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Research Note no. 6 2006–07
North Korean nuclear test: possible or probable?
Jeffrey
Robertson
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Section
28 September 2006
On 10 January 2003, the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea (hereafter North Korea)
withdrew from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). On 2 October
2003, North Korea declared it
had completed reprocessing spent fuel rods, in order to obtain Plutonium-239,
a fissile material used in the production of nuclear weapons.(1)
On 10 February 2005, North Korea
for the first time openly declared that it had manufactured nuclear weapons.(2)
Each of these events represents a line that has been
crossed in defiance of requests by the international community. To date,
diplomatic efforts have failed to convince North Korea
that pursuing a nuclear capability is not in its interests.(3)
The next line to be crossed may be the testing of a nuclear weapon. This
Research Note looks at this possibility and its implications.
Just another nuclear test scare?
On 17 August 2006, the United States (US) news network
ABC reported that North Korea
may be preparing an underground nuclear test.(4) Subsequent
reports indicated that the preparations were underway in Gilju, North
Hamgyeong Province, in the north-east of the country.(5)
Such reports are not new. During the 1990s, there was
concern regarding tunnelling activities in Gilju and in Kumchang-ri. In
2003, the Gilju site, amongst others, was used for conventional high explosives
tests, which are required in the detonation of a nuclear device. In April
2005, there were unconfirmed reports that a reviewing stand was constructed
at Gilju, and that a tunnel was filled. This heightened concern that a
nuclear test was imminent.(6)
Once basic preparations for an underground nuclear
test have been completed, it is extremely difficult to determine when
one is actually going to take place. Basic preparation involves construction
of tunnelling facilities, installation of monitoring equipment and monitoring
stations. Constant and often difficult monitoring is then required to
determine if final preparations are underway. It has been reported that
South Korean National Intelligence Service Director, Kim
Seung-Kyu, stated that ‘the possibility of a nuclear
test is always open as soon as Kim Jong-Il
makes a decision’.(7)
Further, North Korea
is known to be a notoriously difficult target for intelligence gathering.
The closed nature of the regime makes the collection of intelligence from
human sources difficult and the country is adept at using US
satellite intelligence to its own advantage. In 1998, US
intelligence indicated that significant activity was being undertaken
at an underground site in the Kumchang-ri region. After protracted negotiations,
North Korea allowed the US
to inspect the site in return for 400,000 tons of food through the UN
World Food Program, the installation of bilateral food projects and agreement
to discuss North Korean export and development programmes. The site was
found to be empty.
The difficulty in detecting final preparations for
a nuclear test and the nature of the North Korean regime, allow the threat
of a nuclear test to be used as a diplomatic tool to exert pressure and
influence dialogue partners.
North Korea
has previously threatened to conduct a nuclear test in order to influence
negotiating partners. During 23–24 April 2003, North
Korea, the US,
and China, held Three Party Talks
designed to resolve the nuclear issue. Li Gun, the deputy Director-General
of the American Affairs Bureau of the North Korean Foreign Ministry reportedly
stated to James Kelly,
US Assistant-Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, that a
nuclear test was possible.(8) During the 27–29 August
2003 Six-Party Talks, involving the US, North Korea, Japan, China, South
Korea and Russia, the North Korean delegate stated that it had no choice
but to conduct a nuclear test.(9)
To a certain extent, the threat of a nuclear test,
serves the diplomatic aims of the US
by encouraging dialogue partners such as South Korea
and Japan to take a harder line
with North Korea. This has proven
particularly important as South Korea
engages North Korea, seeking
reconciliation under the ‘Sunshine Policy’, straying further from US
policy aims (see below).
The current indications that North
Korea may be preparing a nuclear test could be just
another nuclear test scare—with both the US
and North Korea seeking to use
it as a diplomatic tool to exert pressure and influence dialogue partners
in negotiations. However, the gravity of the implications forces the international
community to take any nuclear test scare very seriously.
Rationale and timing
While it is extremely difficult to determine the rationale
behind North Korea’s diplomacy,
there are several considerations that could explain a nuclear test:
- Prestige. Confirmation of its status as a nuclear weapons
power would strengthen the regime both domestically and internationally.
