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(Chapters 10-13 and Appendixes)

CHAPTER 10

The economy

1. Introduction

The Zimbabwean economy - at least to Independence - was a dual economy with a modern wage sector superimposed on a traditional subsistence sector. The dualism was largely - though not completely - reflected in a racial division which saw whites dominating the modern sector while peasant blacks comprised the subsistence sector. The division was not clear-cut, in that there were a growing number of black entrepreneurs and farmers, and blacks comprised the bulk of the labour force in the modern sector. But in terms of ownership and control, whites were the dominant force.

This was particularly evident in the three productive sectors of manufacturing, mining and agriculture, where whites were estimated to own or control nearly 90% of total productive capacity. Under the terms of the Land Tenure Act black ownership and control up to 1977 was limited to non-white urban, commercial and industrial areas in the case of manufacturing, and to Tribal Trust Lands and African Purchase Areas in the case of agriculture.

In the modern wage sector, while whites comprised only 11.5% of the workforce in 1977 they received 58% of total earnings. Whites in the wage sector ^{earned} received 10 to 11 times more than blacks in the wage sector. Wage differentials between blacks were also marked. Blacks in the wage sector had an average income seven to eight times greater than blacks in the subsistence sector. Within the wage sector the 14% of blacks in manufacturing

earned more than one and a half times the average black wage while the 38% in agriculture earned less than half the average black wage. The average wage for blacks was less than the Poverty Datum Line.

The worst divisions between blacks and whites were to be found in agriculture. Less than 1% of farmers (the whites) owned 46% of farmland while 99% (the blacks) occupied the remaining 54%. Most of the land occupied by blacks was of poorer quality than white land. White agriculture comprised about 6,000 farmers with a total land area of some 15 million hectares. About 700,000 black farming families in the Tribal Trust Lands occupied some 16m hectares and another 8,000 black families owned or occupied about 1.5m hectares in African Purchase Areas (which, until the restrictions were removed in 1977, were the only areas where blacks could own farming land).

White-owned farms accounted for 75% of total agricultural output and at least 90% of marketable output. Some 60% of all white farmland was owned by only about 11% of the total number of white farmers, including corporate owners, and more than half of all white production was accounted for by this 11%. The poorest 43% of white farmers produced less than 10% of total agricultural output. Some 350,000 blacks were employed on the 6,000-odd white farms, and agriculture up to 1979 remained the biggest single source of wage employment for blacks in Zimbabwe. Another area of inequality was that the bulk of agricultural credit went to white farmers - \$2111m in 1975 compared to about \$21m for black farmers.

In general, the modern sector - although it became largely self-sufficient through sanctions, continued to be foreign-dominated. Exact figures were not available because of sanctions, but a pointer is that in 1976, 12 of the 15 leading profit-earning companies were controlled by foreign groups, and one estimate was that in 1977 some 80% of manufacturing concerns

were owned by foreign (mainly UK or South African) interests. UK, South African and US companies were estimated to own about 90% of Zimbabwean mining concerns, in roughly equal shares.

The above outline gives some indication of the problems facing the Government of a newly-independent Zimbabwe. Perhaps the major problem will be to cope with the expectations of the majority of blacks. The long struggle for independence, plus promises by a number of political parties in both the April 1979 and February 1980 elections, have generated expectations among many blacks of major social and economic change which will end their poverty and cause many of their problems to disappear. Poverty, inequality, ignorance and disease do not vanish overnight, however, and a major task of the new Government must be to convince its supporters of this fact, to convince them that while reform and a certain amount of redistribution may alleviate some of their problems, the total resources of the economy are limited - the cake is only so big.

Only increases in overall productivity will provide the longer-term improvements, whatever the political philosophy of the Government. A major factor in the Government's ability to improve productivity, or at a minimum to prevent it from declining, will be its ability to retain white expertise - at least in the short-term. White domination of the economy for so long has meant that, apart from a few blacks, only whites have the expertise and experience to maintain and improve it. Although the number of blacks with the necessary expertise and experience has been growing particularly in the past few years - the total is still small. More will need to be trained, and the quickest and most efficient way of doing so would be to utilise the skills and experience of whites on the job. The experience of several other black African countries suggests that expatriate expertise, unfamiliar with local conditions, is often not as effective.

2. The economy 1965-78

The economy of Zimbabwe, a country well-endowed with natural resources, is better balanced and more diversified than most in Africa. Its strength is attested by its growth and resilience during more than 15 years of political uncertainty, sanctions, a guerilla war and several bad farming seasons.

The economy of Zimbabwe has been described as a dual economy - a developed, modern market economy operating alongside or superimposed on a traditional, basically subsistence economy. The temptation to so describe the Zimbabwe economy was increased by the fact that, until 1979, the dualism was reinforced by racial and political division and by separate systems of land tenure. Thus the economy was seen in terms of a wage or formal sector, controlled by some quarter of a million whites and accounting for about 90% of GDP, and a largely subsistence sector embracing black peasant farmers in the Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs) and African Purchase Areas (APAs) and accounting for less than 10% of GDP.

Such a categorisation over-simplifies, and ignores a variety of inter-relationships which serve to make the two sectors interdependent. For example, there is a two-way flow of produce, income and labour between the subsistence and wage sectors, and many peasant farmers produce at least partially for the market. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the major development effort to 1980 has been concentrated in the white-controlled wage economy, while the black rural economy has been treated as a residual sector.

Prior to the Second World War the Rhodesian economy was heavily dependent on mining and agriculture. Manufacturing was in its infancy. In 1939 metals and minerals (mainly gold and asbestos) accounted for 78% of exports and agricultural produce (mainly tobacco) accounted for 16%. The Second World War provided

a major impetus for the manufacturing sector and by 1945 nearly 18% of Rhodesia's exports were manufactured goods - mainly processed food and tobacco, chemicals, textiles and footwear. A post-war restocking boom and creation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953 provided a further impetus.

The 10 years of federation saw a period of rapid export growth, a high level of white immigration, and expansion and diversification of the manufacturing sector due in part to a larger domestic market including Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. ~~the~~ dismantling of the federation at the end of 1963, however, reduced the domestic market for Rhodesian manufacturing industry and in 1963 and 1964 there were substantial outflows of whites, which adversely affected demand, consumption and the supply of skills. *4/*

A second shock to the economy came with the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 and the subsequent imposition of sanctions. The economy had to switch from an export-led growth strategy to one of inward-looking industrialisation and import replacement (and not only in the manufacturing sector - for example, imported cotton, wheat and barley had to be replaced by locally-grown produce). Only in 1972 did exports regain their pre-sanctions level in terms of real value. The potential for import replacement may be gauged from the fact that in 1964, 41% of all goods consumed in Rhodesia were imported.¹ UDI and sanctions also necessitated a changed international trading pattern. South Africa replaced Britain as the country's main trading partner and chief supplier of imports, and export markets were considerably diversified. The severing of financial ties with the UK, and a reduced inflow of foreign investment capital also increased Rhodesia's reliance on South African capital. To counter the drop in overseas capital, currency restrictions were imposed which made it impossible for substantial amounts of capital invested in Rhodesia to be repatriated. Similar restrictions were applied to the repatriation of profits.

Some of the information necessary to analyse the economy was not published by Rhodesian governments up to 1980 for security reasons. What data is available from the sanctions years suggests a period of relatively slow growth in the three years after UDI, a period of relatively rapid growth from 1968 to 1974, and a decline in growth since 1974. The decline in growth was the combined result of world recession, sanctions, the guerilla war, growing difficulties in delivering traded goods because of transport congestion within Rhodesia and in South Africa (particularly after the closure of the Mozambique border in March 1976) and steep increases in oil prices. The GDP has fallen each year since 1974 in real terms: by 1.4% in 1975, 1.6% in 1976, 6.8% in 1977 and 3.6% in 1978. Another fall was forecast for 1979. The worsening economic situation added its own impetus to demands for a settlement.

The recovery between 1968 and 1974 occurred in all three of the export-related sectors: manufacturing, agriculture and minerals. The gross value of manufacturing, for example, increased from \$2403m in 1965 to \$21,367m in 1975. Agriculture thrived as a result of heavy subsidisation of the white agricultural sector and diversification largely overcame the loss the the UK tobacco market. The value of white agricultural production increased from \$2140m in 1965 to \$2351m in 1975, and black agricultural production from \$234m to \$2101m. The production and export of maize was the most successful part of the diversification process. With the help of international mining companies operating mainly through South Africa, mineral production and exports also expanded.² The value of mineral production increased from \$264m in 1965 to \$2169m in 1975. Most mineral production was exported.

The structure of the economy was such that it was highly dependent on foreign trade. The prosperity of manufacturing, agriculture and mineral production was to a significant extent dependent on exports.

Exports from Rhodesia increased from \$2399m in 1965 to an estimated \$2640m in 1973. However import prices continued to rise relative to export prices due to the effects of sanctions. Although sanctions were effectively by-passed, buying and selling 'under the counter' was expensive: Rhodesia had to export at a discount and import at a premium.

According to one estimate, blacks in Rhodesia in 1976-77 controlled no more than 12% of the productive capacity of the economy, with the remaining 88% being under white (and Asian) control.³ Domestic capital was concentrated largely in agriculture, commerce and small-scale manufacturing. Transnational capital dominated mining and large-scale agriculture and manufacturing.

In the following the Committee will consider the state of the Zimbabwe economy in some detail.

(1) Gross Domestic Product

In the 10 years 1965 to 1974 inclusive the Gross Domestic Product grew at an average of 6.4% p.a. in terms of 1965 prices. In the four years 1975 to 1978 inclusive it declined at an average of 3.4%. In 1978 the GDP, in terms of constant 1965 prices, fell 3.6% despite a rise in market price terms of 5%. According to the Zimbabwe Rhodesian Ministry of Finance, in its Economic Survey of Zimbabwe Rhodesia for 1978, although the economy continued to decline, it did so at a slower rate than expected.⁴ Movements in the GDP since 1965 in market price and real price terms are shown in Table 10.1.

Table 10.1: Gross Domestic Product, 1965-79
(SZ million)

Year	GDP (Market prices)	% change	GDP (1965 prices)	% change
1965 . . .	737	—	737	—
1966 . . .	733	-0.5	750	+1.8
1967 . . .	799	+9.0	804	+7.2
1968 . . .	847	+6.0	826	+2.7
1969 . . .	1 001	+18.2	944	+14.3
1970 . . .	1 078	+7.7	983	+4.1
1971 . . .	1 243	+15.3	1 098	+11.7
1972 . . .	1 411	+13.5	1 199	+9.2
1973 . . .	1 550	+9.9	1 242	+3.6
1974 . . .	1 859	+19.9	1 357	+9.3
1975 . . .	2 008	+8.0	1 338	-1.4
1976 . . .	2 164	+7.8	1 317	-1.6
1977 . . .	2 220	+2.6	1 227	-6.8
1978 . . .	2 332	+5.0	1 183	-3.6
1979 . . .				

Sources: Compiled from Rhodesia, Ministry of Finance, *Economic Survey of Rhodesia* (1976 and 1977); *Economic Survey of Zimbabwe Rhodesia 1978*; and *National Accounts of Rhodesia 1977*.

(2) Distribution of the GDP

Statistically, the main contributor to the GDP since UDI, except in 1966 and 1967, has been the manufacturing sector. However, it should be noted that the national accounts classify the processing of grains, tobacco, sugar, cotton and certain minerals as manufacturing and this to a considerable extent underplays the economy's dependence on the production and export of primary goods.⁵ One estimate is that something like 60% of all industrial output depends to some degree on products derived from agriculture.⁶ In 1978 the gross output of the manufacturing sector was \$21,375m. Net output, or value added, was \$2454m or 22% of GDP at factor cost. Manufactured products accounted for between 25% and 30% of export receipts.

The second major contributor to the GDP in 1978, according to the national accounts, was agriculture, with a net output of \$2353m or 17% of GDP at factor cost. Mining and quarrying had a net output of \$2145m or 6.9% of GDP at factor cost. Manufacturing output at factor cost was up 6.3% on 1977, agriculture 5.4% and mining and quarrying 1%. Details from 1969 to 1978 are shown in Table 10.2.

TableM2: Distribution of the GDP, 1969-78

(\$Z m.)

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Agriculture & forestry	170	153	200	234	215	316	323	350	335	353
Mining & quarrying	65	71	72	75	101	134	126	149	144	145
Manufacturing	175	209	250	296	341	423	449	458	427	454
Electricity & water	30	32	34	38	41	42	50	56	57	56
Construction	52	55	58	74	81	82	94	84	85	74
Finance & insurance	33	36	40	53	59	72	86	92	108	107
Real estate	28	32	35	39	43	46	44	47	47	47
Distribution, hotels & restaurants	123	136	152	171	197	235	252	254	238	247
Transport & communications	89	86	97	107	108	116	131	137	138	144
Public administration	57	62	70	78	91	107	127	160	201	236
Education	32	34	40	43	48	55	65	73	76	86
Health	18	21	25	27	28	33	38	44	49	54
Domestic services	28	30	33	35	37	40	45	49	52	54
Other services, n.e.s.	51	58	62	70	78	93	102	110	118	120
Less: Imputed banking service charges	-18	-21	-23	-30	-32	-42	-52	-56	-66	-71
Gross Domestic Product . . .	933	994	1145	1309	1437	1750	1881	2007	2010	2106
(factor cost)										
Gross Domestic Product . . .	1001	1078	1243	1411	1550	1859	2008	2164	2220	2332
(market prices)										
Gross Domestic Product . . .	944	983	1098	1199	1242	1357	1338	1317	1227	1183
(1965 prices)										

Source: Economic Survey of Zimbabwe Rhodesia 1978

(3) Employment and earnings

While manufacturing plays a key role in the economy of Zimbabwe in terms of its contribution to GDP, and takes more in earnings than any other sector, agriculture plays the key role in terms of employment. In 1978 agriculture accounted for 34% of total employment, while manufacturing accounted for 14% and mining 6%. But in terms of total earnings agriculture accounted for only 9% while manufacturing accounted for 20% and mining 5%. After agriculture and manufacturing, the third major employing sector is private domestic service. In 1978 some 12% of the total workforce, virtually all blacks, were employed in private domestic service. Their share of total earnings was only 4%. Details of employment and earnings are shown in Table 10.3.

Table 10.3: Employment and earnings, 1969-78

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
<i>Number in employment ('000)</i>										
Agriculture and forestry	307.5	297.8	310.9	342.3	356.6	365.6	363.8	356.1	348.2	341.4
Mining and quarrying	54.2	57.2	58.0	58.4	58.1	62.0	62.6	63.8	61.6	58.1
Manufacturing	104.3	115.2	122.3	131.3	140.1	152.0	156.7	145.8	140.1	140.1
Electricity and water	5.3	5.6	5.8	6.1	6.6	6.9	6.9	6.7	6.6	6.5
Construction	39.6	42.4	46.8	49.5	56.8	64.3	60.8	51.6	46.5	40.9
Finance, insurance and real estate	8.9	9.0	9.4	10.4	11.0	11.6	12.1	12.1	12.2	12.0
Distribution, restaurants and hotels	65.2	65.1	66.9	71.5	76.0	75.5	76.6	73.9	71.7	68.4
Transport and communications	35.4	36.5	38.9	41.0	42.3	43.8	45.3	45.7	45.5	44.0
Public administration	37.6	39.0	39.6	40.1	41.4	43.4	48.9	53.8	60.6	68.3
Education	30.9	31.0	31.0	31.9	33.3	34.7	36.0	36.9	36.6	34.9
Health	10.2	10.7	11.4	12.1	12.5	13.0	13.5	13.5	14.5	14.7
Private domestic service	105.4	109.3	114.0	119.4	122.6	124.4	126.3	126.1	123.0	119.4
Other services	30.9	34.8	36.6	39.8	41.3	44.4	44.9	44.0	44.5	43.4
Total	835.4	853.6	891.6	953.8	998.7	1 041.6	1 054.5	1 039.0	1 017.0	992.0
<i>Total earnings (\$Z million)</i>										
Agriculture and forestry	52.8	53.3	56.3	62.6	70.7	80.6	93.4	103.2	112.2	120.1
Mining and quarrying	31.7	35.4	37.1	38.0	40.3	48.2	57.1	65.7	71.4	72.6
Manufacturing	94.9	108.2	120.6	142.3	161.5	194.1	227.7	242.2	254.8	268.5
Electricity and water	7.1	7.5	9.3	10.4	11.7	13.3	15.6	17.0	18.7	20.7
Construction	26.3	31.5	40.8	46.3	49.9	62.9	69.1	65.2	61.5	57.8
Finance, insurance and real estate	21.3	22.9	25.0	30.6	33.8	41.0	46.9	51.1	55.2	57.4
Distribution, restaurants and hotels	66.5	71.2	81.5	89.3	98.1	106.5	123.9	129.1	134.4	136.6
Transport and communications	61.8	65.0	70.9	77.9	85.6	95.4	108.4	121.5	128.0	133.7
Public administration	49.0	51.8	58.6	65.8	73.3	97.3	109.1	104.5	102.1	115.2
Education	31.6	33.8	39.2	42.7	47.7	54.6	64.3	72.2	76.0	85.8
Health	11.1	12.0	14.3	16.1	17.7	20.4	24.4	27.3	30.5	34.8
Private domestic service	27.7	30.2	33.9	35.2	37.0	39.9	45.0	49.2	52.1	53.8
Other services	32.3	36.0	38.2	42.3	50.5	57.0	64.9	69.9	75.3	79.4
Total	514.2	559.1	624.7	699.4	781.9	905.1	1 050.0	1 145.9	1 250.2	1 336.2

Notes:

- (1) Because of collection difficulties the figures exclude employees of small agricultural units and small businesses in rural areas. At the 1969 census these small units had a total of 30 000 employees (approximately 10 per cent of the total).
 (2) Employees temporarily absent from their civilian occupations on military service are shown as employed in their normal civilian industry. However, military make-up pay met by the Government is included under 'Public Administration' and is not allocated to the employee's normal civilian industry.
 Sources: *Economic Survey of Zimbabwe 1978*; *Employment in the Monthly Digest of Statistics*, July 1979.

Table 10.3, as was the case with nearly all statistics released by the Zimbabwe Rhodesian Government since early 1979, ^{does not show} ~~no longer showed~~ employment or earnings on a racial basis. Separate statistics for these were last published in 1978, and are shown in Table 10.4.

The statistics in Table 10.3 show that total employment dropped 25,000 or 2.5% to 992,000 in 1978 - 65,000 or 6% less than the peak of 1,054,500 recorded in 1975. Officials have estimated that given the country's rapid population growth of 3.5%, the economy needs to generate something like 70,000 to 110,000 new jobs a year simply to keep pace with the number of new work-seekers coming on to the labour market each year.⁷ This being the case, then in the three years 1976 to 1978 inclusive in excess of a quarter of a million joined the unemployed through loss of jobs (62,500) or job opportunities not being available (210,000, based on 70,000 a year). This figure does not take into account the backlog of job-seekers from earlier years. If one counts as the labour force all those aged 15-59, then in 1975 some 33% of the labour force was in wage employment as against 31% in 1969, as shown in Table 10.5.

Table 10.4: Employment and earnings by racial groups, 1969-78
(selected years)

	1969	1970	1975	1976	1977	1978
Number in employment ('000)						
Agriculture and forestry						
Blacks	290.1	292.2	357.8	350.2	342.3	..
Whites	5.5	5.6	6.0	5.9	5.7	..
Mining and quarrying						
Blacks	44.1	53.4	58.6	59.6	57.5	..
Whites	3.0	3.8	3.9	4.1	4.1	..
Manufacturing						
Blacks	67.5	98.7	135.3	133.8	126.6	..
Whites	13.7	17.2	22.5	21.7	20.8	..
Services						
Blacks	160.1	196.0	255.6	249.4	251.2	..
Whites	68.4	76.9	88.3	88.0	86.3	..
Domestic service						
Blacks	94.7	109.3	126.3	126.1	123.0	..
Whites	0.4	0.5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	..
Total blacks	657.0	750.0	934.0	919.0	901.0	..
Total whites	91.0	104.0	121.0	120.0	117.0	..
Total	748.0	854.0	1055.0	1039.0	1017.0	992.0
Total earnings (\$Z million)						
Agriculture and forestry						
Blacks	35.9	37.2	64.4	73.1	79.4	..
Whites	16.4	16.1	28.9	30.0	32.7	..
Mining and quarrying						
Blacks	13.0	18.4	29.7	34.2	37.4	..
Whites	10.2	16.8	27.1	31.1	33.8	..
Manufacturing						
Blacks	27.9	47.6	98.0	108.5	117.1	..
Whites	38.7	61.4	130.9	139.0	139.7	..
Services						
Blacks	64.8	96.3	196.3	216.7	244.2	..
Whites	170.6	234.6	429.3	474.2	513.9	..
Domestic service						
Blacks	22.7	30.2	45.0	49.4	52.1	..
Whites	0.4	0.5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	..
Total blacks	164.3	229.7	433.5	481.8	530.2	..
Total whites	236.3	329.1	616.2	674.2	719.8	..
Total	401.0	559.0	1050.0	1156.0	1250.0	1330.0

Notes:

- (1) Discrepancies in totals are due to rounding.
- (2) Whites are defined to include Asians and coloureds.
- (3) 'Services' includes all categories in Table K2 not listed separately, namely: Electricity and water; Construction; Finance, insurance and real estate; Distribution, restaurants and hotels; Transport and communications; Public administration; Education; Health and Other services.
- (4) Agricultural employees in black areas (recorded as 15 400 in the 1969 population census) and also employees of rural black businesses (recorded as 15 200 in the 1969 census) are excluded.

Sources: Supplement to the Monthly Digest of Statistics, October 1978; Economic Survey of Rhodesia 1974.

Table 10.5: The labour force and wage employment, 1969-75

	1969	1975	Growth 1969-75	Annual average growth 1969-75
Labour force	2 358 000	2 843 000	485 000	80 800 (3.2%)
Wage employment	735 000	944 000	209 000	34 800 (4.3%)
Wage employment as per- centage of labour force .	31.21	33.2	43.1	

Source: Paper commissioned by Whitsun Foundation, entitled *Recent Economic Performance*, dated 17-12-76, p. 17.

Table 10.3 shows that in 1978 some 140,000 employees in the manufacturing sector earned a total of \$2269m - average earnings of \$21,916 per person. In agriculture 341,000 earned \$2120m - \$2352 per person, and in mining 58,000 earned \$273m - \$21,250 per person. Average earnings over all sectors in 1978 were \$21,347 per person. These figures, however, do not accurately reflect earnings because they fail to account for racial differences in the distribution of earnings. Figures from Table 10.4 for 1977 (the latest figures available to the Committee for a complete year) show major differences in the average earnings of blacks and whites. In the manufacturing sector the average earnings of blacks were \$2925 and of whites \$26,716; in agriculture black earnings averaged \$2232 and white earnings \$25,737, and in mining black earnings averaged \$2650 and white earnings \$28,244. Blacks in private domestic service earned an average of \$2424. Average black earnings over all sectors were \$2588 and average white earnings \$26,152. Whites in the wage sector earned 10 to 11 times more than blacks in the wage sector. Whites comprised only 11.5% of the workforce in 1977 but received 58% of total earnings.

Actual wages, of course, vary from averages. A study by the Central Statistical Office of the cash wage distribution of permanent black workers in June 1975 showed that of 258,000 in agriculture and forestry, some 120,000 or 46% earned less than \$210 a month and another 109,000 or 42% earned between \$210 and \$220 a month, plus in both cases earnings paid in kind (e.g. food, accommodation, some schooling and medical care, etc).⁸ Details of the wage distribution of permanent black workers are shown in Table 10.6.

Table 10.6: Cash wage distribution of permanent black workers, June 1975

Monthly cash wage (\$Z)	Agriculture and forestry	Mining and quarrying	Manufacturing	Electricity and water	Construction	Finance, insurance and real estate	Distribution, restaurants and hotels	Transport and communications
Under \$10	119 670	2 266	2 070	2 266	2 070	10	510	10
\$10-\$20	108 960	16 320	6 760	30	4 740	30	4 200	260
\$20-\$30	17 970	14 200	13 960	870	9 950	80	8 640	720
\$30-\$40	6 120	10 350	31 860	1 410	21 170	120	13 160	2 970
\$40-\$50	2 340	8 730	37 860	1 590	12 180	440	11 980	4 750
\$50-\$70	1 690	6 370	28 530	1 220	8 670	1 350	12 790	7 250
\$70-\$90	700	1 650	10 580	260	4 210	830	4 360	3 050
\$90-\$110	460	1 420	4 100	70	1 540	630	1 560	1 840
\$110-\$130	370	200	1 760	20	710	290	930	840
\$130-\$150	30	70	830	20	540	220	480	450
\$150-\$200	80	60	980	10	880	190	570	450
\$200-\$250	10	20	490	..	580	170	170	160
\$250-\$300	..	20	190	..	110	80	60	80
\$300+	10	60	410	..	110	70	120	330
Total	258 410	60 736	140 380	5 510	65 900	4 400	60 120	22 930

Monthly cash wage (\$Z)	Public administration				Private domestic services			Total excluding agricultural and domestic employees	
	Health services	Education services	Health services	Private domestic services	Other services	Total excluding agriculture	Total excluding agricultural and domestic employees		
Under \$10	970	190	60	21 320	470	28 790	7 460		
\$10-\$20	4 130	720	110	78 540	4 250	120 070	41 490		
\$20-\$30	3 370	640	440	30 050	3 830	86 760	56 710		
\$30-\$40	3 470	2 160	2 110	5 920	8 180	102 610	96 690		
\$40-\$50	3 990	1 940	1 820	560	8 900	94 740	89 180		
\$50-\$70	9 040	6 490	1 280	..	8 060	87 040	87 040		
\$70-\$90	4 000	7 310	960	..	1 810	39 020	39 020		
\$90-\$110	2 540	6 400	790	..	790	26 680	26 680		
\$110-\$130	1 160	1 240	100	..	530	7 780	7 780		
\$130-\$150	850	420	220	..	440	4 440	4 440		
\$150-\$200	340	420	510	..	240	4 580	4 580		
\$200-\$250	180	280	280	..	140	2 700	2 700		
\$250-\$300	30	190	60	..	60	880	880		
\$300+	140	770	340	..	130	2 470	2 470		
Total	34 140	29 050	9 070	136 380	33 710	602 040	465 660		

Source: Central Statistical Office, mimeo DL/973/60, November 1975, table reproduced in D. G. Clark, *The Distribution of Income and Wealth in Rhodesia* (Mambo Occasional Papers—Soc-Economic Series No. 7).

A study of wage employment and income in Rhodesia in the period to 1976 entitled Recent Economic Performance, prepared for the Whitsun Foundation (a private, non-profit development agency established in August 1975) stated that while there was undoubtedly a racially-based form of elitism in the labour force it would be wrong to infer that 'the fate of the 90% will be inevitably secured by the elimination of existing privileges available to the 10%'.⁹ The paper concluded there was arithmetical scope for some redistribution of incomes from whites to blacks (1% of white earnings in 1975 would have added 1.4% to black earnings if redistributed) but it was 'much less clear what the operational impact of a radical redistribution would be'. For one thing, any such redistribution would need to take into account differentials in earnings between black groups within the wage sector. In 1977 the 14% of black workers in manufacturing earned more than one and a half times (1.57 times) the black wage sector average wage. The 28% in the services sector (as defined in Table 10.4) earned 1.65 times the average wage and the 6% in mining 1.1 times the average wage. However, the 14% in domestic service earned only three-quarters (0.72) of the average wage and the 38% in agriculture only 0.40 of the average wage.

Apart from differences between blacks within the wage sector of the economy, there are also the differences between blacks within and without the wage sector. The Whitsun Foundation paper, Recent Economic Performance, stated that in 1975 some 944,000 or 33% of the black labour force (estimated then at 2,843,000) was in wage employment, the remainder working in the peasant or subsistence sector or being unemployed. Blacks in the wage sector had an average income seven to eight times greater than that of blacks in the peasant sector.

Average wage differentials in the late 1970s may be summarised thus: for about every \$21 of income received by blacks in the peasant sector, blacks in the wage sector received about \$27-8 (but with blacks in agricultural and private domestic

employment receiving considerably less than the average), and whites in the wage sector received about \$270-88.

The adequacy of wage levels for blacks in formal employment was considered in a 1974 University of Rhodesia study, The Urban Poverty Datum Line in Rhodesia.¹⁰ The study showed that in 1974 the Poverty Datum Line (PDL) for an urban family of four (the national average family size for blacks in 1974 was between six and seven) was in the range \$2660-70 a year. The average wage level for blacks (excluding agriculture) in 1974 was \$2556. Less than 15% of non-farm black wage earners earned more than \$2660 in 1974. While there are problems in defining a PDL suitable to all situations, and any conclusions must involve generalisations, the evidence does suggest a serious disparity between wage levels and basic needs. According to the Whitsun Foundation paper, Recent Economic Performance:

This carries serious implications for the economy, beyond the immediate moral considerations, because it tends to entrench the link which urban workers retain with the rural sector for subsidies of various kinds. Retention of this link with the land may, in many instances, be a hindrance to the development of more rational land use in rural areas, an issue of very great importance to the country's long-term development.¹¹

In the years since 1974 this urban-rural link has also been working in reverse, with rural dwellers seeking refuge from the guerilla war with relatives in urban areas. This has further aggravated living conditions for urban blacks on or below the average wage.

An important question in the study of wage structures is the general relationship between productivity levels and wage payments in different sectors. The Whitsun Foundation paper, Recent Economic Performance, concluded that in the decade 1965-75 none of the three productive sectors (manufacturing, agriculture

and mining) paid wages at a rate equivalent to the productivity ranking of the sector. In each case the gap between productivity and wage rankings had widened over the decade. In each of the sectors there was evidence of a distribution of income in favour of profits over wages, with a greater tendency to favour profits in the two lower productivity sectors of mining and agriculture.¹²

In 1965-75 the wages share of the national income declined from 55.6% to 52.2% while the gross profit share increased from 38.3% to 41.7%. According to the Whitsun Foundation paper, Recent Economic Performance, wage incomes as a result were some \$268m or 6.5% less in 1975 than they would have been had the profit share been maintained at its 1965 level. This equated to about \$260 a year for each wage earner, black and white, or about \$286 a year for each black wage earner - equivalent to a 15% increase in average black wage levels. The growth in the wages bill for blacks over the decade was the result of more rapid employment rather than wage increases.¹³

(4) Growth and national income

The accelerated pace of growth of the Rhodesian economy in the early 1970s was the result of a growing demand for domestic goods following a switch away from imports (due to sanctions and foreign exchange limitations) and rising per capita incomes, on the one hand, and an increase in exports due particularly to buoyant international commodity markets, on the other. Of these, the import substitution factor was probably the most important, and one estimate is that it was responsible for about 30% of growth between 1965 and 1974.¹⁴ In the area of primary production, increased production and greater local processing led to greater returns.

Contributing to growth was the increased availability of investment capital through blocking the repatriation of much of

earnings and capital after the imposition of sanctions, an increase in both public and corporate savings and an increase in net external borrowing, much of it probably from South Africa.¹⁵ The growth in savings and the consequent high investment rate were achieved in part as a result of the unequal distribution of income which concentrated resources and ownership predominately in white hands. However, a beneficial effect was the generation of additional employment. In the period 1972-74, 19-21% of Rhodesia's gross national income was invested, compared with 12-13% in 1965-67. Per capita investment in 1975 was \$262 (\$253 in 1965 prices) as against \$221 in 1965. Gross national income, in terms of market prices and constant 1965 prices, is shown in Table 10.7. j/

A major characteristic of the economy's growth since UDI has been the relatively high reliance on employment expansion rather than productivity increases as a means of expanding production, due in part to the ready availability of unskilled labour and the difficulty, under sanctions, of obtaining labour-saving modern technologies from abroad. Thus one effect of sanctions has been to increase the share of the wage sector in the labour force and to reduce somewhat the share of the peasant sector.

Table 10.7: Gross national income, 1965-78
(SZ million)

Year	Market prices	Per-centage change	1965 prices	Per-centage change
1965	725	..	725	..
1966	719	-0.8	706	-2.6
1967	784	9.0	749	6.1
1968	841	7.3	783	4.5
1969	984	17.0	929	18.6
1970	1 057	7.4	964	3.8
1971	1 212	14.7	1 073	11.3
1972	1 376	13.5	1 170	9.0
1973	1 511	9.8	1 211	3.5
1974	1 820	20.5	1 334	10.2
1975	1 967	8.1	1 316	-1.3
1976	2 112	7.4	1 285	-2.4
1977	2 175	3.0	1 202	-6.5
1978	2 297	5.6	1 165	-3.1

Source: *Monthly Digest of Statistics*, February 1974 (1965-68);
Supplement to the Monthly Digest of Statistics, July 1979 (1969-78).

Between 1954 and 1974 gross national income per head increased at a compound annual average growth rate of 1.8% (at constant 1965 prices). This was despite an annual average increase in the population of some 3.5%. However, in Rhodesia's case, aggregate per capita income figures can be misleading because the distribution of incomes is very uneven. Thus, although the average real wage earned by blacks increased 31% between 1965 and 1975, average real earnings in agriculture rose only 3% and in private domestic service only 4.7% (these two sectors account for more than half the employed black labour force). Furthermore, although the growth of the white average real wage was marginally below that of blacks - 30.8% in the period, the absolute wage gap between the two wage structures widened from \$22,292 in 1965 to \$23,063 in 1975 (in terms of constant 1964 prices).

The black population worst off is the more than 80% who may be described as rural - i.e. the peasant or subsistence population plus the black population involved in white agriculture or forestry (on-farm employment). Their situation, up to 1975, is shown in Table 10.8. The table shows that employment growth in the non-farm wage sector was sufficient to reduce the share of population dependent on peasant, or subsistence, agriculture from about 65% of the total black population in 1970 to about 62.5% in 1975. The rural black population as a whole (including blacks in white agriculture) declined from about 87% of the total black population in 1965 to about 83% in 1975.

Table 10.8: Black rural population and per capita incomes, 1965-75
Estimates of black rural and peasant population ('000)

	1965	1966	1969	1970	1974	1975
Total black population	4 357	4 470	4 960	5 130	5 900	6 110
Non-farm employment	367	372	435	458	569	591
Urban population	551	562	676	712	973	1 009
On-farm employment	289	272	301	291	357	354
Total on-farm population	1 040	979	1 083	1 047	1 285	1 274
Peasant population	2 766	2 929	3 201	3 371	3 642	3 854
Rural population	3 806	3 908	4 284	4 418	4 927	5 101

	Total rural income			Peasant income		
	1965-66	1969-70	1974-75	1965-66	1969-70	1974-75
Consumption of own production	47.2	63.0	86.0	47.2	63.0	86.0
Sales from black farming	6.7	8.5	18.0	6.7	8.5	18.0
Wages from white agriculture	34.3	34.5	45.3
Total imputed income	88.2	106.0	149.3	53.9	71.5	104.0
<i>Per capita income (\$Z)</i>						
Total rural	22.87	24.36	29.78
Total peasant	18.93	21.76	27.75
National per capita GNP	152	171	204
Ratios—rural : national	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.12	0.13	0.14

Notes:

- (1) Estimates of total black population are those of Whitsun Foundation paper, *Recent Economic Performance*.
 - (2) 'On-farm employment' includes employees in white agriculture and forestry.
 - (3) 'Consumption of own production' includes capital formation.
 - (4) Peasant blacks are defined as all those outside the urban black population and the population in white agriculture and forestry; rural blacks comprise peasant blacks plus the population in white agriculture and forestry.
- Source: Whitsun Foundation, *Recent Economic Performance*, Table 8.

A fall for the fifth year in succession was expected in per capita real incomes in 1979, according to the Standard Bank's Economic Bulletin released in December 1979. At constant 1965 prices real income per head of population reached a peak of \$2223 in 1974 but by 1978 had fallen to \$2171. A further fall to \$2165 was predicted for 1979.

(5) Trade

Because of sanctions, details of imports and exports were not published after 1965 and total figures for imports and exports were not published after 1972 (although the Ministry of Finance announced on 28 February 1980 that statistics for the sanctions years were to be released in April or May 1980).¹⁶ However, a bank survey in late 1979 after the return to legality did publish estimates of total trade. The Standard Bank, in its December 1979 Economic Bulletin, estimated that exports in 1979 would be close to \$2700m (an increase of 15%) and imports about \$2480m (an increase of 20%). The visible trade surplus could be about \$2190m after allowing for internal freight costs, compared to \$2178m in 1978. The bank said that exports were boosted by higher metal prices, especially for gold, copper and nickel, and a reduction in transport congestion problems. At current prices exports had more than doubled since 1965.

