|
US Missile Defence Program: Responses from South Asia
Ravi Tomar
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group
22 May 2001
On 1 May 2001 President George W. Bush announced that the US would develop
a new missile defence system. He stated that today's world requires 'new
concepts of deterrence that rely on both offensive and defensive forces'
and 'we need a new framework that allows us to build missile defense to
counter the different threats of today's world. To do so we must move
beyond the constraints of the 30 year old ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile)
Treaty.'(1)
President Bush was supported by Australia, the UK, and, surprisingly
given its previous opposition to any missile defence system which breached
the ABM Treaty, a swift and positive response was also forthcoming from
India. There was a measured response by Russia, and China reacted strongly
against the proposals.
The Indian Response
In the debates leading up to the presidential elections last year, it
had often been argued that candidate Bush's proposals for a National
Missile Defense (NMD) would have a destabilising effect on South Asia,
given China's opposition. It was maintained that a NMD would lead to China
upgrading its nuclear and missile capabilities. Given the fact that India
perceived a nuclear threat from China, this would elicit a response from
India and a subsequent reaction from Pakistan.(2)
On a visit to Moscow in June last year, the Indian Foreign Minister,
Jaswant Singh, had stated that a system that breached the 1972 ABM Treaty
'may curb prospects for nuclear disarmament and weaken the non-proliferation
regime.'(3)
Consequently, the swift and positive Indian response took many observers
by surprise. On 2 May, a day after the speech, a Press Release
issued by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) stated inter alia:
India, particularly, welcomes the announcement of unilateral reductions
by the US of nuclear forces ... India believes that there is a strategic
and technological inevitability in stepping away from a world that is
held hostage by the doctrine of MAD to a cooperative, defensive transition
[emphasis added] that is underpinned by further cuts and a de-alert
of nuclear forces ...
India also lauds the desire expressed by the US President to make a 'clean
break from the past' and, especially from the 'adversarial legacy of the
Cold War.'
These events also happened on the eve of the visit of the Russian Foreign
Minister to India. Before leaving he is reported to have welcomed the
US offer to work with Russia on global security.(4) After the
visit, an Indian external affairs ministry spokesman, while making no
mention of the ABM treaty, said the two sides 'also reiterated that bilateral
agreements between the countries [Russia and the US] must be respected
and any modification of such agreements should be through mutual consultations
and understanding.'(5)
Indian Public Reaction
Reaction to the Indian statement was mostly negative among the opposition
political parties, and divided among media commentators. The main criticism
centred on the swiftness of the Indian response, lack of consultation
and the fact that there was no debate within the ministry nor was the
issue formally discussed by the Cabinet Committee on Security.(6)
A spokesman for the major opposition Congress Party stated: 'If the government
can convince the nation that the US missile defence program is in the
national interest, the Congress won't stand in the way. But the Government
must act in a mature way and take the opposition into its confidence.'(7)
The Communist Party of India (Marxist) demanded that the Government retract
its stand, stated its belief that President Bush's announcement would
result in a new nuclear arms race, and criticised the Indian Government
for compromising its position on nuclear disarmament.(8)
The Times of India maintained that the Indian reaction was one
of 'irrational exuberance' and the US claim that it would reduce its nuclear
arsenal would happen 'only after Washington has thrown the ABM into the
dustbin and introduced a dangerous dynamic into the stasis that the capability
of mutually assured destruction (MAD) has imposed on the nuclear weapons
world.'(9)
However, it can be argued that the Indian response was very intelligently
drafted. The emphasis was on the US proposal for a reduction in its nuclear
arsenal and its determination to consult friends and allies, Russia and
China. There was no mention of missile defence.
In fact, the sharp reaction against the swift albeit non-committal response
of the MEA elicited a further clarification. The MEA stated that NMD had
not been mentioned: 'while NMD is still at the idea stage, it is very
necessary for India to make a pronouncement ... keeping in mind the
way the Indo-US relations have evolved [emphasis added].'(10)
A New Relationship
It was a reflection of the improvement in bilateral relations under the
new US administration that India was one of the few countries that were
informed of President Bush's forthcoming speech. A day before, his National
Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice, phoned the Indian Foreign Minister,
Jaswant Singh, to advise him about the policy statement.
