

**SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEFENCE AND
TRADE**

**Australia's involvement in international peacekeeping operations
AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE**

Question No. 1

Senator Trood asked the following question on notice on 25 July 2007:

- a) When you get to 1,200, what proportion of AFP resources will be tied up in the IDG capability?
- b) What proportion of your budget would be dedicated to IDG?

The answer to the honourable senator's questions is as follows:

- a) If the AFP remains at approximately 6500 people, the IDG at full strength (1200) would be approximately 18.5% of the AFP resources.
- b) The IDG proportion of AFP appropriations for the 2007/2008 financial year equates to 23.4% of AFP Budget. Of this, the IDG Future Strategy funding represents 19.7% of IDG Budget.

**SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEFENCE AND
TRADE**

Australia's Involvement in Peacekeeping

AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE

Question No. 2

Senator Payne (Chair) asked the following question on notice on 25 July 2007:

- a) Will the performance measures and the results of the assessments against the performance measures be made public?
- b) If it is material that you can provide to the committee, that would be helpful.

The answer to the Senator's questions is as follows:

A copy of the University of Queensland report is attached.

The University of Queensland Social Research Centre (UQSRC)

DIRECTORS

Professor Paul Boreham, BEcon, PhD
Professor Mark Western, BA, PhD

MANAGER

Warren Laffan, BAppSc, MMRS, QPMR

Level 4, GPNorth 3
The University of Queensland
Brisbane Qld 4072 Australia
Telephone (07) 3346 9686
International +61 7 3346 9686
Facsimile (07) 3346 9676
Email uqsrc@uq.edu.au
www.uqsrc.uq.edu.au/

**Framework for Performance Indicators in Australian Federal Police
(AFP) Peace Operations
Final Report**

**Prepared for:
Australian Federal Police**

The University of Queensland Social Research Centre (UQSRC)

October 2006

Reference: J6008

Dr Alex Bellamy

Professor Daniel Druckman

Professor Paul Boreham

Professor Paul Diehl

Mr Regan Neal

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Executive Summary

The development of effective performance indicators plays a crucial role in measuring the success of peacekeeping operations, increasing knowledge about the factors associated with success, and learning lessons from past missions in order to improve future missions. Existing performance indicators are often problematic in that they measure the elements that contribute to success, rather than measuring success itself.

To be effective, indicators need to focus on outcomes and be constructed independently from the factors that influence those outcomes. Extensive research into peace operations has identified five key considerations when designing such indicators:

- **Success for whom?**

The variety of stakeholders involved within a peace operation (including contributing agencies and nations, and the local population) bring a variety of standards for determining success, with the goals of one actor potentially affecting the goals of another. Effective performance measurement requires identifying whose success is being assessed and how this impacts on overall mission goals.

- **Time Perspective**

Peace operations involve both short and long term goals. Short term success is easier to measure, but may not provide an accurate assessment of broader goals. Long term assessment provides a better indication of overall success, but is affected by issues such as timeframe (when do we assess outcomes?) and causality (the impact of unpredictable external factors upon success).

- **Baseline for Assessment**

There needs to be an appropriate baseline against which to measure success. The complex nature of peace operations is reflected in the variety of approaches to such baselines, all of which have their own benefits and limitations. These range from broad measures, such as comparing conditions during and after deployment with those pre-deployment, to measures which use a mission's specific mandate to assess success.

- **Type of Mission**

Different types of mission have different goals, and therefore require different sets of criteria. For example, a mission that aims to monitor elections needs to be assessed differently from a mission that aims to reform a local police force. The more complex the mission goals, the more complex the criteria for success.

- **Reasonable Expectations**

Determining the conditions for peacekeeping success requires setting mission goals which are reasonable and achievable. The more ambitious the goal, the more potential for factors which undermine the chances of success. Reasonable goals mean a reasonable chance of success.

These considerations have led to the development of a **decision template**, which provides a practical framework for measuring success. The template sets out a variety of mission goals, both generic and mandate-specific. It identifies key questions associated with the achievement of these goals, and suggests measures of progress that can be used to answer these questions, and therefore assess levels of success. The various benefits and limitations associated with these measures are identified, as are the sources used to construct the measures. The format of the template allows for, and encourages, additions from practitioners and scholars based on further research and operational experience.

In its current form, the template presents a number of alternative ways to address mission goals, rather than using a linked sequence of questions to measure achievement. In the future, the template could be used to develop a **decision aid**, which would use a sequential question and answer approach to inform decisions about mission deployment, progress, and withdrawal.

1. Introduction

Determining what constitutes success or failure in peace operations is a prerequisite for building knowledge about the factors associated with those conditions. Despite the centrality of this concern, the scholarly literature on peacekeeping and related missions is not well developed in this respect. The abundance of attention has been given to the inputs (or independent variables) in peacekeeping studies, and considerably less (if any at all) is given to the outcomes (or dependent variables); that is, most studies focus on the factors thought to produce peacekeeping success rather than devoting attention to the criteria used to assess that success.

Even when scholars have paid explicit attention to peacekeeping success, a number of other problems have prevented the emergence of a consensus. There has been a tendency to confound the inputs with the outcomes; that is, scholars often confuse the element needed for success and the measures of success itself. For example, a number of analysts attempt to judge whether a peace operation was successful or not by reference to whether adequate resources were allocated to the mission and its personnel. Yet the provision of resources is a possible determinant of success, not a measure of whether success occurred or not. Some of the more applied studies refer to “measures of progress,” what should be short term indicators of success. Nevertheless, factors listed such as the establishment of training regimens for local police or the support of local religious leaders may be prerequisites of success, but they are not successful outcomes themselves.

Indicators of success must be constructed independently of the factors thought to influence the desired outcomes. To do so, however, is not an easy task. Several choices or considerations are necessary: the reference group, the time frame, and the baselines for assessment. Added to these considerations for indicators are the type of mission and the scope of the expectations developed for success.

1.1 Success for Whom?

First, when conceptualizing peacekeeping success, the question arises: success for whom? Although rarely addressed directly, there are several sets of stakeholders in peace operations, each of which might generate different standards for success: the international community, the main protagonist states or groups, the local population, and the states contributing personnel (Durch in Druckman and Stern, 1997). Although each stakeholder may share some

common interests (e.g., limiting violence), their interests are not completely coterminous. For example, a contributing state may have as one of its goals limiting casualties to its personnel. Succeeding in that goal, however, may necessitate actions that undermine the international community's goal of human rights protection of threatened population. Thus, there needs to be a clearer specification of whose success is assessed and recognition that different factors may affect success in multiple ways across stakeholders.

1.2 Time Perspective

Second, defining success will vary according to whether one adopts a short versus long-term perspective (Weiss, 1994; Bellamy and Williams, 2005b). Success may be conceptualized as achievement of goals that occur during the course of a peace operation or in some time frame immediately following the withdrawal of the peacekeeping force. An example of the former is alleviation of starvation and improvement of medical conditions during a humanitarian operation; an example of the latter is the absence of violent conflict for several years following the operation (e.g., Enterline and Kang, 2003). These are certainly valid conceptions and ones most amenable to the needs of policymakers. Yet we know that a longer-term perspective often leads to a different assessment of an operation's success or failure. For example, various peacekeeping efforts in East Timor were almost universally considered a success in the immediate aftermath, only to prompt a reassessment when violence and instability returned in 2006.

As with different stakeholders, there may be significant differences in the predictor and outcome variables for short and long-term success. With respect to the latter, two problems arise. The initial problem is determining how long a window should be considered in assessing peacekeeping outcomes. Given path dependency (what happens in an earlier phase (or phases) of conflict has an impact on the dynamics of subsequent phases) and other effects, peacekeeping may have consequences that extend for decades. Yet, extraordinarily long time frames make it impossible to assess ongoing and recently concluded operations (Bellamy and Williams, 2005b). Furthermore, the longer the time period that passes between the end of the operation and the assessment, the more difficult it will be to draw causal conclusions about the impact of the operation *per se*; intervening forces are likely to have as great or greater impact as the peace operations on future conditions. For example, regime change or a global economic downturn may influence local conditions more than the legacy of a peacekeeping operation a decade before.

1.3 Baseline for Assessment

A third consideration is developing a baseline against which to assess peacekeeping's effects. Some suggest that peacekeeping be compared against a situation in which no action was taken by the international community (e.g., Durch in Druckman and Stern, 1997). Related to this standard is one in which the conditions prior to deployment are compared to those during and following the operation (e.g., Kaysen and Rathjens, 1995; Heemskerk and Weller, 2002). This standard has the advantage of "normalizing" (making comparisons across missions possible) the baseline, as moderate levels of violence during peacekeeping may be considered progress in some contexts (e.g., deployment during full-scale civil war), but backsliding in others (e.g., deployment following a cease-fire). Yet, decision makers' choices are rarely between just peacekeeping and inaction (Diehl, 1994).