- Deterrence. North Korean massed artillery along the De-Militarized
Zone (DMZ) within range of the South Korean capital, Seoul, is already
a substantial deterrent. However, confirmation of a nuclear weapons
capability inevitably augments the psychological impact of deterrence
on potential aggressors.
- Brinksmanship. A nuclear test could be perceived in North
Korea as just another line to cross that will enhance
its ability to negotiate in future talks.
A nuclear test, however, could remove much of North
Korea’s negotiating strength in future talks. North
Korea uses strategic ambiguity and an image of irrationality
to enhance its strength in negotiations. Testing a nuclear device would
remove this ambiguity and substantially restrain the ability of North
Korea to continue its image of irrationality. As
noted by Columbia University academic Kenneth
Waltz in 1981, using the example of Libya:
“A nuclear Libya, for example,
would have to show caution, even in rhetoric, lest she suffer retaliation
in response to someone else's anonymous attack on a third state … Nuclear
weapons induce caution, especially in weak states”.(10)
Due to the gravity of the event, it is difficult to
calculate the impact that a nuclear test could have on the region. The
first order effects, such as condemnation, sanctions, or even a military
strike, are compounded by potential second order effects such as the re-armament
of Japan, increased anti-ballistic
missile programs in the region, and the commencement of additional nuclear
weapons programs in the region. The increased levels of insecurity in
the region could lead to a regional arms race, which would place North
Korea and its ailing economy at a severe disadvantage.
A nuclear test could reduce North Korea’s
security relative to its regional adversaries. This decreases the likelihood
that a rational actor would pursue the option.
If a nuclear test were to occur, precedent suggests
it may be undertaken either on a day of national significance or on a
day that would heighten its impact on potential targets. On 31 August
1998, North Korea tested a Taepodong-1
ballistic missile ‘to significantly adorn the first session of the 10th
Supreme People's Assembly and the 50th anniversary of the founding of
the DPRK’.(11) Significant days in the North Korean calendar
include:
16 February: Official birth date of Kim
Jong-Il
15 April: Official birth date of Kim Il-Sung
1 May: May Day
25 April: Korean People’s Army Day
8 July: Memorial Day of the death of Kim Il-Sung
27 July: Korean War Armistice Day
15 August: Korean Liberation Day
9 September: Foundation Day
10 October: Workers Party Anniversary
27 December: Constitution Day
A test may also be undertaken on a day that would heighten
its impact on the United States.
The 5 July missile tests coincided with 4 July celebrations in the United
States, which heightened their impact both in terms
of international media coverage and direct influence on the US
administration.
Implications
A North Korean nuclear test would have a profound political
impact, for it would directly challenge the global nuclear non-proliferation
regime. If North Korea were to
test a nuclear device, a dangerous precedent would be set. Other signatories
to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that might seek a nuclear
weapons capability would have an example to follow.
Although less-reported in the media, the more immediate
risk of a North Korean nuclear test is to the environment and local populations.
North Korea is in the centre
of a densely populated region, with South Korea,
Japan, China
and the less densely populated Russian Far East within close proximity.
Nuclear tests (both atmospheric and underground) to
date have occurred in remote regions with low population densities. A
North Korean nuclear test, by virtue of its geography, can only be carried
out within proximity to regions of high population density. Accident or
failure to adhere to adequate safety standards could provoke environmental
and health concerns.
Even under the most stringent safety standards, there
is the potential for mishap. From September 1961 until September 1992
more than 800 nuclear tests were undertaken in the United
States, with all but a select few being underground
tests. Of the underground nuclear tests, 38 resulted in the detection
of off-site radioactive materials.(12) While this
is an incidence of less than 4.75 percent, in the densely populated Northeast
Asian region, this is enough to raise substantial concern.
Underground nuclear tests can also leave a near-permanent
impact on the environment. Leakages from test sites inevitably occur.(13)
The amount and duration of leakage is dependent upon preparation and geological
nature of the test site. Environmental damage could potentially reduce
agricultural production levels, further damaging North
Korea’s precarious food situation.
