

DEPARTMENT OF THE SENATE	
PAPER No.	861
DATE PRESENTED	20 MAY 1980
THE PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA	
<i>Handwritten signature</i> Acting Clerk of the Senate	
THE SENATE 20 MAY 1980 <i>Handwritten initials</i> TAELED PAPER	

Report of the Joint Committee on
Foreign Affairs and Defence

ZIMBABWE
(May 1980)

Volume 2
(Chapters 6-9)

THE PARLIAMENT OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

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CHAPTER 6

The Lancaster House Conference and 1980 elections

1. Introduction

The April 1979 elections, although they produced a majority rule black government (but with a white veto over certain key areas of constitutional change), failed to attract international recognition or a lifting of sanctions and failed to end the guerilla war. Pressures for at least a lifting of sanctions increased within a number of countries but before they had any practical outcome they were forestalled by Commonwealth moves at a Heads of Government meeting at Lusaka in August.

The result of that meeting was a plan for the UK to convene another constitutional conference to which all parties would be invited and which would discuss a settlement on the basis of proposals agreed to at Lusaka. The Muzorewa Government and the two Patriotic Front parties accepted invitations to attend the constitutional conference, to be held at Lancaster House, and negotiations commenced on 10 September 1979.

The negotiations continued until 15 December, and in the end produced agreement on a new constitution, arrangements for a pre-independence period, including the holding of new elections, and a ceasefire. The ceasefire came fully into effect on 28 December, and common roll elections (to elect 80 representative of blacks to a 100-member House of assembly - the other 20 places being reserved for representatives of whites) took place on 27-29 February 1980. The Unilateral Declaration of Independence of 1965 had formally ended on 12 December 1979 with the arrival of a British Governor, Lord Soames, in Rhodesia, which reverted to being a British Crown Colony.

The elections, generally judged to be free and fair despite a number of instances of intimidation, produced a clear overall majority for Mr Mugabe's party, known after the ceasefire as ZANU(PF). Mr Mugabe subsequently announced a coalition government with a Ministry of 23 - 17 ZANU(PF), four Patriotic Front (formerly ZAPU) party members, including Mr Nkomo, and two whites - one a member of the Rhodesian Front.

At midnight on 17 April 1980 Rhodesia was formally granted independence as the Republic of Zimbabwe.

2. From the April 1979 elections to Lusaka

The Zimbabwe Rhodesian Government hoped that quick decisions by a number of key countries to lift sanctions and recognise Bishop Muzorewa's Government of National Unity would follow the April 1979 elections. This was not to be, despite strong support for such moves within several countries, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom.

In an urgent message to US President Carter on 10 May 1979, Bishop Muzorewa appealed for recognition and the lifting of sanctions. Hopes that the US would lift sanctions were dashed, however, when President Carter announced on 7 June 1979 that he was unable to accept that the establishment of the new Government fulfilled the requirements of a September 1978 Congressional decision requiring him to make a decision to lift sanctions if the Rhodesian Government showed its willingness to negotiate at an international conference of all interested parties and if free elections were conducted in Rhodesia under international observation.¹ President Carter said he could not conclude that the elections were free and fair when 95% of the population - the blacks - had never had a chance to consider or vote for or against the 1979 Constitution, and 4% - the whites - had a veto over any significant constitutional reforms and continued control

over the army, the police, the system of justice and the civil service.

The British Government's attitude to the elections and the lifting of sanctions had been expressed by the newly-elected Conservative Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher, who told the House of Commons on 22 May 1979 that if her Government was satisfied that the Constitution had been approved by the people of Rhodesia as a whole (the fifth of the UK's six principles) it would 'be our duty to bring Rhodesia back to legality'. The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Lord Carrington, on the same day told the House of Lords that it would be 'morally wrong to brush aside an election in which 64% of the people of Rhodesia cast their vote' and stressed the Government's aim 'to return Rhodesia to legality in conditions of peace and of wide international recognition'. On 23 May the UK Government announced that Mr Derek Day, an Assistant Under-Secretary at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, would go to Salisbury to represent the British Government there. Lord Harlech would visit a number of black African states.

The OAU had called on Britain and the United States not to recognise the Muzorewa Government, and a meeting of Foreign Ministers from the Front-line States and Nigeria in Dar es Salaam on 2 June warned that any recognition of the Muzorewa Government would 'seriously jeopardize' Britain's relations with African states.² Visits by Bishop Muzorewa to the US and Britain in July, prior to the Lusaka Conference, apparently had little effect.

The British Government had at first seemed inclined towards ending sanctions and perhaps later recognising the new Government in Zimbabwe Rhodesia, particularly after the favourable report on the April 1979 elections by the Conservative Party observer group. Remarks hinting at the possible dropping of sanctions were made by Mrs Thatcher on 1 July 1979 during a visit to Australia.³ However, after representations by a number of countries, including the Front-line States and Commonwealth

countries, the British responses became more guarded, particularly with a crucial Commonwealth Conference due to take place in Lusaka, Zambia, in August.

Speaking in the House of Commons on 25 July 1979 Mrs Thatcher said the British Government had not yet determined whether the six principles had been fully met, and that the Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka would be an important stage in the consultations. Britain had decided to keep its options open until after the Lusaka Conference. Mrs Thatcher told the House of Commons:

Whatever further progress remains to be achieved, the plain fact is that Zimbabwe Rhodesia has moved far along the road, by means of elections, towards the building of a democratic society founded on racial partnership. This achievement must not be thrown away or discarded in favour of the rule of force.

I look forward to the consultations in Lusaka believing they can help us in our task of creating an independent Rhodesia and a Rhodesia which will win that widespread acceptance from peoples of goodwill that is so important for her future.

3. The Lusaka Commonwealth Conference

The 22nd Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting (or Commonwealth Conference) was held in Lusaka on 1-7 August 1979, attended by the Heads of Government of 39 of the then 41 Commonwealth countries.⁴ This was the first regular session of the Conference to have been held in Africa since the special session in Nigeria in 1966. The major task facing the Conference was to find a Rhodesian constitution that would be more acceptable to African opinion than that of the Internal Settlement, and to persuade both the internal parties and the Patriotic Front to agree to meet and consider it. If the Conference failed, and Britain did go it alone in dropping

sanctions, then all the problems raised by the Rhodesia issue would most probably remain. In particular, the fighting would continue and probably intensify. The opportunities for Soviet involvement would increase and Britain's relations with much of black Africa would deteriorate.

Just prior to the Conference, on 30 July, a consultative meeting of the leaders of the five Front-line States was held to formulate 'a common consensus on the situation in rebel Rhodesia'. President Nyerere, who chaired the meeting, said afterwards that Commonwealth leaders should 'not find it difficult to agree on the essentials' of an initiative which could form the basis of a solution acceptable to black Africa.⁵ To add to the pressure on Britain, Nigeria announced on 31 July that it was nationalising the Nigerian assets of British Petroleum (in which the UK Government had a 51% holding).

(1) Opening comments

The chairman and host, President Kaunda, declared in his opening speech that Rhodesia was still a British colony and 'nothing has changed'; the elections held in April were illegal, and had produced an illegal government. Mrs Thatcher said the British Government was wholly committed to 'genuine black majority rule in Rhodesia'. The British Government's aim was:

to bring Rhodesia to legal independence on a basis which the Commonwealth and the international community as a whole will find acceptable; and which offers the prospect of peace for the people of Rhodesia and her neighbours.

The Australian Prime Minister, Mr Fraser, said that the April 1979 elections, although they had settled nothing, had brought about a different situation, created new facts and disturbed a stalemate. There had been significant constitutional changes, but it was clear that before agreement could be reached,

and accepted by a number of African states, there would have to be further changes:

We are all in favour of majority rule - true majority rule which takes account of all the parties concerned and which is reflected not only in elections but in the underlying structure of power and authority ... if a non-violent solution to the problem of Zimbabwe is to be found it will involve flexibility on all sides - flexibility not about the objective of a non-racialist society, but concerning the process of arriving at that objective and the individual interests of the principals.

Australia played a fairly prominent role both in the negotiations at Lusaka and in the preparations for Lusaka. In early July Mr Fraser initiated an informal 'steering group' of six leaders (himself, Mrs Thatcher, Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda, Mr Manley, the Jamaican Prime Minister, and Lt.-Gen. Obasanjo, the Nigerian Head of State), who had agreed to work closely together in drafting and presenting proposals to the full Conference. Mr Fraser also began a process of consultations with Heads of Government in a number of other countries, including Canada and New Zealand.

Senior Foreign Affairs officials were sent to London for consultations on Rhodesia with the new Conservative Government and with the Commonwealth Secretary-General, Mr Shridath Ramphal, in May, and on 23 July the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Peacock, held talks in London with the Deputy Prime Minister in the Muzorewa Government, Dr S.C. Mundawarara. Mr Peacock told Dr Mundawarara that the Internal Settlement and the elections did not go far enough. Australia's position was that unless constitutional change took place, Australia would not recognise Bishop Muzorewa's Government.⁶ Mr Peacock subsequently visited Nigeria, Kenya and Tanzania prior to the Lusaka Conference and Mr Fraser visited Nigeria. An Australian Parliamentary Delegation visited Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, Tanzania, Nigeria, Gabon and Sudan in June-July 1979. Members were Mr D.M. Connolly, M.P., Senator

K.W. Sibraa, Senator George Georges, Senator J.W. Knight and Mr J.W. Haslem, M.P.

(2) The settlement proposals

At the opening of the main debate on Rhodesia on 3 August Mrs Thatcher made a speech acknowledging the validity of criticisms of the entrenched clauses in the Constitution which gave whites excessive power to block change and exercise control in key areas of the civil service, and put forward four points as the basis of British policy: the British Government was wholly committed to genuine black majority rule; it was Britain's constitutional responsibility to grant legal independence and only Britain could do it; the objective had to be to establish independence on the basis of a constitution comparable with the constitutions agreed with other countries granted independence; and as Britain was deeply conscious of the urgent need to bring peace to Rhodesia and her neighbours, Britain would present its proposals as quickly as possible to all parties and at the same time call on them to cease hostilities and move toward a settlement.

During the weekend of 4-5 August the 'contact group' as outlined earlier (but with General Adefope representing Nigeria, and also including Mr Ramphal and Lord Carrington) held discussions on new settlement proposals and agreed to a draft set of proposals. In the course of a social function hosted by Mr Fraser on 5 August the approval of all 39 countries at the Commonwealth Conference was obtained (either personally or by telephone), and details of the settlement were released later that night - pre-empting further discussion at the Conference.

The settlement proposals emphasised Britain's constitutional responsibility for Rhodesia, called for new elections to be supervised by Britain after a constitutional conference to which all parties would be invited, and provided for a ceasefire and an end to sanctions as part of the settlement process. The full text of the proposals was as follows:

Heads of Government had a frank discussion on the current problems of Southern Africa and their implications for the Commonwealth and the wider international community.

While recognising that certain developments since their meeting in London [in 1977] have added new dimensions, they remained concerned by the potential dangers inherent in the existing situation. They therefore stressed the urgent need for finding satisfactory solutions to the remaining problems of this region.

In relation to the situation in Rhodesia, Heads of Government therefore:

- (a) Confirmed that they were wholly committed to genuine black majority rule for the people of Zimbabwe;
- (b) Recognised, in this context, that the internal settlement Constitution is defective in certain important respects;
- (c) Fully accepted that it is the constitutional responsibility of the British Government to grant legal independence to Zimbabwe on the basis of majority rule;
- (d) Recognised that the search for a lasting settlement must involve all parties to the conflict;
- (e) Were deeply conscious of the urgent need to achieve such a settlement and bring peace to the people of Zimbabwe and their neighbours;
- (f) Accepted that independence on the basis of majority rule requires the adoption of

a democratic constitution including appropriate safeguards for minorities;

- (g) Acknowledged that the government formed under such an independence constitution must be chosen through free and fair elections properly supervised under British Government authority, and with Commonwealth observers;
- (h) Welcomed the British Government's indication that an appropriate procedure for advancing towards these objectives would be for them to call a constitutional conference to which all the parties would be invited; and
- (i) Consequently, accepted that it must be a major objective to bring about a cessation of hostilities and an end to sanctions as part of the process of implementation of a lasting settlement.

The proposals were formally approved by the Commonwealth Conference on 7 August and were included in the final communique, which also included a strong Commonwealth declaration on racism (for the Lusaka Declaration of the Commonwealth on Racism and Racial Prejudice, see Appendix Two).⁷ The fact that the proposals were endorsed by militant African states such as Tanzania, Zambia and Nigeria improved the chances of a constitutional conference being held: the African states could put pressure on the Patriotic Front to agree to negotiate and Britain, with the promise of lifting sanctions, could bring its weight to bear on the internal leaders.

(3) Reaction to the proposals

Bishop Muzorewa's reaction to the proposals was cautious.⁸ He said on 6 August that they had some 'positive elements' and he was pleased that Commonwealth leaders had accepted the new reality in Zimbabwe Rhodesia, brought about solely by the April 1979 elections and the installation, for the first time, of a black majority government. But he also said that

the proposal to hold new elections was 'an insult to the electorate' when the April elections had been found to be free and fair by most international observers, including the Conservative Party observer group.

The ZANU leader, Mr Mugabe, said any constitutional arrangements produced by Britain would have to ensure the acceptance of the guerilla forces as the national army of Zimbabwe.⁹ He said the regime of Mr Ian Smith and Bishop Muzorewa would have to be ended and the Zimbabwe Rhodesian army, police and air force disbanded. A statement issued by ZANU welcomed the call for a new constitution and an all-parties conference but regretted 'the introduction of a racist element in the requirement for special racial privileges' (a reference to the 'appropriate safeguards' for minorities). President Nyerere on 10 August tried to 'smooth over' Mr Mugabe's response by saying his demand for the replacement of the existing army by Patriotic Front guerilla forces represented no more than a desire to ensure that new elections were not controlled by Mr Smith.¹⁰

Britain subsequently announced that it would convene a constitutional conference involving all parties at Lancaster House, London, on 10 September 1979. Invitations were sent to the Patriotic Front and the Muzorewa Government on 14 August. The invitations asked each to appoint a delegation of up to 12 members to attend the constitutional conference. Accompanying each invitation was an 11-point outline of Britain's proposals for an independence constitution.

The Muzorewa Government accepted, somewhat reluctantly, on 15 August 1979, on the basis that no pre-conditions were laid down.¹¹ The delegation would represent the Government of National Unity rather than individual political parties. The Patriotic Front announced its acceptance on 20 August 1979, after a meeting in Dar es Salaam between Mr Mugabe and Mr Nkomo. Their statements made it clear that the guerilla war would continue until an agreement had been reached.

Bishop Muzorewa announced his delegation on 22 August: six Members of Parliament from the UANC, with himself as leader; two from the UNFP; two from ZANU (Sithole), including Mr Sithole; two from the Rhodesian Front (the former Prime Minister, Mr Ian Smith, and the Finance Minister in the Muzorewa Government, Mr David Smith); and eight advisers. The advisers were made part of the delegation when Britain agreed on 5 September that each delegation could have 20 members (but reduced the number who could sit at the conference table at any one time to eight). The Commander of Combined Operations, Lt.-Gen. Peter Walls, attended some sessions as an adviser.

The Patriotic Front Delegation of 20 included 10 from ZANU and 10 from ZAPU. The ZANU component was led by Mr Mugab and included Gen. J.M. Tongogara (defence secretary), Mr S.V. Mzenda (vice-president) and Mr E.Z. Tekere (administrative secretary). The ZAPU component, led by Mr Nkomo, included Mr J.M. Chinamano (vice-president), Mr J.W. Msika (secretary-general) and Mr T.G. Silundika.

The British delegation, also of 20, was led by the conference chairman, Lord Carrington, and included Sir Ian Gilmour (deputy chairman), Lord Harlech, Sir Antony Duff, Mr D.M. Day and Mr N.M. Fenn.

4. The Lancaster House Conference

The constitutional conference at Lancaster House commenced on 10 September and concluded on 15 December 1979, after 47 plenary sessions. On 15 and 17 December the delegation leaders initialled the ceasefire agreement, and on 21 December they formally signed it - thus ending 14 weeks of negotiations, 14 years of rebellion (Rhodesia returned to legality on 12 December) and seven years of guerilla warfare.

The negotiations at Lancaster House were in three stages, each dependent on the successful outcome of the preceding stage. Agreement had first to be reached on a new constitution for Zimbabwe, then on pre-independence or transitional arrangements, and finally on a ceasefire and its implementation.

(1) The opening sessions

The Conference was opened by Lord Carrington, with Bishop Muzorewa and Mr Nkomo responding on behalf of their delegations.

Mr Nkomo stated that the Lancaster House Conference was being held because Britain had 'failed to meet her decolonization responsibilities'.¹² He said the task of the Conference was 'to ensure through an indivisible comprehensive agreement the irreversible transfer of power to the people of Zimbabwe'.

Bishop Muzorewa, in his response, claimed that the election of his Government in April 1979 had satisfied Britain's six principles and that Britain had a legal and moral duty, in the name of democracy, to grant it recognition. He pointed out that Zimbabwe Rhodesia enjoyed universal adult suffrage and majority rule and that racial discrimination had been totally abolished. He continued:

Let us accept one further fact. The reasons which led to the British and subsequent international action against our country were directed purely and simply against a white minority government which unilaterally declared independence in 1965. Those reasons are no longer valid, Mr Chairman. That government, which was anathema to the majority of our people, no longer exists. It has now been replaced by a government popularly elected by 64.8 per cent of our electorate in elections which were conducted in an honest, impartial, democratic, free and fair manner.¹³

Bishop Muzorewa said his delegation required to know clearly and categorically what more the British Government required before it would remove sanctions and grant recognition. It also wanted an unequivocal guarantee that no one would be able to veto any decisions reached at the Conference, nor its stated scope and focus.

(2) Negotiations on an independence constitution

After agreement on an agenda, Britain on 12 September distributed a summary of a draft constitution, and the Patriotic Front tabled its proposals for an independence constitution on 14 September. The UK summary declared that Zimbabwe would be the official name of the country. Citizenship was defined in such a way as to enable those who had spent years outside Zimbabwe in exile, and their children, to become citizens. Provision for a Declaration of Rights included protection from arbitrary deprivation of property, and the section on the Executive provided for a constitutional head of state (a President) and an executive Prime Minister - as in the 1979 Constitution.

The British summary departed from the provisions of the 1979 Constitution on the ~~composition~~ and control of the public service, police, defence forces and judiciary, and the representation of whites in parliament. The summary concerning the various service commissions provided that:

The President, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, will have power to give the commissions such general directions with respect to the exercise of their functions as he may consider necessary. These may include directions designed to achieve a suitable representation of the various component groups of the population in the services of the State.

This provision was designed to allow the appointment of blacks to senior posts in the public service, the police and the defence

forces. Otherwise the proposals on the service commissions were similar to those of the 1979 constitution.

In the case of the judicature the summary provided for a Judicial Service Commission, but proposed that the qualifications for appointment as a judge of the High Court be widened to include the alternatives of 'appropriate judicial experience' or practice in a Commonwealth country as well as the 1979 requirements of 10 years' qualification to practise as an advocate in Zimbabwe or in a country where the common law was Roman-Dutch and English an official language.

The legislature was to consist of a President and Parliament comprising a House of Assembly and Senate. The summary did not provide figures for the composition of the House of Assembly but specified there should be 'provision for special minority representation in parliament', and proposed that an (unspecified) number of whites be elected by voters on a white roll, to represent white constituencies, and an (unspecified) number of blacks be elected by voters on a common roll to represent common roll constituencies. One-third of the members of the Senate were to be elected by the ordinary members of the House of Assembly, one-third by the white members, and the election of the remaining one-third was to give 'due weight to regional considerations'. the provisions for minority representation would not be amendable for 'a specific period after independence'.

On the question of constitutional amendment the British summary proposed that key provisions be entrenched and a Bill to amend them would require the affirmative vote of at least 70% of the total membership of the House of Assembly and two-thirds of the total membership of the Senate (but after 180 days such a Bill could be sent to the President for his approval despite the Senate's failure to approve it). The summary also proposed constitutional protection for existing pension rights of public servants, and the appointment of an Ombudsman.

The Patriotic Front's 'Brief summary of proposals for an independence constitution' provided for an executive President who would also be head of state. He would be Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, would determine their operational use, would make appointments, promotions and dismissals, and would be able to delegate any of these functions. The Parliament would comprise a Senate and National Assembly. The Senate would consist of 40 members elected by the members of the National Assembly, and the National Assembly would consist of 120 members elected on a single-member constituency basis. Election to the National Assembly would be on the basis of 'one man, one vote', and there would be 'no provisions for members elected on the basis of ethnic, tribal, religious or other differences'.¹⁴ Any Bill to amend the constitution would require the affirmative votes of two-thirds of the National Assembly and Senate, sitting separately, and could be presented to the President without Senate approval after three months.

The Patriotic Front proposals did not provide for dual citizenship, and proposed the validation of only those laws existing at the time of UDI, subject to the repeal or amendment of specific 'offending' laws. All judges and magistrates would cease to hold office upon Independence but would be eligible to apply for reappointment.

The Patriotic Front proposals were a long way from the British proposals. They envisaged an almost complete 'wiping of the UDI slate' - few post-UDI obligations would be accepted by the new government, senior officers in the public service, armed forces and police, and all judges, would be required to stand down, citizenship would be related to 1965 laws, and new oaths of allegiance would be required. Most of these were unacceptable to both the British and Bishop Muzorewa's delegation. At the same time, the Patriotic Front proposals accepted the principle of an independent judiciary, a bicameral system of parliament, delaying

powers for the Senate, limited power to amend the constitution and a justiciable Declaration of Rights.

Bishop Muzorewa's delegation accepted the 'general principles' of the British constitutional proposals on 21 September (by an 11-1 vote of the 12 senior members of the delegation - only Mr Ian Smith voted against), but at the same time demanded the lifting of sanctions against Zimbabwe Rhodesia.

On 24 September the Patriotic Front made a major concession by agreeing to 20% reserved seats for whites in a National Assembly of 120 members - 96 seats open to members of all races, elected by a common roll, and 24 seats reserved for whites of which 15 would be elected by whites and nine by a common roll (in practice the nine whites elected by the common roll would have been sympathetic to the black majority government). If this proposal was unacceptable, the Patriotic Front proposed that the 96 seats be elected by a black roll only and all 24 white seats by a white roll. The Senate would consist of 60 seats - 48 elected by common roll members of the National Assembly and 12 by white roll members or, alternatively, 48 by black members and 12 by white members. In effect, the Patriotic Front agreed to reserve seats for whites but not to give them power to veto constitutional change. Other differences remained, such as the period in which special representation for whites was to continue.

On 3 October Lord Carrington issued a draft of the British constitutional proposals as revised and expanded in the light of the discussions which had taken place so far both in plenary and bilateral sessions. He said that the revised draft provided for genuine majority rule but also provided adequate reassurance to members of the minority white community and provided for their interests 'during a period of adjustment':

It is our strong conviction that it is wrong for the members of that community, acting alone, to be able to block constitutional amendment, or to exercise effective control over large areas of legislation. But we believe that the members of that community have a vital part to play in the future development and prosperity of the independent state. In striking a balance, we have made clear our view that the representatives of the white community should no longer have a blocking power and that the proportion of seats reserved for them should be set at 20%. The figure for constitutional amendment should be 70%. In addition the government must be in a position to exercise appropriate control over the armed forces and the public services.

Lord Carrington said the revised draft represented the solution most likely to secure agreement, and was to be the final version.

The revised British proposals gave a little to both sides. The Muzorewa delegation was assured that there would be compensation for land compulsorily acquired, full remittability of pensions and compensation, a right to establish special schools, entrenchment of major provisions of the Declaration of Rights for 10 years, entrenchment of white seats for seven years, and acceptance of post-UDI obligations. The Patriotic Front delegation were assured that there would be no white veto of constitutional change despite special white seats, the proportion of white seats was as in the Patriotic Front's revised proposals and would remain for seven, rather than 10 years, and parliament would be able to legislate on citizenship.

Bishop Muzorewa formally accepted the revised British proposals on 5 October, subject to satisfactory transitional arrangements being negotiated and conditional on sanctions being lifted. In his acceptance he conceded the concept of fresh elections. Bishop Muzorewa's acceptance and his call to lift sanctions were made only three days before the start of the British Conservative Party's annual conference at Blackpool, which voted overwhelmingly for the removal of sanctions 'as soon as is practicably possible'.

Lord Carrington had given the Patriotic Front delegation until 11 October to accept the British proposals. The Patriotic Front's response was to issue its own revised constitutional proposals on 8 October and to continue to reserve its position on a number of issues, particularly questions relating to the acquisition of and compensation for land. The Patriotic Front delegation said it wished to move on to discussion of the second item on the agenda, arrangements for the pre-independence transition, for which it had issued proposals on 18 September.

Lord Carrington, however, refused to accept the Patriotic Front's reservations, and on 11 October asked the Patriotic Front delegation once more to accept the British proposals. On 15 October Lord Carrington again asked the Patriotic Front whether it would accept the British proposals for an independence constitution, subject to agreement on pre-independence arrangements. When Mr Nkomo and Mr Mugabe did not give a positive reply he told them that he would begin discussions the next day on arrangements for implementation of the constitution 'with the delegation which had accepted it'. The Patriotic Front could join these discussions once it had accepted the constitution.

Lord Carrington's decision effectively barred the Patriotic Front from participation in further talks until it accepted the British proposals. This drew a hostile response from several quarters, and particularly from the Commonwealth Secretary-General, Mr Ramphal, who said it was 'not within the letter or the spirit of the Lusaka Agreement'. This was denied by Lord Carrington, who said the Lusaka Agreement had called for talks involving all parties and this had been done:

But the Lusaka Agreement does not entitle any party ultimately to obstruct the rights of the people of Zimbabwe to elect their own government on the basis of a democratic

majority rule constitution in free and fair elections supervised by the British authorities as agreed.¹⁵

Leaders of the Front-line States held an emergency meeting in Dar es Salaam on 17 October and declared, in a conciliatory tone, that the Patriotic Front had been right to emphasise the land issue (the major stumbling block for the Patriotic Front) but the question was not so much a constitutional one as one of seeking assurances that funds for compensation would be available. (For a more detailed discussion of the land question, see Chapter 11.)

The next day, on 18 October, the Patriotic Front said that it had received assurances that, depending on a successful outcome of the Conference, Britain, the US and other countries would participate in a multinational financial donor effort to assist in land, agricultural and economic development programs. These assurances went a long way in allaying its great concern over the whole land question 'arising from the great need our people have for land and our commitment to satisfy that need when in government'. The Patriotic Front continued:

In these circumstances ... we are now able to say that if we are satisfied beyond doubt about the vital issues of the transitional arrangements, there will not be need to revert to discussion on the constitution, including those issues on which we reserved our position.

The British delegation and that led by Bishop Muzorewa had begun preliminary bilateral discussions on transitional arrangements on 16 October. The Patriotic Front joined these on 19 October, and the discussions began in earnest on 22 October when Britain tabled its draft 'Arrangements for implementing the independence constitution'. Before reviewing this second stage in the Lancaster House talks, the Committee will first consider the final version of the Independence Constitution in greater detail.

(3) The 1980 Constitution

The final summary of the British constitutional proposals, as agreed by all parties, was presented to the UK Parliament in November 1979.¹⁶ The Constitution based on the summary was published on 6 December 1979 in the form of an Order in Council made on that day under the Southern Rhodesia Act 1979 and entitled 'The Zimbabwe Constitution Order 1979'. The order provided that the new Constitution would come into force on the day that 'Southern Rhodesia becomes independent as a Republic under the name of Zimbabwe'.

(a) The President

The head of state would be a 'constitutional' President, elected by the members of the Senate and House of Assembly sitting together as an electoral college, and would hold office for a maximum period of 12 years (two six-year terms). He would act on the advice of an Executive Council, or the Prime Minister or some other Minister, as provided in particular circumstances, and would be Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces. The President would have power to declare a state of emergency, which would lapse in 14 days if not approved in the meantime by more than half the total membership of the House of Assembly. The prerogative of mercy would also be vested in the President.

(b) Parliament

The legislature of Zimbabwe would consist of the President and Parliament. Parliament would comprise a Senate and House of Assembly, and would have a term of five years.

The Senate would comprise 40 members - 10 elected by House of Assembly members elected ^{from} ~~of~~ the white roll, 14 elected by House of assembly members ^{from} ~~of~~ the common roll, 10 elected by the Council of Chiefs (five from Mashonaland and five from

Matabeleland), and six nominated by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister (by the Governor in the case of the first elections). A Senate Legal Committee would be established with powers of scrutiny over legislation.

The House of Assembly would comprise 100 members - 80 elected by voters on the common roll and 20 by voters on the white roll. The major white party would not be able to form a coalition with any single black party other than the major black party.

(c) The franchise

Any citizen who was 18 and who met the residence qualifications prescribed in an Electoral Act was entitled to enrol on the white roll if a white, Asian or coloured, and in any other case on the common roll.

A Delimitation Commission, to be chaired by the Chief Justice or some other judge of the High Court (and with three other members appointed with the approval of the Chief Justice), would define at five-yearly intervals the 80 common roll and 20 white roll constituencies. Boundaries were to be drawn so that the number of voters in a constituency varied no more than 20% above or below the average number of voters in constituencies on the common roll or white roll.

(d) Legislation and constitutional alteration

The Parliament was empowered to make laws, styled 'Acts', for 'the peace, order and good government of Zimbabwe'. All Bills except constitutional alteration Bills, could be passed by simple majority and, except for money Bills, could be introduced in either House. The Senate's power to delay Bills other than constitutional alteration Bills or money Bills was limited to 90 days (180 days in the case of Bills adversely

reported on by the Senate Legal Committee). After that period a Bill could be sent to the President for his assent, even if it had not been passed, or had been rejected, by the Senate. The Senate did not have power to amend money Bills, and could delay them only eight sitting days.

Bills amending the Constitution fell into three categories:

- . The provisions relating to separate representation for whites in the Parliament, for a period of seven years would be amendable only by the unanimous vote of the House of Assembly and not less than two-thirds of the Senate. After seven years alteration of those provisions would require the affirmative votes of at least 70 members of the House of Assembly and two-thirds of the Senate.
- . The protective provisions of the Declaration of Rights, for a period of 10 years would be amendable only by the unanimous vote of the House of Assembly and not less than two-thirds of the Senate (but a Bill which amended the Declaration so as to reduce the qualifications or exceptions to its provisions would require the affirmative votes of only 70 members of the House of Assembly and two-thirds of the Senate).
- . Bills amending any other provision of the Constitution required the affirmative votes of not less than 70 members of the House of Assembly and two-thirds of the Senate.

The Senate's power to delay constitutional alteration Bills was limited to 180 days, at the end of which such a bill could be sent to the President for his assent, even if not passed by the Senate. *only*

A constitutional alteration Bill could not be introduced into the Senate or House of Assembly unless it had been published in the Gazette at least 30 days previously.

The Senate Legal Committee was required to examine all Bills (except money Bills and constitutional alteration Bills) and statutory instruments published in the Gazette and report on whether any of their provisions, if enacted, would be in contravention of the Declaration of Rights. If the Committee so reported and the Senate endorsed the report, the Senate would not be able to pass the Bill (but could be by-passed after 180 days). In the case of statutory instruments, if the Senate endorsed an adverse report from the Committee and the House of Assembly did not then within 21 days resolve not to repeal the offending provision, the President was required to repeal it by notice in the Gazette.

In its 8 October proposals the Patriotic Front wanted constitutional alteration Bills to be passed by not less than two-thirds of the National Assembly (and two-thirds of the Senate), and for these requirements to apply to provisions for separate representation of whites after five years instead of seven.

(e) Executive Council

The Executive Council would consist of the Prime Minister and other Ministers appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister. The President would appoint as Prime Minister the person who, in his opinion, was best able to command the support of a majority of the members of the House of Assembly.

(f) Citizenship

Every person who immediately before Independence was a citizen of Rhodesia, would automatically become a citizen of Zimbabwe, and in the case of those entitled to become citizens of Rhodesia prior to Independence, upon application within five years. Provision was made for the continuation of dual citizenship, and the Parliament was given power to make provision for a number of citizenship matters.

The Patriotic Front, in its 8 October proposals, continued to press for the UDI date of 11 November 1965 to be the deadline for automatic citizenship. It also called for the elimination of dual citizenship after one year.

(g) Declaration of Rights

The Declaration of Rights in the 1980 Constitution provided for the same rights as those in the 1979 Constitution: the right to life, personal liberty, protection of law, freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of movement, protection from slavery and forced labour, inhuman treatment, deprivation of property, arbitrary search or entry, and discrimination on grounds of race, etc. Both Declarations provided for freedom to belong to political parties, trade unions or other associations for the protection of a person's interests, and both also provided the right for parents to be able to send children to schools not established or maintained by the State.

