all of the
above.
AMSA's role is crucial in conducting port inspections and promoting
ship safety at an international level. Lack of compliance with international
convention requirements by some flag states is a major ship safety problem
(HORSC 1994, ix). In 1994, AMSA detained some 123 ships following inspections
for rectification of mainly minor but important safety problems. Technical
support for sea safety, such as collision avoidance systems, would seem
to play a secondary role to human and administrative factors.
The Department of Transport and Regional Development Marine Incident
Investigation Unit (MIIU) investigates marine incidents as defined by
the Navigation (Marine Casualty) Regulations. These include injury
or death aboard ships, ship loss, fires, collisions, groundings or disabling,
ship damage and serious damage to the environment. Headed by the Inspector
of Marine Accidents, the MIIU publishes reports of its investigations
to determine risk factors, effective procedures and proper management
for the future. The MIIU has five staff and may convene a Board of Marine
Inquiry or special investigation. In 1994-95, the MIIU investigated and
reported on 12 marine accidents (DOT 1995, 52).
Appropriate risk management is the task of vessel owners and operators
in conjunction with maritime safety authorities. AMSA itself is completing
a risk management manual but it is not clear as to what extent the organisation
can encourage similar work among ship operators. There are no direct safety
parameters listed among AMSA's performance indicators. Therefore it appears
that the shipping industry accepts losses to a certain extent and operates
accordingly (HORSC 1995b, vii). Until greater regulatory and insurance
pressures prevail on the maritime industry the level of acceptable safety
is not very high.
In one sense, safety is an economic and social good involving the use of
scarce resources, so that higher safety levels are only achievable through
additional expenditures. Optimal allocation of the safety resource involves
a balance between the level of desired safety and the means to achieve it
at minimum social and economic cost (BTCE 1992, 71). Government involvement
in safety provision and regulation can potentially improve social welfare
but questions remain of resource allocation, modal share, balancing fatalities
to serious injuries and so forth. A means to improve government action in
risk management and prevention is to improve its involvement in transport
accident study and reporting.
An examination of overseas practice is instructive in this regard and in
particular the administrative structures for independent examination of
accidents for all transport modes. An ad-hoc arrangement for safety investigation
between transport modes has prevailed in Australia, as previously described,
in contrast to Canada and the United States where unified multi-modal transport
safety agencies investigate all types of accidents, except road, under the
one administrative structure. Australia has followed British practice instead,
as outlined below.
In the above countries, road accident investigation tends to remain
with local authorities or police, rather than having a coordinated national
analytical effort towards determining trends. Note too that in some countries,
pipeline safety comes under the jurisdiction of transportation safety
agencies. In Australia, the Pipeline Authority constructs and maintains
major installations with a view to creating a national integrated system.
As a commercial enterprise, its role includes securing the safety, health
and welfare of persons engaged in operations. The Authority reports to
the Minister for Primary Industries and Energy and the Minister for Resources
and Energy. Many other pipeline installations are not subject to such
controls but they often do have harmonised standards and practices.
The Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board
Act of 1990 established an independent multi-modal agency known as
the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSBC). Reporting annually to
Parliament the TSBC acts to advance transportation safety by conducting
independent investigation and studies in order to publicly identify safety
deficiencies. As an independent agency, the TSBC has a different perspective
from the regulatory agencies such as Transport Canada, the National Transportation
Agency and the National Energy Board. They were formerly responsible for
accident investigation in the marine, rail and commodity pipeline modes
of transport.
The TSBC has a Board, Executive Director, Corporate Services Branch,
a Safety Analysis and Communications Directorate and an Investigations
Operations Directorate. The latter has Branches to investigate marine,
air, rail and commodity pipeline incidents. It also has engineering and
medicine sections. The other Directorate handles accident prevention,
statistics, human performance and communications. The TSBC provides safety
recommendations, advice and information letters. The TSBC has an annual
budget of around A$27 million and some 300 staff. The TSBC has adopted
most of the Canadian Aviation Safety Board (CASB) structure and processes
for its new organisation. Staff from other modal safety agencies essentially
shifted into a new administrative structure identical to the CASB, though
not without difficulties (Hyndman et al. 1994, 132). While the Canadian
accident rates for marine, air, pipe and rail generally declined from
1990, they rose slightly in 1994 to reach 3 849 occurrences (TSBC 1994,
5).