Regional Reactions
Japan.
The greatest focus of the international community would be on the Japanese
reaction to a North Korean nuclear test. Japan
is a technologically advanced state with the scientific capability to
rapidly attain a nuclear weapons capability. There is a widely held belief
that if North Korea tests a nuclear
device, Japan may follow. As noted by Thomas
Schieffer, US Ambassador to Japan,
“If you had a nuclear North Korea,
it seems to me that that increases the pressure on both South
Korea and Japan
going nuclear themselves”.(14)
In the short-term, however, it can convincingly be
argued that Japan would not follow
the North Korean example. Japan’s
‘peace constitution’ includes the renunciation of war and forbids the
maintenance of offensive military forces. As the only state ever to be
attacked with a nuclear device, Japan
has a strong aversion to nuclear weapons. Japan also continues to follow
the long-cherished, and widely accepted, policy of the ‘nuclear three
nots’—not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them, and not permitting
their introduction into Japanese territory.
Change or re-interpretation of Japan’s peace constitution
and, in particular, the ‘nuclear three nots’ could be expected to be a
slow process given the strong domestic opposition.
Since 1998, the North Korean missile program has been
a rallying point to those in Japan
advocating change or re-interpretation of the peace constitution. North
Korea has been used to justify deployment of independent
satellite capabilities, minor constitutional revision, and strengthening
of the US military alliance,
including implementation of the missile defence program.(15)
A North Korean nuclear test could provide a rallying point for further
change or re-interpretation of the peace constitution and possible an
end to the ‘nuclear three nots’.
A Japanese nuclear weapons programme could also increase
Japanese security with regards to its alliance with the United
States. A junior partner in an alliance is always
uncertain that the senior partner will come to its aid, if such an action
would threaten the senior partner. Doubts as to whether the US
would risk New York over London and Paris in the face
of the Soviet nuclear threat is often cited as a reason for the British
and French decision to initiate a nuclear weapons program.(16)
In a more modern scenario, Japanese strategists may ask whether the United
States would risk Los Angeles over Tokyo in the face of conflict with
a nuclear power, be it North Korea or China.
China.
China is an ally of North
Korea, under the terms of the 1961 Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. However far from being a relationship
based on the Chinese proverb ‘as close as lips and teeth’, contemporary
North Korea has become the proverbial
thorn in China’s side.(17)
Chinese national security seeks above all a stable
and secure environment for economic development. This means the maintenance
of the status quo on the Korean peninsula. Accordingly, it is in China’s
national interest to ensure that North Korea does not collapse, for this
could result in a flood of refugees crossing into north eastern China,
and result in substantial disruption to regional trade.
Further, North Korea,
since before China’s entry into
the Korean War (1950–53), has represented a bargaining chip in China’s
relations with the US over the
question of Taiwan.(18) The key question is whether
supporting North Korea would
extend to accepting a North Korean nuclear test.
A stable and secure environment for economic development
requires good diplomatic relations with partner countries, most importantly,
the US. The dominant pattern
in China’s contemporary diplomacy
is its efforts to present the image of a responsible great power. This
may require China to acquiesce
to US pressure for a much stronger
stance on the North Korean nuclear issue if a test takes place.
South Korea.
The reaction in South Korea
may prove to be the most significant and could see an end to the ‘Sunshine
Policy’ of reconciliation with North Korea.
The Sunshine Policy, established by former President
Kim Dae-Jung, sought reconciliation
with North Korea based on non-aggression
and cooperation. This culminated in the visit of Kim
Dae-Jung to Pyongyang 13–15 June 2000. The two day visit
resulted in the signing of the South–North Joint Declaration, which paved
the way for agreement across a number of political, social and military
issues.
