THE SENATE
24 NOV 1981
TABLED PAPER

DEPARTMENT OF THE SENATE
PAPER No. 2761
DATE PRESENTED 24 NOV 1981
Clerk of the Senate

THE PARLIAMENT OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

JOINT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE

THREATS TO AUSTRALIA'S SECURITY

Their Nature and Probability

THE PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence

Threats to Australia's Security

- Their Nature and Probability

Australian Government Publishing Service Canberra 1981

c Commonwealth of Australia 1981

ISBN 0642 06861 5

Printed by C.J. Thompson, Commonwealth Government Printer,
Canberra

JOINT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE

PROCEDURE ON PRESENTATION OF REPORT 19 NOVEMBER 1981

SENATOR SIBRAA:

MR PRESIDENT,

ON BEHALF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE I PRESENT A REPORT ON THE COMMITTEE'S REFERENCE ON "THREATS TO AUSTRALIA'S SECURITY: THEIR NATURE AND PROBABILITY", TOGETHER WITH THE TRANSCRIPT OF EVIDENCE.

MR PRESIDENT,

I MOVE - THAT THE REPORT BE PRINTED.

(AFTER MOTION FOR PRINTING AGREED TO)

MR PRESIDENT,

I SEEK LEAVE TO MOVE A MOTION THAT THE SENATE TAKE NOTE OF THE REPORT.

(WHEN LEAVE GRANTED)

MR PRESIDENT,

I MOVE - THAT THE SENATE TAKE NOTE OF THE REPORT.

(READ SPEECH)

Cataloguing-in-Publication data:

Australia. Parliament. Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence.

Threats to Australia's Security

- Their nature and probability.

1. Australia - Defenses

2. Title

3. Australia - Military Policy

355.0094
Aus

TERMS OF REFERENCE

To monitor 'the implementation of the Australian Government's announced defence programs'.

(26 February 1980)

MEMBERS OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON

FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE

Chairman - Mr R.F. Shipton, M.P.
Deputy Chairman - Mr R. Jacobi, M.P.

Senator R.C. Elstob
Senator F.I. Bjelke-Petersen
Senator R. Hill
Senator G.D. McIntosh
Senator J.R. Martyr
Senator K.W. Sibraa
Senator B.C. Teague
Mr K.C. Beazley, M.P.
Mr J.J. Carlton, M.P.
The Hon. J.D.M. Dobie, M.P.
Mr P.D. Falconer, M.P.
Mr K.L. Fry, M.P.
Mr A.C. Holding, M.P.
Mr D.F. Jull, M.P.
The Hon. R.C. Katter, M.P.
Dr R.E. Klugman, M.P.
Mr S.A. Lusher, M.P.
Mr R.M. McLean, M.P.
The Hon. W.L. Morrison, M.P.

Members of the Sub-Committee on Defence Matters
(Sub-Committee C)

The following members of the above Committee investigated the terms of reference and reported to the whole Committee:

Chairman - The Hon. R.C. Katter, M.P.
Deputy Chairman - The Hon. W.L. Morrison, M.P.

Senator B.F. Kilgariff (until 23 September, 1981)
Mr K.C. Beazley, M.P.
Mr J.J. Carlton, M.P.
Mr P.D. Falconer, M.P.
Mr A.C. Holding, M.P.

The following were members of the Sub-Committee on Defence Matters until 18 September 1980:

Senator the Hon. R. Bishop
Mr J.L. Armitage, M.P.
The Hon. G.M. Bryant, E.D., M.P.
Mr M.J. Neil, M.P.
Mr G.G.D. Scholes, M.P.
Mr J.R. Short, M.P.