Some scholars suggest that analysts consider opportunity costs imposed by the choice of peacekeeping (Ratner in Druckman and Stern, 1997). Problems with this standard, however, are that it requires an adequate specification of alternative policies and then an accurate counter-factual analysis of what would have happened if other alternatives had been selected. Needless to say, neither of these steps is straightforward and the validity of such efforts would be difficult to determine. Still others suggest comparing effectiveness across peacekeeping operations (Ratner, 1995; Stiles and McDonald, 1992 refer to this as a trend-based assessment), but this generates only comparative assessments of what may be dissimilar operations and provides no assessment baseline.

Not surprisingly, most analysts advocate using guidelines provided in the operations mandate, the authorizing document (e.g., Security Council resolution) provided by the organization carrying out the mission (e.g., Bratt, 1996, Bellamy and Williams, 2005; Durch, 1993; Ratner, 1995; O'Neill and Rees, 2005). Mandates often contain specific tasks to be completed or benchmarks that should be reached. In one sense, this is appropriate as a particular mission is only judged according to the task with which it was assigned. On the other hand, there are a number of drawbacks associated with using mandates to define success.

First, the mandates given for operations are the products of political deliberation and compromise, and the result is that they are frequently vague. There is much room for debate on the scope and detail of the operation's mission; this alone makes it difficult to assess whether the designs of the mandate have been achieved (Diehl in Druckman and Stern, 1997).

Second, mandates may be inflexible in the face of changing conflict conditions, and thus what peacekeepers are attempting to do may no longer reflect the standards present in the mandate (Bellamy and Williams, 2005b). Third, “mandate clarity” is associated with peacekeeping success, again confounding the inputs or influences with the outcomes.

1.4 Types of Peacekeeping Missions

Different kinds of missions may require different criteria for evaluating success. Some missions have as their goal the reduction of violent conflict. Others have more specific aims such as supervising elections, providing human rights protection, or contributing to the building of new societal institutions. The various missions have been shown to differ on a variety of characteristics, particularly with regard to the role of peacekeepers and the type of conflict management process set in motion by peacekeepers’ activities (Diehl et al., 1998).

For this reason, the questions asked about success and the indicators used to diagnose progress are specific to the mission’s goal. For example, if the goal is to contain violence, we would ask whether the violence levels have decreased and measure the number of shooting incidents and casualties both for members of the disputing parties and for the peacekeeping force. If, however, the goal is to protect human rights, we would ask, at one level, whether atrocities have been reduced or genocidal incidents avoided and, at another level, whether a judicial system is in place and functioning. Progress in achieving the goal of human rights is indicated by both a significant reduction in atrocities and by a system that insures due process.

1.5 Reasonable Expectations

Mission goals can shape the way that outcomes are evaluated. The more ambitious the goal, the less likely the mission would be regarded as being successful. For example, a mission intended to transform adversaries into allies or collaborators is a larger challenge than one intended to hold a democratic election following a peace agreement. The larger goal may be accomplished over a longer period of time with contributions made also by NGOs and civilian peace activists. The more modest goal increases the chances for short-term success, especially when the task is mostly under the control of the peacekeeping force. It is also the case that a variety of factors may militate against the force’s contribution to achieving the mission’s goal. International events, restrictions imposed by host states, available resources, and the vagaries of national policies are some of the factors that may influence a conflict but are largely out of the peacekeepers’ control. For these reasons it would seem advantageous to set reasonable

expectations, usually over a shorter time frame, for mission accomplishments. Peacekeeping is then understood to be part of a larger context that includes other factors that also contribute to settling and resolving conflicts.

1.6 A Decision Template

The considerations discussed above inform the development of a decision template. Intended as an aid to the decision-making process, the template highlights several considerations that should be entertained when evaluating the success of peace operations. It turns on distinctions made among different mission objectives. A number of generic goals (such as conflict mitigation) and mandate-specific objectives (such as arms control and disarmament) are included. We include only those types of missions about which there is at least some discussion in the literature of outcomes and indicators. This excludes such mission objectives as observation, pacification, and protective services. For a larger taxonomy of missions see Diehl et al. (1998). For an illustration of the decision template approach, please see Figure 1 below.

Key questions asked are tailored to the mission goals. The goals and many of the questions are suggested by the large scholarly and government report literature. These questions are then answered by specifying appropriate measures of progress. This is a more difficult task because the literature is weaker on defining mission success or effectiveness. The relevant literature cited in the template covers what appears to be available, supplemented by our recommended measures designated with an asterisk. In developing the measures, an attempt is made to separate the conditions for success (referred to above as inputs) from assessments of progress (referred to as outcomes). This distinction is rarely made in the literature; conditions are often confused with assessments in both academic writing and government documents.

Further, the values of many of these measures are largely unknown. Without empirical evaluation, it is difficult to judge their validity or even to know how to use them for policy purposes. These are gaps in the literature that call for attention in future research. Further, some indicators may be relevant primarily to local condition or cultures. These are also important but less relevant to a more general scheme that emphasizes types of missions conducted in a variety of contexts. (For examples of local indicators, see AusAID, 2006.)

Commentary on the measures takes the form of a listing of benefits – such as “easily assessed” – and limitations, such as the “need for baseline data”. Of value also are the sources


for many of the measures. An attached bibliography enables readers to consult relevant articles for more detailed discussions of those indicators that have received attention. The template's format allows for additions in each of the categories. We invite both practitioners and researchers to contribute their observations to this work in progress.

In its present form, the template addresses the way that possible indicators of success derive from practical questions asked about missions. It is a framework for organizing a large amount of information about missions and measures of progress. It does not, however, provide a step-by-step guide to decisions about entering into or exiting from conflict zones. Such a guide – or decision aid – requires a question-answer format that builds on the template's information.

The aid would begin with the key questions asked of each type of mission goal. It would then organize the questions in a linked sequence. They are not organized in this manner in the template: The questions are presented as alternative ways of addressing the goals rather than as sequential time orderings. An exception is the mandate-specific goal of arms control and disarmament. The four questions asked suggest step-wise progress toward the goal of disarmament: combatants disarmed in preparation for negotiation, negotiated agreement signed, combatants withdraw from war zones, and demobilization. Each step can be monitored with the appropriate measures.

An affirmative answer moves monitors to the next question in the sequence. A negative answer suggests either more personnel are needed or that the strategy must be re-evaluated. More complex sequences can be organized as decision trees with branches and feedback loops. Such recursive aids are familiar to many programme evaluators; they are less often used to assess peace operations (See Druckman et al., 1997, Figure 5-1, for an example from the area of organisational mergers). The question-indicator sequences can also provide benchmarks to progression through conflict phases and activities.

Figure 1. Decision Template Approach



2. Peace Operations Decision Template

| GOALS/OBJECTIVES | KEY QUESTIONS | MEASURES OF PROGRESS | BENEFITS | LIMITATIONS | RELEVANT LITERATURE |
|---|--|--|---------------------|--------------------|---|
| GENERIC | | | | | |
| 1. Conflict Mitigation (the reduction or elimination of armed violence) | | | | | Enterline and Kang, Diehl, Bratt, Fortna, Bildt, Pushkina, Welch, Bellamy and Williams, Heemskerk and Weller, Durch, Mullenbach, Paris, Doyle and Suntharalingam, Ofuately-Kodjoe, Malaquias, Doyle and Sambanis, Laremont, Sesay, James, Lake, Astroff and Meren, Jett, Cohen |
| A. Violence Abatement (reduced violence between primary conflict combatants) | | | | | |
| | Is Violence Still Present? | New Crises, Militarized Disputes, or Wars | Transparent | | Diehl, Heemskerk and Weller, Doyle and Sambanis, Bildt |
| | Have Violence Levels Decreased? | Shooting Incidents | Quantifiable | | Diehl |