However, the provisions with respect to protection from deprivation of property, in particular, differed in several respects. The 1979 Constitution required that the acquiring authority had to seek approval from the general division of the High Court either before or within 30 days of proceeding with an acquisition; this provision was deleted from the 1980

Constitution, application to the High Court only being required if the acquisition was contested. The 1979 definition of underutilised land stipulated such land had to be unused for five years, and excluded non-use or underutilisation due to the guerilla war; these limitations were not present in the 1980 Constitution. Nor was the requirement that compensation had to be at least equal to the highest amount the land and improvements would have realised if sold on the open market at any time in the previous five years; the 1980 Constitution referred only to 'adequate compensation' (but the 1980 Constitution did provide that in the event of an acquisition being contested the court could, in fixing adequate compensation, 'ignore any reduction in the value of such land, interest or right resulting from any unusual or extraordinary circumstances existing immediately prior to such acquisition').

Compensation for land compulsorily acquired could be remitted overseas within a reasonable time, free of any deductions, taxes or charges. Pensions would also be remittable overseas. Existing laws in contravention of the Declaration of Rights were saved for a period of five years, unless repealed earlier. .

The major differences between the British and Patriotic Front positions with respect to the Declaration of Rights were over compensation for land compulsorily acquired, the remittability overseas of compensation, the inclusion of pension provisions in the Declaration of Rights (thus requiring the unanimous support of the House of Assembly for change, instead of 70%), the right to set up separate schools, and the protection of the Declaration of Rights for 10 years by requiring a unanimous vote of the House of Assembly to change any of its provisions. On this last point, the Patriotic Front commented:

A Declaration of Rights which cannot respond to legitimate popular pressure will inevitably break under that pressure.¹⁷

(h) State of emergency and preventive detention

A period of public emergency could be declared by the President to cover all or part of Zimbabwe and, if endorsed within 14 days by the House of Assembly, could continue for six months, and could be renewed by the House for a further six months. The House of Assembly could also resolve that a situation existed in all or part of Zimbabwe which, if allowed to continue, might lead to a state of public emergency, and require the preventive detention of persons in the interests of defence, public safety or public order. Such a resolution would have effect for up to a year and could be renewed for a further year. In both cases the resolution would require the support of 50 members of the House of Assembly.

Certain of the rights in the Declaration of Rights could be derogated from, within specified limits, during a period of public emergency or a resolution enabling preventive detention. A person detained under any law providing for preventive detention was to have his case reviewed not later than 14 days (30 in a period of public emergency) by a tribunal established for the purpose, and thereafter his case was to be reviewed at intervals of 30 days (180 days in a period of public emergency). A detained person had to be informed within seven days of the reasons for his detention and was entitled to consult a legal representative of his own choice.

(i) The service commissions

Similar provision was made in the 1980 Constitution as in the 1979 Constitution for service commissions to run the public service and prison service, and to perform certain functions relating to the judiciary, police force and the defence forces. The functions of each commission were similar in both constitutions, as were the qualifications for at least one member

of each commission in addition to the chairman. A major difference was that directions could be given by the President to ensure representation of 'the various elements of the population' in appointments. The main provisions for each service were as follows.

The public service and prison service

The Public Service Commission was to consist of a chairman and two to four other members, appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister. The persons to be appointed were to be chosen for their ability and experience in administration or their professional qualifications, 'or their suitability otherwise for appointment'. The chairman and at least one other member were to be persons who, as in the 1979 Constitution, had held the post of Secretary, Deputy Secretary or Under Secretary or an equivalent post for an aggregate of at least five years.

The Public Service Commission, in considering candidates for appointment to the public service or prison service, was to prefer persons who were the most efficient and suitable for the post, subject to whatever general directions of policy the President gave 'with the object of achieving a suitable representation of the various elements of the population in the Public Service and Prison Service'. The President, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister (who was to consult with the Public Service Commission beforehand), was empowered to appoint Secretaries of Ministries. If the Prime Minister's advice did not conform with the Public Service Commission's recommendations, Parliament was to be informed. Under the 1979 Constitution heads of Ministries were appointed by the Public Service Commission after consultations with the relevant Minister.

The chairman of the Public Service Commission, or his delegate, would be chairman of the Police Service Commission and

the Defence Forces Service Commission, and would be a member of the Judicial Service Commission.

The Patriotic Front objected to the 'senior rank' requirement for the chairman and one other member of the Public Service Commission on the grounds that this would most probably result in the appointment of a white drawn from the existing white-dominated public service. It also objected to the clause concerning 'suitable representation of the various elements of the population' on the grounds that if a black government adequately controlled the commissions such a direction would be unnecessary. The Patriotic Front, in its 8 October proposals, called for the establishment of a Public Service Commission and a Police and Prison Service Commission comprising three to six members chosen for their ability or experience, etc., but not specifying senior ranks held.

The police force

The police force would be under the command of a Commissioner of Police, appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister, who was to inform Parliament if he departed from the recommendations of a specially constituted board to be consulted beforehand. The members of the board would be the chairman of the Police Service Commission, the retiring Commissioner of Police, and a Secretary of a Ministry. Subject to such general directions of policy which might be given to him by the Prime Minister or other responsible Minister, the Commissioner would be responsible for the administration and operations of the police force. The Commissioner, in making appointments, was to give preference to the most efficient and suitable for appointment, subject to directions from the President designed to achieve 'a suitable representation of the various elements of the population' in the police force.

A Police Service Commission, to consider grievances, confirm dismissals and make regulations, would be appointed. It would comprise the chairman of the Public Service Commission as the chairman, and two to four other members. At least one of the other members was required to have held the rank of Assistant Commissioner or a more senior rank in the police force for an aggregate of at least five years.

The defence forces

Each branch of the defence forces - army, air force, etc. - would be headed by a Commander, appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister, who was, again, to inform Parliament if he departed from the recommendations of a specially constituted board to be consulted beforehand. The members of the board would be the chairman of the Defence Forces Service Commission, the retiring Commander or any other Commander, and a Secretary of a Ministry. Each Commander - and a Commander of Combined Operations could also be appointed - would be responsible for the administration and operations of his branch. The Prime Minister or other authorised Minister could give a Commander such general directions of policy as he considered necessary and the Commander was to comply with such directions. Provisions for appointments and promotions were as for the police force, including the right of the President to give general policy directions to achieve 'a suitable representation of the various elements of the population' in the defence forces.

A Defence Forces Service Commission, to consider grievances, confirm dismissals and make regulations, would be appointed. It would comprise the chairman of the Public Service Commission as chairman, and two to four other members, at least one of whom had been a colonel in the army or a group captain in the air force or a more senior rank for an aggregate of at least five years.

The Patriotic Front objected to a Defence Forces Service Commission, and proposed that operational command of the defence forces rest in the Prime Minister or Minister of Defence, instead of in the Commanders. The Prime Minister or Minister of Defence would also be responsible for administration and discipline.

(j) The judicature

The provisions relating to appointment as High Court judges were widened to include the alternative of practice as an advocate for seven years in a country in which the common law was English and English was an official language, provided the appointee was a citizen of Zimbabwe. The 1979 qualifications had been practice for 10 years in Zimbabwe Rhodesia or in a country in which the common law was Roman-Dutch and English an official language, or having been a judge in a superior court in a country in which the common law was Roman-Dutch and English an official language.

The Chief Justice was to be appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister was required to consult with the Judicial Service Commission and to inform Parliament before any appointment was made if his advice was not consistent with the Judicial Service Commission's recommendations. Other judges were to be appointed by the President, acting on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission.

The Judicial Service Commission was to comprise the Chief Justice (or most senior judge if there was no Chief Justice or Acting Chief Justice), the chairman of the Public Service Commission, and two other members appointed by the President - one of whom was or had been a High Court judge or who was or had been qualified to practice as an advocate or attorney in Zimbabwe for at least seven years. Its functions were to tender advice to the President or do such other things as required under the Constitution.

Judges of the High Court would have security of tenure and would retire at either 65 or 70. A judge could be removed from office only for inability to discharge the functions of his office or for misbehaviour.

(k) Miscellaneous

The Constitution also made provision for an Ombudsman, and retention of the system of chiefs and a Council of Chiefs.

(4) Transitional arrangements

(a) The Patriotic Front's initial proposals

The Patriotic Front, on 18 September 1979, had tabled its proposals for the pre-independence interim period on the grounds that important parts of the independence Constitution could not be discussed meaningfully unless considered together with corresponding parts of the transitional arrangements.

The Patriotic Front proposed an eight-member governing council to hold full executive power, with four members representing the Patriotic Front and four members representing the British Government and 'the regime'. One of the British members would be elected chairman, and would exercise formal executive authority, but he would act on the advice of a simple majority of the governing council. The Patriotic Front proposed a transitional constitution, with legislative power exercised by the governing council sitting together with up to 20 appointed Ministers, each in charge of a government department or departments during the interim period.

In relation to the security forces the Patriotic Front proposed a transitional defence committee, appointed by the governing council and composed of representatives of the

Patriotic Front and 'the regime'. The main functions of the defence committee would be to commence the process of 'building the new Zimbabwe army', supervise the ceasefire and provide liaison between the governing council and a United Nations peace-keeping force. A transitional police committee, similarly appointed, would supervise maintenance of public order, provide liaison between the governing council and a UN civilian police force and commence the process of 'building the new Zimbabwe police force'.

In general, existing public servants would continue in office, but subject to the right of a transitional public service commission, appointed by the governing council, 'to retire any officer in the public interest'.

In relation to the judicature the Patriotic Front proposed to retain the existing structure of the High Court and subordinate courts, but to abolish all special criminal courts and tribal courts of appeal. The Chief Justice and judges of the High Court, the Chief Magistrate and regional magistrates would be required to stand down and would be replaced by acting judges and magistrates appointed by a transitional judicial service commission. The transitional judicial service commission would comprise the acting Chief Justice, an acting judge, the chairman of the transitional public service commission and two other members appointed by the governing council.

Arrangements for pre-independence elections would be carried out by an electoral commission comprising a chairman and four members appointed by the governing council. The United Nations would provide civil servants to supervise the elections, and franchise qualifications would be citizenship and the attainment of 18 years of age. Provision would need to be made to ensure that government-controlled news media did not disadvantage any party contesting the elections.

On an agreed date, martial law and the state of emergency would be lifted, no further executions would be carried out, protected villages would be abolished, and all 'political prisoners, detainees and restrictees' would be released. The transitional period should not exceed six months.

The Patriotic Front proposals were detailed and, most significantly, accorded it equal status with a combined British/Zimbabwe Rhodesian presence.

(b) The British initial proposals

The British proposals for the transitional period were tabled on 22 October by Lord Carrington, who said that the British delegation saw no merit in prolonging the transition to Independence 'beyond what is strictly necessary to enable the people of Rhodesia to make that decision'. Lord Carrington proposed two months as a reasonable time. The essence of the British plan was that a British Governor with executive and legislative power and control of the existing security forces in Rhodesia would supervise internationally observed elections.

The British proposals stated that it was Britain's constitutional responsibility, as recognised in the Lusaka communique, to ensure conditions which would enable free and fair elections for the House of Assembly to take place. To fulfil this responsibility the British Government was prepared to appoint a British Governor with executive and legislative authority. All political leaders would commit themselves to the election campaign. A British Election Commissioner, with supporting staff, would be appointed to supervise all aspects of the organisation and conduct of the elections. Commonwealth observers would be present to witness the elections, and to enable the parties to satisfy themselves that the elections were fair and impartial there would be an Election Council, chaired by the Election Commissioner and with all parties taking part in the elections represented on it.

The commanders of the security forces would be responsible to the Governor, who would also assume authority over the civil police. Under the Governor's supervision, the civil police would be responsible for maintaining law and order. There would be agreement between the opposing forces regarding a ceasefire and disengagement of their respective forces. Zimbabwe would become independent as soon as the election results had been declared and a government formed.

Lord Carrington said the purpose of the transition period was to hold elections in which all parties could participate, and in the British Government's view it was neither necessary nor right to create a new machinery of government before independence. This should be left to a newly-elected government. There was no provision in the British plan for a UN presence.

(c) The Patriotic Front's response

On 26 October the Patriotic Front responded with a detailed critique of the British proposals and tabled a paper entitled 'Essential requirements for the transition'. The Patriotic Front stated that the primary purpose of the transition period was to ensure the cessation of hostilities and the establishment of conditions of peace and security, the holding of free and fair elections, and the irreversibility of the process towards genuine majority rule and independence. The British proposals would not meet these conditions. The British claimed that a future government would have the power to carry out policies on which it was elected, and the services of the state would be at its disposal in doing so, but the basis of the British proposals was that existing institutions (the public service, police, security forces) would continue during the transition period and Patriotic Front personnel and forces would be excluded. In such conditions it was impossible for the Governor and his administration to be impartial.

The Patriotic Front objected to the Governor being granted 'total and unfettered power', particularly when the only forces under his command would be the security forces of the Muzorewa Government. Free elections could only take place with security forces in which everyone had confidence. The Patriotic Front reaffirmed that the elections should be supervised by the United Nations, as should the ceasefire arrangements.

The Patriotic Front proposed that the security forces and police force in the interim period be composed of a combination of the forces of the Muzorewa Government and Patriotic Front, operating in both cases alongside UN forces. It called for a transition period of six months - two months for the ceasefire to become effective, three months for the return and resettlement of refugees, registration of voters and delimitation of constituencies, and one month for the election campaign. Polling would be conducted on one day only, and there would be no mobile polling booths.

On 27 October Bishop Muzorewa announced that he and his delegation were prepared to accept the broad principles of the British interim arrangements, contingent upon 'agreement being reached on the definitive details' and arrangements for their implementation. In an address to the nation on 30 October Bishop Muzorewa announced his preparedness to allow a British Governor to administer the affairs of Zimbabwe Rhodesia during an interim period and for his Government to stand down.

(d) Britain's final proposals

After further discussions with the Patriotic Front, Britain on 2 November tabled its final pre-independence proposals. These reaffirmed that the primary purpose of the interim period was to hold elections, and not to remodel the institutions of government, which would be a matter for the

independence government. The British Government would administer Rhodesia through a Governor, and British impartiality should be accepted by all sides. The proposals stressed once more that the interim period should not be 'excessively protracted' as this would lead to political uncertainty and increase the risk of a breakdown in the ceasefire.

The office of Governor would be established under an Order in Council which would confer on him executive and legislative authority. He would act according to the instructions given to him by the British Government. He would make laws by ordinance, and all public officers and authorities in Rhodesia, including the public service, the police and the defence forces, would be required to comply with his directions. There would be a British Deputy Governor, a Military Adviser, Police Adviser, Legal Adviser and Political Adviser, and supporting staff, all British, to enable the Governor to discharge his functions effectively. In his day-to-day administration of the country the Governor would work through the existing public service and it would be for him to ensure that his authority was effectively and impartially exercised.

The Order in Council providing for the establishment of the office of Governor would serve as the interim constitution of Rhodesia. Once the Governor had arrived and his authority had been accepted in Rhodesia, Rhodesia would have returned to lawful government as part of Her Majesty's dominions. All persons detained on political grounds by any party, whether inside or outside Rhodesia, were to be released. All political leaders would commit themselves to the election campaign, and Bishop Muzorewa and his colleagues would not exercise ministerial functions during the interim period. As many refugees outside Rhodesia as possible should be returned to enable them to vote.

Martial law should end with an effective ceasefire. The maintenance of law and order would be the responsibility of the

civil police, acting under the Governor's supervision exercised through the Police Adviser and other British police. The military forces of both sides would maintain the ceasefire, and the military commanders of both sides would be responsible to the Governor for this.

In regard to the elections, the establishment of an Election Council with representation from all parties was confirmed. Commonwealth governments would be invited to send observers. All political parties which registered would be free to campaign and any order restricting or banning a political party would be revoked. The elections would be held over three days and would be on a party list basis. There would be no registration of voters and no residence qualifications. Each party presenting candidates would be entitled to one representative at each polling station in the district concerned to observe the polling.

(e) Acceptance of British proposals

Britain's 'final proposals' for the transitional period were formally accepted by Bishop Muzorewa on 5 November and the Patriotic Front also moved closer to acceptance, but remained concerned on several issues. In a statement on 9 November, the Patriotic Front called for machinery to provide Patriotic Front access to the Governor, international supervision of the elections and ceasefire, extension of the electoral period beyond two months, registration of voters, and the creation of a transitional police committee to supervise the maintenance of public order, commence building a new police force and liaise with an international police force.

After further negotiations the Patriotic Front accepted the British proposals on 15 November, with the addition of an important rider, agreed to by all parties, designed to safeguard the status of its own forces. This was that the guerilla forces

would be accorded the same standing, under the authority of the Governor, as the existing Rhodesian security forces. Lord Carrington's proposal that the electoral period be limited to two months, beginning when the ceasefire came into effect, was endorsed in the final agreement.

(5) The ceasefire

(a) Britain's outline proposals

The day after agreement was reached on transitional provisions, Lord Carrington, on 16 November, submitted outline proposals for a ceasefire. The main points of the British proposals were.

- . A ceasefire should be implemented as quickly as possible and the time required 'need not be more than seven to 10 days'.
- . During this time leaders on each side would ensure that clear and precise instructions were issued to all units and personnel under their command, and both sides would be given full access to facilities to get the ceasefire message to their forces.
- . Also during this period all movement of the security forces into neighbouring countries and by units of Patriotic Front forces into Rhodesia would cease, and military operations would be limited to self-defence.
- . The commanders of the forces involved would be responsible to the Governor for the observance of the ceasefire by the forces under their command. The Governor would be assisted in this task by a British Military Adviser and a team of British military liaison officers.

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- . A Ceasefire Commission would be set up to assess and supervise observance of the ceasefire, with the Governor's Military Adviser as chairman and with military representatives from both sides as members.
- . Only unarmed people would be allowed into Rhodesia between the day of the ceasefire and election day, and neighbouring states would be asked to co-operate with the ban on cross-border military activities.
- . A ceasefire monitoring group, drawn from Commonwealth countries, would be established under the authority of the Governor and his Military Adviser to assess and monitor observance of the ceasefire.
- . The forces of the Patriotic Front and the Rhodesian security forces would be kept geographically separated.

(b) The Patriotic Front's proposals

The Patriotic Front's proposals, tabled on 19 November, differed from the British in several key areas. The Patriotic Front called for a Commonwealth peace-keeping force of several thousand to enforce the ceasefire, as against Britain's several hundred to monitor it. Contributing states had to be acceptable to both parties. The decision on whether the ceasefire had taken effect should be made by a Commonwealth ceasefire supervisory commission - in consultation with the belligerents and the Governor. Both parties would be responsible to the Governor for the observance of the ceasefire, subject to the mandate of the Commonwealth peace-keeping force. A joint ceasefire supervisory commission, comprising representatives of both forces and a British chairman, would ensure co-operation in the establishment and maintenance of a ceasefire, and would be assisted by the Commonwealth supervisory commission.

The Patriotic Front proposals provided for the demarcation of areas dominated by one side or the other. This would be followed by regrouping of both forces immediately the ceasefire was declared to be effective. The Patriotic Front called for the disbandment of certain Rhodesian military and para-military units (particularly the Selous Scouts and Grey Scouts), and the surrender by civilians of private weapons (estimated by the Patriotic Front at 155,000 weapons).

Criteria and machinery should be set up for the determination and establishment of the civil police, who would maintain law and order during the ceasefire. South African forces and 'other foreign military personnel' should be withdrawn, and international co-operation sought to assist in the orderly return of refugees and others.

(c) The conclusion of negotiations

Britain tabled its detailed proposals for a ceasefire on 22 November, and on the same day Lord Carrington asked both sides for an assurance that cross-border military operations between Zambia and Rhodesia would cease. This was prompted by several Rhodesian raids into Zambia in October and November striking at bridges and economic targets. The Muzorewa delegation gave an undertaking the next day, but the leaders of the Patriotic Front, Mr Mugabe and Mr Nkomo, did not respond, and instead flew to Dar es Salaam for discussions with Front-line leaders on the ceasefire negotiations.

Bishop Muzorewa's delegation accepted the British ceasefire proposals on 26 November. On the following day the Patriotic Front leaders tabled their detailed proposals. Major areas of disagreement remained, relating in particular to procedures for the disengagement of the opposing forces and their deployment in assembly areas, the composition, role and size of

the Commonwealth force, the time-scale for the ceasefire, the presence of South African forces, and the grounding of Rhodesian military aircraft.

All parties agreed in principle to a ceasefire on 5 December, based on the British plan of 22 November. Discussions followed on the details of implementing of the ceasefire. The ceasefire agreement was initialled by Lord Carrington for the British delegation and Dr Silas Mundawarara for Bishop Muzorewa on 15 December and by Mr Nkomo and Mr Mugabe on 17 December. The Patriotic Front leaders refused to initial the agreement for two days because of continuing worries about the siting and number of assembly areas. Agreement was reached after Lord Carrington agreed to the establishment of a sixteenth assembly area and for the establishment of additional assembly areas if required. On 21 December all the parties formally signed the ceasefire agreement and the report of the Lancaster House Conference. In signing they agreed to accept the authority of the Governor, to abide by the independence Constitution, to comply with pre-independence arrangements, to abide by the ceasefire agreement, to campaign peacefully and without intimidation, to renounce the use of force for political ends, and to accept the outcome of the elections and instruct any forces under their authority to do the same.¹⁸

The Australian Prime Minister, Mr Fraser, on 18 December welcomed the announcement that agreement had been reached between all the parties at Lancaster House. He said:

The agreement is a magnificent achievement of historic importance. It opens the way for a just and democratic solution to the political problems that have for many years bedevilled Rhodesia. It means an end to the war that has brought suffering, death and economic hardship to many thousands of people of all races in Rhodesia and the surrounding countries.¹⁹

Mr Fraser said Australia had contributed significantly to the reaching of the settlement and would be taking part in its implementation.

(d) The ceasefire agreement

The main points of the ceasefire agreement as signed were that as from 2400 hours on 21 December all movement by personnel of the Patriotic Front armed forces into Rhodesia and all cross-border military activity by the Rhodesian forces would cease. Civilian personnel would be allowed to return to Rhodesia at designated border crossing-points supervised by the monitoring force. The British Government would request the governments of neighbouring countries to make arrangements to ensure that externally-based forces did not enter Rhodesia.

Seven days later, at 2400 hours on 28 December, all hostilities in Rhodesia would cease. A Ceasefire Commission would be established, chaired by the Governor's Military Adviser and with equal military representation from both sides, to ensure compliance with agreed arrangements, ^{to investigate} ~~the investigation~~ of actual or threatened breaches of the ceasefire, and ^{to perform} such other tasks as were assigned to it by the Governor in the interests of maintaining the ceasefire. The Commission would be independent of existing command structures and the Governor would still be able to communicate directly with the commanders of both forces.

The British Government would be responsible for the establishment of a monitoring force under the command of the Governor's Military Adviser. The monitoring force would maintain contact with the command structures of both forces throughout Rhodesia, would monitor and observe the maintenance of the ceasefire, and would monitor agreed border-crossing points. Members of the monitoring force would carry weapons for their personal protection only.

As from 2400 hours on 28 December Patriotic Front forces would report with their arms and equipment to designated rendezvous positions and thereafter proceed to 16 assembly places

(by late agreement the Governor was empowered to designate additional assembly areas if required). Movement to assembly places would be completed by 2400 hours on 4 January 1980. There would be a reciprocal disengagement by the Rhodesian forces, which would comply with the directions of the Governor. Any forces from either side failing to comply with the ceasefire and directions from the Governor, as from ceasefire day, would be deemed to be acting unlawfully.

The monitoring force, when established, comprised about 1350 men - some 1050 from Britain, 150 from Australia, and smaller contingents from New Zealand, Kenya and Fiji.

5. The return to legality

(1) The legal steps

(a) The Southern Rhodesia Act 1979

While the negotiations on transitional arrangements were continuing, the British Government, on 7 November, introduced an enabling Bill which set the broad legislative framework for Britain to restore Rhodesia to legality and to grant it independence after the election of a new government. This was the Southern Rhodesia Bill 1979, which was enacted on 14 November.

The Southern Rhodesia Act 1979 provided for Orders in Council to be made enabling the proposed Constitution of Zimbabwe to come into effect on Independence Day, to revoke the Southern Rhodesia Constitution of 1961 (the last 'legal' Constitution), to make any necessary transitional provisions, to bring particular provisions of the proposed Constitution into effect before Independence Day to enable elections to take place and to make any additional or alternative provisions if required.

The Act also provided for Orders in Council to deal with sanctions. The British Government had stated that it did not intend to renew economic sanctions imposed under section 2 of the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 when the section expired on 15 November 1979. The 1979 Act provided for a number of Orders in Council, also made under section 2 and dealing with constitutional matters such as the authority of the Crown and UK Ministers in relation to Rhodesia, to remain in force until Independence. The Act provided that all remaining sanctions, other than those which would fall away when section 2 expired, would be revoked when Rhodesia returned to legality. As a safeguard, the Act also provided for the renewal or maintenance of sanctions if the need arose. In the event, the 15-20% of sanctions covered by section 2 of the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 were not renewed when the section lapsed on 15 November, and the remaining sanctions were lifted by Order in Council and administrative action on 12 December, when the British Governor arrived in Salisbury and Rhodesia returned to legality.

(b) The Southern Rhodesia Constitution (Interim Provisions) Order 1979

The Governor and Deputy Governor were appointed under the provisions of the Southern Rhodesia Constitution (Interim Provisions) Order 1979, some sections of which came into effect on 4 December and the remainder on 14 December. The Order conferred on the Governor full power to make laws by ordinance, to continue existing laws - with modifications if he saw fit, and to validate transactions entered into after UDI. The executive authority of Southern Rhodesia was vested in the Governor by the Order, and all officers and authorities in Southern Rhodesia were required to comply with the Governor's directions. The prerogative of mercy was also vested in the Governor, and the Order provided that the rights and liabilities of the Government of Southern Rhodesia, including pre-UDI debts and liabilities, remained enforceable.

(c) The Zimbabwe Constitution Order 1979

This Order, dealt with earlier in this chapter, was made on 6 December, to come into effect on Independence Day, and contained the Constitution for an independent Zimbabwe.

(d) The Zimbabwe Act 1979

The Zimbabwe Act 1979, which passed all stages in the House of Commons on 12 December and the House of Lords on 17 December, was the last major legislative step in the process of returning Rhodesia to legality. The Act provided for the attainment by Zimbabwe of full responsible status as a republic. This would occur on Independence Day (subsequently fixed as 18 April), and on that date the unexpired provisions of the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 would cease to have effect, and the Parliament and Government of the United Kingdom would no longer have responsibility for Southern Rhodesia.

Much of the remainder of the Bill dealt with UK and Commonwealth nationality and citizenship provisions which required amendment if Zimbabwe did not rejoin the Commonwealth on Independence Day. In the event, Zimbabwe applied for membership, was unanimously accepted, and on Independence Day became the Commonwealth's 43rd member.

The Zimbabwe Bill provided an amnesty in UK law for acts arising out of UDI and under subsequent constitutions or legislation. The amnesty applied both to acts by members of the illegal regime and to acts by guerilla forces resisting or seeking to overthrow the regime. The Bill also made provision for regulating claims against assets of the Government of Zimbabwe in the UK.

(2) The end of UDI

Members of the Rhodesian House of Assembly voted by 90 votes to nil on 11 December to revert to British colonial rule - 14 years and one month after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence. The Bill, the Constitution of Zimbabwe Rhodesia Amendment Bill 1979, then went to the Senate and was subsequently assented to by President Gumedde. The Act declared that Zimbabwe Rhodesia 'shall cease to be an independent State and shall become part of Her Majesty's dominions'. Among those voting 'aye' on the Third Reading was the former Prime Minister, Mr Ian Smith, who led Rhodesia in its rebellion in 1965.²⁰

The new Governor of Rhodesia, Lord Soames, arrived shortly after 2.00 pm on 12 December, and with his arrival Zimbabwe Rhodesia formally reverted to being the British Crown Colony of Southern Rhodesia (although Lord Soames decreed on 13 December that for the duration of his mandate the country would be known only as 'Rhodesia').²¹

Arriving with Lord Soames were the Deputy Governor, Sir Antony Duff (Deputy Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office), the Military Adviser, Major-General John Acland, the Election Commissioner, Sir John Boynton, and the Police Adviser, Sir James Haughton. An advance party of British officials had arrived in November, and among those arriving subsequently were a number of British police officers and electoral officials.

Britain, on the day of Lord Soames' arrival in Rhodesia, lifted sanctions still in effect and formally notified the UN Security Council that Southern Rhodesia had returned to legality. The US lifted sanctions on 16 December, and Zambia, Mozambique, Tanzania, Angola and Botswana took similar action the the period 22-23 December. Australia removed all sanctions, except trade sanctions, on 18 December. Trade sanctions were formally removed on 21 December.²² In announcing Australia's decision the Prime

Minister, Mr Fraser, said the Australian Government could be satisfied that the objectives for which sanctions were imposed had been achieved.

The Security Council, which had passed its first mandatory sanctions resolution concerning Rhodesia on 16 December 1966 (no. 232), formally called upon members of the UN to terminate sanctions in a resolution (no. 460) adopted on 21 December 1979. The Security Council also dissolved its Sanctions Supervisory Committee, established in May 1968, commended member states, particularly the Front-Line States, for their implementation of Security Council resolutions on sanctions, and called on all UN member states and specialised agencies to provide urgent assistance to Rhodesia and the Front-line States for reconstruction and the repatriation of refugees.

At the same time that most countries were lifting sanctions, the British Government announced on 19 December that no charges would be brought against oil firms accused in the Bingham Report of having broken sanctions for some 10 years by supplying oil to Rhodesia. While sanctions were in force Britain reported several hundred possible breaches of sanctions by individuals and firms from a number of countries to the UN Sanctions Committee. In Britain, 45 prosecutions were brought and 36 convictions obtained.²³

(3) Subsequent developments

21 December 1979: The ban on the Patriotic Front parties and several black newspapers, including The Zimbabwe Times, was lifted after the formal signing of the ceasefire agreement and the Lancaster House Conference report.

30 December: Mr Mugabe's ZANU announced it would contest the February 1980 common roll elections as a separate entity, but a 'loose alliance' would be maintained with its Patriotic Front partner, ZAPU.

31 December: Eleven parties registered for the February 1980 elections (with ZAPU registering late as the 'Patriotic Front'). Two later withdrew and nine contested the elections.

4 January: More than 12,000 Patriotic Front guerillas had assembled at the 16 designated assembly areas when the ceasefire deadline expired at midnight. Late arrivals at assembly areas under an amnesty continued over the next few days and by 8 January some 19,000 guerillas had assembled.

9 January: Air links between Zambia and Rhodesia were reopened, and it was announced that rail and road links would reopen shortly. Air links with Britain were restored on 10 January.

13 January: The ZAPU leader, Mr Nkomo, returned to Rhodesia to a welcome by a crowd of 120,000 or more.

18 January: The Governor, Lord Soames, renewed the state of emergency in Rhodesia for a further six months to July 26.

21 January: The first of more than 200,000 refugees in neighbouring countries were officially repatriated to Rhodesia. The repatriation program was being co-ordinated by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. By 20 February 30,000 had been returned officially, and additional numbers had returned unofficially. By the time of the elections it was estimated about 55,000 refugees had returned.

27 January: At least 150,000 people greeted the ZANU(PF) leader, Mr Mugabe, at a rally on his return to Rhodesia.

28 January: Some 64 dissident members of ZANU(PF) arrived in Rhodesia after being released from detention in Mozambique. Another 40 were said to be still in detention in Mozambique.

8 February: At the request of Lord Soames, all nine parties contesting the common roll elections agreed to sign a charter pledging themselves to a peaceful election campaign, free of intimidation, violence and interference.

19 February: Britain invited the UN Secretary-General, Dr Kurt Waldheim, to send a personal representative to Rhodesia to witness the common roll elections.

27-29 February: The elections to fill 80 common roll seats in the House of Assembly were held.

6. Australian involvement

In early November 1979 Britain approached a number of Commonwealth countries to contribute contingents to a Commonwealth ceasefire monitoring force, should agreement be reached at the Lancaster House Conference. The Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Anthony, announced on 9 November that Australia had agreed in principle to a request for 10 teams of 11 men each. noting this in a statement to the House of Representatives on 22 November the Foreign Minister, Mr Peacock said: 'We have since learned that our agreement, and that of the other Commonwealth countries asked to contribute contingents, greatly assisted the successful negotiation of arrangements for the transitional period'.²⁴

Mr Peacock announced that Australia had also been invited to send a group of observers to Rhodesia to monitor the pre-election period and the elections, and the Government had agreed to send eight persons provided a settlement was reached. The group would report to the Australian Government and Parliament.

