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The Korean Leadership Summit-More Security and Less Uncertainty for
the Asia-Pacific Region?
Gary Klintworth
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group
27 June 2000
The meeting between North Korea's Kim Jong-il and
South Korea's Kim Dae Jung on 12-15 June will be a positive development
for the security of the Asia-Pacific region. It is an example of how a
cooperative approach to regional diplomacy by China and the US, in coordination
with interested parties like Japan and Australia, can achieve a good outcome.
The agreement
The agreement reached by the two Kims is the first ever signed by the
leaders of the two Koreas. The Kims set out their aim to achieve Korean
unification by peaceful means and agreed :
- to resolve the question of unification independently
- to promote unification on the basis of the common elements in Seoul's
concept of a confederation and Pyongyang's idea for a federation, that
is, one country two systems
- to resolve humanitarian issues such as visits by family members separated
since the Korean War
- to consolidate mutual trust by promoting economic, cultural and other
exchanges
- to conduct further dialogue to implement these agreements.
Sensibly, both sides put off discussion of potentially vexations topics
like North Korea's nuclear and missile development program and the question
of the US military presence in South Korea.
Flashpoint Korea?
The Korean peninsula has long been regarded as a dangerous flashpoint
with the potential to ignite a wider regional conflict. The relationship
between the two Koreas for the last fifty years, indeed, has been that
of sworn enemies. Rivalry between the two Koreas was cited by the Secretary
of the Australian Department of Defence, Dr Allan Hawke, as one of the
key factors contributing to Australia's uncertain and volatile strategic
environment.(1)
Until recently, North Korea was widely perceived in the United States
to be an unpredictable rogue state intent on proliferating weapons of
mass destruction and their delivery system. The two Koreas are technically
still at war, even though the Korean War ended in 1953. The demilitarised
zone dividing the peninsula contains concentrations of opposing military
forces - one million on the north versus 750,000 on the south - that are
unmatched anywhere else in the world.
The US is committed to the defence of South Korea under the terms of
their 1953 Mutual Defence Treaty , a commitment guaranteed by the tripwire
location of US armed forces directly in the path of any attempted invasion
across the demilitarised zone.
In this context therefore, the Korean leadership summit signals a potentially
important turning point in the security outlook for the Korean peninsula,
the Asia-Pacific region and for countries like Australia.(2)
Questions about North Korea's sincerity
The welcome given to President Kim Dae Jung by President Kim Jung-il
- and indeed the former's willingness to go to Pyongyang - reflects a
turnaround in intra-Korean politics and security. It confirms a change
of direction in North Korea's attitude towards South Korea, the US and
the Pacific community. It is an indication of North Korea's interest in
opening up to the outside world and undertaking economic reforms along
the lines pioneered by China.
Significantly, the United States State Department considers that North
Korea is genuinely reaching out to engage the rest of the world, and that
North Korea is behaving in a very useful, constructive and business-like
manner, while Kim Jong-il is perceived to be 'a leader with courage and
vision'.(3)
This judgement is supported by North Korea's moves to establish diplomatic
relations with Italy, Australia and prospectively with New Zealand and
other Western countries.
Of course, fundamental differences and distrust remains deeply embedded
in the psyche of both Koreas. In the absence of anything tangible, it
is easy to be sceptical about the prospect of any real progress in North-South
relations. After all, both sides have previously agreed to seek unification
and have spoken of peace and reconciliation, to no avail. And serious
doubts must be raised about North Korea's ability to manage dramatic social
and economic change without disintegrating.
But as Kim Dae Jung observed in Pyongyang, it is not possible to solve
all problems at once. What is important, he said, was that the two Koreas
were choosing reconciliation and cooperation rather than distrust and
confrontation.
Kim Jong-il seemed relaxed and confident and in charge of North Korea
when he met Kim Dae Jung. Presumably anybody opposed to the shift in North
Korea's domestic and foreign policies has been retired or removed.