A Review Commission of the TSBC confirmed the validity of Canada's approach
to ensuring sound accident investigation based on the existence of an
independent and multi-modal accident investigation agency. The merit of
this approach to accident investigation was subject to long debate as
such an integrated approach is not universally accepted (ibid, 4). Professionals
working with specific modes tend to regard their perspective as unique
and resist the notion of integrated accident research. The Canadian Parliament
foresaw modal integration as a way to recognise that all modes deserve
equal treatment and shared technical resources. However, the Review Commission
notes with concern that the TSBC still lacks the power to investigate
highway and boating accidents (ibid, xv-xvi).
In France, two separate agencies handle marine and air accident investigations.
For marine matters, the Secretariat d'Etat de la Mer (SEM) is the responsible
agency, while for aviation incidents, the Bureau Enquetes-Accidents (BEA)
is the relevant body.
The Transport Accident Investigation Commission determines the circumstances
and causes of accidents and incidents to help avoid similar future occurrences.
It has existed within the Ministry of Transport since 1990 with annual funding
of about NZ$1.3 million. The separate Land Transport Safety Authority has
since 1993 been the chief adviser on road and rail safety, but also, among
its many activities, issues driver and operator licences and sets road and
rail safety standards. It has around 230 staff and an annual budget allocation
of about NZ$19 million, excluding funding for land transport initiatives.
In Sweden, the Statens Haveri Kommission (SHK) investigates accident matters
for all modes including road if the nature of the occurrence warrants it.
All investigations and files are open to the public although there is no
provision for public inquiry.
Safety investigation in the United Kingdom resembles Australian practice.
Within the Department of Transport separate Directorates administer mode
policies. The Railways Directorate includes a Safety Division and the Channel
Tunnel Safety Authority. The Road and Vehicle Safety Directorate has a Road
Safety Division. The Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) is responsible
for investigating accidents involving British ships, passengers and crews
worldwide, and other ships in local waters. The separate Marine Safety Agency
manages the implementation of marine safety strategy and the prevention
of ship pollution. The Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) examines
civil aviation incidents and provides technical assistance to the Ministry
of Defence.
The United States National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) exists to
improve safety by investigating accidents, whether aviation, highway, railroad,
marine or pipeline in order to determine the probable and contributing causes.
It does not establish legal blame. Established in 1975, the NTSB issues
advisory reports and safety recommendations as a completely independent
government agency. However, regulations prohibit its intervention into airport
and airline security matters, to the chagrin of some observers (Nader &
Smith 1994, 15). The United States has a separate Office of Pipeline Safety
and a Transportation Safety Institute for education, training and technical
assistance. The NTSB operates through a Managing Director and Offices of
Aviation Safety, Surface Transportation Safety, Administration as well as
Research and Engineering.
Table 3 summarises the major characteristics of accident investigation institutions
in the countries previously mentioned. Canada, the United States and Sweden
have single investigative agencies that deal with air and marine and other
modes. The United States and Swedish bodies also investigate highway safety.
Both the Canadian and United States agencies submit their reports to bodies
other than the transportation regulator and have separate funding (Hyndman
et al. 1994, 14).
Table 3. Accident investigation in selected countries
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Australia Canada France Sweden U.K. U.S.A.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agency Title* M:MIIU TSBC M:SEM SHK M:MAIB NTSB
(refer text) A:BASI A:BEA A:AAIB
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Factor
------
Jurisdiction Modal Multi Modal Multi Modal Multi
Autonomous No Yes No Yes No Yes
Full-time Board No Yes No No No Yes
Board Members ad hoc 5 ad hoc none ad hoc 5
Public Inquiries No Yes No No No Yes
Authoriser Minister Board Minister n.a. Secretary Board
Mandatory Report No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Hyndman et al. 1994, 16-17.
* Note: M - marine, A - aviation.
The United Kingdom, Australia and France have developed mode-specific investigatory
institutions that closely link to the transportation regulator. In a reversal
of the Canadian situation the Australian accident investigators report directly
to the Minister for Transport while the civil aviation authority regulator
is autonomous. Between the North American concept of independence and the
less autonomous operations in other countries is the United Kingdom where
accident reports for both air and marine modes go to the Secretary of State
for decision on whether to make them public.
Accident investigation authorities in Canada, Sweden, the Netherlands
and the United States have recently concluded an agreement to share and
exchange transportation safety information under the aegis of the new
International Transportation Safety Association. The European Community
has taken the first steps towards establishing a trans-national accident
investigation entity, while France has studied Canada's TSBC. Australia
does not appear to have a role and involvement in these international
arrangements.