On 9 December Mr Peacock confirmed that Australia would establish a Liaison Office in Salisbury for the duration of the

transitional period. It would be headed by Mr Charles Mott, the High Commissioner to Nigeria. The Office would assist both the Australian contingent to the Commonwealth ceasefire monitoring force and the Australian election observer team. The Office opened in late December.

An advance party of the 150-strong Australian contingent to the Commonwealth monitoring force arrived in Rhodesia on 23 December and the main force on 25 December. On 6 March, 144 members of the Australian contingent returned to Australia, leaving a small group behind in a temporary liaison role between Patriotic Front and Rhodesian forces. On their return the Minister for Defence, Mr Killen, said the Australian troops, under the command of Colonel F.K. Cole, had discharged their monitoring tasks 'with efficiency and dedication'.²⁵ Their professionalism, displayed in difficult and demanding circumstances, had been outstanding.

Australia's observer in the official Commonwealth Observer Group was announced on 11 January. He was the former head of the Australian Public Service Board, Mr K.C.O. Shann.

The members of the Australian National Observer Group were announced on 31 January. The chairman was Mr N.A. Brown, M.P., and the members were the Hon. R.C. Katter, M.P., Senator E.A. Robertson, Dr N. Blewett, M.P., Mr K.W. Pearson, Chief Australian Electoral Officer, Mr A.T. Griffith, A.M., Special Adviser, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Mr D.W. Evans, First Assistant Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs, and Dr G.A. Snider, Director of Research, Australian Electoral Office. The Group's task was to 'determine whether in its considered opinion the elections in Rhodesia were conducted in a manner which was free and fair to all the participating parties'. The Group left Australia on 9 February, arrived in Salisbury on 10 February, and returned to Australia on 8 March.

On 23 March the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Peacock, announced that the Government had decided to open resident High Commissions in both Salisbury and Lusaka. The decision to open the two posts, said Mr Peacock, reflected the Government's 'close, continuing interest in the political stability and economic development of Southern Africa'. The Australian High Commission in Salisbury was officially established on 18 April 1980, Zimbabwean Independence Day.

An Australian Trade Commissioner visited Rhodesia for 10 days from 27 January to assess trade potential between the two countries. He was Mr George Zegelin, the Trade Commissioner in Nairobi, Kenya.

The Australian Government, on 12 February, decided to give \$1m. to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to assist in the repatriation of Rhodesian refugees from neighbouring countries. Additional aid was offered on 18 April.

7. The 1980 elections

Elections for the 100 seats in the House of Assembly were held in two stages. The white roll elections to decide 20 seats were held on 14 February 1980 and the common roll elections to decide 80 seats on 27-29 February 1980. Candidates in both elections could be of any race, but only blacks could vote for common roll seats, and whites, Asians and coloureds for white roll seats. In the event, no whites stood for common roll seats and no blacks for white roll seats, although at least one Asian and one coloured contested the common roll seats (each was a UANC candidate).

(1) The white roll elections

When nominations for white roll seats closed on 24 January it was found that in 14 of the 20 seats Rhodesian Front

candidates were unopposed. Thus the elections on 14 February were only to decide the remaining six seats. These, too, were won by the Rhodesian Front, giving that party all 20 of the white seats. Among prominent Rhodesian Front members re-elected were Mr Ian Smith, Mr Rowan Cronje, Mr David Smith, Mr P.K. van der Byl and Mr Chris Andersen. In the six contested seats an average of only 56% of white voters actually voted, and the proportion of the formal vote won by the Rhodesian Front varied from 65.5% to 93.8%.

(2) The common roll elections

The common roll elections took place in the presence of an 11-member Commonwealth Observer Group, national observer groups from several individual Commonwealth countries, including Australia, observer groups from a number of non-Commonwealth countries, representatives of the UN and OAU, private observer groups, and more than 500 members of the international Press.

As in 1979, the elections were conducted on a party list system of proportional representation, and with no registration of voters. Each party competing was allocated seats in proportion to the number of votes cast for it in each of the eight electoral districts. The districts, the number of seats allocated to each of the districts, and their estimated voting populations as at December 1979 were as follows:

Manicaland	11 seats	(418,000 voters)
Mashonaland Central	6 seats	(211,000 voters)
Mashonaland East	16 seats	(568,000 voters)
Mashonaland West	8 seats	(311,000 voters)
Matabeleland North	10 seats	(360,000 voters)
Matabeleland South	6 seats	(196,000 voters)
Midlands	12 seats	(421,000 voters)
Victoria	11 seats	(398,000 voters)
	<hr/>	<hr/>
TOTAL	80 seats	(2,883,000 voters)

On average, there was one seat for every 36,000 black electors, compared to one seat for every 11,000 white electors. The total number of voters was up only 56,800 on the estimates for the April 1979 elections.

Nine parties competed in the elections - seven contesting the elections in all eight provinces, one in five provinces and one in only two. The parties were:

- . Patriotic Front (Leader: Mr Joshua Nkomo) - previously ZAPU
- . Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) (Leader: Mr Robert Mugabe) - previously ZANU
- . United African National ^{Council} Union (Leader: Bishop Abel Muzorewa)
- . Zimbabwe African National Union (Leader: Rev. Ndebele) - previously ZANU (Sithole)
- . United National Federal Party (Leader: Chief Kayisa Ndiweni)
- . National Democratic Union (Leader: Mr Henry Chihota)
- . Zimbabwe Democratic Party (Leader: Mr James Chikerema)
- . National Front of Zimbabwe (Leader: Mr Peter Mandaza)
- . United People's Alliance of Matabeleland (Leader: Dr Frank Bertrand)

UPAM contested the elections only in Matabeleland North and Matabeleland South, on a platform involving the creation of a Matabeleland State to form a federation with a Mashonaland State. The UNFP contested only five electoral districts.

The number of persons who voted, according to official figures, was 2,702,275 out of an estimated voting population of 2,883,000 - a turn-out of 93.7%. Only 1.95% of the valid votes cast were spoilt papers. Details are provided in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1: Voting in 1980 common roll elections

Party	Votes	Percentage of valid votes	Seats
PF	638 879	24.11	20
ZANU (PF)	1 668 992	62.99	57
UANC	219 307	8.28	3
ZANU	53 343	2.01	-
UNFP	5 796	0.22	-
NDU	15 056	0.57	-
ZDP	28 181	1.06	-
NFZ	18 794	0.71	-
UPAM	1 181	0.05	-
Total valid votes	2 649 529	98.05	
spoilt votes	52 746	1.95	
Total votes	2 702 275		

Source: Report of the Australian National Observer Group on the Rhodesian Elections 1980 (Lusaka, 11.3.80).

The PF won all the seats in Matabeleland South, all but one in Matabeleland North and one-third the seats in Midlands. The UANC won two seats in Mashonaland East and one in Mashonaland West. ZANU(PF) won all the seats in Manicaland, Mashonaland Central and Victoria, and the remainder in the other electoral districts.

(3) Were the elections free and fair?

(a) General conclusions

The Australian National Observer Group concluded that the February 1980 elections on the whole were free and fair, given the circumstances in which the elections were held and given that freedom and fairness were not to be regarded as absolutes but as gradations on a scale.²⁶ Among the Group's conclusions:

- The fact that some 2.7 million or 93.6% of the estimated electors voted over a three day period, in good order and good humour, without serious incident was evidence of the universal desire to participate in electing a government of the people's choice.
- It cannot be denied that there were flaws in the conduct of the election campaign. Nevertheless, the Group believes that these imperfections were not sufficient to compromise the freedom and fairness of the elections nor to justify any serious questioning of the election result.
- Although some political parties claimed the elections were not free and fair the fact is that all parties remained in the race, mounted vigorous election campaigns with all the features normally seen in a democratic election, and openly solicited the votes of the people, so successfully that they achieved a turnout on a voluntary₂₇ basis virtually without parallel.

The Australian Observer Group concluded that the principles underlying the electoral system and the administrative arrangements were fair and consistent with practice in most democratic countries.

Most other observer groups reported similarly, at least as far as the principles of the electoral system and the administrative arrangements were concerned. Thus the 11-nation Commonwealth Observer Group, in its Interim Report of 1 March stated:

the election up to the end of polling can be considered to have been free and fair to the extent that it provided an adequate and acceptable means of determining the wishes of the people in a democratic manner. This view is fortified by the high turnout, and the orderly and manifestly relaxed manner in which such a large percentage of voters went to the polls.²⁸

The Commonwealth Group said that organisational aspects of the election had on the whole been carried out efficiently and fairly 'in what were undoubtedly difficult circumstances'. Similar reports were made by independent observer groups from countries such as The Netherlands, Britain, Ireland, Canada and the US, and by official observer groups from a number of European Economic Community countries and Commonwealth countries.

The area which drew most attention and comment from observer groups concerned what the Australian Observer Group called 'the conduct of the election campaign': questions of freedom of movement, expression and assembly, access to the media by political parties and candidates, the role of the police and security forces and allegations of intimidation.

(b) Freedom of movement and speech

The Australian Observer Group reported some restrictions on freedom of movement, expression and assembly for a number of

reasons: mined roads (some mines were laid during the election campaign), the possibility of ambush by armed 'dissidents', curfews and intimidation. The Group concluded that while these imposed some restrictions, they were not extensive enough to limit the ability of the participants to conduct effective election campaigns.

(c) The role of the security forces

Although under the Lancaster House Agreement law and order was to be maintained by the police, a number of breaches of the ceasefire and serious incidents of civil disorder caused the Governor to deploy sections of the security forces.

The Australian Observer Group reported that while the Patriotic Front forces under the command of Mr Nkomo complied for the greater part with the ceasefire provisions, significant sections of the forces led by Mr Mugabe, mainly as a result of 'deliberate decisions' by ZANLA commanders (but also as a result of indiscipline), stayed outside the assembly areas, to bring out the vote and to maintain their authority in areas controlled during the war. That this was deliberate policy was instanced by evidence of infiltrations from Mozambique into Rhodesia in breach of the ceasefire agreement. The failure of ZANLA to assemble at near full strength created a requirement for the Governor to approve the extensive use of Rhodesian security forces, and this was exploited by some of the security forces to extend their authority.

The deployment of the security forces led to allegations of partisanship against the Governor's administration and aided a polarisation of attitudes, which ^{was} ~~were~~ reinforced by the selectivity of some of the internal media reporting and comment. The Australian Group said there was a danger that the security forces would become accustomed to an adversary approach to all ZANLA forces and the security forces did initiate several

breaches of the ceasefire, including at least two at assembly points for ZANLA forces. The Group also reported several minor incidents of petty harassment by police of some party agents.

However, the Australian Group concluded that given the sudden transformation of the struggle for power from the military to the electoral sphere, 'a considerable degree of impartiality was achieved in the administration of law and order'.

(d) Allegations of intimidation

The most serious allegations concerning the elections involved intimidation. The allegations were made against both of the former Patriotic Front parties, but particularly ZANU(PF), the security force auxiliaries and the security forces themselves, and against the UANC. Charges were also made, but to a lesser extent, against some of the minor parties. The Australian National Observer Group stated:

A major and highly regrettable feature of the election campaign was the degree of intimidation which was practised by various participants.

Most of the intimidation occurred in the Tribal Trust Lands and other rural areas, although there were several attacks involving bombs and weapons in urban areas, and at least two attempts were made on the life of Mr Mugabe. In the rural areas in most cases people or their families were threatened with death, assault or some other punishment if they did not vote for a certain party, and these threats were carried out in some instances. Another common threat was that the war would be resumed if a certain party did not win the elections. Other voters were made to contribute to party funds or to attend meetings.

As well as direct forms of intimidation there were also indirect forms - pressure on relatives, pressure on employers to

influence employees, claims that spirit mediums or satellites could determine how persons had voted and, in some instances, the mere presence of certain persons near polling stations. Some alleged instances of intimidation were actually acts of violence or robbery by 'bandits' or renegades - guerillas no longer acknowledging the authority of former leaders.

The British Election Commissioner, Sir John Boynton, said in his interim report that although the elections were in general a reflection of the wishes of the people they were 'in no sense free from intimidation and pressure'. He said that while intimidation had been particularly severe in Victoria, Manicaland and the Midlands, in the country as a whole the degree of intimidation and pressure was not so great as to invalidate the overall results of the poll.²⁹ Sir John instanced a number of districts where the high level of intimidation was likely in his view to have affected the results for those areas, but he did not identify the instigators of such intimidation.

Sir John said the powers created by the Governor in the electioneering period to ban any party or candidate or abrogate the election in any area of heavy intimidation had caused 'a marked reduction in the level of intimidation immediately before the poll'. The main safeguard against intimidation, as far as the elections were concerned, had been the secrecy of the poll.

This was confirmed in the report of the Australian Observer Group, which made it a major point of its inquiries to ascertain whether voters knew their votes would be secret. The Group found that 'the overwhelming majority of voters knew and believed that their votes would be secret whatever might have been said to the contrary'.

Who were the main instigators of intimidation? The majority of charges were levelled against ZANU(PF), and its military wing ZANLA, and to a lesser extent against the security

force auxiliaries, accused of favouring the UANC, and the Patriotic Front party and its military wing, ZIPRA. While it would be difficult to allocate responsibility for intimidation between the competing parties, figures produced by the Ceasefire Commission of breaches up to 22 February may give a rough guide. These indicated that of 221 proven breaches 99 were committed by ZANLA forces, another 35 in former ZANLA areas of operation, 24 by ZIPRA forces, another 12 in former ZIPRA areas of operation, two by Rhodesian security forces, 17 by 'bandits', 18 were unattributable and 14 were incitements to commit breaches.³⁰

The Australian Observer Group noted as a general comment that those against whom allegations were made in turn made counter-allegations and claimed they were being blamed for the activities of others. Claims of intimidation and lack of access to certain areas were also used by candidates and party officials, in some instances, to explain their lack of support or lack of activity. The Group found that the intimidation debate was to a certain extent fuelled by exaggerated claims by politicians, and was not helped, either, by declarations from other countries that unless a particular party or group of parties were successful they might not accept that the elections were free and fair.

The Australian Observer Group concluded that on the available evidence there was a considerable degree of intimidatory behaviour during the campaign but this did not negate 'the overwhelmingly more positive aspects of the election, the ultimate guarantee of which was the very widely acknowledged secrecy of the vote'.

The Commonwealth Observer Group, in its final report, while acknowledging the blame to be attached to ZANLA, and to a lesser extent ZIPRA, claimed that intimidation was not confined to those organisations and that intimidation by the guerillas 'was by no means as widespread or as brutal as official spokesmen

claimed'.³¹ The Commonwealth Observer Group said the one-sided picture painted by the authorities in Rhodesia, and reflected by the media, was misleading and inaccurate. The Group said that many claims of intimidation had been exaggerated or made for reasons of political expediency.

(4) After the common roll elections

After the election results were announced, Mr Mugabe was asked by the Governor, Lord Soames, to form a Government. As Prime Minister-designate, he met with the leader of the Patriotic Front party (formerly ZAPU), Mr Joshua Nkomo, and they agreed in principle to form a coalition government which would also include some whites. Mr Mugabe announced on 4 March that his Government would bring about 'realistic changes' and a fair and just Government. He was committed to a non-racial society in which not one community would complain of discrimination by another. On the question of land, he said there was enough land available to resettle peasant farmers 'on a co-operative basis' without dispossessing others. Under his Government blacks and whites would have the same salary starting points and conditions of service and blacks would become more involved in decision-making and management.

In a broadcast to the nation on the same day, Mr Mugabe said the need for peace demanded that all the forces in the field be integrated immediately. He had asked Lt.-Gen. Walls to preside over the integration. The integration of Rhodesian and Patriotic Front forces actually began on about 26 February when some 617 ZIPRA soldiers began retraining at Essexvale, near Bulawayo. ZANLA forces joined in the exercise from the beginning of March. On 16 April Mr Mugabe announced that Lt.-Gen. Walls had been appointed supreme commander of Rhodesia's combined forces and head of a Military High Command comprising representatives of the three major forces - the security forces, ZANLA and ZIPRA.

Tanzania and other Front-line States welcomed the election results. President Nyerere, of Tanzania, who in the previous week had claimed that Britain was biased in its administration of the transition and the elections, admitted he was wrong and predicted a bright future for Zimbabwe under a non-racial government. He hoped the new Government would co-exist with South Africa. The South African response was restrained. The Prime Minister, Mr P.W. Botha, said South Africa had never interfered in the affairs of its neighbours except when requested to assist ^{them} and would not do so now. He warned once more against neighbouring countries allowing their territory to be used for guerilla attacks on South Africa. On 9 March Mr Botha welcomed a statement by Mr Mugabe that Zimbabwe would adopt a policy of good neighbourliness towards South Africa. Mr Botha said relations between the two countries could develop on the basis of mutual respect for the sovereign integrity of each. Mr Mugabe made a similar point on 25 March when he said his Government would adopt a policy of co-existence towards South Africa provided it did not interfere in Zimbabwe's internal affairs.

In an interview with Time magazine Mr Mugabe hit out at dictatorships, saying he disliked them whether brought into being by individuals or by states. 'People have got to have the democratic right to take their decisions even if they don't want to be collectivised,' he said. 'In the final analysis they must decide'. Mr Mugabe said he refused to borrow political models - principles, yes, as long as the people remained sovereign.

Mr Mugabe said his party was prepared to work under a parliamentary democracy as accepted by it at Lancaster House. His party's principles did not derive from Marxism; they were socialist principles which included certain principles derived from Marxism and others derived from other sources, including 'our own traditions'. In this respect Mr Mugabe instanced communal land ownership. The ultimate goal was socialism, but socialism controlled by the people rather than by the State. The development of socialism would be a gradual process. The need for change would have to be balanced with the need to retain skills.

Mr Mugabe was appointed Prime Minister by Lord Soames on 11 March 1980, with effect from Independence Day. Later on 11 March Mr Mugabe announced his Cabinet would comprise 22 Ministers (a 23rd, the Minister of Economic Planning and Development. Dr

Bernard Chidzero, was announced subsequently), assisted by 13 Deputy Ministers. Mr Mugabe announced a coalition Government in which four of the Ministers and two Deputy Ministers would be members of Mr Joshua Nkomo's Patriotic Front party (formerly ZAPU), including Mr Nkomo himself, and two would be whites - one from the Rhodesian Front. Four of the Ministers and one Deputy Minister were not elected Members of Parliament, and were subsequently elected or appointed to the Senate. Of the whites, the Rhodesian Front Minister was Mr David Smith, previously Finance Minister in Bishop Muzorewa's Government, and the other was Mr Denis Norman, President of the Commercial Farmers' Union.

The Ministry was announced as follows (all Ministers are members of ZANU(PF) unless otherwise indicated):

Prime Minister and Minister of Defence	Mr Robert Mugabe
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs	Mr Simon Mzenda
Minister of Home Affairs	Mr Joshua Nkomo (PF)
Minister of Manpower, Planning and Development	Mr Edgar Tekere
Minister of Finance	Mr Enos Nkala
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs	Mr Simbi Mubako
Minister of the Public Service	Mr Richard Hove
Minister of Labour and Social Welfare	Mr Kumbirai Kangai

Minister of Transport and Power	Mr Earnest Kadungure
Minister of Local Government and Housing	Mr Eddison Zvobgo
Minister of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development	Dr Sidney Sekeramayi
Minister of Commerce and Industry	Mr David Smith (RF)
Minister of Agriculture	Mr Denis Norman*
Minister of Information and Tourism	Dr Nathan Shamuyarira
Minister of Natural Resources and Water Development	Mr Joseph Msika (PF)
Minister of Education and Culture	Mr Dzingai Mutumbuka
Minister of Health	Dr Herbert Ushewokunze
Minister of Public Works	Mr Clement Muchachi (PF)
Minister of Posts and Telecommunications	Mr George Silundika (PF)
Minister of Mines	Mr Maurice Nyagumbo
Minister of Youth, Sport and Recreation	Mrs Teurai Ropa Nhongo (wife of the ZANLA commander)
Minister of State in the Prime Minister's Office	Mr Emerton Munangagwa

* not a member of a political party

The Deputy Minister for Education and Culture was Mrs Victoria Chitepo, wife of the former ZANU chairman assassinated in Lusaka in March 1975.

Mr Mugabe announced his Government's priorities at a news conference on 13 March. He said the main priorities would be the acquisition of land to resettle refugees and the establishment of co-operative and collective farms. There was

plenty of unused and under-utilised land which could be acquired 'immediately' for resettlement. Steps would also be taken to reopen schools, hospitals and clinics closed by the war. Mr Mugabe said immediate assistance had been promised by the UK, US, Sweden and members of the European Economic Community to help his Government carry out its land, health and education programs. He had not yet received any pledges of aid from the Eastern bloc but these would be welcomed if offered.

Other areas where his Government would act included the local government system, the district administrative system, the relationship between tribal law and the ordinary courts, the public service and the broadcasting services, and the training and advancement of blacks. Mr Mugabe also announced that the Governor, Lord Soames, had agreed to stay 'for a few [more] weeks'.

Elections for the 40-member Senate took place on 17-19 March. There was no election for the 10 positions to be filled by the white-elected members of the House of Assembly sitting as an electoral college as all 10 Rhodesian Front-sponsored candidates were unopposed and were declared elected when nominations closed on 17 March.

The 14 candidates backed by ZANU(PF) - 12 ZANU(PF) candidates, the Minister for Agriculture, Mr Denis Norman, and one PF candidate, the Minister for Natural Resources and Water Development, Mr Msika - were all elected on 19 March by the common roll-elected members of the House of Assembly sitting as an electoral college. The PF vice-president, Mr Josiah Chinamano, and publicity secretary, Mr Willie Musarurwa, both long-standing nationalists, were among 11 unsuccessful candidates. Other unsuccessful candidates included an Asian and a coloured, both sponsored by the PF, and another Asian standing as an Independent.

The 10 chiefs - five from Mashonaland and five from Matabeleland - were also elected by their respective Councils of Chiefs on 19 March. The leader of ZUPO, Chief J.S. Chirau, who had previously joined Mr Nkomo's Patriotic Front party, was not re-elected by the Mashonaland Council of Chiefs, but Chief Kayisa Ndiweni, leader of the UNFP, was re-elected by the Matabeleland Council of Chiefs.

Two of the six Senators to be appointed by the President (the Governor in the case of the first elections) were Dr Chidzero, the Minister of Economic Planning and Development, and Dr Simbi Mubako, the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs. They were appointed on 20 March, and the remaining four, including a former Prime Minister, Mr Garfield Todd, in April.

Newspapers in Zimbabwe reported on 20 March that fears of a shortage in two to three months had prompted the Government to start importing white maize from South Africa - for the first time since 1965. Also on 20 March Britain announced it had granted Zimbabwe \$Z10m as 'an immediate contribution' to the cost of reconstruction, and further aid would be provided. The US announced on 14 April that it was providing economic aid worth the equivalent of \$A18m.

Martial law was lifted on 21 March and a general pardon extended to all ^{persons} convicted of politically motivated crimes up to 1 March 1980. The pardon and an amnesty extended indefinitely into the past and covered convictions both before and after UDI. An amnesty was also declared for martial law acts.

Also in March a wave of strikes and labour unrest hit a number of firms in urban areas and mining enterprises in rural areas. The strikes were over a range of grievances, but particularly rates of pay, and were generally considered by observers to be the result of black workers reflecting the changed political situation, and indicating their expectations of the newly-elected Mugabe Government.

The Rev. Canaan Banana, leader of ZANU's internal organisation, the People's Movement, in 1978, was elected the first President of Zimbabwe on 11 April at a combined meeting of members of the House of Assembly and Senate.

At midnight on 17 April the Republic of Zimbabwe officially came into being at ceremonies attended by representatives of some 100 countries. Among heads of state attending was the Australian Prime Minister, Mr Fraser. Also attending was the Chairman of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Mr R.F. Shipton, M.P., the chairman of the Australian National Observer Group, Mr Brown, and a member, Mr Katter. Mr Fraser announced at the celebrations that Australia would provide aid worth \$A5m over the next two years (see Chapter 8).

Notes and references

1. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 10.8.79, p. 29761. On August 1979 the Congress approved a resolution requiring President Carter to lift sanctions by 15 November, although the requirement was subject to presidential waiver. Congress was empowered to overrule such a waiver within 30 days. On 8 September the US State Department allowed the Muzorewa Government to establish representation in Washington on an unofficial basis (the nomination of a US 'semi-permanent envoy' in Salisbury, Mr Jeffrey Davidow, had been announced on 26 June).
2. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 10.8.79, p. 29761.
3. The National Times, week ending 14.7.79, p. 26.
4. Independence for St. Vincent in October raised the number to 42. Zimbabwe became the 43rd. The combined population of the Commonwealth is approximately 1,000 million. Commonwealth countries as at the end of 1979 were as follows:

<u>Country</u>	<u>Date of joining</u>
Australia	11 Dec 1931 *
The Bahamas	10 Jul 1973
Bangladesh	18 Apr 1972
Barbados	30 Nov 1966
Botswana	30 Sept 1966
Britain	
Canada	11 Dec 1931 *
Cyprus	13 Mar 1961
Dominica	3 Nov 1978
Fiji	10 Oct 1970
The Gambia	18 Feb 1965
Ghana	6 Mar 1957
Grenada	7 Feb 1974
Guyana	26 May 1966
India	15 Aug 1947
Jamaica	6 Aug 1962
Kenya	12 Dec 1963
Kiribati	12 Jul 1979
Lesotho	4 Oct 1966
Malawi	6 Jul 1964
Malaysia	31 Aug 1957
Malta	21 Sept 1964
Mauritius	12 Mar 1968
Nauru **	31 Jan 1968
New Zealand	11 Dec 1931 *
Nigeria	1 Oct 1960
Papua New Guinea	16 Sept 1975
St Lucia	22 Feb 1979
St. Vincent **	27 Oct 1979
Seychelles	5 Jun 1976
Sierra Leone	27 Apr 1961

Singapore	15 Oct 1965
Solomon Islands	7 Jul 1978
Sri Lanka	4 Feb 1948
Swaziland	6 Sept 1968
Tanzania	9 Dec 1961
Tonga	4 Jun 1970
Trinidad and Tobago	31 Aug 1962
Tuvalu **	1 Oct 1978
Uganda	9 Oct 1962
Western Samoa	28 Aug 1970
Zambia	24 Oct 1964

* Statute of Westminster

** Special Member

5. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 26.10.79, p. 29902.
6. The Australian Financial Review, 24.7.79.
7. For Mr Fraser's report on the Lusaka Commonwealth Conference, see House of Representatives, Hansard, 23.8.79, pp. 576-80. A poll taken on the weekend of 11-12 August, immediately after the Commonwealth Conference, showed that at that time 56% of Australians favoured recognising the Muzorewa black majority Government, 13% were opposed to recognition and 31% were undecided - The Bulletin, 4.9.79, pp. 101-2.
8. Africa Research Bulletin (Political Social and Cultural Series), vol. 16, no. 8, 15.9.79, p. 5388; The Herald (Zimbabwe Rhodesia), 7.8.79.
9. Africa Research Bulletin (Political Social and Cultural Series), vol. 16, no. 8, p. 5388; The Herald (Zimbabwe Rhodesia), 8.8.79.
10. Africa Research Bulletin (Political Social and Cultural Series), vol. 16, no. 8, p. 5388.
11. The statement of acceptance indicated some resentment at the British Government for not granting full recognition to Bishop Muzorewa's Government. The UANC was said to be disturbed by the call for new elections as it feared it would suffer major reverses due to a growing crisis of expectations among black voters disaffected by the Government's failure to fulfil promises and de-escalate the guerilla war.
12. Zimbabwe Rhodesia, Report of the Constitutional Conference, Lancaster House, London, September-December 1979 (Cmd. R.ZR. 3-1980), p. 14.

13. Zimbabwe Rhodesia, Report of the Constitutional Conference, Lancaster House, London, p. 19.
14. Mr Eddison Zvobgo, Deputy Information Secretary ZANU, at a Lancaster House Press conference on 14.9.79, explaining the Patriotic Front proposals.
15. Quoted in Africa Research Bulletin (Political Social and Cultural Series), vol. 16, no. 10, 15.11.79, p. 5450.
16. The summary was published in Command 7758.
17. Patriotic Front statement issued 8.10.79 at plenary session of Lancaster House Conference.
18. Zimbabwe Rhodesia, Report of the Constitutional Conference, Lancaster House, London, p. 2.
19. Department of Foreign Affairs, Australian Foreign Affairs Record, December 1979-January 1980, p. 671.
20. The Herald (Zimbabwe Rhodesia), 12.12.79.
21. Africa Research Bulletin (Political Social and Cultural Series), vol. 16, no. 12, 15.1.80, p. 5513.
22. The Senate, Hansard, 20.2.80, p. 166.
23. The Financial Times (London), 15.11.79.
24. House of Representatives, Hansard, 22.11.79, p. 3387.
25. House of Representatives, Hansard, 6.3.80, p. 739.
26. For a detailed account of the period leading up to the elections, the elections themselves and the conduct of the elections, see the Report of the Australian National Observer Group on the Rhodesian Elections 1980 (Canberra, 11.3.80), presented to Parliament by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on 1.4.80.
27. Report of the Australian National Observer Group, conclusions IX, X, XI.
28. Commonwealth Observer Group, Interim Report on Rhodesia Elections (Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 2.3.80).
29. The Herald (Rhodesia), 4.3.80.

30. Report of the Australian National Observer Group, para. 68.

31. Commonwealth Observer Group, Southern Rhodesia Elections
(February 1980) (Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 8.3.80),
p. 31.

CHAPTER 7

Black nationalism in Zimbabwe

1. Origins of black nationalism in Zimbabwe

A Zimbabwean black nationalist has defined 'nationalism' as 'self-identity and self-assertion by a people living within a defined territorial framework, combined with their desire for self-rule as a group'.¹ The expression 'black nationalism' has an additional dimension: the assertion by blacks of their racial identity in the struggle for equality with whites. In the context of Zimbabwe, black nationalism has generally been taken to mean the struggle by blacks against white minority rule and repression, and for non-racialism, equal rights and equal opportunities.

The origins of black nationalism are widely considered by blacks to be found in the Ndebele uprising of 1893 and the Ndebele and Shona uprisings of 1896-97 (dubbed 'wars of resistance' by the nationalists). However, the ruthless suppression of the uprisings - at least in the case of the Shona - quietened black opposition to white rule for the next half century. Modern black nationalism in Zimbabwe can be said to have emerged in the 1950s, with the commencement of the decolonisation process in Africa. Between 1957 and 1968 Britain granted independence to 13 of its African colonies while France granted independence to 11 of its colonies in 1960 alone.² Decolonisation and the successful fight for independence in countries such as Kenya inspired a resurgence of nationalism among blacks in territories such as Rhodesia still subject to white rule.

In the period to the 1950s a number of black nationalist organisations were formed, but their aims were relatively modest: they sought to modify rather than supplant the existing system of white political, social and economic control. Their demands were limited, in the main, to seeking improvements in the black franchise and to the answering of grievances concerning land, education, economic and social racial barriers, and working conditions. Such organisations included the Rhodesian Native Association (formed in 1920), the Rhodesian Bantu Voters' Association (formed in 1923 with the object of getting more blacks on the electoral register), the Southern Rhodesia Native Welfare Association (1926, which became the African Welfare Association in 1927), and the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (1934).

Labour movements in the period included the militant Independent Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union of Rhodesia (1928) and, in the 1940s and 1950s, the British African National Voice Association (President, Benjamin Burombo), the Reformed Industrial Council of Unions (RICU, under the leadership of Charles Mzingeli), the Railway African Workers' Union (Joshua Nkomo was general secretary in 1951-52) and the African Teachers' Association (Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole was president in 1959, and members included Robert Mugabe and Leopold Takawira).

The aims of organisations such as the above were concentrated on reforms within the white system. Their lack of success and the accumulating frustrations of blacks as a result of their continued subjugation by whites led to the growth of a more militant nationalism, ultimately to see expression in armed struggle.

2. Nationalist politics prior to UDI

The first expression of the new nationalism was the formation of the African National Youth League in May 1956 and in

the following year, the revived Southern Rhodesia African National Congress.

(1) African National Youth League (ANYL)

Moves to found the Youth League began in 1955 through the efforts of Edson Sithole, George Nyandoro, James Chikerema and others. The organisation was formally launched on 13 May 1956 with James Chikerema as president. Its early actions included organising the first bus boycott in Harare (over increases in fares) and opposition to the African Land Husbandry Act of 1951. The Youth League was not averse to advocating direct action and confrontation, and it also demanded 'one man, one vote' - in effect rejecting white domination.

