

# House, Government and Opposition

A knowledge of the structure of the House of Representatives is important to an understanding of its mode of operation. The components or groups which make up the House and which are described in the text that follows are common to most parliamentary systems based on the Westminster model. The relationship and interaction between these components is at the heart of parliamentary activity. The nature of the relationships between the groups largely determines the operational effectiveness of the Parliament, particularly in relation to the Executive Government.

## GOVERNMENT AND PARLIAMENT

### Relationships

The relationship between the groups is governed by a combination of constitutional provisions, convention and political reality, which can be simplified as follows:

- **Members** are individually elected to represent their constituents within an electoral Division and collectively form the House of Representatives.<sup>1</sup>
- In most cases Members belong to and support a particular **political party**.
- The party (or parties<sup>2</sup>) having the support of the majority of Members becomes the **government party**.
- The party, or the largest party in the case of more than one party, opposed to the party supporting the government forms the '**official**' **Opposition**.
- The party having the support of the majority of Members elects one of its members as leader, who is commissioned by the Governor-General as **Prime Minister** to form a Government.
- The party supporting the Government may elect<sup>3</sup>, or the Prime Minister may appoint, a specified number of its members to be **Ministers of State** (the Ministry) who form the Federal Executive Council to advise the Governor-General in the executive government of the Commonwealth and to administer the Departments of State of the Commonwealth.
- The full Ministry<sup>4</sup>, or a selected group from within the Ministry, becomes the principal policy and decision-making group of government which is commonly known as the **Cabinet**.

With its membership drawn from the Parliament, the Executive Government is required to seek the Parliament's approval of new legislation, including financial

1 For discussion of the Member as the basic unit of the House see Ch. on 'Members'.

2 That is two or more parties which combine their numbers to form a coalition government or opposition.

3 The method used by the Australian Labor Party when in government with the exception of the first Labor Government in 1904 when Prime Minister Watson chose the members of his Ministry.

4 The method used by the Australian Labor Party when in government.

legislation. Thus, as most of the more important executive actions are subject to parliamentary approval, the Government is responsible to the Parliament and through it to the electors. Herein lies the distinctiveness of the Westminster model—the interrelation of the Executive Government and the Parliament. It is the essence of what in Westminster terms is called ‘parliamentary government’.

A Government can only maintain office while it retains the confidence of the House of Representatives. Also its continuance as the Government is subject to the judgment of the electors at periodical general elections. In 1975 a third element came into play when the Government was effectively subjected to the will of the Senate which, in the circumstances, forced the Government to the electors.<sup>5</sup>

This basic dissection of the way Government relates to Parliament points to the fact that our system of parliamentary government is not entirely founded on principles expressed in the written Constitution (*see* p. 85). A correct analysis can only be made from an understanding of the development of the Westminster system of responsible government adopted by Australia.

### A note on separation of powers and checks and balances

The doctrine of separation of powers was popularised by Montesquieu in 1748 in his work *L'Esprit des Loix*. Montesquieu held that there were three essentially different powers of government, legislative, executive and judicial, and that a country's liberty depended on each of these powers being vested in a separate body. This theory had a marked effect on subsequent parliamentary and governmental development in democratic societies.

The doctrine of the separation of powers influenced the framing of the Australian Constitution to the extent that the powers of the main arms of government were set down in three separate chapters (s. 1 The Legislature; s. 61 The Executive; s. 71 The Judicature). However, as Ministers must be, or become, members of the legislature, there is a combining and overlapping of the legislative and executive functions.

According to Bagehot, the relationship between the legislative and executive powers in the Westminster system is better described as a ‘fusion of powers’:

The efficient secret of the English Constitution may be described as the close union, the nearly complete fusion, of the executive and legislative powers.<sup>6</sup>

This fusion takes place in a Cabinet, which:

... is a combining committee a *hyphen* which joins, a *buckle* which fastens, the legislative part of the State to the executive part of the State. In its origin it belongs to the one, in its functions it belongs to the other.<sup>7</sup>

Although this fusion of powers in the Westminster tradition may be regarded as a strength, it is also recognised as a potential danger. It is accepted to be undesirable for all or any two of the three powers to come under the absolute control of a single body. There are therefore checks and balances which prevent the fusion of executive and legislative powers from being complete. The essence of a democratic Parliament is that the policy and performance of government must be open to scrutiny, open to criticism, and finally open to the judgment of the electors. When the Government puts its policy and legislation before Parliament it exposes itself to the scrutiny and criticism of an organised Opposition and to its own Members who may be critical of, and suggest improvements to, government policy and administration. Parliament is an important brake on the misuse of executive power

5 See Ch. on ‘Disagreements between the Houses’.

7 Bagehot, pp. 67-8.

6 Bagehot, p. 65.

of the Government collectively, or Ministers individually. It is essential that there be no erosion of Parliament's role in scrutinising the actions of the Government, such as might cause the Parliament to become a mere 'rubber stamp' in respect of government policy. Through the procedures of the House and the will of individual Members, and especially through the institutionalised Opposition, the executive and legislative functions remain sufficiently distinct.

### **The Government and House proceedings**

The Executive Government exercises a controlling influence over the House of Representatives in respect of its deliberations and what it produces. The principle factors in this are that:

- the Ministry is drawn from the legislature;
- for the Government to continue in office it depends on the support of the majority of the Members of the House, and
- the party system and its strong discipline help the Government to maintain its majority.

The capacity of the parties to control the votes of the majority of Members provides the means by which the Government, either directly or indirectly, may exercise its control over the House. At the same time the Government's control is constrained by its accountability and responsibility to the Parliament in which the Opposition (the significance of which is discussed at p. 117) and the Senate play vital and determining roles. Notwithstanding these factors, as all decisions of the House are taken by majority vote, the Government is able to exert substantial influence over the procedures of the House.

Indicative of the significance of some of the matters governed by standing orders<sup>8</sup> but subject to the will of the government majority are:

- the election of the Speaker and Chairman of Committees;
- the initiation, content and processing of legislation;
- additions to, and amendments of, standing and sessional orders;
- the curtailment of debate under the various closure and guillotine provisions;
- the suspension of standing orders;
- the determination of the days and hours of sitting, and
- the establishment and terms of reference of most parliamentary committees.

Other significant ways in which the business of the House is controlled by the Government under the standing orders include the requirements:

- that government business takes precedence of all other business on each sitting day except Thursdays when non-government business has precedence until 2 p.m.<sup>9</sup>, and
- that Ministers may arrange the order of government business as they think fit.<sup>10</sup>

Priority for government business acknowledges the need for the Government to be provided with sufficient parliamentary time for pursuit of its legislative program and the communication of its policies<sup>11</sup> (*see* p. 94).

<sup>8</sup> See relevant part of the text for discussion of each subject.

<sup>9</sup> Under sessional orders first effective in March 1988.

<sup>10</sup> S.O. 105.

<sup>11</sup> See also Ch. on 'The role of the House of Representatives'.

Other provisions of the standing orders which give a preference or latitude to Ministers are:

- a motion to discuss a matter of special interest (S.O. 108) may only be initiated by a Minister;
- a censure or want of confidence motion (or amendment) in the Government may be allowed precedence over other business only if accepted by a Minister (S.O. 110);
- the initiation of financial proposals (partly for constitutional reasons) is restricted to Ministers (S.O.s 291-3);
- a motion for the adjournment of the House (S.O. 50) may be moved only by a Minister;
- a motion for fixing the next meeting of the House (S.O. 51) may be moved by a Minister without notice;
- speech time limits in committee (S.O. 91) permit the Minister in charge to speak for unspecified periods;
- papers may be presented by Ministers at any time when there is no other business before the House (S.O.s 102 and 319), and
- a motion to print or take note of a paper (S.O. 322) may be moved by a Minister without notice.

The principle of responsibility and accountability of Ministers to Parliament is to some extent recognised by standing orders in that:

- a motion or an amendment which expresses a censure or want of confidence in the Government may be moved (S.O. 110). (There is no specific provision for a motion of censure or want of confidence of an individual Minister. This would be treated in the same way as any other private Member's motion.);
- a copy of every petition received by the House is referred to the responsible Minister (without necessitating any action by the Minister) (S.O. 132);
- questions with or without notice may be asked of Ministers in accordance with the rules of the House governing questions (S.O.s 142-153);
- by order of the House a Minister may be required to deliver papers for tabling (S.O. 316);
- a document relating to public affairs quoted from by a Minister (unless stated to be confidential<sup>12</sup> or more properly obtained by address) shall, if required, be tabled (S.O. 321), and
- the procedures in relation to matters of public importance and grievance debate (S.O.s 107 and 106) are used for the purposes of ministerial accountability.

## **The Constitution and Executive Government**

The executive power of the Commonwealth although vested in the Queen is exercisable by the Governor-General and in the words of section 61 of the Constitution 'extends to the execution and maintenance of this Constitution, and of the laws of the Commonwealth'.<sup>13</sup>

12 This is an important exception as it gives rise to the concept of 'crown privilege' which has been invoked in respect of the publication of government documents and information. See Chs on 'Papers and documents' and 'Parliamentary committees'.

13 Constitution, s. 61; and see Ch. on 'The Parliament'.

The significance of this section is expressed by *Quick and Garran*:

This statement stereotypes the theory of the British Constitution that the Crown is the source and fountain of Executive authority, and that every administrative act must be done by and in the name of the Crown . . .

The Governor-General appointed by the Queen is authorized to execute, in the Commonwealth, during the Queen's pleasure and subject to the Constitution, such powers and functions as may be assigned to him by Her Majesty (sec. 2) and by the Constitution (sec. 61). Foremost amongst those powers and functions will necessarily be the execution and maintenance of the Constitution, and the execution and maintenance of the laws passed in pursuance of the Constitution.<sup>14</sup>

The succeeding sections of the Constitution supplement section 61 by establishing in broad terms how and by whom the executive power is in practice to be executed:

**First** (section 62)—There is a Federal Executive Council to advise the Governor-General in the government of the Commonwealth, and the members of the Council are chosen and summoned by the Governor-General and sworn as Executive Councillors, and hold office during his pleasure.

The essence of this provision, read in conjunction with the succeeding provisions, is in the words of *Quick and Garran*:

Whilst the Constitution, in sec. 61, recognizes the ancient principle of the Government of England that the Executive power is vested in the Crown, it adds as a graft to that principle the modern political institution, known as responsible government, which shortly expressed means that the discretionary powers of the Crown are exercised by the wearer of the Crown or by its Representative according to the advice of ministers, having the confidence of that branch of the legislature which immediately represents the people. The practical result is that the Executive power is placed in the hands of a Parliamentary Committee, called the Cabinet, and the real head of the Executive is not the Queen but the Chairman of the Cabinet, or in other words the Prime Minister.<sup>15</sup>

Ever since the resignation of Sir Robert Walpole in 1742, it has been recognized that the Crown could not for any length of time continue to carry on the government of the country, except through Ministers having the confidence of the House of Commons. That constitutes the essence of Responsible Government.<sup>16</sup>

Although there is no constitutional restriction on who shall be appointed to the Executive Council, it has been composed, with a few exceptions, of Ministers. (For discussion of the Federal Executive Council, per se, see p. 116.)

**Second** (section 63)—The provisions of the Constitution referring to the Governor-General in Council are to be construed as referring to the Governor-General acting with the advice of the Federal Executive Council.

This section makes it mandatory, as a constitutional principle, that the Governor-General acts only with the advice of the Federal Executive Council which, by virtue of section 64, and by convention, is the Ministry. The import of this section is to give further constitutional recognition to the concept of responsible government.

**Third** (section 64)—The Governor-General may appoint officers to administer such Departments of State of the Commonwealth as the Governor-General in Council may establish. Such officers hold office during the pleasure of the Governor-General. They must be members of the Federal Executive Council, and are the Queen's Ministers of State for the Commonwealth. After the first general election no Minister of State can hold office for a longer period than three months unless he or she is or becomes a Senator or a Member of the House of Representatives.

<sup>14</sup> *Quick and Garran*, p. 702.

<sup>15</sup> *Quick and Garran*, p. 703.

<sup>16</sup> *Quick and Garran*, p. 704.

This section provides the constitutional authority for the appointment of Ministers and determines that the Ministry, for all intents and purposes, forms the Executive Government of the Commonwealth. The requirement that Ministers must eventually sit in Parliament brings together the executive and legislative organs of government.

**Fourth** (sections 65-67)—The Constitution gives further recognition to the Ministry by empowering the Parliament to determine the number of Ministers and the offices they shall hold<sup>17</sup> (*see* p. 94) and the salaries they are to be paid (*see* p. 110). The Executive Government in the broader sense is not only composed of the Ministry. The Constitution also makes provision, until the Parliament otherwise provides, for the appointment (and removal) of other officers of the Executive Government by the Governor-General in Council.

This provision provides the constitutional authority for the appointment of all Commonwealth public servants. The majority of public service appointments are made under the delegating authority contained within the section. Parliament has legislated on numerous occasions to provide for the appointment of Commonwealth officers, the principal statute being the *Public Service Act 1922*.

### Constitutional conventions

The existence of a wide range of conventions of the Constitution<sup>18</sup> plays a fundamental part in Parliament/Executive Government relations. These conventions are numerous, and in some cases there is no universal agreement that they exist. Conventions are based on established precedent and practice and in many respects have their foundation in British law and practice established before 1901. They are subject to change by way of (political) interpretation or (political) circumstances and may in some instances be broken.

Constitutional conventions are of great significance in the exercise of the reserve powers of the Crown. This is particularly evident in the exercise of the power of dissolution<sup>19</sup>, vested by the Constitution solely in the Governor-General but not normally exercised without regard to convention.

The workings of responsible government, the concept of ministerial responsibility (collective and individual) and the existence of Cabinet (not mentioned in the Constitution) are for all practical purposes the subject of constitutional convention. The Constitution made no mention of political parties until 1977 when section 15, relating to the filling of casual vacancies in the Senate, was amended. Also majority or minority groups and the offices of Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition are not mentioned.

Constitutional convention and the way it is interpreted and applied may, on occasions, have the same force as, but be not superior to, the Constitution itself, and its existence has been recognised by important cases of the High Court.<sup>20</sup> Crisp briefly defines constitutional conventions as:

. . . extra-legal rules of structure or procedure or principle, established by precedent, consolidated by usage and generally observed by all concerned. They will affect the

17 The Parliament has never exercised the power regarding the office a Minister shall hold.

18 These rules Mill referred to as 'the unwritten maxims of the constitution'. Twenty years later Dicey called them 'the conventions of the constitution' while Anson referred to them as 'the custom of the constitution'. Sir Ivor Jennings, *The Law and the Constitution*, 5th edn, University of London Press, London, 1959, pp. 81 ff.

19 Also prorogation and appointing the time for holding sessions, (Constitution, s. 5) and other powers. *See* Ch. on 'The Parliament'.

20 *See*, for example, *Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd* (1920) 28 CLR 129 (Engineers Case) and more recently *Cormack v. Cope* (1974) and others discussed in Ch. on 'Disagreements between the Houses'.

operation of the Constitution and may affect the working of the law but they themselves have not the force of law.<sup>21</sup>

Professor Gordon Reid interprets the phrase as follows:

. . . the expression is little more than an article of political rhetoric and . . . our academic constitutional lawyers were publicly [in 1975] using it as such. It is well known that Australia's written Constitution is silent on many important aspects of government. It says nothing about the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, responsible government, ministerial responsibility, electing a government, dismissing a government, parliamentary control, what is to be done if the Senate refuses to pass an appropriation Bill (or a supply Bill), and so on. In reality this void is filled-in by well established practice, methods, habits, maxims, usages, many of them of long-standing, which were inherited from colonial Parliaments, which in turn inherited them from Westminster. It is these practices, methods and usages which tend to be referred to, albeit vaguely, as 'conventions of the Constitution'.<sup>22</sup>

Although reference to constitutional conventions is made throughout this text, it is not intended to identify and separately examine in depth the full range and meaning of all of them<sup>23</sup>, as they have been subjected in recent times to continuing political questioning which has left the status of many so-called conventions in doubt.