The Sunshine Policy effectively presented a volte-face
to the confrontational approach that had seen the immediately previous
President, Kim Young-Sam
(1993–1998) refuse to send food aid to the North, and actively discourage
other states from doing so.(19)
On 10 December 2000 President Kim Dae-Jung was awarded
the Nobel Peace Prize for his ‘work for democracy and human rights in
South Korea and in East Asia in general, and for peace and reconciliation
with North Korea in particular’.(20)
However, the Sunshine Policy, as continued and extended
by the current South Korean administration of Roh Moo-Hyun, has proven
to be at odds with US North Korea policy.
Roh Moo-Hyun was elected in December 2002 on a wave
of anti-American sentiment following a public outcry at the accidental
deaths of two schoolgirls in a US
military training exercise. Relations with the US
have deteriorated substantially during Roh’s term. Three key issues have
contributed to this. Firstly, South Korea
and the US remain divided over
policy approaches towards North Korea.
Secondly, the higher level of anti-Americanism since 2002 has started
to register in US public opinion.(21) Finally, negotiations
over adjustments to the US military presence on the Korean peninsula,
including base locations and costs, training rights, responsibility for
environmental damage and the operational control of troops, has led to
dissatisfaction on both sides.
The conservative opposition has argued that the dogged
pursuance of reconciliation with North Korea,
in spite of its nuclear weapons ambitions, threatens South Korean security
and weakens relations with the US.
Conservatives point out that the Roh administration’s initial reaction
to the 5 July 2006 missile tests were not to join Japan and the United
States in condemning North Korea, but to first condemn Japan for over-reacting.(22)
In the short-term, depending on the South Korean Government
response, a North Korean nuclear test could result in civil unrest and
further polarisation of South Korean politics.
In the medium term, a nuclear test by North
Korea could be expected to further strengthen the
conservative position in the lead-up to the November 2007 presidential
elections. If elected, it is likely that a conservative administration
would effectively suspend the Sunshine Policy.
United States.
The greatest pressure as a result of a nuclear test may fall on the US.
The detonation of a nuclear device by North Korea
would call into question the Bush administration’s handling of North
Korea.
The first administration of George
W. Bush was slow to
implement a North Korea policy.
At best, the administration pursued a policy of ‘strategic neglect’, focusing
on what it perceived as the more imminent threat of Iraq
and the Middle East. At worst it appeared a concerted North
Korea policy did not even exist, based upon the mixed
messages emanating from the administration during Bush’s first term.(23)
The most characteristic elements of Bush’s North Korea
policy has been its ‘hardline’ approach—refusal to negotiate bilaterally
with North Korea outside the Six-Party Talks framework; refusal to reward
bad behaviour; and insistence that North Korea return to a freeze on its
nuclear program prior to concessions. Prominent academics in the field
of Korean studies have long been critical of this approach, epitomised
by the remarks of noted Korea specialist, James Palais of the University
of Washington: ‘The spectre of immense tragedy looms over all the Korean
peninsula as long as the US continues to refuse meaningful negotiations
with North Korea’.(24)
A nuclear test by North Korea
could be considered as evidence that the hardline approach has failed.
Engagement, pursued by the Clinton administration, achieved
a freeze on known North Korean nuclear programs, albeit while North
Korea allegedly pursued a secret highly enriched
uranium program. A hardline approach, in comparison, has resulted in North
Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT, the reprocessing
of spent fuel rods, and could conceivably result in a nuclear test.
However, a nuclear test could also be used as justification
for a hardline policy towards North Korea.
A test may ultimately make current US North Korea policy substantially
simpler. If, as mentioned, the Sunshine policy in South
Korea comes to an end, US efforts to isolate and
potentially coerce North Korea
could become more achievable. A North Korean nuclear test could also serve
as a rationale to speed up the implementation of anti-ballistic missile
systems currently underway.
Comment
It is impossible for analysts to predict with any certainty
the likelihood of North Korea
conducting a nuclear test. It should also be noted that exploding a nuclear
device in an underground tunnel is substantially different from having
a device small enough to be delivered using North Korean missile technology.
Even after confirming its nuclear weapons capability through a test, North
Korea would not be a direct threat requiring a military
response. Given the gravity of the implications, convincing North
Korea that a nuclear test is not necessarily in its
interest should be a priority for the region and for the international
community.
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