CONTENTS

	page
INTRODUCTION	viii
ABBREVIATIONS	xiii
1. POTENTIAL FOR GLOBAL CONFLICT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR AUSTRALIA	1
Factors for stability in global outlook	2
Uncertainties in the central balance between the superpowers	6
Areas of tension that could disturb superpower balance	11
Trends in the 1980s in the global situation	13
The great powers and Australia's region	15
Uncertainties caused by nuclear proliferation	20
Immediate threats to Australia arising out of general war	22
Powers theoretically capable of posing a nuclear threat	24
Possible motives to attack Australia as a consequence of a war between the superpowers	27
The nuclear risk to the joint Australian/United States facilities	31
Likely warning time and deterrence to general/nuclear war	37
Australia's alliance with the United States	39
Issues that need to be addressed	44
2. INVASION OF AUSTRALIA	51
Level of capability needed to pose such a threat	51
Powers capable of posing a threat of invasion	53

Who could have a motive for invading Australia? 61

Warning times 65

Deterrent to invasion 68

Issues that need to be addressed 72

3. INTERMEDIATE LEVEL THREATS 75

Capability needed to pose an intermediate level threat 76

Who could have capabilities or motives to pose an intermediate level threat? 77

Warning times 80

Deterrent to intermediate level threats 81

Issues that need to be addressed 82

4. LOW LEVEL CONTINGENCIES 85

Who could have capabilities or motives to pose low level contingencies? 86

Warning times 88

Deterrents to low level contingencies 89

Issues that need to be addressed 91

5. CONCLUSIONS 94

ANNEXES

A List of persons and organisations who assisted in the work of the Sub-Committee on Defence Matters 101

B The ANZUS Treaty 109

C Japanese consideration of invasion of Australia, March, 1942 113

INTRODUCTION

1. At a meeting on 26 February 1980, the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence directed its Sub-Committee on Defence Matters to monitor 'the implementation of the Australian Government's announced Defence programs'. The Sub-Committee subsequently called for submissions through newspaper advertisements and direct contact with interested organisations and persons, and commenced its public hearings on 2 April 1980. After the general elections the Sub-Committee was reconstituted on 4 December 1980 with a revised membership and the same terms of reference. At a time of increased interest in defence matters, the Sub-Committee has provided a bipartisan forum which has also given those not involved in government an opportunity to participate in the defence debate.

2. In the course of its hearings to date the Sub-Committee has identified a widespread misunderstanding amongst the public as to what constitutes a 'threat' to Australia's security. Some of this misunderstanding derives from the simplistic way in which defence issues are frequently discussed. As a result most Australians have no framework or set of criteria with which to judge the adequacy of Australia's defence. It is the Committee's view that no analysis of a defence program can proceed without a thorough understanding of the types of threats and contingencies which may be faced by the Australian Defence Force.

3. The purpose of this report is to canvass the concept of 'threat' within the Australian context. It is intended as a forerunner to further reports covering particular aspects of the terms of reference and seeks to provide a framework for public discussion of the subsequent issues. In this context the report presents conclusions without making formal recommendations.

4. If this report has any particular target it is the reasonably well informed citizen who has made no special study of defence, and who has the impression that because of its vast coastline and small population Australia is fundamentally indefensible. Such a person will find substantial reassurance in this report, and will, it is hoped, develop an informed interest in defence matters.

5. A report published by a Parliamentary Committee has an advantage over a Government paper in that it can canvass the delicate matter of Australia's relationships with its neighbours and allies without compromising Government policy. For example, there has sometimes been misinformed comment that individual countries within our region might pose a threat to Australia's security. Official constraints, however justified in the cause of diplomacy, have tended to leave the public in a state of ignorance or uncertainty. It is the Committee's hope that a frank discussion of such matters will dispel unnecessary fears, lead to an informed and balanced appreciation of Australia's regional relationships, and improve the climate of understanding between Australia and its neighbours.

6. What then do we understand by 'threat'?

7. Threat has to be judged in terms of both the capabilities and the intentions of a potential enemy, or combination of enemies. Statements of military capability are based on maximum theoretical capability in terms of a country's order of battle. They outline what countries are physically capable of doing with particular elements of their order of battle, and industrial infrastructure, viewed independently.

8. Intentions are a much more complex matter of study than measurable capabilities. There would probably be ample warning of a change in the attitude of a foreign government towards Australia if it contemplated mounting an attack. Strains in

relationships arise and tensions develop under those circumstances. Any act of war is a major decision for any government, and the use of military force is not a course adopted lightly by one nation against another. Nevertheless, motives or intentions can change much more quickly than a nation's capabilities to wage a war. To change a nation's capabilities for war is a slow and costly process. Also, with modern surveillance techniques and the ready availability of information on the acqusition of modern weapons systems, such changes in capabilities become very obvious to a potential opponent.