(2) African National Congress of Southern Rhodesia (SRANC)

A meeting of the Youth League and the old Southern Rhodesia African National Congress on 12 September 1957 resulted in both organisations combining to form the new African National Congress of Southern Rhodesia (SRANC). The old African National Congress, which had remained active mainly in the Bulawayo area under the leadership of Joshua Nkomo, provided the president of the new organisation (Joshua Nkomo) and the Youth League the vice-president (James Chikerema) and secretary-general (George Nyandoro). The SRANC also adopted the 'one man, one vote' principle, and its slogan was: 'We no longer ask to be ruled well by whites; we want to rule ourselves'.³ The SRANC claimed its philosophy was non-racial, and white Rhodesians were welcome to join.

Like its predecessors, the SRANC also concerned itself with the more immediate disabilities affecting blacks in both urban and rural areas: housing conditions, low wages, inadequate educational opportunities, inadequate health facilities, discriminatory legislation in general and the Land Apportionment Act and African Land Husbandry Act in particular.

A combination of the growing opposition to federation among blacks in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, leading to outbreaks of violence, and a rising tide of disturbances and unrest in Southern Rhodesia itself caused the Prime Minister, Sir Edgar Whitehead, to declare a state of emergency on 26 February 1959. The SRANC was banned the same day. Some 500 of the leading members of the SRANC were arrested and 300 detained (some of the leaders, such as James Chikerema and George Nyandoro, were not released until nearly four years later⁴). Those arrested did not include Joshua Nkomo, who was in Cairo returning from the first All-African People's Conference at Accra in December 1958. Mr Nkomo subsequently set up an SRANC office-in-exile in London and from this base travelled widely until his return to Rhodesia a few days after being elected president of the newly formed National Democratic Party on 28 November 1960.

(3) National Democratic Party (NDP)

Despite the arrests and the banning, civil unrest on the reserves and in the townships continued, and in 1960 the worst outbreaks of violence since the uprisings of the 1890s took place, resulting in the deaths of at least 18 blacks shot by police.⁵ The unrest of 1959 and 1960 prompted the Rhodesian Government to introduce a number of repressive laws. The Unlawful Organisations Act, Preventive Detention (Temporary Provisions) Act, Public Order Amendment Act and Native Affairs Amendment Act, were all passed in 1959 and all placed considerable limitations on individual freedom. These were followed in 1960 by the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, the Emergency Powers Act (which replaced the Public Order Act) and the Vagrancy Act. These Acts were utilised in the ensuing years to ban a number of nationalist organisations and to detain, restrict or imprison thousands of black nationalists.

It was against this backdrop, and to fill the void created by the banning of the SRANC, that the National Democratic Party (NDP) was formed on 1 January 1960, largely by former members of the SRANC. Michael Mawema was appointed president pending the return of Joshua Nkomo, and he was succeeded in September by another temporary president, Leopold Takawira. On 28 November 1960 the NDP held its inaugural congress and, in his absence, elected Joshua Nkomo as president. In its initial statement of principles, the NDP said it was struggling for 'the attainment of freedom for the African people of Southern Rhodesia', the establishment of 'one man, one vote' for 'all the inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia' and the establishment and maintenance of full democracy in Africa 'and the achievement of pan-Africanism'.⁶

While the SRANC policy had been one of exerting domestic pressure on the Rhodesian Government, the NDP attempted to combine internal opposition with intensive lobbying of British Ministers, in the hope that Britain might impress on white Rhodesians the need to come to terms with the black majority. This was a reflection of Mr Nkomo's strategy of bringing the Rhodesian problem into the international arena - in September 1960 Mr Nkomo, for example, had addressed the UN Decolonisation Committee.

Shortly after his election Mr Nkomo accepted an invitation from Sir Edgar Whitehead (made after some British persuasion) to lead an NDP delegation to a constitutional conference held first in London and then Salisbury in December 1960 - February 1961 to formulate a new constitution for Rhodesia. Other members of the delegation were the NDP treasurer, Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, and Herbert Chitepo and George Silundika. The NDP delegation walked out of the London conference but took part in the conference when it reconvened in Salisbury. At the conclusion of the conference, despite reservations, the delegation accepted the draft constitutional proposals. These

provided for eventual black majority rule, dependent on the rate of attainment by blacks of the same monetary and educational franchise qualifications as whites (see discussion of 1961 Constitution in chapter 3).

Although the delegation had accepted the new constitution, most of the rest of the NDP leadership rejected it. Mr Nkomo's predecessors as president of the NDP, Leopold Takawira and Michael Mawema, sent this telegram:

We totally reject Southern [Rhodesian] constitutional agreement as treacherous to future three million Africans. Agreement diabolical and disastrous. Outside world shocked by NDP docile agreement. We have lost sympathy of friends and supporters. ... Demand immediate reversal of present position.

The NDP delegation was forced to respect the groundswell of opinion against the proposals and reversed its earlier decision. The NDP subsequently urged eligible black voters to boycott both the 26 July 1961 referendum on the constitutional proposals and the elections proposed for the following year (which brought the Rhodesian Front to power).

Despite the change of heart after the constitutional conference, regarded by some as evidence of a lack of 'militant integrity', the NDP succeeded in becoming a mass party, with a strong following in both urban and rural areas. By the time it was banned on 9 December 1961, Joshua Nkomo was able to claim that the NDP had a membership of 250,000.⁸

The change of heart did, however, lead to the formation of a splinter group, the Zimbabwe National Party (ZNP), in June 1961 by a number of the nationalists detained on 26 February 1959. These included Dr Edson Sithole (the second black to be admitted to the Rhodesian Bar, the first being Herbert Chitepo) and Michael Mawema. In September 1962 the ZNP joined with the

Southern Rhodesian African Trades Union Congress to form the Pan-African Socialist Union (PASU). The new group lasted only a few months before 'fading away'.⁹

(4) Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)

Eight days after the NDP was banned the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) was formed, on 17 December 1961. Joshua Nkomo was president, Mr Sithole chairman and Robert Mugabe publicity secretary. Herbert Chitepo and James Chikerema (still in detention) were also office-bearers. ZAPU was really the NDP under a new name, and throughout the nine months of its official existence, until it too was banned (on 19 September 1962), ZAPU followed policies similar to those of the NDP except that it emphasised greater militancy. Its basic aim was to achieve majority rule and was confident it could achieve this by constitutional means. Nevertheless, its militancy was being reflected in increasing violence.

A group called the Zimbabwe Liberation Army, linked unofficially to ZAPU (although ZAPU officially denied any connection)¹⁰, in September 1962 began organising acts of sabotage, such as the burning of cattle dips and forest in the eastern districts of Rhodesia, damaging railway lines and attacking rural stores. The Rhodesian response was more repressive legislation, such as the Law and Order (Maintenance) Amendment Act of 1962 (under which death sentences became mandatory for attacks involving petrol bombs, fire and explosives) and the Unlawful Organisations Act of 1962. ZAPU was banned and its leaders restricted to certain rural areas. After ZAPU was banned, its members continued to operate underground. The ZAPU executive moved to Dar es Salaam. Joshua Nkomo was in Lusaka when ZAPU was banned, but returned to Rhodesia after a meeting in Dar es Salaam with members of his executive and President Nyerere, of Tanzania. On his return he was restricted for three months.

After his release, Mr Nkomo called a meeting of the ZAPU executive in Dar es Salaam on 12 April 1963 to set up a government-in-exile. But at this meeting Mr Nkomo was criticised for his style of leadership, for concentrating his political efforts outside Rhodesia instead of inside the country and for the lack of a clear policy of action. He was urged to return to Rhodesia, but did not do so until July 1963. After his departure the majority of the ZAPU executive in Dar es Salaam, led by Mr Sithole and Robert Mugabe, passed a resolution deposing Mr Nkomo from the leadership. However, the attempt to depose him failed. Mr Nkomo, in Rhodesia, rallied support and suspended 'the rebels'. He formed a new organisation, the People's Caretaker Council (named thus to minimise the risk of banning) which, in effect, was ZAPU minus its pro-Sithole members. The dissident group led by Mr Sithole formed its own party, the Zimbabwe African National Union.

(5) People's Caretaker Council (PCC)

The People's Caretaker Council (PCC) was not technically a political party but nevertheless assumed most of the role established by ZAPU. The PCC lasted from the date of its establishment, 10 August 1963, until 26 August 1964, when both it and ZANU were banned. Mr Nkomo was the PCC's president.

(6) Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)

The Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) was formed two days earlier than the PCC, on 8 August 1963, with Mr Sithole as president and Robert Mugabe as secretary-general. ZANU's aims included the establishment of a nationalist, democratic, socialist and Pan-Africanist republic; adult suffrage; repeal of all discrimination based on colour and all repressive laws; national control of all land with the government as the people's trustee; amnesty for all political prisoners; free health service

and unemployment relief; and compulsory secondary education to the level of form two.

ZANU attracted black intellectuals and aimed at 'a grass roots alliance organisation of peasants, peasant farmers, businessmen, students, the chiefs and headmen and the professional men and women'.¹¹

The split in ZAPU and the creation of the PCC and ZANU was to have major repercussions for the nationalist cause. It was the first major division in black politics, and was based on both tactical and personality differences. The major tactical issue was the question of whether the struggle was to be waged inside or outside Rhodesia. Another issue was the type and quality of leadership. Ideology played only a small part in this first serious division, but was to play a more prominent role in later divisions.

In the period 1963-64 there were frequent clashes between ZANU and the PCC as each sought to gain a mass following, and the escalating violence was exploited by the white Rhodesian Government to ban both organisations and detain their leaders. Mr Nkomo was arrested on 16 April 1964 while leading a PCC campaign against school fees for black children in urban schools and from then until December 1974 was under restriction and spent most of the 10 years in gaol. He came into public view on three occasions during the 10 years: in October 1965 in Salisbury for pre-UDI discussions with Mr Harold Wilson, then Prime Minister of Britain; in November 1968 in Salisbury for talks with the Commonwealth Secretary, Mr George Thompson; and in February 1972 to be interviewed by members of the Pearce Commission. Mr Sithole was arrested later in 1964 and restricted until 1969 when he was sentenced to six years' imprisonment for allegedly plotting to assassinate the Rhodesian Prime Minister, Mr Ian Smith, and two Cabinet Ministers. Mr Sithole, too, was released in December 1974. Robert Mugabe also was arrested in 1964 and remained under detention until November 1974.

3. Nationalist politics since UDI

(1) The situation at UDI

The nationalist movement had had high hopes, but as at 1965 had very little to show for its activity in terms of political gains for blacks. It had succeeded in politicising a larger number of blacks, and it had succeeded, to a large extent, in substituting the goal of black majority rule for concessions within the white power structure. On the debit side all attempts at forming a viable nationalist organisation had been stopped by bannings and all the major political leaders at that time were under detention. ZAPU/PCC and ZANU continued some of their activities underground and were directed by executives-in-exile, but morale was low. The array of repressive legislation had further increased, with additional amendments to the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act in 1963, 1964 and 1965, the Preventive Detention (Temporary Provisions) Act in 1964, and the Unlawful Organisations Act in 1963.

Just six days before UDI, on 5 November 1965, a state of emergency was declared under the Emergency Powers Act, which gave the Rhodesian Government wide powers of censorship, detention and restriction, and arrest and search without warrant. This state of emergency has remained in force ever since.

For some years after UDI no black nationalist parties were permitted to exist legally inside Rhodesia. Some blacks did participate in the legal parliamentary parties, such as the United People's Party, the National People's Union and the Centre Party. Most such blacks, however, were rejected by the nationalists. By the time of UDI the nationalist leaders had largely opted for physical confrontation with the Rhodesian Government.

The number of incidents of sabotage (attacks on railways, petrol bomb attacks, damage to cattle-dips and crops, etc.) increased after UDI. In 1964-65 a number of ZANU members went to Ghana and Tanzania for training in guerilla warfare, and a number of ZAPU members were also training, mainly in Tanzania but including several in the USSR. Small groups of guerillas began to cross over into Rhodesia from neighbouring Zambia (independent 24.10.64), after coming from training camps in Tanzania (independent 9.12.62). The first attack on a white family occurred in July 1964 when a ZANU group, 'Crocodile Commando' attacked a white family after setting up a roadblock. The first officially acknowledged military engagement after UDI took place in April 1966 when seven members of a ZANU unit were killed near Sinoia.¹²

ZANU and ZAPU retained their separate identities in spite of several efforts to unite them. The first such effort occurred shortly before the visit of the Pearce Commission to inquire into black attitudes to the Smith-Home Agreement of 1971 and was an attempt to overcome disagreements both within and between the ZANU and ZAPU leaderships-in-exile in Lusaka. The outcome, however, was not a united movement but a third party, the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe.

(2) Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI)

The Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI) came into existence in October 1971 and continued until its December 1974 merger within a reconstituted African National Council, along with ZANU, ZAPU and the then existing ANC. FROLIZI was formed in an effort to unite ZAPU and ZANU nationalists, but the effort did not succeed. FROLIZI was the result not only of internal divisions in ZANU and ZAPU - particularly ZAPU - and a desire for unity by some members of both organisations, but also of external pressures for unity, particularly from President Kaunda of Zambia. However, both ZANU and ZAPU refused to consider

a merger via FROLIZI and claimed that its leadership was an unrepresentative clique of the Zezuru clan.¹³ Two of the prime movers in the formation of FROLIZI, James Chikerema and George Nyandoro, were both Zezuru. The first leader of FROLIZI was Shelton Siwela, but James Chikerema became chairman in 1972.

Instead of a unified movement, the result was three competing nationalist groups instead of two. One of the areas in which FROLIZI began to compete was in the field of armed operations, and in February 1973 two FROLIZI units crossed into Rhodesia near where the borders of Rhodesia, Zambia and Mozambique converge. This action prompted the Liberation Committee of the Organisation of African Unity, which had previously withheld recognition, to reverse its decision and give FROLIZI military and financial assistance on the same basis as ZANU and ZAPU. The Zambian Government also recognized FROLIZI, but as a military unit. Both ZANU and ZAPU continued to denounce the new organisation, and ZAPU expelled both Mr Chikerema and Mr Nyandoro as defectors.

(3) African National Council (ANC)

The first black nationalist party to be tolerated inside Rhodesia since the PCC ^{and ZAPU} was the African National Council (ANC), formed on 16 December 1971 to organise a united campaign among blacks to reject the Smith-Home Agreement of 1971 (see chapter 4). The ANC originated from the discussions of a group of ZAPU and ZANU ex-detainees, including Josiah Chinamano, who were concerned that there was no united organisation to rally black opposition to the Agreement.

They approached Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Bishop of the United Methodist Church in Rhodesia, in late November 1971, and Bishop Muzorewa agreed and became the ANC chairman until the December 1974 merger with FROLIZI, ZANU and ZAPU in a reconstituted ANC (of which he became president). Bishop Muzorewa

was chosen because he had not been involved in previous splits in the nationalist movement, he was not closely identified with any particular party, and because it was hoped he would not immediately attract a banning order.

The Agreement was opposed by blacks because it did not provide for 'one man, one vote' and it would have taken too long for blacks to achieve a majority in the proposed House of Assembly. The ANC was successful in its task and the Pearce Commission reported in May 1972 that most blacks consulted both publicly and privately were against the proposals in the Agreement, and were dissatisfied at delays concerning the implementation of majority rule.

After the Pearce Commission had left Rhodesia the ANC, previously a co-ordinating body, became a political party with the aim of achieving majority rule. The Rhodesian Government permitted the ANC to continue because it had declared itself against violence as a means of achieving its aims. It was this opposition to guerilla warfare that divided the ANC of 1972 and 1973 from ZANU, ZAPU and FROLIZI. Although a number of ANC members were detained, Bishop Muzorewa conducted talks on constitutional issues with Mr Ian Smith during 1973 and early 1974, and in June 1974 it appeared agreement had been reached between the two. However, details of the proposed settlement, which involved only six extra seats for blacks, were rejected by the ANC executive.

The events which followed were radically affected by the Portuguese coup of 25 April 1974 and the subsequent independence of Angola and Mozambique. The coup prompted South Africa to seek detente with black Africa and one of the fruits of the exercise was a series of meetings in Lusaka attended by President Kaunda (Zambia), President Nyerere (Tanzania), President Khama (Botswana), Samora Machel (FRELIMO president and later President of Mozambique) and delegations from ZANU, ZAPU, FROLIZI and the

ANC. Mr Nkomo, Mr Sithole and Mr Mugabe were released from detention to attend the talks. The contribution of Zambia and the other Front-line States was to persuade the various nationalist parties to form an alliance; South Africa's was to pressure Mr Smith into releasing the nationalist leaders and conducting talks with them.

On 7 December 1974 the ANC became an umbrella organisation for ZANU, ZAPU and FROLIZI. The agreement to unite under the ANC banner (the 'Lusaka Declaration of Unity') was signed by Bishop Muzorewa for the ANC, Mr Sithole for ZANU, Mr Nkomo for ZAPU and Mr Chikerema for FROLIZI. Under the Declaration the four nationalist organisations agreed to unite to prepare for 'any conference for the transfer of power to the majority that might be called'.¹⁴ The leaders of the three banned parties were to join an expanded ANC executive for four months prior to holding a congress which would adopt a new constitution, elect a new leadership and consider a new statement of policy. The Declaration also contained a clause stating:

The leaders recognise the inevitability of the continued armed struggle and all other forms of struggle until the total liberation of Zimbabwe.¹⁵

This was the first time that the ANC had formally condoned the guerilla war, even though its emphasis continued to be on a peaceful settlement.

Before continuing to trace developments in the nationalist movement the Committee will briefly survey the development of ZAPU and ZANU up to the time of the Lusaka Declaration.

(4) ZAPU and ZANU - 1970-74

After the detention of Mr Nkomo, James Chikerema set up a ZAPU office, first in Dar es Salaam and later in Lusaka, and became acting president in Mr Nkomo's absence. When Mr Chikerema left ZAPU to form FROLIZI in October 1971 the acting leadership of ZAPU was assumed by Jason Moyo. Mr Moyo later became ZAPU's military commander-in-chief until killed, allegedly by a parcel bomb, in Lusaka in January 1977.

ZANU was affected by the detention and imprisonment of its leaders more so than ZAPU, and ZANU was later to claim that in the period to 1974 the organisation's campaign headquarters were the various prisons in which its leaders were held. Those imprisoned included Mr Sithole, Mr Mugabe, Edgar Tekere, Moton Malianga and Maurice Nyagumbo. Imprisonment hardened their attitudes and led them to believe that peaceful methods would not achieve majority rule. Armed confrontation began to appear the only alternative for many nationalists.

While a number of ZANU's leaders were in prison, Herbert Chitepo was chairman of ZANU and did much to organise underground activity and guerilla insurgencies.¹⁶ He was assassinated when his car blew up in the driveway of his home in Lusaka on 18 March 1975 - the victim, according to a Special International Commission of Inquiry¹⁷, of a power struggle on tribal lines among the military leaders of ZANU. Among those accused by the Commission was Josiah Tongogara, military commander since 1972 of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the military wing of ZANU. Mr Tongogara and a number of others were arrested and imprisoned by the Zambian Government, and brought to trial in April 1976. The charges were withdrawn in October and Mr Tongogara was released to attend the Geneva Conference. Mr Tongogara was killed in a car crash in Mozambique late in December 1979.

Several attempts were made by the OAU to bring unity to the nationalist movement in the period 1970-74. At an OAU Liberation Committee meeting in January 1972 both ZANU and ZAPU declared their intentions to unite, and on 23 March signed a protocol establishing a Joint Military Command. However, the Joint Military Command did not get off the ground. In March 1973 the OAU persuaded ZANU and ZAPU to form a Joint Military and Political Council, but both organisations nevertheless continued to act independently.

Aware that the armed struggle had achieved little until then because of a lack of support from blacks in the areas of its operation, ZANU spent most of 1972 establishing a political base in the countryside. This emphasis on building up support among rural blacks continued in subsequent years and was probably a major reason for the strong vote for ZANU(PF) in the February 1980 elections.

ZANU's military wing, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) opened its campaign in late December 1972 with a series of attacks on white farms in the Centenary area, with the aim of undermining the myth of white invulnerability. ZANLA was able to develop a new front via attacks from Mozambique through co-operation with FROLIZI (Popular Front for the Liberation of Mozambique), then fighting the Portuguese in Mozambique.

The period 1970-74 also saw the commencement of a struggle between Mr Sithole and Mr Mugabe for the leadership of ZANU. In 1970 Mr Sithole was 'deposed' as president of ZANU by an important group of ZANU executive members while all of them were in prison. According to one account a group of six ZANU leaders in prison, including Mr Sithole and Mr Mugabe, decided that the presidency of the party should be put to a fresh vote.¹⁸ Since a party congress was impossible the six agreed that approval by the majority of their group should decide. In the ensuing ballot Mr

Mugabe got the most votes and Mr Sithole was 'deposed'. Nevertheless, upon the group's release in 1974 Mr Sithole continued to be recognised by the Front-line presidents as the president of ZANU, and it was he who signed the Lusaka Declaration of Unity on behalf of ZANU in December 1974. Mr Mugabe, if only temporarily, was rebuffed in his claim to lead ZANU. On the formation of the enlarged ANC he refused to join and instead went to Mozambique to build up support among ZANU guerillas.

(5) The period 1974-76

The first attempt at a constitutional settlement after the formation of the reconstituted ANC resulted in the Lusaka Agreement, reached on 11 December 1974 between the ANC and the Smith government. However the Agreement broke down in January 1975. The next major attempt was the Victoria Falls Conference of 25-26 August 1975. Mr Ian Smith represented the Rhodesian Government and Bishop Muzorewa the ANC (as president). Other members of the ANC delegation were Mr Nkomo and Mr Sithole. Also attending were President Kaunda of Zambia and Mr Vorster, the South African Prime Minister. The conference did not reach agreement.

After this attempt tensions over leadership, policy and tactics, always present but until then submerged in the interests of unity, came to the surface. In September 1975 the ANC split into two groups. One group continued to be led by Bishop Muzorewa and became known as the ANC (Muzorewa) - later to become the United African National Council (UANC). The other was led by Mr Nkomo and became known as the ANC (Nkomo) and also as the ANC of Zimbabwe (ANC(Z)). Both leaders claimed to lead the 'true' ANC.

Mr Sithole, after the Victoria Falls Conference, had attempted to improve his position in ZANU by taking over the leadership of the Zimbabwe Liberation Committee (ZLC) - which was

supposed to have replaced, and united, the three external military wings of parties forming the reconstituted ANC (those of ZANU, ZAPU and FROLIZI). In this he was assisted by James Chikerema and George Nyandoro. When the split in the ANC occurred, Bishop Muzorewa moved into close association with Mr Sithole. Declaring that 'the emphasis on continuing our struggle was outside, rather than inside, the country', Bishop Muzorewa set up headquarters first in Lusaka and then in Dar es Salaam.¹⁹ Bishop Muzorewa and Mr Sithole tried to organise support among the guerillas in camps in Tanzania and Mozambique but their leadership was largely rejected. Bishop Muzorewa remained outside Rhodesia until he returned to a welcome by some 100,000 supporters in Salisbury on 3 October 1976.

Mr Nkomo stayed in Rhodesia and in October 1975 started a series of negotiations with Mr Smith which led to a constitutional conference involving the ANC(Z) and the Smith Government in the period December 1975-March 1976. The position at this time was a somewhat strange reversal of what was to be the case two years later at the time of the Internal Settlement negotiations, when Bishop Muzorewa and Mr Sithole were inside Rhodesia trying to negotiate a settlement and Mr Nkomo was outside Rhodesia directing (with Mr Mugabe) the guerilla war. The Nkomo-Smith negotiations broke down on the question of when majority rule would be implemented.

In late October 1975 some of the guerillas in Mozambique had signed a document expressing no confidence in Mr Sithole and Bishop Muzorewa, and said they would only follow Robert Mugabe. Mr Mugabe had gone into Mozambique after his release from prison and his refusal to join the reconstituted ANC. His aim was to build up support among, and organise, the guerilla groups then in Mozambique - an aim in which he was successful, according to one writer, because he more than any of the other political figures at the time best reflected, and articulated, the mood in the guerilla camps in 1975-76:

As a militant intellectual with considerable political experience he was able to articulate the new spirit of the younger cadres with their strong desire to turn their backs on the past years of political quarrelling, unproductive negotiations and mass disillusion: for them, as for Mugabe, victory lay clearly and simply in the armed struggle.²⁰

Mr Mugabe consolidated his position, and his claim to leadership of ZANU when, on 9 October 1976 he and Mr Nkomo announced the formation of the Patriotic Front to represent the external nationalists at the forthcoming Geneva Conference. The Patriotic Front became the only organisation recognised by the Front-line States as representing Zimbabwean black nationalists: Mr Sithole lost the support of the Front-line Presidents and his following became little more than a ZANU rump. When invitations to the Geneva Conference were issued on 15 October by the British Government his name was not included. He was invited some days later but it was made clear that he was not being invited as the ZANU leader. Mr Sithole returned to Rhodesia after the Geneva Conference but continued to maintain that he was the leader of ZANU. As that organisation was banned inside Rhodesia he called it the African National Council (Sithole), (ANC(S)), but reverted to using the name ZANU prior to the April 1979 elections.

(6) Zimbabwe Independence People's Army (ZIPA)

The formation of the Patriotic Front was the culmination of continuing pressures for political unity from both the Front-line States and the Organisation of African Unity. The OAU Liberation Committee and the Front-line Presidents a year earlier, in November 1975, had persuaded guerillas from ZANU and ZAPU to try and achieve military unity by forming an integrated army, in order to end the bitter divisions between the ZANU and ZAPU guerilla forces and the divisions within ZANU itself. Negotiations took place between Jason Moyo, representing ZAPU,

and Simon Mzenda, then a ZANU commander. Josiah Tongogara, the former ZANU commander-in-chief, then in prison awaiting trial for^{Herb} Chitepo's murder, was also consulted.

The resulting organisation was the Zimbabwe Independence People's Army (ZIPA). An 18-member Joint Military Command was set up to run ZIPA, with nine members from ZANU and nine from ZAPU, but the majority of ZIPA guerillas were ZANU. ZIPA was often referred to as the Third Force to distinguish it - and to a large extent to separate it - from the political leaderships of ZANU and ZAPU. The leader of the Joint Military Command was Rex Nhongu, a ZANU commander who later became deputy commander of all ZANLA forces.

ZIPA continued as an organisation for some two years, but with limited success. Attempts at integration, particularly in training camps, ended frequently with fighting between ZANU and ZAPU guerillas. Eventually, as Mr Nkomo set about building up ZAPU's fighting forces after the Geneva Conference, most ZAPU members of ZIPA returned to Zambia (the ZIPA headquarters had been established in newly-independent Mozambique, where ZANU was strongest).²¹ ZIPA continued for a while, but was gradually absorbed into ZANLA, the ZANU military wing.

The ZAPU military wing became known as the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), and for the rest of the guerilla war the two military wings, ZANLA and ZIPRA, remained separate, each conducting its own operations.

(7) The Patriotic Front (PF)

The Patriotic Front was formed on 9 October 1976 so that ZANU and ZAPU could present a common negotiating position at the Geneva Conference. The alliance was the outcome of efforts by the Front-line States to achieve a measure of unity among the more militant nationalist political leaders when they faced Mr Smith

across the conference table. The Front-line States agreed to recognise only the Patriotic Front as from November 1976, and this decision was endorsed by a meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers in January 1977. The alliance was a tactical one, and the Front did not pretend to be a unified body, with a common policy.

The first serious attempt to formulate a policy for the Patriotic Front was not made until January 1977 when a co-ordinating committee of 10 members from ZANU and ZAPU was established. The Committee laid down four basic objectives:

- (a) To liquidate imperialism and colonialism and thereby overthrow the racist minority regime.
- (b) To create a national democratic state of the people of Zimbabwe.
- (c) To eliminate all forms of capitalist exploitation and thus create conditions for a full-scale social revolution.
- (d) To guarantee national peace, security, equal rights and happiness for all in a free Zimbabwe.²²

These remained the basic objectives of the Patriotic Front, although ZANU was more committed to the third objective of socialism than ZAPU.

Despite the formulation of a common policy, the two wings of the Patriotic Front continued to act independently in most areas, particularly the guerilla struggle, and they contested the February 1980 elections as separate political parties. ZAPU has received most Front-line support from Zambia, and ZANU from Mozambique and Tanzania. ZAPU has received most of its military support from the USSR and allied countries such as Cuba, while ZANU received most of its military support from China (although there was evidence of ^{some} increasing Russian support for ZANU as the Chinese presence in Africa lessened from about 1976).

Some Western countries, sympathetic to the aims of the Patriotic Front, have provided humanitarian aid and finance - but not military supplies. Sweden, for example, has made donations to both ZANU and ZAPU. In 1975 Australia contributed \$A150,000 to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) to assist women and children in the care of a number of liberation movements in camps in Zambia.²³ The money was for tents, blankets and other domestic supplies, classroom equipment and school materials, drugs and medical equipment, food production equipment, and training of medical assistants and nurses. The liberation movements involved included ZANU and ZAPU, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the South-West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) and the African National Congress (ANC).

Since the Geneva Conference the Patriotic Front has continued as a loose alliance of two distinct parties under a 10-man co-ordinating committee. It was involved in negotiations on the Anglo-American Proposals for a settlement in 1977 and 1978 and in attempts to set up an all-party conference in late 1978, but neither was successful. After the April 1979 internal elections renewed efforts to achieve a settlement involving the Patriotic Front parties were made at the Lusaka Commonwealth Conference and these resulted in the successful Lancaster House negotiations of September-December 1979. The Patriotic Front alliance virtually ended when ZANU decided to contest the February 1980 elections as a separate party - ZANU(PF). ZANU(PF) won the elections with a majority but said it would form a broad-based coalition involving both ZAPU (which had been renamed the Patriotic Front party for the elections) and some whites. Mr Mugabe subsequently announced a ¹³22-member ^{Ministry}Cabinet including Mr Nkomo and three other ZAPU members and two whites.

(8) The Geneva Conference

The Geneva Conference of October-December 1976 marked a parting of the ways for the major figures in the Zimbabwe black nationalist movement. Bishop Muzorewa, Mr Sithole and Mr Chikerema became leaders of internal parties seeking to negotiate a peaceful settlement with the Smith Government; Mr Nkomo and Mr Mugabe remained outside Rhodesia dedicated to achieving their aims through armed struggle. Bishop Muzorewa attended representing his branch of the ANC (other members of the delegation included James Chikerema and George Nyandoro), Mr Sithole attended representing his faction of ZANU, Mr Nkomo attended representing ZAPU (which continued to be known as the ANC(Z) inside Rhodesia), and Mr Mugabe attended representing ZANU.

(9) The 'internal' nationalist parties

(a) United African National Council (UANC)

After the Geneva Conference Bishop Muzorewa set about consolidating his support inside Rhodesia, and in August and September 1977 reorganised his branch of the ANC following the resignation of seven members of the party executive, including the vice-president, Dr Elliott Gabellah, and the external affairs secretary, Dr Chakanyika Chikosi. On 24 August Bishop Muzorewa dissolved his party's central committee and its 69-member national executive, and at a national conference on 11 September new office bearers were elected. James Chikerema became first vice-president. The party was renamed the United African National Council (UANC), the name it has carried since. The UANC was a leading participant in the negotiations leading to the Internal Settlement Agreement of 3 March/ 1978, and a participant in the Transitional Government which resulted.

The party's strength was shown in the April 1979 elections when the UANC gained 67.3% of the valid votes cast to win 51 of the 72 black seats. Bishop Muzorewa was thus able to form Zimbabwe's first government with a black majority. The UANC's party manifesto for the April 1979 elections declared its aims and objectives to be:

- (i) To win majority rule for the people of Zimbabwe based on each and every citizen of eighteen years and above being able to vote for the party he or she chooses.
- (ii) To ensure that the people of Zimbabwe are able to defend and safeguard their own majority rule Government, so elected, by training young men in military matters and integrating guerilla units into the new Zimbabwe National Security Forces.
- (iii) To work vigorously for the attainment of a free and democratic society in which colour, race, tribe, creed, wealth and educational attainments will not determine a person's worth. These objectives will be achieved through the repeal of all racial discriminatory legislation.

The UANC drew most of its support from the Shona tribes - although the support of the Shona switched dramatically when ZANU(PF) contested the February 1980 elections. The UANC also drew much support from urban blacks attracted by its moderate stance on most issues and its promise to maintain the free enterprise system.