In 1965 some 92% of mining output, 41% of agricultural output and 32% of manufacturing output was exported. It has been calculated that of net foreign exchange earnings of \$2129m in 1965 more than \$259m or 46% ^{was} were derived from agriculture and \$256m or 43% from mining. By contrast, manufacturing was a net user of foreign exchange of some \$26m.¹⁷

Because of the lack of statistical resource material during the sanctions years it is not possible to give exact details of changes since 1965. Major new exports have emerged (e.g. nickel, cotton), while the importance of some traditional

exports (especially tobacco) has declined. In 1974 primary products accounted for 80% of total merchandise exports from Rhodesia. Although this was at the peak of the commodity price boom, it underlines the economy's continuing reliance on primary production despite the growing relative importance of manufacturing.

In 1965 Rhodesia's main trading partners were the United Kingdom, South Africa, Zambia, West Germany, the United States, Japan and Malawi, as shown in Table 10.9. South Africa and the United Kingdom between them accounted for half Rhodesia's imports but less than a third of Rhodesia's exports. Zambia was the single main export market, taking nearly a quarter of total exports.

Table 10.9: Main trading partners, 1965

Country	Imports from		Exports to	
	\$Z million	% of total imports	\$Z million	% of total exports
Australia	5.23	2.2	2.31	0.8
Belgium	4.56	1.9	3.19	1.1
Botswana	0.14	0.1	3.18	1.1
Canada	3.94	1.6	1.64	0.6
France	4.01	1.7	1.58	0.6
Germany, West	9.73	4.1	25.62	9.2
Iran	7.57	3.2	0.10	—
Italy	5.06	2.1	4.50	1.6
Japan	13.21	5.5	14.80	5.3
Malawi	2.79	1.2	15.48	5.6
Mozambique	2.74	1.1	1.90	0.7
Netherlands	5.91	2.5	7.45	2.7
South Africa	54.92	22.9	25.59	9.2
Sweden	3.05	1.3	1.26	0.5
Switzerland	1.43	0.6	3.60	1.3
United Kingdom	72.71	30.3	62.30	22.4
United States	16.39	6.8	6.99	2.5
Zaire	0.08	—	3.47	1.2
Zambia	8.64	3.6	72.18	25.9
	222.11	92.7	257.14	92.4
Total trade	239.6		278.4 (excl. gold)	

Note: Countries listed accounted for approximately 93% of international trade, excluding gold, in 1965.

Source: Based on table in Harry R. Strack, *Sanctions: The Case of Rhodesia* (Syracuse University Press, 1978), p. 115.

The major export in 1965 was tobacco (30% by value of exports). Other major exports included asbestos (7%), meat (5%), gold (4.4%), copper (4.1%), clothing (3.4%), pig iron and ferro-alloys (2.7%), chromite (2.4%) and sugar (2.2%). The single major import was machinery and transport equipment (32% by value), followed by manufactured goods (26%), chemicals (11.3%) and fuel (5%).¹⁸

The imposition of sanctions altered the pattern of trade significantly. Zambia reduced its Rhodesian imports from \$272m in 1965 to \$221m in 1971 (mostly coal and electricity) and Zambian imports from Rhodesia virtually ceased with the border closure in 1973. Direct trade with OECD countries also dropped - to be replaced, in varying degrees, by indirect trade. Perhaps the main change was increased reliance on South Africa as both a source of imports and a destination for exports.

In 1965 South Africa took about 10% of Rhodesia's exports and supplied almost 25% of Rhodesia's imports. The suppression of key trade figures during the sanctions years makes the identification of subsequent trade movements difficult. Studies in this area have been made by the UN Security Council's Sanctions Committee,¹⁹ and these indicate that in recent years South Africa probably accounted for about one-third of Rhodesia's exports and nearly half of Rhodesia's imports.

The UN Sanctions Committee estimated that in 1976 Rhodesian merchandise exports totalled \$US748m, and imports totalled \$US620m (these figures may be slightly overestimated when compared with the Standard Bank estimates for 1979). After its establishment, some 70 countries undertook to report trade with Rhodesia to the Sanctions Committee. Those reporting receiving Rhodesian exports in 1976 were: United States \$US46m; Malawi \$US10m; Switzerland \$US8m; and the United Kingdom \$US0.4m - a total of nearly \$US65m.²⁰ The Sanctions Committee estimated that in addition the Customs Union of Southern Africa

(predominantly South Africa, but including Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia) received Rhodesian exports amounting to about \$US365m. By subtracting these two amounts from the total of estimated exports and after adjusting for freight charges, the Sanctions Committee concluded that the total of Rhodesian indirect exports was approximately \$US312m.

The Sanctions Committee maintained that most of these exports reach the world market through the Southern Africa Customs Union and that this was reflected in the import figures of the 70 countries reporting to it.²¹ The Sanctions Committee stated that evidence of the existence of these indirect ~~exports~~^{imports} could be shown by a comparison of the imports of 23 of the reporting countries with corresponding exports of the Customs Union, Zambia and Malawi. The 23 countries were the market economies of Western Europe and Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, but excluded the US because of statistical differences. Details are shown in Table 10.10.

Table 10: Estimates of exports and imports,
1965-67 and 1974-76

		(\$USm)					
Exports	1965	1966	1967	1974	1975	1976	
To countries reporting							
to UN	343	181	96	60	67	58	
To Southern Africa Customs							
Union	41	60	80	250	324	365	
To non-reporting countries	15	-	-	-	-	-	
To world markets via							
indirect trade	-	-3	62	290	241	312	
Total domestic exports							
(excl. gold)	399	238	238	600	645	748	
Re-exports	43	24	17	12	13	13	
Indirect trade as							
% of total	-	-	26	48	37	42	
Imports							
From countries reporting							
to UN	253	79	63	20	4	10	
From Southern Africa Customs							
Union	78	110	135	230	270	246	
Unspecified origin	3	-	-	-	-	-	
Unaccounted trade	-	47	64	265	304	364	
Total imports	334	236	262	515	588	620	
Unaccounted trade as							
% of total	-	20	24	51	52	59	

- Notes:
- (1) Figures for 1974 on are UN estimates only.
 - (2) Exports to reporting countries have mostly been adjusted by 10% to allow for freight, etc.
 - (3) Estimates of exports to the Southern Africa Customs Union for 1974 on were derived from published data for imports of the Union from 'Africa' less exports to the Union reported by African countries. Similarly, estimates of imports from the Southern Africa Customs Union were derived from published data for exports of the Union to 'Africa' less imports from the Union reported by African countries.

Source: Tenth Report of UN Security Council Sanctions Committee, Security Council Records, Thirty-third Year, Special Supplement No. 2, vol. 2 (S/12529/Rev.1, Annex VI).

Similarly, the following countries reported exports to Rhodesia in 1976: Malawi \$US3m; United Kingdom \$US2.5m; Switzerland \$US2m; West Germany \$US1m; United States \$US0.8m; and Belgium-Luxembourg, Denmark, France, Italy and Japan a total of \$US0.6m - an overall total of some \$US10m. The Sanctions Committee estimated that in addition the Southern Africa Customs Union sent Rhodesia some \$US246m in goods, and concluded that some \$US364m of Rhodesian imports had not been reflected in the corresponding 1976 export figures of world trade. Details are also shown in Table 10.10.

Most of Rhodesia's trade in the 1970s was conducted with the developed, industrialised nations. The major country involved was South Africa. Other countries with registered companies or nationals known to be involved were Switzerland, the United States, the United Kingdom and Malawi. Countries with registered companies or nationals who have been the subject of complaints to the UN (mainly by the UK) of possible sanctions violations involving trade include Japan, France, West Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, Greece, Norway, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, Israel, Lebanon, Zaire, Chile, Argentina, Peru, Paraguay, Thailand and Panama and Liberia (the last two in relation to registered vessels). All these countries were mentioned in complaints in the Eleventh Report of the UN Sanctions Committee, for the year 1978.²² These countries, as well as other countries, have also been mentioned in earlier reports. ^{The USSR} ~~Russia~~ has been mentioned as a major buyer of Rhodesian chromite and asbestos in both UN and press reports.²³

The major commodities exported were farm produce such as tobacco, maize, meat and meat products, cotton and cotton products and sugar; minerals and mineral products such as chrome ore, ferrochrome, asbestos, gold, copper, pig iron and nickel and nickel alloys; and some manufactures. Major imports included oil and petroleum products, machinery, transport equipment and parts, military equipment, aircraft and parts, and some manufactured goods.

That sanctions had an effect, though not as immediate as initially hoped for either by the UN or UK, is shown in movements in the terms of trade since 1964. The terms of trade are defined as the unit value of exports divided by the unit value of imports. A fall in the terms of trade indicates a rise in import prices relative to export prices. In the case of Zimbabwe Rhodesia movements in the terms of trade have fairly consistently been adverse, as shown in Table 10.11. The terms of trade deteriorated about 40% in the period since 1965, due to the sanctions 'discount' on most exports and the sanctions 'premium' which had to be paid by importers. A substantial increase in exports and imports under legal trading conditions could lead to an improvement of about 10% in the terms of trade in 1980, according to the Standard Bank in its December 1979 Economic Bulletin.²⁴

*Table 10.11: External trade—terms of trade
(excluding net gold sales)*

<i>Year</i>	<i>Unit value indices</i>		<i>Terms of trade</i>
	<i>Imports</i>	<i>Exports</i>	
1964	100.0	100.0	100.0
1965	103.5	104.3	100.8
1966	114.0	93.8	82.3
1967	113.8	90.8	79.8
1968	112.0	92.7	82.8
1969	114.1	98.2	86.1
1970	119.2	102.0	85.6
1971	127.1	103.2	81.2
1972	124.4	102.5	82.4
1973	129.6	110.3	85.1
1974	176.6	144.6	81.9
1975	195.1	153.6	78.7
1976	221.1	162.4	73.5
1977	243.6	167.4	68.7
1978	276.9	173.9	62.8

Source: Supplement to the Monthly Digest of Statistics, July 1979.

Speaking at a seminar in Salisbury on 22 November 1979 the Secretary to the Treasury, Mr David Young, stated that exports would be the key to Zimbabwe Rhodesia's prosperity once sanctions were lifted.²⁵ He pointed out that the economy had become parochial because of sanctions. Attitudes would need to be changed to encourage exports. He predicted that foreign exchange controls would remain for some years to come but would be gradually relaxed as the balance of payments improved. The removal of sanctions and a return to normal trading was expected to boost the balance of payments by at least 15% in the first full year.²⁶ However, with the removal of sanctions, Zimbabwe Rhodesia would also have to resume servicing its external debt which, in the case of sterling alone, was estimated at \$2154m early in 1979.

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Zimbabwean trade received a considerable boost from the lifting of sanctions. For example, the European Economic Community in January 1980 granted Zimbabwe colonial status until the end of 1980 - a decision granting Zimbabwe free access for most of its exports, including tobacco and minerals (but excluding, for the time being, beef). A longer-term arrangement, involving membership of the Lome Convention, was to be negotiated. Sanctions were lifted by Britain as from midnight on 12 December 1979. Other member countries of the EEC, the US and Australia soon followed suit. On 14 December Zimbabwe requested tariff preferences from Britain, and on 19 December from the US and Australia. Australian authorities were considering the request in early 1980.

(6) Balance of payments

In the period 1965 to 1978 inclusive, the Rhodesian balance of payments was in deficit six years out of 14. In 1978 the balance of payments improved from a deficit of \$247m in 1977 to a surplus of \$238m. According to the Economic Survey of Zimbabwe Rhodesia 1978 the turnaround was primarily due to an

increase of 13% in the value of exports, following an upward movement in international commodity prices in the second half of 1978 and a favourable agricultural season.²⁷

Until 1972 the Rhodesian Government released detailed balance of payments statistics which included totals for imports and exports. These figures showed that the largest single decrease in the period to 1972 in Rhodesia's international trade took place in 1966 - the first year after UDI. Despite continued tightening of sanctions in the following years the value of Rhodesia's imports and exports showed a steady recovery to the point where imports exceeded their 1965 value in 1971, and exports did the same in 1972.²⁸ For security reasons, only summary balance of payments statistics were released subsequent to 1972 and these did not show trade trends. The later figures continued to show surpluses on the trading, or merchandise, account but these were offset, in almost every year, by net outflows on current account invisibles due to factors such as higher freight costs, loss of revenue from transit traffic, higher dividend payments to foreign investors and a net outflow on the foreign travel account because of a decline in the number of tourists visiting Rhodesia. Details of the balance of payments are shown in Table 10.12.

Table 10.12 shows that in 1978 the merchandise account had a surplus of \$2178m - \$246m more than in 1977, but this was largely offset by an invisibles deficit of \$2166m, leaving a net current account surplus of \$212. The 1978 year was only the third since 1965 in which the surplus on the merchandise account exceeded the deficit on invisible transactions. Of the \$218.6m increase in the net outflow on services, some \$213m was because of higher freight, insurance and transport costs on external trade, indicating the steadily rising prices of these services. The decline in the outflow of investment income was attributed mainly to a fall of \$26m in remittances by companies following a lower level of profitability.²⁹

On the capital account there was a net inflow of \$226m compared to a net outflow of \$222m in 1977. The surpluses in the current and capital accounts together produced an overall balance of payments surplus of \$238m. Much of the improvement in Rhodesia's foreign exchange position in 1978 was earmarked to pay for the higher cost of fuel procurement³⁰ and to finance war-related imports. Import allocations to the private sector increased only marginally, and in real terms continued to contract. A Standard Bank survey in December 1979 predicted a surplus on current and capital accounts of more than \$240m in 1979, due to higher inflows of capital than in 1978.

Table 10.12: Balance of payments—current and capital transactions, 1965–78
(\$Z million)

	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
Merchandise, net(a)	77.1	27.1	12.3	-26.0	32.0	27.9	3.1
Invisible transactions, net	-50.9	-31.3	-29.0	-24.1	-27.4	-40.4	-58.5
Services		-8.0	-15.5	-8.2	-5.3	-16.8	-24.8
Investment income		-19.2	-13.4	-14.9	-17.8	-21.0	-30.4
Transfers		-4.1	-0.1	-1.0	-4.3	-2.6	-3.3
Net balance on Current Account	26.2	-4.3	-16.7	-50.1	4.6	-12.5	-55.4
Capital transactions, net	4.0	-4.6	23.7	39.5	9.9	26.3	30.5
Total Current and Capital Transactions	30.2	-8.9	7.0	-10.5	14.5	13.8	-24.9

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Merchandise, net(a)	62.1	88.9	59.5	31.9	155.2	132.3	178.1
Invisible transactions, net	-21.8	-103.9	-139.9	-160.5	-155.4	-157.2	-166.2
Services		-58.5	-81.3	-92.8	-80.3	-96.7	-115.3
Investment income		-35.1	-38.5	-39.8	-41.2	-51.9	-45.2
Transfers		-2.8	-6.9	-18.8	-26.5	-23.2	-15.3
Net balance on Current Account	2.4	-15.0	-80.4	-128.6	-0.2	-24.9	-11.9
Capital transactions, net	-2.3	51.6	62.6	105.4	29.0	-22.2	25.6
Total Current and Capital Transactions	0.1	36.6	-17.8	-23.2	28.8	-47.1	37.5

(a) Allowance has been made for non-monetary gold, internal freight to border, timing and coverage adjustments in the computation of merchandise trade.
Source: Monthly Digest of Statistics, February 1974 (1965 figures); Economic Survey of Rhodesia 1974, April 1979 (1969–77 figures); Supplement to Monthly Digest of Statistics, January 1980 (1978 figures).

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In his 1979-80 Budget speech the Finance Minister in the Muzorewa Government, Mr David Smith, warned that inflation would move into double figures in 1979-80. He said factors working against the Zimbabwe Rhodesian economy included a recessionary international economy, increasing oil procurement costs - some of whose effects 'had yet to materialise', sanctions and the security situation, losses of skilled manpower, and losses in individual and business confidence.³¹

In April 1978 the Rhodesian dollar was devalued by 5% against the South African rand and by 8% against other currencies. The downward movements for the Rhodesian dollar in 1977 were 3% against the rand and 6% against other currencies. According to the Economic Survey 1978, the downward adjustment in 1978 was primarily the result of a decline in the value of the US dollar, and was not made for balance of payments purposes. But it had the effect of 'giving welcome short-term relief to producers of some export commodities' despite increasing the cost of imports by between 5% and 8%.³²

(7) Investment

The Rhodesian response to financial sanctions was to impose counter-sanctions. When the United Kingdom Government and other governments blocked the transfer of private investment funds, Rhodesia responded by blocking the repatriation of most investment income. Since the net flow of these transactions had run heavily against Rhodesia, the blocking of further payments had a favourable effect on the balance of payments. Rhodesia also ceased servicing its London market debt and no further payments were made on debts to the British Government or guaranteed by the British Government. This relieved the Rhodesian Government of making capital and interest payments on an obligation of about £160m. The British Government had to repay some of Rhodesia's debts on the London market, and as it was guarantor of a number of World Bank loans to Rhodesia, had to pay compensation of some

\$Z28m to the World Bank.³³ Accumulated interest payments on Rhodesia's external sterling debt were estimated at \$Z154m in late 1979.

In addition to government liability, large amounts due to private investors outside Rhodesia were also blocked. One financial writer estimated such blocked funds to be worth \$Z25-35m in imported capital each year.³⁴ Funds were blocked to countries such as the UK, US, Canada, the East African community and Zambia, but dividends and profits could be repatriated to other countries such as West Germany, Switzerland and South Africa.

Table 10.13 shows that although Rhodesia had a net outflow of investment income (public and private sectors) in each year since UDI this was compensated for by capital inflows. The sources of the capital inflows are not known, but could represent short-term borrowing on private international money markets.³⁵ The United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization (the 'Committee of 24') in reports in March and April 1979 claimed that the Zimbabwe Rhodesian Government had successfully negotiated a \$US15m loan over three years in Eurocurrency during 1978, and that the Government had also received a secret loan of £150m from 'non-African sources' to help pay for the guerilla war.³⁶ Further details were not given.

Table#13: Selected foreign financial transactions, 1965-78

(\$zm)

	<u>Non-residents investment income</u>		Net income paid abroad	Net capital inflow
	Received	Paid		
1965	19.5	-45.6	-26.1	4.0
1966	7.8	-27.1	-19.2	-4.6
1967	12.8	-26.2	-13.4	23.7
1968	14.1	-29.0	-14.9	39.5
1969	13.1	-31.0	-17.8	9.9
1970	14.9	-36.0	-21.0	26.3
1971	14.7	-45.1	-30.4	30.5
1972	14.3	-49.4	-35.1	-2.3
1973	16.3	-54.8	-38.5	51.6
1974	n a	n a	-39.8	62.6
1975			-41.2	105.4
1976			-51.9	29.0
1977			-45.2	-22.2
1978			-35.0	16.6

Source: Rhodesia, Central Statistical Office, National Accounts and Balance of Payments 1974; Supplement to Monthly Digest of Statistics, July 1979.

According to the 1976 paper prepared for the Whitsun Foundation by A.J. Hawkins, gross fixed capital formation in the decade since UDI was financed 'overwhelmingly from domestic sources'.³⁷ Gross capital accumulation in the period 1965 to 1974 was financed primarily by corporate savings (40.8%), followed by personal savings (21.8%), public sector savings (17.3%) and financial institutions (7.8%). Net borrowing from abroad accounted for less than 11% of gross capital accumulation in the period. The public debt, too, was financed increasingly from domestic sources. In 1965 external borrowings comprised 39% of the Rhodesian Government's public debt. By 1975 external borrowings had declined to less than 12% of the public debt and in 1978 to 8% (the Gross Public Debt of the central government in 1978 was \$21,150m, of which \$292m was external borrowings).

As a result of sanctions, statistics on the participation of foreign capital in the economy in the years to 1980 have not been available, are incomplete or are so general as to be of limited value - in part because of the suppression of official statistics, but also as a result of Government prohibitions on the release of certain economic information by private interests (e.g. the Emergency Powers Regulations of 1969, inter alia, prohibited foreign economic and other interests operating in Rhodesia from 'giving away economic secrets either deliberately or through negligence').

The last reliable public survey of foreign transnational investment in Rhodesia was a government survey in 1963. Of the 420 firms surveyed then, 147 were subject to external control, either as branches, subsidiaries or by majority shareholders, and their gross profits accounted for 69% of the total of firms surveyed. Nearly half the foreign-controlled companies were controlled from South Africa.

Among the advantages for a Rhodesian firm in being associated with external companies during sanctions were readier

access to capital investment inflows, access to technical information, assistance with the supply of needed equipment and the arrangement and marketing of exports. Perhaps the major disadvantage was that such associations could lead to even greater foreign ownership and control. Concern over this had been expressed from time to time, particularly in the insurance and finance industries. As an example, the then Rhodesia Herald of 16.12.76, stated that of the 74 direct insurers and professional re-insurers operating in Rhodesia in 1974, 29 had their head offices in South Africa, 25 in Britain, eight in other countries and only 12 in Rhodesia.

The extent of foreign ownership of Rhodesian companies in recent years is not precisely known. One pointer is that of the 15 leading profit-earning companies in 1976, 12 were controlled by external groups. About 80% of manufacturing concerns in 1977 were estimated to be owned by UK or South African interests. In order to ease the strain on reserves through the outflow of dividends and profits the Minister for Finance in April 1973 introduced a non-resident share-holders' tax and a tax on the profits of subsidiaries or branches of foreign companies operating in Rhodesia.

The overall shortage of foreign exchange began to affect the rate of Rhodesia's development from about 1970. As a result, limits were imposed on foreign currency allocations to the private sector. This led to a 'black market' in foreign currency, currency smuggling and schemes to obtain and maintain supplies of foreign currencies overseas. During sanctions major amounts of foreign currency, including some official borrowings, were believed to have reached Rhodesia via Swiss and South African banks, the international connections of the four major Rhodesian commercial banks (Grindlays Bank Ltd, the Standard Bank Ltd, Rhodesian Banking Corporation Ltd (Rhobank) and Barclays Bank International Ltd), merchant banks such as Rhodesian Acceptances Ltd (part of the Anglo-American Group), and holding companies in Switzerland, Luxembourg and Liechtenstein.³⁸

Total assets of the banking sector, which includes all deposit receiving institutions other than the Reserve Bank, rose by \$2185m to \$22,006m in 1978 - an increase of 10.2% compared with an increase of 3.3% in the previous year.

3. Productive sectors of the economy

The major productive sectors in the Zimbabwe economy are manufacturing, agriculture and mining. Together they account for nearly half the GDP, slightly more than half of total employment, and about one-third of total earnings.

(1) Manufacturing

During the period of federation (1953-63) manufacturing output increased rapidly and the sector became one of the most diversified in Africa outside South Africa. Investment in industry prior to UDI rose to a peak in 1957 under the impetus of federation, and then declined. A recovery began after 1963, which was maintained until 1966 when UDI and the imposition of sanctions caused a temporary set-back. However, the growth of manufacturing industry quickly resumed and continued until 1974. In 1975 manufacturing production fell slightly and this trend has continued since. For example, the stock exchange index for industrial share prices in 1978 stood at 285 (1964=100), compared to 343 in 1976. The high point was 460 in 1974.

In 1940 secondary industry employed 21,000 people, in 1965 some 85,000 and in 1975 nearly 157,000. In 1978 manufacturing industry accounted for 22% of the GDP (at factor costs), had a gross output of \$21,375m, and net output of \$2454m, employed 140,000 (about 120,000 blacks and 20,000 whites) - 15% of total national employment, and accounted for 22% of total national earnings.

There were some 1,300 secondary industry establishments in Rhodesia in 1978. However the majority were small with an annual salaries and wages bill of \$250,000 or less. In 1978 only 170 (13%) of the 1,300 industrial establishments employed more than 200 people. But those 170 establishments produced 68% of the total output of secondary industry.³⁹ Thus secondary industry in Rhodesia, somewhat like Australia, is characterised by large numbers of small concerns but with more than 50% of production concentrated in a comparatively few large firms. (Of the industrial establishments, about half reported losses for taxation purposes in 1978-79.)

Although initially stimulated by import substitution programs after UDI, the longer-term growth of industry was hampered by restrictions on the availability of foreign exchange and by the extra difficulties in obtaining markets created by sanctions. Sanctions (as well as low labour costs) also caused much of Rhodesian industry to rely on labour-intensive production techniques using comparatively outdated equipment. Highly expensive, capital-intensive processes were generally not utilised.

Table 10.14 shows the gross output of the manufacturing sector by industrial groups.

Table 10.14: Gross output of the manufacturing sector by industrial groups (\$2 million)

Period	Food-stuffs	Drink and tobacco	Textiles (including cotton spinning)	Clothing and footwear	Wood and furniture	Paper and printing and publishing	Chemical and petroleum products	Non-metals and mineral products	Metals and metal products	Transport equipment	Other manufacturing groups	All manufacturing groups
1964	92.5	37.2	25.2	27.0	13.0	20.4	49.4	8.6	59.1	31.4	4.8	368.5
1965	103.2	38.8	29.8	28.3	13.7	21.9	55.8	9.8	65.5	33.4	3.0	403.4
1966	103.0	26.9	29.5	29.9	13.8	22.0	52.0	11.3	62.2	29.5	3.1	384.3
1967	99.5	37.9	36.1	34.3	13.2	23.4	53.8	12.6	73.0	11.4	4.1	403.3
1968	111.5	39.3	42.7	35.9	16.0	25.4	61.7	17.0	80.2	11.7	4.9	446.3
1969	117.0	45.0	57.7	39.6	18.2	29.2	71.8	19.6	100.1	19.5	5.8	523.4
1970	138.0	49.3	57.4	46.2	22.3	34.1	82.6	24.0	134.6	20.5	6.6	615.6
1971	153.6	55.3	71.6	53.4	25.3	37.7	98.5	28.3	163.1	28.1	7.8	722.7
1972	174.6	63.6	88.0	60.6	28.2	43.1	112.7	33.9	182.0	33.5	9.3	829.5
1973	214.1	69.7	103.0	69.7	32.2	51.5	120.6	39.2	217.1	39.8	10.9	957.7
1974	231.9	80.3	138.9	84.1	38.6	65.5	166.0	45.1	290.4	44.0	13.7	1198.6
1975	260.0	92.1	136.6	89.0	36.3	74.6	184.4	48.4	330.8	51.9	13.7	1318.8
1976	295.8	103.1	151.2	85.2	37.4	65.2	181.8	45.1	336.4	45.1	13.8	1350.8
1977	327.4	105.0	151.5	79.9	33.6	65.5	192.4	41.5	308.9	46.7	14.8	1372.2

Source: Supplement to the Monthly Digest of Statistics, January 1980.

~~In the event of~~ ^{With} a settlement many of the small firms currently in the manufacturing sector may not survive a return to competitive conditions. Of the nearly 4,000 products being manufactured in 1970, some 65% were estimated to be monopoly products resulting from import substitution - the majority of which would probably not survive competition from imports. As put by one economist: 'Too many products for too small a market commits too many producers to too small a scale. Small-scale production is costly production, and costly production cannot compete'.⁴⁰ Those manufacturing industries which do continue will, in many cases, probably be in competition with similar industries in South Africa. What seems reasonably certain is that, like South Africa itself, Zimbabwe will continue to rely upon the export of the primary products of mining and agriculture for the major part of foreign currency earnings.

(2) Agriculture

More than 70% of Zimbabwe's population depends on agriculture as its source of income.⁴¹ Agriculture accounts for more than a third of total wage employment (34% in 1978), more than a third of total foreign exchange earnings and some 40% of the raw materials for manufacturing.⁴² It is also a source of a significant share of the country's re-investible surplus. In the period 1970-75 agriculture accounted for more than 30% of real growth in the GDP, although agriculture's total share of the GDP in 1975 was only 17%. Since 1975 agriculture's share of the GDP has remained fairly constant at about 17%.

In the years prior to UDI agriculture was the largest single contributor to the GDP, averaging just over 20% in the five years to 1965. Manufacturing contributed a greater percentage than agriculture for the first time in 1965, dropped to second place again in 1966 and 1967, and resumed the lead in 1968. Manufacturing has been the main contributor to the GDP since. However agriculture, because of its exports and foreign

exchange earnings, because of its pre-eminent role as employer of wage-earners, because it is tied up in the contentious issue of land distribution and use, and because of its important place in future development plans, is arguably the most crucial sector in the Zimbabwean economy.

Agriculture in Zimbabwe to 1980 was divided basically, but not exclusively, along racial lines. White agriculture comprised about 6,000 farms (mostly individually owned, but some corporately owned), employing about 350,000 to 370,000 black farm workers and producing some 75% of total agricultural output and at least 90% of marketable output.⁴³ Black agriculture produced some 25% of total agricultural output but about three-quarters of this was for subsistence consumption, with the remainder being sold. In both the white and black sectors about 70% of production was crops and 30% livestock.

Until 1977, black land was divided into Tribal Trust Land (about 16m hectares) and African Purchase Area land (about 1.5m hectares usually adjacent to Tribal Trust Lands), with another 0.5m hectares set aside for forest areas, parks and wildlife and specially designated land. Amendments to the Land Tenure Act in March 1977 removed legal racial barriers to land ownership, except in the Tribal Trust Lands which remained for the exclusive use of blacks. From then on, all rural land was open to purchase by all races on a commercial basis. Whites could buy land in former African Purchase Areas and blacks could buy land in white farming areas. In 1979, in practice, the actual distribution of land had not altered significantly - few, if any, whites had bought land in former African Purchase Areas and few blacks - mainly because of lack of access to finance - had bought land in white areas. For the purposes of this discussion, the Committee will continue to refer to African Purchase Areas where necessary to identify the main body of black commercial farmers.

Approximately 700,000 farming families in the Tribal Trust Lands worked, on average, some two to four hectares each on communal farming land and in addition held communal grazing rights. They produced about 90% of total output for blacks, mostly for own consumption, and about 22% of total agricultural output (whites and blacks). About 8,000 black 'commercial' farmers had purchased, or were purchasing, land in what until 1977 were African Purchase Areas. Farmers in these areas produced about 10% of total black output, mainly for sale, and about 2.5% of total agricultural output. The size of farms in the former African Purchase Areas ranged from four hectares to about 800 hectares, but averaged about 115 hectares. The 6,000-odd white farms averaged some 2,100 hectares in size.

The major black crops were maize, groundnuts and cotton, with major livestock production confined to cattle and, to a lesser extent, sheep, goats and pigs. The major white crops were maize, tobacco, sugar and cotton. In excess of 90% of white livestock production was beef.

The division of land, at least up to 1980, between the black and white sectors was unequal both in terms of quantity and quality (see chapter 11). Although there was marginally more black land than white, the fact that the number of white farmers was so small made the division of land highly inequitable. Less than 1% of the total number of farmers (whites) owned 46% of the farmland while the remaining 99% (the blacks) owned or occupied 54%. Even if the black population living in white farming areas (about 1.4m in 1979⁴⁴) was included, there were about 10 hectares per head of population in white farming areas as against less than five hectares in black farming areas. While there was no clear-cut division of 'best' or 'worst' land between each sector, most land owned by blacks was in regions where lower and erratic rains and lighter soils were not suited to intensive farming methods.⁴⁵ Details (for 1974) are provided in Table 10.15, and the key statistics, in percentage terms, are shown in Table 10.16.

Table 10.15: Rural land ownership, farm population and relative productivities in 1974

	White rural sector	Black rural sector			Total both sectors
		APAs (a)	TTLs (b)	Total	
Total population ('000)	1 530.0	103.3	3 500.0	3 603.3	5 133.3
Black	1 500.0	103.3	3 500.0	3 603.3	5 103.3
Other	30.0	30.0
Number of farmers ('000)	6.2	8.6	660.0	668.6	674.8
Wage labour	356.9	4.4	..	4.4	361.3
Total land area ('000 ha)	14 839.9	1 072.2	16 200.0	17 272.2	32 112.0
Area under crops ('000 ha)	614.1	85.9	1 677.0	1 762.9	2 377.0
Ratio cropped area: total area (%)	4.1	8.0	10.4	10.2	7.4
Total value of crop production (\$Zm)	231	8 (c)	72 (c)	80 (c)	311
Average yield per hectare (\$Z/ha)	376	93	43	45.4	131
Total production (crops + live-stock) (\$Zm)	320			120	440
Average per hectare total land area (\$Z)	21.56			6.95	13.70
Average hectares per person	9.7	10.4	4.6	4.8	6.3

(a) African Purchase Areas

(b) Tribal Trust Lands

(c) Estimated.

Source: Based on Whitsun Foundation, commissioned paper entitled *Agriculture in Rhodesia*, dated 8.3.77

Table 10.16: Percentage distribution of land ownership, labour and production in agriculture in 1974

	White agriculture	Black agriculture			Total
		APAs	TTLs	Sub-total	
Number of farmers	0.9	1.3	97.8	99	100.0
Wage labour	98.8	1.2	—	1.2	100.0
Total land area	46.2	3.3	50.5	53.8	100.0
Purchased land	93.3	6.7	—	6.7	100.0
Value of output (total production)	72.7	2.7(a)	24.6(a)	27.3(a)	100.0

(a) Estimated
Source: Based on Table 10.15.

It should be borne in mind, however, that white agriculture provided almost all wage employment in agriculture. Also, there were significant inequalities of land distribution within both the white and black sectors. The general view of white farming as characterised by large landholdings, high productivity and high incomes applied only to a minority of whites in agriculture. Some 60% of all white farmland was owned by only about 11% of the total number of farmers (about 736, including a number of corporate farmers).⁴⁶ At the other end of the scale, about 55% of all white farmers owned less than 10% of total white farmland, with about a quarter of white farmers having average farms no bigger than or smaller than, those in African Purchase Areas. Over half the number of white farmers owned only two to three times more land than the average African Purchase Area farmer. On the production side more than half of all white production was accounted for by only 10% of white farmers, while the poorest 43% of white farmers produced less than 10% of agricultural output.

While the average size of white farms was about 2,100 hectares, in the top 10% of farmers (including the major company ranchers) the average farm size was about 12,000 hectares, while the bottom 25% of farmers had farms averaging less than 100 hectares. And of the 736 individual farmers or companies in the top 10%, 216 had farms averaging more than 26,000 hectares, that is, they owned 5.6m hectares of land between them - more than one-third of the total white area. The size of farms also needs to be considered in the light of land productivity. As measured by taxation returns, some 47% of production in 1974-75 came from only 6.2% of the farms.

The distribution of land in the black sector was less unequal, but nevertheless inequalities did exist. In 1976, projected from 1969 census data, some 30% of blacks in the Tribal Trust Lands occupied more than 61% of the total TTL area, with an average of some 80 hectares per family. Much of this land area

however, was the least favourable for farming, and most of the tribal population lived on much more densely populated land, with 54% of all families having less than 16 hectares in 1976 and with some 17% with less than eight hectares per family (i.e. total farming and grazing land).

According to the 1976 Whitsun Foundation study, Agriculture in Rhodesia, these land patterns did not compare unfavourably with land holding patterns in other developing countries.⁴⁷ For example, 1975 FAO and World Bank data for Africa as a whole (excluding some southern countries) showed that about 73% of total land holdings comprised less than 4% of total land area and constituted an average size holding of no more than five hectares - less than in the most densely populated tribal areas of Zimbabwe. However, the amount of land suitable for agriculture in Zimbabwe is such that traditional forms of extensive agriculture cannot be sustained without either or both changing to more intensive farming and increasing the land available for tribal use.

Agriculture in Zimbabwe in general is land extensive and labour intensive. According to the Whitsun Foundation study, Agriculture in Rhodesia, the potential for further growth in terms of land, water and human resources remain^{ed} great, but what ^{was} not assured ^{is} that the distribution of production growth ^{would} will more closely correlate with the racial distribution of the population.⁴⁸ The paper point^{ed} out that in general the black sector combin^{ed} the application of the lowest productivity techniques to the poorest endowed resource base, in contradistinction to the white-owned sector.

White agriculture remains the largest single source of wage employment in the economy, but its share has been declining. In 1977 some 34% of all labour in wage employment was in white-owned agriculture and forestry, compared to 44% in 1965. This employment comprised less than 6,000 whites (mostly in farm

management jobs) at average wages of \$25,737 a year, and about 342,000 blacks at an annual average wage of some \$2232 a year.

In the mid-seventies, despite underemployment in the TTLs, some labour shortages were experienced by white farmers. This was due at least in part to the low level of wages paid to black farm workers and the decline in the value of those wages. Real per capita incomes in the TTLs increased 5% a year from 1969 to 1975, while black agricultural wages in the white sector increased by only 1.8% in real terms. The lessening of the gap between income on the TTLs and in white agriculture probably made blacks less inclined to work for wages on white farms. In 1965-66 the per capita income of black families employed on white farms was 80% greater than that of the average peasant farmer in the TTLs; in 1974-75 it was only 28% greater. Even though incomes on white farms were mainly cash incomes (as against largely subsistence equivalents in the TTLs), a differential of 30%, according to the Whitsun Foundation study, was not great given such factors as leisure preference, self-employment, and job opportunities in other sectors of the economy.