| GOALS/OBJECTIVES | KEY QUESTIONS | MEASURES OF PROGRESS | BENEFITS | LIMITATIONS | RELEVANT LITERATURE |
|--|--|--|------------------------------------|--|---|
| | | Disputant Casualties | Data Available | Must Differentiate Between Random and Mission Threatening Violence | Diehl, Dobbins et al, Jett |
| | | Peacekeeper Casualties | Data Can Be Gathered Unobtrusively | Indicators Do Not Detect Threat | Bratt, Fleitz |
| | | Days/Months Without War (Peace Duration) | Quantifiable | Major Failures Provide Feedback Too Late, (No Necessary Link Between Failure and Policing Mission) Peace Duration is Post hoc | Fortna, Mullenbach, Doyle and Sambanis, Enterline and Kang |
| B. Conflict Containment (External: prevent conflict from spreading to include new areas or additional actors) | | | | | Pushkina, Bratt, Allan, O'Neill and Rees, Ofuately-Kodjoe, Weinberger, Jett |
| | Has the Conflict Expanded Geographically? | Field Reports of Conflict by Location* | Transparent | Containment Not Always Exclusively Geographic | |
| | Does the Conflict Now Include More Actors? | Number of Active Combatants/Actors* | Mostly Transparent | Covert Aid May Not Be Detected | |

| GOALS/OBJECTIVES | KEY QUESTIONS | MEASURES OF PROGRESS | BENEFITS | LIMITATIONS | RELEVANT LITERATURE |
|--|--|--|--------------|--|--|
| | | Involvement of Neighbouring States | Quantifiable | May Be Hard to Attribute Responsibility for Actions (e.g., snipers), Difficult to Track Off-Budget Involvement, Difficult to Measure Involvement | Bratt |
| | | Involvement of Major Powers | Quantifiable | Difficult to Track Off-Budget Involvement, Difficult to Measure Involvement, May Be Hard to Attribute Responsibility for Actions | Bratt |
| | Are External Actors Aiding Combatants? | Weapons Flows to Combatants* | Quantifiable | Accurate Data May be Difficult to Obtain | |
| | | Financial Flows to Combatants* | Quantifiable | Irregular Military Forces Are Hard to Identify, Not All Financial Flows Are Necessarily or Equally Harmful | |
| | | Contribution of Forces to the Combat Zone* | Quantifiable | Off-Record Contributions Difficult to Track and Politically Sensitive. | |
| 2. Conflict Settlement (resolve the issues in dispute between the conflict participants) | Have the Parties Resolved Their Major Disagreements? | | | | O’Neill and Rees, Ofuatey-Kodjoe, Diehl, Weinberger, Bellamy and Williams, Jett, Bratt, Welch, Allan, Lake |

| GOALS/OBJECTIVES | KEY QUESTIONS | MEASURES OF PROGRESS | BENEFITS | LIMITATIONS | RELEVANT LITERATURE |
|---|--|---|---|---|---|
| | | Agreements/Treaties | Documentation is Available | Progress Observable Only at End of Process | Ofuatey-Kodjoe, Diehl (97) |
| | | Reunification of States in Civil Wars | Observable | Only Relevant for Pre-Settlement Deployments | Lake |
| | | UN Secretary-General Reports on Progress | Relies on External Validation | Agreement Doesn't Guarantee Implementation | Bratt |
| | | | | PK Force May Have Little Direct Influence on Diplomatic Process | |
| | | Ongoing Negotiations/ Press Briefings* | Public Statements and Interviews with Delegates | Negotiation May Not Reflect Actual Progress in Private/Secretive Sessions | |
| | | | | Many Negotiations Fail | |
| | | | | Actors May Use Negotiations as Delay Tactic | |
| 3. Post-Conflict Relations | Has the Relationship Stabilized or has Conflict Re-occurred? | Incidence of Violence Between the Parties | Quantifiable | Stabilization May Be Confused with Resolution | Druckman (02) |
| MANDATE/MISSION SPECIFIC | | | | | |
| 1. Election Supervision (ensure the smooth operation of democratic elections) | Were the Elections "Free" and "Fair?" | | | | Rikhye, Doyle and Suntharalingam, Malaquias, Farris |
| | | Voter Turnout | Quantifiable | Turnout is Post-Hoc | Rikhye, Farris |

| GOALS/OBJECTIVES | KEY QUESTIONS | MEASURES OF PROGRESS | BENEFITS | LIMITATIONS | RELEVANT LITERATURE |
|---|-----------------------------------|--|--|--|--|
| | | Registration Figures | Quantifiable | Dependent on Conflict Abatement | Rikhye |
| | | Certification by IOs and NGOs* | Data Available | Not in Full Peacekeeper Control, Depends on Civil Administration | |
| | | Number and Intensity of Protests by Losing Groups* | Quantifiable | Short-Term | |
| | | Number of Other States Recognizing Results* | Quantifiable | Short-Term | |
| 2. Humanitarian Assistance (protection and delivery of food and medical aid to civilian population) | Was Human Suffering Reduced? | Reduction in Epidemics, Hospital Admissions* | Quantifiable When Health Ministries Collect Data | Lack of Accurate Data | Pushkina, Ratner (97), Rikhye, Ofuately-Kodjoe, Hillen |
| | Has the Quality of Life Improved? | National (or Private) Surveys* | Repeated Surveys Document Change | Difficult to Reach (and Conduct Interviews with) Many Citizens | Johansen (97), Fetherston |
| | Was Aid Distribution Protected? | Reduction in Areas with Land Mines | Measurable Through De-Mining Agents | Reliable Maps of Mined Areas May be Scarce | Ratner (97), Rikhye |
| | | Amount of Aid that Reached Intended Recipients* | Quantifiable | Data May Not Always Be Available, Requires High Levels of Cooperation With Other Agencies, and Relief May Not Involve Areas Controlled By Peacekeeping | |

| GOALS/OBJECTIVES | KEY QUESTIONS | MEASURES OF PROGRESS | BENEFITS | LIMITATIONS | RELEVANT LITERATURE |
|---------------------------------|---|--|--|--|---|
| | Was there Improvement in Food Distribution | Percentage of Population Receiving Food* | Direct Indicator | Difficult to Monitor | |
| | Were the Conditions for Aid Distribution Facilitated? | Opinions of Agencies Responsible for Delivering Aid* | Direct Indicator of Perception of Conditions | Time Consuming to Collect and Process Data, Very Subjective, Agencies Have Incentives to Overestimate Success | |
| | | Infant Mortality Rate* | Quantifiable | Presents Only Part of the Picture | |
| 3. Arms Control and Disarmament | | | | | Welch, Hillen, Farris, Rikhye, Doyle and Suntharalingam |
| | Have Combatants Disarmed? | Reduced Shooting Incidents | Quantifiable | Not a Direct Indicator of Disarmament | |
| | | Number of Weapons Collected* | Quantifiable | Difficult to Measure Impact without Data about Arms in Circulation Prior to Disarmament Never Sure That All Weapons Have Been Surrendered | |
| | Has a Disarmament Agreement Been Negotiated? | Documentation, Briefings* | Available Data | | |

| GOALS/OBJECTIVES | KEY QUESTIONS | MEASURES OF PROGRESS | BENEFITS | LIMITATIONS | RELEVANT LITERATURE |
|--|--|--------------------------------------|--|--|---|
| | Have Troops Withdrawn from Designated Zones? | Physical Observations/Field Reports* | | Combatants Have Incentives for Deception, Irregular Forces Hard to Monitor | |
| | Have Troops Demobilized? | Certification by Combatants* | A Consequence of Disarmament | Re-mobilization Possible | |
| | Are Weapons Carried Openly? | Field Reports | Available Data | Accurate Data Difficult | |
| | | | Translates Disarmament into Behaviour Change, Relates Closely to Law and Order | Only an Indirect Measure of Disarmament | |
| 4. Human Rights Protection (prevent violations of international human rights standards) | | | | | Ratner (97), Malaquias, Ofuatey-kodjoe, Doyle and Sambanis, Fleitz, Hillen |
| | Have Atrocities Been Reduced? | Number of Atrocities* | Quantifiable, Certifiable by a Range of Other Agencies | Must Define 'Abuses' | |
| | Was Genocide Avoided? | Number of Major Abuses | Quantifiable | Hard to Differentiate Arbitrary from Other Killings, May Have Been No or Little Threat of Genocide | Doyle and Sambanis |
| | Was There a Reduction in Arbitrary Killings? | Number of Civilian Deaths | Quantifiable | Must Define Major Abuses | Fleitz |