(b) African National Council (Sithole), (ANC(S))

Although Mr Sithole claimed to represent ZANU at the Geneva Conference his claim was not recognised, and whereas he had been previously considered as a radical, he emerged at the Conference as a moderate aligned with Bishop Muzorewa. On 2 April

1977 Mr Sithole and his supporters announced they were withdrawing their support for Bishop Muzorewa's ANC and forming their own internal party, the African National Council (Sithole), the ANC(S). Mr Sithole himself was allowed to return to Rhodesia on 10 July 1977 upon agreeing to renounce 'terrorism'.²⁴

Mr Sithole continued to call his party ANC(S) until the April 1979 elections, when he registered the name Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). However, Mr Sithole's party since the change in name has generally been referred to as ZANU (Sithole) or ZANU(S) to distinguish it from Mr Mugabe's ZANU. The ZANU(S) policy statement for the April 1979 elections declared that the party would establish a democratic, non-racial republican state with a franchise based on universal suffrage.

The ANC(S) was a participant in negotiations resulting in the Internal Settlement Agreement. As ZANU, it contested the April 1979 elections, in which it gained the second largest number of valid votes, 14.6%, to win 12 seats. However, the party refused to accept the result, claiming the elections were fraudulent. It boycotted the new parliament until 2 August, 1979 when it took up its 12 seats in the House of Assembly and accepted two Cabinet positions. At the Lancaster House conference, ~~the~~ Mr Sithole and another ZANU(S) member were part of Bishop Muzorewa's 'Government of National Unity' delegation. In the February 1980 elections, Mr Sithole's party registered as ZANU, while Mr Mugabe's party registered as ZANU(PF). Mr Sithole's party failed to win a seat.

(c) Zimbabwe United People's Organisation (ZUPO)

A third internal party, the Zimbabwe United People's Organisation (ZUPO), was also started shortly after the Geneva Conference. The party was formally launched on 29 December 1976 by two chiefs who were also Senators, Chief Jeremiah Chirau (a Shona chief who became president of ZUPO) and Chief Kayisa

Ndiweni (an Ndebele chief who became vice-president). The party differed from the others in that its leaders came from within the existing white-dominated political structure (both Senator chiefs were appointed Cabinet Ministers on 28 April 1976, responsible for development in Mashonaland West and Central in the case of Chief Chirau, and Matabeleland North and South in the case of Chief Ndiweni).

ZUPO was established as a democratic multi-racial party, working for majority rule by peaceful negotiation. It pledged to break down tribal and racial barriers and supported the free enterprise system. ZUPO was involved in the negotiations leading to the Internal Settlement Agreement and Chief Chirau was the first black chairman of the Transitional Government's Executive Council. Initially attracting limited support, ZUPO gradually improved its position. Chief Chirau improved his standing by being the only leader in the Transitional Government to consistently call for Patriotic Front involvement in the Internal Settlement.

ZUPO's platform during the April 1979 elections included: Majority rule for the people of Zimbabwe through negotiations and peaceful change; the removal of all racial discrimination; opposition to the nationalisation of industry; and increasing the powers of the chiefs. ZUPO did not win any seats in the election because of its scattered vote (6.4% of valid votes cast) and because of the defection of Chief Ndiweni to form a new party, the United National Federal Party (UNFP), in November 1978. After the 1979 elections ZUPO support declined and although the party announced on 20 December 1979 that it would contest the February 1980 elections, it withdrew on 21 January.

(d) United National Federal Party (UNFP)

The distinctive feature of the United National Federal Party (UNFP), with its predominantly Ndebele membership, was its

advocacy of a federal government. The UNFP advocated a non-racial federal House of Assembly in which half the members would be from Mashonaland and half from Matabeleland, and two State parliaments, with powers divided between the two levels of government. It was thought that this would prevent one tribal group dominating the other. In the April 1979 elections the UNFP gained nearly 11% of the valid votes cast, and won nine seats - seven of them in Matabeleland.

(e) National Democratic Union (NDU)

The fifth party to contest the April 1979 elections was the National Democratic Union (NDU), led by Mr Henry Chihota. ^{it} gained only 1% of the valid votes and did not win a seat. *ch*

(f) Zimbabwe Democratic Party (ZDP)

The Zimbabwe Democratic Party (ZDP) was formed on 20 June 1979 when the UANC's first vice-president, James Chikerema, and seven other, mainly Zezuru, UANC members resigned to start a new party. The defection reduced UANC numbers in the House of Assembly from 51 to 43 (but one of the eight rejoined the UANC five days later). The resignations resulted in part from Mr Chikerema's failure to get a Cabinet seat and his being placed sixth out of eight on the party ticket for Mashonaland West, despite his position as first vice-president. Bishop Muzorewa was accused of favouring his own Manyika tribe.

Both the ZDP and the NDU contested the February 1980 elections but neither won a seat.

(10) The 'external' nationalist parties

(a) Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)

In the months following the Geneva Conference Mr Nkomo concentrated on building up his support and establishing a viable ZAPU army - the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) - so that it would be of comparable strength to ZANU's army. Mr Nkomo also set about uniting ZAPU to end the divisions of the 1960s and early 1970s which resulted both from tribal affiliations and from the problems created by a dual leadership - a leadership inside Zimbabwe, but in prison, and an acting external leadership organising guerilla activities.

ZAPU's basic aim has always been to secure 'one man, one vote' and freedom from domination by a minority. Its aims once majority rule was achieved have been less clearly defined. Mr Nkomo himself has a reputation for being a pragmatist. He has always claimed he is not a communist and that he supports a place for free enterprise. He also has always accepted that whites are a part of Zimbabwe. In a statement on the long-term objectives of his party on 17 October 1976 he said:

... the homes, farms and businesses of Whites in Rhodesia need not be at risk in a nationalist Zimbabwe provided the Whites respected the new laws and accepted²⁵ the inevitability of a non-privileged status.

Mr Nkomo expressed similar views while campaigning for the February 1980 elections.

(b) Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)

After the Geneva Conference Mr Mugabe set about consolidating his position as leader of ZANU and minimising dissension within the party. A number of ZANU cadres were arrested in January 1977 and January-February 1978. Some were

opposed to Mr Mugabe over differences in the way the party was being organised and the rest were opposed to his leadership and that of Josiah Tongogara on grounds of strategy and ideology. Many of those arrested considered Mr Mugabe too moderate. They sought greater political power for the guerillas and felt there was a lack of clarity in the direction of the war. They also wanted an absolute social revolution. Another issue over which disagreement arose was whether more Soviet assistance should be sought. Some observers have interpreted the ZANU factionalism as being mainly a feud between members of the Manyika and Karanga tribes.

Up to the February 1980 elections ZANU was controlled by a political Central Committee, and ZANLA by a military High Command. A restructuring of ZANU took place on 4 September 1977 at the Chimoio Congress. The Congress placed the Central Committee firmly in control, denying overall political power to the guerillas. Mr Mugabe was reputed to refer all important decisions back to the Central Committee, also known as the Dare Re Chimurenga (War Council). Each member of the Central Committee headed a 'department', such as the Department of Education and Culture, the Defence Department, etc.

ZANU had a number of offices around the world, which it referred to as 'foreign missions'. Missions were located at various times in the United Kingdom, the USA, Australia, Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana, Romania, Libya, Egypt, Nigeria, Sweden and Canada. Inside Zimbabwe, ZANU had to maintain a low profile after it was banned in August 1964. From January 1977 it was represented in a low-key manner by its internal organisation, the People's Movement, established by the Rev. Canaan Banana.

ZANU has always been regarded as a more militant and ideologically-oriented party than ZAPU or any of the other Zimbabwean nationalist parties. It bore the brunt of the armed

struggle, which it regarded as being essential if majority rule and independence were to be achieved. In the words of the ZANU Representative for Australia and the Far East, Mr Simbarashe Mumbengegwe:

ZANU did not take up arms lightly. It was compelled to take this move by the continual deterioration of the political and social position of the African majority. The minority regime outlawed all the nationalist organisations that sought to bring about change peacefully. The unwillingness of the white minority regime to settle with the African majority was displayed in November 1965 when the Smith administration declared independence unilaterally in order 'to keep government in white hands for all time'.²⁶

ZANU claims to have launched the armed struggle - the second 'chimurenga' (war of national liberation) - on 28 April 1966. Until 1972 the armed struggle was slow and ineffective due to the inexperience of the liberation forces. After 1972 a new more intensified phase began when ZANU 'mobilised the people' and established a presence in the north-east portion of Zimbabwe.²⁷

In spite of concentrating on military activity, ZANU was prepared to negotiate, as shown by its attendance at the Geneva Conference, the Malta Conference and, finally, at Lancaster House. Between such conferences Mr Mugabe constantly talked to the Front-line Presidents and various US and British negotiators endeavouring to seek a solution to the Zimbabwe problem.

ZANU was the only party to officially adopt an ideology. At the Chimoi Congress on 4 September 1977 'Marxism - Leninism' and 'Mao tse-Tung - thought' were declared to be the basis of ZANU's ideology.²⁸ Despite this, Mr Mugabe's 'socialism' is not generally considered to be of the doctrinaire type attributed to him by Zimbabwean whites prior to independence but a more distinctive type of 'African' socialism. The type of socialist system Mr Mugabe envisages for Zimbabwe is probably one similar

to that of Tanzania. While the ultimate aim is the nationalisation of land and industry, Mr Mugabe has said that he would leave all small businesses free to operate as capitalist concerns and allow white farmers to run their own farms as long as they paid their black workers fair wages.²⁹ Non-utilised or under-utilised land would be reclaimed for redistribution to blacks. Mr Mugabe envisages whites continuing to play an important role in Zimbabwe, but one based on their skills, and not on race.


Mr Mugabe sees a one-party state as being inherently more stable than a multi-party system. He said on 16 April 1978, for example:

We believe sincerely that a multi-party system, unless it is particularly desired by the people, is a luxury. In our state we would concentrate on policies aimed at transforming society.³⁰

Whether the ZANU(PF)-dominated coalition government will become a one-party state, perhaps on the Tanzanian or Kenyan models, remains to be seen. While the Committee would prefer to see the continuation of a multi-party democratic system, it acknowledges that the special circumstances of some African states may make a one-party system temporarily desirable in the interests of minimising tribal and racial differences and promoting planned economic growth.

Figure 7.1 shows the development of black nationalist parties to 1980.

Figure 7.1: Black nationalist parties 1956-80



Notes:

- (a) Banned September 1962, but continued outside Rhodesia.
- (b) After ZAPU was banned, the PCC was formed to continue its work inside Rhodesia. The PCC was banned in August 1964.
- (c) Banned August 1964, but continued outside Rhodesia.
- (d) Formed by dissidents from ZAPU and ZANU and those seeking to unite the two parties. Merged into reconstituted ANC in December 1974.
- (e) Umbrella organisation for ANC, FROLIZI, ZAPU and ZANU. Broke up ^{within} a year.
- (f) After break-up of reconstituted ANC in September 1975, Bishop Muzorewa set up headquarters outside Rhodesia while Mr Nkomo stayed inside Rhodesia. In 1976 Bishop Muzorewa returned to Rhodesia while Mr Nkomo left the country to form the Patriotic Front with Mr Mugabe, who had by then achieved leadership of ZANU.
- (g) The Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole was president of ZANU from 1963 until 'deposed' by Robert Mugabe in the early 1970s. He nevertheless continued to claim leadership of ZANU and registered that name for the 1979 elections. His party in 1979 was generally referred to as ZANU (Sithole) to distinguish it from Mr Mugabe's external ZANU. In the 1980 elections, Mr Sithole again used the ZANU name, while Mr Mugabe called his party ZANU (PF). Mr Nkomo called his ZAPU party the Patriotic Front party.

4. Tribalism and divisions in the nationalist movement

While tribalism has undoubtedly played a role in the various divisions in the nationalist movement, other factors have been equally important. These include leadership rivalry, induced by personal ambitions and animosities, disputes over strategies, tactics and ideology, and failures to achieve results.

ZAPU ~~has drawn~~^{drew} most of its membership from the Ndebele and Kalanga tribes, with the Shona tribal group contributing some 10-25%.³¹ In October 1978 Africa Confidential reported: 'Nkomo has always been careful to keep his internal national executive as much as 75% Shona in accordance with nationwide ethnic proportions'.³² Of the Shona, however, the majority have been from the Zezuru tribe - the second largest tribe, coming from the region around Salisbury. And on the Ndebele side there has been an over-representation of Kalanga, especially on the executive committee.

Most ZANU guerrilla recruits were Shona and there were very few Ndebele in the party. Initially, about 50% of ZANLA guerrillas were Manyika or Zezuru, and most of the other 50% were Karanga. The Karanga became increasingly more influential within the party over the years. The Manyika and Zezuru continued to predominate among the rank and file, but their influence on the executive declined. Mr Mugabe himself has allegiances to both the Karanga and the Zezuru (his father was a Karanga, but he was born in a Zezuru area).

Bishop Muzorewa's party, the UANC, had a fair tribal spread but members of the Bishop's own tribe, the Manyika, tended to predominate. This was one of the reasons which led James Chikerema, a Zezuru, to leave the UANC in 1979 and start his own party, taking with him a number of Zezuru in the process. Mr Sithole, a Ndau, was reputed to have gained most of his support from that tribe, and from the Shangaan and Venda. When he was

president of ZANU much of his support came from the Manyika. His mother was an Ndebele.

The interplay of the factors of leadership rivalry, failure to realise aspirations, tactics, ideology and tribalism can be seen in the following review of dissension within the nationalist movement.

The first major split in the nationalist movement, in 1963 between ZAPU and ZANU, probably had its origins in the frustration of Zimbabwe blacks in not achieving independence like so many of their fellow Africans. There was dissatisfaction within the movement over Mr Nkomo's style of leadership and the tactics being employed. Mr Nkomo favoured working outside the country to obtain international support while others on the ZAPU executive believed the organisation should be concentrating its efforts inside the country. Mr Sithole and other dissenters objected to Mr Nkomo's authoritarian style of leadership, where he tended to make decisions without consulting his executive. They also saw as necessary the use of violence and guerilla warfare. Nevertheless, there were also overtones of tribalism as the dissenters who left ZAPU to form ZANU were mainly Shona, while Mr Nkomo and his supporters were Ndebele.

The next major split occurred in 1971 when FROLIZI was formed, and again there were overtones of tribalism as its prime movers were almost entirely Zezuru. However, FROLIZI was considered a genuine attempt to unite those nationalists in exile.

When the ANC was made the umbrella organisation for the major nationalist organisations in 1974, the group of ZANU members who refused to join did so largely because they did not believe that negotiations would achieve anything. This militant group, led by Mr Mugabe, felt an armed revolution was the only means of achieving independence from whites. Mr Mugabe may also

have refused to join the ANC because the Front-line Presidents would not recognise him as the leader of ZANU. The ANC group split in September 1975 partly because the Victoria Falls Conference proved abortive and partly because of tensions between Bishop Muzorewa and Mr Nkomo. Disputes over strategy also played their part. Tribalism may have been a factor but was not obvious.

The discontent in ZAPU which led to Jason Moyo's death in Lusaka in January 1977 probably was due both to a struggle between pro- and anti-Moscow elements in the party and conflict between the Shona minority and Ndebele-Kalanga majority. There was also some discord between the Kalanga and Ndebele.

ZANU has probably had more violent dissension within its ranks than any other party. Not only has it seen a leadership change with Mr Mugabe replacing Mr Sithole, but there have been frequent instances of dissatisfaction and fighting among its members. ZANU's problems have been the result of disputes between pro-USSR and pro-China groups, leadership struggles, differences over strategy and the importance of ideology, and tribalism. Herbert Chitepo's death in March 1975 was blamed by the International Commission of Inquiry in Zambia on a power struggle between the Manyika (Mr Chitepo was a Manyika) and the Karanga (Josiah Tongogara was a Karanga) tribes, a conclusion supported by Mr Sithole. ZANU, on the other hand, claimed Mr Chitepo was murdered by pro-detente groups in Zambia (backed by South Africa and Rhodesia) who hoped to disrupt ZANU by having its radical members (who happened to be mainly Karanga) blamed for his death. Mr Chitepo at the time was the only Manyika left on the ZANU Central Committee and was alleged by some to have come round to supporting unity and detente. His death, it was argued, would enable Zambian authorities to arrest and detain the radical members of ZANU to aid the cause of detente. Whichever version is closer to the truth, the result was that ZANU came largely under Karanga control.

The Patriotic Front has never become one party primarily because of rivalry between Mr Nkomo and Mr Mugabe, differing emphases on ideology, organisational differences and tribal differences. Different sources of external support and different operational areas may also have been factors.

One split in which tribalism may be said to have been the single major factor was that when Chief Ndiweni left ZUPO in November 1978 and formed the UNFP. Chief Ndiweni had demanded that half the seats in a majority rule parliament should be reserved for the Ndebele. The Shona members of ZUPO objected because the Ndebele comprised less than one-fifth of the Zimbabwe population. When Chief Ndiweni left ZUPO he took nearly all its Ndebele members with him.

It is likely that originally the splits in the nationalist movement were primarily the result of frustration within the movement over its failure to achieve majority rule and independence. This failure led to dissatisfaction with the leadership and resulted in rivalry between aspiring leaders. It also led to disagreement over whether diplomacy or violence should be used to achieve nationalist aims. Differences in ideology emerged between those who favoured a complete socialist revolution and those who were prepared to accept a capitalist or partly capitalist society in Zimbabwe. Tribal differences added an extra dimension of dissent and in some cases predominated. Nevertheless, no major nationalist party became based exclusively on one tribe, and tribalism may not be as important a factor in the future of Zimbabwe as some, mainly white, critics have forecast.

5. The multi-racial parties

The conflict in Zimbabwe has often been painted in terms of blacks versus whites. Such a picture, however, is oversimplistic and ignores a considerable body of whites sympathetic

to black aspirations for equality and majority rule. Although Mr Smith's Rhodesian Front won all the white seats in every election from May 1965 to August 1977 inclusive, there was always a core of between about 15% and 25% of whites who voted against it. However, this opposition was relatively ineffectual. Perhaps the major avenue for the expression of white opposition was through support for multi-racial political parties.³³

In the May 1965 elections the major multi-racial party was the Rhodesia Party, formed in August 1964 as a successor to the United Federal Party (UFP). The Rhodesia Party failed to win an 'A' roll seat (voted for mainly by whites) but did manage to win 10 of the 15 'B' roll seats (voted for mainly by blacks). However, all its successful candidates for the 'B' roll seats were themselves blacks. (The remaining five 'B' roll seats went to Independents - one of them, Mr Ahrn Palley, a white). The result of that election was that for the first time in Rhodesia's history the official Leader of the Opposition was a black, and the only white in Opposition was an Independent elected mainly by black voters.

Shortly after the elections the Rhodesia Party was dissolved. Its 10 black parliamentary representatives and the four black Independents formed a new party, the United People's Party (UPP), under the leadership of Josiah Gondo (who became Leader of the Opposition). The former white members of the Rhodesia Party, together with a number of former UFP members, formed the Rhodesian Constitutional Association (RCA), which later merged with the newly-formed Centre Party. The historian, Robert Blake, has commented on this division as follows:

It was perhaps sad and symbolic that even at this last hour 'liberal' Europeans felt obliged to keep themselves separate from a party whose leader and parliamentary membership had become wholly African.³⁴

The next major multi-racial party was the Centre Party, formed in August 1968. The Centre Party stood for a united, independent Rhodesia, with one parliament for all Rhodesians, advancement by merit, and the eradication of racial discrimination (though without forced integration in residential areas). The Centre Party's president at the April 1970 elections was Pat Bashford, its vice-president Mr N.J. McNally. At these elections Centre Party black candidates won seven of the eight African Roll seats (the other eight, under the 1969 constitution, were filled by blacks elected by chiefs). The Rhodesian Front once again won all 50 of the European Roll seats. The only other African Roll seat was won by the National People's Union.

In the July 1974 elections the Centre Party won only one of the eight African Roll seats (with all the European Roll seats going once more to the Rhodesian Front). Seven ANC members won the remaining African Roll seats, standing as Independents. They were subsequently ordered to resign from the ANC for ignoring its boycott of the elections.³⁵ The main multi-racial party opposed to the Rhodesian Front in 1974 was not the Centre Party (which won less than 1% of the vote), but the Rhodesia Party, formed in 1972, which won 18% of the white vote (but no seats).

The Rhodesia Party supported a qualified franchise, a common roll and 'responsible' government. It opposed Rhodesian Front policies, particularly on racially discriminatory laws, and proposed a five-year transitional period leading to majority rule. Prior to the Geneva Conference in 1976 the Rhodesia Party unsuccessfully lobbied for white parties other than the Rhodesian Front to be granted representation at the talks. its president was Mr Timothy Gibbs and its chairman Mr R.A. Anderson. A prominent member was a former Rhodesian Front M.P., Mr Allan Savory. *ck/*

Prior to the August 1977 elections the Rhodesia Party and the Centre Party joined forces with the National Pledge

Association (formed in May 1976 by a group of businessmen and professional people with the aim of removing racial discrimination) to form an umbrella organisation, the National Unifying Force (NUF) - in much the same way that the reconstituted ANC became an umbrella organisation for the major black nationalist groups. At its formation the NUF supported the Anglo-American Proposals for a settlement. Its policies included universal adult suffrage and free elections following a ceasefire, prior to transfer of power to a black majority government. At the 1977 elections the NUF won only 4.5% of the vote (the Rhodesian Front once again won all 50 European Roll seats). Its president was Mr Allan Savory; a later vice-president was Mr N.J. McNally. The NUF did not contest the April 1979 elections for 20 white constituency seats (all won by the Rhodesian Front - 16 uncontested). The NUF had wanted the 20 white parliamentarians to be chosen by a common, non-racial, voters' roll.

The multi-racial parties in general have sought to cover the 'middle ground' between the militancy of the black nationalists and the obduracy of the Rhodesian Front. They failed to attract sufficient support from either extreme and as a result were never a strong force in Zimbabwean politics. They did, however, indicate that not all whites in Zimbabwe were opposed to majority rule and that a significant proportion sympathised with the aims of the black nationalists, if not always their methods.

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29. J. Barraclough, 'Portrait of a "terrorist"', The Listener, 19.4.79, pp. 534-6.
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33. Various church groups were another source of support for the nationalist movement. Perhaps the most prominent of such groups was the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia, an organisation appointed by the Rhodesian Catholic Bishops' Conference. The Rt. Rev. Donal Lamont, Bishop of Umtali, was president of the Commission until his deportation on 23 March 1977 after an unsuccessful appeal against a 10-year prison sentence imposed in October 1976 for failing to report the presence of guerillas (Bishop Lamont was 65 when deported). The CCJP of Rhodesia was formed in 1972, and has links with similar bodies overseas, including the Australian Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (see Evidence, pp. 1546-92).
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CHAPTER 8

The guerilla war

1. The period to 1965

The guerilla war grew out of sporadic outbursts of violence in the late 1950s and 1960s. These outbursts were the result of blacks' frustrations with living and working conditions, the restrictions imposed on them and their lack of a political voice. In 1960 a number of outbreaks of violence in the larger towns left 18 blacks dead - shot by police. The Government response to the increasing incidence of violence at this time was to ease some restrictions on the one hand, but to impose harsher security measures on the other.

In the early 1960s the violence became more politically oriented. A Rhodesian Government White Paper on ZAPU reported the following acts of political violence occurring between January and September 1962: 33 petrol bombings, burning of 18 schools and 10 churches, and 27 attacks on communications.¹ A lot of this violence was spontaneous, but an increasing amount was organised. James Chikerema later declared that the decision to use political violence was taken as early as 1960:

... although not for the purpose of guerilla warfare but the purpose of carrying out acts of sabotage which were considered relevant to bring forth fear and despondency to the settlers of Rhodesia and to influence the British Government and the settlers in Rhodesia to accede to the popular revolutionary demands of the people in Zimbabwe.²

The aim of such violence was to try and generate sufficient unrest to cause the British to intervene and impose constitutional change. Most of the early attacks were in fact against blacks identified in some way with the white establishment.

In mid-1962 a further step was taken with the decision to start bringing arms and ammunition into Rhodesia and to send young men away for sabotage training.³ About this time an organisation called the Zimbabwe Liberation Army (ZLA), linked unofficially to ZAPU, began to attack white-owned stores, dislocate railway lines, disrupt electricity supplies, burn cattle-dips, destroy crops and perform other acts of sabotage.⁴ The training of nationalists in other countries began in 1964-65. Between September 1964 and March 1965 about 40 ZANU members went to Ghana and Tanzania for training in guerilla warfare, sabotage and the manufacture of explosives, and between March 1964 and October 1965 some 52 ZAPU recruits were trained, mainly in Tanzania, but including four in Moscow, one in Nanking and one in Pyongyang, North Korea. Although the nationalists created widespread disturbances the resulting disorder did not lead to British intervention.

Under the multi-racial United Federal Party, while harsh security measures were introduced, some of the more offending legislation which affected the daily lives of blacks was liberalised. However, in the December 1962 elections the white-supremacist Rhodesian Front party replaced the United Federal Party in government. A hardening of white attitudes to the growing level of black violence was reflected in this change of government. The massive electoral victory in May 1965 for the Rhodesian Front and UDI in November 1965 were again, in part, responses by whites to the increasing incidence of racial conflict and black violence.

The response of successive Rhodesian governments to black violence was to increase the range of restrictive security legislation, to ban black political parties and movements and to detain their leaders. In the period 1959 to 1964, five major parties were banned (the SRANC, NDP, ZAPU, PCC, and ZANU) and a number of their leaders detained. Each such act added to the frustrations of the nationalists and increased their militancy.

2. Beginnings of the armed struggle: 1966-72

The origins of the guerilla war are to be found in the period 1966-67 when the external leaderships of ZAPU and ZANU began to send small groups of armed men into Rhodesia from Zambia (independent since October 1964). The first officially acknowledged military engagement with such a group occurred in 1966 at a white farm near Sinoia. Seven members of the group were killed. Poor tactics and a lack of clear, precise objectives at the time led to a number of such groups being met by Rhodesian security forces and their members being either captured or killed.

In mid-1967 a large combined force of ZAPU and the African National Congress of South Africa (SAANC) crossed the Zambezi River upstream from Victoria Falls. A series of engagements saw both the guerillas and security forces sustaining heavier casualties than previously. Joint ZAPU/SAANC forces also attempted to infiltrate into Zimbabwe in January-March 1968 and in July 1968, but were again unsuccessful. These joint ventures, despite their failure, resulted in South African para-military units being sent to help the Rhodesian forces. These units stayed until August 1975.⁵

In the words of A.R. Wilkinson, the incursions at that time revealed:

...serious deficiencies in nationalist strategy and proved extremely costly, in terms of both trained manpower and shattered morale. Relatively large, externally-based insurgent columns, despite offering tough resistance, were at a serious disadvantage when confronted by superior numbers of highly mobile ground troops with support from the air.⁶

Apart from successful counter-insurgency measures, Rhodesian governments continued to strengthen their security legislation.⁷

With the failure of British attempts to negotiate independence and eventual black majority rule at the Tiger and Fearless talks in 1966 and 1968, the nationalists began to shift away from the idea of precipitating British military intervention towards a more self-reliant strategy. The nationalists' military defeats also led them to reappraise their tactics. The result was a move away from confrontation and military engagements to a more selective approach aimed at building up black support and undermining white morale and the white economy. The nationalists, particularly those from ZANU, also began to concentrate on building up support among the black peasantry within Rhodesia.

Because of low morale from previous defeats, the reconsideration of tactics, and a series of leadership crises, guerilla incursions in the period 1969-71 were limited. Military training continued in several African countries but particularly in Tanzania and Zambia. A number of ZAPU and ZANU personnel trained overseas - ZANU mainly in China (Josiah Tongogara and a number of other ZANU fighters went to Nanking in 1966 and Mr Tongogara twice since⁸) and ZAPU mainly in the Soviet Union, but also in Cuba and North Korea.

3. The armed struggle: 1972-79

(1) The guerillas

December 1972 is generally regarded as the real beginning of the guerilla war. This was the time when ZANU guerillas launched their offensive in north-eastern Zimbabwe. The impact of the offensive was such that, for the first time, Prime Minister Ian Smith, on 4 December, felt compelled to warn the white public that the security situation was 'far more serious than it appears on the surface'.⁹

The guerilla offensive in the north-east was particularly aimed at the white agricultural sector, to frighten farmers off their farms. The guerillas were using as their base the Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land, from which they were able to carry out operations into the surrounding farming areas of Centenary, Umvukwes and Mazoe. In these attacks the guerillas generally chose unpopular farmers and attacked their farms. Security units coming to the aid of the farmers were frequently delayed by landmines on approach roads, which enabled the guerillas to escape.

A prime objective of ZANU's operations was to reverse the general black view of white invulnerability. To this end attacks were frequently made on symbols of white authority, such as the offices of District Commissioners. Traditional spirit mediums were also used by the nationalists to stir up feelings among local blacks, and frequent comparisons were made with the uprisings of the 1890s.

For the first time the nationalist guerillas offered a sustained threat to the durability of the white regime, in spite of the fact that the number of guerillas was still small. The guerillas received greater support from local populations, partly because of previous 'politicising', particularly by ZANU, and

partly because of the increased consciousness of blacks developed during the visit of the Pearce Commission.

ZANU was able to establish itself effectively across the border in Mozambique from 1972 because of the support of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO). Not only did ZANU use FRELIMO's supply routes and bases, but some of its fighters also gained valuable combat experience alongside FRELIMO guerillas fighting the Portuguese prior to Mozambique's independence. After independence FRELIMO gave what assistance it could to ZANU, including bases, transport, supplies and training - and men. According to a Rhodesian security forces report of 12 June 1979, up to 1,000 regular soldiers of the Mozambique army were operating alongside the guerillas of ZANU's military wing, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA).¹⁰ ZAPU's military wing, the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), meanwhile, was initiating the use of landmines in the border area near Zambia. Landmines were to be extensively used by both groups right to the end of the guerilla war. Although primarily aimed at hindering the movement of security forces, and secondarily at reducing white morale through civilian deaths and injuries, landmine attacks were indiscriminate, and in the end killed more blacks than whites.

At the beginning of 1973 the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI) joined ZANU and ZAPU in their insurgent activity, undertaking their own incursions until FROLIZI integrated into the reconstituted ANC at the end of 1974. Although FROLIZI's success in obtaining recruits and mobilizing the people was minimal, the FROLIZI presence in the Midlands and even more importantly in Salisbury did have a significant psychological impact on the white population. Up until then urban areas had seen little guerilla activity. The presence of 'terrorists' in the country's capital shook business confidence and discouraged foreign investment. By the end of 1973 the guerilla war was making a significant impact.

The establishment of the reconstituted African National Council (ANC) in December 1974 caused a slow-down in guerilla activity during 1975 while attempts were made to reach a constitutional settlement. The failure of these attempts was to lead to an intensification of the war, aided by the stronger and more effective political leadership given to the external nationalists after 1975 by Mr Nkomo and Mr Mugabe (both released in late 1974 after 10 years in prison).

The failure of negotiations also led the Front-line States and the Organisation of African Unity to increase their support for the guerillas. Both continued their attempts to increase political and military unity among the external nationalists. Their first success was the formation of the Zimbabwe Independence People's Army (ZIPA) in November 1975, and their second the formation of the Patriotic Front in October 1976. The formation of ZIPA, even though it proved only temporary, and the dramatic increase in the number of blacks going to Mozambique to join the armed struggle, led to an upsurge in guerilla activity in 1976.

After the formation of the Patriotic Front and the failure of negotiations at the Geneva Conference both parties undertook a major recruitment drive, especially Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU. Mr Nkomo's army was small, despite the return of the ZAPU component of ZIPA in 1977. To try and match the growing strength of Mr Mugabe's ZANU, Mr Nkomo began to actively seek recruits, particularly among the Ndebele. During his recruiting drive many black students left Zimbabwe via Botswana: some were abducted, others went voluntarily. In a single evening, for instance, 400 black students were transported across the border into Botswana for guerilla training and political education.¹¹ David Martin, of the London Observer, reported from Botswana on 29 May 1977 that black refugees were fleeing into Botswana at the rate of 800 a week. About a third were between 16 and 25, and many of these

wanted to undergo guerilla training.¹² Those who wanted training were airlifted to Zambia. The majority, coming from Matabeleland, were pro-ZAPU and went to ZAPU training camps, but those who were pro-ZANU were sent on to Tanzania or Mozambique.

By the end of 1977 more than 10,000 black Zimbabweans were undergoing training in Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana, Angola and Tanzania. From 1976 Chinese support for ZANU decreased, and ZANU received greater support from the Soviet Union, including training as well as weapons, but most Soviet support continued to go to ZAPU. Cuba, East Germany and Yugoslavia were also assisting the Patriotic Front with training and military equipment. From 1977 the guerilla war steadily intensified, as manpower increased, training improved and more weapons were obtained.

Accurate figures on the strength of the guerilla armies as at the December 1979 ceasefire are difficult to obtain. A December 1979 estimate of the total strength of the Patriotic Front forces was about 55,000 - up to 30,000 ZIPRA guerillas based in Zambia and Angola, and up to 25,000 ZANLA guerillas based in Mozambique.¹³ Another estimate was up to 25,000 ZAPU inside and outside of Zimbabwe and 35-40,000 ZANU.¹⁴ Some 15-17,000 guerillas were believed to be operating inside Zimbabwe (about 11,000 ZANLA and the rest ZIPRA).