In an attempt to improve wages in the agricultural sector, the Minister for Manpower, Social Affairs, Youth and Rehabilitation in the Muzorewa Government, Dr Aaron Mutiti, announced on 15 November 1979 that adult farmworkers would soon earn a minimum of \$220 a month (\$2240 p.a.) plus traditional benefits.⁴⁹ The minimum wage and conditions came into effect on 1 January 1980.

In the period 1965 to 1978 total gross agricultural production grew from \$2177m to \$2545m, measured in current price terms. In 1978 the total value of agricultural production from white areas was \$2428m, and the value of black production was \$2117m. Details are provided in Table 10.17. The table shows that while white output, most of it for sale, has been increasing each year, black output has remained fairly constant since 1975, and

is being increasingly utilised for household consumption rather than sale. Black sales through marketing agencies have decreased each year since 1975. However, this latter trend may in part reflect an increasing tendency for blacks to sell unofficially, by-passing the marketing agencies.⁵⁰ The population of the Tribal Trust Lands is becoming more dependent on white commercial farms for its basic food requirements.

Both the black and white agricultural sectors experienced growth in production over the period, if somewhat unevenly, with black production more susceptible to climatic changes. Black diversification over the period was mainly into cash crops (cotton, groundnuts, etc.) rather than traditional food grains.

Table 10.17: Agricultural output, 1964-78

Year	Black sector			White sector		
	Sales through marketing agencies	Production for rural household consumption	Approximate total	Gross output (at current prices)	Index of gross output (at 1964 prices)	Index of producer prices
	\$Z million	\$Z million	\$Z million	\$Z million	1964 = 100	1964 = 100
1964	9,0	27,2	36,2	140,0	100,0	100,0
1965	8,6	26,4	35,0	142,2	93,2	108,3
1966	10,2	42,0	52,2	146,6	113,4	90,8
1967	12,3	60,1	72,4	147,1	117,7	88,5
1968	7,2	39,9	47,1	138,7	97,4	98,3
1969	13,7	55,1	68,8	174,2	129,6	93,2
1970	11,2	46,2	57,4	171,9	122,3	98,8
1971	16,5	61,4	77,8	211,7	154,9	97,4
1972	24,9	65,4	90,3	237,5	169,4	98,2
1973	22,2	46,6	68,8	250,7	140,8	126,9
1974	31,9	88,0	119,9	324,7	165,4	140,5
1975	32,2	70,1	102,3	368,2	171,5	154,0
1976	34,1	82,8	117,0	393,4	182,9	152,9
1977	27,3	87,9	115,2	401,0	177,5	159,3
1978 (a)	26,7	90,1	116,8	428,4		

(a) Provisional.

Source: Supplement to the Monthly Digest of Statistics, April 1979. (The July 1979 Supplement shows figures for the Tribal Trust Lands and for 'Other Areas' only, to reflect the fact that the African Purchase Areas no longer exist. 'Other Areas' include both white areas and the former APAs.)

Following is a brief review of the major agricultural products:

(a) Livestock and meat

The national cattle herd of Zimbabwe in early 1978 was larger than the national herds of Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland combined. The official estimates of livestock are shown in Table 10.18. Meat exports have formed an important part of Zimbabwe's agricultural foreign exchange earnings in recent years. Domestic consumption of meat is also comparatively high. In the 1975-76 season it was estimated that 152,000 tonnes of beef were produced - about 60% of it from white farms and the rest from black farms.⁵¹ Other estimates put the white contribution as high as 75%. The 1979 white cattle herd was concentrated on about 4,700 farms.⁵² Cattle in the TTLs are important as draught animals and suppliers of manure, as well as for beef and, to a lesser extent, milk. The black herd has been seriously affected by the guerilla war, and on 27 July 1979 the Government admitted that more than 1m out of a total of 3.4m TTL cattle had died, mainly as a result of tick-borne and other diseases.⁵³ Estimates in late 1979 were that all but 1,500 of the 8,000 cattle-dips and spray-races in black areas were no longer in use. Tsetse fly was once again becoming a serious problem.

According to estimates by the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), Rhodesia exports in 1976 of fresh and frozen meat totalled 17,000 tonnes (worth \$US13m) and canned meat totalled 5,000 tonnes (\$US5m).

Table 10.18: Numbers of livestock, 1965-78.
(*'000*)

Year	White sector			Black sector (a)			
	Cattle			Sheep	Cattle	Sheep	Goats
	Beef	Dairy	Total				
1965	1 519	111	1 631	217	1 844	182	599
1966	1 635	114	1 749	245	1 714	215	778
1967	1 649	108	1 757	260	2 183	263	851
1968	1 966	112	2 078	315	2 036	278	975
1969	2 156	120	2 275	372	2 482	377	1 326
1970	2 440	123	2 563	363	2 623	431	1 545
1971	2 634	123	2 757	330	2 786	438	1 735
1972	2 602	125	2 726	275	2 879	451	1 861
1973	2 481	129	2 610	253	3 037	491	1 930
1974	2 476	128	2 604	235	3 125	518	1 975
1975	2 685	127	2 812	223	3 317	536	1 719
1976	2 805	126	2 931	211	3 381	476	1 734
1977	2 884	123	3 008	199	3 592	486	1 787
1978	2 734	117	2 851	175			

(a) Figures for the black sector for 1965 to 1968 inclusive relate to the TTLS only; those for 1969 onwards also include livestock in the APAs.

Source: Supplement to the Monthly Digest of Statistics, April 1979.

(b) Maize

The major staple of black diets is mealie-meal (maize meal). Annual production, mainly because of the weather, has tended to fluctuate, and varied between 0.6m and 2.0m tonnes in the years 1973-76. In the 1975-76 season, of the estimated 1.75m tonnes produced, 72% came from the white sector, 3% from African Purchase Areas and 25% from TTLs.⁵⁴ Production in 1976 was estimated at 1.4m tonnes of which about 0.5m tonnes was estimated to have been exported.

In 1978, 60% of the national maize crop came from only 1,100 white producers.⁵⁵ Maize production was down in 1978 and again in 1979 because of drought. According to the Minister for Finance in the Muzorewa Government, Mr David Smith, in his Budget Speech on 26 July 1979, maize deliveries in the 1979-80 season would be down by 40% over those in 1978-79 because of drought. However, stockpiles from previous good years were adequate to ensure there would be no shortages during 1979-80.⁵⁶ Drought particularly affects subsistence farmers, who have least money to buy stockpiled grain in bad times. Official maize sales from TTLs have been declining, due in part to seasonal factors and also to increasing household consumption. Sales from the mainly white commercial sector to TTLs have increased in the past few years.

According to figures released by the Government in April 1977, the average yield of maize from white farms was approximately 5,000 kg/hectare, compared to 1,300 kg/ha in Zambia, 700 kg/ha in Zaire and 500 kg/ha in Angola.⁵⁷

(c) Wheat

Wheat is an example of Zimbabwe achieving self-sufficiency after UDI in a formerly imported item. In 1965 Rhodesia imported wheat valued at nearly \$24m - 68% of it from Australia.⁵⁸ After UDI Australia continued to sell wheat to

Rhodesia in substantial quantities until 1972 on 'humanitarian grounds'. But the need for Australian wheat declined over the period and Australia stopped selling wheat from 1972. In 1965 Rhodesia was producing 1.5% of its domestic wheat requirements, by 1971 Rhodesia was producing 75% of domestic requirements, and by 1975, 95%. Rhodesia reportedly became self-sufficient in wheat in 1978. The 1975-76 wheat crop was estimated at 126,000 tonnes of which only about 2% was produced by blacks.

(d) Tobacco

At the time of UDI Rhodesia was, after the United States, the world's second leading exporter of flue-cured tobacco. Tobacco exports, one third by value of all domestic exports in 1965, went to some 64 countries, but with nearly half going to the UK. In 1965 sales of one product, tobacco, to one country, the UK, accounted for 15% of Rhodesia's total exports. Because of this, and because Rhodesian tobacco was easily identifiable, sanctions hit hard. By 1968 the crop had been halved and the number of growers reduced to 1,700 (from 2,800 in 1965).⁵⁹ To meet this situation the Government created the Tobacco Corporation to buy the crop at a guaranteed price, to make export sales and to stockpile the rest. When international demand for tobacco increased in 1972 Rhodesia re-entered what was a seller's market. The journal, World Tobacco, estimated in 1972 that Rhodesia still accounted for 10% of the world's trade in flue-cured tobacco (the pre-UDI figure was 27%).

Because of sanctions few statistics on tobacco production and sales have been made public. A Rhodesian Tobacco Industry Council publication of late 1978 claimed that tobacco in 1978 was still the largest single earner of foreign currency. The Council said the tobacco industry directly employed about 138,000, nearly 15% of all blacks in employment, and 35% of all persons employed in agriculture. Tobacco employed twice as many as in the mining sector, and about the same as in the

manufacturing sector. Mainly as a result of post-UDI diversification, tobacco growers also produced half the national maize crop, half the fodder crop, 29% of groundnuts, 17% of winter wheat and 13% of cotton. In addition, 21% of the national beef herd was on tobacco farms. Tobacco still offered the best financial return per hectare compared to other major crops and 'recently' (1977?) achieved a gross margin of \$2538 per hectare, despite sanctions. According to the Council:

... the tobacco industry has maintained its pre-eminence in the Rhodesian economy in spite of having borne the brunt of sanctions. Through sanctions, inefficiencies have been steadily removed, so that the expertise now remaining is well poised to take advantage of any future expansion ...

Drought, increasing competition from countries such as Brazil and Korea, and a recession in the international market, were factors in a reduction in demand for tobacco in 1978 and 1979. A UN Security Council report estimated 1974 tobacco production at about 75,000 tonnes.

(e) Cotton

Cotton was a major factor in enabling Rhodesia to withstand sanctions. Land and labourers made surplus by the slump in tobacco after UDI were diverted to cotton. Between 1965 and 1972 the production of cotton expanded 800% to more than 200m pounds, 80-90% of which was exported.⁶⁰ The cotton was of best quality, could not be identified as coming from Rhodesia (unlike tobacco) and, via the Cotton Marketing Board, was sold around the world through a single broker. An important by-product of the expansion of cotton-growing was the growth of the domestic textile industry. Textile output doubled between 1965 and 1971. Rhodesia became virtually self-sufficient in essential day-to-day clothing and exported about half its production (part of it to South Africa, where Rhodesian products were so successful that in

1976 Rhodesian textile manufacturers were forced to agree to a limited quota as an alternative to the higher duties being called for by South African textile manufacturers to protect their own position⁶¹). Production in 1976 was estimated at 175m kilograms.

(f) Sugar

Sugar was another product hit hard by sanctions. Sugar became an export earner in the early 1960s through the impetus of large-scale irrigation projects, particularly in the Sabi-Limpopo Valley. The UK became a major market, and in January 1965 Rhodesia obtained a quota under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. It lost this in early 1966 after sanctions. Sugar and tobacco were the two largest single exports to the UK, accounting between them for about 70% of Rhodesian exports to the UK. sugar production reached a peak in 1966 of about 2.6m tonnes of sugar cane. By 1968-69 production had fallen to about 1m tonnes, with considerable sugar-growing areas having been given over to cotton, wheat and citrus fruits. Sugar production began to increase from 1969-70 onwards, and by 1976 had again reached about 2.7m tonnes of sugar cane. The FAO estimate for sugar exports in 1976 was 116,000 tonnes worth \$US46m.

(g) Other crops

Other crops include sorghum and other cereals, groundnuts, soya beans, rice, fruit, coffee and tea. Production of sorghum, millet, barley and other cereals in 1975-76 was estimated at 270,000 tonnes. Sorghum is another staple for many blacks, and sorghum and millet are estimated to account for about 12% of the cultivated area of TTLs. The bulk of marketed sorghum is used for brewing African beer.

Sanctions forced the Rhodesian Government to introduce statutory marketing controls on the production, pricing and

marketing of agricultural produce. Organisations were established such as the Agricultural Marketing Authority (1967), a parent body for such organisations as the Grain Marketing Board (all grains, coffee and tea), the Cotton Marketing Board, the Cold Storage Commission (meat products) and the Dairy Marketing Board. The Tobacco Marketing Board operated outside the AMA and the Tobacco Corporation handled external marketing of the tobacco crop. Other major organisations included the Sabi-Limpopo Authority (1970), set up to develop the potential of the south-eastern lowveld, the Agricultural Development Authority (1971), to develop the national agricultural potential, the Agricultural Finance Corporation (1971), to provide public credit for white farmers (to all farmers from 1979), the Tribal Area Development Corporation (TILCOR, 1968), to foster development in tribal areas, and the Agricultural Research Council (1971), to co-ordinate agricultural research.

A measure of the increase in statutory marketing since 1965 is that in that year more than 35% of total sales were handled by statutory agencies; by 1973 the proportion exceeded 70%. With increased statutory marketing came increased price control, including in a number of cases guaranteed pre-planting prices. Until at least 1977 blacks who marketed produce through statutory boards, while guaranteed a secure price, had to pay a levy on their sales to the African Development Fund, administered by the then Minister of Internal Affairs, for tribal area development. White farmers did not have to pay an equivalent levy.

In recent years white agriculture has become increasingly credit intensive. In 1975 some 6,200 white farmers received credit of about \$211m (about \$218,000 per farmer). On the other hand, the 670,000-odd black farming families (in the TTLs and APAs) received credit of only about \$21m (less than \$22 per farming family).⁶² A major reason for the difference was that most of the credit for whites came from private sector finance

and favoured the type of farming performed by whites (in terms of scale, efficiency and commercial orientation, as against subsistence), and communal land ownership created collateral problems for blacks. Government funds to stimulate black commercial farming were inadequate and, according to the Whitsun Foundation paper on agriculture, poorly managed. The author of the paper commented (in 1977):

Despite the nature of conditions inherent in peasant farming and the difficulties they imply for credit management, these cannot justify the very low level of public resources allocated to this sector. Clearly, this is also a reflection of the low priority given to peasant sector development in general by those deciding on the allocation of public funds.⁶³

The author of the paper claimed that a 'marginal' reallocation of credit resources from white to peasant farming would, in fact, increase total production, because in 1975 the average product per dollar of credit in white agriculture was \$23.16 whereas for blacks utilising credit from the African Loan and Development Trust (ALDT) one of a very few private agencies lending to blacks the average product per dollar of credit was about \$23.60. Most blacks granted loans by ALDT were from African Purchase Areas.

In September 1979 the President of the ^{then} African Farmers Union, Mr Garry Magadzire, claimed that agricultural loan policies continued to discriminate against black farmers despite the advent of a black majority government.⁶⁴ He said the Agricultural Finance Corporation continued to require potential borrowers to have 40% of the purchase price of a farm before it would make a loan. This condition favoured whites and made it almost impossible for black farmers seeking to purchase better farms to do so. Mr Magadzire said that a new financial institution was needed, supported by the Government, specifically to assist small landowners to buy better farms. Certainly blacks have had little access to credit facilities to improve their production and holdings.

(3) Mining

The mining industry of Zimbabwe is small by world standards, but it is diversified, relatively efficient and contributes significantly to the Zimbabwean economy. Some 40 different minerals and metals are produced, the most important of which are asbestos, chromite, coal, copper, gold and nickel, followed by tin, lithium and iron ore. Other minerals include antimony, arsenic, barytes, beryl, corundum, diamonds, flourspar, graphite, kyanite, lead, limestone, mercury, mica, magnesite, manganese, phosphate, platinum, rutile, tantalum, tungsten, vanadium, vermiculite and zinc. Despite sanctions, the industry has been increasing its output in terms of value every year since 1964. But in terms of volume, output has been declining since 1976.

The value of mineral production increased by 6.2% in 1978 despite sanctions and problems caused by transport congestion. Some mines experienced liquidity problems in 1978 in covering stockpiles. These difficulties combined to cause the volume of production index to fall by 7.3% (5.7% in 1977). However, the fall in volume was more than compensated for by increases in the prices of gold, tin, and copper. The Economic Survey for 1978 predicted that the volume and value of production would move ahead when trading restrictions were eased, but limits on transport capacity would prevent mineral exports reaching their full potential for some time.⁶⁵ The Acting Minister for Mines in the Muzorewa Government, Mr W.D. Walker, predicted in November 1979 that the value of mineral production for 1979 was likely to reach \$2300m, and that production of \$2330m was 'not impossible' in 1980.⁶⁶

During sanctions figures for production and reserves of minerals were not released by the Rhodesian Government, but estimates were made by the UN, the US Bureau of Mines and other

organisations interested in mineral supplies. Table 10.19 shows estimated production and reserves for 1977.

Table 10.19: Estimated mineral production and reserves, 1977

Mineral	Production		Reserves (a)	
	Quantity (tonnes)	Percentage of world	Quantity ('000 tonnes)	Percentage of world
Asbestos	80 000	1	n.a.	10
Chromite (22-38% chromium)	600 000	6	544 000	22
Coal	2 500 000	—	1 390 000	—
Copper	50 000	1	n.a.	—
Gold	20	1	300	1
Iron ore	600 000	—	438 000	—
Nickel	16 000	2	n.a.	—
Antimony	300	—	n.a.	—
Bauxite	2 000	—	n.a.	—
Beryllium	3	3	7 000	2
Columbium and tantalum	40	—	n.a.	—
Corundum	2 720	23	300	1
Lithium	91	—	47 000	2
Magnesite	20 000	3	n.a.	—
Phosphate	180 000	—	n.a.	—
Platinum group metals	n.a.	—	4 000 000	—
Silver	5	—	n.a.	—
Tin	600	—	n.a.	—
Tungsten	25	—	4 500	—

(a) Excluding sub-economic resources, as at 1977.

Sources: Based on figures supplied (in early 1979) by the Australian Bureau of Mineral Resources, Geology and Geophysics; the figures for columbium and tantalum, magnesite and phosphate are 1974 figures from W. C. J. van Rensburg & D. A. Pretorius, *South Africa's Strategic Minerals* (Valiant Publishers, Johannesburg, 1977), p. 39; the figure for platinum group metals is from Harry R. Strack, *Sanctions: The Case of Rhodesia* (Syracuse University Press, 1978), p. 92.

The major mineral foreign exchange earner, and also the mineral of most strategic value produced by Zimbabwe is chromite. Chromite is produced in three grades, used by the metallurgical industry, the chemical industry and the refractory industry. The metallurgical industry uses the highest grade of chromite to produce alloy steels, particularly stainless steel. There is no known substitute for chromium to produce stainless steel. However, a variety of industrial materials can substitute for stainless steel but generally give inferior performance for increased costs. Chromium used in some alloy steels may be replaced by metals such as nickel, cobalt, columbium, vanadium or molybdenum, but again the result is often inferior performance at increased costs. Chromium's two principal chemical uses are in pigments (yellow) and plating. Both of these are more susceptible to substitution than metallurgical applications. The refractory industry uses chromite to produce refractory bricks for lining surfaces that operate at high temperatures (mainly open hearth and electric furnaces in the steel industry). However, magnesite bricks can be substituted in many uses.

Zimbabwe produces less than 10% of the world's chromite. The major producer is South Africa (34% of world production in 1977) followed by the USSR (23%) and Albania (8%). Zimbabwe is estimated to have 22% of world reserves of chromite, while South Africa has 75% and the USSR only 1%.⁶⁷ What makes Zimbabwe chromite strategically important is that it comprises 80-90% of the world's known reserves of the highest grade of chromite, the metallurgical grade, for which there are no comparable substitutes in some uses (e.g. in making stainless steel). South Africa has only about 9% of world reserves of metallurgical grade chromite and the USSR only about 2%. While South African production of chromite is greater than that of Zimbabwe, most of it is chemical grade chromite and South Africa has on occasions imported metallurgical grade ore from Zimbabwe for its own ferrochromium industry. Interestingly, over the years since UDI there have been reports that the USSR has been purchasing

chromite (and asbestos) from Rhodesia despite sanctions, and in the case of chromite, reselling some of it to the US at a profit. The USSR has also been accused of sanctions-breaking by purchasing minerals from Rhodesia by the UN Security Council's Sanctions Committee.⁶⁸

Rhodesian chromite production was about 585,000 tonnes in 1965. Production fell with the imposition of mandatory sanctions in 1966, rose again from 1969, but declined from early 1977 with the 'repeal' of the Byrd Amendment and an international slump in the steel and metal industries. The Byrd Amendment (to a Defence Procurement Bill), passed by the US Congress in November 1971, prohibited the embargoing of any strategic material imported from a non-communist country as long as the same material was being imported from a communist country. Without explicitly referring to Rhodesia or chrome, the main effect of the amendment was to exempt Rhodesian chrome and other strategic minerals from US import restrictions imposed in support of UN mandatory sanctions. (Rhodesia in 1972 was producing 22 of the 72 metals or minerals products listed by the US as 'strategic and critical'). The amendment was not actually repealed, but in March 1977 Congress enacted legislation which circumvented it with the effect of reimposing a US embargo on Rhodesian chrome.⁶⁹

The imposition of sanctions in 1966 forced the US into greater reliance on the USSR and South Africa (and, to a lesser extent, Turkey) for its chromite supplies. When the Byrd Amendment came into effect Rhodesian exports of metallurgical grade chromite resumed, to reach about 11% of total US imports (by volume) between 1972 and 1976 - considerably less than the 35-40% of total US imports in the early 1960s. The low percentage on the resumption of exports to the US is misleading in that US imports of processed chromite, in the form of ferrochrome alloys, increased significantly. A Rhodesian move toward the processing of chromite, begun before UDI, was given added impetus by sanctions - the extra value added meant more foreign exchange.

With the passage of the Byrd Amendment, US imports of ferrochrome from Rhodesia increased from nil to some 20-40% of total ferrochrome imports. Another reason for chromite exports to the US not returning to their former levels was that Rhodesia had diversified its markets and, with sanctions, was not keen once again to concentrate them. Additionally, the USSR's share of US imports of chromite had increased, from 36% in 1965 to 67% in 1968, and back to 58% in 1970. The USSR's share in 1974, some two years after passage of the Byrd Amendment, was still 56% due to price cuts to meet Rhodesian competition.⁷⁰

Of the other major minerals, in excess of 80% of asbestos, copper, gold and nickel were also believed to be exported. Rhodesia was the third largest producer of asbestos in the Western world before UDI - chrysotyle asbestos being its most valuable mineral product. Its current share of world production is small, due in part to a declining demand for asbestos and to increased production in other countries (Canada, the USSR and South Africa between them produced more than 80% of world requirements in 1977).

Until it was overtaken by asbestos in the 1950s, gold was the principal mineral product of Rhodesia. The estimated production of some 20 tonnes in 1977 came mainly from a large number of small mines - some 530, according to the UN Economic and Social Council's Commission on Transnational Corporations.⁷¹ Australia in 1977 produced approximately the same quantity of gold as Rhodesia. By comparison, South Africa's production of gold in 1977 was about 700 tonnes, and the USSR's about 444 tonnes.

Secondary industry has benefited considerably from Rhodesia's mineral development - the processing and beneficiation of minerals up to 1980 accounted for more than 25% of industry's output (particularly the steel and ferro-alloy industries). According to spokesmen for the mining industry there is good

potential for growth and the exploitation of new deposits and new minerals (e.g. platinum is known to exist in considerable quantities in the Great Dyke area), depending on world mineral and metal markets and the availability of capital.⁷²

The mining industry in 1978 employed about 54,000 blacks and 3,900 whites, compared to 60,000 blacks and 4,100 whites in 1976. Nearly all employees, plus approximately 150,000 dependents, were accommodated at the mines - 52% of black employees in married accommodation and the remaining 48% in single quarters. According to the mining industry about 2,000 whites and 6,000 blacks were salaried staff and the remaining 1,900 whites and 48,000 blacks were 'daily paid' workers. About 20% of workers were union members. Black workers in 1979 occupied between 15-20% of the skilled positions, and the percentage was increasing as training programmes were stepped up.

According to the British journal, New African Development (January 1977), UK, South African and US companies were estimated to own about 90% of Rhodesian mining concerns - in roughly equal shares.

The industry's main problems in 1979 were the world recession, the loss of white skills through emigration and, to a lesser extent, the call-up, the security situation in some mining areas and sanctions.⁷³

4. Other sectors

(1) Construction

The lack of economic growth since 1974 has hit building and civil engineering more than most other industries. The amount of new work commenced, mainly in the public sector, has declined steadily since 1975, and would have declined even further but for greater emphasis on low-cost housing for blacks. In 1978 plans

for 11,600 new low-cost houses were approved, compared to 8,700 in 1977. The number of approvals for 1979 was expected to exceed the total for 1978. Total value of construction in 1978 fell by 11.2%.

(2) Tourism

The number of visitors to Rhodesia in 1972 was 405,000. The number in 1978 was 102,000 - only a quarter of the total five years earlier. The decline was attributed mainly to the worsening security situation caused by the guerilla war. The continuing decrease in the number of overseas visitors (mainly tourists, but including businessmen and other persons) had a serious effect on the tourist industry and the national airline, Air Rhodesia. A number of hotels at tourist centres outside the main cities (e.g. at Victoria Falls) had to close or operate on a care and maintenance basis. The number of Rhodesian residents travelling outside the country (mainly to South Africa) declined to 174,000 in 1977 as against a peak of 230,000 in 1973.

(3) Banking and finance

A marked build-up in liquidity in the banking sector was a feature of 1978. This was a result of the general decline in economic activity and a further decline in the demand for bank advances because of the lack of opportunity for business investment. The money supply grew strongly, reflecting increased Government borrowings to help finance the guerilla war and meet difficulties caused by sanctions. Although the money supply grew faster than the GDP at current prices it was not, according to the Economic Survey for 1978, considered excessive 'bearing in mind the need to maintain a stimulative influence on the economy while the recession continues'. ~~Total assets of the banking sector, including all deposit receiving institutions other than the Reserve Bank, rose \$2185m to a total of \$22,006m in 1978 - an increase of nearly 10%.~~ Stock exchange turnover for 1978 was nearly 18% higher than in 1977.

(4) Commerce

In 1978 the consumer price index for higher income urban families (mainly whites) increased by 6.4% (excluding sales tax and excise duty), compared to 6.8% in 1977. The increase for lower income urban families (mainly blacks) was 9.9% (excluding sales tax and excise duty), compared to 8.9% in 1977. In both cases the major contributor to the increase was food (5.2% in the case of lower income urban families).

Over the 14 years to 1979 the retail and wholesale sectors came to rely heavily on the manufacturing sector for merchandise - before UDI almost all consumer goods were imported but in 1978 the importation of consumer goods had reduced to less than 15% of what it was in 1965. Apart from tourism, the sector earned very little foreign exchange. In terms of wages to blacks, the commercial sector is well above the national average. In 1977 for blacks in commerce, wages varied from \$2810 p.a. to \$21,360 p.a. - compared to the national average of \$2588 p.a.⁷⁴

5. Infrastructure

(1) Energy

Main sources of power in Zimbabwe are hydro-electricity (supplemented by thermal electricity from coal) and imported liquid fuels. Hydro-electricity comes from the Kariba Dam hydro-electric scheme, a joint facility with Zambia, administered by the Central African Power Corporation. Kariba produced its first power in 1960 and its generating plant was fully commissioned in 1962. In 1965 Rhodesia consumed 2,138m kilowatt hours of electricity but by 1978 this had grown to 6,263m kilowatt hours - most of it from the Central African Power Corporation grid (based on Kariba). Only about 11% of Zimbabwe's power was generated by thermal stations in 1978. Nearly half (47%) the electrical energy

consumed is used by the manufacturing, transport and construction industries. Another 20% is used in mining and quarrying, 7% in agriculture, and 10% by domestic users.

Zimbabwe has good supplies of coal suitable for both electricity generation and oil-from-coal processes. Active research and development programs are underway in relation to solar power, and obtaining liquid fuels from agricultural products.

Virtually all of Zimbabwe's liquid fuels are imported, coming from or through South Africa for most of the period of sanctions. One estimate of oil consumption in Rhodesia for 1976 was between 14,000 and 18,000 barrels a day - about 600,000 tonnes a year.⁷⁵ This represented about 7.5% of the then production of South African refineries. A higher estimate was given in the Bingham Report on the supply of petroleum and petroleum products to Rhodesia.⁷⁶ The report stated that at the time of UDI total consumption of all petroleum products in Rhodesia was running at an annual rate of about 410,000 tonnes. The total fell after UDI but was restored to its pre-UDI level by about 1969. It increased thereafter and in 1977 stood at about 800,000 tonnes a year. Consumption to 1980 probably did not increase significantly.

(2) Transport

Transport and communications are generally well-developed. However the railway system is overloaded and needs upgrading. The Zimbabwe rail system consists of a line to Zambia at Victoria Falls, two lines to Mozambique (to the ports of Beira and Maputo (formerly Lourenco Marques)), a line through Botswana to South Africa and a direct line to South Africa through the border town of Beit Bridge. Border closures by Zambia (1973) and Mozambique (1976) meant that all freight into and out of Zimbabwe had to travel either on the direct route to South Africa or the route via Botswana.

The Zambian border closure caused Rhodesia Railways to suffer loss of considerable revenue from transit traffic - the railways' net deficit of \$21.9m in 1972 rose to \$211m in 1973 and \$219m in 1974. Zambia and Rhodesia agreed to allow through-traffic to Zaire to continue, and in 1979, because of economic difficulties, Zambia itself resumed rail shipments through Rhodesia. The border closure also halted road traffic.

The March 1976 border closure by Mozambique was an even more severe blow. In 1974 Rhodesia had been sending up to 80% of its total exports through Mozambique. At the time of the border closure this figure was still at least 30% (other estimates put the figure as high as 60%⁷⁷) - all of which then had to be re-routed to South Africa. In addition to the extra costs of carriage over rail routes nearly three times longer than those through Mozambique, Rhodesia Railways also lost an estimated sixth of its rolling stock in Mozambique at the time of the closure. The deficit increased to \$229m in 1976, \$237m in 1977 and dropped slightly to \$236m in 1978. The deficit in 1978-79 was \$229m - a reduction from the previous year due in part to the return of Zambian traffic. Since 1976 revenue earnings per tonne hauled, gross and net tonnes per kilometre and the number of passengers carried have all declined 13% or more.

The closure of the Mozambique border left Rhodesia with four major outlets - air services (mainly to South Africa), a road through Beit Bridge into South Africa, the railway line to South Africa through Beit Bridge and the railway line through Botswana. A shortage of rolling stock, occasional bottlenecks in South Africa, particularly at South African ports, shortages of skilled manpower and spare parts and guerilla activity all contributed to congestion on Rhodesia Railways. Dependence on South Africa for trade outlets also left Rhodesia open to political pressures, as in 1976 (long delays experienced in the second half of 1976 were said to have been deliberately contrived

as a warning to Mr Smith to seek a settlement⁷⁸). The Economic Survey of Zimbabwe Rhodesia for 1978 referred twice to the problems caused for mineral and manufacturing exports by rail congestion.

The Standard Bank, in its December 1979 Economic Bulletin, said that transport congestion ^{would} continue well into 1980 and that it could take up to a year to re-open rail links to the Mozambique ports of Beira and Maputo.

Zimbabwe has a fairly well developed internal road system, but during the time of the Zambian and Mozambique border closures, depended on one major road, that through Beit Bridge, for the movement of the bulk of its non-rail surface freight (there is another longer, road link with South African through Botswana).

The main airline and national carrier is Air Zimbabwe, which, as Air Rhodesia, was organised in 1967 on the dissolution of Central African Airways. Originally Air Rhodesia provided services to South Africa, Mozambique and Malawi. The Mozambique and Malawi services stopped in 1976 with the Mozambique border closure. Services to South Africa continued. In 1978, according to Zimbabwe Rhodesian statistics, Air Rhodesia carried 418,000 passengers and flew 40m tonne kilometres. Air Rhodesia enjoyed an interline agreement and pooling arrangements with South African Airways, the only foreign airline which flew into Zimbabwe until the return to legality brought a resumption of air services from countries such as the UK, Zambia and Malawi in early 1980.

An independent Rhodesian airline, Afro-Continental Airways, maintained cargo and passenger services to Windhoek, Namibia, between at least 1971 and 1973, and was connected to another Rhodesian airline, Air Trans-Africa (ATA), which established a subsidiary, Affretair, in Gabon. Affretair

maintained an extensive air freight service for the benefit of Rhodesia until dissolved by the Gabon Government in 1976.⁷⁹

(3) Water

Zimbabwe has more than 7,000 dams, ranging from numerous small ones to some 45 major ones, used both for drinking water and irrigation, and in the case of Kariba, for electricity generation. Currently, more than 20% of crop land is under irrigation, and estimates are that only between 10% and 15% of Zimbabwe's water storage capacity has been utilised, indicating considerable development potential, if finance is available.

6. The 1979-80 Budget

'This is unashamedly a war budget', the Zimbabwe Rhodesian Finance Minister in the Muzorewa Government, Mr David Smith, said when he introduced the 1979-80 Budget into Parliament on 26 July 1979. Mr Smith announced that \$2402m, the equivalent of \$21.1m a day⁸⁰, would be provided for defence and security. This was 37% of total expenditure. By contrast, the 1974-75 figure for defence and security was \$295.6m, or 18% of total expenditure. Mr Smith said that growth in the administrative, social and economic spheres had been sacrificed to meet the demands of the war against Patriotic Front guerilla forces.

Supplementary estimates tabled in the Zimbabwe Rhodesian Parliament on 27 November 1979 provided for an additional \$276m for defence spending - increasing expenditure on security and defence to about 41% of the 1979-80 Budget.⁸¹ The supplementary expenditure meant that the war in late 1979 was costing some \$21.3m. a day - until the ceasefire negotiated at Lancaster House.

The 1979-80 Budget was the first in Rhodesia to exceed \$21,000m. Despite a 26% increase in the Law and Order vote and a

25% increase in the Defence vote, overall expenditure (excluding constitutional and statutory appropriations) went up only about 10%. In real terms overall expenditure was about the same as that of 1978-79. The largest appropriation, of \$2213m, went to Defence. It was more than twice the next largest vote, \$2104m, for Education. The third largest vote was \$293m for Law and Order. For details of estimated expenditure see Table 10.20.

Table 10.20: Zimbabwe Rhodesia 1979-80 Budget—Expenditure

	Amount (\$Z million)	Percentage of total	Percentage change on 1978-79
<i>Vote appropriations</i>			
Defence	213	24.9	+24.5
Education	104	12.2	+15.7
Law and Order	93	10.8	+26.1
Transport and Power	64	7.4	+ 9.7
Agriculture	62	7.2	- 8.4
Health	52	6.1	+14.6
Treasury	52	6.1	+23.1
Home Affairs (previously Internal Affairs)	43	5.0	+ 3.3
Works	38	4.5	+10.0
Roads and Road Traffic	31	3.6	+ 9.9
Commerce and Industry	18	2.1	-49.1
Other	85	10.1	-
Total	854	100	+ 9.5
<i>Constitutional and statutory provisions</i>			
Pensions and commutation of pensions	30		+25.4
Compensation to 'victims of terrorism'	20		-14.3
Servicing national debt	83		+27.4
Repayment of loans	82		+47.7
Other	13		-
Total	229		+25.3
Total expenditure	1 083		+13.5

Note: Discrepancies in totals are due to rounding.

Source: Based on Rhobank Ltd. *Rhobank Economic Review*, September 1979, and an analysis of budget by Rhodesian Accountants Ltd (publishers of *Executive Guide to the Economy*).

With total expenditure estimated at \$21,083m, main sources of income were stated as \$2616m from revenue (including \$224m from a 10% tax surcharge) and \$212m from loan recoveries, leaving a deficit of \$2454m to be met by borrowings - an increase of 28% over the previous year. For details of estimated income see Table 10.21. Of revenue, some \$2158m was expected from personal income tax. (In 1976-77, the amount raised from personal income tax was \$292.3m, of which \$291m was contributed by 94,472 whites and \$21.3m was contributed by 4,484 blacks.)

~~The information available to the Sub-Committee did not indicate the total of Zimbabwean external borrowings in recent years, but it did not appear to be large in proportion to domestic borrowings. Of the \$282m provided for the repayment of borrowings in 1979-80 only \$26.5m was for external borrowings.~~

Of total estimated expenditure of \$21,083m, current expenditure was stated as accounting for \$2916m (up 13%), capital expenditure for \$258m (up 6.5%), government loans for \$226m (down 22.6%), and repayment of borrowings for \$282m (up 48.8%). Major changes in the Budget were the dropping of the 12.5% National Defence Levy on tax payable by companies and individuals, but the reintroduction of the tax surcharge with an increase from 7.5% to 10%. The holiday allowance was increased to \$2600 for holidays in Africa and \$2800 for overseas.