Even though the division is not always clear, there are other conventions which may fall under such headings as governmental, (party) political, and parliamentary. Parliamentary convention may be considered to be synonymous with parliamentary practice which is, as the term implies, of very broad scope.

### **Aspects of ministerial responsibility**

Ministerial responsibility takes two forms—collective cabinet responsibility (or 'cabinet solidarity') and individual ministerial responsibility. Both concepts are governed by conventions inherited from Westminster and both are central to the working of responsible government.

#### *Collective Cabinet responsibility*

Cabinet is collectively responsible to the people, through the Parliament, for determining and implementing policies for national government. Broadly, it is required by convention that all Ministers must be prepared to accept collective responsibility for, and defend publicly, the policies and actions of the Government or else resign. Most importantly, the convention also requires that the loss of a vote on a no-confidence motion in the House or on a major issue is expected to lead to the resignation of the whole Government (including Ministers not in the Cabinet) or, alternatively, the Prime Minister is expected to recommend to the Governor-General that the House be dissolved for an election. Such events are, in the ordinary course, unlikely, given the strength of party discipline. Further, contemporary thinking is that, should a Government lose a vote on a major issue, it would propose a motion of confidence to test or confirm its position before resigning or recommending an election.<sup>24</sup>

21 Crisp, p. 352.

22 G.S. Reid, 'The Double Dissolutions and Joint Sitting Commentaries', in Gareth Evans (ed.), *Labor and the Constitution 1972-1975*, Heinemann, Melbourne, 1977, p. 244.

23 Suggested references include Sawyer, *Federation Under Strain*; Evans, *Labor and the Constitution*; Cooray, *Conventions, The Australian Con-*

*stitution and the Future*; Saunders and Smith, *Paper prepared for Standing Committee D (of the Australian Constitutional Convention) identifying the Conventions associated with the Commonwealth Constitution*.

24 See Chs on 'The role of the House of Representatives' and 'Motions'.

It has been generally agreed that among the principles implicit in the convention each Minister is required to abide by the following<sup>25</sup>:

- he or she must be prepared not only to refrain from publicly criticising other Ministers and their actions but also to defend them publicly, or else resign;
- he or she must not announce a major new policy without previous Cabinet consent—if a Minister does, Cabinet must either provide support or request his or her resignation;
- he or she must not express private views on government policies nor speak about or otherwise become involved in a ministerial colleague's portfolio without first consulting that colleague and possibly the Prime Minister, and
- government advice to the Crown must be unanimous.

Not all principles associated with the convention have always been scrupulously upheld. At times governments have perhaps chosen to observe the convention for political expediency or have chosen not to follow it for the same purpose. Where crucial political advantage or disadvantage has been involved party political considerations have sometimes predominated over strict adherence to the convention.

While there have been departures from the convention the following comment on the controversy concerning the vitality of the convention places the matter in perspective:

Most of the current disagreement turns on degree. Some critics have been concerned to point to the increasing number of deviations from the traditional rules; this article has been emphasising the overwhelming majority of cases in which the rules are still followed. The break with the past is less than has been thought.<sup>26</sup>

For precedents of resignations by individual Ministers in accordance with the convention *see* p. 104.

#### *Individual ministerial responsibility*

During this century there has been a change in the perceptions of both Ministers and informed commentators as to what is required by the convention of individual ministerial responsibility. The real practical limitations on strict adherence to the convention as it was traditionally conceived are now openly acknowledged.

The 1976 report of the Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration reflects the current position:

It is through ministers that the whole of the administration—departments, statutory bodies and agencies of one kind and another—is responsible to the Parliament and thus, ultimately, to the people. Ministerial responsibility to the Parliament is a matter of constitutional convention rather than law. It is not tied to any authoritative text, or amenable to judicial interpretation or resolution. Because of its conventional character, the principles and values on which it rests may undergo change, and their very status as conventions be placed in doubt. In recent times the vitality of some of the traditional conceptions of ministerial responsibility has been called into question, and there is little evidence that a minister's responsibility is now seen as requiring him to bear the blame for all the faults and shortcomings of his public service subordinates, regardless of his own involvement, or to tender his resignation in every case where fault is found. The

25 *See, e.g.*: Crisp, pp. 354-6; Hugh V. Emy, *The Politics of Australian Democracy*, 2nd edn, Macmillan, South Melbourne, 1978, pp. 246, 312-13; S. Encel, *Cabinet Government in Australia*, 2nd edn, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1974, p. 107.

26 David Butler, 'Ministerial responsibility in Australia and Britain', *Parliamentary Affairs* XXVI, 4, 1973, pp. 413-14.

evidence tends to suggest rather that while ministers continue to be held accountable to Parliament in the sense of being obliged to answer to it when Parliament so demands, and to indicate corrective action if that is called for, they themselves are not held culpable—and in consequence bound to resign or suffer dismissal—unless the action which stands condemned was theirs, or taken on their direction, or was action with which they ought obviously to have been concerned.<sup>27</sup>

As the Royal Commission and other authorities have noted, there are still circumstances in which a Minister is expected to accept personal responsibility and to resign (or be dismissed):

Resignation is still a valid sanction where ministers have been indiscreet or arbitrary in exercising power. In cases where the minister has misled parliament, condoned or authorized a blatantly unreasonable use of executive power, or more vaguely, where the minister's behaviour contravenes established standards of morality, resignation or dismissal is the appropriate action. In these cases, the factors which may often excuse the minister from blame for administrative blunders do not operate to the same degree: the minister's personal responsibility may be more easily isolated.<sup>28</sup>

The responsibility of ministers individually to parliament is not mere fiction. An individual can be disciplined whereas the whole cannot. The events of recent years show that a minister can become too great a burden to carry. The parliament's role has been to expose and demean. Forced ministerial resignations and dismissals have been the decision of the prime minister not the parliament by its vote. The chief of the executive has judged that the public would accept no less. The credibility of a number of other ministers has been rightly challenged in parliament. Whether the challenges were merited or not the right of parliamentary inquiry cannot be denied. For a government to deny the right may prove to be suicidal. Parliament is the correct forum, the only forum, to test or expose ministerial administrative competence or fitness to hold office. However, allegations of a different kind, that is, offences against the law, should not be tried by parliament. The proper forum for those allegations is the courts. In cases of moral misconduct by a minister, the sanction should be political, in the form of resignation or defeat.

I continue to believe that in the matter of ministerial responsibility, in the strict sense of actions done in his name for him or on his behalf in his role as a minister, his responsibility is to answer and explain to parliament for errors or misdeeds but there is no convention which would make him absolutely responsible so that he must answer for, that is, to be liable to censure for all actions done under his administration.

. . . If the compelling penalty for a 'mistake' is resignation then the compelling prerequisite for punishment is the establishment of proof. This is not easily done in the political arena. The gravity of the 'mistake' would be an essential factor to any requirement of resignation. Equally the premise is only as sound as 'personal fault' or 'lack of reasonable diligence' can be established. Penalty by compulsion is dependent on the establishment of guilt. For the purposes of political advantage, allegations of ministerial 'mistakes' of a baseless or minor nature are no less possible than ministerial or government defence in the interests of self-preservation. Executives and ministers will always find it hard to permanently cover-up allegations of serious maladministration or misconduct.<sup>29</sup>

27 'Australian Government Administration', *Report of Royal Commission*, PP 185 (1976) 59-60; see also B. M. Snedden, 'Ministerial Responsibility in Modern Parliamentary Government', paper presented to the Third Commonwealth and Empire Law Conference, *Record*, Law Book Co., Sydney, 1966; R. V. Garland, 'Relations between Ministers and Departments', *Royal Institute of Public Administration (ACT Group) Newsletter* 3, 3 August 1976, p. 24.

28 Emy, p. 280.

29 Sir Billy M. Snedden, 'Ministers in Parliament—A Speaker's eye view'. In *Responsible Government in Australia*, Patrick Weller & Dean Jaensch (eds), Drummond, Richmond, 1980, p. 76. See also Sir Robert Garran oration, (1988) by Hon. R. I. L. Hawke.

In a practical sense, a Minister may resign, not as an admission of culpability, but rather to remove pressure from the Government while serious criticisms of his or her capacity or integrity are properly and dispassionately assessed. Alternatively, a Minister may be given leave from ministerial duties for the same purpose (see p. 105).

When responsibility for a serious matter can be clearly attached to a particular Minister personally, it is of fundamental importance to the effective operation of responsible government that he or she adhere to the convention of individual responsibility. However, the prime consideration in determining whether a Minister should resign or be dismissed has sometimes been the assessment of the likely political repercussions on the Government.<sup>30</sup>

Excluding the most serious cases and those where a Minister is clearly culpable the records have shown that a Government can rely on party discipline to ensure that a Minister's resignation is not forced by a direct vote of the House. Indeed there has been no occasion of an adverse resolution of the House in the nature of a want of confidence or censure motion in an individual Minister (excluding the unusual events on 11 November 1975) on which resignation or dismissal would be expected.

However some ministerial resignations have been forced by pressure applied through questioning and criticism in the House. The effects of this pressure on public opinion have been such that the Minister concerned or the Prime Minister has been forced to take action.

In 1973 a want of confidence amendment in the Attorney-General was agreed to in the Senate. On the following sitting day a motion of confidence in the Attorney-General was agreed to in the House.<sup>31</sup> In 1974 a motion in the Senate that the Minister for Foreign Affairs was 'deserving of censure and ought to resign' because of three separate issues was divided and the motion as it related to one of the issues was agreed to.<sup>32</sup> On 13 September 1984 the Senate agreed to a motion of censure of the Minister for Resources and Energy 'for his deliberate misleading of the Senate by selective tabling of documents and his refusal to explain his actions despite repeated questioning by the Senate'. On 7 April 1989 the Senate agreed to a motion censuring the Minister for Resources in connection with alterations to the *Hansard* record. In none of these cases did the Minister concerned feel compelled to resign. These instances would seem to reinforce the principle inherent in the system of responsible government that Ministers, individually and collectively, are responsible to the lower House.

## POLITICAL PARTIES

Although political parties were not recognised by the Constitution until 1977<sup>33</sup>, their existence has since Federation, and more particularly since 1910, dominated the operation of the House of Representatives.

Political parties are not formally recognised in the standing orders of the House yet the proceedings of the House turn on the interaction of the major parties forming the Government and Opposition.<sup>34</sup> In the context of the House of Representatives party loyalty and discipline are strong with the effect of Members generally voting in accordance with the decision taken by the party unless a 'free' vote has been permitted.<sup>35</sup> Failure to vote along party lines on important issues may

30 See R. V. Garland, *Relations between Ministers and Departments*, p. 24.

31 J 1973-74/91-2, 93-4; VP 1973-74/104-6; see also Ch. on 'Motions'.

32 J 1974-75/195-7.

33 Section 15 of the Constitution altered with respect to filling of casual vacancies in the Senate.

34 For discussion of the private Member's conflicting responsibilities see Ch. on 'Members'.

35 See Ch. on 'Routine of business and the sitting day'.

seriously jeopardise a Member's chances of re-election in the event of the party organisation withdrawing its support.<sup>36</sup> Party discipline is essential to the governing party in order to retain the support of the majority of the Members of the House without which it could not continue to govern. Conversely the basic strength of the private Member lies in the dependence of ministries and shadow ministries on the support of the individual Members of the parliamentary party. While it can be said that generally a private Member has to a large extent lost individuality of action in the House where party solidarity is usually exhibited, he or she has many opportunities to put a personal point of view within the party (*see* p. 93).

From the practical point of view, the working of the House is greatly facilitated by the existence of political parties, as they create a degree of certainty and add stability. Parties create 'numbers', or blocks of votes, on many issues which come before the House and it is around these 'numbers' on each side of a question that parliamentary activity mainly revolves. However, when from time to time the governing party is not able to maintain a majority of votes, the consequences of this inability fall on the party, and the machinery of the House is not affected.

Between 1901 and 1910 allegiances to party, particularly in respect of the groups known as protectionists and free traders, were fluid and governments were made and unmade on the floor of the House.<sup>37</sup> Following the defeat of the Deakin 'Fusion' Ministry at the general election of 1910 a two party situation developed in the ensuing Parliament—Labour and Liberal.<sup>38</sup> With the formation of the Country Party in 1919 a third party was introduced into the House.<sup>39</sup> Since then representation in the House of Representatives has been composed almost entirely of these three political parties and their successors, namely, the Australian Labor Party<sup>40</sup>, the Liberal Party of Australia (under various names) and the National Party (*see also* p. 118).

The Labor Party is Australia's oldest political party having evolved in the 1890s as the political wing of the trade union movement. The present Liberal Party was formed in October 1944 out of the United Australia Party and its earlier predecessor, the Nationalist Party. Since the general election of 1949 the Liberal and National Country (later renamed National) parties have formed governments as a coalition<sup>41</sup> except for the period of Labor government between 1972 and 1975 and since 1983 when they have formed 'coalition oppositions'.

The three major political parties are organised at a national, State and sometimes at local level. While there are important differences in the structure of the parties, at the national level they all have an organisational and a parliamentary wing. The extra-parliamentary or organisational wings of the political parties are not recognised in a procedural sense and have no role in the formal parliamentary structure and workings of the Parliament. Parliamentary activity revolves around the parliamentary wings of the political parties, that is, the elected representatives.

### Leaders and office holders

The parliamentary parties determine who shall be their leaders and deputy leaders in both Houses; hence they determine who shall be Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition. All leaders and other office holders receive a salary

36 The discipline exercised by the Labor Party has been considered to be greater than that exercised by the coalition parties.

37 VP 1904/49,149-51; VP 1905/9; VP 1908/79,81-3; VP 1909/11-13.

38 This earlier Liberal Party later formed part of the Nationalist Party in 1917.

39 Renamed National Country Party of Australia in 1975, VP 1974-75/624.

40 Unofficial spelling changed from 'Labour' to 'Labor' from circa 1912. Now recognised as 'Labor'.

41 For a record of party representation in the House *see* Appendix 10.

additional to their allowance as a Member of Parliament.<sup>42</sup> While Ministers are in fact holders of (ministerial) office, those offices are strictly positions of government under the Crown.<sup>43</sup> For constitutional and statutory reasons therefore, and for the purposes of the Remuneration Tribunal, Ministers are not defined as office holders of the Parliament.

The Remuneration Tribunal regards the occupants of the following positions as office holders of the Parliament for the purposes of payment of allowances in addition to their allowance as a Member<sup>44</sup>:

**President of the Senate**

**Speaker of the House of Representatives**

Leader of the Opposition

Deputy Leader of the Opposition

Leader of the Opposition in the Senate

Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate

Leader of the Third Party in the House of Representatives

Leader of a recognised non-government party of at least five members not otherwise specified

Leader of the National Party in the Senate

**Chairman of Committees in the Senate**

**Chairman of Committees in the House of Representatives**

Government Whip in the House of Representatives

Opposition Whip in the House of Representatives

Government Whip in the Senate

Opposition Whip in the Senate

Third Party Whip in the House of Representatives

Deputy Government Whip in the House of Representatives

Whip in the Senate of a recognised non-government party of at least five members not otherwise specified

Deputy Government Whip in the Senate

Deputy Opposition Whip in the Senate

Deputy Opposition Whip in the House of Representatives

**Deputy Chairman of Committees in the Senate**

**Deputy Chairman of Committees in the House of Representatives**

**Chairman of a parliamentary committee concerned with public affairs<sup>45</sup>**

The Leader of the House and the Leader of the Government in the Senate, although they clearly have parliamentary roles, are also Ministers and are classified by the Remuneration Tribunal as such.