9. For the purposes of this report, threats to Australia can be classified under four headings: potential for global conflict and its implications for Australia; invasion of Australia; intermediate level threats to Australian interests; and low level contingencies. A chapter is devoted to each type of threat. It is difficult to choose an ideal classification as any one of the abovementioned threats could develop as an outcome of a general war between the superpowers (sometimes referred to as global war). General war and nuclear war have been discussed together and in depth in Chapter 1 because of an inherent difficulty in preventing the escalation of a general war into a nuclear conflict.

10. In subsequent chapters, the Committee considers a much wider range of potential threats to Australian interests which may arise as an outcome of a general war or as more localised conflicts. Because the possible range and nature of such conflicts is more widespread, the assessment is necessarily more tentative, highlighting the difficulties of defence planners in a medium power with extensive interests.

11. In each chpater the Committee considers the level of capability needed to pose the type of threats, who has the capability, who may have the motive, the likely warning time and possible deterrents. At the end of each chapter the Committee

lists some of the consequential issues that need to be addressed. Substantial space has been devoted to the issues concerning global conflict because of the immensity of the subject. However the Committee wishes to draw attention to the importance for Australian defence planning of the issues canvassed in Chapters 3 and 4. These deal with intermediate level threats and low level contingencies which may require an Australian response independent of the actions of our allies. Therefore they have implications for the structure and capacity of our Defence Force.

12. In its work on its reference to date, the Sub-Committee on Defence Matters has received a large volume of evidence and documents. It has met on 45 occasions since February 1980. Despite an intervening election, it took over 1800 pages of public evidence in the 12 months period from April 1980. It has also taken a considerable amount of 'in camera' evidence.

13. The Committee has not had access to the various threat scenarios on which Department of Defence contingency plans are based. However, as indicated in the list of witnesses in Annex A, the Sub-Committee on Defence Matters has had the benefit of hearing the views on related matters from witnesses from the Departments of Defence and Foreign Affairs. Representatives of the Governments of Western Australia, Tasmania and the Northern Territory have also placed their Governments' views before the Sub-Committee, mainly in regard to low level contingencies. The Sub-Committee has also received information from a wide variety of non-departmental sources.

14. In the belief that Australians living in the remote parts of the continent feel more vulnerable than those living in the more populous south-eastern part of Australia, the Sub-Committee on Defence Matters has placed some emphasis on taking evidence in northern and north-western Australia. As part of the Joint Committee, members of the Sub-Committee on Defence Matters also visited the Joint Australian-United States facilities at

North West Cape, Pine Gap, Nurrungar and Smithfield. In addition, the Sub-Committee on Defence Matters has attended several Defence Force exercises including two visits to HMAS MELBOURNE. The Sub-Committee is grateful to all those with whom it came into contact, for making these visits so worthwhile.

15. The Committee would like to thank all those who contributed their time, knowledge and experience to this inquiry. Special appreciation is due to those who appeared in person before the Sub-Committee on Defence Matters, and to those individuals and organisations who made the effort to provide written information.

R.C. Katter, M.P.
Chairman
Sub-Committee on Defence Matters

Irkutsk
Ulan Bator
Petropavlovsk
Sovietskaya Gavan
Khabarovsk
Vladivostok
Shenyang
Peking
Tientsin
Pyongyang
Seoul
Tokyo
Osaka
Nanking
Shanghai
Chengtu
Okinawa
Taipei
Islamabad
New Delhi
Canton
Hong Kong
Dacca
Hanoi
Vientiane
Rangoon
Manila
Tinian
Guam
Bangkok
Phnom Penh
Ho Chi Minh
Honolulu
Kwajalein
Bombay
Madras
Kuala Lumpur
Singapore
Colombo
Port Moresby
Honiara
Jakarta
Townsville
Vila
Suva
Apia
Mt Isa
Alice Springs
Noumea
Exmouth
Brisbane
Diego Garcia
Perth
Adelaide
Sydney
Melbourne
Canberra
Rarotonga
Papeete
Auckland
Hobart
Wellington
Australian Antarctic Territory

