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CSHA assistance |
|
CRA |
||
|
|
$m |
2001-02 $m |
|
$m |
2001-02 $m |
|
1992-93 |
1485.4 |
1758.7 |
|
1199.0 |
1419.6 |
|
1993-94 |
1419.6 |
1662.5 |
|
1401.0 |
1640.8 |
|
1994-95 |
1509.6 |
1649.4 |
|
1453.0 |
1688.2 |
|
1995-96 |
1489.8 |
1688.4 |
|
1552.0 |
1758.9 |
|
1996-97 |
1353.4 |
1510.1 |
|
1647.0 |
1837.7 |
|
1997-98 |
1207.4 |
1328.4 |
|
1484.0 |
1632.7 |
|
1998-99 |
1276.6 |
1402.3 |
|
1505.0 |
1653.2 |
|
1999-2000 |
1331.0 |
1431.0 |
|
1538.0 |
1653.6 |
|
2000-01* |
1406.5 |
1442.7 |
|
1717.0 |
1761.2 |
|
2001-02* |
1392.3 |
1392.3 |
|
1815.0 |
1815.0 |
*CSHA expenditure in 2000-01 and 2001-02 contained $89.7 million of GST compensation paid to State and Territory Governments.
Source: Department of Family and Community Services, Annual Reports (various years); Housing Assistance Act 1996, Annual Reports (various years); ABS, National Accounts: National Income, Expenditure and Productivity, Cat. No. 5206.0.
6.31 Submissions also commented on the decline in funding for the CSHA. ACOSS stated that expenditure on the CSHA has declined in real terms since the 1980s, and between 1984-85 and 1994-95 ACOSS estimated that per capita levels of spending on social housing via the CSHA declined by 25 per cent.[28] This decline in funding levels was confirmed in the recent Report on Government Services 2004. The report stated that expenditure on CSHA assistance declined in real terms by approximately 18.6 per cent between 1993-94 and 2002-03. Expenditure on CRA increased by approximately 9.8 per cent in real terms over the same period.[29]
6.32 The Queensland Government noted that historically CSHA grants have not been indexed for inflation, and have declined in absolute terms since 1996 when the Commonwealth began applying 'efficiency dividends'. As a result, the States are left with public housing infrastructure that can no longer be sustained with current levels of funding. The Queensland Government, referring to features of the 2003 CSHA which introduces indexation, but also continues to apply efficiency dividends – noted that the Agreement 'will still result in a decline in the real value of funding'.[30] Waiting lists for public housing have also increased – the waiting list for public housing in NSW alone is 90 000 to 100 000.[31]
6.33 Concerns were also expressed at the increasing 'welfarisation' of public housing. Over the last decades public housing has been increasingly rationed to the most disadvantaged in the community whereas historically it provided affordable housing for low to moderate income households.[32] Most new tenants are now on some form of Centrelink payment or benefit – being on a low income of itself is therefore no longer the main criteria for being eligible for public housing. Approximately 80 per cent of households renting from State housing authorities in 1997-98 relied on pensions and benefits as their principal source of income. Although people with a disability represented 17 per cent of the total population aged between 15-64 years in 1998, 39 per cent of public housing tenants of this age group in 1998 were people with a disability.[33] In June 2002, of all income units in public housing almost one in three contained an adult with a disability.[34]
6.34 Submissions noted that current Government policy favours the targeting of scarce affordable housing resources to those with the highest – and often the most complex – needs and with low incomes. The Tenants Union of Victoria noted that because of the tight targeting, households experiencing only affordability problems, and 'working poor' households are either waiting for excessively long periods for allocation of a property, or are excluded from the system altogether.[35]
6.35 ACOSS noted that the social housing system cannot be sustained if both income-related rents and targeting remain. ACOSS also noted that public housing is carrying significant unfunded maintenance and redevelopment liabilities, and faces a cash flow crisis which has meant virtually no new stock has been added nationally as capital funding has been used to meet this gap.[36] The level of public housing stock at the national level has declined from 362 967 dwellings in 1999-00 to 354 124 dwellings in 2001-02.[37] The BSL advised that annual additions nationally to public housing have declined from between 10 000 and 15 000 to less than 5000 dwellings in the last few years. The Brotherhood noted that internal revenue now generated in Victoria's public housing only covers the cost of rental operations but is not sufficient to fund the acquisition of new stock, improvements to older stock or redevelopment of estates.[38]
6.36 Submissions argued that it was vital that a viable public housing system be maintained and be adequately funded.[39] Shelter NSW stated that:
It is...vital for capital funding levels to increase substantially, given that funding reductions together with increased targeting of public housing to at-risk groups have led to a steep decline in new construction (combined with a blow out in waiting lists) and an equally steep decline in rental returns with higher percentages than ever of tenants on statutory benefits.[40]
6.37 The provision of a viable public housing system would, however, require considerable expenditures. Shelter NSW estimated that it would cost $2 billion a year to provide a sustainable system in NSW alone – 'you have 130,000 units of public housing and we are talking about tripling that. It is a lot of money. But then you would end up with a sustainable social housing system which would house not just very poor people but up to moderate income people'.[41]
6.38 The use of private capital to finance public and community housing is sometimes cited as a way of increasing stock without increasing the level of government funding. This Committee's 1997 report into housing assistance drew attention to a number of overseas countries, for example, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, where private institutional investors are a significant source of funding for public and social housing.[42]
6.39 Recent CSHAs have encouraged the States to use Agreement funds for arrangements involving investment from the private sector into public housing. In recent years there has been a trend towards greater involvement of the private sector in the provision of this form of housing. Indeed, one of the objectives under the 2003 CSHA is to 'promote innovative approaches to leverage additional resources into Social Housing, through community, private sector and other partnerships'.[43]
6.40 Several States have promoted greater private and community sector involvement in the area of public housing provision. In Victoria, the 2000-01 State Budget provided $94.5 million over three years (2000-03) for the Social Housing Innovations Project. The aim of the Project is to develop joint housing ventures with local government bodies, non-government organisations and private sector companies. At June 2002, 66 such joint ventures had been announced across the State. Queensland is also looking at ways of using the community and private sectors in the provision of affordable housing. One example is the establishment of the Brisbane Housing Company, which procures homes in inner Brisbane to rent to people on low or moderate income. It is a 'partnership' arrangement between government, community groups and the private sector. Western Australia is also increasing the range of alternative housing solutions by expanding its community housing sector and bond assistance scheme, as well as maximising the ability of housing providers to access private investment. In 2000-01, private investments in public/community housing totalled $450 000 compared to $300 000 in 1999-2000.[44]
6.41 Some reservations were expressed with the concept of public-private partnerships. The Tenants Union of Victoria stated that while there were many theoretical models 'there is no real practical experience in the Australian context of that working'. The Tenants Union pointed to the experience of the redevelopment of the Kensington public housing estate in Melbourne's west, which was a public-private partnership between Becton and the Victorian Office of Housing, noting that 'the compromise that was required there to make that work was significant control for the developer around the nature of public housing, the nature of allocations of the residents of the estate – lots of qualifications that are around social engineering'.[45]
6.42 The Committee believes that public and community housing provides a vital element in addressing the housing needs of some of the most disadvantaged people in the community, especially those with low incomes and those with special needs. The Committee is strongly supportive of continuing Commonwealth and State government funding for public housing. The Committee also believes that partnerships should be developed with the private sector to jointly finance public housing developments.
Recommendation 17
6.43 That base funding arrangements for public housing be increased under the Commonwealth-State Housing Agreement.
Recommendation 18
6.44 That the Commonwealth and the States:
6.45 Commonwealth Rent Assistance (CRA) is designed to assist those on income support payments with housing affordability in the private rental market. It is a supplementary payment, payable in addition to most classes of income support payments to assist with private rental costs. In 2002-03, Commonwealth outlays on CRA to income support recipients was $1.8 billion. There were 940 708 recipients of CRA (as at June 2003).