For parliamentary purposes the Remuneration Tribunal's definition of office holders of the Parliament needs some qualification to distinguish their parliamentary or party relationship:

- The Presiding Officers and Chairmen of Committees<sup>46</sup> are elected by their respective Houses and are correctly known as Officers of the House and the Senate respectively. These are strictly parliamentary offices.

42 See also Ch. on 'Members'.

43 This is an important distinction for the purpose of the constitutional provision regarding 'office of profit', see p.

44 Note that these positions are not regarded as offices of profit under the Crown by virtue of section 44(iv) of the Constitution; the persons are neither appointed by nor are they servants of the Crown. Those officers not in bold type are not strictly parliamentary office holders.

45 Other than chairmen of 'domestic' parliamentary committees as defined by the Remuneration Tribunal.

46 The occupants however are pre-selected for nomination by the parliamentary parties; and see Ch. on 'The Speaker, the Chairman of Committees and Officers'.

- Deputy Chairmen of Committees are nominated by the Presiding Officers in consultation with the respective parties. These are parliamentary positions.
- The chairmen of parliamentary committees may be either elected by the committee<sup>47</sup> or nominated by the Prime Minister. These are parliamentary positions.
- The leaders and deputy leaders of the political parties, although they receive parliamentary recognition, hold party positions determined within the parliamentary parties.
- Whips and deputy whips strictly hold party positions determined within the parliamentary parties.<sup>48</sup>

At the commencement of each Parliament (or whenever a change occurs) the leader of each party makes a formal announcement to the House as to its leadership and whips.<sup>49</sup>

### Party whips

Each party has its own whip whose main function is to act as an administrative officer to his or her parliamentary party. Although whips have duties in relation to the proceedings of the House they occupy essentially party political positions. Outside the Chamber the whip may be required to provide the clerical back-up for such matters as co-ordinating party committees, arranging party nominations to parliamentary committees and organising any party balloting which may be required.<sup>50</sup>

The term 'whip' is derived from the English hunting expression 'whipper-in', which was the title for the person responsible for preventing the hunting hounds from straying from the pack. The first use of the term in a parliamentary context has been attributed to Edmund Burke who, in 1769, described the intense lobbying over a particular division as a 'whipping-in' of Members.<sup>51</sup> Wilding and Laundy, however, trace the use of the term back even further, when they refer to Porritt's claim that the whip, meaning a document instructing persons which side to take on a particular question, was in vogue as early as 1621. In the House of Commons, whips of all parties supply their Members with information on forthcoming business with each item of business underlined according to its importance, hence the use of the term 'whip' in relation to the document, for example, a 'three line whip'.<sup>52</sup>

In the case of a coalition government, the whip of the senior partner becomes Government Whip. Within the House of Representatives, the Government Whip and the Opposition Whip are assisted by a Deputy Government Whip and a Deputy Opposition Whip respectively. Whips are either elected by the parliamentary party (Labor Party, National Party) or appointed by the parliamentary leader of the party (Liberal Party). Whips do not have any administrative responsibility or control in relation to the parliamentary or government administrations. The Government Whip in the House of Representatives is not a Minister as he is in the House of Commons. In recognition of their party duties, not shared by other private

47 The occupants however are pre-selected for nomination by the parliamentary parties in the first instance; and see Ch. on 'Parliamentary committees'.

48 The Parliamentary Labor Party nominates and elects its members to occupy all parliamentary and party positions. The parliamentary wing of the Liberal Party elects its leader (and deputy leader) who appoints its Senate leaders, and whip and deputy whip in the House. Liberal Party whips in the Senate are elected. The National Party elects its leaders and whips.

49 VP 1978-80/7-9.

50 The whips may be assisted by a returning officer or a secretary to the parliamentary party (also members of the parliamentary party). They are party internal positions which have no formal recognition within the Parliament itself.

51 *Odgers*, p. 288.

52 N. Wilding & P. Laundy, *An Encyclopaedia of Parliament*, 4th edn, Cassell, London, 1972, pp. 785-7, including reference to Porritt, *The Unreformed House of Commons*.

Members, whips and their deputies receive an allowance in addition to their allowance as Members.

Within the parliamentary process a whip is required to perform a multitude of tasks including:

- Arrangement of the number and order of Members who wish to speak in debate. (The 'list of speakers' is advisory only and does not bind the Chair in allocating the call.) This may be done in consultation with the Leader of the House in respect of government Members and his counterpart in the Opposition or the party leader(s) in respect of opposition Members.
- Ensuring the attendance of party members for divisions and quorum calls. This responsibility is more onerous on the Government Whip as it has been considered that the Government should ensure that a quorum is maintained.<sup>53</sup>
- In conjunction with other whips, the arrangement of 'pairs'<sup>54</sup> for Members who are absent from the House or who may desire to be absent from the House.
- In divisions, by convention on appointment from the Chair, to act as a teller.<sup>55</sup>
- The Government Whip has the added responsibility of assisting the Leader of the House in ensuring that the timetable for the Government's legislative program is met and regularly moves procedural motions such as the motion for the closure.

### Party committees and meetings

Both the government and the opposition parties have backbench committees to assist them in the consideration of legislative proposals and other issues of political significance allied to each committee's function. These committees, which consist of Members having a special interest in the subject matter of the committee, are particularly useful in that they provide a forum in which a Member is able to discuss on a party basis matters of importance to his or her party and electoral Division. In respect of both sides of the House these committees have been shown to influence (and in some cases directly or indirectly overturn) government policy or decisions.

All parties have party meetings in sitting weeks but usually at times when the House is not sitting. The proceedings of party meetings are regarded as confidential, and the detail of discussions is not normally made public. These meetings provide the forum, particularly for backbenchers, for internal party discussion of party policy, parliamentary activity, parliamentary tactics, resolving internal party disputes, election of officers and provide a means of exerting backbench pressure on, and communication with, its leaders.

Party meetings of the Parliamentary Labor Party are commonly referred to as 'caucus' meetings.<sup>56</sup> Used in its collective sense the 'caucus' of the Labor Party is composed of all Labor Members of the House and the Senate meeting together. In its extended sense the 'caucus system', as applying to all parties, was arrived at from the development of formalised party arrangements and rules.

53 Although it is probably incumbent on all Members to maintain a quorum, as it is generally government business which is before the House, it is to the Government's advantage to see that it does not lapse through want of a quorum. See Ch. on 'Routine of business and the sitting day'.

54 See Ch. on 'Routine of business and the sitting day'.

55 See Ch. on 'Routine of business and the sitting day'.

56 The word 'caucus' was originally an American term meaning in its broadest sense simply a meeting of parliamentary members of a particular party to consult. See Patrick Weller (ed.), *Caucus Minutes 1901-1949*; Vol. I, Melbourne University Press, 1975, pp. 5-7.

Important differences between the two main parties in their caucus arrangements are:

- The Chairman of the Labor Party caucus is elected from among its members and is usually a backbencher, while in the Liberal Party the leader traditionally presides over caucus meetings including joint party meetings.
- The Labor Party caucus elects its members to all positions of office including Ministers, while the leader of the Liberal Party traditionally appoints members to most offices including Ministers.
- Party discipline, in particular voting requirements, is more formal in the Labor Party and the National Party than the Liberal Party, but in each case party discipline is strong.

### **Parties and their effect on the House**

In many respects the functioning of the House is based on the clear-cut division between Government and Opposition, that is, the opposing political parties, and the working arrangements and conduct of business reflect this. An obvious recognition of this historical development is the seating arrangement in the House with government Members sitting to the right of the Speaker's Chair and opposition Members to the left. Procedural recognition is exemplified by the practice of the Chair of alternating the call between government and opposition Members.

The important functions performed by the parties are mostly unrecognised by the standing orders in the working of procedure, although the standing orders recognise the Government's control in arranging the business of the House (*see p. 82*).<sup>57</sup>

The party system has a strong influence on the day-to-day workings and decision-making of the House in direct contrast to the traditional 'public' role of Parliament. As one commentator puts it:

The implications of a predominantly team approach to parliamentary matters even to the abrogation of any effective rights of the individual representative raises important questions about the nature of our modern parliamentary system and the extent to which public frustration with it as an institution may relate to undue party cohesiveness.<sup>58</sup>

To facilitate the management and programming of the business of the House, a Government/Opposition consultative arrangement has existed, in formal terms, since 1951. The Leader of the House, generally a senior Minister, consults, or ensures that consultations are held, with a member of the shadow ministry nominated by the Leader of the Opposition, and is assisted by the Government Whip. They are jointly responsible for the daily programming of the House. The final responsibility remains with the Leader of the House acting on behalf of the Government (*see p. 102*).

## **THE MINISTRY**

### **Composition of the Ministry**

#### *Number of Ministers*

The Constitution provides for the number of Ministers as follows:

Until the Parliament otherwise provides, the Ministers of State shall not exceed seven in number, and shall hold such offices as the Parliament prescribes, or, in the absence of provision, as the Governor-General directs.<sup>59</sup>

<sup>57</sup> See also Ch. on 'Routine of business and the sitting day'.

<sup>58</sup> K. Jackson, 'Caucus—the Anti-Parliament System', *The Parliamentarian* LIX, 3, 1978, p. 159.

<sup>59</sup> Constitution, s. 65.

The Parliament increased the number of Ministers from 7 to 8 in 1915.<sup>60</sup> Further statutory increases have brought the number up to the present limit of 30.<sup>61</sup>

The allocation of portfolios, that is, the Departments of State that Ministers shall administer, has never been determined by the Parliament although there have been unsuccessful attempts in the House to have the Parliament elect the Ministry.<sup>62</sup> In practice the Governor-General determines the allocation of portfolios on the advice of the Prime Minister. In the case of a Liberal-National Party coalition the Prime Minister, following consultation with the Leader of the National Party, selects Ministers and decides their portfolios for recommendation to the Governor-General. Since the formation of the Fisher Ministry in 1908, the Australian Labor Party caucus has elected its Ministers and the Prime Minister has allocated portfolios for recommendation to the Governor-General.

The approval of the Governor-General to the composition of the Ministry, the creation of Departments, the allocation of portfolios and any ministerial and departmental change is notified publicly<sup>63</sup> and announced in the House.<sup>64</sup> The principal areas of departmental responsibility and enactments administered by the respective Ministers are notified publicly by order of the Governor-General.<sup>65</sup> Temporary ministerial arrangements may be made by the Prime Minister without reference to the Governor-General (*see also* p. 99).

Since the formation of the first Commonwealth Government on 1 January 1901 the Ministry has always included a Prime Minister, a Treasurer, an Attorney-General and a Minister for Defence.<sup>66</sup> The titles and functions of other Ministers have varied over the years. A Vice-President of the Executive Council has always been appointed and, since the early 1930s, has usually administered a Department of State in addition to performing Executive Council duties (*and see* p. 116).<sup>67</sup>

A Minister may administer more than one department. Following the general elections on 2 December 1972, the Governor-General called upon the Parliamentary Leader of the Australian Labor Party, Mr Whitlam, to form a Government. Mr Whitlam was sworn in as Prime Minister and the Deputy Leader, Mr Barnard, was sworn in as Deputy Prime Minister. Pending a meeting of the parliamentary Labor Party to elect the full Ministry, which could not be held until the conclusion of the counting of votes in closely contested seats, a Ministry (interim) was formed with Mr Whitlam and Mr Barnard sharing between them the administration of the various government departments, 13 and 14 departments respectively, until 19 December.

### *The two level Ministry*

In September 1987 the 3rd Hawke Government instigated a two level ministerial structure accompanied by a reorganisation of the public service which considerably reduced the number of government departments. Each of the major departments so created<sup>68</sup> was headed by a senior or 'portfolio' Minister, who was also a member of

60 *Ministers of State Act 1915* (Act No. 18 of 1915).

61 *Ministers of State Act 1952*, s. 4; for a schedule of statutory increases in the number of Ministers *see* Appendix 9; for a list of Ministries *see* Appendix 7.

62 VP 1905/47,89,146; VP 1909/66; VP 1910/122; VP 1925/42,73.

63 *Gazettes* S267-70 (5.12.78).

64 VP 1978-80/615.

65 Known as the Administrative Arrangements Order; *Gazette* S64 (4.3.88).

66 Except for a re-organisation of the Department of Defence between 1939 and 1942.

67 In the early Ministries the Vice-President was a member of the Executive Council without ministerial portfolio. Prime Minister Lyons filled the position between 1935 and 1937.

68 The number of departments was reduced by amalgamation from 28 to 18; 16 major departments were so created, with two small departments remaining administratively distinct under junior Ministers, H.R. Deb. (15.9.87) 43-4.

Cabinet. Senior Ministers were assisted in the administration of their portfolios by junior Ministers with specific titles and responsibilities for designated areas of departmental operations.

In announcing the new administrative arrangements the Prime Minister stated that under the new system portfolio Ministers were released from some of the detailed administrative work, enabling them to give greater attention to policy. All portfolios were represented in Cabinet without the need for the Cabinet to be expanded to an unmanageable size. Portfolio Ministers were ultimately responsible for the administration of their entire portfolios and were accountable to Parliament for their overall operation. All Ministers, however, had a clear accountability within specific responsibilities allocated to them, which included responding to questions without notice.<sup>69</sup>

### *Coalition Ministries*

On occasions Governments have been formed from the combined membership of two (or more) political parties. Coalition Governments have occurred when the numerical strength of one party is less than an absolute majority of the House, or for political reasons by agreement between the parties. The Ministry is composed of members of the coalition parties determined by agreement. Between 1949 and 1972, and between 1975 and 1983, Liberal-National Party (formerly Country Party then National Country Party) coalition Governments were in office.

The Free Trade-Protectionist coalition between August 1904 and July 1905 was known as the Reid-McLean Ministry. Between February 1923 and October 1929 the Nationalist-Country Party coalition was known as the Bruce-Page Ministry. Between June 1909 and April 1910 the existing three non-Labour groups formed a Protectionist-Free Trade-Tariff Reform coalition which was known as the 'Fusion' Ministry.

### *Interim Ministries*

In order that the Government of the country continues uninterrupted there have been occasions when the Governor-General has found it necessary to appoint an interim or 'caretaker' Government pending the resolution of political matters, for example, the election of party leaders or a general election.

The Page Ministry (Country Party-United Australia Party coalition) from 7 to 26 April 1939 was formed on the death of Prime Minister Lyons as a temporary arrangement until the numerically stronger partner of the coalition, the United Australia Party, decided upon a new leader, Mr Menzies. Similarly on the death of Prime Minister Curtin, the Forde Ministry was formed and held office between 6 and 13 July 1945 until the Australian Labor Party elected a new leader, Mr Chifley. Following the presumed death of Prime Minister Holt, the McEwen Ministry (Liberal-Country Party coalition) held office between 19 December 1967 and 10 January 1968 until the senior partner of the coalition elected Senator Gorton as Leader of the Parliamentary Liberal Party.