| GOALS/OBJECTIVES | KEY QUESTIONS | MEASURES OF PROGRESS | BENEFITS | LIMITATIONS | RELEVANT LITERATURE |
|--|---|---|---|--|---|
| | Were Designated Areas Protected? | Number and Scale of Attacks in Protected Areas* | Quantifiable | Presents only a Partial Picture | |
| | Were 'Protected Persons' (Refugees, IDPs, etc) Protected? | Number of Deaths of Protected Persons* | Quantifiable | Requires Clear Definition of Protected Persons | |
| | Is There a Functioning Justice System? | Relative Frequency of Free and Fair Trials | Certifiable by a Range of International Observers | Requires Clear Guidelines, Involves Collating Subjective Judgments | Ratner (97) |
| | | Reports of IOs and NGOs* | Provides Overall Picture | Not Necessarily Specific to Problem Areas | |
| | | Access to Legal Advice for all Parties* | Partly Measurable | Difficult to Get Country-Wide Data | |
| | | | International Police in a Good Position to Judge | Need Clear Guidelines for 'Adequate' or 'Good' Treatment | |
| | Are Institutions (police, military, judiciary) Publicly Committed to Human Rights Standards | Statements by Security Institutions | Demonstrable | Not Clear That Statements Always Translate Into Practice | Hansen, Marotta |
| 5. Democratization (the promotion of democratic elections and political processes) | | | | | Doyle and Sambanis, Zisk-Marten, Welch, Paris, Heemskerck and Weller, Laremont, Sesay |
| | Is There Broad Political Participation? | Number of Years of Free Elections | Quantifiable | Some Indicators Not Measurable for Many Years | Laremont |

| GOALS/OBJECTIVES | KEY QUESTIONS | MEASURES OF PROGRESS | BENEFITS | LIMITATIONS | RELEVANT LITERATURE |
|--|---|---|----------------------------|---|---|
| | | Percentage of Voters Participating* | Quantifiable | Assumes Comprehensive Voter Registration Process | |
| | | Number of Politically Engaged Indigenous NGOs* | Quantifiable | Does Not Present Whole Picture | |
| | | Existence of a Plurality of Views in the Public Media* | Transparent and Measurable | Involves Subjective Judgments | |
| | | Number of Women Actively Involved in Political Process* | Quantifiable | May Be a Problematic Measure in Patriarchal Societies | |
| | Is There a Minimum Level of Political Openness? | Regime Survival Through Two or More Elections | Transparent | May Take Decades to Assess | Heemskerk and Weller |
| | Is There Power Sharing Among Groups? | No Overthrow of Legal Authority | Transparent | No Coups=Only “Negative” Success | Sesay, Blechman et al, |
| | | Multiparty Electoral Competition* | Transparent | Does Not Necessarily Relate to Power Sharing, May Be Associated with Patrimonialism | |
| | | Surveys of Public Attitudes* | Quantifiable | Expensive, Politically Sensitive | |
| 6. Peacebuilding | | | | | |
| A. Local Security (Physical Protection of Civilians in Everyday Activities) | | | | | GAO, Welch, Malaquais, Dobbins et al., Blechman et al, Cohen, Dzedzic |

| GOALS/OBJECTIVES | KEY QUESTIONS | MEASURES OF PROGRESS | BENEFITS | LIMITATIONS | RELEVANT LITERATURE |
|-------------------------|--|---|----------------------------------|---|----------------------------|
| | Is There Freedom of Movement? | Roads Opened or Re-Opened | Physical Evidence | | GAO |
| | | Checkpoints Removed | Physical Evidence | | GAO |
| | | Percentage of Primary Roads Experiencing Violent Attacks in Previous Month | Quantifiable | Reporting is Not Necessarily Universal | Cohen |
| | | Number of Estimated Landmines in Area | Quantifiable | Only Meaningful as an Indicator If the Number Increases or If Compared against Targets | Cohen |
| | | Percentage of Residents Who Consider it Safe to Travel to Market, Work, and School | Quality of Life Indicator | Depends on Survey Data Which May Be Difficult to Obtain | Cohen |
| | Are National Military Forces Capable? | Number of National Forces Deployed in Areas Vacated by Peacekeepers | Accessible | Numbers Do Not Necessarily Translate Into Effectiveness | GAO |
| | | National Forces Assume Responsibility for Defence | | Greater Numbers Could Stem from Lower Efficiency | GAO |
| | | Withdrawal of Foreign Forces | Transparent | Difficult to Measure Clandestine Deployments, Not All Foreign Deployments Necessarily or Equally Harmful | GAO |

| GOALS/OBJECTIVES | KEY QUESTIONS | MEASURES OF PROGRESS | BENEFITS | LIMITATIONS | RELEVANT LITERATURE |
|------------------|---|--|--|--|---------------------|
| | | Number of Training Programs with Benchmarks on Effectiveness of Training* | Transparent | Need Clear Benchmarks, Measures of Effect of Training Courses, and Measures of Numbers and Types of People on Training Courses | |
| | Are Ex-Combatants Reintegrated into Society? | Number of Ex-Combatants Disarmed? | Quantifiable | Requires Operational Definition for Disarmament | GAO |
| | | Number of Ex-Combatants Repatriated | Quantifiable | Repatriation Isn't Always Politically Feasible or Desirable | GAO |
| | | Ban on External Supply of Weapons to Armed Groups-Absence of Extra-Governmental Supply of Weapons | Observable | May Be Disguised or Circumvented | GAO |
| | | High Level Command of Unified National Forces-Absence of Para-Military or Alternative Military Organizations | Observable | Formal Structures Do Not Always Correlate to Informal Networks of Security Governance | GAO |
| | Is There a Continuing Pattern of Violence and Crime in the Post-Conflict Period | Post-Conflict Death Rate | Quantifiable for All the Measures that Address this Question | Difficult to Get Accurate Crime Statistics in Post-Conflict Environment | Dobbins et. al, |
| | | Frequency of Politically Motivated Acts of Violence | Data Already Being Collected | Difficulty in Defining What is Meant by Politically-Motivated | Blechman et al, |

| GOALS/OBJECTIVES | KEY QUESTIONS | MEASURES OF PROGRESS | BENEFITS | LIMITATIONS | RELEVANT LITERATURE |
|-------------------------|----------------------|--|-------------------------------------|---|----------------------------|
| | | Number of Execution Style Murders | Quantifiable | Difficult to Define 'Execution Style' , Societal Reluctance to Report Such Crimes | Dziedzic |
| | | Positive Changes in Daily Activity of Population – e.g., Market Activity | Measurable from a Number of Sources | Time Consuming to Collect and Process Data | Dziedzic |
| | | Homicides per 100k Population | Quantifiable | Record-keeping May Be Problematic; Definition of Homicide May Be Contended | Dziedzic |
| | | | | Need Context-Specific Baseline for What Counts as 'Acceptable' Level | |
| | | Percent of Population as Victims of Violent Crimes, Threats, and Intimidation in the Past Year | Quantifiable | Difficult to Get Reliable Data on Victims of Threat and Intimidation | Dziedzic |
| | | Number of Assassinations per Province | Quantifiable | Problem of Distinguishing Between Different Types of Killing | Dziedzic |
| | | Number of Kidnapping Crimes per Province | Quantifiable | Record-keeping May Be Difficult | Dziedzic |

| GOALS/OBJECTIVES | KEY QUESTIONS | MEASURES OF PROGRESS | BENEFITS | LIMITATIONS | RELEVANT LITERATURE |
|---|-------------------------------|---|------------------|--|---------------------|
| | | Average Number of Hours per Day with Imposed Curfews | Quantifiable | Time Consuming to Collect and Process Data, Curfews May Have Preventive Aspect (e.g. around elections) and Do Not Necessarily Correlate to Deterioration of Security | Dziedzic |
| | | Polling Data on Group or General Public Satisfaction with Security Protection | Quantifiable | Difficult to Conduct, Expensive/May Not Be Available | Dziedzic, UNDP |
| | | Number of Civilian Casualties | Quantifiable | Cause of Casualties May Be Ambiguous | Bratt, Fleitz |
| B. Rule of Law | | | | | Dziedzic |
| (Political Decisions are Made According to Legal Rules) | Does a Legal Framework Exist? | Approval of Constitution by Parties | Documented Event | Formal Approval Does Not Always Correlate with Defacto Acceptance | GAO |
| | | Polling Data on Population Knowledge of Legal Processes and Civil Rights | Quantifiable | Difficult to Conduct, Expensive/May Not Be Available | Dziedzic |
| | | Courses on the Country's Legal System Available in High Schools and Colleges* | Observable | Significant Lag Time Before Effect on Attitudes | |
| | | Usage Rates for Legal Library Services | | | AusAID |
| | | Polling Data on Percent Who Know How to Access the Legal System | Quantifiable | Difficult to Collect, Question Wording Important | Dziedzic |