ABBREVIATIONS

ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
ALCM	Air-Launched Cruise Missile
ASDF	(Japanese) Air Self-Defence Force
ASW	Anti-Submarine Warfare
CEP	Circular Error Probability
CG	Guided Missile Cruiser
CL	Light Cruiser
CSE	Central Studies Establishment, Department of Defence, Canberra
DD	Destroyer
DDG	Guided Missile Destroyer
FF	Frigate
FFL	Light Frigate
GSDF	(Japanese) Ground Self-Defence Force
ICBM	Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile
LST	Landing Ship, Tank
MIRV	Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle
MRV	Multiple Re-entry Vehicle
MSDF	(Japanese) Maritime Self-Defence Force
MX	Multiple-sited missile system (experimental)
NTMV	National Technical Means of Verification
RDF	Rapid Deployment Force
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitations Talks
SDF	(Japanese) Self-Defence Force
SLBM	Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
SS	Submarine

SSBN	Ballistic Nuclear Submarine
SSN	Nuclear Submarine
VTOL	Vertical Take-Off and Landing Aircraft

CHAPTER 1

POTENTIAL FOR GLOBAL CONFLICT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR AUSTRALIA

1.1 Since the Second World War the world has lived with a fear of nuclear destruction through superpower conflict. Successive Australian governments have acknowledged that the principal insurance against such a threat has been the conventional and nuclear power of the United States of America, supported by alliances with friendly powers such as under the North Atlantic and ANZUS treaties. These alliances have not continued without their occasional disagreements and difficulties, as one would expect of the relationships between countries most of whom have had democratic governments and open societies. However, in the absence of a fundamental change in the relationship between the superpowers, the democracies must continue to bear the unwelcome burden of arms for defensive purposes, and accept the difficult task of gaining agreement between democracies on a united response to a threat from a totalitarian government.

1.2 This chapter considers the threats to Australia that might result from a 'general war' between the superpowers and their allies, in which nuclear weapons would be used. It includes consideration of contingencies which might involve a nuclear attack by the Soviet Union on a small number of targets in Australia. Most strategic analysts agree that any general war involving significant conventional forces of the superpowers would most likely escalate into a nuclear war, and that it would be unrealistic to believe that any resort to limited nuclear war by the superpowers could be contained before the rapid onset of full-scale nuclear war. Some analysts refer to such a conflict as

'global war' in their belief that the war would quickly spread to many parts of the globe. For reasons outlined in other parts of this report, it is difficult to envisage a serious strategic threat to Australia or to Australia's area of primary strategic concern which is unrelated to a major breakdown in the existing world order or which is unrelated to Australia's alliance with the United States.

1.3 In the absence of more lasting solutions to the problems of world conflict, Australia has an obvious interest in a stable central balance between the superpowers and in the isolation of any regional conflict to prevent its escalation to general war. Governments of all parties have sought to encourage such a stable central balance. It should be noted that general war need not affect all areas of the globe equally. Except insofar as Australia hosts facilities associated with the United States nuclear war deterrent, any hostile attention to Australia early in a nuclear war would be unlikely or incidental. Australia would be seriously affected by the inevitable disruption to world order, damage to commerce and to the economies of our major trading partners.

Factors for stability in global outlook

1.4 There is much in the present superpower strategic relationship to promote stability or at least to reduce the chance of major conflict. Of utmost importance is the commonality of interest, that of avoiding mutually destructive war between the superpowers, and the equivalence of their strategic forces. Other positive factors are: the will and determination of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to maintain that equivalence, the likelihood of continuing strategic arms limitation negotiations; the tacit alignment of China with the West; the degree of economic interdependence of the great powers; and the knowledge that each superpower has of the other's capabilities.