On the dismissal of the Whitlam Australian Labor Party Government on 11 November 1975, the Governor-General commissioned the Leader of the Opposition, Mr Fraser (Liberal Party), to form a 'caretaker' Government (Liberal-National Country Party coalition) until a general election was held. The 'caretaker' Ministry, consisting of 15 Ministers, was formed on the basis that it 'makes no appointments or dismissals and initiates no policies'<sup>70</sup> and held office until 22 December 1975.

<sup>69</sup> H.R. Deb. (15.9.87) 43-6.

<sup>70</sup> Statement by Governor-General on 11 November 1975. See Ch. on 'Disagreements between the Houses'.

*The Ministry and the Senate*

The composition of the Ministry has always included some Senators in order to represent the Government by presenting its policies and facilitating the passage of its legislation in the Senate. Senate Ministers initiate bills (other than financial bills) and make policy statements to the Senate connected with their portfolios. In addition each Senate Minister represents in the Senate one or more Ministers located in the House. Likewise each Senate Minister is represented by a Minister in the House of Representatives.

The House from which Ministers shall be drawn is not mentioned in the Constitution. In practice the number of Senate Ministers is determined by the Prime Minister or the parliamentary party, as the case may be, and in recent years has varied between four and nine. A large component of Senate Ministers may be seen as running counter to the concept of responsible government and the Senate's traditional role as a 'House of review'. In keeping with constitutional principles and the constitutional limitations on the Senate regarding the initiation of financial legislation, the majority of the Ministry, including the Prime Minister and the Treasurer (*see p. 101*), has always been drawn from the House of Representatives.

Following the presumed death of Prime Minister Holt on 17 December 1967, the Liberal Party chose Senator Gorton as its leader on 10 January 1968 and he was sworn in as Prime Minister the same day. Although there had been previous occasions of Senate Ministers acting as Prime Minister<sup>71</sup>, this is the only occasion on which the Governor-General has commissioned a sitting Senator to form a Government. Senator Gorton did not sit in the Senate as Prime Minister because neither House met during the period between his election as Prime Minister and his subsequent election as a Member of the House of Representatives. Prime Minister Gorton resigned his place as a Senator on 1 February 1968, in order to seek election to the House of Representatives. He was elected on 24 February 1968 at the by-election for the Division of Higgins left vacant by Mr Holt's death. Between 1 February and 24 February Mr Gorton was a Member of neither House but, as permitted by the Constitution, was able to remain Prime Minister during this period.<sup>72</sup>

From time to time the view has been put that the presence of Ministers in the Senate is incompatible with its effective performance as a House of review and a States House. In 1979 a general business motion was moved in the Senate, but remained unresolved, to the effect that Senators should no longer hold office as Ministers of State, with the exception of the Leader of the Government in the Senate, and that chairmen of the Senate's Legislative and General Purpose Standing Committees should be granted allowances, staffs and other entitlements similar to Ministers.<sup>73</sup> In 1986 the Standing Committee on Procedure expressed the opinion that all Ministers should be Members of and responsible to the House of Representatives.<sup>74</sup> In 1988 a private Member's motion was debated in the House, but remained unresolved, urging the party winning the next and subsequent elections to appoint all Ministers from the House of Representatives and urging the Senate to further expand its committee system and adopt greater powers of investigation and inquiry.<sup>75</sup>

71 (i) H.R. Deb. (9.5.16)7686, (ii) during adjournment of the Houses between 30 August 1962 and 2 October 1962.

72 Constitution, S64.

73 J 1978-80/571; S. Deb. (22.2.79) 229-40. A notice of motion with similar intent was later given in the House on 3 May 1979, NP 96 (8.5.79) 5205.

74 PP 354 (1986) 25.

75 H.R. Deb. (24.3.88)1292-8.

## Prime Minister

There have been 24 Prime Ministers of Australia.<sup>76</sup> The origin of the title is to be found in English constitutional history with the title being first attributed to Sir Robert Walpole in 1721.<sup>77</sup> The Cabinet system of government and the position within it of the Prime Minister was established Westminster practice at the time of the establishment of the Commonwealth. The occupant of the position has been variously described as the First Minister<sup>78</sup>, *primus inter pares* (first among equals)<sup>79</sup>, Chairman of the Cabinet<sup>80</sup>, Chief Advisor to the Crown and in contemporary usage Head (or Leader) of the Government. The Prime Minister is placed third in the Commonwealth of Australia Table of Precedence, immediately after the Governor-General and State Governors.

The first Prime Minister (Barton) was officially appointed as Minister for External Affairs and it was not until 1913 that the Prime Minister (Fisher) was appointed by the Governor-General to administer his own department. According to Sawyer:

A *de facto* Prime Minister's 'Office' had been steadily growing since 1904, and in 1911 was for the first time separately provided for in the Estimates. In 1913, Fisher was formally appointed by the Governor-General in Council 'to administer our Prime Minister's Department'.<sup>81</sup>

The first statutory recognition of the title was in the *Public Service Act 1922* followed later by an amendment to the Ministers of State Act in 1938<sup>82</sup> in order to give the Prime Minister special salary status (*see* p. 110). Crisp makes the following comment on the title:

This traditional absence of definition of the office and its powers and its underpinnings has favoured rather than delimited the development of the office in authority and influence. Today it affords each successive occupant access to great power and great authority.<sup>83</sup>

The confusion over the appointment of Australia's first Prime Minister is recounted by Sawyer:

Proceeding to Australia, the Governor-General, as advised by the British Colonial Office, asked William Lyne, Premier of New South Wales, to form the first federal administration. This was a proper step to take, the Colonial Office and the Governor-General being in no position to judge whether the incumbent of the senior political office in Australia was unworthy to be the first chief Minister of State of the Commonwealth. Equally properly, the leaders of the federal movement in Australia refused to serve under Lyne, who had opposed federation, and made it known that they wished Edmund Barton, the acknowledged leader of the federal movement and one of the chief architects of the Constitution, but at this time merely a private member of the Legislative Council of New South Wales, to be the first chief Minister. Lyne so advised the Governor-General, who called on Barton, and the latter soon formed a cabinet with himself as Minister for External Affairs.<sup>84</sup>

76 For a list of Prime Ministers *see* Appendix 6.

77 Wilding & Laundy, p. 581.

78 Derived from the Latin *primus*—first.

79 Attributed to Keith, *British Cabinet System*, referred to in Wilding & Laundy, p. 580. With the development of Cabinet government and growth in power and prestige of the Prime Minister, this term can no longer be strictly acceptable terminology.

80 *Quick and Garran*, p. 703.

81 G. Sawyer, *Australian Federal Politics and Law 1901-1929*, Melbourne University Press, 1956, pp. 90-1; *see also* 'History of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet', *Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 1st Annual Report, 1978-79*, PP 196 (1979)29 ff.

82 *Parliamentary Salaries Adjustment Act 1938* (Act No. 2 of 1938).

83 Crisp, p. 357.

84 Sawyer, *Australian Federal Politics and Law 1901-1929*, p. 3.

In Australia the appointment (and removal) of a Prime Minister clearly rests with the Governor-General and the Governor-General alone, whose prerogative power is nevertheless limited by the rules of established constitutional conventions with the result that the choice is made for him. The selection of the Prime Minister is in practice made in the party political and parliamentary arenas. Since the appointment of Prime Minister Barton, excepting the 1975 incident noted below, the choice of Prime Minister has been limited to the person, for the time being, elected as leader of the party having the support, directly or indirectly, of the majority of Members of the House of Representatives.

The constitutional convention is that the Prime Minister remains in office while maintaining the support (leadership) of the majority party (or coalition) and the support of a majority of the Members of the House of Representatives. The only exception to this convention occurred in 1975 when Prime Minister Whitlam was dismissed as Prime Minister even though he retained the leadership of the majority party and a majority support in the House of Representatives. (A deadlock had arisen between the House and the Senate over the appropriation bills, with the actions of the Senate in failing to pass the bills threatening the availability of funds necessary for the operation of government departments and programs).<sup>85</sup>

Apart from dismissal, Prime Ministers have ceased to hold office as a result of death<sup>86</sup>, failure to be re-elected as a Member of the House<sup>87</sup>, removal as leader of the majority party<sup>88</sup>, failure to maintain majority support of the House of Representatives<sup>89</sup> and retirement.<sup>90</sup>

The Prime Minister's prestige and power are largely due to the authority and control enjoyed as Chairman of Cabinet and the ability, not available to other Ministers, to make important decisions outside Cabinet. One of the most significant powers is the control over the composition of the Cabinet, and, in the case of Liberal-National Party Governments, the Ministry. The appointment and removal of Ministers, changes in the Ministry and the allocation of portfolios are made by the Governor-General on the advice of the Prime Minister. However, within the Australian Labor Party the Prime Minister is limited to allocating portfolios to those Members elected by the parliamentary party to be Ministers. The power of the leader of the Australian Labor Party is nevertheless considerable as the leader may remove Ministers, move Ministers in and out of Cabinet<sup>91</sup> and re-shuffle portfolios, although since changes to caucus rules in 1976 the leader has been required to consult the party's other leaders and caucus before dismissing Ministers or 'shadow' Ministers.

A Ministry's existence depends on the Prime Minister's continuance in office. The resignation or dismissal of the Prime Minister, by convention, causes the resignation of the full Ministry. A Prime Minister may resign, hence causing the resignation of all Ministers, in order to reconstruct a new Ministry<sup>92</sup> and continue in office.

The Prime Minister may make temporary ministerial arrangements without reference to the Governor-General.<sup>93</sup> A Minister may act for another Minister on

85 See Ch. on 'Disagreements between the Houses'.

86 Three Prime Ministers have died while in office—Lyons in 1939, Curtin in 1945 and Holt in 1967.

87 The only Prime Minister defeated at an election was Bruce in 1929.

88 Most recently Gorton in 1971.

89 (i) Loss of majority on floor of the House without general election most recently Fadden in 1941, (ii) loss of majority following general election most recently Fraser in 1983, and (iii)

loss of majority in House and failure to regain majority at general election most recently Bruce in 1929 (himself defeated), and Hughes in 1923.

90 Most recently Menzies in 1966.

91 The issue of the ALP's Leader's power of dismissal was the subject of public comment in 1916 by the Labor Minister for Home Affairs, Mr O'Malley. For comment see Crisp, pp. 364-5.

92 For example, Fraser in 1977.

93 VP 1978-80/530.

account of absence from Australia or from the Ministry or due to ill health. The Acts Interpretation Act confers upon an Acting Minister the same power and authority with respect to the absent Minister's statutory responsibilities.<sup>94</sup>

Another example of personal Prime Ministerial power is advice to the Governor-General on dissolving the House of Representatives, as this advice may be given by the Prime Minister without reference to the Cabinet.<sup>95</sup> Most other major matters of State are subject to the collective decision of Cabinet, but nevertheless the Prime Minister would exercise considerable authority and control (*see* p. 113).

In the past Prime Ministers have frequently held an additional portfolio, usually that of Treasury or Foreign Affairs. Prime Minister Hughes was also Attorney-General between 1915 and 1921.

Other than for brief periods, and with the exceptions of Prime Ministers Menzies and Whitlam, who also held the portfolio of External Affairs and Foreign Affairs respectively for substantial periods, the modern practice is for Prime Ministers not to administer more than one Department of State.<sup>96</sup>

Prime Ministers of both the coalition parties and the Australian Labor Party have been assisted by another Minister who is appointed as Deputy Prime Minister. In the case of a coalition Government the Deputy Prime Minister has been the Leader of the National Party, and in the case of a Labor Government the Deputy Leader of the party. The position is a formal one without portfolio *per se* for which the occupant is paid a higher allowance than other Ministers (*see* p. 110). It is the practice for the Deputy Prime Minister to be Acting Prime Minister when the Prime Minister is absent from Australia or absent on account of illness. The Deputy Prime Minister would normally be commissioned to become Prime Minister in a caretaker capacity in cases of emergency, for example, the death of the Prime Minister.<sup>97</sup>

## Treasurer

A Treasurer has been included in all Ministries since Federation, the first Treasurer being Sir George Turner. The requirement of a separate Department of State is implied by section 83 of the Constitution which provides, in part:

No money shall be drawn from the Treasury of the Commonwealth except under appropriation made by law.

The Treasurer has always been a senior member of the Government and is responsible for economic and financial matters. Although the Cabinet takes collective decisions and assumes collective responsibility, the Treasurer is nevertheless the focal point of the financial deliberations of Cabinet, not only within the scope of his or her own portfolio, but in relation to the financial implications of all other matters that come before Cabinet. The Treasurer introduces financial proposals into the House as the responsible Minister, the preparation and presentation of the annual Budget being the most obvious manifestation of this responsibility.

That the duties of Treasurer have been considered to be more demanding than most other portfolios is recognised by the Remuneration Tribunal which grants the Treasurer a higher allowance than other Cabinet Ministers excepting the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister (*see* p. 110).

<sup>94</sup> *Acts Interpretation Act 1901*, s. 19.

<sup>95</sup> Crisp, p. 368.

<sup>96</sup> Prime Minister Menzies was also Minister for External Affairs between 4 February 1960 and

22 December 1961. Prime Minister Whitlam was also Minister for Foreign Affairs between 5 December 1972 and 6 November 1973.

<sup>97</sup> Most recently McEwen in 1967.

A unique feature of the office of Treasurer is that it must always reside in the House of Representatives since under the Constitution it is in that House that financial legislation must be initiated.

In 1976 the functions of the Department of the Treasury were redefined resulting in the establishment of a separate Department of Finance. Initially the Treasurer administered both Departments but in 1977 a Minister of Finance, from the House of Representatives, was appointed to administer the new department. This portfolio was transferred to the Senate in November 1980 on the commissioning of the fourth Fraser Ministry and, for most of the period since then, has remained there.

### Attorney-General

The Attorney-General was another of the seven original Ministers appointed in 1901, the first Attorney-General being Alfred Deakin. The origins of the office of Attorney-General can be traced back in English history to the 13th century and many of the traditions surrounding it have continued to characterise the office in Australia.

The Attorney-General is the chief legal adviser to the Commonwealth Government and has overall responsibility for the conduct of actions brought by the Commonwealth Government in the legal system. He or she is the Minister responsible for the Office of Parliamentary Counsel<sup>98</sup> the duties of which include the drafting of bills and amendments.

When making decisions about whether the laws of the Federal Parliament are being properly observed and whether people should be prosecuted for not observing the law, the Attorney-General acts as the First Law Officer of the Crown. As First Law Officer, the Attorney-General gives advice on the basis of what is just, and must separate the advice from any political considerations. The principle of this independence of the office of Attorney-General was the subject of the resignation of Attorney-General Ellicott on 6 September 1977.<sup>99</sup> In his letter of resignation to the Prime Minister he stated:

It is with great regret that I am forwarding herewith my resignation as Attorney-General.

I am doing so because decisions and actions which you and the Cabinet have recently made and taken have impeded and in my opinion have constituted an attempt to direct or control the exercise by me as Attorney-General of my discretion in relation to the criminal proceedings *Sankey v. Whitlam and others*.

In the circumstances I feel that I have no other course but to resign my office. I regard it as vital to our system of government that the Attorney-General's discretion in criminal matters remains completely independent.<sup>100</sup>

This resignation illustrates one Attorney-General's view of the independent nature of the office of Attorney-General notwithstanding the general concept of Cabinet responsibility.

The Second Law Officer is the Solicitor-General. The Solicitor-General may appear in court in the major cases in which the Government is involved but importantly is a statutory appointee and not a Member of the Parliament. The Solicitor-General gives independent legal advice to the Government. This independence is guaranteed by an Act of Parliament.<sup>101</sup>

98 *Parliamentary Counsel Act 1970*; see also Ch. on 'Legislation'.