| GOALS/OBJECTIVES | KEY QUESTIONS | MEASURES OF PROGRESS | BENEFITS | LIMITATIONS | RELEVANT LITERATURE |
|------------------|--|---|----------------|--|---------------------|
| | | Polling Data on Legitimacy Ascribed to Legal Codes and Procedures by the Population | Quantifiable | Difficult to Collect, Expensive/May Not Be Available | Dziedzic |
| | Is There Impunity for Political and Criminal Elites? | Number of Criminal Cases Involving Elites Taken to Trial | Quantifiable | Two-Edged Sword- Large Numbers Mean System Works, but also That Such Crime is Frequent | Dziedzic |
| | | Number of Convictions at Above Trials | Data Available | Two-Edged Sword- Large Numbers Mean System Works, but also That Such Crime is Frequent | Dziedzic |
| | Does Judicial Coverage Extend to All Areas? | Number of Districts Without Courts or Administrative Centres | Data Available | | GAO USAID |
| | Are Protections Provided to Detainees? | Percent of Population in Pre-Trial Detention | Data Available | Reporting Depends on Likely Perpetrators | Dziedzic USAID |
| | | Number of Prisoners Subject to Torture, Degrading, or Other Improper Treatment | Quantifiable | Requires Frequent or Constant Monitoring | Dziedzic |
| | | Number of “Disappeared” Citizens Attributable to Government Security Services | Measurable | Attribution is Politically Sensitive, Acquisition of Information Very Difficult | Dziedzic |
| | | Percent of Prisoners Without Access to Counsel | Quantifiable | Western Standards May Not Translate to Local Context | Dziedzic |

| GOALS/OBJECTIVES | KEY QUESTIONS | MEASURES OF PROGRESS | BENEFITS | LIMITATIONS | RELEVANT LITERATURE |
|------------------|---|--|--------------------------|--|---------------------|
| | | Presence of Detainee Registry | Available | Requires Constant Monitoring | Dziedzic |
| | | Frequency with which Victims are Denied Access to Legal Proceedings | Quantifiable | Difficult to Define the Parameters, Difficult to Identify Cases | Dziedzic |
| | | | | Time Consuming | |
| | | Number of Persons Detained for More than 72 Hours Without Case Review by Administrative Judge | Quantifiable | Requires Constant Monitoring, Criteria Must Be Sensitive to Local Laws | Dziedzic |
| | | Polling Data on Group or General Public Perception of Treatment of Detainees and Prisoners | Quantifiable | Difficult to Collect, Expensive; May Not Be Available | Dziedzic |
| | | Percent of People for Whom Lawyers are Available or Affordable; Availability of Pro Bono Services* | Quantifiable | Difficult to Collect, Expensive; May Not Be Available | Dziedzic |
| | | Percent of Pre-Trial Detention Facilities Operating Under International Human Rights Standards | Quantifiable | Requires Clear Articulation of Standards and Permanent Monitoring | Dziedzic |
| | Does the Judicial System Function Fairly and Efficiently? | Percent of Judges with Personal Security Protection | Quantifiable | Personal Sense of Insecurity May Not Correlate with the Real Threat | Dziedzic |
| | | Number of Judges Kidnapped or Assassinated | Data Should Be Available | May Be Difficult to Assign Responsibility | Dziedzic |

| GOALS/OBJECTIVES | KEY QUESTIONS | MEASURES OF PROGRESS | BENEFITS | LIMITATIONS | RELEVANT LITERATURE |
|-------------------------|----------------------|--|---------------------------------|--|----------------------------|
| | | Number of Attempted Attacks on Judges, Courts, and Court Personnel | Data Should Be Available | Reliability of These Data May Be Problematic | Dziedzic |
| | | Number of Witnesses Assassinated | Data Should Be Available | Reliability of These Data May Be Problematic, Responsibility May Not Always Be Clear | Dziedzic |
| | | Number of Attempted Assassinations of Witnesses | Data Should Be Available | Confidence in Reporting May Be Problematic | Dziedzic |
| | | Polling Data on Percent of Citizens Who Perceive They Will Not Be Treated Fairly by the Justice System | Quantifiable | Difficult to Collect, Expensive, May Not Be Available | Dziedzic, AusAID |
| | | Reports from External Professional Associations | Data Available | Need Robust Criteria for Which Associations to Include; Reliability of Data Will Vary | Dziedzic |
| | | Percent of Complaints that Result in Convictions | Quantifiable | In Societies With Low Trust of the Police, Most Abuses Will Not Be Reported | Dziedzic |
| | | Polling Data on Group or General Public Trust in Legal System vs. Sectarian Leaders as Source of Protection | Quantifiable | Difficult to Collect | Dziedzic |

| GOALS/OBJECTIVES | KEY QUESTIONS | MEASURES OF PROGRESS | BENEFITS | LIMITATIONS | RELEVANT LITERATURE |
|------------------|--|---|----------------|--|---------------------|
| | | Percent of Prison Facilities Operating Under International Human Rights Standards with International Assistance | Quantifiable | Requires Robust Benchmarking; Questions about Appropriateness of Applying World’s Best Standards | Dziedzic |
| | | Percent of Judges Removed for Cause Relative to the Number of Ethical Violations Reported | Quantifiable | Two-Edged Sword-Publicized Cases Show Both the Problem and the Problem Being Dealt With | Dziedzic |
| | | Existence of Record Keeping System to Deter Judicial Misconduct Cover-ups | Observable | Procedures Don’t Guarantee Compliance | Dziedzic |
| | | Existence of Complaint Procedures for Misconduct in the Judicial System | Data Available | Procedures Don’t Guarantee Compliance | Dziedzic |
| | | Frequency of Use of Complaint Procedures* | Quantifiable | Two-Edged Sword-Frequency of Complaints Also Indicates Frequency of Abuses | |
| | Is There a Professional and Sustainable Prison System? | Number of Prison Security Incidents | | | AusAID |
| | Is There a Functioning Rehabilitation System? | Number of Probation Orders Made and Implemented | | | AusAID |

| GOALS/OBJECTIVES | KEY QUESTIONS | MEASURES OF PROGRESS | BENEFITS | LIMITATIONS | RELEVANT LITERATURE |
|---|--|---|--|---|------------------------|
| | | Number of Rehabilitative Programs Established and Used | | | AusAID |
| C. Governance | | | | | Laremont, GAO |
| (the provision of standard governmental services) | Has Local Governance Been Restored? | | | | GAO |
| | | Elections for Local Officials | Easy to Record | Little International Consensus on What Level is Appropriate | GAO |
| | | Number of District Officials | Easy to Record | Says Little About Their Role, Effectiveness and Legitimacy; High Numbers May Indicate Corruption and Patrimonialism | GAO |
| | Who Controls Access to Food, Shelter, Healthcare, etc – Government or Local Faction Leaders? | Number of Government Offices (vs. Factions) Charged with Responsibility for Access | Good Challenge to Functioning Local Government Offices | Difficult to Measure Precisely; Requires Normative Judgments | Cohen |
| | Is There Civilian and Democratic Control of the Military? | Removal of Discredited Members of the Military | Observable | Difficulties in Defining ‘Discredited’ | Ratner (97) |
| | | Attempted Military Coups* | Data Available | | |
| | Is the State Independent from Foreign Powers or Fully Sovereign? | Presence of Foreign Troops or Foreign Intelligence Officers in Key Governmental Positions or Geographic Locations | | | Doyle & Suntharalingam |

| GOALS/OBJECTIVES | KEY QUESTIONS | MEASURES OF PROGRESS | BENEFITS | LIMITATIONS | RELEVANT LITERATURE |
|------------------|------------------------|--|-------------------|--|---------------------|
| | | Size of 'Off-Budget' Military Expenditures* | Quantifiable | Data is Difficult to Collect | |
| | | Military Has a Clear Mission Statement and Well-Defined Roles* | Observable | Mission Statements Do Not Guarantee Compliance | |
| | | Elected Representatives Hold Ultimate Legal Authority Over the Security Forces (parliamentary scrutiny)* | Observable | Difficult to Discern Informal Networks | |
| | | Merit Based Promotion System* | Observable | Requires Constant Monitoring and Clear Standards | |
| | Is Corruption Limited? | | | | Dziedzic, Johansen |
| | | Number of Officials Arrested for Corruption | Records Available | Two-Edged Sword-High Numbers Indicate System Works, but Also Corruption Levels are High. | Dziedzic |
| | | Number of Investigations of Corruption | Records Available | Two-Edged Sword-High Numbers Indicate System Works, but Also Corruption Levels are High. | Dziedzic |
| | | Number of Investigation Cases Referred to Trial | Records Available | Two-Edged Sword-High Numbers Indicate System Works, but Also Corruption Levels are High. | Dziedzic |