Planned expenditures of most benefit to blacks included the construction of 19 new primary schools and extensions to other schools to provide 22,000 new places, four new secondary schools and extensions to others to provide 3,000 new places, commencement of a major hospital to serve the Chitungwiza area, \$21m for rural development (three land settlement schemes), and greater emphasis on low-cost housing - despite a drop of \$22.5m in the housing vote from \$233m last year. Other items of expenditure included a \$231m subsidy for the Zimbabwe Rhodesia Railways - a drop of \$211m on the previous year, plus a loan to

the railways of \$29.4m nearly \$230m for subsidies on crops and drought relief, \$29m for export incentive bonuses, a \$215m grant to RISCO, the Rhodesian Iron and Steel Corporation - \$212.5m less than the previous grant, and \$29m for the University of Zimbabwe Rhodesia. Another \$23m was set aside for youth work and rehabilitation in areas affected by the security situation.

Table 10.21: Zimbabwe Rhodesia 1979-80 Budget—Income

	Amount (\$2 million)	Percentage of total	Percentage change on 1978-79
Revenue			
Sales tax	160	26.0	+ 7.7
Personal income tax	158	25.6	+ 13.7
Company tax	124	20.1	+ 14.2
Property and investments	43	6.9	- 3.6
Excise tax	37	6.0	+ 4.5
Customs duties	22	3.6	+ 1.1
Pensions contributions	15	2.3	+ 1.1
Education and health fees	12	1.9	+ 42.2
Stamp duties	4	0.7	+ 2.0
Other (incl. tax surcharge)	42	6.9	-
Total	616	100	+ 6.3
Loan recoveries	12		- 5.8
Borrowings and cash balances	454		+ 27.7
Net decrease in short term loans	1		- 91.2
Total income	1 083		+ 13.5

Note: Discrepancies in totals are due to rounding.

Source: Based on Rhobank Ltd, *Rhobank Economic Review*, September 1979, and on analysis of budget by Rhodesian Acceptances Ltd.

The budget was basically one of consolidation. There was little in the Budget to meet the higher aspirations of blacks after the April 1979 elections in the form of attempts to narrow the wage gap, and to provide cheaper education and health services, better housing, greater rural development and generally a better standard of living. Mr David Smith instead urged wage restraint and continued belt-tightening because of sanctions and the continuing guerilla war. In a veiled warning to whites he said there would be times when it would be 'simply not possible' to maintain a particular standard of living. Mr Smith said the existing time was one for continuing restraint in prices and wages. He appealed particularly to the large numbers of black teachers pressing for wage parity. He said most of their claims were 'justifiable' but warned that with a limited Education vote not everything could be achieved in the existing situation, particularly in view of pressures 'to bring about the opportunity of schooling, especially secondary schooling, to an increasing number of those who desire it'.⁸²

In relation to agriculture Mr Smith said that the most urgent task was to develop the smaller farmers and the subsistence sector. Commercial farming had to be maintained and expanded but it was within the small-scale and subsistence sectors that economic advancement for most people lay. 'We do not wish ever to find ourselves in the position of other countries in Africa which are perennial importers of foodstuffs ...', he said.⁸³

In relation to the overall economy, Mr Smith said that reduced economic activity had caused increased unemployment and had had 'severe effects' on the urban population, which could no longer return to the rural areas as a haven in times of recession. He continued:

Partly because of security problems the movement is now in a reverse direction, and the urban dwellers are hard-pressed to care

for the increasing number of dependants as their relatives move out of rural production into greater reliance on the urban economy.⁸⁴

7. Conclusions

While the Zimbabwe economy has grown despite sanctions, there is evidence to indicate that growth has not been as great as it might have been. A comparison of growth rates with certain other countries in the region shows that some countries, Kenya in particular, have enjoyed faster growth rates in a number of areas in the early 1970s, as shown in Table 10.22. Zambia, Malawi, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda all enjoyed a faster growth rate in exports and Kenya in agricultural and manufacturing production and manufacturing employment. Both Kenya and Zambia also achieved greater rates of school enrolments and education spending than Zimbabwe Rhodesia.

*Table 10.22: Comparative growth rates
(Index numbers (1964-65 = 100))*

<i>Exports</i>	<i>1973</i>
Rhodesia	110
Zambia	148
Malawi	252
Kenya	264
Tanzania	156
Uganda	164
Agricultural production	1973
Rhodesia (1969 = 100)	157
Kenya (1969 = 100)	167
Manufacturing production	1976
Rhodesia (1969 = 100)	144
Kenya (1969 = 100)	181
Manufacturing employment	1976
Rhodesia	160
Malawi (1971)	400
Kenya	210
School enrolments (all races)	1976
Rhodesia	134
Zambia (1971)	200
Malawi (1971)	111
Kenya	303
Education budget	1971
Rhodesia (1968 = 100)	142
Zambia (1968 = 100)	168
Kenya (1968 = 100)	207

Sources: Africa: South of the Sahara 1978-79 (Europa Publications), p. 756, based on comparable data from Monthly Digests of Statistics, Salisbury, Zomba and Lusaka; Economic and Statistical Review, Nairobi.

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What of the future? Zimbabwe Rhodesian government officials in 1979 predicted that in the first full year after sanctions were 'lifted, the GDP could rise by 3% in real terms. In the longer term, the capacity of the Zimbabwean economy to expand and develop would be 'limited only by its ability to broaden its skilled manpower base and its success in developing alternative domestic sources of energy to reduce its dependence on imported fuels'.⁸⁵

The present chapter has outlined a broadly-based, basically sound economy which, as at 1979, was under stress because of sanctions and the guerilla war, and suffering particularly from foreign exchange shortages and losses of skilled manpower. The outline is also of an economy that until 1979 was white dominated and in which the fruits of production in virtually all sectors were shared unequally between the races.

In its examination of the past the chapter points to the main problem for the future - the aspirations of blacks for greater participation in the money economy and for a more equitable distribution of resources. This is the challenge which faces the recently - elected Government led by Mr Mugabe. It is, as the next chapter will show in more detail, a daunting challenge.

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CHAPTER 11

Land and economic development

1. Land tenure

(1) The period to 1930

Perhaps the major determinant of Zimbabwean economic, political and social life has been land. Whites were first attracted to Rhodesia for its reputed mineral wealth, not its land. But when it became apparent that the mineral wealth was not going to materialise to the extent hoped for, the emphasis quickly switched to the exploitation of land for farming and grazing, and by 1899 some six million hectares of land had been expropriated by white settlers (about one-sixth of Zimbabwe's total land area of 39m hectares).

The first reserves for blacks were marked out when the Land Commission of 1894 recommended the establishment of two native reserves in Matabeleland as part of the settlement after the Ndebele uprising in 1893.¹ By 1908 nearly 100 reserves totalling about 10m hectares had been approved (80 reserves, plus most of the Mtoko District, totalling an estimated 7m hectares in Mashonaland and 16 reserves totalling an estimated 3.1m hectares in Matabeleland).

In the early years of rule by the British South Africa Company blacks had the right - at the insistence of the Imperial authorities in Britain - to own and buy land anywhere. Thus the Southern Rhodesia Order in Council 1898 proclaimed the right of blacks to 'acquire, hold, encumber, and dispose of land on the same conditions as a person who is not a native'.² Although

native reserves had been set up for 'traditional' communal occupation, individual blacks with the capital and expertise could buy freehold farms in the same way as white settlers. A few sales or grants were in fact made to blacks, but these were almost always blacks imported from South Africa who had helped put down the Ndebele uprising. Company policy was to oppose the transfer of freehold land to blacks - it refused to sell its own land to blacks and did not encourage white settlers to sell to blacks. By 1925 only 14 farms had been sold to blacks.

When the expectation of a 'Second Rand' in Rhodesia was not fulfilled, Company policy from 1908 was to encourage maximum utilisation of the land by whites and to this end it actively encouraged immigration from the UK. It hoped by this means to establish a Southern Rhodesia which was largely self-sufficient, which would enable it to recover its investments and which would generate a profit on land sales and the use of the Company-owned railway system.

The reserves had been created in response to the uprisings of 1893 and 1896-97 - it was not generally intended then that they be permanent.³ White demands for the better land near railways subsequently caused the reduction of some reserves and by 1915 their area was only about 8.3m hectares, holding an estimated 55% of blacks (in Mashonaland the proportion was 65%; in Matabeleland 36%). The remainder lived either on the 9.1m hectares alienated by whites by 1913, or on the 19.4m hectares which remained virtually unalienated.

The pressures on blacks to move on to reserves, however, were increasing. White farmers, under the High Commissioner's Proclamation of 1896 regulating black settlement on white farms, were able to charge annual rents from blacks on their land - land which the selfsame blacks had owned before it was expropriated by whites - and some absentee white landlords were in effect living off the rents charged to their tenants ('kaffir farming'). An

attempt to limit this practice was the Private Locations Ordinance of 1908 which limited the number of blacks permitted on a white farm and which required owners to take out a licence for each adult male on their farm (with absentee landlords paying a much higher rate for their licences). Because of the limits, and the rents charged to blacks, a number were forced off white farms. Another impetus to the settlement of reserves (and to assist in procuring labour for whites) was the Company decision in 1908 to impose a rent on unalienated land. Other factors included a tax on dogs, the decision by a number of ranching companies in 1912 to charge their tenants a grazing fee on top of (increased) rents and compulsory cattle-dipping charges in some areas.

The Native Reserves Commission was set up in 1914 to regularise the piecemeal adjustment of reserve areas and to ensure adequate land was available for the future requirements of blacks. The Commission's interim report of 1914 and final reports of 1915 were accepted by the UK Government in 1917 and given effect by the Native Reserves Order in Council of 1920. The Commission recommended a net reduction in the total area of reserves of some 430,300 hectares - some 5% of the total of 104 reserves the Commission found to be in existence. In general, large reserves were reduced to create as many medium size reserves as possible located near white farming areas. There was little adjustment to white farming areas. The land transferred from reserves to white farming areas was generally the better quality land. Overcrowding on some reserves was already apparent.⁴

In the period 1915-25 white agriculture expanded rapidly and became increasingly important in the country's economy. Company rule ended and Rhodesia became a 'self-governing' colony. With the increase in importance of white agriculture, calls for some form of segregation of whites and blacks also increased. The reasons for this were complex, and were not dependent solely on

prejudice, although an important factor was the stimulus being provided by similar moves in South Africa. White farmers were strongly opposed to blacks buying land in their midst for both social and economic reasons - the major economic reason at that time being that they feared possible black competition.⁵ They began to press more and more strongly for the creation of separate areas in which blacks could purchase land.

The Native Department supported black land ownership but also came to support the creation of separate areas, possibly adjoining reserves, where this could take place. Missionaries took a similar view - many on the grounds that the right of blacks to purchase land anywhere in practice meant that they purchased nowhere.⁶ Black associations such as the Rhodesian Bantu Voters' Association (RBVA) and the Rhodesian Native Association were also prepared to accept a policy of separate land ownership - if only as a means of having more land made available to blacks. A further reason in favour of separate black ownership of land was that it would allow the establishment of black middle class farmers sympathetic to white agricultural production who could act as a buffer between the whites and dispossessed blacks.

The increasing pressures for some form of segregation based on land resulted in the setting up of another Land Commission, the Morris Carter Land Commission, in 1925. At the end of that year the Commission reported in favour of a policy of separate land purchase areas for blacks and whites. It recommended that an estimated 2.8m hectares of unalienated (i.e. Crown) land be assigned to blacks as Native Purchase Areas, that 7.1m hectares be reserved for future purchase by whites and that 7.2m hectares, in remote and tsetse-ridden areas, be left unassigned. Paragraph 63 of the Commission's report read:

However desirable it may be that members of the two races should live together side by side with equal rights as regards the holding

of land, we are convinced that in practice, probably for generations to come, such a policy is not practicable or in the best interests of the two races, and that until the Native has advanced very much further on the paths of civilization, it is better that the points of contact in this respect between the two races should be reduced.

The main points of the Commission's report were:

- (a) That separation between black and white was desirable and was likely to remain so for many years to come;
- (b) That the future of the black was mainly agricultural and pastoral;
- (c) That growing numbers were, however, moving into urban areas and on to mines; and
- (d) That a class of black was emerging who was becoming completely divorced from tribal society and economy.

The Commission excluded from its terms of reference the question of the enlargement or adequacy of reserves. After some five years of discussion and negotiation, most of the commission's recommendations were agreed by the Government of Southern Rhodesia with the passage of the Land Apportionment Act in 1930.

Much of the best land had already been alienated. Of the 3m hectares of Native Purchase Areas actually assigned in the Land Apportionment Act, some 1.6m hectares comprised five large, remote, low-lying and in some cases tsetse-infested areas, long distances from markets and of little use. A lot of the land was waterless and could not be farmed. Despite the fact that some 3m hectares of white land - more than two-thirds of it within 50km of the railway - was unoccupied and undeveloped at the time, the Act nevertheless extended the white area from 12.6m hectares to

19.4m hectares. Although white agriculture expanded rapidly in the next 40 years the actual area of land used by whites increased by only 1.8m hectares or 14%, indicating that much of the additional land assigned to whites could have been allocated to blacks.⁷

(2) The Land Apportionment Act 1930

The Land Apportionment Act was probably the most contentious item of legislation passed by a Rhodesian government up to UDI. It figured predominantly in political debate from the time of its enactment and an attempt to repeal it was largely responsible for the fall of the United Federal Party Government in 1962. Robin Palmer, in a study of the origins of the Act entitled Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia, commented:

Since UDI, it and its successor, the 1969 Land Tenure Act, has been a major bone of contention in the various Anglo-Rhodesian negotiations over the independence issue. For the whites in Rhodesia the Act has become something of a Magna Carta, guaranteeing the preservation of their way of life against encroachment from the black hordes, whereas for Africans the Act is seen as blatantly discriminatory and palpably unjust. On both sides the issue has become emotionally charged,⁸ defying all attempts at rational analysis.

The Land Apportionment Act came into effect on 1 April 1931. It divided the land thus: 8.8m hectares for Native Reserves, 3m hectares for Native Purchase Areas and 19.9m hectares for white areas, with the remaining 7.2m hectares of unreserved land remaining unallocated. At the time there were 48,000 whites, of whom only 11,000 were settled on the land, and 1.4m blacks. Whites received the major share of the land both in terms of quantity and quality. By means of the Land Apportionment Act, whites firmly established themselves in a position of economic and political dominance. Segregation meant separateness, but not equality.

In the years following, attempts were made to encourage blacks occupying land in white areas and paying rent to white farmers to move on to reserves or to purchase land in Native Purchase Areas, so that only wage-earning or contract labour blacks would remain in white areas. In some areas blacks were also moved from unalienated Crown land but in others overcrowding on nearby reserves made this difficult and blacks were permitted to stay on payment of rent. Measures designed to limit competition from blacks, such as the Maize Control Acts and the Cattle Levy Act, also had the effect of forcing blacks on to reserves.

The Land Apportionment Act was to have been implemented by 1937 - implementation involving the movement of some 100,000 blacks. When it proved impossible to meet this deadline the time limit for the abolition of rent agreements was extended to 1941, by which time an estimated 50,000 blacks had been moved from white areas on to reserves.⁹ Additional land had to be provided for blacks in areas particularly subject to overcrowding in 1935-36, and again in 1950 (Special Native Areas).

What proved so galling for blacks being forced off white land by one means or another was that so much of it was not being used, while the reserves on to which they were being forced were frequently overcrowded and overstocked. In many reserves blacks could no longer live off the land and thus were forced to turn to wage labour to survive. By 1932 more than 80% of black cash earnings were from wage labour.

By the end of the 1930s the agricultural economy of the Shona and Ndebele had been largely destroyed. White farmers were assisted by subsidies and loans and extension facilities. Their control of land through the Land Apportionment Act gave them control over labour. Blacks were denied a political voice, were relegated to a subsistence existence on overcrowded reserves and

were given little or no assistance if they did attempt to purchase land in Native Purchase Areas. Little money was spent on agricultural development on the reserves compared to what was spent on promoting white agriculture. An attempt to convert the communal ownership system of the reserves into a form of individual ownership through the African Land Husbandry Act of 1951 was abandoned 10 years later.¹⁰ This Act also attempted, unsuccessfully, to enforce conservation measures alien to most blacks on reserves.

By 1960 a reduction in urban job opportunities and increasing black resentment against the Land Apportionment Act, plus the economic security of whites vis a vis blacks, encouraged the governing United Federal Party to propose abolition of the Act. In doing so the UFP was acting on the recommendations of a Select Committee (the Quinton Committee) set up by the Rhodesian Legislative Assembly in 1958 which reported in 1960. Among the Committee's conclusions were the following:


In general, your Committee feels that many of the original justifications for land apportionment are no longer valid. One of the major difficulties arising from the operation of the Act is the illogicality of reserving land in a particular area for purchase exclusively by members of one race, to the exclusion of members of the other race. For example, an African or a European, with the necessary financial resources and other qualifications, who wishes to buy a particular piece of land, may be debarred from doing so solely on the grounds that the land in which he is interested is situated in an area reserved for occupation by members of the other race. Whatever justifications there may originally have been for this attitude it is difficult to justify this artificial barrier in 1960 when the crying need is for more development and for an increase in the national output. This demands the freeing of all land from unnecessary restrictions. (para. 214)

The Select Committee also proposed that native reserves (which were protected not by the Act but by the 1923 Constitution) should also be opened up, as they would be doomed to economic stagnation if the rest of the country was opened up.

At the next general election, in December 1962, the UFP was defeated by the white farmer-supported Rhodesian Front, which had made retention of the Act an important part of its policy. The Rhodesian Front did abolish the Land Apportionment Act in 1969, but replaced it with the Land Tenure Act, which maintained and strengthened major provisions of the earlier Act.

The Land Apportionment Act was amended in both 1961 and 1964. The apportionment of land as at the end of 1968 is shown in Figure 11.1.

Figure 11.1: Land apportionment 1968



(3) The Land Tenure Act 1969


The Land Tenure Act 1969 defined a 'European' as a person who was not an African, and an 'African' as any member of the aboriginal tribes or races of Africa or a person who had the blood of any such tribes or races and lived as a member of an aboriginal native community. It divided most of the country into two equal parts - the European and the African Areas. The third category was National Land, reserved for the conservation of wildlife, national parks, etc. The divisions as at 1970 are shown in Table 11.1. A comparison of the allocations of land in Zimbabwe since 1925 is given in Figure 11.2.

Table 11.1: Division of land by race under Land Tenure Act 1969

	<i>Hectares</i>	<i>Acres</i>
<i>European area</i>		
Forest area	754 887	1 863 918
Parks and wildlife	1 775 296	4 383 447
General land	15 618 620	38 564 496
Specially designated land	7 659	18 910
Total	18 156 649	44 831 233
<i>African area</i>		
Forest area	172 060	424 840
Parks and wildlife	255 363	630 526
Tribal Trust Land	16 191 885	39 979 963
Purchase area	1 486 662	3 670 770
Specially designated land	118 122	291 660
Total	18 224 081	44 997 731
National land	2 671 735	6 596 876
Total	39 052 465	96 425 840

Sources: Roger C. Riddell, *The Land Problem in Rhodesia (Alternatives for the Future)*, (Mambo Press, Rhodesia, 1978), p. 33.

Figure 11.2. Changes in land allocation from 1925 to 1970



Source: *Rhodesia: Its Natural Resources and Economic Development* (M.O. Collins (Pvt) Ltd, Salisbury, 1965), p.48 (1925, 64 figures); Roger Riddell, *The Land Problem in Rhodesia*, p.33 (1970 figures).

Subject to certain exceptions, the Act limited the ownership, lease and occupation of land in the European Area to whites and land in the African Area to blacks. There were prohibitions against disposing of land in the European Area to blacks, but there was also power to designate non-racial residential, commercial and industrial areas in the European Area, to establish black townships in the European Area and, in certain cases, to permit blacks to own, lease and occupy such land.

Attendance at a school or other educational institution as a teacher or pupil, or at a clinic, hospital or other medical institution as a doctor, employee or patient was regarded as constituting occupation. A person who stayed at a hotel, motel, boarding house or club at which residential facilities were provided was also regarded as occupying the land on which the premises were situated. Blacks in such situations had to obtain a permit. These were granted to allow a limited intake of black pupils into independent schools, to advocates to occupy chambers in the city, to certain hotels to have black guests, to specified bars to serve black customers, etc.

Tribal Trust Lands were to be used and occupied 'solely and exclusively by tribesmen'. Provision was made for areas in the Tribal Trust Lands to be converted to individual freehold if desired by the tribesmen living in the area.

According to a review of the Act by the Quenet Commission of Inquiry into Racial Discrimination in 1976, its provisions were prohibitory in character and were used to stop multi-racial sport, social and educational gatherings.¹¹ Only a small number of black pupils attended independent schools, most hotels did not accept black guests, multi-racial sports were mostly forbidden, attendance at religious institutions was not always unrestricted, black doctors could not attend white hospitals, black teachers could not teach in white schools, and

blacks were usually limited to leases for houses in black townships - freehold ownership was generally not available. Blacks were not able to buy farms in the European Area or land in white residential areas, nor could they establish businesses or industries in the white commercial and industrial areas.¹²

The rationale for the Land Tenure Act was that it divided land equally between the races. This ignored the fact that in 1969 whites comprised less than 5% of the population and blacks 95%. Some 80% of the rural population lived in black rural areas and only 20% of the rural population in white rural areas. By largely accepting the boundaries fixed under the Land Apportionment Act, the Land Tenure Act also 'froze' the unequal distribution of fertile land between the races, with whites retaining most of the best land. White areas also included all the urban centres, the commercial and industrial areas and major infrastructure (roads, railways, etc.). Finally, white farming areas were closest to major marketing and distribution centres. The Tribal Trust Lands remained a source of cheap labour for white farmers, for the mines and for urban commercial, industrial and domestic requirements.

The African Purchase Areas had become somewhat of an anachronism. Because of lack of finance, only a few blacks could afford to buy land in the APAs. A number of those who did were in fact rich businessmen who were mainly absent from their farms and did little to develop them. The genuine farmers were hampered by lack of development funding. Freehold tenure appeared to be progressive, but without assistance for development (water supplies, etc.) it was 'mere window dressing'.¹³

(4) The Land Tenure Amendment Act 1977

The Land Tenure Act came under the scrutiny of the Quenet Commission of Inquiry into Racial Discrimination in 1975-76, and arising out of the Commission's recommendations (23

April 1976), the Act was altered in 1977. In relation to the Tribal Trust Lands the Commission recommended that they should remain as they were - not open to whites - for the protection of tribesmen. Nor did it think that more land should be added to the then existing tribal area, but recommended instead that greater emphasis be placed on financial assistance for agricultural development, particularly irrigation. However, the Commission went on to recommend that the two main land classifications - the European Area and the African Area - should be abandoned and replaced by Private Land and State Land. Private Land was to include white residential, urban and agricultural land, African Purchase Areas, black townships and existing multi-racial areas. State Land was to include Tribal Trust Lands, the National Area, Parks and Wildlife land, Forest land, unalienated land and unreserved land.

The Commission recommended that more residential land be made available for blacks in urban areas, but that white residential land should not be opened up to blacks. Blacks in the townships should be able to convert leasehold land to freehold and more multi-racial areas should be established (where persons of all races could live). African Purchase Areas, ^{and} ~~in the same way~~ as white agricultural land, should be open to purchase by persons of all races. The Commission also recommended the removal of many of the restrictions on admission to hotels and restaurants, multi-racial sport (but not multi-racial swimming pools), and attendance of black pupils at independent schools (but not multi-racial government schools).

A number of the Commission's recommendations were subsequently embodied in the Land Tenure Amendment Act, which came into force on 1 April 1977. Racial restrictions on the use of all agricultural land, including white farming areas and African Purchase Areas - but not Tribal Trust Lands - were removed, as were racial restrictions on the use of national parks and Ministerially-declared urban, commercial and industrial areas

(white residential areas remained inviolate). The legal change made little difference in practice - by mid-October 1977 only two farms had been bought in the white farming area by blacks, while vacant farms remained in the African Purchase Areas.¹⁴

(5) The Land Tenure (Repeal) Act 1979

On 2 February 1979 the Land Tenure (Repeal) Act was gazetted by the Transitional Government. The repeal Act eliminated the remaining racial restrictions on the ownership, occupation or use of land in non-rural areas. Another Act gazetted at the same time, the Tribal Trust Land Act 1979, set aside approximately 40% of the area of Zimbabwe for the exclusive use of blacks on a voluntary basis. At the commencement of 1980 this remained the only Act discriminating between the races.

(6) Urban land

Restrictions on urban land complemented those on rural land. With the development of reserves the assumption became that blacks should only be permitted in urban areas to work. Their time in urban areas should be temporary and when not employed they should return to the reserves. The main aim of urban land policy was to maintain supplies of cheap labour and minimise the cost of urban black housing.¹⁵

The year 1906 saw the first urban legislation relating to blacks when Native Urban Locations were created next to white townships. The Natives Registration Act was passed in 1936 to control what was then considered to be an excessive 'influx' of blacks to urban areas.

A 1941 amendment of the Land Apportionment Act provided, among other things, for the establishment of urban black townships. The first real recognition of the permanency of urban blacks, however, came with the passage of the Native (Urban

Areas) Accommodation and Registration Act of 1946, which provided the first institutions of urban black local government, and which forced local authorities to provide adequate housing and employers to provide free accommodation for their workers. Of course, by requiring employers to provide accommodation, the assumption was that if an employee left or lost his job he would also lose his accommodation and be forced to return to a reserve.

During the 1950s, due to rapid growth in commerce and industry, there was a shift of emphasis away from the provision of cheap labour towards provision for a more stable labour force, and by 1960 the Land Apportionment Act had been amended to allow a limited number of residential rights to be given a limited number of blacks by means of freehold or leasehold tenure in black townships. Since the 1950s there has been a constant waiting-list of blacks seeking low-cost housing in the townships. The townships are generally overcrowded, with only limited water and electricity. Most are located several kilometres from white suburbs and business districts.

The Land Tenure (Repeal) Act of 1979 lifted legal restrictions on black ownership of urban land other than in townships, but in practice mainly a few wealthy blacks were able to buy land or houses in previously white areas due both to the costs involved and a number of local government regulations and provisions of the Housing Standards Control Act designed to 'maintain standards' in residential areas and prevent overcrowding. Economic forces were calculated to prevent a rapid movement of blacks into white areas.

2. Land reform and rural development

(1) Some differentials

In the preceding section the Committee looked at the development of land policies to the present. In the previous

chapter, on the Zimbabwean economy, the Committee pointed to a number of differentials in economic circumstance between rural blacks and whites resulting to a considerable extent from the unequal distribution of land. The present section will summarise the major differentials and then discuss two approaches to a more equitable distribution.

It should be noted that with the passage of the Land Tenure (Amendment) Act in 1977 restrictions on black ownership of land in white rural areas were removed. In practice, the removal of the legal barriers made little difference because of economic barriers, and the situation as at 1977 has remained virtually unaltered since. For the purposes of this study, therefore, the Committee will examine the situation as at 1977.

(a) Distribution of land

Until 1977, of the rural land available for farming 17.7m hectares, or 53%, was open to blacks (the TTLs and APAs) and 15.6m hectares, or 47%, to whites (General Land). The total rural population as at 1976 was about 5.6m, of which approximately 4.5m was located in black farming areas, and approximately 1.1m in white farming areas. The black farming areas thus carried 80% of the rural population and the white areas 20%. On a population density basis the black farming areas comprised four hectares per person and the white areas approximately 14 hectares per person (490 hectares per white - 97% of those in white areas were black agricultural workers and their families). Dividing ^{total rural land} ~~both sectors~~ by the total rural population, the average amount of land available per person in 1976 was six hectares.

In 1977 there were some 165 TTLs and 66 APAs, with the 165 TTLs being divided into approximately 252 chiefdoms.

(b) Quality of land

Not only was the rural population more heavily concentrated in black areas, but the white farming areas contained a higher proportion of the more productive land. Using the 1960 study of agricultural regions by V. Vincent and R.G. Thomas, An Agricultural Survey of Southern Rhodesia¹⁶, as the basis for assessing agricultural potential, only 27% of black rural land as a whole fell within the three regions classified as suitable for specialised crop production, dryland cropping and intensive livestock production. However, some 57% of white rural land fell within the same regions.¹⁷ Thus the pressure on black land was even more serious than suggested by the population figures. A comparison of the 1969 population (Figure 11.3) with an evaluation of land potential for rural development in 1969 (Figure 11.4) gives an idea of the imbalance in quality of land between whites and blacks.

Figure 11.3: Distribution of black population, 1969





Figure 11.4: Evaluation of land potential
for rural development, 1969

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(c) Carrying capacity of land

To assist in the implementation of the Land Husbandry Act of 1951, the concept of a Standard Unit was developed to describe the area of land in a TTL which 'if properly farmed would keep the holder and his family occupied ... and provide subsistence food requirements plus a [small] surplus for sale'. The Standard Unit included both land for cultivation and land for grazing, as cattle were considered necessary to provide both draught and manure for arable land. The Units varied from 28 hectares in comparatively high rainfall areas to 158 - 250 hectares in low rainfall areas.

Applying the Standard Unit to the Vincent and Thomas division of land into natural regions and to the then area and location of TTLs, then in 1977 the TTLs should only have been carrying about 280,000 farming families instead of the approximately 675,000 families actually on them.¹⁸ That is, the TTLs in 1977 were carrying more than twice the number of families recommended under the Standard Unit concept. These figures are averages, and some TTLs were more over-crowded than others. (The availability of modern fertilizers would make a difference to the Standard Unit figures, but the poverty of most TTL farmers is such that few ^{could} ~~can~~ afford fertilizers in adequate quantities, if at all.)

(d) Deterioration of land

Traditionally blacks in Zimbabwe practised shifting agriculture. Land was used by both pastoralists and agriculturalists as long as it remained fertile. When fertility declined the land was left to revert to bush and in the interim farmers moved to other land. In time with population growth and the limited size of TTLs such practices were no longer possible: land size was fixed, the same fields were ploughed regularly, grazing land became overstocked, while the availability of

fertilizers was limited. Under-employment or no employment became common.

Overpopulation of the TTLs led to widespread deterioration of the soil, with the result that fewer people could be supported. A temporary solution was to convert some grazing land to cultivation, but this led to over-grazing on the remainder. In 1965 it was estimated that 50% of all grazing land in the then reserves was either bare or over-grazed.¹⁹ Cattle numbers since then have increased substantially.

As noted in the chapter on the economy of Zimbabwe, pressure on the land has led to greater inequalities in land ownership. It has also led to an increase in the number of landless. In 1960 over 15% of all adults in the TTLs were paid employees within the Tribal Areas, and the number since then has probably increased. Not all of these need be landless, but when one considers that in 1977, for example, there were 1,887,000 adults in the TTLs, of whom 675,000 were cultivators, then a considerable number would seem to be without land, even after allowing for wives. The TTLs are becoming increasingly reliant on food grown in the commercial farming sector.

(e) African Purchase Areas (1977)

The 66 African Purchase Areas (until the distinction between them and white farming areas was removed by the Land Tenure ~~Amendment~~ Act of 1977) covered about 1.5m hectares, about 56% of which was in the more productive regions, compared to 27% for black farming land as a whole and 57% for white farming areas. As at 1977 more than one-third of the APA total area was either unplanned or consisted of vacant farms. The remainder varied from small, overcrowded subsistence farms to a few comparatively large farms.

Average farm size was about 115 hectares but a majority were too small to be economically viable. The situation on these farms was worsened by overcrowding and on some a continuation of subsistence farming - only 66% of total production from the APAs in 1976 was sold, the remainder being consumed on the farm. Lack of capital, and inadequate returns, plus lack of access to loan money, meant that most APA farms were not developed and were under-fertilized. In 1977 of the 8,102 farmers on APAs only 23 earned enough on their agricultural production to pay income tax.

(f) White farming areas

White farming land is seriously under-utilised. Apart from land not yet converted to farming, a number of farms ~~have~~^{were} ~~been~~ abandoned because of the guerilla war, and a number of others ~~are~~^{were} used mainly as residences. In 1976 in Matabeleland, 370 farms out of a total of 1,050 were said to be vacant and 254 to be owned by non-resident farmers.²⁰ One estimate was that in 1976 only some 15% of potentially arable land in the white farming areas of Rhodesia was being cultivated - excluding grazing land, also under-utilised.

The total land area covered by the 6,682-odd farms in the white farming area in 1977 was 14.5m hectares. The average price per hectare of white farms sold in the period January - March 1977 was \$228.9 compared to \$234.13 in 1975. At the January - March price, the total value of land occupied by white farms in 1977 was approximately \$2419m.

(2) Possible approaches to land reform and rural development

Various proposals have been made for land reform and agricultural development in Zimbabwe. Proposals have come from political parties, the former Transitional Government, farmer organisations and development groups such as the Whitsun Foundation (a private, non-profit development agency). Academics,

specialists in land reform and interested observers have also put forward plans.²¹

Virtually all the proposals differ in detail and in methods of implementation, but in terms of approach they can be broadly classified into two groups, which may for convenience be labelled the 'capitalist' approach and the 'socialist' approach or the 'moderate' approach and the 'radical' approach. The basic difference between the two is that the former depends on the continuity of private enterprise agriculture, extending it where possible into the TTLs, whereas the latter depends on the eventual abolition of private enterprise agriculture and its replacement by some form of communal ownership.

The moderate approach wishes to preserve the system of individual tenure and gradually extend it into the TTLs by resettling large numbers of blacks from overcrowded TTLs on to non-utilised or under-utilised white and Government-owned land and by large-scale agricultural development programs to boost farming skills, improve or provide infrastructure and develop conservation techniques. The radical approach wishes to restructure the economy along socialist lines, with some form of communal ownership of land and with a large measure of central planning. The goal of both approaches, of course, is to improve the position of rural blacks above subsistence levels, to provide security of land tenure, productive employment for all those seeking it, and active participation in the broader national economy.

The moderate approach is to be found in the Transitional Government plan, the plans of most of the black and white internal political parties up to 1979 and the plans advocated by rural groups such as the Commercial Farmers' Union (previously the mainly white Rhodesian National Farmers' Union) and the Zimbabwe National Farmers' Union (previously the African Farmers' Union of Rhodesia). The moderate approach is also advocated by

the Whitsun Foundation. The radical approach has been argued particularly by Roger Riddell, of the Catholic Institute for International Relations, London, in his works The Land Question and (in greater detail) The Land Problem in Rhodesia. A variant is espoused by Mr Mugabe's ~~ZANU~~ (ZANU (PF)) ~~after the return to legality~~.

The Committee will outline the plans of the former transitional Government and the Whitsun Foundation as representative of the moderate approach, and the plans of Riddell and ZANU (PF) as representative of the radical approach.

(a) The Integrated Plan for Rural Development

The Transitional Government's Ministry of Finance in January 1979 issued Proposals for a Five-Year Programme of Development in the Public Sector. An annexure to that document, to support its proposals for rural development, was the report by a sub-committee of the working party which produced the main report, entitled Integrated Plan for Rural Development (as at July 1978).²² The overall five-year development plan was prepared originally for possible use by whichever government came into power at the April 1979 elections.²³ Subsequent to those elections the plan was subjected to study by an inter-departmental committee of government officials. With the return to legality the Acting Minister of Finance in the Muzorewa Government, Dr Dennis Nyamuswa, announced that the plan would be ready for implementation immediately after the February 1980 elections. Shortly before the return to legality the Muzorewa Government did begin to implement several small-scale rural resettlement schemes.²⁴

The report outlining the rural development plan defined the main problems as exceptionally rapid population growth, outstripping resources and creating 'immense pressure' on rural areas; the prevalence of subsistence farming with low per capita

incomes; the existence of large under-utilised land and water resources; scattered population and a lack of urban/commercial development to cater for its needs; inadequate training and extension facilities; inadequate rate of creation of new jobs in all sectors; inadequate housing, security of tenure and pension provision for the expanding urban population; underdeveloped rural infrastructure; and a serious lack of trained manpower to sustain an accelerated development program.

The plan sought to 'alleviate' these problems in rural areas through eight objectives:

- (1) Major water and land resource development.
- (2) Economic settlement of a large number of farmers on both dryland and irrigation schemes.
- (3) Accelerated development of the tribal trust lands towards agricultural viability.
- (4) New urban development based on physical resources or socio-economic criteria.
- (5) Increased output from the vital commercial agricultural industry.
- (6) Increased rate of urban development in existing centres, especially freehold housing.
- (7) Promotion of tourism in unexploited regions to enhance the inflow of much needed foreign exchange.
- (8) National training facilities and educational programmes to enable the above programmes to be carried out.

The plan sought to meet these objectives by an expenditure of some \$2827m, as follows: major dams and irrigation \$2147m (18% of total rural expenditure); settlement of under-utilised land \$255m (7%); rural development in TTLs \$2162m (19%); urban development in TTLs \$226m (3%); commercial agricultural development \$2216m

(26%); urban development in the main centres \$294m (11%); development of tourism \$217m (2%); infrastructure - development of roads in TTLs \$105m (13%); and forestry development in TTLs \$26m (1%).