Combining BASI, MIIU, pipeline and rail investigators into one agency
would involve creating an independent Australian Transportation Safety
Board (ATSB). This would unite 100 staff, excluding efficiencies, with
an annual budget of about $9 million to investigate some 1 300 incidents
annually. This compares to the 300 staff and $27 million annual cost of
Canada's TSBC that handles some 3 900 cases each year. Given the annual
cost of our air, sea and rail accidents of around $476 million in 1993,
a $9 million outlay does not seem to be an excessive investment for better
safety. While the TSBC does not undertake road safety investigation work
this could be a task of an ATSB if it incorporated FORS as well. This
would involve absorbing FORS 90 staff and its annual funding of $8 million.
Australia's overall transport safety standards appear reasonable but they
could still improve. The decline in road accident rates in particular appears
to be stalling, suggesting a need for more innovative and perhaps even technical
programs to help identify and remedy problem areas. They also suggest a
need for wider national accident investigation strategies utilising risk
management techniques. However, transport modes currently have separate
safety agencies responsible for assessing accident trends and advising on
precautions. These may perform well but it may be possible to improve their
standards still further.
The question remains as to whether existing Australian safety investigation
organisations are effective or not and whether their outputs are useful.
BASI, MIIU and rail investigations vary widely in their resources, approaches
and published reports. Given that accident rates for their modes have
not dramatically improved and that air and sea safety practices remain
of concern to the community, perhaps a new approach is required. Through
the operation of an efficient multi-modal transport safety agency a more
acceptable level of transport safety may be possible. It would certainly
bear more study.
Australia should consider adoption of its own national transport safety
agency to coordinate independent safety investigations into all modes
of transport. This would help to overcome the current legacy of competing
interests, separate bureaucracies and agencies serving different modes
without overall coordination. An Australian Transportation Safety Board
(ATSB) could also link to similar multi-modal organisations now emerging
in other nations around the world. A multi-modal approach offers advantages
of pooling specialised resources in areas such as engineering, medicine
and psychology. An ATSB could share the experiences of each transport
mode to increase the effectiveness of investigation and analysis.
Management of all transport modes together can increase public confidence
that a broad range of skills and experience can be brought to enhance
safety. Integration allows the most efficient use of limited resources
to deal with those safety deficiencies having the highest risk potential.
It is the cost, severity and frequency of risk exposure that matters to
travellers, bystanders and the industry and not the transport mode involved.
Through a common, consistent approach, evaluation of acceptable transport
safety should become possible and available to the wider community.
AMSA 1995, Annual Report 1994-95, Australian Maritime Safety Authority,
AGPS, Canberra, October.
ASA 1995, Corporate Plan July 1995 to June 2000, AirServices
Australia, Canberra, September.
Atkinson, E. and Hinds, A, 1995, "Considerations involved in Risk
Assessment and Analysis", Proceedings: 1995 Transport Safety
Forum, IIR Conferences, Sydney, April 20-21.
Brookhuis, K. and Brown, I. 1992, 'Ergonomics and road safety', Impact
of Science on Society, No.165, pp.35-40.
BTCE 1992, "Social Cost of Transport Accidents in Australia",
Report 79, Bureau of Transport and Communications Economics,
AGPS, Canberra, September.
BTCE 1994, "Costs of Road Crashes in Australia -1993", Information
Sheet, No.4, Bureau of Transport and Communications Economics, Canberra,
December.
BTCE 1995a, "Costs of Aviation Accidents in Australia - 1993",
Information Sheet, No.5, Bureau of Transport and Communications
Economics, Canberra.
BTCE 1995b, "Evaluation of the Black Spot Program", Report
90, Bureau of Transport and Communications Economics, AGPS, Canberra,
May.
BTCE 1995c, "Costs of Rail Accidents in Australia - 1993",
Information Sheet, No.7, Bureau of Transport and Communications
Economics, Canberra, December.
BTCE 1995d, "Costs of Maritime Accidents in Australia - 1993",
Information Sheet, No.8, Bureau of Transport and Communications
Economics, Canberra, December.
CASA 1995, Corporate Plan 1995-96 to 1997-98, Civil Aviation
Safety Authority, AGPS, Canberra, November.
DOT 1995, Annual Report 1994-95, Department of Transport, AGPS,
Canberra, October.
FORS 1992, The National Road Safety Strategy, Federal Office
of Road Safety, Department of Transport and Communications, Canberra.
FORS 1996, Road Fatalities Australia, Federal Office of Road
Safety, Department of Transport and Communications, Canberra, January.
HORSC 1992, Ships of Shame: Inquiry into Ship Safety, Report
from the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Transport, Communications
and Infrastructure, The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, AGPS,
Canberra, December.