| GOALS/OBJECTIVES | KEY QUESTIONS | MEASURES OF PROGRESS | BENEFITS | LIMITATIONS | RELEVANT LITERATURE |
|--|---|--|-------------------|--|---|
| | | Percent of Cases Resulting in Convictions | Records Available | Two-Edged Sword-High Numbers Indicate System Works, but Also Corruption Levels are High. | Dziedzic |
| | | Polling Data on Population Perception on Whether Corruption was Better, Worse, or Stayed the Same over the Last 3 Months | Quantifiable | Requires Periodic Monitoring Which May be Difficult, Expensive; Corruption May be Covert | Dziedzic |
| D. Restoration, Reconciliation, and Transformation (changing attitudes and relationships so as to prevent a recurrence of conflict) | | | | | Ratner (95), Johansen, Paris, Fetherston, Welch, Rikhye, Dobbins et al. |
| | Have War Criminals Been Brought to Justice? | Frequency of Trials | Data Available | Assumes Societal Agreement with 'War Crimes' Path Rather than Truth and Reconciliation | Welch |
| | Do Institutions and Culture Promote Peaceful Conflict Resolution? | Number of Programs (including courses) for Developing Conflict Resolution Skills* | Data Available | Courses Must Be Connected to Application/Practice | Fetherston, AusAID |
| | | Number of Professional Mediation Associations* | Quantifiable | Number of Associations Doesn't Directly Correspond with What They Do | Fetherston |

| GOALS/OBJECTIVES | KEY QUESTIONS | MEASURES OF PROGRESS | BENEFITS | LIMITATIONS | RELEVANT LITERATURE |
|---|---|---|----------------|--|---|
| | Have Relations Between Conflicting Parties Changed? | Number and Type of Collaborative Activities Among Members of the Different Parties* | Observable | Difficult to Discern Whether Collaboration is Strategic Bargaining or Genuine Cooperation | Fetherston |
| | Are Displaced Persons Being Resettled? | Percentage of Refugees Returned | Data Available | Refugees May Not Always Want to Be Returned, Danger of Encouraging Forced Repatriation | Dobbins, et al, Ratner (95), Ratner (97), Rikhye, Doyle and Suntharalingam. Cohen |
| E. Economic Development (improved standards of living for the local population) | | | | | Cohen, GAO |
| | Are Basic Needs Being Met? | Increase in Percentage of Households with Access to Safe Drinking Water | Quantifiable | Not Directly Related to Policing | GAO, Cohen |
| | | Increase in Percentage of Children Enrolled in Primary School | Data Available | Effects Will Be Long-Term | GAO |
| | | Increase in Health Units Rehabilitated and Functional | Quantifiable | Not Directly Related to Policing | GAO |
| | | Increase in AIDs Awareness Among Women | Quantifiable | Not Directly Related to Policing, Requires Opinion Surveys that Could be Expensive, AIDs Awareness Not Pivotal in Every Case | GAO |
| | | Increase in Budget Devoted to Road Maintenance | | | AusAID |

| GOALS/OBJECTIVES | KEY QUESTIONS | MEASURES OF PROGRESS | BENEFITS | LIMITATIONS | RELEVANT LITERATURE |
|---|---|---|-----------------------|---|---|
| | Is the Economy Improving? | GNP Growth Rate | Data Available | Not Directly Related to Policing | GAO, Johansen |
| | | Return of Trade Lost to Conflict | Quantifiable | Not Directly Related to Policing | Rikhye |
| | | Economic Agreements between Conflicting Parties | Data Available | Positive Effects May Not Be Immediately Apparent | GAO |
| | Has the Black Market Diminished? | Change in Tax Revenues* | | Indicators May Be Unreliable | |
| | Is There a Functioning System of Financial Accountability? | Accurate Reporting on Tax Exemptions | | | AusAID |
| | Does the Government Have the Capacity for Economic Reform and Promoting Development? | Customs Processing Time | | | AusAID |
| F. Local Policing Capacity (the ability to maintain order and responsiveness to the government and public) | Are Local Police Seen to Operate Effectively and Professionally | Crime Statistics (Compared to Previous 6 Months) | Quantifiable | Data Collection Difficult if Violence Still Present | Bajraktari et. al., Plunkett |
| | | Polling of Public Perception regarding Crime Rates | | Public May Have Unrealistic Expectations of Progress | UNDP, Hansen, Schmidl |
| | | Number of Officers Per Specified Number of Inhabitants | Quantifiable | Numbers Do Not Represent Quality/Capacity | GAO, Bajraktari et. al, Jones & Wilson et. al. |

| GOALS/OBJECTIVES | KEY QUESTIONS | MEASURES OF PROGRESS | BENEFITS | LIMITATIONS | RELEVANT LITERATURE |
|------------------|--|---|----------------|--|--|
| | | Survey of Issues/Incidents in Which Police (Rather than Military, Community Leaders etc.) Seen as Most Capable of Addressing* | | Highly Subjective | UNDP |
| | | Proportion of Police with Standardized Uniform and Equipment | Measurable | Has to be Tested Against Agreed Criteria; May Not Directly Correspond to Outputs | ICG-Haiti |
| | | Proportion of Police Vehicles Per Number of Officers | Quantifiable | Numbers Do Not Represent Quality/Capability | ICG-Haiti, Bajraktari et. al., Schmidl |
| | | Proportion of Officers with Specialized Skills (Investigative; Forensic; Intelligence; Riot Control, etc.) | Quantifiable | Requires Context-Specific Benchmarks | ICG-Kosovo |
| | | Data on Geographic Distribution of Police | Data Available | | ICG-Bosnia Jackson |
| | | Survey of Police Academy Graduates on Confidence to Handle a Variety of Issues/Incidents as a Result of Training Received | Measurable | Data Collection May Be Inaccurate and Data Gained Subjective, Belief in Ability May be Ill-Founded | |
| | Do the Public Have Confidence in Police? | Surveys of Public Perceptions re. Police (e.g. Do They View Them with Respect, Fear, Indifference, etc.) | Quantifiable | Danger of Unrealistic Public Expectations | UNDP, Krasno |

| GOALS/OBJECTIVES | KEY QUESTIONS | MEASURES OF PROGRESS | BENEFITS | LIMITATIONS | RELEVANT LITERATURE |
|--|---|--|---------------------|--|---|
| | Are Police Seen to Protect Citizen's Interests | Percentage of Population Who View Police as Protecting Interests of the Public, as Opposed to Those of the State | Quantifiable | Possibility of Imperfect Results, Politicized Answers, etc. | UNDP, Brzoska, Dziedzic, Groenwald & Peake |
| | | Polling Data on Investigations/Prosecutions Into Prior and Existing Crimes? | Quantifiable | Data Gathering May Be Expensive and Results Subjective | Brzoska, Jackson |
| | | Polling Data on Proportion of the Population that Views the Local Police as Legitimate? | Quantifiable | Data Gathering May Be Expensive and Results May Be Subjective | Bajraktari, et. al, Brzoska, Nield, Jackson |
| a. Police Accountability (Responsiveness to the Public) | Does Public Have Confidence in Police Accountability | Data on Number of Complaints/Allegations | Quantifiable | | Bajraktari, et. al. |
| | | Percentage of Complaints/Allegations Investigated | Quantifiable | May Be Difficult to Gather; Veracity of Investigation Requires Normative Judgment | Bajraktari et. al. |
| | | Percentage of Prosecutions/Disciplinary Action Relating to Complaints/Allegations | Quantifiable | Difficult to Make Judgments about Veracity of Complaints | Bajraktari et. al. |
| | | Polling of Public Attitudes regarding Accountability of Police | Quantifiable | Polling May Be Difficult and Expensive | |

| GOALS/OBJECTIVES | KEY QUESTIONS | MEASURES OF PROGRESS | BENEFITS | LIMITATIONS | RELEVANT LITERATURE |
|--|---|---|------------------------------------|--|-----------------------------------|
| b. Police Loyalty and Accountability (response to government control) | | | | | |
| | Are the Local Police, Loyal and Accountable to the Government? | Presence of Training and Mentoring-Number in Those Programs | Quantifiable | Training Doesn't Guarantee Successful Implementation | GAO, Donais |
| | | Presence of Strategic Management/Planning | Visible | Planning Alone Doesn't Indicate Capability | GAO, Groenwald & Peake |
| | | Comparison of Present Force Levels with Pre-War Levels | Quantifiable | Levels Must Be Compared with Threats | GAO |
| | | Provision of Equipment | | Must Be Compared with Level of Equipment Deemed Necessary | GAO |
| | | Transfer of Policing Duties from Peacekeepers to Local Authorities-Number of Districts | Quantifiable/Data Available | Effectiveness/Outcomes Must Be Measured By Other Outcomes | GAO |
| | | Downsizing of International Police | Quantifiable/Data Available | Response to Rather Than Indicator of Success | GAO |
| | | Polling Data on Group or General Public Confidence Police Will Uphold the Law | Indicates Legitimacy | May Be Difficult to Obtain | Dziedzic |