99 VP 1977/249; H.R. Deb. (6.9.77)721-32.

100 H.R. Deb. (6.9.77)721.

101 *Law Officers Act 1964*.

### Leader of the House

The office of Leader of the House was created without legislation and without any formal decision of the House. By convention, it is now accepted as an office which is necessary for the proper functioning of the House. Because of the demands placed on the incumbent during the sittings of the House, the office has received special consideration by the Remuneration Tribunal by way of payment of an allowance additional to that paid to other members of Cabinet.

The history of the office can be traced to the United Kingdom Parliament. The office resulted in part from the fact that when the Prime Minister was a Member of the House of Lords, it was necessary for someone to act for him in the House of Commons, and it was usual for the most senior Minister in that House to be chosen.<sup>102</sup> From the mid-19th century the Prime Minister was also known as the Leader of the House of Commons and took responsibility for the regulation of the business of the House. The first specific appointment of another Minister as Leader of the House of Commons was that of Mr Eden in 1942.<sup>103</sup>

In the House of Representatives the position of Leader of the House as a defined and separate office originated in 1951.<sup>104</sup> In a press statement on 10 May 1951, Prime Minister Menzies announced the appointment of the first Leader of the House, the Hon. E. J. Harrison, then Vice President of the Executive Council and Minister for Defence Production. The Prime Minister's aim was to improve the organisation and conduct of business in the House of Representatives, from which both he and the Deputy Prime Minister were of necessity often absent.

The appointment is made by the Prime Minister, but the Leader of the House is responsible to the Prime Minister who has ultimate authority and responsibility for the programming of government business. As it is a delegated function, it is not unusual for the Prime Minister, when in attendance, to intervene in the proceedings of the House and to move procedural motions.

In broad terms the Leader of the House is responsible for the arrangement and management of government business in the House of Representatives. In respect of the daily business of the House, it is his or her responsibility, in consultation, as necessary, with the Prime Minister and other Ministers, and the Opposition, to determine the order in which the items of government business will be dealt with, and to ensure that, as far as practicable, the passage of government business is not unduly delayed or disrupted. The majority of formal or general procedural motions are moved on behalf of the Government by the Leader of the House.<sup>105</sup>

The Leader of the House works closely with the government whips and consults with them regarding the selection of speakers from the government parties. He or she arranges the allocation of time for debates and, where problems arise in regard to the program, determines the tactics to be followed by the Government.

An important aspect of the functions of the Leader of the House is to undertake negotiations (often resulting in a trading of available parliamentary time) with the opposition counterpart, the Manager of Opposition Business, on matters relating to the programming of the House.

There is a continuing process of negotiation with the Opposition on such matters as the order in which bills will be debated; arranging for cognate debates to be held on related bills; the making of, and the Opposition's reply to, ministerial statements;

102 In the Senate the most senior Minister is known as the 'Leader of the Government in the Senate'.

103 Wilding and Laundy, p. 427.

104 For a list of Leaders of the House see Appendix 8.

105 For example, motions for leave of absence to Members, suspension of standing orders, alterations in the order of business, changes in days and hours of sitting, the closure, the adjournment, etc.

the amount of time to be made available for particular debates, and on any other matter that may arise during the course of proceedings in the House that may have a bearing on the progress of government business.

It is essential for the Leader of the House to maintain a constant liaison with the Speaker and the officers of the House in regard to the arrangements for programming government business<sup>106</sup>, and in regard to the wide range of procedural questions which arise from time to time. The Leader of the House must also be kept in touch with developments in the Senate that may have a bearing on the future programming of the House, for example, where it appears that the Senate may return a bill to the House with amendments, and must also take into account the Senate's own programming requirements when planning the program for the House.

Day-to-day functions must be set against the longer term policy objectives of the Government. The principal body concerned with these longer term objectives, apart from the Cabinet itself, is the Parliamentary Business Committee of Cabinet of which the Leader of the House is a member. This committee<sup>107</sup> decides the composition of the Government's legislation program for a period of sittings and undertakes a general supervisory role of the Government's legislation program and the progress of legislation through the Parliament. The forward programming of business involves the preparation of schedules of parliamentary sittings and prospective legislation schedules.

The office, combined as it is with a ministerial portfolio, can be demanding, especially during the sittings of the Parliament when the Leader of the House normally gives some priority to the functions of the office and spends a great deal of time in the Chamber itself.

The Manager of Government Business in the Senate, also a Minister, performs an equivalent function in the Senate.

## **Cessation of ministerial office**

### *Resignation*

Ministers may resign for personal reasons, or following defeat at a general election or resignation from Parliament.<sup>108</sup> When a Government loses office, the Prime Minister resigns and, therefore, so do Ministers.<sup>109</sup> A Prime Minister may resign and then be reappointed in order to form another Ministry.<sup>110</sup> Ministers have also resigned<sup>111</sup> in order for ministerial rearrangements to be made and, while remaining members of the Executive Council, have been subsequently reappointed as Ministers to administer other or new Departments of State. On occasions Prime Ministers, on questions of principle, have refused to accept voluntary resignations of Ministers who have thereupon remained in the Ministry.<sup>112</sup>

106 See also Ch. on 'Routine of business and the sitting day'.

107 See also Ch. on 'Legislation'.

108 Sir Garfield Barwick resigned his seat to become Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia, VP 1964-66/76.

109 See Gazettes 98(19.12.49)3831 and 124A(5.12.72)1.

110 Gazette S290(20.12.77)1.

111 Gazette S268(5.12.78); see also Gazettes 32(22.3.71)2007 and 48B(12.6.74)1-2, but the Minister's appointments on these occasions were 'determined'.

112 Case of the Hon. Peter Howson in 1967, H.R. Deb. (8.11.67)2775-80; case of the Hon. P. Nixon, H.R. Deb. (21.9.82)1674.

Convention requires that Ministers accept collective responsibility for the policies and performance of the Government. If any Minister is unable to accept or publicly dissents from the opinion and policy of Cabinet, it is his or her duty to resign (see p. 87).<sup>113</sup>

Examples of ministerial resignations, other than for personal reasons, based on individual or collective ministerial responsibility and accountability to Parliament and the people<sup>114</sup>, have been:

- publishing or expressing views opposed to government policy<sup>115</sup>;
- disagreement with government policy<sup>116</sup>;
- breaching Cabinet confidentiality<sup>117</sup>;
- misleading the Parliament<sup>118</sup>;
- misleading the Prime Minister, and through him the Parliament<sup>119</sup>;
- a Minister's department entering into contracts with a company in which the Minister held a position<sup>120</sup>;
- initiation of legal action against a Minister for an alleged breach of the Commonwealth Electoral Act<sup>121</sup>;
- private dealings with an officer of a company negotiating with a Minister's department<sup>122</sup>;
- disagreement with actions of the Prime Minister<sup>123</sup>;
- adverse reflections on a Minister's integrity in a Royal Commission report<sup>124</sup>;
- as a result of allegations concerning the propriety of possible conflicts between a Minister's public duty and personal and family financial interests<sup>125</sup>, and
- perceived attempts by Cabinet to control or direct a Minister's independence and integrity as Attorney-General.<sup>126</sup>

Ministers have also resigned following disagreements with the Prime Minister over organisational and Party matters<sup>127</sup> and following allegations of impropriety in matters unrelated to parliamentary or ministerial duties.<sup>128</sup>

113 *Quick and Garran*, pp. 705-6.

114 As a duty to the Parliament and the people, reasons for resignation or dismissal are normally made public. See also Sir Robert Garran oration (1988), by Honourable R. J. L. Hawke, for comment on the grounds justifying resignation.

115 Case of the Rt Hon. W.M. Hughes, H.R. Deb. (6.11.35)1306-7; see also case of the Hon. L.H.E. Bury in 1962 who was asked to resign by the Prime Minister, Crisp, p. 355.

116 Case of the Rt Hon. R.G. Menzies on 20 March 1939. See H.R. Deb. (20.4.39)18.

117 Case of the Hon. M. J. Young, H.R. Deb. (23.8.83)16; subsequently reappointed, H.R. Deb. (28.2.84)1.

118 Case of the Hon. J. Brown, S. Deb. (17.12.87)3390.

119 Case of the Hon. R.F.X. Connor, H.R. Deb. (14.10.75)2031-2,2033,2038.

120 Case of Senator the Hon. A. J. McLachlan, H.R. Deb. (4.11.38)1322; S. Deb. (3.11.38)1189.

121 Case of the Hon. R.V. Garland in 1976, *The Parliamentarian* LVII, 4, 1976, p. 253.

122 Case of the Hon. J.N. Lawson in 1940, G. Sawyer, *Australian Federal Politics and Law*

1929-1949, Melbourne University Press, 1963, p. 104.

123 Case of the Hon. J.M. Fraser, H.R. Deb. (9.3.71)679-84; case of the Hon. A. S. Peacock, H.R. Deb (28.4.81) 1607-14.

124 Case of the Hon. E.G. Theodore, H.R. Deb. (8.7.30)3749-53. Mr Theodore submitted his resignation to the Prime Minister on 5 July 1930 following certain allegations against himself contained in the report of a Royal Commission appointed by the Government of the State of Queensland.

125 Case of the Rt Hon. P.R. Lynch, *Commonwealth Record* 2, 45, 14-20 November 1977, pp. 1662-4.

126 Case of the Hon. R.J. Ellicott, H.R. Deb. (6.9.77)721-32.

127 Case of the Hon. E. L. Robinson, VP 1978-80/645,648; H.R. Deb. (22.2.79)334. Mr Robinson was reappointed a few days later, H.R. Deb. (27.2.79)345-6.

128 Case of the Rt Hon. I. McC. Sinclair *Commonwealth Record* 4, 38, 24-30 September 1979, p. 1444; *Gazette* S192(27.9.79). Mr Sinclair was reinstated to the Ministry following acquittal from criminal charges, *Gazette* S180(19.8.80).

*Dismissal*

Although there is no constitutional distinction between resignation and dismissal, reasons for ministerial dismissal would be expected to concern questions of ministerial responsibility and accountability. Resignation implies voluntary action, at least publicly, on the part of a Minister whereas dismissal implies involuntary removal or may reflect the seriousness of the situation or offence.

In 1918 the Hon. J. A. Jensen was 'removed' from the office of Minister for Trade and Customs having received unfavourable mention in the report of the Royal Commission on Navy and Defence Administration.<sup>129</sup>

In 1975 the Hon. C. R. Cameron had his appointment as Minister for Labor and Immigration 'determined' after he had refused to resign during a rearrangement of the Ministry. Later, on the same day, he was appointed to another portfolio.<sup>130</sup> Also in that year the appointment of the Hon. J. F. Cairns as Minister for the Environment was formally 'determined'.<sup>131</sup> Prime Minister Whitlam informed the House that this action was because of a total discrepancy between information supplied to the House by the Minister and a letter he had written earlier, and because reported activities of an officer of the Minister's staff would make it possible for that officer to make a profit from his position. The Prime Minister had received no satisfactory explanation of these matters.<sup>132</sup>

On 11 November 1975 the Governor-General 'determined' the appointment of the Hon. E. G. Whitlam as his Chief Adviser and Head of Government as, in view of the prevailing circumstances, he had refused to resign or advise an election. Concomitantly the appointments of all the Ministers of his Government were also 'determined'.<sup>133</sup>

Following the finding of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Matters in Relation to Electoral Redistribution of Queensland, 1977, that a certain action of Senator the Rt Hon. R. G. Withers constituted 'an impropriety' within the meaning of the Letters Patent appointing the Royal Commission<sup>134</sup>, his appointment as Minister for Administrative Services was 'determined' and his appointment as Vice-President of the Executive Council was 'terminated'.<sup>135</sup>

Ministers' appointments have also been 'determined' by reason of ill health<sup>136</sup>; and following defeat at a general election.<sup>137</sup>

*Leave of absence*

The Hon. E. J. Ward, Minister for Labour and National Service, was 'relieved of his administrative duties' on 24 June 1943 during the inquiry of a Royal Commission into allegations by the Minister that an important document, relating to 'The Brisbane Line', was missing from the official files.<sup>138</sup> The report of the Royal

129 Gazette 193(13.12.18)2353; VP1917-19/411; H.R. Deb. (13.12.18)9296. See H.R. Deb. (17.12.18)9614-39 for Mr Jensen's comments.

130 Gazettes S104(6.6.75) and S106(6.6.75); see also John Kerr, *Matters for Judgment*, Macmillan, Melbourne, 1978, pp. 242-3. Sir John Kerr discusses also the power of the Governor-General to dismiss Ministers and the attempt by Mr Cameron to be heard by the Governor-General before being dismissed.

131 Gazette S133(2.7.75).

132 H.R. Deb. (9.7.75)3556-7.

133 *Simultaneous Dissolution of the Senate and the House of Representatives by His Excellency the Governor-General on 11 November 1975*, PP 15(1979)1.

134 'Matters in relation to Electoral Redistribution, Queensland, 1977', *Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry*, PP 263(1978)243.

135 Gazette S149(8.8.78); H.R. Deb. (15.8.78)16-19.

136 On 8 July 1976 the appointment of Senator the Hon. I.J. Greenwood was 'determined' because of his continuing ill health, VP 1976-77/253.

137 The appointment of the Hon. A.J. Grassby was 'determined' almost a month after his defeat at a general election. Gazette 48B(12.6.74)1.

138 H.R. Deb. (24.6.43)333; H.R. Deb. (30.6.43)572.

Commission was made public on 14 July 1943 and, on the same date, the Prime Minister directed Mr Ward by letter to continue to abstain from the administration of his office until the Parliament had dealt with matters arising from the report.<sup>139</sup> A general election followed and Mr Ward continued on leave until his appointment to the new Ministry on 21 September 1943.<sup>140</sup>

On a second occasion in 1949, Mr Ward, as Minister for Transport and Minister for External Territories, was relieved of the administration of his ministerial offices from 1 January 1949 to 24 June 1949 while a Royal Commission investigated allegations of corrupt practices in relation to the handling of timber leases in Papua New Guinea. The findings of the Royal Commission were that the charges were completely without foundation.<sup>141</sup>

The Hon. E. L. Robinson, Minister for Finance, was granted 'leave from ministerial duties' on 24 April 1978 while allegations against him were being examined by an inquiry into the 1977 electoral redistribution of Queensland. The report of the Royal Commission exonerated the Minister and he resumed his ministerial duties on 8 August 1978.<sup>142</sup>

### Ministerial assistance

For 50 years following Federation it was not uncommon for Executive Councillors, formally or informally, to assist the Ministry without administering a Department of State. At various times they were known as 'Member of the Executive Council'<sup>143</sup>, 'Honorary Minister'<sup>144</sup>, 'Assistant Minister'<sup>145</sup>, 'Assistant Minister' to assist a specified Minister or with specific duties<sup>146</sup>, 'Minister without portfolio'<sup>147</sup> and 'Minister in charge of' certain responsibilities.<sup>148</sup>

Assistance to Ministers has also been provided by Members not appointed as Executive Councillors. They have been known as Parliamentary Under-Secretaries or Parliamentary Secretaries (*see* p. 108). Members have been 'appointed' to assist Ministers while not being given any title or recognition in the House.<sup>149</sup> A more recent method of sharing the ministerial work-load has been the formal appointment of a Minister to assist a more senior Minister, such an appointment being in addition to the Minister's appointment to a particular portfolio.<sup>150</sup>

Of the nine original members of the Executive Council only seven were appointed Ministers to administer Departments of State, the exceptions being Messrs O'Connor

139 H.R. Deb. (15.10.43)673-4.

140 H.R. Deb. (23.9.43)18; *also* information from the 'Register of Executive Councillors' maintained by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.