HORSC 1994, Review Inquiry into Ship Standards and Safety: Progress
Report, Report from the House of Representatives Standing Committee
on Transport, Communications and Infrastructure, The Parliament of the
Commonwealth of Australia, AGPS, Canberra, November.
HORSC 1995a, Plane Safe - Inquiry into Aviation Safety: the Commuter
and General Aviation Sectors, Report from the House of Representatives
Standing Committee on Transport, Communications and Infrastructure, The
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, AGPS, Canberra, December.
HORSC 1995b, Ships of Shame - A Sequel: Inquiry into Ship Safety,
Report from the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Transport,
Communications and Infrastructure, The Parliament of the Commonwealth
of Australia, AGPS, Canberra, November.
Hyndman, L.D., Gauthier, J. and Everson, W.E. 1994, Advancing Safety,
Report of the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and
Safety Board Act Review Commission, Minister of Supply and Services, Ottawa,
January.
Learmount, D. 1996, "Off Target: 1995's World Airline Safety Performance
shows that targets are not being met", Flight International,
January 17-23, London, pp. 24-34.
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and Values in Risk Management, Oxford University Press, New York.
Moses, L. and Savage, I. (Ed's) 1989, Transportation Safety in an
Age of Deregulation, Oxford University Press, New York.
Nader, R. and Smith, W.J. 1994, Collision Course: The Truth About
Airline Safety, TAB Books, McGraw-Hill, Blue Ridge Summit PA.
NRC 1995, Annual Report for the 1994-95 Financial Year, National
Rail Corporation Limited, Parramatta, September.
NRTAC 1995, Annual Report 1993-94, National Road Trauma Advisory
Council, AGPS, Canberra, February.
NTPT 1994, Building for the Job: A Strategy for Australia's Transport
Network, National Transport Planning Taskforce, AGPS, Canberra, December.
OECD 1994a, Improving Road Safety by Attitude Modification,
Road Transport Research, Report prepared by an OECD scientific expert
group, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris.
OECD 1994b, Targeted Road Safety Programmes, Road Transport
Research, Report prepared by an OECD scientific expert group, Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris.
Perrow, C. 1984, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies,
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Sabey, B.E. and Taylor, H. 1980, "The Known Risks we run: the Highway"
in:- Schwing, R.C. and Alders, W.A. (Ed's) 1980, Societal Risk Assessment:
How Safe is Safe Enough?, Plenum, New York, pp. 43-63.
Spiro, E. and Parfitt, A. 1995, "Applying cost-benefit analysis
to marine safety measures", Maritime Policy and Management,
Vol.22, No.3, July/September, pp. 215-223.
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Committee on Aircraft Noise in Sydney, Department of Senate, Parliament
House, Canberra, November.
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Safety Board of Canada, Ottawa.
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Note, No. 37, Department of the Parliamentary Library, Parliament
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Report No. 53, Monash University Accident Research Centre, April.
- AAIB
- Air Accidents Investigation Branch (United Kingdom)
- AMSA
- Australian Maritime Safety Authority
- ASA
- AirServices Australia
- ATSB
- Australian Transportation Safety Board
- BASI
- Bureau of Air Safety Investigation
- BEA
- Bureau Enquetes-Accidents (France)
- CASA
- Civil Aviation Safety Authority
- CASB
- Canadian Aviation Safety Board (Canada)
- CBA
- cost benefit analysis
- FAC
- Federal Airports Corporation
- FORS
- Federal Office of Road Safety
- IMO
- International Maritime Organisation
- MAIB
- Marine Accident Investigation Branch (United Kingdom)
- MIIU
- Marine Incident Investigation Unit
- NRC
- National Rail Corporation Limited
- NTSB
- National Transportation Safety Board (United States)
- SEM
- Secretariat d'Etat de la Mer (France)
- SHK
- Statens Haveri Kommission (Sweden)
- TSBC
- Transportation Safety Board of Canada
- VoL
- Value of Life
- WHO
- World Health Organisation
Acknowledgments
This is to acknowledge the assistance of John Prytz for seeking out relevant
references and the help of Paul Kay for preparing suitable graphics. Thanks
are also due to draft readers Tim Winn, Geoff Winter, Rod Panter, Dennis
James, Ian Ireland, Gary Brown and Greg Baker for their comments and ideas.
Comments to: web.library@aph.gov.au
Last reviewed
19 July, 2004
by the Parliamentary Library Web Manager
© Commonwealth of Australia
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