Prior to the February 1980 elections some 22,000 persons had assembled at designated assembly areas (by mid-March the total was 24,000). All of them claimed to be guerillas, although according to some reports, a number were untrained men and youths.¹⁵ Of the 22,000 at assembly points, about 17,000 were considered to be ZANU supporters. Rhodesian Combined Operations Headquarters 'assessed' in mid-February 1980 that about 5,000 'trained men and women had entered Rhodesia from Mozambique in violation of the ceasefire agreement' since the signing of the Lancaster House Agreement on 21 December, and that numbers of ZANLA men in particular were staying 'in the field' rather than assembling at ceasefire points.¹⁶

Throughout the guerilla war the nationalists, especially ZANU, continued their program of 'politicising' and 'educating' the tribespeople inside Zimbabwe. The guerillas heavily infiltrated many of the Tribal Trust Lands and spent a considerable amount of time organising village meetings. They also continued their policy of demonstrating that the Government was not invulnerable and that it was unable to give tribal blacks security.

The guerillas generally took care to avoid, as far as possible, direct contact with the security forces. Their tactics were to disrupt government administration and the white dominated economy and to render counter-insurgency measures cost-ineffective. Attacks on white farms caused a number of farmers to abandon their farms, thus lowering white morale and hitting an economy heavily reliant on primary produce. Attacks on administrative centres, schools, missions, health clinics, cattle-dips, communications and roads were all aimed at undermining the white administration and replacing it, where possible, by a new black administration.

While attacks on whites received the most publicity, in excess of 80% of the victims were blacks - many the innocent victims of landmines. The guerillas dealt ruthlessly with those blacks whom they considered to be 'sell-outs', who had reported the presence of guerillas or in some way assisted the security forces. The Rhodesian Government claimed in May 1979 that the total of white civilians killed by guerillas since December 1972 was 404 (including the 107 killed when two Air Rhodesia airliners were shot down), whereas the number of black civilians killed by guerillas in the same period was 2,658 - a ratio of one white to every six blacks.¹⁷

On the other hand, blacks convicted of recruiting or helping guerillas were liable to be hanged or sentenced to long terms of imprisonment by the Rhodesian authorities after civilian or military trials. According to the International Defence and Aid Fund, at least 186 persons known to it were executed or sentenced to death for such offences between March 1968 and September 1979 - the majority since early 1975.¹⁸ Black civilians were caught in the middle, and suffered the brunt of the guerilla war. Forced on occasion to assist one side, they then suffered retribution from the other.

Urban areas, although more secure, were on occasions subject to guerilla attacks. Perhaps the most noteworthy of the urban attacks, certainly the most spectacular, was that of 11 December 1978 on a bulk fuel depot on the outskirts of Salisbury. One estimate put the loss of fuel in the resulting fire at up to 100 million litres - believed to be a quarter of Rhodesia's supplies.¹⁹ The fire represented a massive loss of foreign exchange.

(2) The Rhodesian military

(a) The security forces

The success of the guerilla incursions at the end of 1972 and in early 1973 was such that the white Government immediately started to build up its security forces - the army, air force and police - a process repeated in subsequent years by ever extending call-ups.

In 1972 the security forces were short of manpower and finance. Conditions of service and pay were poor. The Military Balance of 1971-72 gave the strength of the army as 3,400 and the air force as 1,200.²⁰ There were 8,000 army and air force reserves. The British South Africa Police (BSAP) had 6,400 active members (only a third of them whites), plus a reserve of 28,500

(three-quarters white). The BSAP was responsible for internal security.

The army consisted of two infantry battalions, one Special Air Service Squadron and one artillery battery. Whites completing their military service were assigned for three years' part-time service with territorial units. The air force had 55 combat aircraft, including 11 Canberra bombers, 12 Hunters, 12 Vampires, 13 T-52 Provost aircraft, and eight Alouette III helicopters.

Since 1972, details of the exact strength and equipment of the security forces was kept a close secret, but the potential strength of the forces on a full-scale call-out would be at least 100,000. The Military Balance for 1978-79 gave the strength of the army as 9,500 (about 6,250 regulars plus 3,250 conscripts) and an additional 15,000 in the territorial army called up for service at any one time.²¹ The army consisted of one armoured car regiment, six infantry battalions (one white, the Rhodesian Light Infantry, with 1,200 members; four black, the Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR), with 4,000 members; and a fifth black battalion being formed), four Special Air Service Squadrons (white commando units), the Selous Scouts (a mixed-race counter-insurgency unit), the Grey Scouts (a mixed-race mounted infantry unit with 250 members), one artillery regiment, six engineering squadrons and seven signals squadrons. The territorial army comprised eight battalions.

The British South Africa Police (BSAP) comprised 8,000 active members (about a third being whites) and 35,000 reservists (about three-quarters white). The Guard Force, used for guarding 'protected villages', had an establishment of 1,000, nearly all blacks.

The strength of the air force was stated to be 1,300, and the number of combat aircraft 84: a bomber squadron of seven

aircraft, including five Canberras; two fighter squadrons, one with 10 Hunters and the other with 18 Vampires; one training/reconnaissance squadron with eight Provost T-52s and 11 Vampire T55s; another squadron with 12 AL-60C4s and 18 Cessna 337s; one transport squadron, including 10 C-47s; and two helicopter squadrons with 66 Alouette II/IIIs. In addition, in December 1978 it was revealed that 11 US-designed Huey Bell 205A helicopters were in service. These had reached Zimbabwe presumably via South Africa after being sold by Israel to a private firm in Indonesia.²²

(b) The military call-up

The Defence Act of December 1972 increased the period of national service training from 245 to 365 days, ~~one year~~, and liability for service was extended to include persons formerly exempted for minor medical reasons. In March 1973 the Minister of Law and Order stated that men would be able to do their national service training in the BSAP as well as the army and air force. Then in June 1973 the Minister of Defence announced that all employers had to provide details of their employees between 17 and 30 years of age. This was to prevent draft dodging. In August 1973 men between 38 and 48 who were members of the army reserve were called up to release younger men for more active roles.

In February 1974 plans were announced for a massive increase in the security forces so that the Rhodesian Government could shift its approach to the war from the 'defensive' function of border control to a more 'offensive' role.²³ National service intakes were doubled. Men over 25 years who had no military commitment and had been in Rhodesia for more than five years were made liable for one month's service each year. They were to be used primarily for protective military duties. At the same time it was announced that new immigrants would be given a five-year period of grace, but could volunteer for service sooner if they wished.

In April 1974 lump sum payments were offered to national servicemen as an incentive to stay an extra year. Then in May another pay increase was announced, again being designed to encourage national servicemen to stay in the army. In March coloured and Asian national service pay was brought into line with that of whites.

Women were first recruited as volunteers into the regular army and air force in 1975. Women regulars were trained to take over clerical and administrative jobs behind the lines to release men for active service, but the women were all taught the use of firearms and counter-insurgency techniques.

Military commitments for men continued to grow during 1976 and 1977. In May 1976 national service for white males between 18 and 25 was extended from 12 months to 18 months, before periodic service in territorial army or police reserve units. From January 1977 men between 25 and 38 were called up for 190 days of service a year. Then in February 1977 the call-up was extended to whites, Asians and coloureds between 38 and 50 years for 70 days a year. This was in response to ZAPU's recruitment drive and the large increase in the number of guerillas in ZANU. Men over 50 years still had no compulsory service, but they were encouraged to volunteer for guard and police duties. By 1978 conscription for whites had been greatly extended.

In January 1979 the Transitional Government finally extended call-up orders to men between 50 and 59 who lived in urban areas. The order covered whites, Asians, coloureds - and also some blacks, notably doctors. Some of these men were posted to the police field reserve for country duty, but most were included in the urban special reserve. They were to do at least four hours' duty a week, serving a maximum of 42 days in 1979. The basic reason for this call-up was to strengthen the security forces for the April 1979 elections.

As at 1979 the security forces could be boosted to a total strength of some 100,000: about 19,000 regular army, air force and police, plus conscripts; about 55,000 territorials and reserves; about 35,000 BSAP reserves; plus a smaller number in other classifications (e.g. the Guard Force). In addition, there were more than 10,000 security force auxiliaries. By 1979 military call-ups were beginning to have a seriously disruptive effect on the economy, and were causing many whites to question whether Rhodesian society warranted such sacrifices. The strains imposed by call-ups and the war were also evident in a rapidly increasing divorce rate.

The Government-elect of Mr Mugabe decided in March 1980 to end conscription and military call-ups.

(c) Blacks in the security forces

The Transitional Government announced on 17 September 1978 that provision had been made under the 1976 National Service Act for blacks with four years of secondary education to be eligible for national service. This was the first time military conscription had been applied to blacks. Call-up papers for blacks were first issued in December to just over 1,500 men, but only 250 responded. The intake was further reduced to 163. Although the first black conscript intake was small, the white intake at the same time was 1,085 - one of the largest white intakes on record.

According to the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia the decision to conscript blacks was 'designed to pacify whites who felt that they were partaking in an undue share of the fighting and to encourage a "yes" vote in the referendum [on the 1979 Constitution]'.²⁴ The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace went on to say: 'At a time when there was apparently no lack of black recruits for the Government security

forces, the measure seemed totally unjustified'. According to the Guardian (London) over 650 black students who protested the Government's call-up plan for blacks were arrested during November 1978.²⁵ On 10 August 1979 the Muzorewa Government extended eligibility for conscription to all blacks aged 16 to 50 who had three years of secondary education or had at any time registered as apprentices (an estimated 50,000). The Minister of Manpower in the Muzorewa Government, Dr Aaron Mutiti, said at the time that not all eligible blacks would be called up. There were sufficient volunteers for rank and file positions but ^{there was} a desperate shortage of leaders and specialists. For this reason the registration drive would be limited, for the time being, to blacks with educational or trade qualifications.

There were already many blacks in the security forces. The regular army was about 80% black (of which 85% were Shona). The majority of blacks were in the Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR). This group had a strong corporate identity, reinforced by recruitment largely through family connections, and mainly from the Karanga tribe. Blacks were prominent also in the Selous Scouts and Grey Scouts. More than two-thirds of the BSAP was black, and more than 90% of the Guard Force. Comparatively few blacks were commissioned officers in any of the services, but by the end of 1979 there were no obstacles preventing black advancement in the forces, and overall about 10% of officers were blacks, albeit junior officers. Although pay scales for blacks in the services were much lower than those of whites, they were considerably more than the black average wage.

(d) Mercenaries

The Smith Government welcomed white volunteers from other countries wishing to join the security forces, especially as the emigration rate rose and the guerilla war worsened. Volunteers were accepted into the forces on the same pay and conditions as local recruits. For this reason the white

Government always claimed volunteers from other countries were not mercenaries seeking their fortune by fighting, but rather were simply foreign-born soldiers. The black nationalists, however, considered them to be mercenaries and objected to them. Mr Nkomo defined mercenaries as 'people who join armies that are not their national armies'.²⁶

Foreigners usually joined in the war because they considered themselves as professional soldiers and Zimbabwe was the location of a war, or because they had an ideological commitment and believed they were fighting the spread of communism. Figures for the numbers of mercenaries or foreign soldiers vary, but overall foreign recruitment was not sufficient to solve the whites' manpower problem. It is generally considered there were in the order of 1,000 - 3,000 mercenaries.

Foreign soldiers in the Rhodesian army came from many countries, particularly South Africa, Britain and the US, but also Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Portugal, Belgium, France, West Germany and other Western countries. A number of these soldiers had previous military experience in Korea, Northern Ireland, Vietnam, and other parts of Africa including Mozambique.

The ZANU representative in Australia, then Mr Simbarashe Mumbengegwe, told the Sub-Committee in late 1978 that roughly 300 Australians had been recruited into the Rhodesian army as mercenaries and that the Rhodesian Information Centre in Sydney was a 'key agency through which these recruitments are made'.²⁷ He recommended then that:

The Australian Government should take all measures possible to prevent its nationals from being recruited into Smith's army as mercenaries. This would mean legislation and imposition of stiff sentences on both recruiters and recruits.²⁸

Similar allegations were made to the Sub-Committee by the Campaign Against Racial Exploitation (CARE). However, neither CARE nor ZANU were able to produce primary source evidence to support their allegations.

The Department of Foreign Affairs responded to these allegations by saying that it was aware there were Australians serving in the Rhodesian armed forces but it believed the number involved was more likely to be in the region of 150 than 300. The Rhodesian Information Centre denied acting as a recruitment centre or agency. Two Australians were reported killed in a Zimbabwe Rhodesian raid into Mozambique in September 1979.

The Committee noted that legislation had been passed making it an offence for persons to recruit in Australia for the armed services of foreign countries. This was the Crimes (Foreign Incursions and Recruitment) Act 1978, which came into force on 14 April 1978. The Committee also noted that the Act did not prevent Australians from travelling overseas as private citizens and then enlisting in the armed services of other countries. The Committee considered this was a matter warranting further consideration by the Government.

(e) Auxiliary forces

From the beginning of 1978, both Bishop Muzorewa and Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole were actively engaged in recruiting their own private armies, or 'auxiliary forces' as they became known, but by the beginning of 1979 these forces had come under the overall command of the military and were known as 'security force auxiliaries'. The recruits came largely from among the unemployed, but between 5-10% were former guerillas who had defected.

In November 1978, Bishop Muzorewa and Mr Sithole each had an army of about 1,000 men, but by the April 1979 elections Mr Sithole had around 2,000 auxiliaries while Bishop Muzorewa had up to 8,000. After the April 1979 elections Bishop Muzorewa's army continued to grow. Auxiliaries loyal to Mr Sithole, however, received a severe set-back on 20 July when Government forces began regrouping them for 'retraining and reorientation'. Two groups of auxiliaries, mainly loyal to Mr Sithole, resisted and in ensuing clashes 183 were killed. A military communique said

action was taken against the auxiliaries because of their 'ill discipline'. The communique stated:

This situation has been a festering sore for some time. Tribespeople were being terrorised by gangs who were nothing more than bandits and it was felt that the situation had to be corrected before any amnesty campaign could be launched.

Mr Sithole was in London at the time of the move against the auxiliaries.

The Rhodesian Government moved in response to frequent reports of auxiliary involvement in rape, arson, assaults, theft and other forms of harassment. Auxiliaries were trained, placed under security force control, and given specific tasks, civilian as well as military. They were deployed mainly in the Tribal Trust Lands, and the civilian projects in which they participated included road and bridge building, re-opening schools, re-opening cattle-dips, etc. They also provided security and endeavoured to clear guerillas from assigned areas.

By August 1979 most of the auxiliaries, including Mr Sithole's, had been absorbed into the overall military structure. The total auxiliary force was approaching 15,000 and was under the army's command rather than being controlled by a political party. Many of the auxiliaries were integrated into the Rhodesian African Rifles and some into the Selous Scouts. Overall the auxiliaries boosted the Government's forces considerably. By the beginning of 1980 there were said to be around 20,000 auxiliaries.

(f) Strategy and tactics

Operationally all the security forces including the police and emergency services were under the direction of the Commander of Combined Operations. To effectively enlarge the security forces at the rate which became necessary to counter the growth of the guerilla forces the training system was expanded to produce a steady flow of officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers, and to continually improve their professional skills.

Particularly from 1976 onwards, when the numbers of black nationalists training in camps in nearby countries increased dramatically, the security forces frequently undertook 'offensive' raids on guerilla camps in these countries, particularly in Zambia and Mozambique (but also in Botswana and Angola). These raids were normally not 'hot-pursuit' raids but rather 'preventive action' attacks - or in some instances 'retaliation' attacks - primarily aimed at curtailing the flow of guerillas into Zimbabwe. For instance, on 24 September 1978 Combined Operations Headquarters reported that 25 'terrorist' bases had been attacked in Mozambique. Again, around 20 October 1978 there were a number of air strikes against guerilla bases in both Zambia and Mozambique. The security forces were aiming to destroy bases, disrupt guerilla logistics, eliminate 'terrorists' and collect intelligence. The Government wanted to eliminate as many guerillas as possible before the rainy season which gave guerillas an advantage in the bush.

Another series of raids into Zambia and Mozambique took place in April 1979 just prior to the April 1979 elections. By 20 April 1979 Salisbury military headquarters had announced a total of 16 raids across Rhodesian borders during 1979. These were aimed to prevent guerillas disrupting the elections. These raids continued under Bishop Muzorewa's Government: for instance, on 3 June 1979 there were a series of ground and air strikes against

guerilla camps in Mozambique. On 26 June Zimbabwe Rhodesian commandos struck the headquarters of Mr Nkomo's ZIPRA forces on the outskirts of Lusaka, including Mr Nkomo's house.

Raids into neighbouring countries were also conducted for 'political' reasons, for example the series of raids into Zambia in late 1979 during the course of the Lancaster House conference. These raids disrupted Zambia's vital transport links with Tanzania, Malawi and Mozambique and forced Zambia into almost total dependence on the southern routes through Zimbabwe for its foreign trade and, in particular, much needed shipments of maize. Zimbabwe Rhodesia's strategy was generally considered to be aimed at disrupting the economies of Zambia and Mozambique as much as possible to undermine their support for the Patriotic Front and a continuation of the guerilla war. The attacks on Zambia caused President Kaunda to put his forces on alert, call up reservists, and to declare 'we are now in a full-scale war situation'.³⁰ Other raids into Zambia, in early December 1979, were to prevent a build-up of ZIPRA forces for infiltration into Zimbabwe Rhodesia during the ceasefire then under negotiation at Lancaster House.

(3) Rhodesian legal and administrative responses

Apart from its military responses, the Rhodesian Government also attempted to counter the guerilla offensive by a series of legal and administrative measures, aimed particularly at isolating the guerillas from the black population. The measures introduced included the following.

(a) Collective fines

On 19 January 1977 the Emergency Powers (Collective Fines) Regulations were ^{proclaimed} ~~enacted~~ to empower Provincial Commissioners to impose collective fines on communities which failed to report the presence of guerillas or in which it was

suspected that a member or members had assisted guerillas. The seizing of cattle, burning of crops, and destroying of huts were all measures used to punish rural blacks for assisting guerillas.

(b) 'No-go' areas

'No-go' corridors were established along parts of the border areas to deprive guerillas of contact with the local people. The first 'no-go' areas were established in the north of the Centenary district. In these areas any black could be shot on sight.

(c) 'Protected' and 'consolidated' villages

'Protected' and 'consolidated' villages were set up to keep villagers and guerillas apart, thereby denying the guerillas access to food and shelter. Protected villages were surrounded by a security fence which was guarded at all times, while a consolidated village was guarded but not fenced in. Many blacks were forced to move into these villages under a hastily devised program called 'Operation Overload'. They received no compensation for lost property. Conditions varied in these villages but were frequently poor, with disease and malnutrition not uncommon.

The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace estimated in 1977 that more than half a million people had been moved into more than 200 protected or consolidated villages.³¹ Most protected and consolidated villages were subject to curfews. Protected villages were 'opened' by the Government-elect of Mr Mugabe in March 1980. At that time there were estimated to be 150 such villages with a population of about 300,000.³²

(d) Curfews

In many parts of the country, and particularly around protected and consolidated villages, curfews were imposed which lasted 12, 18 or even 22 hours each day. They were imposed and lifted periodically in different parts of the country. Curfews made it particularly hard for blacks to go about their daily tasks such as tending crops and herding cattle. Curfew-breakers were liable to be shot without warning. Curfews and protected villages succeeded in alienating considerable numbers of blacks.

(e) Other disruptions to tribal life

In some areas schools, mission stations, hospitals, community centres, grinding mills, businesses and trading centres were closed for security reasons. This happened, for example, in February - March 1973 when the Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land was sealed off. In addition blacks were subject to identity checks under the Africans (Registration and Identification) Act. All blacks over the age of 16 were required to carry an identification certificate at all times. In June 1974 this requirement was extended to black males over 12 years.

(f) Forced labour

The construction and maintenance of roads, bridges, fences, dams and communications by forced labour was also introduced under emergency regulations in February 1974. Anyone between 12 and 60 years of age was eligible for such work.

(g) Psychological warfare

Psychological warfare was used by the Government in an attempt to win support. For example, pamphlets such as the following, written in Shona, were dropped from the air:

Mhondoro, your tribal spirit, has sent a message to say that your ancestral spirits are very dissatisfied with you. Besides Chiwawa [an important spirit] has abandoned the man whom he used as his medium because this man has helped the terrorists. As a result of this, there has been no rain, your crops have died and there could be great famine. It is only the Government which can help you, but you have to realize³³ your obligation to help the Government also.

Some leaflets offered financial incentives for providing information about the guerillas. Others were to the point:

The speed with which you inform the police and soldiers [of the presence of guerillas] is the speed with which your schools, grinding mills and beer halls will be opened.³⁴

(h) Martial law

In an effort to counter escalating guerilla activity a series of martial law proclamations were made starting on 23 September 1978. The first declaration applied to seven areas of mainly Tribal Trust Lands, but including some white-owned farms and other settlements. On 3 October 1978 martial law was extended to most of Matabeleland, excluding the cities of Bulawayo and Gwelo but including the areas south of Bulawayo as far as Beit Bridge, to Victoria Falls in the north-west and Chipinga in the east. Martial law was also declared on 4 October in an additional seven Tribal Trust Lands in the east and north-east of Zimbabwe.

Further extensions took place on 31 October and 10 and 24 November, so that by the end of November 1978, 75% of the country was under martial law.³⁵ A further 15 areas came under martial law on 12 January 1979, making between 90-95% of the country subject to martial law. Only areas along the main communications routes between Bulawayo and Salisbury, and between Karoi and Umtali were exempted, but Umtali itself was under martial law.

Martial law areas were subject to special courts-martial, which could hold their proceedings anywhere, either in public or in camera. They could impose the death penalty or any sentence that the court considered appropriate for war-related offences. Government troops could demand the help of local people. Martial law freed the security forces from civil restraints including the right of appeal to higher courts. Its aim was to facilitate operations against the guerillas and those assisting the guerillas. The Government declared that 'so long as citizens observe the laws of the country, their normal day-to-day activities will not be the subject of interference'.³⁶

During Bishop Muzorewa's term as Prime Minister, the martial law zones were extended once, on 3 September 1979, to bring almost the entire country under martial law. This was done to counter supposed guerilla plans to escalate the war during the Lancaster House Conference.

No official figures on the number of blacks detained or tried under martial law were available as at the end of 1979. The Guardian (London) in September 1979 gave an estimate of 15,000 people being arrested and detained without trial since martial law was introduced.³⁷ The International Defence and Aid Fund had estimated that the number detained under martial law as at August 1979 was about 7,000³⁸, and at the time Lord Soames took over as Governor of Rhodesia in mid-December the estimate was 5,000.³⁹

Martial law was lifted under a proclamation by the Governor of Rhodesia, Lord Soames, which came into effect on 21 March 1980. In the previous week, according to 'informed sources' quoted by the Press, 1,278 people detained under martial law had been released, leaving only one person still in detention (to be charged with a civil offence).⁴⁰ The number of detainees at the time of the February elections was 1,338 under martial law and 705 under ministerial detention orders - a total of 2,043, according to the report of the Australian National Observer Group.

(i) Censorship

As the guerilla war intensified the Government imposed greater censorship on the news media. On 26 April 1976 new regulations were published. A national security committee was set up, comprising members of the Cabinet, which had powers to prohibit the publication or broadcasting of certain news items. The Prime Minister, Mr Ian Smith, stated that the regulations were to 'prevent the dissemination of information which would prejudice the security of the state and be harmful to Rhodesia.'⁴¹ In July 1976 foreign journalists working in Zimbabwe were allowed work permits valid for only 30 days, though renewable thereafter. Additional measures were later taken to restrict and censor news reporting of the war. A number of black newspapers were banned.

4. The costs of the guerilla war

The escalation of the guerilla war, particularly from 1976, was at great cost to both sides, particularly in terms of lives: by the end of 1979 some 20,000 lives had been lost since 1972 inside Rhodesia. In early 1979 about 1,000 persons a month were being killed. A Combined Operations Headquarters communique issued on 4 November 1979 stated that 18,783 had been killed since December 1972, excluding guerillas killed in across-border raids.⁴² The total included 10,052 guerillas, 3,480 'collaborators, stock thieves and crossfire victims', 4,127 civilians killed by the guerilla forces (about 500 of whom were whites), and 1,124 members of the security forces.

The figures show that more than 25% of those killed were civilians, mainly blacks. Rural blacks suffered most during the guerilla war. They were subject to demands from both sides, were frequently assaulted from both sides (on accusations of having helped the other side) and their daily lives were disrupted by

searches, curfews, restrictions, forced movement, school and health clinic closures and food shortages. Observers at both the April 1979 and February 1980 elections commented that the main hope ^{expressed by} of rural voters was that elections would bring peace and an end to the war. That hope was not fulfilled after the April 1979 elections but it was with the February 1980 elections.

The costs of the war, for the ordinary population, may be gauged from the following:

- . Vast areas of farmland were left untended, and would not bear a harvest in 1980.
- . More than 850,000 people lost their homes.
- . At least 50 of the 100 mission hospitals and clinics that provided medical care in rural areas were untended, and most of the rest damaged, looted or run-down.
- . A total of 433,000 children were displaced from school, some for more than five years.
- . At least 10,000 persons were maimed.
- . Widespread unemployment.

The above picture was painted by the Salvation Army's relief agency in Zimbabwe in early March 1980. A report in March 1979 claimed that of 450 hospitals and clinics for blacks operated by the Government and the missions, 155 had closed, including 29 hospitals.⁴³ As a result the incidence of disease had increased, as had the infant mortality rate.

The annual report of the Rhodesian Secretary for Education for 1978 stated that 1,094 primary schools and 38 secondary schools had been closed since 1972 - 617 primary and 30

secondary schools in 1978 alone. The 1978 closures resulted in 173,021 pupils and 3,406 teachers being displaced in primary schools and 8,604 pupils and 451 teachers in secondary schools. By January 1980 the number of primary schools closed since the guerilla war began was 1,521, the number of secondary schools closed was 89 and in excess of 400,000 children had been displaced from schools.⁴⁴ A survey of rural areas by the International Committee of the Red Cross estimated that about one-third of children between one and five suffered from malnutrition. For rural blacks in particular the legacy of the war was suffering, destruction and deprivation.

The guerilla war was also costly in economic terms. Apart from the direct damage caused to the Rhodesian economy by guerilla attacks, the indirect damage caused by frequent call-ups of whites was considerable. The direct cost of the war rose rapidly each year from \$295.6 million in 1974-75 to \$2402m in the 1979-80 Budget - more than \$21m a day. The direct cost represented 37% of total 1979-80 Budget expenditure (41% after a supplementary Budget in November 1979).

Although the guerilla war was costly in terms of lives and money, it is likely - given the previous record of negotiations failures - that without the guerilla war there would not have been a peaceful resolution of the 'Rhodesia problem' by early 1980.

5. International aid

As at Independence Day, Britain had agreed to provide aid totalling \$A136m, and Nigeria, Sweden and West Germany had promised aid totalling \$A50m between them. The US had already provided \$A1.8m for the repair of rural health clinics damaged by the war, and was providing another \$A12m in the 1979-80 financial year. In addition, the US had also provided \$A4.5m for the resettlement of refugees, and hoped to provide an additional

• \$A22.5m to \$A27m in the financial year starting 1 October 1980, subject to Congressional approval.

• The urgent need for aid in Zimbabwe is in the one to two years immediately after Independence, to enable reconstruction and a quick improvement in the lives of the majority of blacks. The requirement is for aid to repair the damage caused by war and to start eradicating some of the inequalities resulting from past racial policies. Refugees and the homeless need to be resettled; land needs to be redistributed; schools, hospitals and health clinics need to be reopened, and new ones established; minimum wages for blacks need to be improved, and new jobs created. Malnutrition needs to be eradicated, and good agricultural practice restored (cattle-dips reopened, etc). Improvements in the initial period are essential to provide the stability needed for longer-term reform.

• The Committee was pleased to note an Australian aid grant of \$A5 million, to be provided over the next two years, was offered by the Australian Prime Minister at the Independence Day celebrations on 18 April 1980, and that \$A1.5 million of it had been allocated for the immediate rehabilitation and expansion of facilities such as schools and hospitals, and for veterinary work and agricultural rehabilitation.

The Committee noted further that Australia had already provided \$A1 million to assist the repatriation of refugees from neighbouring countries back to Zimbabwe and that it would continue to sponsor Zimbabwean students in Australia.

• The Committee welcomes these initiatives, and urges the Government to keep the needs of Zimbabwe under review. If requests for additional aid are received from Zimbabwe, the Committee urges that they be considered sympathetically, so that the hard-won independence of Zimbabwe is not jeopardised.

Notes and references

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CHAPTER 9

Population, migration and refugees

1. Introduction

Australia's present migration ties with Zimbabwe are fairly small: Zimbabwean immigrants comprise less than 1% of Australia's annual migrant intake. The number in 1978-79 was 595, virtually all whites. But although small, the number coming to Australia has been increasing.

In this chapter the Committee examines the immigration of Zimbabweans to Australia in the context of Australia's immigration policy, and looks at the question of Australia's response if called on to accept refugees from Zimbabwe. Before considering these matters the Committee examines the Zimbabwe population structure and white and black migration.

2. Zimbabwe

(1) Population

The officially estimated population of Zimbabwe as at 30 June 1979 was 7,140,000 - 6,860,000 blacks, 244,000 whites, 10,600 Asians and 24,700 coloureds. In the previous 12 months the black population had increased by an estimated 220,000 while the white population fell by an estimated 16,000. Some estimates put the 1980 white population at about 220,000.

The annual rate of growth of the total population in 1978 was estimated at 3.2% - a decline on previous years attributed to emigration.¹ At the usual rate of growth of 3.5%

the Zimbabwe population is expected to be about 10,000,000 in 1987 and 15,000,000 by the turn of the century.²

A feature of the Zimbabwe population is that more than 50% are children under 15 years of age.³ Some 21% of the population is below the age of five. As a result Zimbabwe has one of the highest dependency ratios (i.e. the number of dependents expressed as a percentage of the adult population between 15 and 65) in the world. In Zimbabwe for every 100 people 15 or over, there are 102 under this age, whereas in the United States and Japan there are 32 and in the United Kingdom 30. The average adult in Zimbabwe has to support more than three times as many children as his counterpart in a developed country.

Details of population growth, at five year intervals to 1965 and one year intervals thereafter, are shown in Table 9.1. The first full census of blacks in Zimbabwe was taken only in 1962, although censuses of whites had been taken regularly since 1901. The last census of whites was in 1969.

Table 91: Population estimates by broad ethnic groups

Year	Blacks	Whites	Asians	Coloureds	Total
As at 30 June					
1901	700	11		1.5*	710
1905	770	13		2.1*	790
1910	860	21		2.8*	880
1915	970	27	1.0	2.0	1 000
1920	1 090	33	1.2	2.0	1 130
1925	1 220	38	1.4	2.1	1 260
1930	1 380	48	1.7	2.4	1 430
1935	1 610	54	2.1	3.0	1 670
1940	1 870	65	2.5	3.8	1 940
1945	2 200	81	2.9	4.5	2 290
1950	2 600	125	4.0	5.7	2 730
1955	3 090	165	4.9	7.6	3 270
1960	3 610	218	6.7	9.9	3 840
1965	4 260	210	8.0	12.6	4 490
1966	4 400	213	8.3	13.3	4 630
1967	4 550	215	8.6	13.9	4 790
1968	4 710	223	8.8	14.6	4 960
1969	4 880	230	9.0	15.3	5 130
1970	5 050	239	9.2	16.1	5 310
1971	5 220	249	9.3	16.9	5 500
1972	5 400	262	9.6	17.7	5 690
1973	5 590	270	9.7	18.6	5 890
1974	5 780	273	9.8	19.5	6 080
1975	5 980	277	10.0	20.4	6 290
1976	6 190	277	10.1	21.4	6 500
1977	6 410	268	10.3	22.5	6 710
1978	6 640	260	10.5	23.6	6 930
1979	6 860	244	10.6	24.7	7 140
As at 31 December					
1970	5 130	243	9.2	16.5	5 400
1971	5 310	255	9.4	17.3	5 590
1972	5 490	267	9.6	18.1	5 780
1973	5 680	271	9.7	19.0	5 980
1974	5 880	274	9.9	19.9	6 180
1975	6 080	278	10.0	20.9	6 390
1976	6 300	273	10.2	22.0	6 610
1977	6 520	263	10.3	23.0	6 820
1978	6 750	251	10.5	24.0	7 040
1979					
* Asians and coloureds combined					

Sources: Zimbabwe Rhodesia, Central Statistical Office, Supplement to the Monthly Digest of Statistics (Salisbury), and data supplied by the Zimbabwe Rhodesian government.