US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage's visit to New Delhi on
11 May also appeared to have been successful, with the Indian Government
appreciating his presentation and looking forward to 'further exchanges.'(11)
He also carried a letter from President Bush in which he accepted an invitation
to visit India.
These moves are part of evolving Indo-US relations. In a wide-ranging
interview recently, the Indian Ambassador to Washington, Lalit Mansingh,
made the following points.(12) Firstly, the nuclear genie could
not be put back in the bottle, the two countries had to 'go beyond and
look at common strategic interests.' Secondly, contrary to the perception
that the missile plan would impel China to expand its nuclear missile
stockpiles, at present India did not fear such an outcome, but he refused
to say whether growing cooperation was aimed at deterring China. Thirdly,
the two countries (despite current sanctions)(13) are to resume
military relations, beginning with a visit to New Delhi by the chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff later in May. In fact US military talks began
in April when Jaswant Singh, who serves both as foreign and defence minister,
met in Washington with Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld. Finally,
during a visit to Washington by the Indian Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha
in April, he had been assured that the US would soon lift economic sanctions.
What is not very well known is that on 3 April a Bill (107 H.R. 1358)
was introduced in the US Congress designed to remove all economic and
military sanctions on India and Pakistan. This bill also has the support
of the Bush administration. During her confirmation hearings, the nominee
for the U S Secretary of State for South Asia, Christina B. Rocca stated
that sanctions had outlived their usefulness and were an obstacle to engaging
both India and Pakistan.(14)
Pakistan's Reaction
Pakistan's reaction was slow and negative. The Jang newspaper
reported on 9 May, citing a foreign office spokesman, that Pakistan was
aware of the international concern over the program and could not welcome
it and that it would not help stop the proliferation of missiles and weapons
of mass destruction.
On 12 May, Chief Executive General Parvez Musharraf, for the first time,
said that Pakistan was opposed to 'any action that re-initiates [a] nuclear
and missile race.' Significantly, he was speaking on the occasion of a
visit by the Chinese Prime Minister and added that China and Pakistan
had commonality of views on all issues.(15) Given Pakistan's
close relationship with China, his reaction was not unexpected.
Further, General Musharraf would not have been encouraged by Richard
Armitage's comment in New Delhi the previous day (11 May) that 'We
have questions about Pakistan. It is well known.' Three days later, in
an apparent reversal of its position, Pakistan's Foreign Minister clarified
that General Musharraf's remarks had nothing to do with the missile defence
program.(16)
A New Agenda in South Asia?
In conclusion, with regards to China's response to the US proposals and
its impact on India, it already has the capability to devastate several
Indian cities. Secondly, given the ongoing improvements in Sino-Indian
relations, to link US-China equations to threats faced by India makes
for rather convoluted logic. Consequently, it can be said that India's
swift (albeit ambiguous) response to the proposals was a consequence of
its developing close economic and military relations with the US. Also,
the US plan, in its current form is more of a vision statement, with no
concrete details. It thus declares India's intention to be part of the
consultations, discussions and debate on what form the missile defence
proposals will eventually take.
For Pakistan, it is indeed a tightrope walk given its friendship with
China and its dependence on international financial institutions, strongly
influenced by the US, to bail it out of its tough economic situation.
. Washington File, 1 May 2001.
- Gaurav Kampani and Peter Sacacino, 'National Missile Defense Threatens
Stability in South Asia', Defense News, 10 July 2000.
- Times of India, 4 May 2001
- The Hindu, 4 May 2001.
- Times of India, 5 May 2001.
- Indian Express, 8 May 2001.
- ibid.
- The Hindu, 11 May 2001.
- 4 May 2001.
- The Newspaper Today at thenewspapertoday.com, 10 May
2001.
- The Hindu, 13 May 2001.
- Washington Times, 3 May 2001.
- Sanctions were imposed by the Clinton Administration on India and
Pakistan as a response to the 1998 nuclear tests.
- The Hindu, 19 May 2001.
- Associated Press of Pakistan, 13 May 2001.
- The Hindu, 16 May 2001.
|