According to data in the rural development plan the TTLs in 1976 were supporting 2.5m people in excess of their 'safe carrying capacity'. The aim was to reduce the population in areas of greatest stress by resettlement, by the development of rural urban centres and by increasing employment opportunities. The report claimed that implementation of the rural development plan could lead to the direct creation of about 150,000 permanent jobs. Assuming a multiplier effect of 2.5, this would result in the permanent employment of 375,000 people. Taking into account dependents, the plan could lead to the support of some 2,250,000.²⁵

The sections of the rural development plan dealing with land resettlement identified some 4m hectares of under-utilised land: land where existing output was less than a designated minimum (crops and livestock), land which was part of very large externally controlled ranches, land held for speculative purposes, abandoned land and unused land. On the basis that newly created farms should have a yearly net income of about \$22,000 - between the average of black farmers in former African Purchase Areas and full commercial white farms, some 10,000 emergent farmers (about 120,000 persons, including dependents) could be settled as dryland farmers.²⁶ However, they would displace some 870 commercial farms and about 90,000 black employees and dependents. Implementation of a program of tenant farming schemes would employ an additional 3,500 farmers, and implementation of the major irrigation schemes would create some 14,000 jobs during the construction period and 56,000 when the schemes were in operation.

The total cost of resettling the 4m hectares was put at \$2110m - \$78m for acquisition, \$223m for development and \$29m for seasonal finance requirements. Settlement in new areas would be limited to the more promising farmers in TTLs; freehold title in the TTLs would also be limited to the better farmers.

The aim in relation to the Tribal Trust Lands was to eventually make them economically viable - although it was recognised that a major sector of the population - some 40% by 1985 and 25% by 2000 - would remain resident in and dependent on Tribal Trust Land.²⁷ Economic viability would depend on 'transfer development' - transferring out those persons with an orientation towards wage sector employment and resettling them in urban areas, both newly-created and existing - and 'transformation development' - land reform of the TTLs to increase security of tenure and negotiability of farming, residential and commercial land, provision of extension services and infrastructure and the planned development of a number of urban growth centres (20 to 25 with average populations of 2,500 to 25,000) and a large number of minor urban centres. The urban centres would provide services, supplies and marketing outlets, and would be linked to major marketing and supply centres. Ten such centres would be developed in the first five years.

The rural development plan observed that existing TTLs were characterised by very poor infrastructural development, especially in respect of roads, water supplies, marketing and supply facilities and the complete absence of urban development. Agricultural extension services were minimal and there was 'an almost total lack of agricultural credit'.²⁸

Five areas particularly subject to population pressures were selected for priority attention commencing in the first five years, with less intensive programs for the remainder. These Intensive Rural Development Areas (IRDAs) between them covered 5m hectares and accounted for 1.8m people, including 340,000

cultivators (i.e., 31% of TTL land, 47% of TTL population, and 52% of TTL cultivators). Work in the IRDAs would concentrate on agriculture and land, agricultural administration, marketing and supply, credit, infrastructure and village development. The agriculture and land component would include projects for irrigation, livestock, veld and pastures, reclamation, forestry, land reform, extension, research and training.

The report argued that the nature of the Zimbabwean economy was such that the commercial agricultural sector provided the major stimulus for growth and development in the ^{other} remaining sectors. Any program of rural development had to ensure that the commercial sector continued to feed the nation, produced a surplus to earn foreign exchange, and increased employment opportunities. To increase the output of commercial agriculture would cost at least \$2216m over five years for agricultural support services alone (finance, marketing and processing facilities and technical knowledge). According to the report:

A dynamic commercial agricultural sector will be of inestimable value to the nation in the foreseeable future. Benefits include assured food supplies for the bulk of those not living in tribal trust lands (as well as a percentage within them); the continued supply of a major (and potentially growing) slice of foreign exchange earnings; and the provision of a large and growing employment sector.

Until 1978 various Rhodesian governments isolated the TTLs from commercial development: development loans were generally unavailable, expertise limited and large numbers of blacks were allowed to subsist on TTL land without farming it (through lack of employment, etc. depending on relatives for subsistence). Past attempts at TTL development had been ad hoc and dispersed among a variety of government agencies. In mid-1978 these agencies were gathered under one co-ordinating body, the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority, which was to co-ordinate the implementation of rural development throughout the

country. Whether the Authority will be able to implement the Integrated Plan for Rural Development will depend on Mr Mugabe's Government. Whatever its fate, the plan is typical of the more general proposals put by the 'moderate' groups.

(b) The Whitsun Foundation plan

The Whitsun Foundation was established in August 1975 as a private, non-profit development agency. Its broad objectives were to pursue the economic development of the country with specific reference to the least developed sectors of the economy. The Foundation is funded from private contributions from individuals and companies predominantly from within Zimbabwe.

In a 1976 study, An Appraisal of Rhodesia's Present and Future Development Needs³⁰, the Foundation called for balanced development - rapid growth in the modern wage sector concomitant with land reform. The Foundation stated that the non-agricultural rural population should be fully urbanised and transferred off the land to make room for farmers. A land reform program would need to include resettlement on under-utilised land in commercial farming areas as well as redevelopment of TTL land to improve its productivity. TTL land should be changed to freehold tenure as soon as practicable as the existing system of tenure restricted 'entrepreneurial initiative and on-farm investment'.³¹ Poor farmers and landless farmers would work State-owned farms until absorbed by the modern sector or until they achieved individual tenure.

The emphasis of the Whitsun Foundation scheme was to encourage and extend commercial agriculture based on individual land tenure and initiative. Continuity with the existing system of commercial agriculture was emphasised, with major restructuring limited to relocation of the better farmers on under-utilised land and the gradual extension of freehold tenure into the TTLs as a program of urban resettlement made room.

The Director of the Whitsun Foundation, Dr Ian M. Hume, said more recently that the aim of land reform should be to achieve greater equity in land tenure while at the same time allowing for increased production.³² He said this would basically involve the redistribution of between five and eight million hectares of white land to black commercial farmers, which would allow the resettlement of between 130,000 and 160,000 farming families (about 1m people). This would be accompanied by the transfer of a further 300,000 or so people from the TTLs into non-farming employment. Such a move would reduce pressure on the TTLs, which could then be further developed.

In February 1980 the Whitsun Foundation published details of a \$2105m decentralisation scheme designed to complement the Integrated Plan for Rural Development. The scheme involved the establishment of 300 'rural service centres' or commercial centres over five years, in addition to the 20 small towns proposed in the Integrated Plan. Benefits of the scheme included the creation of 25,000 jobs, a slowdown in the rural/urban migration and the provision of infrastructure, urban facilities, transport and communications and better marketing facilities.

(c) An alternative strategy

An alternative approach has been propounded by Roger Riddell, of the Catholic Institute for International Relations, London, and formerly of the University of Rhodesia. Riddell points to the failure, in his view, of land reform proposals similar to those outlined above in Kenya as evidence of their likely failure in Zimbabwe.

In Kenya until 1959 slightly more than 3m hectares of land (about 20% of arable land and 6% of total land) was reserved for whites, mainly in the so-called 'White Highlands'. With the

announcement of impending black rule a scheme was devised by Britain and the World Bank at a cost of some £50m to buy out white settlers at full compensation. The process began in 1960 with the piecemeal settlement of peasant farmers but its main impetus came in 1963 with the 'million acres scheme'. The result was that approximately half the previously white areas remained intact as mainly white ranches and plantations, a quarter was purchased from departing whites by a new stratum of black large-scale farmers, 'among whom Kenyan politicians, civil servants and traders were prominent'³³, and the remaining quarter was allocated to settlement schemes with small plots for peasant farming. Land in the former reserves was consolidated and could be registered under individual freehold titles. Some co-operative and State-owned farms were also established.

According to Riddell, the big and medium-sized farms in Kenya, both black and white, benefited and production increased. However, the majority of small plot-holders benefited little: a 1972 International Labour Office Mission categorised some 620,000 out of approximately 1.2m farmers in Kenya in 1969 as 'rural poor'.³⁴ In most cases they were still subsistence farmers. Riddell claimed that considerable areas of prime land were under the control of rich urban blacks who used it as collateral rather than as land to be worked. Growing numbers of the rural poor were being displaced as a result of individual ownership schemes and were migrating to urban centres, but were not being absorbed into the urban economy and so were creating new social and economic problems.

The Riddell plan for land reform in Zimbabwe involves 'a land strategy based on socialism' as part of an overall program of socialist development.³⁵ Riddell claims the problem is not a shortage of land but the inequality of its distribution. At the core of his strategy would be a large-scale resettlement program to move blacks from the over-populated TTLs on to white-owned commercial land. This would lead to an easing of pressures on the

TTLs and present greater potential for their development. The system of ownership, however, would change from individual tenure to communal ownership through the State. Instead of dividing the land into small individual plots, there would be a system of communes, which could be either labour-intensive or capital intensive.

Riddell argues that communes would provide key centres for the rural population in the provision of health and education facilities, would lessen income inequalities which would be perpetuated under a system of individual tenure, and would make the provision of capital and expertise easier and more readily available than a system of individual holdings. More land would be farmed than under a system of small holdings, infrastructure could be provided more readily, the costs of extensive subdivision would be avoided, and the upheaval which would result from the introduction of private ownership on the TTLs would be avoided.³⁶

According to Riddell the commercial farming area as it exists would be utilised for communes, although some of the larger units might need to be subdivided and some of the smaller units amalgamated, depending on the quality of land. The creation of communes would probably be best related to chiefdoms or tribal wards. If each of the approximately 250 chiefdoms were to comprise a commune, each commune would consist of some 1,000 households. If each of the approximately 1,000 wards were to comprise a commune, then there would be approximately 270 households to each unit. Riddell argues that the tribal ward, because it is based on territory, would seem to provide a more natural basis for the creation of communes.

The aim of the plan was to minimise the acute inequalities in rural land ^{distribution} in Zimbabwe and widespread poverty among the rural poor. Resettlement on white land would be one part of the land strategy. The other would entail providing

adequate land in the TTLs for all those remaining who were dependent on agriculture. Eventually all rural land would consist of 'relatively self-contained communes'.³⁷

Riddell points out that in the short-term, steps would need to be taken to ensure that existing white (and multi-national) expertise was encouraged to stay. In recent years the predominantly white commercial sector had produced some 70-75% of total agricultural output. If the expertise in this sector was lost through a large-scale emigration of whites (and the withdrawal of foreign capital) a massive reduction in food production could lead to widespread starvation - particularly in the TTLs - and to economic and political instability.

As one solution Riddell suggests that all farming land should be nationalised as a first step. Such a nationalisation would need to be accompanied by measures to persuade the (probably not more than 2,000) most efficient commercial farmers to stay to maintain production on what were their farms, and to pass on their technical and managerial skills. One possibility would be to offer incentives with the highest going to farmers who were most efficient and most co-operative in facilitating the changeover to communes and the training of workers. At the end of the transition period the original landowner would have the choice of remaining as a commune member or leaving.³⁸ Riddell states that what was proposed was a gradation of compensation: those who had no wish to participate would have their land expropriated; those who maintained high levels of production and moved swiftly to co-operative farming would receive the highest compensation, with gradations between.

Two examples of co-operative farming in Rhodesia were the Cold Comfort Farm near Salisbury and the Nyafaru Development Company in the Inyanga District. Although both had to close for security reasons Riddell claims that the two ventures proved co-operative farming was a realistic proposition in Zimbabwe. The

success of the Silveira House mutual-aid farming groups among TTL peasant farmers also pointed to the likely success of co-operative farming.

(d) The ZANU(PF) plan

Mr Mugabe's ZANU(PF) (previously ZANU) in its 1980 manifesto made it clear that it subscribed to socialism as an ideology, but in working towards a socialist transformation of Zimbabwe society a ZANU(PF) government would take into account historical, social and other practical realities. It regarded land reform as one of its most urgent priorities, and if it came into power it would:

- . Create a land and agricultural development fund.
- . Acquire as much land from the private sector as was necessary for the resettlement of the peasant population currently without land or with poor land.
- . Promote on newly acquired land the establishment of collective villages and collective agriculture.
- . Ensure that land to be used for emergency resettlement and agricultural programs would come from the following private sector categories: unused or abandoned land, under-utilised land, land owned by absentee owners.³⁹

The manifesto stated that the peasantry and their agriculture would receive high priority in policy related to farming. The State would establish large farms to produce key products while the private sector of agriculture would be retained - 'but restricted only to efficient farmers'.

In one of the ZANU(PF) policy documents seized by Rhodesian Customs in January 1980 after the return to legality ZANU(PF) stated:

ZANU holds the view that all the wealth of Zimbabwe belongs to the people ... of Zimbabwe in perpetuity. The people's government shall hold the land and shall be the administrator and trustee for the present and future generations. Consequently, there cannot be any private ownership of the natural wealth as it belongs to the people as a whole.... Landlord estates ... will have no place in the socialist Zimbabwe since all will have been returned to the people and the capitalists associated with their proprietorship will have been expelled.⁴⁰

The document makes clear that all the means of production will, sooner or later, come under public ownership.

Mr Joshua Nkomo's Patriotic Front Party (previously ZAPU) manifesto promised a fair distribution of land and stressed that all land belonged to the people. The manifesto omitted any mention of either 'socialism' or 'free enterprise'.

(3) Which approach?

Ideally, there are a number of questions which need answers before any particular policy of land reform is decided. Perhaps the most basic questions are:

- (a) To what extent does the policy take into account population growth of 3.5 to 3.6% a year - an increase of 220,000 blacks during 1978-79, as well as endeavouring to meet existing demands?
- (b) How many rural blacks want to be farmers, and of these, how many wish to be commercial farmers and how many would be content to be basically subsistence farmers (but perhaps producing a small surplus to provide some cash income)?⁴¹

- (c) How many farmers in both categories can farming land in Zimbabwe support given the aims of maximising land usage and production? How many can be supported under other possible scenarios, e.g. to ensure self-sufficiency in food rather than aim for an exportable surplus?
- (d) Depending on the scenario, how many black farmers will need to be resettled from the TTLs to ensure adequate agricultural standards in the TTLs? What land will be required for their resettlement, how will it be acquired and at what cost?
- (e) What system of land tenure do most black farmers wish to see implemented?
- (f) To what extent can the modern sectors of the economy be developed to employ rural blacks who do not wish to be farmers or can't be farmers?
- (g) What training or retraining of farmers will be required?

These, and other questions, remain unanswered or only partially answered in most of the land reform proposals surveyed by the Committee. This is understandable in view of the limited resources and skills available to carry out surveys to acquire the answers. The plan which goes closest to providing some of the answers is perhaps that of the Transitional Government's Ministry of Finance. The figures presented indicate that over five years the rural development plan could create employment for 375,000 people in both rural and urban areas - some 2,250,000 counting dependents. The Ministry calculated that in 1976 the TTLs were supporting some 2.5m people in excess of their safe carrying capacity. Had the five-year plan been finalised in 1976 it might have succeeded in 'mopping up' most of the excess. Since 1976 the black population of Zimbabwe has increased by well over half a million.

What is evident is that unless there are major resources of finance, expertise and materials available, the process of alleviating rural poverty in Zimbabwe will not be a quick one. The difficulties of implementing any of the plans will be compounded if white farmers leave in large numbers and Zimbabwe has to become a net importer of food instead of a net exporter.

The Committee does not pretend it can make a judgment on which approach is best suited to the needs of an independent Zimbabwe. Whatever approach is taken, and whatever plan is adopted, however, the Committee would urge the Australian Government, and governments around the world, to offer what assistance, expertise and facilities they can to assist in alleviating the hardships of rural poverty in Zimbabwe.

Australia has particular expertise in most of the areas of agriculture practised in Zimbabwe, and it could do much to assist by providing such expertise on the spot (as it already does in other African countries such as ^{Kenya} Zambia and Tanzania), by providing training facilities, and by financial assistance.

(4) Land and the Lancaster House Agreement

Whichever scheme of land reform is considered most desirable, it will be constrained to some extent by the provisions of the British-drafted Constitution for an independent Zimbabwe which was agreed by all the major parties at the Lancaster House Conference.

The provisions of the Constitution dealing with land are to be found in the section of the Declaration of Rights dealing with protection from deprivation of property (section 16). This section, by virtue of provisions in section 52, can not be altered for 10 years unless such alteration is approved by all the members of the House of Assembly and two-thirds of the

Senate. After 10 years the section may be altered if approved by at least 70 members of the 100-member House of Assembly and two-thirds of the Senate. In both cases Senate approval may be by-passed after six months if at least 70 members of the House of Assembly vote in favour of such a course.

Section 16 declares that every person will be protected from having his property compulsorily acquired except when the acquisition is in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, town and country planning, the development or utilisation of that or other property in such a manner as to promote the public benefit or, in the case of under-utilised land, settlement of land for agricultural purposes. Acquisition for any of these purposes will be lawful only if there is adequate and prompt payment of compensation and, where the acquisition is contested, a court order is obtained.

A person whose property is so acquired will be guaranteed the right of access to the Zimbabwe High Court to determine both the validity of the acquisition and the amount of compensation. During a period of public emergency property may be acquired temporarily, or permanently upon payment of compensation, but again both the acquisition and the question of compensation are justiciable. Compensation paid for expropriated land will be remittable overseas to Zimbabwean citizens or companies free of taxes or charges and within a reasonable time.

The British felt such provisions were necessary to persuade white Zimbabweans to have confidence in whatever government was elected to protect the value of their assets and land. When the British constitutional proposals were first announced ~~on 3 October 1979~~ the Patriotic Front parties objected strongly on both practical and ideological grounds, and the issue of land, its acquisition and compensation became the most critical aspect of their opposition to the British proposals.

The Patriotic Front parties argued, on 8 October, that the basic objective of 'the struggle in Zimbabwe' was the recovery of land of which the people were dispossessed. Such dispossession had always been without compensation. The Patriotic Front parties stated:

This is the problem with which the government of the new Republic of Zimbabwe will have to deal. That government must have the right to acquire any land in the public interest, compensation⁴² being in the discretion of the government.

The British provisions, according to the Patriotic Front parties, converted freedom from deprivation of property into 'a right to retain privilege and perpetuate injustice'. The provisions were 'unreasonably restrictive' as to the purposes for which land could be acquired and the stringent compensation provisions were designed to maintain the status quo. To permit the remittance overseas of compensation was 'iniquitous' - it accorded the wealthy a privilege normally only accorded to foreigners and it could have 'disastrous consequences' for the economy.

The Patriotic Front parties instead put forward the following provisions concerning property:

- (1) Every person will be protected from having his property compulsorily acquired, subject to the right of the Government to acquire any property in the public interest. Compensation for property so acquired will be in the discretion of the Government.
- (2) Exception will be made for the taking of possession of property during a period of public emergency.
- (3) The constitution will on the same basis as in other Declarations of Rights make clear that a number of transactions which might be considered to involve an

element of compulsory acquisition will not be so regarded for the purposes of the Declaration of Rights.⁴³

In responding to the Patriotic Front parties Lord Carrington firmly rejected any widening of the Government's powers to acquire land and the provision to make compensation discretionary. He said the government of the day would be able to purchase land, and to compulsorily acquire under-utilised land, and that the British proposals struck 'a fair balance' between protection of private property and the legitimate desire of the Government to spread land ownership more widely.

Two days later Lord Carrington made a further statement in which he announced that the British Government recognised the importance of the land issue to a future Zimbabwe government and would be prepared, within the limits imposed by Britain's financial resources, to assist, for example, with technical assistance for settlement schemes and capital aid for agricultural development projects and infrastructure. Britain would also be prepared to contribute to the initial capital of an agricultural development bank or equivalent institution. In addition, Britain would be ready to support efforts by a Zimbabwe government to obtain international assistance for such purposes.

Shortly afterwards the United States Administration announced that the US would be 'prepared to co-operate in a multi-donor effort to assist the agricultural and economic development of an independent Zimbabwe'. No specific commitment was made as this depended on Congressional approval. On the basis of these and other assurances the Patriotic Front parties, on 18 October, agreed to accept the British proposals subject to the successful negotiation of transitional arrangements and a ceasefire. Bishop Muzorewa's Government had formally agreed to them on 8 October.

The Committee urges the Australian Government to contribute financially to any international scheme established to finance land redistribution and agricultural development in an independent Zimbabwe, and to provide what other assistance it can (e.g. the provision of experts, technical assistance, training, etc.).

3. Urban development

In the preceding sections the Committee has concentrated on land and rural development. However, no study of the development needs of Zimbabwe would be complete without an examination of urban development needs.

(1) Some statistics

The following statistics give some indication of the extent of under-employment in the Zimbabwean economy.

- . There are in excess of 3m adult blacks in Zimbabwe, but only about 1m are in formal employment. The remainder depend entirely on the rural economy in the TTLs and former APAs, and on those in employment.⁴⁴
- . Some 70,000 to 110,000 new job-seekers come on to the labour market each year.
- . The number of landless adults in the TTLs in 1977 was about 500,000.⁴⁵
- . The number in formal employment has been dropping steadily since 1975 (it dropped 63,000 in the period 1975-78).

The number of skilled blacks available within and without the workforce can not be reliably quantified because of the lack of

statistics, but given past policies of exclusion of blacks from skilled positions the number is undoubtedly inadequate to meet the immediate needs of an expanding economy in which blacks will have a greater say and ~~(presumably)~~ share.

(2) Patterns of urbanisation

The official estimate of the number of people living in urban areas as at mid-1979 was 1.4m, of which about 1.2m were blacks. In addition there were an estimated 600,000 to 750,000 displaced persons in urban areas living mainly in squatter camps or with relatives as a result of the guerilla war.⁴⁶ Thus the total population of the urban areas in mid-1979 was approximately 2m, or about 28% of the total Zimbabwean population (the 'official' population of the urban areas ^{was} ~~is~~ just under 20%). The official rate of growth of the urban population in recent years has been nearly twice the national population growth rate.⁴⁷

In excess of 70% of the urban population is concentrated in two cities, Salisbury and Bulawayo. Until the repeal of racially discriminatory legislation in 1979 whites lived in suburban areas, and blacks in townships (dubbed 'local government areas' after the repeal) or in illegal squatter camps. A few of the wealthier blacks lived in one or two mixed race suburbs. Since 1979 blacks have been free to move into white areas if they can afford to.

Until 1979 attempts were made to limit the movement of blacks into urban areas. Apart from the provisions of the Land Tenure Act and its predecessor, the Land Apportionment Act, the provisions of the African (Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration Act (1951), among other things, made legal residence in urban areas dependent on the attainment of formal employment. A number of administrative devices were also used to limit the influx of blacks. However, several factors mitigated against the success of such a policy: better job opportunities in urban

areas, improved living conditions, better education and health facilities, and the 'lure of the bright lights'. Land pressures in rural areas also played their part. But perhaps the major single cause of the influx since 1972 ~~has been~~^{was} the escalating violence of the guerilla war, with the rural peasantry by and large caught in the middle and victimised by both sides. The end of the guerilla war ~~may see~~^{has seen the commencement of} a partial movement back to tribal areas by some urban squatters, but land reforms and the removal of discriminatory controls make a decline in the growth of urban areas unlikely. There is probably also a 'backlog' of potential rural migrants previously discouraged from moving. In any event, increasing urbanisation is a trend not only in Africa but in most of the rest of the world.

The result of urban migrations to date has been that while some two-thirds of urban blacks are housed in middle to low income (by black standards) standard houses in the townships and a handful of blacks enjoy accommodation comparable to whites, about one-third live in poor to appalling conditions in squatter camps - some temporary, some almost permanent. Any program of urban development will need to cater for these squatters, as well as for new arrivals from rural areas.

(3) Urban growth and housing

A planned scheme of urban development, to be successful, must be able to produce jobs on the one hand and housing, land and essential services on the other. The aim must be to avoid 'the translation of rural underemployment and indigence into urban squalor and open unemployment'.⁴⁸ The growth in employment opportunities must be generated primarily in the manufacturing and services sectors and in the public sector. The provision of housing, land and essential services will be constrained by the availability of public finance and the level of wages compared to living costs (to enable loan and rent repayments), but will itself generate employment.

Two comparatively recent studies of urban development needs in Zimbabwe have been the Whitsun Foundation's The Urban Challenge (a commissioned study - December 1976) and a report on Urban Development in the Main Centres prepared by a sub-committee of the Ministry of Finance working party which prepared Proposals for a Five-Year Programme of Development in the Public Sector (January 1979). Both concentrate on the extent to which housing and services will need to be provided.

Based on an 'official' population of 1,018,000 urban blacks in the 14 main centres⁴⁹ in 1978 - an estimate probably at least one-third less than the actual population then - the Urban Development report projected the likely populations of those centres by 1983 at various rates of urbanisation. These are shown in Table 11.2.

Table 11.2: Projected number of urban blacks by 1983 at various rates of urbanisation

Rates of urbanisation	1978						
	'official' population	3.5%	4.6%	7.0%	10%	11.5%	15%
Total ('000)	1 018	1 209	1 275	1 428	1 640	1 749	2 047
Increase ('000)	..	191	257	410	622	731	1 029

Source: Zimbabwe Rhodesia, Ministry of Finance, Urban Development in the Main Centres, published as an annexure to Proposals for a Five-Year Programme of Development in the Public Sector, January 1979.

Applying the growth rate of 11.5% (which it regarded as a little on the high side, but which it considered would take into account the then existing backlog of dependents in rural areas) to the seven major centres only (1978 'official' black population: 643,000), the Urban Development report concluded that 128,600 new dwellings would be required in the five years to 1983 (at five persons a dwelling). This represented some 26,000 dwellings a year.

The Whitsun Foundation report, based on the population and urban migration trends of 1976, projected a minimum urban black population of 2.25m in 1986. Over the decade 1976-86, this represented an average increase of 120,000 persons a year. At five persons per dwelling, some 24,000 new dwellings would need to be built each year. The Whitsun Foundation stated that if relatively uncontrolled urban growth occurred the rate of housing required would increase; on the other hand, if political change disrupted the pace of economic growth, this could lead to less employment and reduce the flow of migrants to urban areas.

The projections in both reports are based on a number of variables, and thus can only be taken as pointers to likely requirements, particularly as neither takes into account the migration to urban areas caused by the guerilla war. If one takes a median figure of 25,000 new dwellings a year, even this would be more than twice the rate of low-cost dwellings actually constructed in 1975-76 (11,500 new low-cost houses) and 1976-77 (11,200 new low-cost houses). Thus any program of urban housing development designed to cater for a migration from rural to urban areas predicated on trends in the period 1976-78 would have to proceed at a rate two to three times faster than in 1976-77 simply to keep pace with projected urban growth.

The Urban Development report estimated that the provision of 128,600 serviced sites in the seven main centres by 1984 would cost \$251.5m. To provide each site with services and a

'core' house (27m² space: basic unit of one room, kitchen and ablution facilities - additional rooms can be added later) would cost \$2164m. Better housing would cost more. The report predicted that the construction industry should be able to handle such a development program, particularly if ^{a considerable number} ~~most~~ of the houses were 'owner-built' (the report recommended this be encouraged where possible to ensure limited financial resources were spread to assist as many persons as possible - it rejected 'lowering of standards' arguments). The construction program itself would create job opportunities. Availability of urban land would not be a problem.

The five-year program actually recommended in the Urban Development report for the seven major centres provided for a mix of development: the provision of site only, sites with communal ablutions and sites with individual ablutions (to cater for owner-builders at varying income levels); serviced sites with core houses already built (for lease or freehold purchase); and sites for medium cost housing. Total cost over five years was estimated at \$294m, not taking into account the provision of schools, health facilities, police stations, bulk water supplies and sewerage treatment works, electricity supplies, welfare and recreational facilities and the provision of new distributor roads.

The Urban Development Study concentrated only on the seven major centres in Zimbabwe. The Public Sector five-year plan projected the figures in the study on a national basis to conclude that some 150,000 housing units would need to be supplied over the five years, plus 25,000 to clear the existing backlog. It proposed the building of 77,000 houses (47,000 core houses, 23,000 completed low-cost houses and 7,000 completed medium cost houses), with the balance comprising serviced sites on which the occupier would build his own house, as follows:

- . transit areas with communal ablution blocks, where an occupier may build whatever accommodation suits him (30,000 units);
- . serviced sites with individual ablution blocks, where the occupier will build a conventional (for blacks) house subject to certain standards (60,000 units);
- . 'half-acre' (0.2 hectare) sites for owner-built high quality housing (8,000 units).

The transit areas were seen as an interim stage to cater for sudden influxes and for those who needed time to acquire money either to pay rent or construct their own houses.

The Whitsun Foundation report argued that a program of urban development would have to compete for limited public funds with many other, equally important projects and therefore maximum reliance should be placed on financing houses from occupants' wages rather than the public purse - this to be done in the form of rent or mortgage payments. The paper argued that the capacity for such payments was there, provided there was some cross-subsidisation of the lowest by the higher income groups.⁴⁹ The lowest income groups might also require assistance from public finance, particularly in the event that urban growth was not matched by growth in formal employment. The introduction of credit financing of house construction would presuppose individual tenure, and the establishment of an institution such as a housing bank to tie the provision of capital more closely to the rent or mortgage capacity of those in wage employment.⁵⁰

4. Economic development

In the preceding sections of this chapter the Committee has surveyed the history of land tenure in Rhodesia, the need for land reform, proposals for such reform and for rural development

generally, and urban development. Although the growth of urban areas will depend to some extent on land reform schemes and the need to urbanise those blacks who are not dependent on agriculture or who do not wish to become farmers, the success of any urban development scheme will depend ultimately on the number of jobs available in the urban areas - in manufacturing, in the service industries, and in the public sector. Zimbabwe's economic future will depend to a large extent on the growth and possible restructuring of the so-called modern sector.

As in the consideration of land reform, there are two possible approaches - the 'moderate' approach, which basically involves expansion of the existing private enterprise system, with modification of its worst aspects (e.g. wage differentials based on race), or the 'radical' approach, a more self-reliant economy based on socialism, which at least initially emphasises social reforms at the possible expense of productivity. The former approach has been argued effectively by Dr I.M. Hume, Director of the Whitsun Foundation, and the latter by Roger Riddell, of the Catholic Institute for International Relations, London.⁵¹

(1) The 'private enterprise' approach

Independence will enable blacks to re-order their relative position in the economy, through measures such as Africanisation, land reform and a redistribution of wages and profits. But ~~independence~~^{such measures} will not alleviate the absolute conditions of Zimbabwean economic life such as an overall low per capita income, an acute insufficiency of wage-paying employment and limited government revenues. According to Hume, Zimbabwe's annual population growth rate adds about 110,000 new, mainly male, entrants to the labour force each year:

When job creation was at its greatest during the period of rapid economic growth (before the 1976 recession), an average annual

investment level of about Rh\$450 million produced about 50,000 jobs. To provide jobs in the wage sector for all the current yearly increase would require an annual investment of around Rh\$800-900 million, or about 40% of gross national product, a target that would demand a period of accelerated investment greatly beyond present [1977] levels and which will not be easy to achieve under any foreseeable circumstances.³²

How, then, can job opportunities and incomes be expanded? According to Hume the choices were between 'authoritarian socialism' and '(largely) free enterprise'. Hume argued for the latter: a reformist economic regime (and a minimum exodus of whites) could result in an investment boom 'which will create conditions whereby such things as land reform and wage-profit redistribution become sustainable alongside an expansion of jobs in the wage sector'. As an example of the scope available under the existing system, Hume pointed out that the profit share of value added in the major economic sectors of manufacturing, agriculture and mining increased 20% or more in the decade from UDI. If the increase had been limited to 10% and the balance had accrued to black labour, then the average wage payment to blacks in 1972-74 would have been 16% greater in manufacturing, 22% greater in mining and 27% greater in agriculture. There was significant opportunity for black wage gains without crippling profit earnings.

Maintenance of a free enterprise economy would also maximise foreign development assistance and foreign private direct investment. Hume considered that the economy would be able to service official development assistance from the OECD of some \$2100-150m a year, plus private foreign investment. Such flows of foreign investment, coupled with local investment, could raise total investment levels above \$2600m, and would help generate 60-70,000 new jobs a year.

Hume argued that a socialist system would prove less effective, and for reasons unrelated to the more desirable socialist reforms such as a more equitable distribution of income. At least three considerations were involved in this view:

- (a) socialism was unlikely to be effective unless the central administration of the economy was strong, and this was probably unlikely in the case of a 'revolutionised Zimbabwe';
- (b) industrialisation had succeeded under socialism principally where there had been a productive peasantry to provide the agricultural surplus needed for industrial investment, but the peasantry in Zimbabwe lived so close to subsistence that there was little left for capital accumulation;
- (c) given that private industrial investment would cease, foreign aid would become indispensable, but socialist countries for both doctrinal and practical reasons placed little reliance on foreign aid - the practical reasons being that most non-military development aid came from Western and not socialist countries (in 1970-75 some 83.2% of all aid came from the Development Assistance Committee countries, basically the OECD group, and only 8.1% from communist countries).

Hume predicted that 'the major structural collapse in investment, wage employment and income growth which would follow the adoption of a socialist model would set the country back several years'. Whites would leave in large numbers, forcing industries dependent on them to close, reducing drastically the output from white farms and creating large-scale unemployment as a result. The domestic service sector, the third largest employer of blacks, would be particularly vulnerable to a white exodus. Total wage employment could decline to half, even a third, of its

(1977) level, which could mean unemployment for some 500,000 to 600,000 of the one million people in formal employment. At (1977) investment levels it would take 'about a decade' to create work for this number alone, let alone the 110,000 or so being added to the labour force each year. At reduced investment levels, re-employment would take much longer.

A retributive stance towards whites, argued Hume, could lead to the inter-dependence of blacks and whites in the economy being overlooked:

Too zealous an attack on the issue of the blacks' relative poverty may lead to their being condemned to a degree of absolute poverty which the economy as presently structured could well be geared, with reform, to avoid.⁵³

(2) The 'socialist' approach

Riddell argued that the existing system had enabled the development of a small, highly developed and dynamic modern sector at the expense of a vast, underdeveloped residual sector. The existing economic system was built on high wages and profits for a few and poverty for the majority. The free enterprise system had failed to absorb the available workforce into productive employment, which had risen comparatively little in the past decade. To provide some 100,000 new jobs a year would require growth in real terms of 11% a year - a rate highly unlikely to occur. The need to reduce wage differentials and the costs of land reform would reduce profits and lessen the expansion of the modern sectors of the economy. Economic development would be further hindered by the demands on foreign exchange of foreign debt servicing. Riddell pointed to both Kenya and Zambia as countries which had followed 'policies of export-led growth and an openness to foreign capital' and which were both now facing severe balance-of-payments problems, domestic inflation and increasing unemployment.⁵⁴

What was needed, said Riddell, was a radical restructuring of the economy. A socialist economic strategy would aim at the nationalisation of all land, the resettlement on to under-utilised land of large numbers of peasant farmers and the creation of a system of communally-owned farming units, to provide the 'basic framework for productive agricultural employment' for a largely rural population. A socialist economic strategy would also aim at the reorganisation of industry so that manufactured goods were geared to mass consumption (food, clothing, housing materials, etc.), 'rather than to luxury items'.

Critically related to this radical restructuring of agriculture and industry, argued Riddell, was the need to control and change the production processes and financial operations of foreign capital, which was 'largely responsible for the present export-led growth strategy that has led to growing inequalities and increasing debt'. It would also be important to narrow wide income differentials, initially through lowering 'the vastly inflated incomes of the managerial, industrial, and bureaucratic categories of the work-force'.⁵⁵

Riddell argued that the transition to a socialist system would not be overly disruptive if the more productive commercial farms continued in operation. During such a period exceptions would also need to be made in the nationalisation process in order to maintain foreign exchange, availability of expertise, etc. He considered it unlikely that transnational corporations would withdraw totally nor would trade with the West cease (e.g. the Angolan oil fields were run by transnationals, with oil sales to the West, and a number of Western mining companies were operating in Angola). However, reliance on the West should not be too great, and economic links should also be opened with the East, bearing in mind that the overriding consideration should be self-reliance. Riddell also considered it unlikely that Western

development aid would not be offered to a socialist regime. He instanced Mozambique where agricultural development was being financed by \$250m from Scandinavia, while Holland and West Germany, ^{as well as the UN} were participating in reconstruction, ~~as well as the UN.~~

The loss of a large number of skilled whites, while it would put strains on the economy, need not see its collapse. Riddell estimated there were some 6,000 trained Zimbabweans living abroad (1978), there had been an increase in on-the-job training for blacks, and the frequent absences of whites on military service had meant a rapid increase in the acquisition of skills by black workers left behind to maintain production. Finally, the experiences of Angola and Mozambique showed that alternative sources of foreign skilled manpower would be available to maintain essential services and conduct training programs.