Kim Jong-il may have used North Korea's economic plight to argue for
faster and more dramatic policy change. By 1995, North Korea was on the
brink of famine because of the cumulative effects of drought, floods,
rural mismanagement, the inability of China to fill the gap because of
its own harvest failures and shortages of spare parts, fuel and fertiliser
after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
There were however signs of a policy rethink in Pyongyang many years
before the 12-15 June summit. They include:
- North Korea's attempts to ease its perceived security dilemma by developing
nuclear weapons in the late 1980s;
- its acceptance by 1991 that reunification of the Koreas could not
be achieved by force and that it had to co-exist with South Korea
- Kim Il-sung's agreement for a leadership summit when he met former
US President Jimmy Carter in June 1994
- North Korea's compliance with its 1994 undertakings to cease nuclear
research at Yongbyon
- experimenting with Chinese-style special economic zones at Kungansan
and Rajin-Sonbong
- opening up to tourism and trade with South Korea since 1997, and
- the 1999 agreement to refrain from testing missiles in exchange for
the lifting of US trade sanctions.
Impact on the regional balance of power
While by no means guaranteed, strategic stability in Northeast Asia has
been enhanced. The four big powers with a stake in the region have demonstrated
a new style of cooperative diplomacy. The collaboration between China,
the US, Japan, and to a lesser extent Russia in opening the door to North
Korea reflects a shared great power interest in building trust and common
security in the peninsula.
China however, gains most. If sustained, the promise of the summit will
strengthen Beijing's role as a central player in the Korean peninsula.
Kim Jong-il, for instance, consulted with China's President Jiang Zemin
just prior to his meeting with Kim Dae Jung.(4) If it continues,
North Korea's good behaviour will weaken the American case for maintaining
its 37,000 military personnel in Korea. North Korean restraint on developing
weapons of mass destruction will help undermine the moral argument being
made in Washington for developing a national missile defence system (NMD).
China and Russia are opposed to NMD because it jeopardises the 1972 ABM
(Anti Ballistic Missile) Treaty.
The US military presence in Korea is unlikely to change in the medium
term. South Korea's Kim Dae Jung said he told Kim Jong-il that the US
military presence in South Korea should remain even after reunification.
Kim Jong-il is reported to have said that the US troop presence in South
Korea was 'not necessarily bad', a view also espoused by his father, Kim
Il-sung. China can probably see the benefit of the strategic stability
offered by a US presence in Korea, as too does Japan.
But in the longer term, improved North-South relations will eventually
add to the pressure for a reduced US military presence in Korea. Similarly,
it may become harder for the US to justify the expense and uncertainty
of NMD if North Korea, for example, ceases to be a missile-equipped rogue
state.
Japan sees economic opportunities and strategic benefit in North Korea's
change of direction. Japan has been working closely with the US and South
Korea to give North Korea a soft economic landing provided North Korea
gives up its missile plans. In the longer term however, Japan will be
concerned about the implications of a dynamic united Korea. It will also
be concerned about a shifting regional power balance in which China's
influence is likely to expand at the expense of the US.
Russia too has an eye on renewing its influence in the peninsula. Russian
President Vladimir Putin is to visit Pyongyang and Beijing in July where
no doubt he will push his opposition to America's NMD agenda.
Assessment
Despite doubts about North Korea's bona fides and allegations that it
is still intent on developing nuclear weapons and missiles, the Kim summit
is an achievement of historic significance. In the short term, it is likely
to enhance security cooperation and stability in Northeast Asia. In the
longer term, a federated Korea may reduce US influence in the region but
it could also serve as a useful buffer that can stabilize the potential
great power rivalry of China and Japan.
If North Korea does come in from the cold, as seems likely, credit should
be given to the willingness of the US and China to collaborate in cooperative
diplomacy, and to South Korean President Kim Dae Jung's decision to pursue
a 'sunshine' policy of engagement with the North.
- 'Defence-the state of the nation', RUSI, Canberra, 2 February 2000.
- As well as being an ANZUS Treaty ally Australia was one of 16 nations
that signed a declaration on 27 July 1953 to the effect that the signatories
would return to Korea in the event of another armed attack from the
North.
- USIS EPF502, 9 June 2000, 'Special State Department Briefing'.
- 'China supports DPRK-ROK Summit', Wen Wei Po, Hong Kong, 9
June 2000.
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