About 96% of the population in Zimbabwe is black, about 3.5% is white and about 0.5% Asian or coloured. Since 1969 the growth rate for blacks has been estimated at some 3.5% - one of the highest both in Africa and in the world. The black population is expected to increase this year by about 240,000 or more - the total of the white population.

Apart from missionaries and a few traders there were few whites in Zimbabwe before 1890. By 1896 there were about 5,000 and by 1901 about 11,000. The white population reached 100,000 in 1948 and at the time of UDI in 1965 it was 210,000. The maximum, of 278,000, was reached in December 1975. Since then white numbers have been declining steadily through emigration.

The overall population of Zimbabwe has steadily increased, despite the guerilla war and the decline in the white population. The increase has resulted from the high growth rate in the black population, assisted marginally by the growth rate in the Asian and coloured population groups.

Most of the population in Zimbabwe is non-urban. The population of the 14 main towns at the end of 1978 was officially estimated at 1,364,000 or 19% of the total population. The population of each of the five largest towns was estimated as follows⁴:

	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u> (mid-year)
Salisbury	616 000	633 000
Bulawayo	357 000	366 000
Gwelo	69 000	70 000
Umtali	63 000	64 000
Que Que	51 000	51 000

These figures were based on employment figures with allowance being made for dependents. They did not include the unemployed or

• their dependents or the many rural blacks who moved to the main
urban centres to escape the guerilla war. The 'unofficial'
. population of each of the main urban centres was probably
considerably higher.

The 'official' distribution of population as at the end
of 1977 is shown in Table 9.2.

Table 9.2: Distribution of population 1977

	Whites	Asians and coloureds	Blacks
	%	%	%
Urban areas	85.3	90.2	16.5
White rural areas	13.6	7.3	19.8*
National lands	0.1	-	0.1
Tribal Trust Lands	0.9	0.6	60.3
Other black areas	0.1	1.9	3.3

* Mainly employed on white - owned farms

Source: Rhodesia, Department of Information, Immigration and Tourism.

(2) White migration

(a) Immigration

Immigration was the major factor in the build-up of the white population in Zimbabwe. In 1951 Zimbabwe-born whites comprised only 32.7% of the white population; in 1961 the figure was 35% and in 1969 it was still only 40.7%.⁵ As the 1969 census was the last held in Zimbabwe later figures are not available. The origins of whites in 1951, 1961 and 1969 are shown in Table 9.3.

Table 9.3: Origins of Zimbabwean whites 1951, 1961, 1969

Percentage of whites born in	1951	1961	1969
Zimbabwe	32.7	35.0	40.7
United Kingdom	28.8	26.9	23.0
South Africa	30.5	26.2	21.7
Other countries	8.0	11.9	14.6

Sources: Columns 1 and 2, John Sprack, Rhodesia : South Africa's Sixth Province (International Defence and Aid Fund, London, 1974), p. 73; col. 3, Harry R. Strack, Sanctions : The Case of Rhodesia (Syracuse University Press, 1978), p. 213.

A more detailed breakdown of the position in 1969, based on the census, is shown in Table 9.4. The figures in Tables 9.3 and 9.4 show that migrants from the United Kingdom were the major foreign group in Zimbabwe, with South Africans forming the second largest group.

Table 9.4: Country of birth of whites, 1969

Country	Number	Percentage
Zimbabwe	92 934	40.7
United Kingdom	52 468	23.0
South Africa	49 585	21.7
Zambia	8 130	3.6
Other Africa	4 683	2.1
Portugal	3 206	1.4
Ireland	1 833	0.8
Greece	1 658	0.7
Germany	1 602	0.7
Other Europe	6 202	2.7
Other	5 995	2.6

Total white population	228 296	100
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Source: Rhodesia, Central Statistical Office, Census of Population 1969 (Salisbury), p. 72, as quoted in Strack, Sanctions: The Case of Rhodesia, p. 213.

The years after World War Two saw a boost in immigration which continued into the 1950s. Total immigration began to decline from 1958 into the early 1960s while emigration increased, with the result that the years 1961 to 1964 inclusive and 1966 saw a net outflow of whites. From 1967 to 1975 inclusive there was a yearly net inflow of whites, but the net outflow resumed in 1976 and has continued since. Details are provided in Table 9.5.

Table 7.5: Migration of whites 1955 to 1979

Year	Immigrants	Emigrants	Net migration
1955	14 000	6 000	+ 8 000
1956	19 000	8 000	+ 11 000
1957	18 000	11 000	+ 7 000
1958	14 000	9 000	+ 5 000
1959	9 000	5 000	+ 4 000
1960	8 000	7 000	+ 1 000
1961	8 000	10 000	- 2 000
1962	8 000	12 000	- 4 000
1963	7 000	18 000	- 11 000
1964	7 000	15 710	- 8 710
1965	11 128	8 850	+ 2 278
1966	6 418	8 510	- 2 092
1967	9 618	7 570	+ 2 048
1968	11 864	5 650	+ 6 214
1969	10 929	5 890	+ 5 039
1970	12 227	5 896	+ 6 331
1971	14 743	5 336	+ 9 407
1972	13 966	5 141	+ 8 825
1973	9 433	7 751	+ 1 682
1974	9 649	9 069	+ 580
1975	12 425	10 497	+ 1 928
1976	7 782	14 854	- 7 072
1977	5 730	16 638	- 10 908
1978	4 360	18 069	- 13 709
1979 -			
January	325	1 398	- 1 073
February	311	903	- 592
March	304	1 555	- 1 251
April	237	1 865	- 1 628
May	283	1 291	- 1 008
June	228	1 049	- 821
Total			
Mid-year	1 688	8 061	- 6 373
July	225	1 001	- 776
August	355	911	- 556
September	272	866	- 594
October	349	556	- 207
November	277	621	- 344
December	251	958	- 707
Total 1979	3 416	12 973	- 9 557

Source: Compiled from tables in Monthly Migration and Tourist Statistics, prepared by the Central Statistical Office, Salisbury.

In the years following UDI the Rhodesian authorities encouraged white immigration. Rhodesia's economic expansion after the application of sanctions produced an accelerated demand for skilled personnel. White immigration was also encouraged for political and psychological reasons: in an interview in the South African magazine, To the Point, of 15 January 1972 Prime Minister Ian Smith was quoted as saying that Rhodesia's immigration policy was 'not purely an exercise to try to alter the ratio of black to white. It is a practical exercise which will develop the country but which will also, at the same time - I don't deny it - give more confidence to the white man if we can increase the white population'.⁶ Rhodesian governments encouraged white immigration by offering a range of incentives including assisted passages.

(b) Emigration

Zimbabwe for many years had a comparatively large mobile white population, as shown by the figures in Table 95. However, the balance for most of the period to 1961 was in Zimbabwe's favour. In 1961 the balance swung the other way, with 2,000 more whites leaving the country than arriving. The swing to a net outflow continued until 1965, when there was a net inflow. From 1972 the trend began towards a negative net migration - apart from 1975 when the number of immigrants was boosted by an influx of Portuguese refugees from Angola and Mozambique. In 1976 the number of refugees from Angola and Mozambique lessened, while the emigration rate increased by some 42% over the previous year. The emigration rate rose another 12% in 1977 and 9% in 1978, while the immigration rate continued to decline. However, in 1979 the emigration rate fell 28%. In the years 1976 to 1979 inclusive, in each of which more migrants left than arrived, the net outflow of whites was 41,246.

The greatest net outflow in any month from when detailed statistics were kept in 1955 to the end of 1979 occurred in December 1978 when only 166 immigrated whereas 2,937 emigrated,

resulting in a net migration of -2,771. December, being the end of the school year, is traditionally a heavy emigration month. December 1978 was particularly so as it was also the month originally scheduled for elections leading to black majority rule. The escalation of the guerilla war in 1978 would also have contributed. The net loss in December 1979 was only 707. The net outflow in 1979 averaged slightly less than 800 a month - the lowest rate since 1976.

The main reasons for increased emigration in recent years included the intensification of the guerilla war, increasing military service requirements, general political uncertainty and sanctions. Social instability, disruption of family life, feelings of insecurity and tension, and parents' doubts about the future of their children were also cited in evidence as reasons for leaving Rhodesia.

Emigration to the end of 1979 was boosted by fears of what might eventuate under majority rule - possible expropriation of land or property, doubts about career prospects under a voluntary or enforced scheme of Africanisation, the fear that the limited right to take funds out of the country might be even further restricted, fears of loss of privilege, and perhaps ultimately of expulsion, and fears of possible civil war. A number of whites left because at the time they feared a military takeover by the Patriotic Front. More abstract reasons included fear of losing high socio-economic status and becoming subservient to blacks, and fear of losing their white cultural heritage and identity in much the same way that some ethnic communities in Australia fear losing their cultural identity.

Up to the return to legality in December 1979 Zimbabweans could take only \$R1,000 plus personal belongings such as furniture and a car out of the country. Other assets were 'frozen' with the result that a number of whites claimed they were virtual 'financial prisoners' inside the country - they

would like to go but couldn't afford to leave everything behind and start again. To further discourage whites from emigrating, the then Prime Minister, Bishop Muzorewa, announced on 22 July 1979 that anyone leaving Zimbabwe Rhodesia who wished to return would face a re-entry fee of \$R20,000.

The floating or transitory nature of a considerable part of the white population of Rhodesia was indicated by the fact that since the beginning of 1966 to the end of 1979, total immigration was 132,560 and total emigration 133,844. A further indication was a study of the departure rate of immigrants who arrived in the years 1964 to 1969. The results of this study, based on immigration and census statistics, are shown in Table 9.6.

Table 9.6: Immigrant settlement in Rhodesia, 1964-69

Year	Immigrants	Immigrants still in Rhodesia in March 1969	Percentage of immigrants who had left
1964	7 000	2 762	60.5
1965	11 128	3 886	65.1
1966	6 418	3 036	52.7
1967	9 618	5 470	43.1
1968	11 864	8 356	29.6
1969 (Jan-March)	2 698	2 472	-

Source: B. Davidson, J. Slovo, A.R. Wilkinson, Southern Africa: The New Politics of Revolution (Penguin Books, 1976), p. 314.

(i) Age

In recent years the largest group of white emigrants ^{was} ~~has~~ been the 20-39 age group, despite restrictions relating to military service: youths ^{had} ~~have~~ to register for national service prior to turning 18, and ^{could not} ~~cannot~~ usually obtain emigrant status until they ^{had} ~~have~~ completed at least 18 months of national service. During 1976-78 more than a third of those emigrating ^{were} ~~have been~~ in the 20 to 39 age group. Details are provided in Table 9.7.

Table 9.7: Age distribution of white emigrants

(Percent)

Year	0-14 years	15-19 years	20-39 years	40-59 years	60 and over
1976	27	6	43	16	8
1977	25	6	41	17	11
1978	26	6	37	19	12

Source: Calculated from tables in Monthly Migration and Tourist Statistics, prepared by the Central Statistical Office, Salisbury.

The statistics in this and the next section on occupation suggest that those going ~~are~~^{were} the people Zimbabwe need~~d~~^{ed} most - the young professional elite.

(ii) Occupation

Those who ~~have~~ emigrated from Zimbabwe in the past few years, particularly in the economically active age groups, ~~have~~^{were} ~~been~~ mainly professional, skilled or semi-skilled workers and their families. The pool of skilled manpower in Zimbabwe ~~has been~~^{was} diminishing, and this ~~is~~^{created} ~~creating~~ problems. The Ministry of Finance, in its Economic Survey of Zimbabwe Rhodesia for 1978, stated:

The emigration of skilled personnel was another factor which adversely affected employment. During 1978 there was a net loss of almost 5,000 skilled people and unless this trend is halted many unskilled workers who depend on their skilled colleagues for employment, will lose their jobs.

As an example, the Ministry pointed out that in agricultural industry fewer than 6,000 skilled farmers employed more than 300,000 people. In 1978 the loss through emigration of 165 skilled personnel accounted for a significant proportion of the 7,400 jobs lost in agriculture that year. The total number in employment fell by more than 25,000 in 1978 - the third year in a row in which employment numbers declined.⁸ Main causes for the decline were sanctions, reduced foreign exchange earnings and the emigration of skilled personnel.

Although not a large proportion of the total numbers emigrating in each of 1977 and 1978, the exodus of the professional, technical and administrative personnel shown in Table 9.8, in proportion to the numbers in their occupational categories within Zimbabwe, was producing strains in the economy. In the six months December 1978 to May 1979 the country lost 144

engineers, 41 doctors, 91 accountants, 30 draughtsmen and 128 nurses. Altogether nearly 1,100 'highly qualified' persons left the country in that six months.⁹

**Table 98: Selected occupations of economically active
white, Asian and coloured migrants,
1977 and 1978***

(males and females)

Occupation	1977			1978		
	Immig- rants	Emig- rants	Net mig- ration	Immig- rants	Emig- rants	Net mig- ration
Physical scient- ists & related workers	15	51	-36	12	43	-31
Engineers	149	241	-92	90	261	-171
Draughtsmen	68	58	10	45	70	-25
Engineering technicians	67	117	-50	33	62	-29
Physicians & surgeons	23	63	-40	36	61	-25
Accountants & auditors	65	211	-146	57	188	-131
Teachers	94	328	-234	74	330	-256
Nurses & midwives	84	195	-111	74	204	-130
Religious workers	99	196	-97	81	161	-80
Other professional/ technical	267	581	-314	240	582	-342
Administrative & managerial	146	568	-422	129	571	-442
Clerical & related	926	1 569	-643	593	1 654	-1 061
Production super- visors/foremen	82	123	-41	61	132	-71
Mechanical engineer- ing workers	268	437	-169	171	481	-310
Motor mechanics & related	88	258	-170	54	211	-157
Electricians & related	91	166	-75	73	196	-123
Construction workers	60	237	-177	28	171	-143

* The proportion of Asians and coloureds in these figures is minimal

Source: Compiled from tables in Monthly Migration and Tourist Statistics, prepared by the Central Statistical Office, Salisbury.

The economically active males who emigrated in 1977 totalled 5,036. Of these, 1,334 or 26% were persons in the professional, technical and related occupations and 534 or 11% in administrative and managerial occupations. However, in the 1969 census persons in the professional, technical and related category comprised only 15% of the total economically active male population and persons in the administrative and managerial category only 7%. Thus persons in the professional, technical, administrative and managerial occupation categories were 'over represented' in the total of emigrating active males during 1977, assuming the 1969 census proportions applied equally in 1977. Conversely, persons in the clerical, sales and agricultural categories were 'under represented' - clerical workers comprised 9% of 1977 economically active male emigrants but 22% of the total economically active male population (1969 census); sales workers comprised 6% of 1977 economically active male emigrants but 11% of the total economically active male population; and agricultural workers comprised 4% of 1977 economically active male emigrants but 9% of the total economically active male population. Similar ratios applied in 1978.

The figures would seem to suggest that professional and managerial persons tend^{ed} to be more mobile, but this situation may alter under majority rule if a process of 'Africanisation' is instituted. In such a situation the jobs of clerical, sales and agricultural workers, and those in manual trades, would be subject to Africanisation at an earlier stage than the jobs of the more skilled. The numbers of clerical, sales, agricultural and manual workers seeking to emigrate might then well increase. Unfortunately, it is persons in these categories who might find it the most difficult to emigrate in view of the increasingly strict occupational criteria of traditional immigration countries resulting from world unemployment. The Australian Government could possibly be called on to make special arrangements to accept a number of persons in these categories in the next few years.

The year 1973 was the first since 1966 in which there was a net emigration of white professional and technical manpower, and the net loss of skilled personnel has continued since. For example, doctors, accountants and engineers are now in short supply in Zimbabwe. The problem is aggravated by the fact that until 1978, with a few exceptions such as the major international mining houses, white employers were slow to advance or train their black staff.

The security forces and police, too, have experienced difficulties as the result of white emigration. The departure of whites, particularly officers, created gaps in leadership which were difficult to fill immediately as the guerilla war escalated. Some estimates ~~have been~~^{were} that up to 25% of the white manpower pool available to the armed forces left Zimbabwe during 1977 and 1978.¹⁰ During the guerilla war, military service was claimed to be the key factor behind decisions by whites to leave. White males 18 to 38 were called on to spend up to 190 days a year in the army or the police on active service in periods of six weeks at a time, after completing national service. Between the ages of 38 and 50 they were required to spend 70 days a year in the armed forces. The consequent disruption to family life and career prospects forced many to go.

(iii) Destination

Apart from the normal immigration criteria of countries accepting migrants, in the case of Zimbabwe other limiting factors - at least until the return to legality - had also to be taken into account. These stemmed from sanctions and included the acceptability of a then Rhodesian passport, the acceptability of Rhodesians travelling on non-Rhodesian passports, whether other countries were willing to issue special travel documents, and the amount of money and value of goods emigrants were permitted to take with them.

The question of passports was complicated by the fact that many white Rhodesians were dual nationals. The 1969 census of Rhodesia showed that of the 228,296 whites, 7.7% held Commonwealth dual citizenship, 7.0% were citizens of South Africa, 10.3% were citizens of the United Kingdom and colonies and 6.0% were citizens of other countries; some 69% were citizens solely of Rhodesia.¹¹ Immigration since 1969 raised the number of UK citizens and dual nationals substantially. The Australian Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs estimated the number of UK citizens and Commonwealth citizens in 1978 at a much higher level - at about 31% and 29% respectively. The Department's estimate was that of some 260,000 whites, 80,000 were believed to be United Kingdom citizens and another 75,000 were believed to be Commonwealth citizens who might have a partial right of entry to the United Kingdom.¹² It estimated another 50,000 might have a right of entry to South Africa. Generally, it was believed that 100,000 to 150,000 of the whites in Zimbabwe at the end of 1978 had some right of entry to Britain. The number could be greater as it did not include persons married to those with a right of entry. About 50,000 had a right of entry to South Africa, and up to 10,000 Portuguese and 10,000 Greeks might have had rights of entry to their countries. In total at least 170,000 whites were considered to have some right of entry to another country. In the absence of an up-to-date census, however, accurate figures are difficult to obtain. Not all persons with passports or citizenship from other countries would necessarily want to go to those countries if they emigrated.

A number of countries including Australia, in certain circumstances, issued special travel documents to prospective immigrants holding only Rhodesian passports, provided they complied with the particular country's immigration requirements and with UN Security Council Resolution 253, of 29 May 1968. This required member states to prevent the entry into their territories, save on exceptional humanitarian grounds, of any

person travelling on a Rhodesian passport, and also required member states to prevent the entry of persons ordinarily resident in Rhodesia who were believed to have furthered or encouraged the unlawful actions of the then illegal regime.

One of the basic objectives of the resolution was to ensure that sanctions placed on Rhodesia were effective. According to the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, the resolution was aimed mainly at those travelling to promote the cause of the illegal regime. Countries such as Australia also rejected prospective immigrants if they were considered to have furthered or encouraged the illegal regime.

White emigrants from Zimbabwe have settled mainly in South Africa and the United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, in Australia and similar countries. In 1978 nearly half the whites who left Zimbabwe settled in South Africa: of the 18,069 white emigrants, 8,650 or 47% went to South Africa, according to figures from the South African Department of Statistics. In each of the years since UDI, with the exceptions of 1971 and 1972, more Rhodesians emigrated to South Africa than South Africans emigrated to Rhodesia. The net migration between the two countries is shown in Table 9.9.

Table 9.9: Net migration between Rhodesia and
South Africa, 1960-78

Year	South Africa to Rhodesia	Rhodesia to South Africa	Net loss/ gain to Rhodesia	Emigration to South Africa as percentage of total Rhodesian emigration
1960	4 551	2 166	+ 2 385	31
1961	4 635	5 760	- 1 125	58
1962	2 636	7 180	- 4 544	60
1963	2 214	15 414	- 13 200	86
1964	2 731	12 976	- 10 245	83
1965	2 764	3 494	- 730	39
1966	1 600	5 096	- 3 496	60
1967	2 617	4 115	- 1 498	54
1968	2 856	3 177	- 321	56
1969	2 639	3 441	- 802	58
1970	2 343	2 964	- 621	50
1971	3 073	2 585	+ 488	48
1972	2 491	2 047	+ 444	40
1973	1 580	2 706	- 1 126	35
1974	1 083	4 099	- 3 016	45
1975	992	5 034	- 4 042	48
1976	729	7 628	- 6 899	51
1977	865	8 077	- 7 212	49
1978		8 650		47

Sources: Compiled from South Africa, Department of Statistics, Quarterly Bulletins of Statistics; Zimbabwe Rhodesia, Central Statistical Office, Monthly Migration and Tourist Statistics. See also Davidson, Slovo and Wilkinson, Souther Africa: The New Politics of Revolution, p. 324, and Strack, Sanctions: The Case of Rhodesia, p. 212.

Table 9.9 shows that at times of greater uncertainty, such as the break-up of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1963-64 and after UDI in 1965, the percentage of emigrants to South Africa rose. At other times it was in the vicinity of 50% of total emigration. In the 18 years 1960 to 1977 Rhodesia experienced a net loss of 55,560 migrants to South Africa - an average of 3,087 a year. Some of those who went to South Africa later moved on to other countries, but the numbers involved are unknown.

(3) Black migration

The growth in the black population has been from natural increase - the result of an average growth rate of 3.5% per annum. What black migration there ~~has been~~^{was} stem~~me~~^{med} from two main causes: the importation - and subsequent re-exportation - of migrant labour, and the exodus of refugees from the guerilla war.

(a) Foreign workers

The 1969 census recorded 337,840 foreign-born blacks living in Rhodesia - 48% from Malawi, 32% from Mozambique, 13% from Zambia and 6% from other countries. The number of foreign-born blacks in Rhodesia in 1969 exceeded the total white population by nearly 50%. In 1972 the Rhodesian Central Statistical Office estimated there were 223,000 alien black workers alone in Rhodesia - representing 27% of the total black labour force.

Blacks from neighbouring states were originally recruited as cheap labour mainly for the mines and agriculture. The wages were so low that despite unemployment amongst Rhodesian blacks, indigenous workers could not be attracted away from the Tribal Trust Lands. As a result - and also to maintain low wages - foreign black labour was recruited.¹³ South Africa had no difficulty recruiting Rhodesian blacks for its mines from 1975

because the going rate in the South African mines - low by white South African standards - was up to four times the going rate in the Rhodesian mines.¹⁴ In 1975 South Africa recruited 8,619 blacks, and between January and October 1976, 27,700.

Since before UDI Rhodesia had been endeavouring to reduce the number of foreign black workers: from 1964 foreign blacks were not permitted to seek work in urban areas and from 1976 foreign blacks were prohibited from seeking employment anywhere except in the mines or on farms. The success of Rhodesian policy to reduce the number of foreign blacks in the country is shown in Table 9.10. The table presents statistics on the migration of foreign black men, not workers, but the two are nearly synonymous as blacks were not usually permitted to immigrate to Rhodesia as settlers. Statistics were not kept on the migration of foreign black women and children and, according to the Central Statistical Office, insufficient information was available from which to estimate the migration of locally-born blacks.

Table 9.10: Migration of foreign black men

Year	Immigrants	Emigrants	Net Migration
1965	26 920	30 300	- 3 380
1966	17 430	33 630	- 16 200
1967	16 280	20 960	- 4 680
1968	19 350	21 910	- 2 560
1969	15 880	18 020	- 2 140
1970	13 010	22 270	- 9 260
1971	10 500	20 250	- 9 750
1972	8 640	16 290	- 7 650
1973	11 310	13 040	- 1 730
1974	6 990	11 290	- 4 300
1975	6 320	21 260	- 14 940
1976	6 280	9 890	- 3 610
1977	5 890	14 740	- 8 850
1978	4 070	9 410	- 5 340
1979	2 700		
(Jan. to Nov.)			

Source: Zimbabwe Rhodesia, Central Statistical Office, Monthly Digest of Statistics

Between 1965 and 1978 the number of foreign black men in Rhodesia was reduced by 94,390. The estimated number of foreign adult blacks (men and women) in Rhodesia at the time of the 1979 common roll elections was 240,000, of whom an estimated 230,000 were eligible to vote as they had been resident in the country two years or more.¹⁵

The principal source of foreign black labour has been Malawi, followed by Mozambique and Zambia. In 1965, 68% of foreign black men were from Malawi. Immigration from Malawi reached a peak in 1967 at 78% of the total and then declined until by 1975 it constituted less than half - 47%. Average immigration from Malawi for the period 1965-75 was 66%.

(b) Refugees

The other main area of population movement among blacks - both across borders and within the country - arose from the guerilla war. Many blacks were forced to seek refuge across the borders of Zimbabwe, mainly in Botswana, Zambia and Mozambique. Some joined the Patriotic Front while others remained refugees.

Estimates of the number of Zimbabwean black refugees in other countries have varied, due in part to whether or not members of the Patriotic Front guerilla forces were included. One of the more recent estimates, by the Director of the Rhodesian Department of Social Affairs, put the number of refugees due for repatriation as at January 1980 at in excess of 200,000. He estimated there were about 45,000 in Zambia, 160,000 in Mozambique and 26,000 in Botswana - a total of 231,000.¹⁶ This number included an estimated 42,000 orphans. A total of 231,000 would represent slightly more than 3% of the mid-1979 black population.

There were also several thousand black Zimbabweans in countries other than the border states, including some 4,500

university graduates.¹⁷ Many of the overseas black refugees were in the United Kingdom, with others in various black African countries and in the United States.

The guerilla war created additional refugees within Zimbabwe. In the past few years there was a steady stream of blacks from rural areas to the urban centres. The International Defence and Aid Fund claimed in early 1979 that the 'official' population of Salisbury of 616,000 was in fact closer to one million, and the 'official' population of Bulawayo of 357,000 closer to half a million because of the influx of refugees.¹⁸ The Director of the Department of Social Affairs estimated in January 1980 that more than 400,000 refugees and squatters were believed to be in the Great Salisbury area alone - nearly double the number of refugees outside the country.¹⁹ Large numbers were also clustered around other urban centres such as Bulawayo and Umtali. According to one newspaper report, the consensus among welfare groups and the Red Cross in Zimbabwe was that at the end of 1979 there were some 750,000 refugees: 220,000 in camps in Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana; 300,000 in Salisbury and 230,000 in other centres in Zimbabwe.²⁰

(4) Asian and coloured migration

A distinctive feature of the movement of Asians and coloureds ^{was} ~~is~~ that in contrast to the negative migration rate for whites in the past few years, Asian and coloured migration ~~has~~ generated a positive rate. The year 1978 saw the highest immigration of Asians and coloureds since UDI in 1965 and also the highest net migration. More Asians and coloureds came into Zimbabwe in each of the years 1976 to 1978 than left. Details are shown in Table 9.11.

Table 9.11: Migration of Asians and coloureds

Year	Immigrants	Emigrants	Net Migration
1965	178	172	+ 6
1966	131	160	- 29
1967	201	118	+ 83
1968	149	149	-
1969	146	113	+ 33
1970	118	128	- 10
1971	138	81	+ 57
1972	119	102	+ 17
1973	78	121	- 43
1974	115	109	+ 6
1975	127	133	- 6
1976	159	110	+ 49
1977	184	101	+ 83
1978	290	141	+ 149
1979			

Source: Zimbabwe Rhodesia, Central Statistical Office, Monthly Migration and Tourist Statistics.

(5) Whites - Should they be encouraged to leave or stay?

Whites for a long time held a privileged position in Zimbabwe. They maintained their position by control of the economy, the government and its administration, the security forces, and by denying blacks the opportunity and the skills needed to participate in any of these except at the lower levels. With the advent of majority rule blacks are no longer denied the opportunities of participation but, except for a ^{comparative} handful, they have not yet been able to acquire the skills or experience necessary to participate on an equal footing with whites. To maintain the existing economy, and to assist blacks to participate more meaningfully in that economy, white expertise will be needed for some years yet.

However, due first to the guerilla war and then the advent of black majority rule, significant numbers of whites left, particularly the younger skilled whites. To discourage emigration the Rhodesian Front Government imposed currency restrictions, limiting the amount an emigrating family could take with it. The main positive effort to persuade whites to stay up to 1980 was the entrenchment of a number of safeguards in the 1979 Constitution. These were subsequently criticised as giving whites too much power, too much protection, and too much continuing privilege. Shortly after his election, Mr Mugabe made several speeches reassuring whites that he would honour safeguards for them in the 1980 Constitution, and that development of his party's policies would need to be balanced against the need to retain white expertise.

The emphasis in most plans put forward to settle the Rhodesian problem was to persuade whites with their skills and expertise to stay. The opposite approach is to encourage whites to go. This approach was suggested in evidence to the Sub-Committee in late 1978 by Mr Anthony McAdam, Senior Tutor in Politics, Monash University, and a former lecturer at the then

University College of Rhodesia.²¹ Mr McAdam's plan was based on 'the brutal fact' that 'a large part of the solution to the [Rhodesian] problem involves the withdrawal of the main cause of that problem - the whites'.²² A similar scheme was the Kenyan White Acres Scheme of the early 1960s when hundreds of white settlers in Kenya were paid compensation to leave their land in the 'White Highlands'. A scheme to buy out whites who would not live under 'a real black government' in Zimbabwe was also suggested by President Nyerere, of Tanzania, at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Lusaka on 3 August 1979.

Mr McAdam's scheme was proposed to meet the situation obtaining in 1977 and 1978. Since the election of a black majority rule government in April 1979 and the return to legality in December 1979 the scheme has probably lost most of its relevance, but if such a scheme had been implemented, Australia could have been asked to play a significant role in resettling whites. Now that there is black majority rule, the Committee considers it is important that whites be encouraged to stay in Zimbabwe to assist in the training of blacks and to help keep the economy viable until blacks can participate in it fully. The Committee hopes that the end result will be a peaceful and progressive multi-racial society.

The Committee does not believe, however, that anyone, white or black, should be compelled to stay in Zimbabwe against their will. Persons wishing to emigrate should be free to do so, although the Committee does not object, in principle, to limits on the amounts of money and assets emigrants can take with them. The Committee also considers that Zimbabwe citizens, white or black, should not be required to leave their country against their will. Race, religion, class, ethnic or social origins should not be a reason for prejudicial treatment of any sort.

3. Australia

(1) Immigrants from Zimbabwe

The Committee examined the implications for Australia of a large number of immigrants or refugees - black or white - wishing to come from Zimbabwe. The numbers ^{would} ~~will~~ depend, of course, on the situation from time to time. Up to 30 June 1979 only three per cent or less of emigrants from Zimbabwe have been coming to Australia. The number of settlers giving their country of last permanent residence as Rhodesia/ until 1978-79/ was less than 400 a year. In 1978-79 there were slightly less than 600. Although the numbers emigrating from Zimbabwe to Australia up to 1980 have been small in terms of Australia's total immigration program, they were increasing.

Should a deterioration of the internal situation lead to a mass emigration from Zimbabwe, Australia could be under pressure to relax its immigration criteria, and might conceivably have to cut back on immigrants from traditional sources. Charges of racism could arise if most of the immigrants from Zimbabwe continued to be whites and could result in divisions in Australian society.

(a) UN Security Council Resolution 253

From 1968 until the return to legality in December 1979 Australia's acceptance of immigrants from Zimbabwe was subject to the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 253, of 29 May 1968, the relevant parts of which instructed member states to:

- (a) Prevent the entry into their territories, save on exceptional humanitarian grounds, of any person travelling on a Southern Rhodesian passport, regardless of its date of issue, or on a purported passport issued by or on behalf of the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia;

- (b) Take all possible measures to prevent the entry into their territories of persons whom they have reason to believe to be ordinarily resident in Southern Rhodesia and whom they have reason to believe to have furthered or encouraged, or to be likely to further or encourage, the unlawful actions of the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia or any activities which are calculated to evade any measure decided upon in this resolution or resolution 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966.

While sanctions were in force, the resolution was strictly implemented by Australia but, subject to its observance, people living in Rhodesia were accepted as migrants on the same basis as people from all other countries.²³

The UN resolution specified two grounds for preventing entry of Rhodesians: travel on Rhodesian passports, and belief that a person had furthered or encouraged, or was likely to further or encourage, 'the unlawful actions of the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia'. In relation to the first ground the Deputy Secretary of the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs told the Sub-Committee in late 1978 that Australia did not recognise Rhodesian passports for travel purposes. If a person qualified for entry as a migrant, temporary resident or visitor he was issued a one-way letter of authority for entry in to Australia. This procedure, he said, was in accordance with practice in other countries. As the Department understood it, the basis for the first part of the resolution was to ensure that member states did not lend support either explicitly or implicitly to the illegal regime by recognising documentation either issued or purporting to be issued by it. The resolution did not require that all persons having a Rhodesian passport be denied entry, but that all persons travelling on a Rhodesian passport be denied entry. The numbers of Rhodesians admitted to Australia on special travel documents was not available.