The Riddell blueprint for a socialist Zimbabwe is most closely aligned to the policies of ZANU (PF), which won the February 1980 elections. At the time of writing it was not known to what extent ZANU (PF) would be implementing its declared policies for a socialist Zimbabwe and whether those policies would be altered when tested against the realities of power. Nor was it known how many more whites would leave Zimbabwe and what effect this would actually have on the economy. Zimbabwe has embarked on a new course and the Committee will wait with interest to see where that course leads.

5. The public sector

Programs of rural and urban reform and the creation of additional jobs will depend to a large extent on infrastructure and other services provided by the public sector - whatever course the Zimbabwean economy takes. Probably the most detailed blueprint for development of the public sector currently available is the report Proposals for a Five-Year Programme of

Development in the Public Sector, prepared by the Ministry of Finance and made public in January 1979.⁵⁶ The program was based on a continuation of the free enterprise system but much of it should be capable of adaptation to meet the needs of a socialist economy.

The major objectives of the program were listed as follows:

- (a) to stimulate and facilitate the growth of the economy through the continued development of all infrastructural requirements;
- (b) to improve the quality of life and the standard of living in the population generally and to boost economic output particularly of the presently non-commercial agricultural sector;
- (c) to raise the general standard of education and to increase the local output of higher skills through post-school training;
- (d) to eliminate the shortfall in urban housing and to meet the rising demand for better housing throughout the country.

The emphasis of the plan was on expansion of power supplies, transport capacity and communications, rural development and education, housing, health and other services.

The overall cost of the plan was estimated at \$23500m over five years, of which at least \$2928m would need to be provided in the form of international aid, with the remainder coming from the domestic capital market and Budget contributions (\$21000m), State recurrent expenditure (\$2400m) and the commercial undertakings of major public utilities (power, railways, telecommunications and airways - \$21200m). The report claimed that 'once the economy starts to move forward again', and if the plan was implemented, then it should be possible to achieve a real growth rate of about 8%. Such a growth rate would

increase employment by about 5% a year to create 350,000 new jobs over the five years.

One of the main aims of the plan was to develop the rural areas and urban growth centres (as discussed earlier in this chapter). Agricultural development and rural resettlement was expected to cost more than \$2700m over five years, and plans to house more than 800,000 blacks in urban areas \$2173m. The capital intensive projects requiring a high degree of foreign exchange would be those for the Electricity Supply Commission (\$2565m), Central African Power Corporation (\$2329m), national railways (\$2192m) and the Posts and Telecommunications Corporation (\$2104m). The electricity supply votes were mainly for the construction of a thermal power station at Wankie, and hydro-electric projects on the Zambezi in co-operation with Zambia. The main railways project would be electrification of the line from Salisbury to Beit Bridge and Malvernia. The posts and telecommunications sum was mainly for the extension of urban and rural telephone facilities, but included a component for preliminary work towards the establishment of an earth station for satellite communications.

More than half of the \$2969m destined for social services was planned to go on primary and secondary education and teacher training. Capital and running expenditure for this would total \$2612m over five years. In 1977 the total primary school enrolment of black children was 855,025 out of an estimated 1,484,500 in the age range 7-14 years (i.e. 57.6%). The five-year plan sought to cater for an additional 50,000 primary school pupils per annum. In 1978 only about 20% of primary school leavers entered secondary school. The aim of the plan was to increase the intake to 50%, which meant an additional 127,000 new secondary places by the end of five years. The other major expenditure planned in the social services field was \$2173m on urban housing. Other social services spending recommended included community development training, \$24m; vocational

education and industrial training, \$Z24m; national university, \$Z33m; health services, \$Z118m; and family planning \$Z5m.

Other areas of expenditure included civil aviation (a new airport for Salisbury, initial costs \$Z16m), national airline (long-haul aircraft, initial costs \$Z20m) and conversion to colour TV broadcasting, \$Z8m.

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25. Integrated Plan for Rural Development, p. 4.
26. On the basis of a net farm income of \$21400 p.a., 16,000 farmers (194,000 persons, including dependents) could be settled on the 4m hectares, and on the basis of a net farm income of \$2800 p.a. (the average 1976 net farm income in African Purchase Areas), 22,000 farmers (267,000 persons) could be settled - Integrated Plan for Rural Development, Table 4, p. 22.
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CHAPTER 12

Sanctions

1. Introduction

The main indicator of world disapproval of UDI, and the main international instrument to compel a settlement providing for black majority rule, was sanctions: the economic, diplomatic and social isolation of Rhodesia. Sanctions were intended to be a short term measure but, for a number of reasons, they failed to produce a quick result. They did have a longer term, cumulative effect.

In this chapter the Committee examines the use of sanctions as an instrument of international policy in general and looks at the failure of the embargo on deliveries of oil to Rhodesia as an example of the reasons why sanctions did not succeed as expected.

The Committee, in the final part of this chapter, examines Australia's implementation of sanctions, with particular reference to trade, the legal basis for sanctions and the role and continued existence of the Rhodesia Information Centre.

2. Sanctions as an instrument of international policy

(1) A broad survey

Sanctions used as an instrument of international policy are usually economic or political, or both. Economic sanctions can range from a total boycott of trade to a boycott of specific items of trade. Political sanctions involve a range of measures

but usually include a cut in diplomatic relations, restrictions on international travel, and limits on international relationships and contacts generally. Sanctions have been used by one country against another, by groups of countries and by international organisations.

The type and range of sanctions used depends on the ends to be achieved. Sanctions can be imposed to change a government, to change specific policies or counter specific acts of a government, to enforce treaty or contractual obligations, or to enforce conformity with internationally accepted norms or standards of behaviour. Sanctions have sometimes been imposed as a penalty for breaches of treaties, contracts or obligations.

Historically, sanctions have been used mainly by a state or group of states to advance their national interests by compelling another state to do what they desired, or in support of military measures in times of war. They have sometimes been used to gain advantages from a vulnerable country without resort to war. The use of sanctions by international organisations to deter or dissuade states from pursuing policies which do not conform with accepted norms of international conduct is a more recent phenomenon, made possible in particular by the growth in international trade and interdependency after the industrial revolution.

Examples of groups of states applying sanctions include the Organisation of American States against the Dominican Republic in 1960 and against Cuba in 1962 (the US had first applied sanctions against Cuba in 1960), the Arab states against Israel in 1948, and Soviet bloc countries against Yugoslavia in 1948 and Albania in 1961 (after its 'defection' to the Chinese communist camp). The first application of sanctions by a world, as opposed to a regional, organisation occurred in 1935 when the League of Nations applied a range of economic sanctions against Italy over its invasion of Ethiopia.

The League's successor, the United Nations, applied limited sanctions against China and North Korea during the Korean War in support of military measures but these had little effect as both countries were receiving most of their supplies from the Soviet bloc, which had opposed the use of sanctions. In the 1960s the UN General Assembly passed several resolutions calling for sanctions against Portugal to induce the Portuguese Government to accept the principle of self-determination for its peoples in Africa, and in 1963 and 1965 the UN Security Council passed two recommendatory resolutions calling for a ban on the sale or shipment of arms and military equipment or material which could be used for the suppression of indigenous peoples in Portugal's African territories.¹

UN sanctions have also long been proposed against South Africa over its policy of apartheid. The UN General Assembly in 1962 called for economic and political sanctions against South Africa, set up the Special Committee on Apartheid and asked the Security Council to take appropriate measures, including sanctions, to secure South African compliance with UN resolutions.² The Security Council in the following year called for an arms embargo on South Africa³, a call which was strengthened in 1970 to include spare parts⁴, and was made mandatory in 1977.⁵

(2) The United Nations and sanctions

The first use of mandatory sanctions by the United Nations was in 1966, against Rhodesia. The subject of Rhodesia had featured in United Nations resolutions at least since 1962, and immediately prior to UDI, on 5 November 1965, the UN General Assembly had called on Britain to employ all necessary measures, including force, to deal with any rebellion by the Smith Government.⁶ The Security Council similarly had requested Britain to take all necessary action to prevent a unilateral declaration

of independence some six months earlier, on 6 May 1965.⁷ When Rhodesia did declare its own independence on 11 November 1965, the UN Security Council passed a resolution condemning the UDI the next day⁸, and on 20 November called for the implementation of an arms embargo, the breaking of all economic relations and in particular an embargo on oil and oil products.⁹

The Security Council had acted at Britain's request. Britain, as the responsible administering power, had commenced sanctions action as from 11 November. Other Commonwealth countries had also imposed sanctions, including Australia which first imposed them on 16 November. British and Commonwealth moves on sanctions after UDI are discussed in greater detail in chapter 4.

In April 1966, against^{at} the request of Britain, the Security Council took further action. In order to prevent oil reaching Rhodesia through the Mozambique port of Beira, the Security Council in resolution 221 of 9 April 1966 invoked Article 39 of the UN Charter and authorised Britain to intercept ships bound for Beira which were reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for Rhodesia and stop them discharging their cargo, by force if necessary. A British naval squadron had commenced patrolling the Mozambique Channel prior to 9 April, and after passage of the resolution ~~turned away a number of~~ ^{begun turning away} tankers bound for Beira.

According to a study by Margaret Doxey of economic sanctions and their international enforcement:

The grounds for voluntary collective action against the rebel regime in Rhodesia were provided by Britain's decision, supported by resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, that the rebellion was not only an illegal act, which should be put down by the constitutional authority (Britain), but was legitimately the concern of the United Nations. That Britain acknowledged this fact

from the beginning is clear from warnings that she would take the matter to the United Nations if the Rhodesian government did not come to terms; her subsequent recourse to the Security Council for authority to establish a blockade of Beira confirms this point.¹⁰

Mandatory sanctions under Article 41 of the Charter were first imposed by resolution 232 of 16 December 1966. The export to Rhodesia of oil, arms, ammunition and military equipment, vehicles and aircraft was embargoed, as was the import from Rhodesia of tobacco, sugar, meat and meat products, asbestos, copper, chrome ore, iron ore, pig iron, hides and skins - commodities making up the bulk of Rhodesia's export trade. Also banned was the shipment of these commodities, activities to promote Rhodesian exports, and activities to promote banned imports. The aim was to force a return to Rhodesia's previous status under its 1961 Constitution and to ensure rapid progress towards majority rule. According to Doxey, external pressure was intended to produce radical internal change.¹¹

However, radical internal change did not result, and so on 29 May 1968 the Security Council, in resolution 253, extended the scope of mandatory sanctions. Members of the United Nations were required to prohibit:

- . The import of all commodities and products originating in Rhodesia;
- . Any activities by their nationals or within their territories which would promote the export of Rhodesian products;
- . The shipment of Rhodesian products;
- . The sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories of any commodities or products to persons or bodies in Rhodesia and the shipment of such products;

- . The provision of funds for investment or of any other financial or economic resources to the Rhodesian Government, or to Rhodesian commercial or industrial enterprises;
- . The remittance of any funds except for pensions or exempted items (medical supplies, educational equipment, publications, news materials and in special humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs);
- . The entry into their territory of persons using Rhodesian passports, except on exceptional humanitarian grounds;
- . Any airline links with Rhodesia.

The resolution called for the withdrawal of all consular and trade representation in Rhodesia and the *discouragement of* emigration to Rhodesia.

The resolution censured those states which had persisted in trade in embargoed goods with Rhodesia in defiance of resolution 232. The Security Council stated its view in the resolution that the UK as the administering power should ensure that no settlement was reached 'without taking into account the views of the people in Southern Rhodesia, and in particular the political parties favouring majority rule, and that it is acceptable to the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole'. The UN Sanctions Supervisory Committee was established by the resolution.

Subsequent Security Council resolutions on sanctions continued them in force and further tightened their scope, particularly resolutions 388 of 6 April 1976 and 409 of 27 May 1977. More than 20 sanction resolutions were passed between 29

May 1968 and 21 December 1979, when sanctions were formally lifted by resolution 460.

The UK Permanent Representative advised the Security Council on 12 December 1979 that Britain's actions in assuming full legislative and executive authority over Rhodesia had been undertaken in exercise of its responsibility as administering power 'which the Security Council has repeatedly acknowledged as falling uniquely upon the United Kingdom'. In his letter the Permanent Representative said:

The situation which was determined by the Security Council in resolution 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966 to constitute a threat to international peace and security, as reaffirmed by subsequent resolutions of the Council, has accordingly been remedied and the purpose of the measures which were decided upon by the Council on the basis of that determination has been achieved.

In these circumstances, the obligations of Member States under Article 25 of the Charter in relation to those measures are, in the view of the Government of the United Kingdom, to be regarded as having been discharged. This being so, the United Kingdom is terminating the measures which were taken by it pursuant to the decisions adopted by the Council in regard to the then situation of illegality.¹²

There was some dispute at the time whether Britain could unilaterally lift sanctions or whether it should do so through a Security Council determination that the conditions which led it to impose sanctions no longer existed, i.e. Rhodesia was no longer a 'threat to the peace'. In the event a number of countries, including Australia, had unilaterally lifted sanctions by the time the Security Council made its determination on 21 December.

3. The effectiveness of sanctions

The theory of sanctions postulates that within the country being sanctioned there is a causal link between deprivation, usually economic deprivation, and political change. But this is not always so. In fact sanctions, as Rhodesia proved in the early years of sanctions against it, may well have effects opposite to those intended. Instead of promoting political change, sanctions may well do the opposite - promote solidarity and popular support for the government being sanctioned. A siege mentality may produce national unity - as proved to be the case among Rhodesian whites - and prolong the state of affairs meant to be changed.

Sanctions may also have unintended beneficial effects. In the case of Rhodesia, sanctions promoted a policy of economic self-reliance. Agriculture and industry diversified as a result of import replacement policies, and where imports were required, these were obtained by alternative means. Another benefit in the case of Rhodesia was that exports became more diversified.

A major problem with sanctions is that of enforcement. Unless sanctions can be effectively enforced, the country being sanctioned will find means of evading sanctions, as Rhodesia did. The effectiveness of sanctions is further reduced by the activities of countries not involved in sanctions, by countries which say they are enforcing sanctions but whose nationals or corporations freely trade 'under the counter', and by the imposition of counter-sanctions - if the country being sanctioned has key commodities required by sanctioning countries. In the case of Rhodesia most of these elements were present in varying degrees.

Countries such as South Africa, Portugal, Mozambique (prior to independence in 1975), Zambia, Botswana, Zaire, Malawi, Gabon, Switzerland, Liechtenstein and Luxembourg, to name some,

were utilised at various times and to varying degrees by Rhodesia to by-pass the effects of sanctions. Some were utilised because of their sympathy for the Rhodesian position, others because of their neutrality and non-membership of the UN. Some were willing to provide assistance because of economic benefit or self-interest, and some were forced to trade with Rhodesia because of their geographic position in relation to and interdependence with Rhodesia. The governments of a number of countries, while not supporting sanctions-breaking, tended to turn a blind eye to the activities of some of their nationals and corporations. The last factor mentioned, counter-sanctions, was not used, mainly because of the foreign exchange earned for Rhodesia by key exports. However, the potential for its use was there in that exports of the strategically most valuable mineral produced by Rhodesia, chromite, could have been withheld, thus causing some disruption, if not permanent damage, to Western industrial and military interests (the effectiveness of a counter-boycott would have been dependent mainly on the other major chromite producers, the USSR and South Africa, not taking up the shortfall in production). For a more detailed examination of the importance of Rhodesian chromite, see chapter 10.

A major 'official' breach of sanctions by a Security Council member, the US, occurred in November 1971 when Congress passed the so-called Byrd Amendment, which prohibited the embargoing of any strategic material imported from a non-communist country as long as the same material was being imported from a communist country. The effect of the amendment was to exempt Rhodesian chromite and other strategic minerals from US import restrictions imposed in support of UN mandatory sanctions. The Amendment was 'repealed' in early 1977. In the period 1972 to August 1977 when the Byrd Amendment had effect the US imported \$US15m in chrome ore and \$US106m in ferrochrome. Another major mineral import by the US from Rhodesia over the period was nickel (US imports of Rhodesian nickel were worth \$US60m over the period). Total US mineral imports from Rhodesia in the period

1972 to August 1977 were worth \$US212m.¹³ In 1976, the last year before 'repeal' of the Byrd Amendment, Rhodesian mineral exports to the US were nearly 20 per cent by value of total mineral production.

In the period after UDI sanctions moved from the bilateral (imposition by individual Commonwealth countries) to the multilateral (imposition by a collective decision of the UN), from the voluntary to the mandatory and from the selective to the comprehensive. The time taken for each of these transitions was sufficient for Rhodesia to sort out new avenues for evasion. Additionally, Rhodesia was never completely isolated - particularly in the areas of communications (postal, telephone, telex and telegraph) and travel. This lack of isolation weakened the overall effect of sanctions. A further weakness of sanctions against Rhodesia was that they over-rated Rhodesia's economic dependence on the outside world.

Finally, the lack of a precise objective weakened the resolve to continue sanctions. The purpose of implementing sanctions was never clearly stated: was it to show disapproval of UDI, to bring about a return to legality after UDI, to promote majority rule, to end racism, to ensure a settlement which involved external as well as internal nationalist parties, or a combination of some or all of these? The lack of a precise objective caused decisions on compliance by individual governments to vary and made it difficult for Rhodesia to know exactly what was required to end sanctions. This was particularly so when the Muzorewa Government was elected in April 1979 - when many inside and outside Rhodesia considered that it had fulfilled the original conditions for a lifting of sanctions.

This lack of a precise objective, coupled with what the Muzorewa Government saw as a continuation of sanctions after April 1979 for political motives, at a time when less than half the UN members imposing sanctions were themselves democracies, could well have damaged the general perception of the UN as an instrument able to promote world peace and security.¹⁴

Whatever their short-comings, there seems little doubt that in the case of Rhodesia sanctions did have an effect in the longer term. The Rhodesian economy experienced a downturn from 1974, reflecting a downturn in the world economic situation generally, the escalating cost of oil and the rapidly increasing costs of the guerilla war. But the downturn was also partly the result of sanctions - exports had to be discounted to make their illegal purchase attractive and imports attracted a premium for similar reasons. Over a period this reduced profit margins and adversely affected the balance of payments and foreign reserves. Closure of the Mozambique border in 1976 further cut into profit margins by increasing transport costs for imports and exports.

The Rhodesian economy had been able to meet sanctions in the short term by a program of import substitution and by using excess industrial capacity. In the longer term these were limited alternatives, and the remaining option of increased productivity depended increasingly on export performance and the availability of capital and key items of imports.

Sanctions kept Rhodesia diplomatically isolated and forced the country to struggle for economic survival at ever increasing costs. They maintained international concern over the Rhodesia issue and 'sustained the world view of the unacceptability of the regime'.¹⁵ Sanctions proved to be a long term weapon. Taken in isolation, they were only partially effective, but taken in conjunction with other circumstances such as the world economic downturn, the increasing costs of oil and of the guerilla war, and Rhodesia's loss of trade transport routes through Mozambique, sanctions were an important impetus towards a settlement.

Sanctions were breached or by-passed in numerous ways by numerous methods. A number have been documented in reports from the UN Sanctions Supervisory Committee and others will no doubt

be documented in studies in years to come. As an example of sanctions evasion, and because it was arguably the single most important breach in the sanctions wall, the Committee will consider how Rhodesia managed to maintain its supplies of oil.

4. A case study: oil

As a landlocked country, Rhodesia would have been quickly and seriously affected by sanctions if all her neighbours had acted in concert and sealed their borders. Rhodesia was able to withstand sanctions because this did not occur. Two countries were the key to Rhodesia's ability to withstand the worst effects of sanctions. These were South Africa and (until 1976) Portuguese-controlled Mozambique.

From 1965 to 1974 up to three-quarters of Rhodesia's exports were sent through Mozambique to be shipped from the ports of Beira and Maputo (then Lourenco Marques). The majority of imports also came through Mozambique. From the early 1970s, as Portuguese control of the country grew less secure, South Africa became increasingly important and, after the Mozambique border closure in March 1976, became the key to Rhodesia's survival. Without its lifelines through South Africa, Rhodesia could not have survived economically.

The single major import on which Rhodesia depended for her economic survival was oil. Rhodesia had no supplies of her own, and was completely dependent on oil imports. According to the Report on the Supply of Petroleum and Petroleum Products to Rhodesia by T.H. Bingham and S.M. Gray (the 'Bingham Report'), the total consumption of all petroleum products in Rhodesia at the time of UDI was about 410,000 tonnes. The total fell after UDI but was restored to its pre-UDI level by about 1969 and in 1977 stood at about 800,000 tonnes.¹⁶

The success of sanctions was predicated by Britain to depend to a large extent on the effectiveness of an oil embargo. To this end Britain, with UN backing, instituted a naval blockade of the Mozambique port of Beira to prevent oil destined for Rhodesia from getting through. The blockade commenced after passage of UN Security Council resolution 221 on 9 April 1966 and continued until June 1975.¹⁷ Prior to UDI most of Rhodesia's oil imports had been landed at Beira, to be piped direct to Rhodesia's only major refinery, at Feruka, near Umtali, through the Lonrho-owned and operated Beira-Umtali pipeline (built in 1962). The blockade caused the pipeline and the refinery to close in ~~January~~ 1966, and they remained closed at least until sanctions were lifted.

Five international oil companies operated subsidiaries in Rhodesia as at UDI: Shell, British Petroleum, Mobil, Caltex and Total (the first British-Dutch, the second British, the third and fourth US companies and the fifth French). Shell and BP accounted for about half of all sales, and were also responsible for the joint management and partial control (41.5 per cent) of the Feruka refinery. Until 1975 Shell and BP products in Southern Africa were marketed by the Consolidated Petroleum Co. Ltd, largely managed by Shell.

From the time of British-imposed sanctions until January 1968 oil from the five companies, but particularly Shell and BP, was sold to customers in Rhodesia via various intermediaries in South Africa. Immediately after UDI oil products began to reach Rhodesia by road tanker over the Beit Bridge. The road tanker traffic declined as oil products began to be carried by rail from South Africa via Mozambique. This traffic reached a peak in May 1966 and ceased altogether in May 1967. Most of Rhodesia's oil products were then supplied direct from Mozambique, being railed from Shell Mozambique's Lourenco Marques facilities (Shell Mozambique in turn received its supplies by ship from South Africa). Deliveries were to forwarding agents and intermediaries, who resold them to GENTA (the Rhodesian oil procurement agency).

The British Government was aware of the movement of oil from the South African subsidiaries of the five international oil companies and was also aware that without an embargo on oil supplies to South Africa and Mozambique it could not stop the movement of oil to Rhodesia. Britain then concentrated its attention on ensuring that British companies were not engaged in supplying Rhodesia and that no British oil reached Rhodesia.

The solution, reached by Shell and BP in February 1968, was a 'swap' arrangement with the French company, Total. Total South Africa would supply oil products to Mozambique from its Matola installation in exchange for an equivalent quantity of product supplied to it by the Consolidated companies (Shell and BP) in South Africa. The arrangement avoided any direct involvement by British-registered firms such as Shell Mozambique. According to the Bingham Report the British Government was made aware of this arrangement if not at the time then in the following year.¹⁸ The exchange arrangement was later altered to a 'throughput' arrangement by which products supplied by the Consolidated companies were handled through the Total installation at Lourenco Marques for a fee and then delivered by Total to intermediaries who resold them to GENTA.

The arrangement with Total ended in 1971 after which orders placed by South African intermediaries on Shell South Africa and other South African subsidiaries of the major oil companies were met from products supplied by Shell Mozambique at Lourenco Marques. Most if not all of these products were then consigned by the same or different intermediaries to Rhodesia. According to the Bingham Report details of the new arrangement were known to the top management of Consolidated when the previous arrangement with Total ended, but it was not until 1974 that the Shell and BP managements in Europe were told, and the UK Government was not informed at all. The supply of oil to Rhodesia via Mozambique stopped in 1976 when the border between the two

countries was closed. Supplies through Mozambique had been dropping since 1974 in any event, after the opening that year of a direct rail link between South Africa and Rhodesia.

According to a 1979 UN report the UK Government was investigating allegations that Shell and BP continued to supply oil products to Rhodesia after 1976.¹⁹ This was by means of an agreement, admitted by BP, between Shell/BP and SASOL (the State-owned South African Coal, Gas and Oil Corporation) to assist SASOL in marketing refined oil products. Reportedly, the joint Shell/BP refinery near Durban supplied certain quantities of oil to SASOL customers inside South Africa while SASOL sent equivalent quantities of oil to Rhodesia, mainly by rail.

The Bingham Report deals mainly with the activities of Shell and BP, and to a lesser extent the role played by Total. However, other studies, notably those by Bernard Rivers (The Oil Conspiracy) and Dr Martin Bailey (Shell and BP in South Africa) have alleged a similar involvement by the US-based companies of Mobil and Caltex. One account alleged that Mobil's South African subsidiary supplied 20 per cent of Rhodesia's oil between 1968 and 1976.²⁰

The aim of the various arrangements was to avoid a direct link between the international oil companies and their South African subsidiaries, and also to avoid a direct link between the South African subsidiaries and the Rhodesian subsidiaries. The sanctions legislation existing at the time in the UK, France, the Netherlands and the US did not apply to subsidiary companies incorporated in South Africa - a crucial loophole in the application of sanctions. Thus the parent companies could not be held liable for the actions of their subsidiaries. They could only be held liable if they themselves breached the sanctions legislation of their own countries. Such a breach might have been involved if it could be proved the parent companies actively assisted their South African subsidiaries to

breach sanctions, or knew they were doing so and did not take steps to stop them.

The South African subsidiaries would have been in a difficult position if they had wanted to conform with sanctions in that they were subject to direction by the South African Government. The South African Government had directed in 1968 that the subsidiaries operating under its jurisdiction were to fulfil orders placed by South African customers (whether suspected of being intermediaries or not) and the ultimate destination of their product was not their concern. The South African subsidiaries were also bound by the provisions of the South African Official Secrets Act, which forbade the publication of strategic information on oil supplies - even between parent company and subsidiary. Thus the South African subsidiaries claimed they were unable to provide information to their parent companies which might have shown whether or not sanctions were being breached.

The Rhodesian subsidiaries were bound to secrecy by Rhodesian security legislation, and would have been subject to criminal penalties had they detailed sanctions-breaking operations. As pointed out in the Bingham Report, had the parent companies attempted to wind up the operations of their Rhodesian subsidiaries their assets and operations would probably have been taken over by the Rhodesian Government. In any case their dealings were mainly with the State-owned purchasing agency, GENTA, which procured most of the oil products required by Rhodesia and allocated them to existing Rhodesian marketers roughly in proportion to their market shares.

The principal role in breaching oil sanctions was played by the South African subsidiaries of the five major oil companies. Whether they did so willingly or under pressure from the South African Government has not been established beyond doubt.

Possible courses of action which might have been taken to ensure compliance with sanctions include pressure on the South African subsidiaries by their parent companies, which in turn might have required pressure being put on the parent companies by their respective governments (either non-legislative or legislative). The British and French governments could have exerted pressure through their majority shareholdings in BP and Total respectively. The parent companies might also have been able to replace the boards of their South African subsidiaries with persons willing to ensure compliance with sanctions. Ultimately, they could have cut off oil deliveries to their subsidiaries. A second course of action might have been to extend sanctions legislation to make parent companies legally liable for the activities of their subsidiaries with regard to trade with Rhodesia.

A third course of action might have been a partial or complete oil embargo of South Africa for as long as it supplied Rhodesia. This would have been necessary in the event that South Africa supplied oil to Rhodesia from its own oil-from-coal plants, rather than from imports. An embargo, to be effective, would probably have involved a blockade and could have led to military confrontation. Each course of action, especially the last, would have tested the resolve of the South African Government to support Rhodesia, as well as the resolve of sanctioning countries.

The Committee has examined the failure of oil sanctions in some detail both because of the importance of oil in any modern economy, and because the oil question was symptomatic of a number of problems involved in economic sanctions against Rhodesia, including: the lack of commitment by the governments of a number of sanctioning countries, the apparent ease with which major international companies were able to continue to supply Rhodesia and maintain their interests there despite sanctions,

the crucial role of South Africa in Rhodesia's economic survival, and the need for effective enforcement if sanctions are to succeed. Rhodesian ingenuity in by-passing sanctions was another major factor in their failure to obtain a quick result.

5. Sanctions and Australia

(1) Trade

Australia adhered to UN Security Council resolutions on sanctions since their first imposition in 1966. In fact Australia joined Britain and a number of other Commonwealth countries in imposing a range of economic sanctions on Rhodesia in late 1965 immediately after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence - a year before the first of the Security Council's mandatory sanctions resolutions was passed. Australian exports at the time were worth some \$A5m and imports some \$A2.5m.

Australia's major export in 1965-66 was wheat, worth \$A3.2m. Other exports were tallow, malt, non-electric machinery and dried and preserved milk. Australia's major import in 1965-66 was unmanufactured tobacco, worth \$A1.8m. Other imports were chrome ores and concentrates and iron and steel.

In 1966-77 Australian exports were worth \$A4m - mainly wheat, while imports had fallen to less than \$A100,000. Australia continued to export wheat to Rhodesia until 1972 on 'humanitarian grounds'. Rhodesia's growing self-sufficiency in wheat and a change in Australian governments caused Australian wheat exports to cease in 1972. Trade thereafter was minimal, as shown in Table 12.1.

Table 12.1: Australian-Rhodesian trade

(\$A'000)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Australian imports</u>	<u>Australian exports</u>
1964-65	3 836	3 786
1965-66	2 490	5 072
1966-67	68	4 059
1967-68	79	5 561
1968-69	22	4 574
1969-70	3	3 041
1970-71	1	4 454
1971-72	-	2 496
1972-73	-	51
1973-74	14	12
1974-75	-	10
1975-76	-	3
1976-77	1	-
1977-78	4	1
1978-79	-	-
1979-80 (to end Feb.)	5	12

Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics

In 1965, after UDI, Australia banned the export of military equipment to Rhodesia and the import of tobacco, ferro-alloys, chrome ore and asbestos. In 1968, in conformity with Security Council resolution 253, Australia banned all trade except for exports of medical supplies, educational equipment, publications and news material and 'foodstuffs in special humanitarian circumstances'. In December 1972 the Australian Government prohibited wheat exports on the grounds that trade in that commodity on humanitarian grounds was no longer justified. In 1973 all trade was banned except where the consent of the Minister for Customs and Excise was obtained. Standard permission was given for the export and import of single copies of newspapers and publications, personal and household effects and gift parcels up to a value of \$A50 a parcel.

The prospects for a resumption of Australian trade with an independent Zimbabwe were not clear to the Committee at the date of writing. Evidence to the Sub-Committee was not optimistic, pointing out that both countries were essentially primary producers - exporting agricultural produce and minerals, and therefore likely to be competing in some areas, and that Zimbabwe had become self-sufficient in many of the areas in which it previously imported. The market for Australian wheat no longer existed (except perhaps in exceptional circumstances such as drought). Possibilities existed for the export of Australian agricultural and mining machinery, although Australia could expect competition from other countries, particularly South Africa. Imports of chrome ore or alloys could resume on a limited scale. The Australian Trade Commissioner in Nairobi visited Rhodesia to assess trade potential in January-February 1980.

(2) The legal basis of Australian sanctions

As UN Security Council resolutions do not apply in Australia by their own force, mandatory sanctions were implemented by Acts of Parliament and regulations thereunder. The

legislation that was relied on to give effect to sanctions was as follows:

- . . Banking Act 1959
 Banking (Foreign Exchange) Regulations
- . . Customs Act 1901
 Customs (Prohibited Imports) Regulations
 Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations
- . . Migration Act 1958
- . . Passports Act 1938
 Passport Regulations

Action was taken to withdraw sanctions imposed under this legislation in late December 1979.

(3) The Rhodesia Information Centre

The Rhodesia Information Centre began as a privately-sponsored organisation in Melbourne in 1966. It was moved to Sydney in 1967 when it became an overseas office of the Rhodesian Department of Information, and its first full-time director was Mr A. Izod. Mr Izod was succeeded in November 1967 by Mr K.D.L. Chalmers, who in turn was succeeded by Mr R. van der Spuy in June 1972. ^{Mr van der Spuy remained as the director until September 1978.} Mr D.V.M. Bradley was variously assistant director or acting director in the period 1970-73. From September 1978 the acting director was Mr G. Aplin.

The purpose of the Rhodesia Information Centre has been described consistently over the years as 'the dissemination of factual information about Rhodesia throughout Australia'.²¹ The Centre distributed publications such as 'The Rhodesian Commentary', 'Focus on Rhodesia' and tourist literature, and also answered specific requests for information.

Allegations were made at various times during the sanctions years that the Centre was active in promoting trade with Rhodesia in breach of sanctions and that it recruited mercenaries to fight in the Rhodesian security forces.²² These allegations were not proved to the Committee. Nor were allegations that the Centre undertook diplomatic activities and encouraged immigration to Rhodesia.

The Committee is not stating that recruitment of Australians to serve in the Rhodesian security forces did not take place. There is some evidence this did in fact occur. For example, in 1974 Commonwealth Police were investigating the possible 'leaking' of confidential Australian Army records to a man believed to have been an officer in the Rhodesian army, who allegedly came to Australia as a South African businessman, and who was allegedly recruiting for the Rhodesian security forces. However, the Sub-Committee in its inquiry did not receive any substantiated evidence that the Rhodesian Information Centre was involved in this or other alleged recruitment attempts.

The Centre was the subject of three court cases in the period 1973-75, resulting from efforts to close it by the Labor Government.

The first case arose out of a direction by the Commonwealth Postmaster-General on 18 April 1973 that all postal and telecommunications services for the Rhodesia Information Centre be withdrawn. Postal deliveries were stopped, the post-office box cancelled and the telephone disconnected. The acting director at the time, Mr Bradley, took action in the High Court in May 1973. The Court, in September, ruled in his favour and ordered that the services be restored. The case was Bradley v The Commonwealth and Another.²³ The Chief Justice, Sir Garfield Barwick, and Mr Justice Gibbs said in their (majority) judgement:

It is true that the plaintiff [Bradley] is employed by a regime in Rhodesia whose activities, on the assumptions made, are illegal in that country, but neither that circumstance, nor the fact that he may be assumed to be endeavouring to influence public opinion in Australia in favour of that regime, means that he himself has committed any breach of the law....²⁴

Another dispute between the Centre and the Postmaster-General also went to the High Court. On 20 December 1974 the Postmaster-General's Department informed the Rhodesia Information Centre that action was being taken to exclude its name from the 1975 Sydney telephone directory. The then director of the Centre, Mr van der Spuy, took High Court action and on 14 February 1975 was granted an interim injunction against the Postmaster-General. The immediate result was that the entry for the Centre was placed in the 1975 directory. At a Full Court hearing on 14 August 1975 the proceedings were, by consent, dismissed. This case was van der Spuy v The Commonwealth and Others, and was not reported.

The third case involved proposals by the New South Wales Corporate Affairs Commission to cancel the business name, 'Rhodesia Information Centre', registered under the NSW Business Names Act of 1962 (business: 'consultant on information and tourism'). This case, Corporate Affairs Commission v Bradley, Commonwealth of Australia (intervener), was finally decided in June 1974 in the NSW Supreme Court.²⁵

The business name had originally been registered on 1 June 1967. In late 1972 the newly-elected Federal Labor Government called on the NSW Government to close the Rhodesia Information Centre. The NSW Government refused, but did move to cancel the Centre's business name. The Centre's acting director, Mr Bradley, appealed against the decision to cancel and also against the intervention, in the initial hearing, by the Commonwealth. He lost the appeal against cancellation of the business name, but won the appeal against Commonwealth

intervention. In this, the NSW Supreme Court ruled that the doctrine that generally in issues of public policy the courts should accept the guidance of the executive was subversive of the independence of the judiciary:

The courts do not exist to enable the Australian or any government to satisfy foreign States of the sincerity of a government's attitude; they exist to adjudicate upon rights and for a court to permit a government to appear for the express purpose of achieving a particular result in litigation between two private litigants, in which it concedes that it has no rights of its own, would be wrong.²⁶

Although registration of its name as a business name was cancelled, the Centre was able to continue its normal activities under the same name. The only difference was that the name no longer enjoyed the protections of the NSW Business Names Act.

The Australian Government's interest in acting against the Centre was to conform with UN Security Council resolutions on sanctions, beginning with resolution 253 of 29 May 1968. The Australian Government's difficulties stemmed from the fact that resolutions of the Security Council were not part of the law of the Commonwealth, nor by their own force did they confer any power on the Executive Government which it did not otherwise possess. In their joint judgement Chief Justice Barwick and Mr Justice Gibbs stated:

Since the [UN] Charter and the resolutions of the Security Council have not been carried into effect within Australia by appropriate legislation, they cannot be relied upon as a justification for executive acts that would otherwise be unjustified....²⁷

Although certain UN Security Council resolutions might have been mandatory insofar as membership of the UN was concerned, they had no legal effect by themselves in Australia,

and required the use of existing or new legislation for implementation. In the absence of new legislation, there were doubts that the Commonwealth had the power to close the Rhodesia Information Centre - its expressed aim - and its only actions against the Centre relied on existing legislation dealing with other matters such as postal services.