141 VP 1948-49/335; *also* information from the 'Register of Executive Councillors'.

142 VP 1978-80/156; H.R. Deb. (2.5.78)1584; H.R. Deb. (15.8.78)18; PP 263(1978); *also* information from the 'Register of Executive Councillors'.

143 VP 1905/11; VP 1907-08/271.

144 VP 1909/13; VP 1911/82; VP 1914-17/568; VP 1917-19/157; VP 1920-21/5,221; VP 1922/2; VP 1923/5; VP 1925/2; VP 1926-28/491; VP 1929/5; VP 1929-31/5. In 1918 one Honorary Minister acted as Minister for the Navy and had charge of shipping and ship building and another was given complete control of recruiting, H.R. Deb. (10.4.18)3724. In 1934 the Hon. C.W. Marr was appointed an Honorary Minister in charge of the Royal Visit then in progress, VP 1934-37/19.

145 VP 1914-17/381,513; VP 1932-34/436.

146 VP 1929-31/484; VP 1934-37/6; VP 1970-72/708.

147 VP 1934-37/6. In the coalition Ministry of 1909-10 Prime Minister Deakin did not administer a Department of State, VP 1909/13. There have also been appointments of Ministers without portfolios with specific duties, VP 1934-37/6,262,641; VP 1937-40/5,241.

148 VP 1937-40/349; VP 1940/2.

149 VP 1940-43/279; H.R. Deb. (20.5.42) 1455.

150 For example 'Minister for Employment and Youth Affairs and Minister Assisting the Prime Minister'. There have also been 'Ministers appointed only to assist' a specified Minister, VP 1937-40/349; VP 1940/2. In *Zoeller v. Attorney-General (Commonwealth) and others* (76 ALR 279) it was held that s. 64 did not require that only one Minister could administer each department and that it was lawful to appoint two Ministers.

and Lewis.<sup>151</sup> Senator O'Connor held the appointment of Vice-President of the Executive Council, while Mr Lewis was not a candidate at the first general election. Following his election to the 1st House of Representatives, Sir Phillip Fysh was appointed to the Executive Council (in place of Mr Lewis) and was commonly referred to as 'Minister without portfolio' or 'Honorary Minister', and in the House answered questions on notice<sup>152</sup> and took charge of bills during the second reading<sup>153</sup> and committee stages.<sup>154</sup>

#### *Assistant Ministers*

The Constitution makes no provision for Assistant Ministers. *Quick and Garran* commented that the practice of including in ministries members of the Executive Council who did not administer Departments of State had grown in some of the Australian Colonies:

. . . but it does not appear to be contemplated by this Constitution. The heads of the chief departments are to be 'the Queen's Ministers of State'—a phrase which appears to mean not only that these officers are to be Ministers of the Queen, but that they are to be *the* Ministers of the Queen; in other words, that all the Ministers of State are to administer departments of State.<sup>155</sup>

In 1914 the question of the designation of Ministers without portfolio was raised in the House. Prime Minister Fisher preferred 'Assistant Minister' to 'Honorary Minister' but saw no distinction between the two. Speaker McDonald ruled that he knew of no constitutional objection to a question being addressed to an honorary Minister as 'Assistant Minister for Defence'.<sup>156</sup>

The practice of having Assistant Ministers continued until 1941 when it came to be regarded as unsatisfactory<sup>157</sup>, especially in relation to the payment of salaries<sup>158</sup>, as it was felt that any such appointment would constitute an office of profit under the Crown not authorised by the Constitution (*see* p. 110). Prior to 1941 Assistant Ministers were paid, not directly, but out of the Cabinet Fund, by deductions from the salaries of Ministers administering Departments of State.<sup>159</sup> When the Ministry was expanded from 11 to 19 in 1941, the immediate need for Assistant Ministers ceased.

Between August and October 1971, Assistant Ministers were again appointed—five Members and one Senator.<sup>160</sup> They were referred to as 'Assistant Minister assisting the Minister for . . .'.<sup>161</sup> They were sworn as Executive Councillors, but were not Ministers of State in the constitutional sense and only supported certain senior Ministers in the discharge of their responsibilities. They received no salary, but were compensated for expenses incurred in accordance with the following statement by Prime Minister McMahon:

Because they are not Ministers of State in the constitutional sense, section 44 of the Constitution precludes the payment of any salary to Assistant Ministers in respect of their duties. All it will be possible to do will be to make payments to them to meet out-of-pocket expenses, including travelling expenses, which they necessarily incur in the performance of their duties. I intend that the Assistant Ministers will be sworn as Executive Councillors. They will thus form part of the Federal Executive Council whose

151 Gazette 1(1.1.01)4. Number of Ministers limited to 7 by the Constitution, s. 65.

152 H.R. Deb. (26.6.01)1619-20.

153 H.R. Deb. (30.7.01)3171.

154 H.R. Deb. (13.8.01)3661-70.

155 *Quick and Garran*, p. 711.

156 H.R. Deb. (9.10.14)59-61.

157 H.R. Deb. (24.6.41)323.

158 H.R. Deb. (5.12.46)1146; H.R. Deb. (19.3.58)434.

159 The doubtful validity of this practice is outlined in EnceI, p. 177; *see also* H.R. Deb. (5.12.46)1146.

160 VP 1970-72/707-8.

161 H.R. Deb. (20.4.72)1925.

function, under section 62 of the Constitution, is to advise the Governor-General in the government of the Commonwealth. The Assistant Ministers will thus participate in a most important aspect of the continuing good government of the Commonwealth. As members of the Federal Executive Council, the Assistant Ministers will in general be able to exercise statutory functions of the Ministers they are assisting—including the making of appointments and the performance of other functions expressly conferred on the Minister—provided he has authorised them to this effect. This is made possible by section 19 of the Acts Interpretation Act which, subject to any contrary intention in the particular legislation, permits any Minister or member of the Federal Executive Council to act for and on behalf of a Minister referred to in the legislation. Thus Assistant Ministers will be able to make appointments and perform other functions expressly conferred on the Minister by legislation.<sup>162</sup>

Following a report from the Standing Orders Committee<sup>163</sup>, standing orders 143 (Questions), 319 (Papers presented), 321 (Quoting documents), 322 (Motions to print or take note of papers) and 91 (Time limits for debates and speeches) were amended to cater for Assistant Ministers.<sup>164</sup> The House also agreed to the adoption of variations in practice to the effect that Assistant Ministers could be seated at the Table when in charge of debates (without allotting them seats on the ministerial bench), that motions or amendments moved by an Assistant Minister need not be seconded, and that an Assistant Minister, acting on the request of the Minister, could take charge of a bill in committee of the whole and, following the committee stages, formally move for the adoption of the report and the third reading. Should debate arise at the third reading the Minister responsible would again take charge of the bill.

The Prime Minister also expressed the view that Assistant Ministers could ask questions of Ministers, but not of the Minister whom they were assisting, and that they could not answer questions in the House.<sup>165</sup>

#### *Parliamentary Under-Secretaries and Parliamentary Secretaries*

Parliamentary Under-Secretaries and Parliamentary Secretaries have on occasions been appointed to assist Ministers in the performance of their duties<sup>166</sup>, most recently in 1980 and 1987.<sup>167</sup> The title 'Parliamentary Secretary' has become the preferred one. Unlike the majority of Assistant Ministers they have not been sworn as Executive Councillors.

Prior to the 1980 appointments they were not paid a salary for the duties they performed<sup>168</sup> but did receive an allowance to reimburse them for expenses incurred.<sup>169</sup> They did not answer questions in the House.<sup>170</sup> Their duties included the

162 H.R. Deb. (29.4.71)2244.

163 PP 20(1972).

164 VP 1970-72/1009-10.

165 See H.R. Deb. (18.5.72)2758-9; H.R. Deb. (7.3.72)589-90; H.R. Deb. (28.9.72)2103-4.

166 Parliamentary Under-Secretaries: VP 1922/2; H.R. Deb. (29.11.34)650; VP 1950-51/6. Parliamentary Secretaries: VP 1937-40/188; VP 1956-57/167.

167 *Parliamentary Secretaries Act 1980*; VP 1987-89/8-10. In 1987 the title Parliamentary Secretary was used temporarily in respect of three Members pending amendment of the Ministers of State Act.

168 As a recognition of their duties the Nicholas Committee on the salaries and allowances of Members of Parliament recommended 'Subject to the proper interpretation of Section 44 of the Constitution' that an under-secretary or an assistant minister be paid an additional salary of £500 per annum. 'Salaries and Allowances of Members of the National Parliament', Report of Committee of Enquiry, 1952, p. 19 (not ordered to be printed).

169 H.R. Deb. (27.8.52)619. Outside Australia on ministerial business all expenses were an official charge, H.R. Deb. (26-27.10.61)2647.

170 *But see* H.R. Deb. (12.7.22)324; H.R. Deb. (5.12.34)786; H.R. Deb. (29.11.34)650.

signing of ministerial correspondence<sup>171</sup> and they were obliged to travel both within Australia and overseas to attend conferences and meet deputations.<sup>172</sup>

In 1952 Speaker Cameron, in reply to a question without notice, stated that in his view the appointments of Parliamentary Under-Secretaries were unconstitutional, that any administrative act they performed was unconstitutional and illegal, and that any Member who accepted such a position had accepted an office of profit under the Crown and the payment of expenses to them was unconstitutional and illegal. In his view the test was that the office had been accepted and not that the holder made a profit.<sup>173</sup> In addition the Speaker ordered the removal of the 'title' from the office door of one of the Members.<sup>174</sup>

The statement and action of the Speaker were challenged in ministerial statements by Acting Prime Minister Fadden<sup>175</sup> and later by Prime Minister Menzies<sup>176</sup> who argued that the appointments were informal and had been made with Cabinet approval, that the Members concerned performed no executive act which a Minister by law is required to perform, and that Parliamentary Under-Secretaries did not, in law, hold an office at all, still less an office of profit under the Crown.

The statement by the Prime Minister was debated and its contents approved.<sup>177</sup> In the debate Leader of the Opposition Evatt ventured to support the Speaker's view that Parliamentary Under-Secretaries performed a service for the Crown.<sup>178</sup>

The *Parliamentary Secretaries Act 1980* provided, for the first time, a clear authority for appointment, by the Prime Minister, of Members or Senators to become Parliamentary Secretaries to Ministers.<sup>179</sup> Two Parliamentary Secretaries were appointed under the Act to assist the Prime Minister and the Minister for Primary Industry respectively. They were to assist:

... by undertaking as requested a range of duties including assistance with correspondence and other papers, liaison with other members of parliament, and meetings with delegations and clients of the department and authorities, and other representational activities. Parliamentary Secretaries will be able to play a very useful role, particularly in assisting to bring the views of others to the attention of Ministers. Ministers will of course retain their responsibility to the Parliament.<sup>180</sup>

These Parliamentary Secretaries did not play any ministerial role in House proceedings and continued to ask questions without and on notice.

Parliamentary Secretaries were again appointed in 1987. However, the appointments were of a temporary nature pending amendment of the Ministers of State Act to increase the size of the Ministry. On the Act's amendment the three Parliamentary Secretaries concerned were sworn in as Ministers. In the interim they did not answer questions without notice, have the carriage of legislation or perform Chamber duty.<sup>181</sup>

As in the case of Assistant Ministers only strictly limited payments can be made to Parliamentary Secretaries because of the constitutional limitations relating to offices of profit under the Crown. The Parliamentary Secretaries Act provides that a Parliamentary Secretary cannot receive payment beyond his or her salary and allowances as a Member (or Senator) except that they may be reimbursed for

171 H.R. Deb. (6.5.58)1445.

172 H.R. Deb. (2.11.50)1896-9; H.R. Deb. (9.9.52) 1118-20; H.R. Deb. (6.5.58)1445.

173 H.R. Deb. (22.5.52)717.

174 VP 1951-53/387,393. See Ch. on 'The Speaker, the Chairman of Committees and Officers'.

175 H.R. Deb. (27.5.52)8189.

176 H.R. Deb. (27.8.52)618-21; PP 114(1951-53).

177 VP 1951-53/387-8.

178 H.R. Deb. (27.8.52)621-3.

179 *Parliamentary Secretaries Act 1980*, s. 3(1).

180 H.R. Deb. (26.11.80)81.

181 H.R. Deb. (15.9.87)46.

expenses reasonably incurred in holding or performing the functions of the appointment, that is, out-of-pocket expenses.<sup>182</sup> The amount of these expenses for which a Parliamentary Secretary can be reimbursed cannot exceed an allowance to be determined by the Remuneration Tribunal or prescribed by regulation.

The appointment of a Parliamentary Secretary may be revoked at any time by the Prime Minister.<sup>183</sup>

### **Ministerial allowances**

All Ministers receive a salary and allowance in addition to their salary and allowance as a Member of Parliament.<sup>184</sup> Ministers are not parliamentary office holders (*see* p. 91) but holders of (ministerial) office under the Crown. Authority is made in the Executive Government provisions (Part II) of the Constitution for salaries to be paid to Ministers of State in the following terms:

There shall be payable to the Queen, out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Commonwealth, for the salaries of the Ministers of State, an annual sum which, until the Parliament otherwise provides, shall not exceed twelve thousand pounds a year.<sup>185</sup>

In addition to determining the number of Ministers (*see* p. 94), the Ministers of State Act appropriates a sum of money, in lieu of the sum stated in the Constitution, for the payment of ministerial salaries and allowances for expenses of ministerial office.<sup>186</sup> The Remuneration Tribunal annually recommends to the Parliament the level of salaries and allowances to be paid to Ministers.<sup>187</sup> A decision is made by Cabinet as to whether or not the recommendations should be implemented.

Increases in ministerial salaries and allowances can only be made by amending the Ministers of State Act to increase the annual sum appropriated by that Act. The level of salary of office varies according to each Minister's level of responsibility, in the following descending scale:

Prime Minister  
Deputy Prime Minister  
Treasurer, Leader of the Government in the Senate  
Other Ministers

The allowance payable to Ministers, in effect an expense allowance, is paid in the following descending scale which is also based on level of responsibility:

Prime Minister  
Deputy Prime Minister  
Treasurer, Leader of the House, Leader of the Government in the Senate  
Other Ministers<sup>188</sup>

### *Office of profit*

The Constitution disqualifies any person who 'holds any office of profit under the Crown' from being chosen or sitting as a Member of Parliament.<sup>189</sup> The Constitution goes on to provide that this restriction does not apply 'to the office of any of the Queen's Ministers of State for the Commonwealth'<sup>190</sup> who of necessity sit as Members of Parliament. There is therefore no constitutional inconsistency

182 *Parliamentary Secretaries Act 1980*, s. 4.

183 *Parliamentary Secretaries Act 1980*, s. 3 (2).

184 *See* Ch. on 'Members'.

185 Constitution, s. 66.

186 *Ministers of State Act 1952*.

187 *Remuneration Tribunals Act 1973*.

188 For rates of salary and allowance *see* latest Remuneration Tribunal Review.

189 Constitution, s. 44(iv).

190 Constitution, s. 44.

between this section and the later section which authorises the payment of salaries to Ministers of State.<sup>191</sup>

No exemption exists, and no payment of salary can be authorised, for a Member of Parliament performing the duties of Assistant Minister, Parliamentary Secretary or similarly termed appointee whether sworn of the Federal Executive Council or not. To be a Minister, and therefore constitutionally eligible to receive a ministerial salary of office, a Member, by definition, must administer a Department of State of the Commonwealth (*see* p. 84).