6.46 Despite significant Commonwealth outlays, evidence to the inquiry expressed concerns about the effectiveness of the CRA program in addressing the housing affordability problems experienced by people on low incomes.[46] A major concern was that a large proportion of people in receipt of CRA still experienced considerable housing affordability problems. Shelter NSW stated that CRA is not keeping up with rising rents in most capital cities and some regional areas.[47] FaCS data for December 2002, indicate that 34 per cent of CRA recipients spent more than 30 per cent of their income in rent and 9 per cent spent more than 50 per cent of their income on rent.[48] Similar figures were reported in the recent study by National Shelter and ACOSS referred to earlier in this chapter.
6.47 Concerns were also raised that CRA has no real effect on the supply of affordable housing in the private sector. The Tenants Union of Victoria commented that the decline in affordable housing stock across Australia has two features. It shows a decline in absolute numbers of low cost private rental at a time when the private rental market experienced strong growth overall, and it demonstrates that there is also a problem for low income renters accessing low cost stock, as they are competing with other renters in the market.[49] Evidence also indicated that flexibility of location is often not provided. One witness, referring to the situation in NSW, commented that CRA 'does not provide people with flexibility as to location. People have to go where the poor housing is and strangely enough, low-cost housing is way out of the way of any jobs'.[50] The Queensland Government also noted that the private market for low income households is in decline – 'when combined with the decline in social housing, this inevitably means that an increasing number of households will face higher levels of housing stress and poverty'.[51]
6.48 Submissions argued that the Commonwealth's shift in funding priorities away from public housing programs to demand driven programs like CRA may be counter-productive in the longer term. As Table 6.1 indicates, Commonwealth expenditures on the CRA have increased substantially in real terms since the 1990s, whereas expenditures on the CSHA have declined over the same period. The Queensland Government stated that in fiscal terms, there is evidence that over the longer term, housing needs can be more efficiently addressed through capital based programs rather than recurrent programs as capital programs create a portfolio of dwellings that can assist many households over time. Furthermore, the portfolio can be realigned over time through upgrades, sales and new constructions to remain responsive to changing client profiles –'in contrast, demand driven programs such as income supplements represent cash payments with no resulting asset and no capacity to provide ongoing assistance over the long term. The move towards income supplements may therefore ultimately result in greater costs to governments'.[52]
6.49 Equity issues were also raised in relation to CRA, as it only assists some income support recipients and only those in the private rental market. People experiencing hardship purchasing a home are not assisted, nor are low income working households assisted with private rental costs. Some witnesses argued that CRA should be extended to these groups.[53]
6.50 Despite the criticisms of the program, several groups acknowledged that CRA does assist private renters with the cost of rental accommodation, at least to some degree.[54] It was also argued that CRA needs to be increased to keep pace with rent increases.[55] A major concern, however, related to the possibility that increases in CRA would result in landlords 'creaming off' the increase by putting rents up as soon as CRA was increased with the result that there would be no improvement in affordability for low income renters. This concern was not necessarily supported by evidence that suggests that increases in CRA have not led to corresponding increases in rents. Data from FaCS indicates that from June 2000 to June 2002, average CRA payments increased by 16 per cent, while average rents for CRA recipients increased by 12 per cent. By comparison the CPI increased by 9 per cent in the two years to March 2002.[56]
6.51 A review of CRA was called for in a number of submissions. The Tenants Union of Victoria argued that such a review should address the effectiveness of CRA as a housing program in improving affordability and access; the cost of the program; the relationship of CRA to income support and to the private rental market; and the eligibility criteria.[57]
6.52 The Committee is concerned at the Commonwealth Government's shift in policy emphasis from social housing to CRA, especially as this policy shift has not addressed affordability and access issues for low income people attempting to rent in the private market. The Committee believes that the overall operations of CRA, especially in relation to access and affordability for low income households, should be reviewed as part of the Committee's recommendation for a national housing strategy.