United Nations pressure on Australia to close the Centre grew when the Security Council decided by resolution 409 of 27 May 1977 that all member states should prohibit the use or transfer of any funds in their territories by the illegal regime 'for the purposes of any office or agency' of that regime established within their territories. The Australian Government told the Security Council's Sanctions Supervisory Committee on 2 June 1977 that it would take legislative action to implement resolution 409 and this assurance was reaffirmed in an Australian note to the Committee on 23 February 1978.²⁸ By this time only the US and Australia had Rhodesian representational offices, apart from Rhodesian accredited diplomatic representation in South Africa (the accredited representative for a number of years to the time of preparation of this report was Harold Hawkins, an Australian).

In another response to the Sanctions Supervisory Committee, dated 30 November 1978, the Australian Government repeated assurances that it was 'giving active consideration' to the preparation of legislation which would give effect to resolution 409 and which would also be consistent with 'the various established freedoms' in Australia.²⁹ The proposed legislation was still under consideration in 1979, particularly because of opposition to it on the grounds of free speech, and had not been introduced ^{into the Parliament} by the time sanctions were repealed.

The Australian Government announced on 23 March 1980 that it would establish a High Commission in Salisbury. The Government of Mr Mugabe indicated it would like to reciprocate

but shortages of finance and manpower made this impossible for the time being. Mr Mugabe's Government also decided that the Rhodesia Information Centre would close as of 31 May 1980.

Notes and references

1. United Nations Security Council resolutions 180 (31.7.63) and 218 (23.11.65).
2. UN General Assembly res. 1761 (XVII), 6.11.62.
3. UN Security Council res. 181 (7.8.63).
4. UN Security Council res. 282 (23.7.70).
5. UN Security Council res. 418 (4.11.77).
6. UN General Assembly res. 2022 (XX), 5.11.65.
7. UN Security Council res. 202 (6.5.65).
8. UN Security Council res. 216 (12.11.65).
9. UN Security Council res. 217 (20.11.65). The Organisation of African Unity commenced sanctions against Rhodesia in December 1965.
10. Margaret P. Doxey, Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement (The Royal Institute of International Affairs and Oxford University Press, London, 1971), p. 71.
11. Doxey, p. 72.
12. United Nations, Press Release, SC/4143, 21.12.79.
13. Harry R. Strack, Sanctions: The Case of Rhodesia (Syracuse University Press, 1978), p. 149.
14. Strack, p. 251.
15. Strack, p. 238.
16. Conclusion xxxiii.
17. The UN Security Council had first called for an embargo of oil and petroleum products in resolution 217 of 20 November 1965.
18. Conclusion xix.
19. United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Report of Secretariat, entitled 'The Activities of Transnational Corporations in the Industrial, Mining and Military Sectors of Southern Africa' (doc. E/C.10/51), 22.3.79, p. 37.
20. New York Times, 26.1.79.

21. Bradley v The Commonwealth of Australia and Another, Commonwealth Law Reports, vol. 128, 1972-73, p. 561.
22. See, for example, the evidence of the Free Zimbabwe Centre (formerly the Alternative Rhodesia Information Centre), Evidence, pp. 822-47, of the representative of ZANU in Australia and the Far East, Mr Simbarashe Mumbengegwe, Evidence, pp. 572-5, and submissions by groups such as the Southern Africa Liberation Centre. And see various reports of the UN Security Council's Sanctions Supervisory Committee.
23. Commonwealth Law Reports, vol. 128, 1972-73, pp. 557-94.
24. Commonwealth Law Reports, vol. 128, p. 583.
25. Federal Law Reports, vol. 24, 1974, pp. 44-60; New South Wales Law Reports, 1974, pp. 391-3.
26. Federal Law Reports, vol. 24, pp. 44, 54-7.
27. Commonwealth Law Reports, vol. 128, p. 582.
28. Security Council Official Records, Thirty-fourth year, Special Supplement No. 2, vol. 1, 1979 (S/13000), p. 97.
29. Security Council Official Records, S/13000, p. 97.

CHAPTER 13

Human rights and racial discrimination

1. Introduction

Human rights in Rhodesia were circumscribed by racially discriminatory legislation almost from the time the country was first settled by whites in 1890. With the commencement of the guerilla war in 1972 human rights in Rhodesia were further restricted by measures aimed at cutting off any support or sympathy for the guerilla movement.

This chapter examines the major areas in which human rights in Rhodesia were curtailed. Because most racially discriminatory legislation was dismantled in the period 1977-79, the chapter deals mainly with the situation existing at or prior to 1977. An examination of this situation is vital to an understanding of the rise of black nationalism in Rhodesia and the origins and development of the guerilla war.

The situation prior to the period 1977-79 has been summarised by the International Commission of Jurists in its 1976 study, Racial Discrimination and Repression in Southern Rhodesia, as a 'vast network of ... legislation' whose primary purpose was to:

formalise and maintain a division between the races - a division which largely dictates the range of jobs open to a man, the education his children will receive, what wages he is paid, where he can live, how he may behave to his fellows and to members of another race, and what civil and political freedoms he may be permitted to enjoy.¹

Some of the discriminatory measures outlined in this chapter have been covered in greater detail elsewhere in this report - particularly inequalities in the distribution, ownership and occupation of land (chapter 11), inequalities in incomes and economic circumstance (chapter 10), and the limitation of the black franchise (chapters 3-4). These matters will be referred to only briefly in this chapter. Other matters such as the limitation of the basic freedoms (freedom of movement, speech, assembly and association), questions of law and order (arbitrary arrest and search, detention without trial, restriction, deportation, etc.), inequalities in education, labour conditions and health and welfare, and 'petty' social discrimination, will be examined more closely.

Racial discrimination has been defined in Article 1 of the United Nations International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination as:

any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.

This definition spells out the grounds on which racial discrimination is based - race, colour, descent and national or ethnic origin; it indicates the kinds of acts which lead to discrimination - distinctions, exclusions, restrictions and preferences; it provides that discriminatory acts include not only those whose effect or result is discrimination but also those having this intent or purpose; and it includes acts which partially impair the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as those which nullify it.

Article 4 of the Convention provides that temporary discrimination to ensure that all racial or ethnic groups are able to exercise and enjoy equally human rights and fundamental freedoms is not to be deemed racially discriminatory. Its intent is to make up for past abuses; once the objectives of equal freedom and equal enjoyment have been achieved, temporary measures should not be continued. Article 4 states:

Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protection as may be necessary in order to ensure to such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be deemed racial discrimination, provided, however, that such measures do not, as a consequence, lead to the maintenance of separate rights for different racial groups and that they shall not be continued after the objectives for which they were taken have been achieved.

Thus measures by Mr Mugabe's Government to 'Africanise' the public service by favouring senior black appointments or promotions over whites would not, under the Convention, be regarded in the same light as discriminatory practices which prevented blacks achieving significant senior positions in the past - as long as such measures were abandoned once the scales were balanced. As the inequalities outlined in this chapter indicate, temporary positive discrimination may be needed in a number of areas, including housing and land, education and training, employment and wages, and health and medical facilities.

Blacks were subject to two kinds of discrimination prior to 1977: (a) legislation which referred specifically to blacks and regulated their lives and living conditions, such as the Land Apportionment and Land Tenure Acts, the African Labour Regulations Act, African Education Act, African Affairs Act, Africans (Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration Act, and

African Beer Act, to name some, and (b) legislation which, in principle, covered the whole population but which in its implementation was directed predominantly at blacks, such as the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, the Emergency Powers Act and Regulations, the Masters and Servants Act, the Vagrancy Act and various Electoral Acts, again to name only some.

2. Social rights

Prior to 1977 blacks were legally discriminated against in areas such as freedom of access to public facilities, entertainment and accommodation, and housing and land. In the period 1977-78 measures were introduced to reduce legal discrimination in these and other areas and in 1979 to end it.

The major changes in 1977 were in the Land Tenure Amendment Act. In 1978 the Executive Council abolished discrimination against blacks in public places, including hotels, restaurants, bars, cinemas and theatres. And in 1979 all remaining legislation containing discriminatory provisions was repealed. This is not to say discrimination ended. In areas such as housing, education and health, a certain amount of discrimination was maintained in practice by embodying in the relevant legislation economic criteria or by setting 'standards' (e.g. for neighbourhoods). Nevertheless, legalised discrimination based on race was ended.

The situation prior to 1977-79, outlined below, was a major source of black resentment and a crucial factor in the support for black nationalism.

(1) Public facilities

Measures discriminating against blacks with respect to public facilities and accommodation were, prior to 1977-79, to be found in a number of Acts, including the Town Management Act, the

Municipal Act and the Land Tenure Act.

The Town Management Act provided for separate facilities and accommodation, based on race, to be decreed or maintained by local authorities. The Municipal Act allowed municipalities, among other things, to regulate black eating houses, to prohibit non-blacks from being present in black eating houses, and to control the use blacks made of footpaths and public streets. For example, a Gatooma Municipality by-law of 1965 stated:

No native shall make use of, walk, stand or loiter on any footpath, or any path used solely or mainly for pedestrian traffic within the limits of the Municipality except for the purpose of crossing the same to enable such native to enter any shop, store or place of business or dwelling house to make bona fide purchase, or to transact bona fide business on his own behalf or that of his master or employer. Natives in charge of European children shall be allowed to walk on footpaths when actually in attendance on such children.²

Municipalities could nominate separate buses or portions of buses for the exclusive use of various racial groups. However, segregation on buses began to break down from about 1961.

Municipalities could also restrict the use of public amenities such as parks, swimming pools, sporting facilities, toilet facilities, restaurants, cafes, and entertainment centres (theatres, cinemas, etc.). In 1972 the Rhodesian Government classified swimming pools as coming under the Land Tenure Act, thus barring one race from attending a swimming pool in the area of another race.³

On 8 August 1978 the Executive Council announced it would make admission to hotels, restaurants, cafes, beerhalls, swimming pools, cinemas, theatres and other public places open to persons of all races. Owners and managers would continue to control the right of admission but such a right would not be

exercisable on grounds of race or colour and civil action could be taken by any person who felt he had been discriminated against on such grounds. Measures to give legal effect to the Executive Council's decision were contained in the Public Premises (Prevention of Racial Discrimination) Act of 1979.

(2) Land and housing

The Land Tenure Act of 1969 divided land equally between the races - about half for whites (less than 5 per cent of the population), and about half for blacks (95 per cent of the population). The better quality land in rural areas also went mainly to whites. Discrimination in the allocation of land between the races in both rural and urban areas is discussed in greater detail in chapter 11.

The Land Tenure Act also divided residential land in urban areas. Virtually all land in urban areas was classed as white area land, but sections could be designated for black townships. Blacks were not permitted to own, lease or occupy land or housing in white areas and whites, similarly, were not permitted to own, lease or occupy in black areas. In major centres such as Salisbury, there were also one or two declared multi-racial suburbs.

The commercial and industrial areas were all white, but sections of them could be declared non-racial and blacks were permitted to occupy, lease or own land in such areas. Blacks such as doctors and lawyers were only allowed to establish themselves in white commercial areas if they had a permit. Blacks were not allowed to stay in hotels or motels in white areas unless they had a permit.

Although there was a range of standards of white housing and also of black housing, in general black housing was inferior to that of whites. The Professor of Geography at the time

University College of Rhodesia, George Kay, in his 1970 study, Rhodesia: A Human Geography, described the differences thus:

European residential areas do differ considerably, but generally they consist of large, well-appointed houses in spacious grounds with their own garages and servants' quarters; in many cases they are equipped with swimming pools or tennis courts. They reflect the privileged position and high incomes that most Europeans are able to command.

African housing areas also vary considerably. They include depressing blocks of flats or barracks and shanty towns at one extreme; and pleasant, relatively large cottages with individual plots and services at the other. Mostly, however, they consist of monotonous masses of closely-spaced rows of tiny, box-like dwellings set on either side of narrow, ill-kept lanes. They are products of poverty and paternalism.⁴

These differences were mainly the result of the great inequalities in incomes between whites and blacks, but they were also a product of discriminatory measures in land allocation, local government regulations and finances, and availability of loans for housing.

Blacks enjoyed less privacy in their houses than whites. Under the provisions of the Africans (Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration Act the police had the right to enter on black land at any time to ensure that the provisions of the Act, or any other Act, were being complied with, to preserve the peace and to prevent crimes. The police could also inspect any premises in a black residential area at all reasonable times. Unlike in white residential areas, search warrants were not necessary. Similar powers were available to police under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act.

The Commission of Inquiry into Racial Discrimination of 1976 (the Quenet Commission)⁵ recommended that all urban

commercial and industrial land be made available to all races, but that white residential land should remain for the exclusive use of whites. This recommendation was implemented in the Land Tenure Amendment Act of 1977, which ended the division of rural land between the races and most restrictions in commercial and industrial areas, but maintained separate urban residential areas. Racial restrictions on the ownership, lease or occupancy of land and housing in urban areas were not finally eliminated until the Land Tenure (Repeal) Act came into force and the Africans (Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration Act was repealed in early 1979.

Although statutory discrimination on grounds of race ended in 1979, amendments to other laws ensured white privilege would continue for some years. The Local Government Laws Amendment Act and amendments to the Housing Standards Control Act effectively ensured the retention of white residential areas at the then existing level of standards by measures such as the requirement that only one family (parents and children only) could occupy each property. As most blacks placed considerable importance on the extended family the measure was an additional bar to blacks moving into white areas even if they could afford to. The main bar, of course, was economic.

3. Political and constitutional rights

Prior to the Internal Settlement Agreement of 1978 political rights for blacks were limited. They could not vote unless they met economic and educational criteria beyond the means of all but a handful. Freedom of movement, freedom of assembly and freedom of speech were all severely curtailed under provisions of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act and other legislation. Freedom of association - the right to form political parties and other organisations - was also severely circumscribed.

After the Internal Settlement the franchise was extended to all blacks and was based simply on age and residential qualifications, although the intent of a universal franchise was distorted by the reservation for whites of sufficient seats in the Parliament to block any constitutional change, and the continuation of a separate white voters roll. The 1980 Constitution reduced the number of reserved seats for whites in the Parliament and eliminated their ability to block constitutional change as a racial group, apart from the Declaration of Rights and the provisions for separate representation of whites. These required the unanimous vote of all 100 members of the House of Assembly to be altered.

The settlement of December 1979 began a process of removing restrictions on freedom of movement, assembly and association so that by the time of the elections in February 1980 there were comparatively few such restrictions remaining.

The Committee has reviewed restrictions on the franchise and related discriminatory provisions in some detail in the chapters dealing with Rhodesia's constitutional development. The situation prior to 1977-79 with regard to other political rights will be reviewed in the following.

(1) Freedom of movement

Pass laws were introduced in Rhodesia to control the movement of blacks into urban areas, to control the supply of labour in urban areas and white farming areas, and as a security measure. The first pass laws were introduced by the British South Africa Company in 1892, in the B.S.A. Company Native Rules and Regulations. These were consolidated in the Native Passes Act of 1939 and continued largely unchanged until certain of their provisions were repealed by the Land Apportionment Amendment Act in 1960.

However, the major principles of the pass laws were maintained in the Africans (Registration and Identification) Act of 1957, including the registration of blacks, the issue of registration certificates or books, and the imposition of criminal liability for any black found in any district without such a certificate or book, or who refused or neglected to produce one when required to do so by any police officer or other authorised official. Every black male over 16 (in some areas 12) was required to carry a pass. The pass laws were particularly disliked by blacks. The penalty for contravening them was a fine of up to \$2100, up to six months' imprisonment, or both.

Another law restricting freedom of movement of blacks in particular was the Vagrancy Act, introduced in 1960. Although not directed specifically at blacks, in that it provided for the arrest of any person 'unable to show that he has employment or visible and sufficient means of subsistence', figures for the first week of its operation show that six whites, three coloureds and 686 blacks were arrested.⁶ Blacks classed as vagrants were prohibited from entering urban areas.

The movement of blacks was also restricted under the Land Apportionment and Land Tenure Acts, which confined blacks to Tribal Trust Lands and prevented them from permanently living in black townships in urban areas unless employed (they were excluded altogether from white areas).

The Law and Order (Maintenance) Act provided for curfews, for Ministerial orders against any person to exclude them from any designated area in Rhodesia for a period up to five years, for the restriction of any person to a specified area for up to five years, and for the notification by designated persons of their movements. Restriction orders could also be made under the Unlawful Organisations Act. Under the Protected Places and Areas Act the relevant Minister was able to control the movement of persons in areas declared prohibited or protected. A number of

labour laws also restricted freedom of movement (see later). The Departure from Rhodesia (Control) Amendment Act of 1972 gave the relevant Minister power to prevent the departure of any person from Rhodesia.

The Report of the Quenet Commission in 1976 described the requirement for black males to carry registration certificates, but not whites, Asians or coloureds, as discriminatory. While the Commission's inquiry was underway the Government announced that it would require everyone over the age of 16 - blacks, whites, Asians and coloureds - to carry identity cards. The National Registration Act was passed in the second half of 1976 and a program of registration, expected then to take five years, commenced in January 1977.

(2) Freedom of speech and assembly

The 1961 Constitution was the first in Rhodesia to contain a Declaration of Rights. Its major provisions were repeated in the 1965 'independence' Constitution and the 1969 'republican' Constitution. The section dealing with freedom of speech and assembly in the 1969 Constitution stated:

No person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of -

- (a) his freedom of expression, that is to say, freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without interference and freedom from interference with his correspondence; or
- (b) his freedom of peaceful assembly and association, that is to say, his right to assemble freely and associate with other persons and, in particular, to form or belong to trade unions or other associations for the protection of his interests.

However, the qualifications in the remainder of the section severely limited any guarantees it offered. The section went on to state that no law should be construed to be inconsistent with freedom of speech or assembly to the extent that it provided for defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health or the economic interests of the State, or that it imposed restrictions on public officers necessary in the public interest.⁷ Nor was a law inconsistent with freedom of speech to the extent that it 'regulated' telephone, telegraph and postal communications, radio and television broadcasts, newspapers or other publications, public exhibitions or public entertainments.

The 'regulation' of assemblies and of communications, publications, etc. was carried out principally under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act. Part I of the Act dealt with the control and/or prohibition of processions, gatherings and meetings, and Part II with prohibited publications. Under the provisions of Part I, inter alia:

- . Permits were required for public processions, public gatherings, and the use of loudspeakers, and a wide range of conditions could be attached to such a permit;
- . Political gatherings were not permitted on public holidays or Sundays;
- . All or any class of public processions could be banned for up to three months in a particular district, or 12 months if banned by the relevant Minister;
- . All or any specified public gatherings could be banned for up to three months in a particular district, or 12 months if banned by the relevant Minister;

- . Public gatherings could be banned on any day or days of the week or restricted to certain hours;
- . Any person could be prohibited from attending a public gathering for a period up to 12 months;
- . Police could disperse any unlawful gathering of three or more persons if they had reasonable grounds for believing a breach of the peace was likely to occur. Persons attending an unlawful gathering could be imprisoned for up to one year.

Under the provisions of Part II, inter alia:

- . The President, by notice in the Gazette, could declare a printed publication or series of publications or all publications by any person or association to be prohibited (a House of Assembly resolution authorising such an order was required in the case of registered newspapers);
- . Any such order made by the President could not be varied by a court of law;
- . Any person who printed, published, distributed or reproduced any prohibited publication could be imprisoned for up to one year (first offence) or two years (subsequent offences);
- . Packages or articles could be opened by postal or customs employees and prohibited material seized.

Under the Emergency Powers (Maintenance of Law and Order) Regulations of 1977, made under the Emergency Powers Act, the relevant Minister could prohibit or regulate the printing or publication within Rhodesia of any publication or class of

publications, prohibit the possession, sale, distribution or import of a publication or class of publications, and prohibit or regulate the import, distribution or exhibition of television or cinematographic films, if this appeared necessary in the interests of public safety or order, including 'the prevention of alarm or despondency among the inhabitants of Rhodesia'.

Although the provisions of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act were non-discriminatory, in practice they were applied mainly against blacks. Most of the organisations banned were black political parties (see chapter 7), most of the meetings banned were black meetings, and most of the publications banned were black publications (e.g. the African Daily News in 1964; the Catholic weekly Moto in 1974; an ecumenical periodical, Umbowo, in 1976 and 1977; The Zimbabwe Times in 1978).⁸

Two other sections of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act which impinged on freedom of speech and whose effect was felt mainly by blacks were sections 44 and 45, dealing with subversive statements and the publication of subversive statements. Subversive statements were defined in the Act to include any statement likely 'to engender or promote feelings of hostility to or expose to contempt, ridicule or disesteem any group, section or class in or of the community of a particular race, religion or colour', any statement likely 'to incite any person to attempt to procure, otherwise than by lawful means, the alteration of any matter by law established in Rhodesia', and any statement likely 'to lead to public disorder or to the disturbance, disruption, hindering of or interfering with any undertaking, industry, trade or occupation or the carrying on thereof'. The penalty was up to five years' imprisonment. Any person who published, circulated, or made a subversive statement, or had in his possession a subversive publication, was also liable to five years' imprisonment.

Under section 49 any person who published or reproduced a false statement, rumour or report likely to cause fear, alarm or despondency among any section of the public or likely to disturb the public peace was liable to up to seven years' imprisonment.

After UDI direct press censorship existed for a time and blank spaces appeared in newspapers where news items had been censored. In April 1968 a policy of 'voluntary censorship' was introduced and news material was submitted in advance to the Ministry of Information for vetting. No security or war-related material could be printed until cleared by the Defence Ministry or Combined Operations Headquarters. The 1969 Emergency Powers (Sanctions Counter-Espionage) Regulations and the Official Secrets Act were used to prevent disclosure of sanctions evasion methods.

A Censorship Board set up under the Censorship and Entertainments Control Act of 1967 had the power to ban publications considered indecent, obscene, likely to give offence to religious convictions or feelings, harmful to public morals, likely to harm relations between any sections of the public, or likely to be contrary to the interests of public safety or public order. Any political works could also be banned.

In September 1975 the Minister of Law and Order, under the Emergency Powers Regulations, was given the power to prohibit or regulate the printing, publication, possession, sale, distribution or importation of any written matter or recording. In April 1976 a national security committee, including members of Cabinet, was set up with power to issue notices preventing publication of specified matters. Offenders were liable to a fine of up to \$210,000 or up to five years' imprisonment or both.

In July 1976 the Government imposed conditions on the entry of foreign journalists by requiring them to apply for

residence, or for temporary employment visas valid for up to 30 days and renewable thereafter. To become an accredited defence correspondent a journalist had to take up Rhodesian residence, thereby rendering himself liable to conscription. Further restrictions on the Press were introduced in October 1977, and in January 1978, under the Emergency Powers (Maintenance of Law and Order) (Amendment) Regulations 1978 (No. 6), it was made an offence to communicate, publish or disseminate inside or outside Rhodesia any information about the guerilla war or acts of sabotage, unless previously cleared or released in an official statement, court proceedings or Parliament.

Thus while under the Declaration of Rights freedom of speech and freedom of assembly were supposed to prevail in Rhodesia, in reality these freedoms were severely curtailed for everyone, but for blacks more than whites.

(3) Freedom of association

A number of the restrictions mentioned in the previous section also applied to freedom of association - the right to form associations or organisations, particularly political parties. The main control on freedom of association was the Unlawful Organisations Act of 1959 which provided, inter alia, for the President to declare an organisation unlawful if it appeared that:

- (a) the activities of the organisation were likely to endanger, disturb or interfere with defence, public safety or public order;
- (b) the organisation was affiliated with a proscribed organisation or promoted the objects and opinions of any organisation outside Rhodesia;

- (c) the organisation was a parent of an unlawful organisation;
- (d) the organisation was the successor of an unlawful organisation; and
- (e) the organisation was composed substantially though not necessarily predominantly of, or directed or controlled, directly or indirectly, by persons who had been or were office-bearers or officers of unlawful organisations.

An organisation could be declared unlawful if it appeared that its activities endangered public order by appearing to 'raise disaffection' or promote feelings of racial 'ill will or hostility' within Rhodesia. Membership of an unlawful organisation, or other contraventions of the Act, could result in a sentence of up to five years' imprisonment.

The Act was used mainly against black political parties (see chapter 7), but other, less political, organisations such as the African Congress of Trade Unions and the Cold Comfort Farm Society, a multi-racial agricultural co-operative, were also banned.

4. Law and order

The rights of both blacks and whites prior to the December 1979 settlement were restricted by a number of legislative measures relating to law and order. Persons could be arrested without warrant, detained without trial for indefinite periods, have arbitrary restrictions placed on their movements and be subject to mandatory life imprisonment or death sentences.

The provisions of law and order legislation such as the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act and the Emergency Powers Act were non-racial but in practice fell most heavily on blacks. There

were also a number of legal measures aimed specifically at blacks in the Tribal Trust lands, such as the African Affairs Act. Law and order legislation was extensively used to prevent protest and political activity by blacks, regardless of whether the protest was against racial discrimination or against political repression.

(1) The judicial process

Perhaps the most noticeable feature of the legal system of Rhodesia was that there were separate courts for blacks and for non-blacks in respect of both civil litigation and for appeal cases. No distinction was made for criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the magistrates' courts and the High Court but blacks, unlike whites, had no right to a trial by jury under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act.

Courts were authorised under the Act to admit as evidence any statement or confession alleged to have been made by an accused person at the time of his arrest, even though such a statement might not have been recorded in writing at the time. In a dispute, the onus of proof was on the defendant to prove he did not make the statement or that it was made under duress. Another feature of the Act was that it allowed trials for political offences to be conducted in camera.

Under the major provisions of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act the presumption of innocence did not always apply. For example, a person accused of possessing offensive weapons or arms of war had the onus of proving, beyond reasonable doubt, that he did not intend to endanger the maintenance of law. Failure to do so could result in a sentence of 20 years' imprisonment in the case of offensive weapons or life imprisonment or death in the case of arms of war (defined as including bombs, rifles, pistols, apparatus for the discharge of projectiles, and items such as fuses or timing devices; the definition of offensive weapons included stones).

Another area of discrimination was that blacks, generally poor and ill-educated, could not afford legal counsel, were usually unaware of procedures under which legal aid could be obtained, and were frequently unfamiliar with white legal procedures.

(2) Arrest and detention

The Emergency Powers Regulations - Rhodesia was under a continuous state of emergency from November 1965 - enabled police to arrest and detain without a warrant any person in respect of whom an officer had reason to believe there were grounds which would justify his detention. A detained person could be held for 30 days. This could be extended to 60 days by the Minister of Law and Order.

The major powers of detention were vested in the Minister of Law and Order, who could order the indefinite detention of any person or class of persons if this appeared 'expedient in the interests of public safety or public order'. Martial law regulations also permitted indefinite detention. Detainees did not have to be told the reasons for their detention.

Thousands of opponents of the Rhodesian Front Government were detained without charge or trial in the years 1965-79 on grounds that they posed a threat to law and order or national security. Most of those detained were blacks. A number were detained after completing prison sentences for political offences and some after being acquitted of political charges in a court of law.

The International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa claimed that in December 1974 there were 400-450 'indefinite' (detained under Ministerial orders) detainees. As at

December 1976 IDAF claimed to know the names of some 914 such detainees. About 1,000 'indefinite' detainees were estimated to be in prison at the time of the Internal Settlement in March 1978 but more than three-quarters of these were released in May 1979 as a consequence of the Internal Settlement Agreement and more were released later. By September 1979 IDAF knew of only 196 such detainees.⁹ By February 1980 all persons detained on an indefinite basis had been released, although some were still being detained on a short-term basis by police under the 30-day provisions of the Emergency Powers Regulations.¹⁰

The number of detainees under martial law as at January 1980 was not known precisely. IDAF had quoted figures of up to 18,000 martial law detainees in November 1979¹¹, but the British Governor, Lord Soames, claimed in January that figures of 5,000 to 6,000 such detainees were 'absurdly high'¹²; IDAF also said that in January 1980 there were more than 4,000 political prisoners convicted under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act or the Emergency Powers Regulations. Whatever the precise number, nearly all were released under an amnesty proclaimed after the election of Mr Mugabe's Government.

(3) Arbitrary search

The Emergency Powers Regulations enabled any police officer to stop and search any person or vehicle or enter and search any premises, land or vehicle and seize anything which might afford evidence of a possible offence.

Section 4 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Amendment Act 1975 gave the State very wide powers to seize any article 'believed to be concerned in the commission or suspected commission of an offence' or 'which may afford evidence of the commission or suspected commission of an offence' or 'believed to be intended to be used in the commission of an offence'.

(4) Restriction

Under the provisions of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act the Minister of Law and Order could restrict a person to or exclude him from any particular area of Rhodesia for up to five years and such an order could be renewed on expiry. The Minister could require that person to notify the authorities of his or her movements and forbid him or her to attend public gatherings. Restricted persons could not be named or quoted by the Press. Most of those restricted were blacks but a few, such as former Prime Minister and currently (1980) Senator, Mr Garfield Todd, were whites.

(5) Deportation and deprivation of citizenship

Under the Citizenship of Rhodesia Act 1970 the relevant Minister could deprive a naturalised Rhodesian of his citizenship. Such persons could then be deported. A non-citizen could be deported after being declared a 'prohibited immigrant' in terms of the Immigration Act of 1966. A person could be so declared by the President if he received information, from any source, that the person was 'an undesirable inhabitant or an undesirable visitor to Rhodesia'.

A number of journalists, missionaries and university lecturers, among others, were expelled under these provisions. They included the Catholic Bishop of Umtali, Bishop Donal Lamont, who became a naturalised Rhodesian in 1950 but who was deported in 1977 after being deprived of his citizenship.

(6) The death penalty

The death penalty was widely used in Rhodesia not only for criminal offences such as murder and rape, but also for political offences. Under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act a number of offences could incur the death penalty and others

carried a mandatory death penalty, i.e. judges were deprived of any discretion in relation to such offences.

Offences which might incur the death penalty, or life imprisonment, included possession of arms of war, commission of acts of terrorism or sabotage, harbouring guerillas or failing to report the presence of guerillas. Offences for which the death penalty was mandatory included the recruitment of guerillas, encouraging persons to undergo guerilla training, or undergoing guerilla training, and offences involving arson and the use of explosives. Only pregnant women and children under 16 were excluded. According to the International Defence and Aid Fund at least 186 persons known to it were sentenced to death for 'political' offences between March 1968 and September 1979.¹³

Blacks tended to be treated more harshly than whites. For example, although a number of blacks had previously been executed for failing to report the presence of guerillas, a Swiss-born Catholic priest, Rev. Paul Egli, on 12 January 1977 was sentenced to five years' imprisonment for the same offence and this was reduced to one year on appeal.¹⁴

Persons sentenced for any offence under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, except some carrying the death penalty, could also be sentenced to a whipping.

(7) Allegations of torture

Allegations against the Rhodesian security forces of torture and the commission of atrocities were common throughout the guerilla war, and have been documented by organisations such as Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists, the International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia, the United Nations and others.¹⁵

The Committee does not intend to examine these in any detail. It is satisfied such incidents did occur, and it is equally satisfied that torture and the commission of atrocities were also perpetrated by members of the guerilla forces. The Committee deplors the use of such practices by both sides, even in a situation of war.

(8) Indemnity

Persons who suffered loss or injury at the hands of the police, security forces or other officials were deprived of recourse to the law by legislation indemnifying such officials. The major piece of such legislation was the Indemnity and Compensation Act of 1975, which effectively deprived the courts of jurisdiction over all proceedings, civil or criminal, against the Government or its servants for any harm or damage caused either deliberately or accidentally. Any compensation was at the discretion of a Compensation Board chosen by the Minister of Justice.

The Act was passed in October 1975, but its provisions were made retrospective to December 1972, and prohibited courts from hearing cases based on acts committed 'in good faith for the purposes of or in connection with the suppression of terrorism'. A certificate in writing by the Minister of Justice that an act was done for or in connection with the suppression of terrorism was conclusive proof of the fact. The Act was used to terminate a number of cases pending or underway against the Ministers of Justice and Law and Order in respect of torture allegations against police and members of the security forces.

The major difference between this and previous Indemnity Acts, or most Indemnity Acts in other countries, according to Sir Robert Tredgold, Chief Justice of the former Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, in a letter to The Rhodesia Herald on 3 September 1975, was that all previous Acts:

... have been passed after the war or insurrection to which they were related was over, and when all the facts that were ever likely to be known were available to Parliament. There is a vital distinction between these and giving an indemnity against future occurrences - a distinction that is analogous to giving a blank cheque, as opposed to a cheque for an ascertained amount.¹⁶

According to the Legal Study, Racial Discrimination and Repression in Southern Rhodesia, by the International Commission of Jurists, the Rhodesia Bar Council made no comment on the Act at the time of its passage through Parliament.¹⁷

5. Education

Education in Rhodesia prior to 1977-79 was racially segregated and unequal. The inequalities were the result both of deliberate policies to maintain the ascendancy of the white minority, and of the major income differentials between whites and blacks. Segregation was maintained by legislation.

White (including coloured and Asian) education came under the Education Act; white schools were controlled by a Ministry of Education and white teachers were public servants subject to supervision by the then Public Service Board. Black education came under the African Education Act; black schools were controlled by a Department of African Education, but black teachers employed by the Department were not public servants. Their pay was considerably less, their qualifications lower, their promotion opportunities less, and their conditions of employment and work poorer. White teachers could teach in black schools but black teachers were not allowed to teach in white schools.

Each system had its own curriculum and different end examinations. Black secondary schools were further divided into

two streams - one which prepared black students up to university entrance and one which was more vocationally oriented and prepared students for non-professional jobs. Critics frequently claimed the standard of education in the second stream was inferior, but this claim was rejected by the Quenet Commission of Inquiry into Racial Discrimination.

White children could go to State schools or private schools. Black children went either to mission schools or schools run by local authorities with Central government support. Asian and coloured children also had separate schools. Although some fees were charged at State schools these were comparatively low and were waived in the case of poor white parents. But in the case of black schools fees were comparatively high in relation to parents' incomes and black children were not allowed to attend schools if fees were outstanding. Education was compulsory for white children but optional for blacks. Details of school enrolments for blacks and whites are shown in Table 13.1. The table also shows attendance at tertiary institutions.

**Table 13.1: Enrolments at schools and
tertiary institutions**

	1969	1972	1975	1977	1978	1979
Enrolments in Terms of the African Education Act (February)						
Primary Schools:						
Grade 1	135 206	151 721	163 224	169 162	158 259	
Grade 2	121 643	128 914	148 492	149 686	139 845	
Grade 3	112 604	118 413	134 803	136 561	125 541	
Grade 4	99 826	102 136	120 058	119 475	110 129	
Grade 5	94 689	93 438	105 361	106 720	97 233	
Standard 4/Grade 6	59 001	67 227	83 290	92 588	84 682	
5/Grade 7	45 085	53 478	68 636	80 867	77 256	
Special schools	39 786	583	715	783	834	
Total Primary	708 497	716 171	824 579	855 842	793 779	
Secondary Schools:						
Form I/Grade 8	8 240	12 290	13 688	14 350	14 073	
II/Grade 9	6 401	10 903	12 789	12 351	12 603	
III/Grade 10	2 406	4 190	7 634	8 918	9 554	
IV/Grade 11	1 967	3 069	4 906	7 506	7 987	
VI Lower	190	292	372	467	551	
VI Upper	174	221	354	434	444	
Remove classes	—	—	—	—	—	
Total Secondary	19 878	30 966	39 743	44 031	45 212	
Post Primary Vocational and Homework Schools	805	996	1 312	1 409	1 120	
Teacher Training	1 824	2 110	2 494	2 554	2 627	
Total Enrolments in terms of the African Education Act	730 704	750 243	868 128	903 836	842 738	
Enrolments in Terms of the Education Act (June)						
Primary Schools:						
Infants 1st year	5 316	5 789	5 779	5 295	5 178	
Infants 2nd year	5 533	5 421	5 546	5 273	4 891	
Standard 1	5 515	5 405	5 485	5 945	4 806	
2	5 633	5 610	5 443	4 951	4 696	
3	5 578	5 949	5 292	5 016	4 803	
4	5 578	6 026	5 673	4 970	4 788	
5	5 389	5 949	5 635	4 951	4 750	
Special classes	691	738	740	694	823	
Aided Community classes	139	177	72	90	87	
Total Primary	39 372	41 264	39 685	36 185	34 822	
Secondary Schools:						
Form I	5 415	6 196	5 992	5 030	4 675	
II	5 222	5 982	5 978	5 198	4 882	
III	5 286	5 694	6 076	5 494	5 053	
IV	4 780	4 966	5 576	5 221	5 181	
V	1 800	1 977	2 169	2 375	2 381	
VI M	1 141	975	1 229	1 139	1 136	
VI Lower	729	1 060	1 102	1 104	1 208	
VI Upper	656	726	838	863	948	
Special classes	417	499	488	535	535	
Total Secondary	25 444	28 075	29 448	26 959	25 999	
Total Enrolments in terms of the Education Act	64 818	69 339	69 133	63 144	60 821	
Enrolments at tertiary institutions						
Agricultural College	163	159	159	164	133	171
Teachers' Training College	2 261	2 612	2 932	2 985	2 982	3 082
Technical College†	3 324	3 461	4 033	3 852	3 694	3 558
University of Rhodesia	857	978	1 355	1 617	1 796	1 481

Source: Zimbabwe Rhodesia, Supplement to the Monthly Digest of Statistics, April 1979. From 1976 1979 separate figures for the two races were no longer issued.