| GOALS/OBJECTIVES | KEY QUESTIONS | MEASURES OF PROGRESS | BENEFITS | LIMITATIONS | RELEVANT LITERATURE |
|--|---|---|--------------|---|--|
| | Do Police Have Loyalties to Other Political Elites, Former Regime Elements, Community or Religious Leaders? | Survey of Police Officer/Public Regarding Feelings of Loyalty | Quantifiable | Total Depoliticisation May Be Unrealistic | Brzoska, Donais, Perito, Call & Stanley, Jackson |
| | Do Police Have Professional Independence to Operate Effectively? | Examination of Written Frameworks Guaranteeing Independence | Observable | Too Much Independence May Inhibit Reform; Questions of Democratic Accountability; Police Ought to be Subservient to Civilians | Bajraktari et. al., Brzoska, Call & Stanley (2001) |
| | | Data on Number of Promotions, Awards for Good Service, etc. | Measurable | Involves Difficult Judgments on a Case by Case Basis; Difficult to Generalize, May be Politicized | Peake |
| c. Representativeness of Police (makeup of force vis-à-vis society as a whole) | Do Police Have an Appropriate Ethnic Balance? | Ethnic Breakdown of Force (particularly important in conflicts relating to ethnic identity) | Quantifiable | Political Ramifications? Ethnic Balance May Not Always Be Appropriate | OSCE, UNDP, Brzoska, CALL, ICG-Kosovo |
| | Do Police Have an Appropriate Gender Balance? | Number of Female Officers as a Percentage of Force | Quantifiable | May Be a Problematic Measure in Patriarchal Societies | Harris, ICG-Haiti |
| | Do Police Operate Effectively in Different Ethnic Areas? | Percentage of Officers with Multiple Language Abilities and Cross-Cultural Awareness | Quantifiable | Politically Sensitive, Statistical Correlation Does Not Equate to Causation, Difficulties in Assigned Responsibility | Jones & Wilson et. al., Wilson |

| GOALS/OBJECTIVES | KEY QUESTIONS | MEASURES OF PROGRESS | BENEFITS | LIMITATIONS | RELEVANT LITERATURE |
|---|---|---|---------------------|--|-------------------------------|
| d. Governance of Local Police (control of police by government authorities) | Is There Civilian and Democratic Control of the Police? | Removal of Discredited Members of the Police* | Observable | Difficulties of Defining ‘Discredited’ | |
| | | Size of ‘Off-Budget’ Police Expenditure* | Quantifiable | Data is Difficult to Collect | |
| | | Police Have a Clear Mission Statement and Well-Defined Roles* | Observable | Mission Statements Do Not Guarantee Compliance | |
| | | Elected Representatives Hold Ultimate Authority over the Police Force* | Observable | Difficult to Discern Informal Networks | |
| | | Merit Based Promotion System* | Observable | Requires Constant Monitoring and Clear Standards | |
| OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS (goals specific to the peacekeepers as stakeholder) | | | | | |
| 1. Good Relations with Local Population (cooperative interactions between peacekeepers and civilians) | | | | | Johansen, Neack, James |
| | Does the Local Populace Support the Peacekeeping Operation | Public Support for the Mission | Quantifiable | Requires Survey but Many Missions Already Do This | |
| | | Does Local Population Understand the Purpose of the Operation? | Quantifiable | Requires Expensive Surveys | |

| GOALS/OBJECTIVES | KEY QUESTIONS | MEASURES OF PROGRESS | BENEFITS | LIMITATIONS | RELEVANT LITERATURE |
|---|---|--|----------------|--|---------------------|
| | Are Social Ills Created by the Peacekeeping Force? | | | | |
| | | Incidence of Rape Associated with Mission | Quantifiable | Difficult to Draw Parameters for 'Associated with Mission' Label | James |
| | | Incidence of Prostitution Association with Mission | Quantifiable | Difficult to Draw Parameters for 'Associated with Mission' Label | |
| | | Incidence of Local Crime Association with Mission | Quantifiable | Difficult to Draw Parameters for 'Associated with Mission' Label | Johansen |
| | | Attacks Against Peacekeepers | | | |
| 2. Maintain Organizational Values (goals that support the protection and development of the military and police) | | | | | |
| | Was National Command and Control Maintained? | Command Structure | Observable | Doesn't Say Much about Outputs | Clinton |
| | Was the Burden (\$ and Personnel) Shared with Allies? | Mission Composition | Observable | Doesn't Say Much about Outputs | Clinton |
| | Were Personnel Protected? | Peacekeeper Casualties* | Data Available | | |

| GOALS/OBJECTIVES | KEY QUESTIONS | MEASURES OF PROGRESS | BENEFITS | LIMITATIONS | RELEVANT LITERATURE |
|-------------------------|---|---|-----------------------------------|--|---|
| | Was Squad Cohesion Maintained? | | | Difficult to Measure | Harris |
| | Was the Health of Personnel Maintained? | | | | Harris |
| | Was the Mission Cost Effective? | | | Definition of Effectiveness May Be Disputed | Canada, Fleitz |
| | Did the Military Peacekeepers Coordinate and Cooperate with Police Peacekeeping Units? | Existence of Standard Operating Procedures* | | | |
| | | Number of Conflict Incidents Between Units* | | | |
| | Did the Peacekeepers Engage in Conflict Resolution/Mediation Activities? | Incidents of Contact Activities Reported by Peacekeepers | Part of Required Reporting | Retrospective Accounts May Be Inaccurate | Last and Eyre (1995), Wall, Druckman, and Diehl (2002), Wall and Druckman (2003) |

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**SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEFENCE AND
TRADE**
Australia's involvement in international peacekeeping operations

AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE

Question No. 3

Senator MacDonald asked the following question on notice on 25 July 2007:

- a) What is the youngest age for a recruit under the present recruiting regime?
- b) In the broad what number of recruits are raw recruits – so it is their first job, their first port of call in terms of employment? [in relation to sworn positions].

The answer to the honourable senator's questions is as follows:

- a) 18 years of age. The AFP also emphasises life experience and a mature attitude as being of direct relevance to a person's employment suitability.
- b) A sworn member deployed to the IDG for peacekeeping operations requires a minimum of 4 years policing experience as noted in Question on Notice 6. By applying this eligibility criterion, 'raw recruits' are not part of IDG operations.

**SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEFENCE AND
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Australia's involvement in international peacekeeping operations

AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE

Question No. 4

The answer to question 4 was covered in question 6, and therefore there is no separate number 4.

SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEFENCE AND TRADE

Australia's involvement in international peacekeeping operations

AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE

Question No. 5

Senator MacDonald asked the following question on notice on 25 July 2007:

The Senator raised several matters relating to rehabilitation and compensation and complementarity between the ADF and AFP in accordance with the Proof *Committee Hansard* 25 July 2007 p. 29.

The answer to the honourable Senator's questions is as follows:

The responses to the questions raised by Senator MacDonald have been provided within the written questions on notice numbers 24 to 28.

The AFP however does not consider it appropriate at this time to comment on the complementarity of the proposed AFP rehabilitation and compensation scheme to that of the ADF.

STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE

Senate inquiry into Australia's involvement in peacekeeping operations

AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE

Question No. 6

Senator FORSHAW asked the following question on notice on (25 July 2007):

1. How many of those [6,500, total number of AFP personnel], in round figures, are sworn officers? How many members of the AFP would be, say, eligible for or capable of being deployed to a peacekeeping policing mission overseas?

The answer to the honourable senator's questions is as follows:

As at 8 August 2007 the AFP had a total staffing of 6567, with 2623 sworn police officers. For a member to be eligible to deploy with the IDG the member would need to meet the following requirements:

- have a current passport;
- have completed pre-deployment training;
- be medically cleared for deployment (with immunisations for whichever country the deployment is for);
- no current Professional Reporting Standard issues;
- no current open compensation case;
- have a current psych clearance;
- have a current senior first aid certificate

A sworn member would also have to have the following:

- have more than 4 years policing experience;
- be Use of Force qualified for the period of deployment; and

There are approximately 2000 sworn members with more than 4 years policing experience and 2100 unsworn members that would be able to deploy providing they meet the above criteria. This is inclusive of current IDG members.

**SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEFENCE AND
TRADE**

Australia's involvement in international peacekeeping operations

AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE

Question No. 7

Senator Forshaw asked the following question on notice on 25 July 2007:

I now want to go to one of the missions which I have a particular interest in because I have visited it, and that is Cyprus. There was some discussion at the UN level, as I understand it, whereby the UN may vacate the mission and hand over the monitoring etcetera to the European Union. That has not occurred, but I am wondering if you could update me on what is happening, if anything, with regard to that.

The answer to the Senator's questions is as follows:

- As stated in the 4 June 2007 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus", the UN is committed to its long standing role in Cyprus.
- The EU supports the lead role played by the UN in Cyprus.
- There is no suggestion of the EU taking over the UN role in Cyprus.

**SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEFENCE AND
TRADE**

Australia's involvement in international peacekeeping operations

AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE

Question No. 8

Senator Payne (Chair) asked the following question on notice on 25 July 2007:

Language, cultural and human rights training.

- a. Would you like to flesh out a little for us—on notice perhaps—the sorts of external providers you use and the extent of the language, cultural and human rights training—some of the issues that you have already identified on page 12?
- b. Regarding your response to the question I asked earlier, which you undertook to take on notice—that is, the training detail—could you add gender awareness training to that answer?

The answer to the Senator's questions is as follows:

The AFP Pre-Deployment Training (PDT) program utilises the expert knowledge of internal and external providers to facilitate language, culture and human rights training during the pre-deployment training program. The external providers linked to these include:

- Dr Abby McLeod (formerly ANU, now AFP) for culture
- the Stolmack Group for coaching, (within the culture setting)
- Anthony McLean (Command and Control with a link to the cultural expectations)
- Ms Neva Wendt from the Australian Council for International Development
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees representatives
- International Red Cross
- Greenpeace
- Medical Health Services for health and safety and first aid
- The ADF Peacekeeping Centre provides presentations on the United Nations and ADF/AFP interoperability
- Other presentations are given by internal subject matter experts across a wide range of duty of care matters such as OH&S, climatic conditions, country history and politics

A generic cultural briefing is given to all participants on the program to establish a base knowledge of the possible cultural differences AFP members deploying overseas may encounter. This is followed by a country specific briefing shortly before members depart overseas.

PDT participants on the program receive literature concerning cultural differences in the country they are deploying to. This literature also contains a language “ready reckoner” with common words and phrases. A program of individual language training is being scoped for

future programs, however the time frame allocated for PDT dictates that any additional language training will remain at a basic level for the majority of members deploying.

Further, as the Committee was advised by Assistant Commissioner Walters:

“Language training has been an issue that we have been looking at quite a bit in the last 12 to 18 months. It has also been an issue that has been identified through some of the work of the Policing the Neighbourhood project. We are looking at ways to provide an enhanced language training capability for people deploying into missions. There are some challenges with that, given the volume of police that do deploy into missions — for example, RAMSI—and the amount of time that we can take them offline to provide them with the language training. But we are looking at options.”

“The AFP’s learning and development area is looking at language training opportunities across Arabic, Chinese and Bahasa. We do provide opportunities for people to undertake language training whilst they are in the mission, and many of the officers have done that. They see learning another language whilst they are in the mission as another opportunity they are quite keen to pursue.”¹

However, given the throughput of AFP members in various missions and the duration of some deployments AFP official support for language training must be viewed in the long term benefit the AFP would get from its investment rather than the personal satisfaction individuals may have.

Last year, members of the Solomon Islands Police Force (SIPF) attended the training program as guest instructors on a series of pilot programs to gauge their effectiveness in delivering training to Australian members. This pilot program was very successful. Negotiations are currently underway to bring members of the SIPF to Australia on a regular basis as presenters on the pre-deployment program. These members will deliver on culture, language and operational issues.

Human Rights presentations and assessments are provided by the AFP Legal Team. This is based on the United Nations generic training package requirements. Within this package gender and child issues are covered.

Cultural and human rights knowledge is assessed during scenarios in the practical nine day field exercise phase of the program.

The Committee’s attention is also drawn to the answer of written question on notice 13.b. on health aspects as it provides women, human rights and ethics training being undertaken in RAMSI.

¹ Proof Committee Hansard, Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Reference: Australia’s involvement in international peacekeeping operations Wednesday, 25 July 2007 Canberra, p FAD&T 37

**SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEFENCE AND
TRADE**

Australia's Involvement in Peacekeeping

AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE

Question No. 9

Senator Payne (Chair) asked the following question on notice on 25 July 2007:

Specifically, there are couple of other points in the World Vision submission that the committee and I take very seriously. They may not need to be pursued on the record here today—in terms of the time frame—but would the AFP please look at that submission and take those specific allegations and issues on notice and respond to the committee?

The answer to the honourable senator's questions is as follows:

The AFP is concerned with the manner in which World Vision raised allegations pertaining to the use of force in the Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands. Further, the AFP is surprised that World Vision would use this public forum to table allegations almost 12 months (submission published 29 March 2007) after they are alleged to have occurred without first, if the concern was so great, having referred the allegations to the AFP or the Commonwealth Ombudsman.

The three use of force related matters raised in the World Vision submission have, as the Committee was advised at the hearing, been fully investigated by AFP Professional Standards.

a. Munitions used on the Solomon Islands. “Concerns have been expressed to us by serving AFP officers about the deployment of non-approved munitions in the Solomon Islands around the time of the riots in Honiara on 18 –19 April 2006. These included either 40mm bean bag rounds or 40mm foam rounds, 12 gauge bean bag rounds, CS Gas and possibly Stinger grenades containing rubber balls.”

The outcome of the Professional Standards investigation conducted in 2006 was that all these munitions are approved for use by the AFP. The investigation identified that there was no AFP training package for 40mm grenade launchers used by the AFP and therefore no AFP members were endorsed to use the weapon. Subsequently, an accredited external training organisation was identified to deliver an accredited training curriculum to ensure AFP members were appropriately endorsed.

b. Inappropriate and possibly illegal information on the use of force. “Concerns have been expressed to us by serving AFP officers who witnessed inappropriate, and possibly illegal information, given by an IDG Team Leader in the Solomon Islands during his presentation on the use of less than lethal force to members of the ADF and the New Zealand Police.

The outcome of the Professional Standards investigation into this matter found there was no substance in the allegation.

c. Weapon qualifications. “...concerns have been expressed to us by serving AFP officers about some IDG members using weapons overseas without having undertaken either

the AFP approved training program, or if they were already qualified in their own police forces, the AFP validation programme to ensure their competency.”

The outcome of the Professional Standards investigation conducted in 2006 found the allegation was too general to be properly investigated as it did not identify a member or weapon system. The investigation did identify that a training adviser with the AFP Operations Support Team used a less than lethal weapon on a non AFP member during a presentation of less than lethal use of force. This is a breach of Commissioner’s Orders 3 (Use of Force).

In this instance the AFP member providing the training had not undertaken an AFP validation program; however he was a highly trained tactical operator with 10 years experience with a state police tactical response team and had been delivering training on this weapons system for four years.

**SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEFENCE AND
TRADE**

Australia's Involvement in International Peacekeeping Operations

AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE

Question No. 10

Senator Payne (Chair) asked the following question on notice on 25 July 2007:

One point we did not really have an opportunity to discuss with the ADF yesterday was the status of UN Security Council resolution 1325 [involvement of women in peace operations].

- a) What approach does the AFP take in this regard, both in relation to the deployment of female members of the AFP and in relation to the engagement of women in the communities in which you are operating?
- b) Does that reflect the general proportions in the AFP?

The answer to the Senator's questions is as follows:

a) The AFP values the unique contribution women make to policing and sees the deployment of women on overseas missions as essential to the effectiveness of the International Deployment Group's (IDG) capacity building operations and peace operations commitments.

The AFP recognises that female peacekeepers play a crucial role in providing support and leadership to local female police. They also provide valuable role models to women in the community, often in societies where women have been suppressed or subjected to violence.

b) Currently 17.5 per cent of AFP personnel serving overseas on IDG missions are women. More than half of these are sworn officers and make up 12.9 per cent of the total sworn component of all IDG overseas missions.

The AFP encourages all suitable applicants to apply for peacekeeping roles.

Table 1: The following table shows the gender breakdown of AFP staff (not including State Police).

| | Sworn | PSO | Unsworn | Total |
|--------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Male | 2026 – 77% | 1238 – 92% | 1010 – 45% | 4274 – 70% |
| Female | 597 – 23% | 102 – 8% | 1236 – 55% | 1935 – 30% |