6.53 A number of submissions argued that the Commonwealth should develop strategies to increase the level of private finance directed to providing affordable housing for low income earners. There are a range of schemes that have been proposed but these were not canvassed in any detail during the inquiry.[58] SACOSS suggested the introduction of tax credit arrangements for investment in low-cost housing.[59] It was also emphasised that initiatives in this area should be in addition to a commitment by governments to maintain a viable social housing sector.
6.54 Submissions argued that there should be greater encouragement for low income households to purchase their own homes. The Tenants Union of Victoria argued that home ownership remains the most cost-effective housing tenure for all households. It is the only tenure that ensures that housing costs reduce over the lifetime of the household, as purchasers pay out their mortgages and secure a substantial asset as a result.[60] The Tasmanian Government offers assistance for home ownership by providing access to finance through its Home Ownership Assistance Program (HOAP) and equity grants to assist public housing tenants to purchase their homes. Eligibility under the HOAP is restricted to those earning $700 per week or less and the maximum loan is set at $80 000.[61]
6.55 The Commonwealth's First Home Owner Grant (FHOG), which provides a non-means tested grant to eligible first homebuyers, was criticised by some groups, essentially because of the untargeted nature of the program. It was also argued the FHOG may have simply assisted households who would have purchased a home anyway to do so earlier, rather than providing a genuine opportunity for low income households to buy a home.[62] Some submissions argued that the scheme should be replaced with a subsidy for social and low cost housing.[63]
6.56 A number of concerns were expressed during the inquiry that the rights of tenants were being undermined by the increasing abuse of residential tenancy databases by real estate agents. Concerns included inappropriate listings, unfair or poor database operating practices and privacy concerns. The Tenants Union of Victoria stated that:
The difficulty with those databases is that they still operate in a largely unregulated environment. The information exchange is not subject to the scrutiny that it should be to ensure that at least, if it is about management of risk on the part of lessors, there is not unnecessary discrimination against tenants. What we would certainly see as necessary is greater regulation of those databases.[64]
6.57 Residential tenancy databases are lists of tenants who real estate agents believe to be bad tenancy risks. Real estate agents who subscribe to a tenancy database can use the database to check the names of prospective tenants, or to list details of tenants they believe are a bad tenancy risk. A number of tenancy databases operate in Australia – these include the Tenancy Information Centre Australasia (TICA), RP Data, Remington White and Tenant Reference Australia.
6.58 Tenants may be listed on a tenancy database for a range of reasons. For example, the TICA website lists a range of potential breaches including rental arrears or breaking a lease; poor periodic inspections; or dishonoured cheques. The website also explains how long tenant details will remain on the database. Tenants who allegedly breach their tenancy agreement but who do not have a debt are listed for 3 years. If a tenant has an alleged debt their name remains on the database until the debt is paid. When a debt is cleared this is noted on the TICA database but the tenant's personal details will remain on the database for a further 5 years.[65]
6.59 A particular concern raised during the inquiry was that some people had problems accessing rental accommodation after being placed on tenancy databases.[66] One witness stated that '...discrimination is a significant part of the private rental market, so what tends to happen is information can very quickly be used to exclude someone from housing'.[67] A Queensland Government report found that there is a very real risk that any adverse database listing will render it difficult for a tenant to secure appropriate private rental accommodation. This is particularly so if the rental market is experiencing a period of low vacancy and competition for accommodation is high.[68]
6.60 The Tenants Union of Queensland cited a number of concerns with tenancy databases. These include:
6.61 Database operators and real estate agents have respective responsibilities for the collection, use and disclosure of data under the provisions of the Privacy Act 1988 and must comply with the National Privacy Principles that cover the fair handling of private information. The Tenants Union of Queensland claimed, however, that database operators often fall short of the voluntary standards.[70]