The decline in black enrolments from 1977 was due to the effects of the guerilla war. As detailed in chapter 8, a considerable number of schools were closed as a result either of guerilla action or Government measures.

At the time of the 1969 census 23.6 per cent of all black men and 33.3 per cent of all black women had never had any kind of formal education. An estimate for the February 1980 elections by Roger Riddell, of the Catholic Institute for International Relations, London, was that at the end of 1979 some 37 per cent of all black adults 18 and over had never been to school.¹⁸

The discriminatory nature of the education system was reflected in the amounts spent by the Rhodesian Government on education for whites and for blacks. In 1976-77 the Government spent \$241.08m on black education and \$231.12m on white education - \$246 for each black child and \$2531 for each white child at school. That is, the Government was spending more than 10 times as much on the education of each white child as each black child. Conditions in white schools were far superior to conditions in black schools, which tended to be overcrowded, with few, poor quality amenities and less qualified teachers.

For many years children of one race were not permitted to enter the schools of another race even for sports events.¹⁹ A limited number of black students were subsequently allowed to attend private (mainly church-run) white schools but by 1972 the number ~~who had~~ enrolled was only 400. Until 1977 the number of blacks allowed to attend a white private school was limited to 6 per cent of the total. ^{exhibit} In April 1977 private schools were allowed to permit greater numbers of blacks to attend (some were already doing so) if parents of children at the school and school governors agreed. However only a small minority of blacks could afford the fees and lived close enough. State schools remained segregated.

In 1978 about half of Rhodesia's black population of 6.8 million was 15 or less. Of these, at least 1.6m were of school age, but only about half were actually attending school. More than half of all black children dropped out of school before completing their primary education. Even fewer black children commenced secondary school. In 1978, there were 793,779 black children attending primary school and 45,212 at secondary school (and of the 45,212 only 995 - 2 per cent - were in the final year of secondary education). In the same year there were 34,822 white children attending primary school and 25,999 attending secondary school (including 3,292 - 12.5 per cent - in the final year of secondary education). There was a continuous drop-out rate among black students which was particularly heavy at the end of primary school and at the end of the second and fourth years of secondary school. There was no significant drop-out rate among white children until the end of the fourth year of secondary education.

Not all black children who successfully completed primary school could find places in secondary schools, whereas all white children were automatically granted places in secondary schools after completing primary school, even if their results were poor. In 1978, 43 per cent of all white children attending school were in secondary schools, compared to 5.5 per cent of all black children attending school.

However, if a black student managed to complete his secondary schooling his prospects of university entrance were relatively good. As the 1976 study, Racial Discrimination and Repression in Southern Rhodesia, by the International Commission of Jurists, put it:

The University of Rhodesia constitutes a remarkable exception to the racial segregation which prevails in the educational system. Both staff and students are racially mixed, including in the student residences on the campus. Academic standards are high and academic freedom exists within the limitations imposed by the general law.²⁰

The 1979 university intake was 452 - 128 whites, 299 blacks and 25 Asians, coloureds and others. The total enrolment in 1979 was 1,481. The 1978 intake was 758 - 197 whites, 531 blacks and 30 Asians, coloureds and others (total enrolment, 1,798). The drop in intakes and enrolments between 1978 and 1979 was due mainly to the decision by the Transitional Government to make black university students eligible for military call-up.

Nevertheless, there was some discrimination even at university level, in that many white students received Government assistance to study at South African white universities. Some 50 per cent of qualified white school leavers received State-aided university education. The proportion for blacks was considerably less. The most serious problem for black university students, however, did not confront them until they graduated. This was their lack of employment opportunities within Rhodesia, particularly in areas outside education and medicine.

Legal discrimination in education was abolished in early 1979 with the repeal of the Education Act and the African Education Act and their replacement by a new Education Act. The new Act did not, however, provide for a unified, multi-racial system of education. By permitting the establishment or continuation of community and private schools, some high fee-paying, the Act ensured that existing standards of white education would be preserved.

The Act provided for three types of schools:

(a) Government schools

- . High fee-paying (based on strict residential zones - blacks would first have to move into predominantly white suburbs, high fees, and age limits for classes);

- . Low fee-paying (which would cater for most blacks);
- . No fee-paying (which would presumably take the poorest blacks).

(b) Community schools

These were based on differences in language, religion and culture. their policies, including admission, were determined by the schools' boards of governors. Existing State schools could be purchased by their local communities, and new community schools could be established. In practice whites would have purchased or established the majority of such schools because of the costs involved, but the same opportunities, in theory, were also open to blacks.

(c) Private schools

These included most of the Government-supported mission schools and grant-aided schools.

The Zimbabwe Prime Minister, Mr Mugabe, has said he is not satisfied with the 1979 arrangements and would be re-examining them to ensure the opportunity for an education to as many blacks as possible.

6. Labour conditions and training

Discrimination in the area of economic activity was another major source of resentment among blacks. Blacks were discriminated against in the right to work, to free choice of employment, to work under equal conditions with whites, to receive equal pay for equal work and a just remuneration, and in

the right to form trade unions and take industrial action. In the area of training, there were few black apprentices compared to whites.

(1) Training

The major professions open to black students who completed secondary school and went on to a tertiary institution were teaching, medicine and the law, and a few other service-related occupations. For students who did not complete secondary school the opportunities were limited.

Blacks were not allowed to become apprentices until 1959, when the Apprenticeship Act was passed. Three years later, in 1962, out of an intake of 436 apprentices, 10 were blacks (2.3 per cent of the total). In 1975, out of an intake of 1,211 apprentices, 219 (18 per cent) were blacks and in 1976, out of 964, 143 (15 per cent) were blacks. The proportion of black apprentices never exceeded 20 per cent.

During the sanctions years the Government suffered acute shortages of skilled manpower in a number of areas, but rather than increase the number of black apprentices it chose to try and overcome such shortages by encouraging further white immigration. As a result, even by 1980, there were comparatively few skilled black workers in Rhodesian industry and most black workers were semi-skilled or unskilled.

(2) Choice of employment

Prior to 1979, the African Labour Regulations Act severely limited the right of a black to choose his field of work by providing strict controls over the movement of blacks and by subjecting blacks to criminal sanction if they deserted or unlawfully absented themselves from their employment. Restrictions on the movement and choice of employment of blacks

were also contained in the Africans (Registration and Identification) Act.

Generally speaking, employment opportunities for blacks were restricted. Their principal areas of employment were as labourers, agricultural workers, domestic servants, unskilled workers in manufacturing, construction, mining and quarrying, and in distribution, restaurants, and hotels. There was also a small but growing number of blacks in semi-skilled occupations. Many blacks, however, had to accept jobs well below their educational qualifications and their aspirations.

(3) Conditions of employment

If a black was able to find employment he had to contend with a vast array of discriminatory labour practices. Chief among these was the wide disparity in average earnings between blacks and whites (see chapter 10). In addition, blacks often could not use amenities supplied for whites such as the canteen or the same toilets, ~~even though employed to do the same job.~~

(4) Trade unions

The rights of blacks to organise in trade unions in Rhodesia were very restricted. Political and administrative measures and complex legal restraints severely restricted the attempts of black workers through their unions to improve their conditions.

The major pieces of legislation affecting trade union activities were the Masters and Servants Act of 1901, the African Labour Regulations Act, and the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1934 (as amended in 1964, 1967, 1971 and 1975). In addition the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act contained powers which were also used to regulate trade union activities.

Under the Masters and Servants Act, which covered the employment of domestic servants and workers in forestry and agriculture, 'servants' - virtually all blacks - were denied the right to form or join trade unions. This meant that nearly half the total black work force was prevented from joining trade unions. The Act provided for fines and/or imprisonment if 'servants' committed offences such as absenting themselves from their workplace without the employer's permission, performing their work 'carelessly' or neglecting to perform it, refusing to obey any command of their employer which it was their duty to obey, being abusive or insulting to their employer or his family, or leaving their employer's service with intent not to return.²¹

The Labour Regulations Act covered all blacks employed to perform 'bodily labour' in mining, agriculture, husbandry, trade or manufacture, but excluded skilled workers and domestic workers. One section of the Act made it an offence to offer higher wages or greater benefits or other inducements to persuade or attempt to persuade any black to break or repudiate any existing 'contract' of service, whether or not the contract was in writing. Effectively, this prevented rival employers bidding up the wages of blacks whose services or skills might have been in demand. No such legislation applied to whites.

The Industrial Conciliation Act seriously reduced the bargaining power, opportunity for free association and basic rights of trade unionists.²² Blacks were excluded from the bargaining procedures available to whites under the Act from its inception in 1901 until 1959, when a revised Act was promulgated. The provisions of this Act were non-racial, but were written in such a way that black trade unions fared worse than white ones (whose activities, by Australian standards, were also severely circumscribed: for example, under a 1971 amendment, the President had the power to remove the right to strike where he was satisfied that a strike would prejudice the public interest). Where mixed unions did exist, they were often dominated by whites

under a provision requiring 'the adequate representation of skilled and minority interests' on the governing bodies of trade unions. Although unions could not exclude an applicant for membership on grounds of race or colour, the membership could be divided into branches on grounds of race or colour, or basis of class or work - and each branch was entitled to 'equitable representation' on the governing body.

The Act covered all employees except those in domestic service or agriculture (who were covered by the Masters and Servants Act), the civil service and Rhodesia Railways.

Unions were tied to a particular industry trade or occupation, and location, and no union could represent workers from more than one industry. This had the effect of decentralising and fragmenting the bargaining structure. Unions had to register to obtain the benefits of and status for collective bargaining. Registration proved easy for white unions but much more difficult for unskilled black unions. Unregistered unions were made subject to all the liabilities of registered unions, but none of the benefits. The political activities of unions were limited and none was allowed to contribute to or assist a political party.

Differentiation of unions was permitted on the basis of skill and so skilled workers in an industry were usually able to organise separately from semi-skilled or unskilled workers. As most skilled workers were whites and unskilled workers were blacks, many unions were differentiated on racial grounds in practice. This weakened the position of black workers as a whole, permitted employers to exploit divisions and prevented the creation of a unified negotiating position.

Although a major feature of the Act was to bring workers under greater control, the Act also had an opposite influence in that it discouraged union membership through provisions that any

improvement in working conditions or wages negotiated by a union was applicable to all employees in the industry covered by that union, whether union members or not. Benefits were secured irrespective of union membership. Consequently, there were positive benefits in avoiding union membership (no union subscriptions, meetings or employer antagonism) and little direct benefit in joining. The net result was that union activists were controlled by the Act, while union activity was limited by less than full memberships and support.

The overall effect of the legislation was to make it difficult for black trade unions to function effectively. In 1974 it was estimated that only 42,000 members of black-led trade unions were governed by agreements obtained through union negotiations. This was less than 5 per cent of the total black workforce.

Furthermore, over the years a number of black trade unionists, especially leaders, were restricted, detained without trial, or forced into exile, under provisions of the Emergency Powers Act, the Emergency Powers (Maintenance of Law and Order) Regulations, and the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act. Many blacks were debarred from union activity. This both weakened the leadership and undermined black union organisations. In contrast white workers were organised into the Trade Union Congress of Rhodesia, which effectively wielded considerable influence with employers and with the Government.

(5) The right to strike

Labour and security laws in Rhodesia made it virtually impossible for black workers to go on strike legally, thus denying them a major means of improving their poor working conditions.

Under the Industrial Conciliation Act industrial disputes were to be resolved through a system of industrial

councils and industrial boards, heavily weighted in favour of the Rhodesian Government and white employers. Under the Masters and Servants Act, black agricultural workers and domestic servants were liable to up to one month's imprisonment for any act of disobedience. Under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, it was a criminal offence to 'hinder or interfere with the carrying on of any essential service'. These were defined so broadly that few areas of employment were excluded. The penalty was up to 10 years' imprisonment. Any person who incited or encouraged another person to strike in an essential service was liable to five years' imprisonment. Under the Industrial Conciliation Act, strikes were specifically prohibited in the light, power, water sanitation and fire services. Many other restrictions existed under both the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act and the Emergency Powers Regulations.

A strike was only legal after a number of preliminary procedures had taken place. Since 1973 the Industrial Conciliation Act required the submission of disputes to an industrial tribunal appointed by the Minister. Only then could a strike be called, and notice of the strike had first to be placed in the Gazette. A strike could be declared 'illegal' by the President if it was deemed not to be in the national interest.

As most blacks were in semi-skilled or unskilled jobs, and there were large numbers of unemployed blacks in those categories, employed blacks had to weigh carefully the risks involved in a strike. In the majority of such cases striking workers were usually dismissed and replaced. The spate of strikes among blacks in March 1980 after Mr Mugabe's election was considered by many observers to be as much an expression of blacks' rights to strike without fear of retaliation from the law or employers as of claims for improved wages or working conditions.

7. Health and welfare

The remaining major area of discrimination was that of health and welfare. Under the provisions of the Land Tenure Act hospitals in white areas could not cater for blacks and vice versa. In 1977 privately-owned institutions were permitted to be multi-racial if they wanted to. In 1979, with the repeal of the Land Tenure Act and passage of the Medical Services Act, admission of patients to hospitals could no longer be regulated on the basis of race. However, the Medical Services Act required hospitals to be classified as open or closed, depending on whether fees were charged, and in practice the fees at previously white hospitals were set at such a level that only the wealthier blacks could afford them. This is another area which the Zimbabwe Prime Minister, Mr Mugabe, has indicated would be re-examined by his Government.

Another area of discrimination was in the provision of health services. The availability of health services for blacks, particularly in rural areas, was considerably less, and sometimes of a lower quality, than that available to whites. Most medical services in rural areas were provided by medical missions (a number assisted by Government grants) or Government subsidised clinics.

In the Social Security field, whites, Asians and coloureds were entitled to State-financed old age pensions, but blacks were not. Bishop Muzorewa's Government in December 1979 passed a law ending all pension entitlements except those then existing (i.e. newly retiring whites, Asians or coloureds would not be entitled to pensions). The Muzorewa Government argued it could not finance pensions for the elderly of all races and it was inequitable to finance them for all but blacks. It proposed replacing pensions with a scheme under which the needy elderly could obtain welfare assistance. Those not in need should make provision for their retirement during their working years.

Notes and references


1. International Commission of Jurists, Racial Discrimination and Repression in Southern Rhodesia (a Legal Study published by the Catholic Institute for International Relations, London, and International Commission of Jurists, Geneva, March 1976), p. 3.
2. Quoted in Claire Palley, The Constitutional History and Law of Southern Rhodesia 1888-1965 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1966), p. 621, note 3.
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4. George Kay, Rhodesia: A Human Geography (University of London Press Ltd., 1970), pp. 164-6.
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7. Rhodesia, 1969 Constitution, Second Schedule, section 9.
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9. IDAF, Political Prisoners in Rhodesia in 1979 (Fact Paper on Southern Africa No. 7) (IDAF, London, February 1980), p. 17.
10. IDAF, Political Repression in Rhodesia (briefing notes prepared by IDAF for the February 1980 elections), pp. 8-9.
11. IDAF, Political Repression in Rhodesia, p. 10.
12. B.B.C., 21.1.80, quoted in IDAF, Political Repression in Rhodesia, p. 10.
13. IDAF, Political Prisoners in Rhodesia in 1979, p. 32.
14. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 18.2.77, p. 28204.
15. See, for example:
Amnesty International -
(a) Zimbabwe/Rhodesia (Briefing Paper No. 2) (London, March 1976);

- (b) Amnesty International Report 1978, 'Rhodesia/Zimbabwe' (Paper No. 9 in evidence of Australian section of A.I., Evidence, pp. 2038-42).
- International Commission of Jurists, Racial Discrimination and Repression in Southern Rhodesia.
- International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa -
- (a) Focus on Political Repression in Southern Africa, nos. 1-27;
- (b) Ian Smith's Hostages: Political Prisoners in Rhodesia.
- Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia -
- (a) The Man in the Middle: Torture, resettlement and eviction (published by the Catholic Institute for International Relations, London, 1975);
- (b) Civil War in Rhodesia (CIIR, London, September 1976);
- (c) Rhodesia: The Propaganda War (CIIR, London, September 1977).
16. Quoted in ICJ, Racial Discrimination and Repression in Southern Rhodesia, p. 85.
17. ICJ, Racial Discrimination and Repression in Southern Rhodesia, p. 86.
18. Annex 17 to Commonwealth Observer Group, Southern Rhodesia Elections (February 1980) (Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 8.3.80).
19. ICJ, Racial Discrimination and Repression in Southern Rhodesia, p. 19.
20. ICJ, Racial Discrimination and Repression in Southern Rhodesia, p. 24.
21. For more detail see, for example, Duncan G. Clarke, Domestic Workers in Rhodesia (The Economics of Masters and Servants) (Mambo Occasional Papers - Socio-Economic Series No. 1, Mambo Press, 1974).
22. For greater detail on the Industrial Conciliation Act and trade unions see Peter S. Harris, Black Industrial Workers in Rhodesia (The General Problems of Low Pay) (Mambo Occasional Papers - Socio-Economic Series No. 2, Mambo Press, 1974); and International Labour Office Labour conditions and discrimination in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) (ILO, Geneva, 1978).

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By order of the Committee,

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R. F. SHIPTON, M.P.
Chairman

20 May 1980

Appendix OneElections in selected African countries,
and Australian diplomatic representation, to April 1980

Country	Recent general elections	Percentage vote	Choice of political parties	Establishment of Australian diplomatic representation
<u>Front-line States</u>				
Angola	No general elections since independence 1975	Not applic.	Not applic. (one-party state since 1975)	Nil
Botswana	1969 1974 1979	54 33 55	4 3 4	1973
Mozambique	1977	Not avail.	One-party state since 1975	Nil
Tanzania	1965 1970 1975	78 70 82	One-party state since 1977	1962 (Tanganyika)
Zambia	1968 1973 1978	77 39 70	2 One-party state since 1972	1972
<u>Members of the Commonwealth</u>				
(For Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia, see above.)				
Gambia	1973 1977	Not avail. Approx. 41	2 4	Nil
Ghana	1965 1969 1979	Not applic. 63 Less than 50	1 5 6	1957
Kenya	1969 1974 1979	42 40-65 in various constituencies Approx. 75	One-party state since 1969	1965
Lesotho	1970	Not avail.	Four, but election	

				declared null and void. Since 1973 Govt. has included members of two opposition parties by nomination of governing party	1973
Malawi	1978	35		One-party state since 1966	Nil
Mauritius	1976	Not avail.	9		1970
Nigeria	1964	23-60 due to boycotts in various regions.	6		1960
	1979	Not avail.	5		
Seychelles	1974	Not avail.	2	One-party state since 1978	1976
	1979	96	1		
Sierra Leone	1973	Not avail.	2		Nil
	1977	Not avail.	2	Became one-party state in 1978	
Swaziland	1972	74	5		1973
	1978	Not avail.		No formal parties - elections conducted at 'tribal level'	
Uganda	No general elections since independence 1962	Not applic.		Not applic.	1965

Source: Department of Foreign Affairs

Lusaka Declaration of the Commonwealth on Racism
and Racial Prejudice

(Unanimously approved by Heads of Government at the
Lusaka Commonwealth Conference, August 1979)

We, the Commonwealth Heads of Government, recalling the Declaration of Commonwealth Principles made at Singapore on 22 January 1971 and the statement on Apartheid in Sport, issued in London on 15 June 1977, have decided to proclaim our desire to work jointly as well as severally for the eradication of all forms of racism and racial prejudice.

The Commonwealth is an institution devoted to the promotion of international understanding and world peace, and to the achievement of equal rights for all citizens regardless of race, colour, sex, creed or political belief, and is committed to the eradication of the dangerous evils of racism and racial prejudice.

We now, therefore, proclaim this Lusaka Declaration of the Commonwealth on Racism and Racial Prejudice.

United in our desire to rid the world of the evils of racism and racial prejudice, we proclaim our faith in the inherent dignity and worth of the human person and declare that -

- (i) the peoples of the Commonwealth have the right to live freely in dignity and equality, without any distinction or exclusion based on race, colour, sex, descent, or national or ethnic origin;
- (ii) while everyone is free to retain diversity in his or her culture and lifestyle, this diversity does not justify the perpetuation of racial prejudice or racially discriminatory practices;
- (iii) everyone has the right to equality before the law and equal justice under the law;
- (iv) everyone has the right to effective remedies and protection against any form of discrimination based on the

grounds of race, colour, sex, descent,
or national or ethnic origin.

We reject as inhuman and intolerable all policies designed to perpetuate apartheid, racial segregation or other policies based on theories that racial groups are or may be inherently superior or inferior.

We reaffirm that it is the duty of all the peoples of the Commonwealth to work together for the total eradication of the infamous policy of apartheid which is internationally recognised as a crime against the conscience and dignity of mankind and the very existence of which is an affront to humanity.

We agree that everyone has the right to protection against acts of incitement to racial hatred and discrimination, whether committed by individuals, groups or other organisations.

We affirm that there should be no discrimination based on race, colour, sex, descent or national or ethnic origin in the acquisition or exercise of the right to vote; in the field of civil rights or access to citizenship; or in the economic, social or cultural fields, particularly education, health, employment, occupation, housing, social security and cultural life.

We attach particular importance to ensuring that children shall be protected from practices which may foster racism or racial prejudice. Children have the right to be brought up and educated in a spirit of tolerance and understanding so as to be able to contribute fully to the building of future societies based on justice and friendship.

We believe that those groups in societies who may be especially disadvantaged because of residual racist attitudes are entitled to the fullest protection of the law. We recognise that the history of the Commonwealth and its diversity require that special attention should be paid to the problems of indigenous minorities. We recognise that the same special attention should be paid to the problems of immigrants, immigrant workers and refugees.

We agree that special measures may in particular circumstances be required to advance the development of disadvantaged groups in society. We recognise that the effects of colonialism or racism in the past may make desirable special provisions for the social and economic enhancement of indigenous populations.

Inspired by the principles of freedom and equality which characterise our association, we accept the solemn duty of working together to eliminate racism and racial prejudice. This duty involves the acceptance of the principle that positive measures may be required to advance the elimination of racism,

including assistance to those struggling to rid themselves and their environment of the practice.

Being aware that legislation alone cannot eliminate racism and racial prejudice, we endorse the need to initiate public information and education policies designed to promote understanding, tolerance, respect and friendship among peoples and racial groups.

We are particularly conscious of the importance of the contribution the media can make to human rights and the eradication of racism and racial prejudice by helping to eliminate ignorance and misunderstanding between people and by drawing attention to the evils which afflict humanity. We affirm the importance of truthful presentation of facts in order to ensure that the public are fully informed of the dangers presented by racism and racial prejudice.

In accordance with established principles of International Law and, in particular, the provisions of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, we affirm that everyone is, at all times and in all places, entitled to be protected in the enjoyment of the right to be free of racism and racial prejudice.

We believe that the existence in the world of apartheid and racial discrimination is a matter of concern to all human beings. We recognise that we share an international responsibility to work together for the total eradication of apartheid and racial discrimination.

We note that racism and racial prejudice, wherever they occur, are significant factors contributing to tension between nations and thus inhibit peaceful progress and development. We believe that the goal of the eradication of racism stands as a critical priority for governments of the Commonwealth, committed as they are to the promotion of the ideals of peaceful and happy lives for their people.

We intend that the Commonwealth, as an international organisation with a fundamental and deep-rooted attachment to principles of freedom and equality, should co-operate with other organisations in the fulfilment of these principles. In particular the Commonwealth should seek to enhance the co-ordination of its activities with those of other organisations similarly committed to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Witnesses

The Committee is grateful to all those who have appeared before the Sub-Committee on Southern Africa to date to present oral evidence, not only on Zimbabwe but on other countries in Southern Africa and on the region as a whole. Witnesses who appeared before the Sub-Committee, in most cases after having presented a written submission, are listed below in the capacity in which they appeared (relevant page numbers in the official transcript of evidence are shown in parenthesis):

- ALEXANDER, Mrs G.E. - Co-President, Australia-Rhodesia Association of Victoria (pp.401-468).
- ALLBROOK, Prof. D.B. - President, Amnesty International (Australian Section) (pp.2019-2107).
- ASHWIN, Mr C.R. - First Assistant Secretary, Western Division, Department of Foreign Affairs (in camera).
- AYOUB, Dr M. - Senior Research Fellow, Department of International Relations, The Australian National University (pp.2168-2212).
- BEAZLEY, the Hon. K.E. - former Member of Parliament (pp.1142-1148; 1987-2018).
- BOWEN, Mr G.E. - Assistant Secretary, Trade Relations and Markets Division, Department of Trade and Resources (pp.53-149).
- BRINK, Mr J.C. - Chairman, Executive Committee, Southern Africa Defence & Aid Fund in Australia (pp.710-779).
- BUCHHORN, Rev. Father R.J. - Member, Executive Committee Southern Africa Defence & Aid Fund in Australia (pp.710-779).
- CALLOW, Mr N.R. - formerly lived in Zambia (pp.1446-1464).
- CASTLES, Prof. A.C. - Professor of Law, University of Adelaide (pp.1922-1944).
- CLARKE, Mr R. - Vice-President, Australia-Rhodesia Association of N.S.W. (pp.1593-1618).
- COOPER, Mr F.B. - First Assistant Secretary, Western Division, Department of Foreign Affairs (pp.150-324).
- DALY, Mr G.J. - Executive Director, Confederation of Australian Sport (pp.578-615).
- DALZIELL, Mr I.L. - former United Nations Volunteer in Lesotho (pp.1015-1055).

- DEXTER, Mr A.M. - Secretary, Australia South Africa Association (pp.848-897).
- DIBB, Mr P. - Acting Director, Joint Intelligence Organisation (pp.672-708).
- DOWTHWAITE, Rev. R.W. - General Secretary (Australia), Africa Evangelical Fellowship (pp.898-918).
- DOYLE, Rear-Admiral D.H. - Chief of Joint Operations and Plans, Department of Defence (pp.672-708).
- DRIESSEN, Mr A.J.B. - Senior Mineral Economist, Bureau of Mineral Resources, Geology & Geophysics, Department of National Development (pp.618-669).
- DRURY, Miss J.M. - Administrative Officer, Africa Evangelical Fellowship (pp.898-918).
- DUNSTONE, Ms J.S. - President, Adelaide University Liberal Club (pp.1881-1921).
- ELLIOTT, Mr B.G. - Principal Executive Officer, Exploration Policy Section, Water Division, Department of National Development (pp.618-669).
- EVANS, Mr C.J. - Representing Australian Golf Union (pp.578-615).
- EVANS, Mr D.W. - Assistant Secretary, Information Branch, Department of Foreign Affairs, (in camera).
- FERGUSON, Mr J.A. - Head, Central & Southern Africa Section, Western Division, Department of Foreign Affairs (pp.150-324).
- FREELAND, Mr C.W.M. - Deputy Secretary (Policy and Planning), Department of Transport (pp.1149-1206).
- FURLONGER, Mr B.J. - Journalist (pp.1466-1493).
- FURNER, Brigadier J.O. - Deputy Director (Military), Joint Intelligence Organisation (pp.672-708).
- GERTZEL, Dr C.J. - Reader in Politics, The Flinders University of South Australia (pp.1945-1984).
- GOLDSWORTHY, Dr D.J. - Reader in Politics, Monash University (pp.327-400).
- GRAHAM-SMITH, Mr E. - Member, Rhodesian Association of Western Australia (pp.2137-2166).
- HANCOCK, Mr I.R. - Senior Lecturer in History, The Australian National University (pp.920-1014).
- HAWES, Mr M.R. - Director, Sea Transport Policy Division, Department of Transport (pp.1149-1206).
- HAWKER, Mr M.C.S. - Executive Member, Adelaide University Liberal Club (pp.1881-1921).
- HEHIR, Mr M.D. - Australian Capital Territory Representative, Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (pp.1546-1592).

- HENDERSON, Dr W. - former President, Federal Council of Australia Rhodesia Associations (pp.1806-1825).
- HERBERT, Mrs W. - Member, Rhodesian Association of Western Australia (pp.2137-2166).
- HILL, Ms H.M. - National Treasurer, Campaign Against Racial Exploitation (CARE) (pp.1349-1444).
- HOCKMAN, Mr B. - Past President, Adelaide University Liberal Club (pp.1881-1909).
- HOLLAND, Mrs S. - Director, Free Zimbabwe Centre (pp.822-847).
- HUNTER, Mr D.H. - First Assistant Secretary, Economic & Policy Division, Department of Trade and Resources (pp.53-149).
- JOHNSTONE, Mr D.K. - Desk Officer, Rhodesia, Department of Foreign Affairs (in camera).
- JONES, Mr P.D.P. - Member, Executive Committee, Southern Africa Defence & Aid Fund in Australia (pp.710-779).
- KANJERE, Mr T. - Chairman, Melbourne Branch, Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) (pp.512-577).
- KEYS, Sir William - National President, The Returned Services League of Australia (pp.1056-1099).
- KGWARE, Prof. W.M. - Rector (Vice-Chancellor), University of the North, South Africa (pp.1102-1140).
- LANE, Mrs H. - Chairman, Rhodesian Association of Western Australia (pp.2137-2166).
- LIGHTOWLER, Mr M.D. - First Assistant Secretary, Trade Relations & Markets Division, Department of Trade and Resources (pp.53-149).
- LINDENMAYER, Mr I.K. - First Assistant Secretary, Division 3, Department of Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (pp.4-52).
- LINDSAY, Mr S.H. - Member, Adelaide University Liberal Club. (pp.1910-1921).
- LIVINGSTONE, Prof. S.E. - Head, School of Chemistry, The University of New South Wales (pp.780-821).
- McADAM, Mr A. - Senior Tutor, Department of Politics, Monash University (pp.469-511).
- McEACHERN, Mr M.C. - President, Australia-Rhodesia Association of N.S.W. (pp.1593-1618).
- MARSHALL, Mr G.R. - Acting First Assistant Secretary, Strategic & International Policy Division, Department of Defence (pp.672-708).
- MITCHELL, Mr D.C. - former Solicitor-General of Lesotho, 1975-77 (pp.1207-1304).
- MUMBENEGWI, Mr C. - Member, Campaign Against Racial Exploitation (CARE) (pp.1349-1444).
- MUMBENEGWI, Mr S. - Australia & Far East Representative, Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) (pp.512-577).
- MUSARA, Mr F.S. - Zimbabwe student (pp.1826-1880).
- NORMAN, Mr P.W. - Co-President, Australia-Rhodesia Association of Victoria (pp.401-468).

- OWENS, Mr P.L. - Committee Member, Australia-Rhodesia Association of N.S.W. (pp.1593-1618).
- PERKIN, Mr D.J. - Supervising Mineral Economist, Mineral Economics Section, Bureau of Mineral Resources, Geology and Geophysics, Department of National Development (pp.618-669).
- POLLARD, Mr D.A. - National Secretary, Catholic Commission for Justice & Peace (pp.1546-1592).
- PRESCOTT, Dr J.R.V. - Reader in Political Geography, University of Melbourne (pp.1306-1348).
- REID, Mr W.V. - President, Confederation of Australian Sport (pp.578-615).
- RICHARDSON, Mr H.G. - National Secretary, Gliding Federation of Australia (pp.578-615).
- SAMPSON, Mr R.G. - Member, Australia-Rhodesia Association of N.S.W. (pp.1593-1618).
- SHEA, Mr L.S. - National Co-ordinator, Campaign Against Racial Exploitation (CARE) (pp.1349-1444).
- SHELL, Senator Glenister (pp.1620-1803).
- SIDOTI, Mr C.D. - Associate Secretary, Catholic Commission for Justice & Peace (pp.1546-1592).
- SNELL, Mrs B. - Victorian Co-ordinator, Campaign Against Racial Exploitation (CARE) (pp.1349-1444).
- SOROUR, Mr J. de L. - Director-General, South Africa Foundation, South Africa (pp.2214-2234).
- SOUTHEY, Mr N.J. - Secretary/Manager, Confederation of Australian Sport (pp.578-615).
- TSCHEPPARA, Mr J.H. - Acting Director, International Policy Division, Department of Transport (pp.1149-1206).
- VINCENT, Major-General D. - Defence Adviser, Member of National Executive, The Returned Services League of Australia (pp.1056-1099).
- VOLKER, Mr D. - Deputy Secretary, Department of Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (pp.4-52).
- WADDELL, Mr G.H. - Executive Director, Anglo-American Corporation; Member, Federal Executive, Progressive Federal Party; former Member of Parliament, South Africa
- WALKER, Mr J.R. - Vice-President, Australia-Rhodesia Association of Victoria (pp.401-468). (in camera).
- WOODS, Mr R. - Senior Lecturer in Sociology, Western Australian Institute of Technology (pp.2108-2136).
- WOOTTON, Rev. R.F. - Secretary, Justice & Human Rights, Australian Council of Churches (pp.1494-1545).

Written submissions

The Committee is grateful to persons and organisations who have provided written submissions but who, to date, have not given oral evidence. The submissions listed include those covering other aspects of the terms of reference as well as Zimbabwe:

Adams, Ms S.
African-Australian Association
Albinski, Prof. H.S. - Research School of Pacific Studies,
The Australian National University
Alexandra Electors' Association
Allaway, Mr R.C.T.
Allen, Mrs F.
Allen, Mrs J.E.
Appleby, Mr J.P.L.
Arblaster, Rev. E.H.
Archibald, Ms J.
Ashton, Mr C. - Journalist
Australasian Alliance of Bible Believing Christian Churches
The Australian Citizens for Freedom
The Australian League of Rights
Australia - Rhodesia Association (W.A.)
Australia - South Africa Association
Back, Mr K.
Barclay, Mr G. St.J. - Reader in International Relations,
University of Queensland
Barker, Mr G.R.
Barnett, Mr K.
Barton, Mr J.D.S.
Bean, Mr D.R.
Bebb, Mr T.
Bender, Miss P.A.
Bennett, Mr B.G.
Boele van Hensbroeh, Mr P.R.
Bootes, Mr R.G.
Bourne, Mr R.J.
Boyack, Mr R.M.
Brampton, Mrs J.H.
Brown, Mr L.J.
Bruce, Mr J.B.
Burke, Mr W.E.
Burns, Mr W.G.

Cameron, Mr T.C.
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Campbell, Mr A.J.
• Campbell, Mr P.A.
Captive Nations Council of Queensland
Carlson, Mr D.R.
• Carson, Mrs L.Y.
Chalmers, Mr W.
Chapman, Mr C.R.
Chappell, Mr M.E.
Cheeseman, Ms M.J.
Chimhamhiwa, Mr S.W.
Chitrate, Mr C.M.
Church of England in Australia, The General Synod
Clarke, Mrs M.F.
Clegg, Mr W.S.
Conan-Davies, Mr G.W.S.
Connolly, D. & M.
Cooper, Mr D.
• Cooper, Mr & Mrs D.G.M.
Cooper, Dr N.K.
• Cope, Mr J.H.
Couch, Mr R.
Cowan, Dr E.D.
Creasey, Mrs P.
Critchley, Mr S.
Cruttwell, Mr J.M.R.
Curtis, Mr N.
Dale, Mrs D.V.
Darling Downs Electors Association
Das, Dr J.
Davidson, Mr A.G.
Davis, Mr P.W.
Deans, Ms N.C.
Devine, Mr & Mrs J.A.
• Dewal, Mr R.B.
Dickinson, Mr J.A.
Dillon, Mr C.C.
• Dodd, Mr P.B.
Donnelly, Mr M.F.S.
Dunkley, Mrs H.M.
Dunstan, Mr A.R.

Eckersley-Maslin, Mr C.E.
Elliott, H.W.D. & F.M.E.
Ellis, Mr A.H.
Elworthy, Mr P.M.
Evans, Mr P.A.
Everingham, the Hon. D.N., M.P.
Fielder, Mr T.
Foreman, Mr R.K.
Fowora, Mr E.O. - Acting High Commissioner,
Federal Republic of Nigeria
Fox, Mr P.J.
Francis, Mr D.H.
Fraser, Mr H.D.
Fraser, Mr K.E.
Freeman, Mr N.J.
Gayndah Voters Policy Association
Geerlings, Mr J.
Gell, Mr E.
Gentle, Mrs M.F.
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