### Pecuniary interest

In the House of Representatives the pecuniary interests of Members of Parliament are governed by precedent and practice established in accordance with sections 44 and 45 of the Constitution, standing orders 1 and 196 and resolutions of the House.<sup>192</sup> The question of pecuniary interests of Ministers is of greater importance than that of other Members, having regard to the paramount place of Ministers in the decision-making process. The question has arisen from time to time in the House of Representatives and, on occasions, the Prime Minister of the day has stated the general understanding which the Ministers in his Government have had in the matter.

In 1913 a matter relating to ministerial conduct and pecuniary interest arose from an admission by the Attorney-General (Mr Irvine) that he had accepted a retainer from a company which was in litigation with the Commonwealth. A motion was moved and subsequently negatived that Ministers of the Crown should not violate the code of rules laid down by the British Prime Minister (Mr Asquith). These rules related to the possible conflict of private pecuniary interest and public duty, and the acceptance of favours from those negotiating with the Government. The motion concluded with the words:

. . . that the action of the Attorney-General . . . in determining to hold a retaining fee from the Marconi Company, now in litigation with the Commonwealth Government, has violated the rules of conduct here laid down, and is detrimental to the best interests of the Commonwealth.<sup>193</sup>

On 3 November 1938 the Postmaster-General (Senator A. J. McLachlan) resigned from the Ministry following a question on notice concerning his activities as a director of certain companies.<sup>194</sup> He admitted that his department did, in the normal course of activity, by public tender, enter into contracts with a company of which he was a director. In his letter of resignation Senator McLachlan stated that the suggestion underlying the question that he may in some obscure way have influenced the department left him no alternative but to tender his resignation. Prime Minister Lyons accepted the resignation and on 9 November 1938 made a statement on the subject of ministerial conduct in these matters.<sup>195</sup> He informed the House that the Government was giving consideration to the setting up of a definite precedent for future guidance.

In recent times Prime Ministers have paid close attention to the relationship between the public duties and private interests of Ministers. For example, Prime Minister Gorton stated to the House:

I do not believe that Ministers should, when the Governments in which they are Ministers are engaged in particular arrangements with any businesses, have shareholdings

191 Constitution, s. 66.

192 *See* Ch. on 'Members' for discussion generally.

193 VP 1913/47; H.R. Deb. (9.9.13)944-1001.

194 H.R. Deb. (3.11.38)1189.

195 H.R. Deb. (9.11.38)1373-4.

in those businesses or accept offers which are in themselves offers which could lead to a capital profit.<sup>196</sup>

Prime Minister Whitlam informed the House of certain principles he expected of his Ministers<sup>197</sup> and Prime Minister Fraser formally asked all Ministers to make a declaration of interests to him which was to be held by him on a confidential basis.<sup>198</sup>

The 1975 report of the Joint Committee on Pecuniary Interests of Members of Parliament recommended that:

. . . Ministers of the Crown, on assuming office, should resign any directorship and dispose of any shares in a public or private company which might be seen to be affected by decisions taken within the Minister's sphere of responsibility.<sup>199</sup>

No action was taken on this report.

Prior to the 1977 general election the financial interests of the Treasurer (Mr Lynch) were brought into question. In a letter of resignation to Prime Minister Fraser, dated 18 November 1977, Mr Lynch informed the Prime Minister, in part, that:

I want to stress in the clearest of terms that I have at all times acted with propriety and discharged my Ministerial duties in a responsible and proper manner. I know of nothing that would call into question my integrity. In particular I have at no time used, or sought to use, my Ministerial position as a means of furthering the financial interests of myself or my family.<sup>200</sup>

The Prime Minister, in accepting Mr Lynch's resignation, replied, in part, that:

I accept the view that you have put to me that this matter must be resolved. I also accept your view with extreme sadness that the proper course is for you to stand aside but, in so doing, I want to reaffirm my confidence in you . . . I appreciate the extent to which your action is directed towards the maintenance of the complete integrity of the Government.<sup>201</sup>

The Prime Minister subsequently accepted independent legal advice that neither Mr Lynch nor his family, on the evidence available, had done anything which was 'illegal, commercially improper or represented a conflict between his or their private interests and Mr Lynch's public duty as a Minister of the Crown'.<sup>202</sup> Mr Lynch was reappointed to the Ministry on the return of the Government at the general election.<sup>203</sup>

In 1978 a government committee was appointed to inquire into matters relating to public duty and private interest. The committee's recommendations relating to the disclosure and divestment of Ministers' interests<sup>204</sup> were accepted by the Fraser Government.<sup>205</sup>

Ministers are required to make full declarations of their own private interests and those of their immediate families as far as they are aware of them. In 1983 the Hawke Government instigated the practice of periodically tabling copies of Ministers' statements of their interests, more detailed information including the actual

196 H.R. Deb. (5.5.70)1562-3.

197 H.R. Deb. (16.5.73)2170.

198 H.R. Deb. (18.2.76)35; VP 1977/201; H.R. Deb. (25.10.78)2327.

199 'Pecuniary Interests of Members of Parliament', *Report of Joint Committee*, PP 182(1975)27.

200 *Commonwealth Record* 2, 45, 14-20 November 1977, p. 1662.

201 *Commonwealth Record* 2, 45, 14-20 November 1977, pp. 1663-4.

202 *Commonwealth Record* 2, 49, 12-31 December 1977, p. 1906.

203 VP 1978-80/7.

204 'Public Duty and Private Interest', *Report of the Committee of Inquiry*, PP 353(1979)67-74.

205 H.R. Deb. (21.5.80)3026-8.

values of such interests being retained by the Prime Minister on a confidential basis.<sup>206</sup>

Following the adoption by the House in 1984 of standing order 28A and other resolutions relating to the registration and declaration of Members' interests (*see* Chapter on 'Members'), details of the interests of Ministers from the House of Representatives have been included with those of other Members in the Register of Members' Interests tabled at the commencement of each Parliament. In the absence of a similar requirement applying to Senators, details of Senate Ministers' interests have been tabled separately.

As well as the requirement for the formal registration of their interests, Ministers attending meetings of the Ministry, Cabinet or Cabinet committees have been required to declare any private interests in matters under discussion which conflict or might conflict with their public duty as Ministers. Following such a declaration, which is recorded by Cabinet officers, it is open to the meeting to excuse the Minister from the discussion or to agree to his or her participation.

Ministers are prohibited from engaging in professional practice or the daily work of any business and may derive no income through personal exertion other than as Ministers or members of the Parliament. They must divest themselves of shares or similar interests in any company or business involved in the area of their portfolio responsibilities. A Minister should inform the Prime Minister if a conflict of interest arises in the course of the administration of his or her department, so that a decision can be made as to how the matter is to be handled.<sup>207</sup>

## CABINET

The Cabinet is the focal point of the decision-making process of government. It is composed of either the full Ministry, or a specified group of Ministers, known as an 'Inner Cabinet', selected by the Prime Minister, the practice of non-Labor Governments since 1956 and Labor Governments since 1983. This latter practice resembles more closely the model of Cabinet Government developed in the United Kingdom. The group of Ministers known as Cabinet is not explicitly provided for in the Constitution nor by any other law. The relationship between Cabinet and Parliament is of no greater or lesser significance than the relationship between the Ministry as a whole and Parliament.<sup>208</sup> In a purely parliamentary context the existence of an Inner Cabinet is of little procedural consequence. It is in basic terms an administrative mechanism to facilitate the decision-making process of the Executive Government.

The use of Cabinet as a mechanism of government has its origins deep in English constitutional history in the form of the ancient Council of the King, the *Curia Regis*, and later in the form of the Privy Council.

According to Wilding and Laundry:

The Cabinet evolved from the Privy Council . . . and eventually took its place [early 18th century] as the executive organ of government, but its growth was a largely informal process. The word itself originally meant a small room or closet and thus came to signify a body of persons meeting together to deliberate in secret.<sup>209</sup>

206 H.R. Deb. (22.9.83)1172-4.

207 Cabinet Handbook, Canberra, AGPS, 1983, p. 4.

208 On a point of terminology 'Cabinet Government' in parliamentary terms can be equated with 'Responsible Government'; 'Cabinet soli-

darity' and 'collective Cabinet responsibility' can be equated with 'collective ministerial responsibility'.

209 Wilding and Laundry, p. 66. For further historical reference *see* pp. 66-72, 190-1, 601-4.

A significant development in the British Cabinet system was that by the end of the 18th century, as with the Privy Council earlier, a distinction developed between the whole body and the Inner Cabinet. The composition of the Cabinet came to be confined to the ministerial heads of the principal Departments of State and the holders of traditional office who were in effect Ministers without portfolio. The British Cabinet has thus long been characterised by the Inner Cabinet concept, composed of the Prime Minister and such of his or her colleagues as he or she may select, thereby, in practice, causing the omission of a number of Ministers of State from the main policy and decision-making group of government.

The Australian Cabinet system between 1956 and 1972 and since 1975 has followed the British practice of including only selected Ministers in the Cabinet. The periods of government when the Cabinet was composed of the full Ministry was due in part to its relatively small size (11 in number in 1941), but may also have been due to the provision of the Constitution which determines that a Federal Executive Council, which constitutionally and in practice is composed of all Ministers of State, is to advise the Governor-General.

An Inner Cabinet is an administrative arrangement for government decision-making. In constitutional terms certain decisions of government may be made by Cabinet but can only be implemented via the Federal Executive Council (*see* p. 116).

*Quick and Garran* describes the Cabinet as:

. . . an informal body having no definite legal status; it is in fact an institution unknown to the law; it exists by custom alone, and yet is the dominant force in the Executive Government of every British country . . .

There are thus two commonly recognized qualifications necessary for ministerial appointment, (1) membership of the Privy or Executive Council, (2) membership of Parliament. From the point of view of the first qualification the ministry may be described as a select committee of the Privy or Executive Council; the remaining members of that body not being summoned to attend either the meetings of committees or the ordinary meetings of the Council. From the point of view of the second qualification the ministry may be called a Parliamentary committee, whose composition and policy is determined by the party commanding a majority in the national chamber.<sup>210</sup>

*Quick and Garran* also states some of the time-honoured and pre-eminent features of Cabinet organisation and some of the rules of Cabinet discipline and government:

The proceedings of the Cabinet are conducted in secret and apart from the Crown. The deliberations of the Executive Council are presided over by the representative of the Crown. Resolutions and matters of administrative policy requiring the concurrence of the Crown, decided at meetings of the Cabinet, are formally and officially submitted to the Executive Council, where they are recorded and confirmed. The principle of the corporate unity and solidarity of the Cabinet requires that the Cabinet should have one harmonious policy, both in administration and in legislation; that the advice tendered by the Cabinet to the Crown should be unanimous and consistent; that the Cabinet should stand or fall together.

The Cabinet as a whole is responsible for the advice and conduct of each of its members. If any member of the Cabinet seriously dissents from the opinion and policy approved by the majority of his colleagues it is his duty as a man of honour to resign.

Advice is generally communicated to the Crown by the Prime Minister, either personally or by Cabinet minute. Through the Prime Minister the Cabinet speaks with united voice.<sup>211</sup>

210 *Quick and Garran*, pp. 704-5.

211 *Quick and Garran*, pp. 705-6.

This concise statement of principles attaching to Cabinet organisation is regarded as having continuing validity, even though the rules have from time to time been broken or qualified under exceptional political circumstances.<sup>212</sup>

### Select Cabinets

On a number of occasions Prime Ministers have organised their Ministry to form small Cabinet groups composed of selected Ministers. Following the reconstruction of the Lyons Ministry on 7 November 1938, Prime Minister Lyons reorganised Cabinet to form an 'inner group' of Ministers to examine and formulate policy prior to submission to the full Cabinet.<sup>213</sup> This scheme ceased with Lyons' death on 7 April 1939 but later found an equivalent in the War Cabinet formed on 15 September 1939 by Prime Minister Menzies.

As noted by Sawyer, the War Cabinet, which originally consisted of six Ministers:

. . . was the inverse of the Lyons scheme for an 'inner group', because full Cabinet remained responsible for general policy and the function of War Cabinet was detail and execution; however, in practice War Cabinet tended to become the first formulator of general policies having a relation to the war, which came to mean most issues of political significance. The War Cabinet developed secretarial and recording procedures which profoundly influenced the subsequent development of federal Cabinet as a whole.<sup>214</sup>

The War Cabinet was continued by successive Governments until January 1946 when the powers vested in it reverted to the Cabinet composed of the full Ministry. Other forms of Cabinet committee organisation have occurred to facilitate the work of Cabinet<sup>215</sup> including an 'Economic Cabinet' instituted in 1939. World War II also produced an Advisory War Council which included senior Ministers and senior opposition Members.

The Inner Cabinet system was first introduced informally by Prime Minister Menzies in 1954, primarily in the form of a Cabinet committee structure.<sup>216</sup> The present practice, whereby the Cabinet is comprised of some but not all Ministers, was formally adopted on 11 January 1956 and has characterised all Governments since, with the exception of the Whitlam Government when all Ministers comprised the Cabinet, thereby reverting to the pre-1956 practice.

In announcing the new Ministry in 1956 Prime Minister Menzies said:

Experience in the previous Government has amply demonstrated that the pressure of work on Ministers is increasing. I have therefore decided that the following arrangements should apply with regard to Cabinet and ministerial work.

In the first place Cabinet as such will consist of the first twelve Ministers whom I have named. The other Ministers will be co-opted to attend Cabinet meetings as required, but normally they will be left free to attend to other ministerial duties.<sup>217</sup>

Subsequently, the size of Cabinet has ranged between 11 and 17 Ministers, while the Ministry has ranged from 22 to 30 Ministers.

In 1976 the Remuneration Tribunal reinstated the pre-1973 practice of dividing the Ministry, for the purposes of salary of office, into two groups.<sup>218</sup> However, in

212 For a detailed exposition of the role, functioning and organisation of Cabinet the reader is referred to Jennings, *Cabinet Government*; Crisp, *Australian National Government*; Encel, *Cabinet Government in Australia*.

213 H.R. Deb. (8.11.38)1323 ff.

214 Sawyer, *Australian Federal Politics and Law 1929-1949*, p. 103.

215 Crisp, pp. 374-83.

216 Announced outside the House; *but see* H.R. Deb. (10.8.54)116.

217 H.R. Deb. (15.2.56)17.

218 'Salaries payable to Ministers of State', *Report of Remuneration Tribunal*, PP 221(1976)3.

1983, following the election of the Hawke Labor Government, the practice again reverted to Cabinet and non-Cabinet Ministers receiving equal salaries.<sup>219</sup>

Under the Inner Cabinet system, a Minister not in Cabinet could be summoned to Cabinet meetings when the affairs of his or her own department were under discussion, but matters of administrative detail were the concern of the department and of the individual Minister. The work of Cabinet under this system was regularly facilitated by the formation of various Cabinet committees on which Ministers not in Cabinet may serve.

Under the two-tier ministerial arrangements introduced in 1987 (*see* p. 95) each senior or 'portfolio' Minister is a member of the Cabinet.

### FEDERAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

The Federal Executive Council was established by the Constitution to perform similar functions in Australia to those performed by the Privy Council in the United Kingdom, that is, to advise the Crown.<sup>220</sup> It is the formal, constitutional and legal body responsible for advising the Governor-General (as distinct from Cabinet). The Executive Council is the legal means of ratifying executive acts (as distinct from prerogative acts) by or on behalf of the Governor-General. Any reference to the Governor-General in Council in the Constitution or elsewhere refers to the Governor-General acting on and with the advice of the Executive Council. The Governor-General's advice, however, does not come from the total membership of the Executive Council, but is limited to that group of members who are currently Ministers of State, the Chief Advisor being the Prime Minister.