6.62 There have been calls for a co-ordinated approach in the development of national guidelines applicable to the operation of tenancy databases. A Queensland Government Backbench Committee argued that a national approach was the most desirable outcome for both tenants and the industry through the application of national standards, possibly by way of template legislation. The Committee suggested that a mechanism to achieving national standards could be through respective Ministerial Councils as well as the convening of a forum as a starting point for a national working group of relevant Commonwealth and State departmental officers. The Committee argued that with the development of national databases, together with the mobility of the Australian population, individual State responses will be less effective and equitable than a national response.[71] The Real Estate Institute of Australia has also called for the development of national guidelines governing the operation of tenancy databases. The Institute stated that 'consumers have a right to know what information about them is kept on a database and to have information corrected swiftly if information is inaccurate on any database kept by a database operator or agent'.[72]
6.63 In December 2003 the NSW Government released draft regulations to ensure the fairer use of tenancy databases by real estate agents in NSW. The draft regulations provide that an agent must notify a tenant that they are going to be listed on a tenancy database; tenants are to be given a reasonable opportunity to review and correct information which will be listed; a tenant can only be listed on a database for specified reasons, such as owing rent exceeding the rental bond; an agent must notify a database operator within 7 days after becoming aware that a debt listed on that database has been paid; and an agent can only use a database if the database provides tenants with free access to information about themselves, amends inaccurate, out of date or incomplete information without charge to the tenant, and deletes listings within certain specified periods of time. It is proposed that the new laws will come into effect in May 2004.[73]
6.64 The Committee notes that the Commonwealth Attorney-General announced in August 2003 the establishment of a joint working group involving the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General and the Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs to examine issues surrounding tenancy databases.[74] Specifically, the working group will report on the role and operation of these databases; examine the existing framework for regulating the use of databases with regard to issues relevant to tenants, database operators, real estate agents and landlords; and develop, where necessary, options for a nationally consistent framework.[75] The working group is due to report in June 2004. The Committee supports the aims of this review and considers that a national approach to residential tenancy databases is urgently needed.
Recommendation 19
6.65 That, in supporting the current review being undertaken by the working group into residential tenancy databases, the Commonwealth Government, in co-operation with the States, develop national guidelines as a matter of priority in relation to the operation of tenancy databases.
6.66 Evidence to the inquiry indicated that the Commonwealth should play a key role in co-ordinating a process to advance national housing outcomes, and in particular, to respond to the emerging crisis in the supply of affordable housing for low income groups. It was argued that there was a need for the development of a national housing strategy as part of this process. The Queensland Government stated:
Currently, there is no national housing policy framework. On the contrary, there is a divergence between the Commonwealth and State/Territory housing policy directions. An agreed policy framework and funding priorities...would maximise the use of public funds and deliver improved housing outcomes for those most in need.[76]
6.67 The Tenants Union of Victoria also pointed to the need for a coordinated and strategic policy approach at the Commonwealth level – 'current housing policy initiatives are dispersed across departments and Ministers, leading to a lack of strategic focus, and minimising the potential for effective outcomes'.[77]
6.68 ACOSS argued that such a strategy should be developed with the aim of ensuring that all households have access to appropriate and affordable housing, particularly low income households. The elements of the strategy would include specific strategies to achieve growth in the supply of affordable housing through both public and private investment, rental and home ownership; an increase in the supply of public housing; development of housing affordability measures; and addressing discrimination issues, including the development of core principles for good private rental market management and monitoring of residential tenancy databases.[78] Submissions emphasised that the strategy needed to be developed in consultation with State Governments, community housing providers, the construction industry and the finance sector.[79]
6.69 The Committee is strongly of the view that the Commonwealth needs to take a co-ordinating role, in consultation with the States and other key stakeholders, in the development of a national housing strategy. This strategy should aim to ensure that low income and disadvantaged households, in particular, have access to appropriate and affordable housing.
Recommendation 20
6.70 That the Commonwealth Government develop a national housing strategy in consultation with key stakeholders including State Governments, community housing providers, the construction industry and the finance sector; and that this national strategy involve:
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