Observance of the first part of the UN resolution resulted in some inequities. It did not cover most of the whites who immigrated to Rhodesia after UDI because nearly all such immigrants would have travelled on other than Rhodesian passports. From UDI to 1979 some 132,000 persons immigrated to Rhodesia. A number of the adult whites in this group would have been sympathisers of the illegal regime. On the other hand, the first part of the resolution did cover people who were born in Rhodesia and who might only be entitled to Rhodesian passports, but a number of whom might ^{have been} ~~be~~ opponents of the regime. In view of this situation the Committee endorses the Department's adoption prior to the return to legality of a discretion to issue, where desirable, travel documents to persons possessing only Rhodesian passports. Since the return to legality in December 1979 Australia has accepted Rhodesian and from April, Zimbabwean, passports.

In relation to the second ground, the Deputy Secretary said that if a person was judged to have furthered or encouraged the illegal regime in any way the policy was to deny him entry. There was no provision in the second part of the resolution for exceptions on humanitarian grounds, unlike in the first part, and accordingly Australia did not make exceptions on that basis. The prohibition on the entry of persons who were judged to have furthered or encouraged the illegal regime was total.

In deciding whether a person had furthered or encouraged the 'illegal regime' the Department examined each case on its merits, using as a basis for its assessment guidelines originated by the United Kingdom Government in 1968. Persons who had been drafted into the armed forces were not automatically excluded, but the status of such a person was looked at carefully. Those who had occupied positions of authority were generally deemed to come within the prohibited categories. All applicants for entry from Rhodesia or who were of Rhodesian origin were required, before visas were issued, to sign an affirmation that they had not furthered or encouraged the illegal regime.

The Sub-Committee received evidence of a few supporters of the illegal regime having managed to enter Australia during the sanctions period by not disclosing an official position and by signing the affirmation that they had not furthered or encouraged the illegal regime (e.g. a senior officer in the security forces who was also a farmer and company director but who gave his occupation only as a farmer and company director). The Department pointed out that it was not always possible to corroborate information supplied as the information it could obtain independently from Rhodesia was limited because of sanctions. A broader problem was that it was sometimes difficult to interpret what 'furthering and encouraging' really meant in particular cases.

(b) Australia's immigration policy

In addition to complying with UN Security Council Resolution 253, ^{prior to 1978} a prospective immigrant from Rhodesia ~~prior to 1980~~ also had to comply with Australia's normal immigration criteria. Prior to June 1978 Australia's policy was fairly tightly defined, with migrant entry limited to nominated immediate family members, refugees, persons travelling under Australia's bilateral arrangements with New Zealand, and a very narrowly-defined group of workers with occupational skills in continuing demand in Australia. A new policy was announced by the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs on 7 June 1978.²⁴ The policy involved some relaxation of the criteria for family reunion, a more structured and organised approach to the selection of immigrants and three-year rolling programs.

The Government identified nine principles as the basis for its new policy:

- (i) It is fundamental to national sovereignty that the Australian Government alone should determine who will be admitted to Australia.

- (ii) Apart from people admitted as refugees and for family reunion, migrant entry criteria should be developed on the basis of benefit to the Australian community, and the social, economic and related requirements within Australia.
- (iii) The size and composition of migrant intakes should not jeopardise social cohesiveness and harmony within the Australian community.
- (iv) Immigration policy should be applied on a basis which is non-discriminatory.

The principle of non-discrimination means that policy will be applied consistently to all applicants regardless of their race, colour, nationality, descent, national or ethnic origin or sex.

- (v) Applicants should be considered for migration as individuals or individual family units, not as community groups.
- An exception will be refugees in designated refugee situations, although even in such circumstances the criteria for selection will be related to the characteristics of individual applicants.
- (vi) Eligibility and suitability standards for migrants should reflect Australian social mores and Australian law.

Polygamous unions will not be accepted, or the entry of child fiancées. The concept of immediate family, for eligibility purposes, will be derived from the Australian norm, that is, the unit consisting of husband, wife and minor unmarried children.

- (vii) Migration to Australia should be for permanent settlement although there should be no barrier preventing the departure of persons wishing to leave.

- (viii) While migrants will have the same rights as other Australian residents to choose their place of residence individually or collectively, enclave settlement will not be encouraged.

Immigration policy will not consider communities for mass movement to Australia in situations where enclave settlement would occur.

- (ix) Policies governing entry and settlement should be based on the premise that immigrants should integrate into Australian society. Migrants will be given every opportunity, consistent with this premise, to preserve and disseminate their ethnic heritage.²⁵

To be eligible to migrate to Australia for permanent residence, an applicant had to come within one of four categories:

- Family reunion;
- General eligibility (possession of skills, qualifications, personal and other qualities which represent a gain to Australia and which ^{were} ~~are~~ conducive to successful settlement);
- Refugees (separate criteria);
- Special eligibility (citizens and certain residents of New Zealand, British 'patrials', entrepreneurs and retired applicants capable of being fully and permanently self-supporting in Australia).

Since 1 January 1979 Australia has used a new system for selecting immigrants - NUMAS (numerical multi-factor assessment system). The system was conceived in an effort to achieve consistency of selection, non-discrimination and fairness, but

has not been without its critics. Under the system each applicant had to score a minimum number of points to be accepted for immigration.

Applicants eligible to immigrate to Australia must attend an interview with an Australian official overseas, at which the NUMAS assessment is made, and they must undergo a medical examination. For persons immigrating from Rhodesia the closest Australian immigration office in 1979 was in Pretoria (staffed by a Chief Migration Officer and two Migration Officers). A Migration Officer was also based at Capetown. Interviews of prospective immigrants usually took place in Pretoria or Durban. The next closest Australian immigration office in 1979 was in Nairobi, Kenya (one Migration Officer).

The Department told the Sub-Committee that because Australia's policy was non-racial, it did not keep separate figures on racial origin. The Committee applauds the non-racial aspects of the policy but noted that the lack of information on racial origins made it difficult for it to assess whether the policy was being applied in a discriminatory or non-discriminatory manner. Evidence to the Sub-Committee suggested that nearly all settlers arriving from Rhodesia to 1980 were whites. The Sub-Committee was not able to ascertain whether this was because blacks were not applying to immigrate, were applying but were being rejected because they did not meet entry requirements, or whether Australia's immigration policy was being applied in a discriminatory manner - as suggested by some (e.g. Campaign Against Racial Exploitation). The Department assured the Sub-Committee that it was conscientiously putting into effect the immigration policy as stated by the Minister, including its non-discriminatory aspects as outlined in principle (iv).²⁶

The Committee noted that a number of blacks in Zimbabwe, particularly in rural areas, were married polygamously, and on this basis would be excluded from immigrating to Australia under

principle (vi) of the immigration criteria. In circumstances where Australia may be faced with applications to immigrate from polygamously married persons, the Committee considers that this restriction should be re-examined.

(c) Zimbabwean immigrants in Australia

Small in total, the number of immigrants to Australia from Zimbabwe has been growing, although the exact number is not precisely known. The Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs keeps statistics on persons who give their country of last permanent residence, of birthplace and of citizenship as Zimbabwe or Rhodesia. But up to 1980 any Rhodesian citizen or long-term resident travelling, for example, on a South African or United Kingdom passport after a period of residence in South Africa, would probably be included in the South African or United Kingdom statistics for last permanent residence (the major statistic). The Department said in evidence that it believed the number of persons who migrated from South Africa or the United Kingdom but who had previously been resident in Rhodesia would be 'very small'.²⁷

The number of immigrants who gave Rhodesia as their country of last permanent residence in 1977-78 was 381, according to Departmental statistics (359 according to revised figures by the Australian Bureau of Statistics). Some 294 gave Rhodesia as their birthplace but only 62 gave Rhodesia as their country of citizenship - indicating once again the transitory nature of much of the white population of Rhodesia, and the fact that most whites ~~have~~ retained dual citizenship to enable them to travel on non-Rhodesian passports. Provisional figures by the Department for 1978-79 show that 595 gave Rhodesia as their country of last permanent residence - an increase of 56% on the previous year. Details are provided in Table 9.12.

The Department uses the 'country of last permanent residence' figure for immigration totals, as this usually subsumes most of the 'birthplace' and 'citizenship' figures. In references to Zimbabwean immigration to Australia in this report, the Committee has also used 'country of last permanent residence' as the basis for its statistics. It should be noted from the discussion above that these figures may slightly understate the actual position.

The increasing interest of Rhodesians in Australia to 1980 was also reflected in the number of applications for immigration received from Rhodesia. In 1976-77 the number was approximately 1,159, in 1977-78 approximately 970 and in 1978-79, 1,879.²⁸ These figures, when related to those in Table 9.12, indicate that approximately only one in three applications was successful in those years.

Table 9.12: Settler arrivals from Rhodesia

Year	Country of last permanent residence	Country of birth	Country of citizenship	Total settler arrivals - all countries (i.e. total immigrants to Australia)
<u>Rhodesia, Malawi, Zambia*</u>				
1967-68	220	186		137 525
1968-69	275	210		175 657
1969-70	356	220		185 099
1970-71	505	282		170 011
1971-72	361	221		132 719
1972-73	387	175		107 401
1973-74	356	185		112 712
	<hr/>	<hr/>		<hr/>
	2 460	1 479		1 021 124
<u>Rhodesia</u>				
1974				
(Jan-June)	62	40		
1974-75	164	122	55	89 147
1975-76	134	104	25	52 748
1976-77	247	153	50	73 189
1977-78	381	294	62	75 732
1978-79	595	497	238	68 749
(provisional)				
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	1 583	1 210	430	359 565
* Rhodesians were groupd statistically with former residents of Malawi and Zambia until January 1974.				

Table 9.12 shows that compared to Australia's total immigration intake the number of settlers from Rhodesia has been small - 0.5% in 1977-78 and 0.9% in 1978-79. But although small, the number has grown each year since 1975-76.

Rhodesia did not figure in the top twenty source countries for immigrants to Australia in 1978-79, but its southern neighbour, South Africa did. South Africa is Australia's major source of immigrants from Africa. In 1978-79 it supplied 2,943 immigrants or 4.39% of the total (continent of Africa as a whole, 5%). South Africa is ranked fourth after Britain, New Zealand and Malaysia as a major migrant source country. If refugees were excluded from the Malaysian total it would rank third.

Most of those arriving from Rhodesia have come in the general eligibility category and, specifically, under occupational eligibility criteria. In fact 63% of all migrants from Rhodesia came under the occupational eligibility criteria in 1978-79 (i.e. 374 out of 595). Of the remainder, 20% (119) came under the family reunion category, 12% (74) came under special eligibility and 5% (28) were unclassified. Of the total of 595 immigrants from Rhodesia in 1978-79 202 were workers and 393 were dependents. The occupational categories of the workers is shown in Table 9.13.

Table 9.13: Arrivals by level of skill, all categories

Occupational category	1977-78	1978-79
Professional and technical	49	59
Clerical, commercial, administrative	19	48
Skilled workers	39	55
Semi-skilled workers	8	23
Unskilled workers	2	10
Not classified	9	7
Total workers	126	202
Total dependents	255	393
TOTAL	381	595

Source: Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs.

. The Department was able to provide only partial
statistics on proposed state of residence of settlers from
. Rhodesia. These statistics are shown in Table 9.14. The figures
show that New South Wales and Western Australia were the most
popular settlement states, taking some two-thirds of Rhodesian
settlers between them.

Table 9.14: Proposed State of residence of arrivals*

State	Rhodesian citizens		Persons, Rhodesian birthplace	
	1977-78	1978-79	1977-78	1978-79
NSW	22	75	105	166
Vic.	14	31	51	73
Qld.	9	19	41	50
SA	2	13	16	25
WA	22	94	72	164
Tas	2	7	28	10
NT	-	-	3	-
ACT	-	4	-	9
	—	—	—	—
AUSTRALIA	71	243	316	497

* Complete figures not available

Source: Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs.

The Committee found that the majority of Rhodesian immigrants tended to integrate into the community fairly quickly, particularly as most had skills which helped them obtain employment and particularly as there were no language or cultural barriers to cross. Rhodesian settlers tended, on the whole, to be fairly self-reliant and the Sub-Committee received no evidence of any being a burden on the community. Probably because of a closeness or solidarity forged by the guerilla war and sanctions, being immigrants from a small population group, and because of the limited assets they were able to bring with them, Rhodesians tended to get together and assist each other and new arrivals. Nearly each State had an Australia-Rhodesia Association, but perhaps the most outstanding example of this type of activity was that of The Rhodesian Association of Western Australia. The group, consisting of immigrants from Rhodesia, described itself as a non-political association whose aim was to help newly-arrived immigrants, mainly from Rhodesia but also from other Southern African countries, to 'assimilate' into the Australian community. Approximately 120 Rhodesian families in Western Australia were members. The Association assisted immigrants by meeting them, helping them find accommodation, jobs, transport and schooling, and by welfare work.

The witnesses for the Association, when asked in mid-1979 why they had left Rhodesia, replied as follows:

- A. It has to do with previous experiences in Africa. We are a family. We have children to raise and we are uncertain of the future in Africa.... We thought of the experiences people like us have gone through in Africa in the past. They have eventually had to leave. We felt that we were not prepared to take that chance.... We wanted a bit of stability. We had lived through 13 years of instability. We were tired of this and concerned about it.

It was not even so much the black majority rule that concerned us. It was

living in a war situation. No matter what happened we felt the war would not end.... This gets you down after a while. You lose a lot of friends and family.²⁹

- B. I was particularly concerned for the safety of my family. In the war situation there were dangers. I could not see any future for my children in the country in this war situation.... I was reaching the critical age of 40 years, and the prospects of re-establishing oneself in another country were diminishing. I had to make a decision. I made it and I believe it was the correct decision.³⁰
- C. We could see that Rhodesian living standards were deteriorating.... The job situation was becoming very critical too. I think a lot of people have come here because the Rhodesian economy is very shaky. Because of the constant call-ups a lot of jobs have folded up, firms have closed down. For the young people there is a lot of unemployment.³¹ The whole situation is very black.

All three witnesses were young professional people with families. Asked if they would go back to Rhodesia to live if the war ended, they replied they would not. One witness said:

This [Australia] is my country and that is the end of it. I have no further desire to live in Rhodesia or Southern Africa permanently, or even to visit that area. It brings back too many bad memories. I have lost a lot of my friends who were killed or maimed in the war. I have given up that idea completely.³²

Two of the main attractions of Australia for Rhodesians appeared to be its similar climate and lifestyle. Career and employment opportunities were also a major factor, and a growing factor was the increasing number of friends and relatives already in Australia. A few Rhodesian whites have found it difficult to settle in Australia and have returned.³³ In 1978 Australian citizenship was granted to 42 Rhodesians, in 1977 to 26 and in 1976 to 32. From 1972 to 1978 inclusive, 271 Rhodesians have been granted Australian citizenship.

(2) Refugees

Since World War Two Australia has absorbed more than 300,000 refugees and displaced persons.³⁴ In the four years to 1979 it accepted in excess of 35,500 - more than half of them from Indo-China with the remainder coming from some 40 other countries. Australia accepted 13,500 refugees in 1978-79 and announced it would take 14,000 refugees in 1979-80 - most of them from Indo-China.

Australia has a tradition of accepting refugees and displaced persons. It was a major recipient of European refugees after World War Two. It was among the leading countries for resettlement of Hungarian refugees following the uprising of 1956, and the resettlement of Czech refugees following the 1968 crisis, taking some 14,000 and 5,500 respectively. It has continued accepting refugees from Europe: between 1969-70 and 1975-76, 35,000 refugees of many nationalities but mostly Yugoslav have arrived via Austria alone. More than 1,000 refugees have come from Chile, 4,000 from Cyprus, several thousand from Lebanon and the Middle East, and in excess of 20,000 from Indo-China.³⁵ Refugees comprised 8.3% of settler arrivals in Australia in 1975-76, 11.1% in 1976-77 and 12.7% in 1977-78.³⁶ Australia has had long experience in dealing with refugees and has been fairly flexible in its responses.

(a) UN Convention on Refugees

What is a refugee? Victims of many different circumstances have been called refugees: displaced and stateless persons, people seeking political asylum, defectors, members of oppressed minorities and victims of natural disasters, to name some. The United Nations in 1951 adopted a Convention relating to the Status of Refugees which prescribed the conditions under which a person could be considered a refugee for its purposes and

who, if also given refugee status by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), were entitled to UN care and protection. The Convention was amended by a Protocol which came into force in 1967. The definition of a refugee under the Convention and Protocol is as follows:

[Any person who,] owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

The UNHCR was established in 1950 to 'provide international protection for refugees and to seek permanent solutions to their problems on a purely humanitarian and non-political basis'. Its charter does not extend to persons who emigrate because of dissatisfaction with political conditions in their country unless they are victims of persecution or discrimination. Nor does it normally cover people who are driven from their homes by war or other disturbances but who are not outside their own country.

Australia has ratified both the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol concerning refugees, is a member of the Executive Committee of the UNHCR, and also contributes to UNHCR resettlement funds. Australia recognises its obligations under the Convention, but also recognises that people can be in a refugee-type situation and merit sympathetic consideration although their status has not been officially recognised by the UNHCR. Thus the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, in announcing the Government's policy on refugees on 24 May 1977, said:

There will be people in refugee-type situations who do not fall strictly within the UNHCR mandate or within Convention definitions. Government policy will be sufficiently flexible to enable the extension of this³⁷ policy, where appropriate, to such people.

(b) Australia's refugee policy

The Government's policy on refugees is based on four main principles:

- (i) Australia fully recognises its humanitarian commitment and responsibility to admit refugees for resettlement.
- (ii) The decision to accept refugees must always remain with the Government of Australia.
- (iii) Special assistance will often need to be provided for the movement of refugees in designated situations or for their resettlement in Australia.
- (iv) It may not be in the interest of some refugees to settle in Australia. Their interests may be better served by resettlement elsewhere. (The Australian Government makes an annual contribution to the UNHCR which is the main body associated with such resettlement).³⁸

The policy is based on the view that the acceptance and settlement of refugees should begin with a 'quick and decisive' response ~~to internal crises~~ and conclude with successful integration into the Australian community.³⁹ Mechanisms to effect this include the establishment of a Refugee and Special Programs Branch within the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, the establishment of a Committee on Determination of Refugee Status (DORS Committee), and the establishment of a Standing Inter-departmental Committee on Refugees consisting of senior members of those departments involved in the selection,

screening, movement, reception and resettlement of refugees - Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Prime Minister and Cabinet, Employment and Youth Affairs, Social Security, Finance, Health and Education, with other departments being co-opted as necessary.⁴⁰ The Refugee and Special Programs Branch, together with the Inter-departmental Committee, advises on existing and developing refugee situations, the background of the refugees and their ability to integrate, and Australia's capacity to accept refugees. Recommendations are made to the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs as to whether or not Australia should be involved, the extent to which it should be involved and the options for Australian responses.⁴¹

According to the statement by the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs in May 1977 Australia's refugee policy will enable it to respond to the needs of those displaced 'without the constraint of a technical definition'. The policy, he said, should not be seen as limiting Australia's options in particular situations:

A refugee policy must be capable of coping with crises which arise suddenly and often unexpectedly. It must be cognisant of the fact that in such situations human beings have human needs which are intensified by conditions of danger and distress.⁴²

The Minister said Australia's refugee policy was non-racial and non-discriminatory, and global in its application.

Accepting that Australia's policy is non-racial and non-discriminatory, the Committee noted that a bias towards whites might result if the criteria for the selection of Indo-Chinese refugees were applied too narrowly in the event of a refugee situation arising in Southern Africa. The criteria were outlined by a First Assistant Secretary in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs at a conference on Indo-Chinese refugees at the Australian National University on 31 July 1979, as follows:

First, we have to reunite immediate families; this element of the program accounts for a large share of the total.

Secondly, we have sought to identify and accept those who by previous association with Australia or who as a result of personal qualities or qualifications, are considered to have the capacity to adapt readily to the Australian social and economic environment.

Thirdly, Australia has committed itself to accepting a proportion of what might be called the hard core - those who have been rejected for resettlement and who have no prospect of a new home elsewhere.

Virtually all refugees under the first criterion, and perhaps a majority under the second, would be whites in the case of Southern Africa. Criteria appropriate in one refugee situation might not be appropriate in another. If a situation occurred in which both white and black refugees wished to come to Australia, the Committee considers the Department should have available criteria which would ensure that one race was not favoured over another.

(c) Refugees from Zimbabwe

In the course of its inquiry the Sub-Committee received considerable evidence on the refugee situation existing inside and outside of Zimbabwe prior to the Lancaster House settlement. Much of this evidence was overtaken by events and lost its direct relevance: with the ceasefire refugees began to return to Zimbabwe and resettlement programs commenced.

Nevertheless, the Committee canvassed some of the issues because of their possible relevance to other refugee situations which may occur in the Southern Africa region at some future time.

The Committee considers that the February 1980 elections and independence on 18 April 1980 should result in a lasting settlement for Zimbabwe. In the event of internal instability there could be small numbers of refugees, but a major exodus seems unlikely in the short term. Prior to Independence, when refugees were continuing to leave Zimbabwe, the Sub-Committee examined the implications for Australia should a 'worst case' situation, such as a civil war, arise. The Sub-Committee was told that most blacks who left Zimbabwe as refugees would prefer to resettle in Africa, and this would probably also be the case with blacks from other countries in the region - should a refugee situation develop elsewhere.

In evidence, the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs stated that in its view, and it understood this was also the view of the UNHCR, there was not a great deal of interest among blacks to be resettled outside Africa.⁴³ Black refugees mainly seemed anxious to remain nearby until conditions in their country stabilised to the point where they could return. They preferred, as long as possible, to remain in an environment similar to that to which they were accustomed. Most of the evidence from interested witnesses tended to support this view, although it was felt that a few blacks might seek resettlement overseas.

The number of whites or blacks who might wish to come to Australia would depend on the circumstances at a particular time. No persons classed as refugees came to Australia from Zimbabwe up to 1980. Whites from Zimbabwe coming to Australia up to the end of 1979 were immigrants and not refugees. Very few, if any, of the black refugees outside Zimbabwe up to 1980 applied to come to Australia.

Estimates to the Sub-Committee of the number of whites who might have sought to come to Australia ^{in a 'worst case' situation} ranged from several thousand to 50,000. Again, these were pre-Independence estimates,

and related to a situation in which most whites would have left the country. After assessing the various estimates the Subcommittee concluded that a likely figure could have been in the range of 10,000 to 20,000 whites - most probably closer to 10,000. A situation involving a sudden mass exodus of whites, at the time of preparation of this report, seemed unlikely, and the figures remain hypothetical.

However, should a refugee situation develop anywhere in the Southern Africa region which requires an international response then Australia should also play a part. The Committee is firmly of the opinion that Australia should accept refugees or displaced persons from Southern Africa should the need arise. The Committee endorses the non-discriminatory aspects of Australia's refugee policy and re-emphasises that racial considerations must never enter into the selection of refugees.

(d) Logistics

The Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs said in his submission that while it was difficult to predict the location and scale of refugee situations and develop advance plans for handling them, Australia's refugee policy and associated mechanisms enabled it to provide a quick and flexible response whenever such situations occurred. He added that problems of logistics would have to be resolved at the time.

Australia had migrant hostel accommodation for about 10,000 persons as at the end of 1978.⁴⁴ All of this was in use, either by migrants or refugees from Indo-China. Had Australia needed to take a significant number of additional refugees from Southern Africa or elsewhere before the Indo-China refugee crisis was over, additional accommodation would need to have been found, despite some additional accommodation being available in State Government hostels and in Commonwealth facilities such as the Quarantine Station.

Transport arrangements would depend on the size and location of a refugee situation, but might need to involve charter aircraft and the use of VIP aircraft.

The Committee appreciates that most of the logistical problems could only be resolved, as stated by the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, 'at the time'. Nevertheless, it considers that the Department should, as soon as possible, locate additional accommodation in case of need in a refugee situation requiring a quick response. This is particularly so with existing accommodation under pressure from Indo-Chinese refugees and assisted migrants.

(3) Integration of Zimbabwean immigrants

Most immigrants from Zimbabwe appeared to be settling in with little difficulty. According to the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs the available evidence was that those who had arrived had experienced few difficulties.⁴⁵ The Department attributed this mainly to their knowledge of English and their familiarity with the Australian life-style. In addition, the majority had entered under occupational criteria and would, as a result, be in possession of qualifications and skills needed and recognised in Australia.

Some witnesses expressed concern that if large numbers of whites were admitted many would be persons with little or no skills. The evidence available suggested that the majority of whites admitted to date have been admitted under occupational criteria.

The main concern expressed to the Sub-Committee was that Zimbabwean whites would bring with them racist attitudes and worsen race relations in Australia. The Campaign Against Racial Exploitation, for example, suggested that white immigration from

Southern Africa should be restricted on the basis that only bona fide opponents of white racist rule in Southern Africa should be considered.⁴⁶ The organisation suggested that applicants should be screened for racist attitudes, with Aboriginal and migrant interviewers involved in the screening process.

When questioned on concerns about the racial attitudes of immigrating white Zimbabweans the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs stated that all applicants were interviewed in depth and one of its concerns in such interviews was to ensure that intending migrants would integrate into the Australian community. The Department's Deputy Secretary went on to say:

I am not aware of situations to date where applicants from Rhodesia have demonstrated such racist attitudes that they would be ruled out on that ground, but certainly if people did demonstrate outright and overtly racist attitudes which meant that they were in fact not going to be able to integrate into the Australian community we would look very carefully at that.

Integration did not depend upon race, colour or ethnic origins but on the 'intrinsic qualities' of the individual concerned.

The Committee, on the evidence available, rejects the contention that all whites from Zimbabwe are racists. The majority of white Zimbabweans who have immigrated to Australia to date have integrated into the Australian community without any major problems involving racism. Nor have any complaints of racial discrimination against white Zimbabweans featured in any of the reports of the Commissioner for Community Relations since his office was established under the Racial Discrimination Act 1975. In fact, the reverse is the case. The Fourth Annual Report, for 1978-79, lists four complaints of racial discrimination lodged by Zimbabweans, one of them allegedly involving refusal of entry to a hotel, out of a total of 993 complaints.

No person's political or racial views can be safely inferred from his membership of a racial group or his country of birth or residence. A blanket exclusion of immigrants or refugees because they were white and came from Zimbabwe would show an intolerance no different from that of the racists being condemned. The Committee believes, however, that caution should be exercised so that people of overt extremist racist views are not admitted to Australia thereby damaging the racial harmony of this country. In this regard the Committee draws attention to the evidence of the Department of Foreign Affairs quoted above.

(4) Zimbabwean students in Australia

In 1977-78 there were 40 black students from Zimbabwe at Australian educational institutions under official sponsorship.⁴⁸ A smaller, unknown, number were studying under private sponsorship. All but one of the 40 were training under the Special Commonwealth African Assistance Plan (SCAAP), while the remaining student was sponsored by the Commonwealth Co-operation in Education Scheme (CCES), both administered by the Australian Development Assistance Bureau. The purpose of the two schemes at the time was to contribute 'to the creation of a pool of trained manpower which could become available to future majority based governments in Zimbabwe and Namibia'.⁴⁹ The then governments of Zimbabwe and Namibia were not involved in either scheme, with awards being granted to individual students.

In the case of students from Zimbabwe the grant of an award during the sanctions years depended on their obtaining or possessing non-Rhodesian travel documents. If the student did not possess a United Kingdom or South African passport or a passport of some other nationality he had to obtain travel documents in another country through, for example, a British High Commission Office, or through the Australian Embassy in Pretoria. UN travel documents could also be used.

Students completing their courses up to the end of 1979 were not obliged to return direct to Zimbabwe, but undertook to return to a developing country in Africa when they had finished their training.⁵⁰ In practice many Zimbabwean students completing courses were permitted to remain in Australia as temporary residents. As at March 1980 there were 34 known Zimbabwean students studying in Australia, with another 10 due to commence studies in the remainder of the year.

(5) Emigration from Australia to Zimbabwe

Details of the number of Australians who emigrated to Zimbabwe are not known. A small number of Australian emigrants to South Africa are believed to have gone on to Zimbabwe in earlier years but it is doubtful whether many did so in the past year or two. Australian emigration to South Africa totalled 6,097 from 1970 to 1977 inclusive - an average of 762 a year.⁵¹ The Australian Government did not, and was not required under UN sanctions to, prevent persons travelling to Zimbabwe.

Notes and references

1. Zimbabwe Rhodesia, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey of Zimbabwe Rhodesia 1978 (Salisbury, April 1979), p. 6.
2. Zimbabwe Rhodesia, Division of African Education, Population Education (Salisbury, 1976), Population Paper No. 5, p. 4.
3. Economic Survey, p. 6.
4. Economic Survey, p. 20; Supplement to the Monthly Digest of Statistics, January 1980. Refugees from rural areas are excluded from these figures.
5. C. Leys, European Politics in Southern Rhodesia (1959), p. 7 (1951 figure); Rhodesian Journal of Economics, vol. 5, no. 4 (Dec. 1971), p. 20, as quoted in John Sprack, Rhodesia: South Africa's Sixth Province (International Defence and Aid Fund, London, 1974), p. 73 (1961 figure). The 1969 figure is from the Census of Population 1969 (Central Statistical Office, Salisbury), p. 72, as quoted in Harry R. Strack, Sanctions: The Case of Rhodesia (Syracuse University Press, 1978), p. 213.
6. South Africa, To the Point, 15.1.72, p. 55, as quoted in Strack, p. 211.
7. Economic Survey, p. 7.
8. Economic Survey, p. 6.
9. The Herald (Zimbabwe Rhodesia) 24.7.79.
10. Paul Ellman, 'White exodus puts extra strain on Rhodesia', The Observer Foreign News Service, 1.11.78.
11. Rhodesia, Central Statistical Office, Census of Population 1969, p. 78, as quoted in Strack, p. 196.
12. Evidence, p. 21.
13. Strack, p. 207; and see International Labour Office, Labour conditions and discrimination in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), (I.L.O., Geneva, 1978) p.85.
14. Strack, p. 209.
15. Dr C.A.L. Myburgh, Director of Census and Statistics, Zimbabwe Rhodesia, in paper 'Estimate of potential black voters 1979', prepared for international observers at the 1979 common roll elections.
16. The Herald (Zimbabwe Rhodesia), 24.1.80.

17. Nicholas Ashford, The Times (London), 1.9.78.
18. IDAF, Focus, no. 21, March-April 1979, p. 5.
19. The Herald (Zimbabwe Rhodesia), 24.1.80.
20. The Sydney Morning Herald, 10.1.80.
21. Evidence, pp. 481-6. Mr McAdam originally proposed his scheme in an article entitled 'Rhodesia: A plan for the whites' in the New Statesman of 13.5.77, pp. 627-9.
22. Evidence, p. 481.
23. Evidence, p. 16.
24. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, 'Immigration policies and Australia's population', House of Representatives, Hansard, 7.6.78, pp. 3153-60.
25. House of Representatives, Hansard, 7.6.78, pp. 3154-5.
26. Evidence, p. 49.
27. Evidence, p. 33.
28. Statistics supplied by the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs in correspondence to the Sub-Committee. The 1976-77 and 1977-78 figures are Departmental partial estimates as separate statistics for Rhodesia and South Africa were not available for some months.
29. Mrs W. Herbert, Evidence, p. 2147.
30. Mr E. Graham-Smith, Evidence, p. 2148.
31. Mrs H. Lane, Evidence, p. 2148.
32. Mr Graham Smith, Evidence, p. 2149.
33. Evidence, p. 438.
34. Department of Foreign Affairs, Backgrounder, no. 123, 3.2.78, p. 10.
35. Australian Population and Immigration Council, Immigration Policies and Australia's Population - A Green Paper (AGPS, 1977), p. 40; and Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs annual reports.
36. Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, Review '78, Facts and Figures, p. xi.

37. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, 'Refugee Policy and Mechanisms', House of Representatives, Hansard, 24.5.77, p. 1715.
38. House of Representatives, Hansard, 24.5.77, p. 1714.
39. Department of Foreign Affairs, Backgrounder, no. 123, 2.2.78, p. 10.
40. Evidence, p. 13.
41. Evidence, p. 39.
42. House of Representatives, Hansard, p. 1716.
43. Evidence, p. 43.
44. Evidence, p. 22.
45. Evidence, p. 20.
46. Evidence, p. 1352. See also pp. 1379-80 and 1416-7.
47. Evidence, p. 48.
48. Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs.
49. Evidence, p. 232.
50. Evidence, p. 256.
51. South Africa, Bulletin of Statistics (Quarterly).