Members of the Federal Executive Council are chosen, summoned and sworn in by the Governor-General<sup>221</sup> and hold office during the Governor-General's pleasure which, generally, is for life. An exception was Senator Sheil who was appointed to the Executive Council on 20 December 1977 without portfolio but following certain public statements on policy matters had his appointment terminated on 22 December 1977.<sup>222</sup> The modern practice is for appointments to the Executive Council to be made with the intention of the member becoming a Minister of State. There have been instances of Honorary Ministers and Assistant Ministers being appointed to the Executive Council (*see* p. 107).

At any one time there are many Executive Councillors who are no longer Ministers. In practice the only Executive Councillors who are summoned to Council meetings are those who are, currently, Ministers of State. Members of the Executive Council may use the title 'Honorable' while they are Executive Councillors, that is, usually for life.<sup>223</sup> There is nothing in the Constitution which determines the *modus operandi* of the Executive Council, which is for the Council itself to decide. Meetings of the Executive Council are normally presided over by its 'President'<sup>224</sup>, the Governor-General or, if the Governor-General is unable to be present, by a Deputy appointed by the Governor-General.<sup>225</sup> The Deputy is usually the Vice-President of the Executive Council or, in the absence of the Vice-President, the senior member of the Executive Council present at the meeting may preside if so authorised.<sup>226</sup>

219 'Salaries payable to Ministers of State', *Report of the Remuneration Tribunal*, PP 52(1984)13.

220 *Quick and Garran*, pp. 704-5.

221 *See* generally Constitution and particularly ss. 62-4; *see also* p. 84.

222 *Gazettes* S290(20.12.77)1 and S295(22.12.77).

223 *See also* Ch. on 'Members'.

224 This is not a formal title.

225 Constitution, s. 126.

226 *Gazette* S184(24.7.87)6.

This delegation of authority is limited to presiding over meetings and signifying approval of the proceedings. The delegation does not carry with it authority to make appointments and perform other acts on behalf of the Governor-General; it is limited to signifying to the Governor-General the approval of the Council to the recommendation (minute) placed before the Council.<sup>227</sup>

The provisions of the Constitution applying to the Governor-General also apply to any person appointed by the Queen to administer the Government of the Commonwealth.<sup>228</sup> Hence, in the absence of the Governor-General, the Administrator presides over meetings of the Executive Council and signs Executive Council Minutes.

## THE (OFFICIAL) OPPOSITION

The Opposition is the party or group in the House which is organised as a unit and works to oppose the Government. The party (or sometimes coalition of parties) consists of a minority of the total membership of the House and is officially recognised as the 'alternative Government', that is, the body which would form the Government, with its leader as Prime Minister, if the existing Government loses the confidence of the House or the people.

The Opposition is an important component in the structure of the House and is considered to be essential for the proper working of democratic government and the parliamentary process in the Westminster system.

The recognition of Her Majesty's Opposition is believed to have originated in the early 19th century.<sup>229</sup> Essentially the term is based on the constitutional convention that, in the parliamentary system, the Crown recognises that Her Majesty's Government exists, for the time being, as the preference of the House over Her Majesty's Opposition.

## Composition

In the period of the 2nd and 3rd Parliaments between 1904 and 1910, the Governor-General looked to the non-government groups (parties) for the formation of the Government on five separate occasions.<sup>230</sup> During the circumstances of the frequent rearrangement of alliances in this period, the acknowledged concept of the Leader of the Opposition being commissioned to form the Government did not necessarily prevail because he may have lacked sufficient support to maintain Government.<sup>231</sup>

In more recent times with the development and stability of the party structure, the division between Government and Opposition has become clear and constant. The nature of Australia's party system and the existing electoral system has historically produced an almost total absence of representation of minor parties in the House of Representatives.

227 Advice from Attorney-General's Department, dated 8 January 1948, relating to execution of instruments by Governor-General; and see G. Sawyer, *Federation Under Strain*, pp. 100-2.

228 Constitution, s. 4.

229 Wilding and Laundry, p. 509. The term Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition was also used.

230 (i) On 27 April 1904 Watson (ALP) was commissioned in place of Deakin (Protectionist), (ii) on 18 August 1904 Reid (Free Trade-Pro-

tectionist) was commissioned in place of Watson, (iii) on 5 July 1905 Deakin was commissioned in place of Reid, (iv) on 13 November 1908 Fisher (ALP) was commissioned in place of Deakin, and (v) on 2 June 1909 Deakin (Fusion) was commissioned in place of Fisher.

231 On 27 April 1904 Reid (Free Trade) was Leader of the Opposition; on 5 July 1905 Watson (ALP) was Leader; on 13 November 1908 Reid was Leader; and see Appendix 4.

On 7 October 1941 following the defeat of the Fadden (Country Party-United Australia Party) Government, the Governor-General called on Leader of the Opposition Curtin to form a Government. On 11 November 1975 following the dismissal of the Whitlam (Australian Labor Party) Government, the Governor-General asked Leader of the Opposition Fraser to form a 'caretaker' Government.

When the Opposition consists of more than one party opposed to the Government, and the parties prefer to remain distinct, the single party having the largest number of members is recognised as the 'official Opposition'. If the official Opposition is not clear by virtue of numbers, it is for the Speaker to decide which group shall be so called, and who will be recognised by the Chair as the Leader of the Opposition.

During the period of the Australian Labor Party Government between 1972 and 1975 the Opposition was composed of the Liberal Party and the National Country Party. During the 28th Parliament (1973 and 1974), the Leader and the Deputy Leader of the Opposition together with the Shadow Ministry came from the Liberal Party. In the 29th Parliament (1974 and 1975), a 'coalition' Opposition was formed and, while the offices of Leader and Deputy Leader of the Opposition remained with the Liberal Party, the Shadow Ministry was composed of Members from both parties. Following the return of the Labor Party Government in 1983, the Liberal Party-National Party coalition Opposition again shared Shadow Ministry positions.<sup>232</sup>

Following the formation of the Curtin Government in October 1941, Mr Menzies resigned as leader of the United Australia Party (with 24 members) and was replaced by Mr Hughes, with Mr Fadden as Leader of the Country Party (with 12 members), an arrangement which continued until the election in August 1943. There was a lack of unity among the parties and an abnormal opposition arrangement existed during this period as recounted by Sawyer:

Fadden led the Opposition as a whole, with Hughes as Deputy for parliamentary purposes. In March 1943, seventeen U.A.P. members headed by Menzies quarrelled with the rest of the Opposition over tactics on the conscription issue, formed themselves into the 'National Service Group', and ceased attending U.A.P. and Joint Opposition party meetings, but they did not claim recognition as a separate party.<sup>233</sup>

After the election Mr Menzies was again elected leader of the United Australia Party and, as leader of the larger non-government group, was also Leader of the Opposition.

On two occasions when the Labor Party has been in Opposition breakaway groups have formed splinter parties. A split in the Australian Labor Party in April 1940 saw the formation of the Non-Communist Branch of the Labour Party with five members<sup>234</sup> including a leader and deputy leader. Another split in April 1955 produced the Australian Labour Party (Anti-Communist) consisting of seven members.<sup>235</sup> The party had a leader and deputy leader, sat in a separate section in the Chamber, and was allocated a party room by the Speaker.<sup>236</sup> The leaders of both these parties were not entitled to receive special remuneration. The leader of the

232 Except for a period of separation prior to the 1987 election, from 29.4.87.

233 Sawyer, *Australian Federal Politics and Law 1929-49*, p. 126.

234 VP 1940/19. This group had its origins as early as 1931 and in fact brought about the defeat of the Scullin Government that year. It was also known as the 'Langites' and the 'Beasley Group'. Following the election in November 1940, four

Members were returned and the party rejoined the ALP in March 1941.

235 VP 1954-55/161. No members of this party were returned to the House at the December 1955 election.

236 A dispute occurred over the allotment of rooms to the party but the Speaker's decision was confirmed by the House, VP 1954-55/173,181-2.

Australian Labour Party (Anti-Communist) had no entitlement under the Parliamentary Allowances Act as payment could only be made where a party consisted of not less than 10 members.<sup>237</sup> This provision was introduced in 1947 in recognition of the Leader of the Country Party who was not Leader of the Opposition but who led in opposition 11 other Members.<sup>238</sup>

### Leader of the Opposition<sup>239</sup>

The House took no official cognisance in its records of the appointment of a Leader of the Opposition prior to 1920, even though the role of the office was firmly established. The position had no constitutional base and was not recognised by the standing orders.

In 1920 the office was statutorily recognised for the purposes of the payment of an allowance.<sup>240</sup> Since then the status of the office has continued to rise as reflected by the recognition of the duties of the office by way of remuneration<sup>241</sup> and resources, and the Leader of the Opposition is presently remunerated at a rate above that for the majority of Ministers. The Leader of the Opposition is placed ninth in the Commonwealth Table of Precedence, immediately after Ministers of State.

It was not until 1931 that the office was recognised in the standing orders when the Leader of the Opposition was granted special rights with regard to speech time limits in specific instances.<sup>242</sup> The Deputy Leader of the Opposition was also recognised in the standing orders with ex officio membership of the Standing Orders Committee and in a sessional order adopted in 1980 with ex officio membership of the Privileges Committee.<sup>243</sup>

It is the practice of the House for the Leader of the Opposition and the Deputy Leader to receive special latitude or preference from the Chair by virtue of their offices with respect to:

- receiving the call of the Chair in preference over other opposition Members, particularly in asking questions without notice, and
- indulgence of the Chair in order to explain or clarify matters before the House or to make a personal explanation.

The special role played by the Leader of the Opposition has been recognised in the following comments made in reports by independent inquiries into the parliamentary salary structure:

A Leader of the Opposition is an essential figure in parliamentary government. In most English-speaking countries he receives a salary in addition to his salary as a private member. In Canada his salary is the same as that of a Cabinet Minister. His duties are arduous, for he has to be prepared to discuss every Bill introduced by the Government, subject to his right of delegation, and to do this he has not the power to call on departmental officers for information or assistance. His responsibility is not equal to that of the Prime Minister but it is a responsibility to his Party, to the country which

237 *Parliamentary Allowances Act 1952*, s. 9 (Act No. 2 of 1952).

238 *Parliamentary Allowances Act (No. 2) 1947* (Act No. 64 of 1947).

239 There is only one Leader of the Opposition. The Senate Leader is 'Leader of the Opposition in the Senate'. For a list of Leaders see Appendix 4.

240 *Parliamentary Allowances Act 1920* (Act No. 12 of 1920).

241 Particularly as a result of an enquiry into the salaries and allowances of Members of the national Parliament in 1952 (and later inquiries). This inquiry also resulted in special remuneration for the Deputy Leader of the Opposition for the first time.

242 VP 1929-31/587-90; S.O. 91.

243 S.O. 25; VP 1980-81/64.

he informs and which he aspires to lead. His entertainment expenses are less but are by no means negligible, for overseas visitors frequently wish to interview one whom they regard as the possible head of a government.<sup>244</sup>

An effective Opposition is essential for the proper functioning of a democracy. Its Leader has possibly the most difficult job in the Parliament. A Minister must, of course, be thoroughly conversant with the details of Bills or other matters which affect his own department, but the advice and resources of the departmental staff are constantly at his call. The Leader of the Opposition has to make himself master of all the business which comes before the House (not merely that of one or two departments); he has to do this at times at short notice and under constant pressure; and he gets no help from permanent officials. At all times he is the spokesman for those who are critical of or opposed to the Government, and he must be unceasingly vigilant and active. He and the Prime Minister should be the most powerful agents in guiding and forming public opinion on issues of policy.<sup>245</sup>

The Leader of the Opposition leads a group of Members, elected by the party when the Labor Party is in opposition or nominated by the leader when the coalition parties are in Opposition, which is known as the Opposition Executive or the Shadow Ministry or the Shadow Cabinet. In past years the Opposition Executive has been less than the number of Ministers but at the beginning of the 35th Parliament consisted of a total of 30 members in both Houses, making the Shadow Ministry the same size as the Ministry. Each Shadow Minister covers the responsibilities of one or possibly more Ministers or areas of administration and acts as the opposition spokesman in respect of his or her designated areas.

As with Cabinet which is assisted by a system of standing committees and government members' party committees, the Opposition Executive has a system of opposition members' committees to develop attitudes to government policy and to develop alternative policies for presentation to the Parliament.

A senior and experienced member of the Opposition Executive is appointed Manager of Opposition Business with the responsibility, in consultation with his or her leaders and colleagues, of regularly consulting and negotiating with the Leader of the House in relation to such matters as the allocation of time for debates, and the order and priority of consideration of items of business (*see* p. 102).

### **Role of the Opposition**

Before the establishment of Cabinet Government, the primary function of the whole House, through its role of scrutiny and criticism, was to exercise a check on the actions of the Government. In modern times this role is largely discharged by the Opposition and, thus, the functions of the Opposition have become identified and linked with the role and more important functions of the House. These functions include:

- unmaking the Government—the Opposition, by definition, seeks to defeat a Government or cause a Government to resign. Theoretically, it could be said that an Opposition endeavours to achieve this by persuading government supporters to accept its viewpoint but, in reality, it looks to a general election for defeat of the Government and endeavours to achieve it by public persuasion;

<sup>244</sup> *Enquiry into the Salaries and Allowances of Members of the National Parliament 1952*, p. 18 (not ordered to be printed).

<sup>245</sup> *Inquiry into the Salaries and Allowances of Members of the Commonwealth Parliament*, PP 15(1959-60)31.

- scrutiny of, criticism of, and suggestion of improvements to, legislation and financial proposals;
- examination of expenditure and public accounts;
- seeking information on and clarification of government policy (principally questions with and without notice);
- surveillance, appraisal and criticism of government administration;
- ventilating legitimate grievances;
- petitioning, and
- examination of delegated legislation.

While all private Members are to some extent involved in such functions as petitions, grievances, questions, and participation in committee work, the effective performance of these and other functions listed above is largely dependent on a vigilant, industrious and organised Opposition. Members supporting the Government play an effective part in this parliamentary process but the Opposition may be expected to do so and to articulate, for example, the views of minority groups within the community.

The procedural means available to the Opposition and to individual private Members to pursue their roles are limited in certain areas.<sup>246</sup> This is particularly so with regard to opportunities for initiating alternative or new proposals as, in the House of Representatives, the Opposition has few rights over the time of the House, and, in practice, has limited opportunity to choose the subjects to be debated. Fair, democratic and efficient parliamentary government calls for:

- the provision of reasonable parliamentary time for opposition purposes;
- the protection of the rights of minorities in the House by the Speaker;
- the provision of information and resources<sup>247</sup> (to reduce the wide gap in information availability between Government and Opposition), and
- the provision of drafting assistance when necessary.

There are two points relating to the role of the Opposition which require qualification. First, there is normally a good deal of co-operation between the parties in dealing with business, and in arranging the program of the House, so that proper use is made of the time available. Secondly, its role is not only one of criticism but, at times, it also offers agreement, assistance or improvements to the actions and policies of the Government in the interests of the people and the nation. Nevertheless, despite this very necessary qualification, there is more than a grain of truth in the proposition that 'We rely for good government, not on the wisdom and probity of the House, but on the adversary relationship between the government and the opposition'.<sup>248</sup>

246 See Ch. on 'Private Members' business'.

247 Staff assistance to the Leader of the Opposition, provided at government expense, has increased especially since the period of the ALP Government of 1974-75.

248 J. Stewart, *The Canadian House of Commons*, Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977, p. 168.