1.5 It has been said that the Soviet Union has been encouraged to increased adventurism by a lack of Western resolve in recent years; nevertheless, the Soviet Union has a real interest in the continuation of the Strategic Arms Limitation process. Some of the factors bearing heavily on the Soviet leadership to exercise restraint in strategic matters include:

(a) the Soviet Government's awareness that it could not win an unrestrained nuclear arms race, over the longer term, against the superior technological and industrial capacity of the United States, and the firm Soviet interest in the greater predictability which maintenance of the Strategic Arms Limitation process would bring to decisions on the new development and deployment of weapons;

(b) the effect of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan on its standing in the Third World in reducing any optimism regarding Soviet peaceful intentions among Western and neutral countries, and on the availability of Soviet forces for other purposes;

(c) the Soviet requirement to deploy substantial forces along the Chinese border;

(d) major economic and political problems in the socialist states of Eastern Europe, requiring increasing Soviet attention; and

(e) the broadening of trade between East and West and Soviet reliance on access to Western technology.

1.6 The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) process has been supported by past and present United States governments, although the administration of President Reagan has not yet made

a firm commitment as to the timing of resumed negotiations (desired by the Soviet Union), or as to the fate of the unratified SALT II Agreement (which is being unofficially observed). In any case, the Reagan Administration faces a number of constraints on any pressure to adopt a course of unbridled expenditure on nuclear weapons including the following factors:

(a) The SALT negotiations offer the only practicable alternative to unrestricted nuclear competition, which would destabilise the strategic balance and increase the risks of devastating destruction in a nuclear war. Furthermore, a failure to impose ceilings on Soviet weapons via SALT would obviate any marginal advantage to the American side accruing from the deployment of weapons systems such as the MX missile.

(b) The economic costs that would be related to a situation of strategic instability are very high; the United States economy already faces a burden of unprecedentedly high defence expenditure.

(c) Any failure by the United States to lock the Soviet Union into a new nuclear arms control agreement would still have to take into account that the United States no longer has the ability to achieve a 'usable' predominance in strategic arms over the Soviet Union, as was the case from the late 1940s to the 1960s.

(d) The European allies of the United States, particularly the Federal Republic of Germany, have pressed the United States to undertake arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union in connection with the deployment of new United States theatre nuclear weapons in Europe. The United States has agreed to enter into such discussions before the end of 1981 and it would then be difficult to separate negotiations over European theatre weapons from

those which are the subject of renewed SALT talks. (The United States already has thousands of forward-based 'tactical' nuclear weapons capable of reaching targets in the Soviet Union, whereas comparable Soviet theatre weapons, unless upgraded, cannot reach targets in the United States.) Further pressure for such arms control discussions has arisen from internal dissension in Western Europe over the upgrading of nuclear weapons in the NATO theatre.

(e) A number of allies of the United States are keen to preserve some benefits of the detente period, particularly for economic reasons, and many of these allies have shown a reluctance to respond to United States' encouragement to increase defence expenditure.

(f) Any failure by the United States to agree to a resumption of the SALT negotiations could be seen as handing a propaganda victory to the Soviet Union.

1.7 Overall, there is a clear comprehension by both superpowers of the awesome consequences of escalation to nuclear conflict. Just one of the forty-one United States nuclear strategic submarines, which are currently considered invulnerable to a Soviet first strike, has sufficient warheads (160) to obliterate every Soviet city with a population greater than 150 000. (These cities account for about one-third of the Soviet population).[1] The threat of general devastation which a nuclear war would entail not only deters nuclear aggression, but it also serves as a very powerful deterrent against some acts of conventional aggression. However, whatever confidence of continuing stability these circumstances provide is confined more to the core of the superpower relationship than to its periphery.

Uncertainties in the central balance between the superpowers

1.8 While there are several factors which impel the superpowers towards maintaining and enhancing stability in their relations, opportunities will inevitably arise, in circumstances where the vital interests of the United States and the Soviet Union are not engaged, for either superpower to gain some political advantage at the cost of regional disturbance if not conflict. It is such peripheral disturbances in the superpower relationship that may cause considerable concern, even though the core of the relationship remains essentially stable. The following paragraphs outline some of the factors in the global outlook - many of them uncertainties - that could become the focus of superpower tension, or at worst involve the superpowers on opposite sides in hostilities.

1.9 The greatest danger that could arise from 'peripheral' disturbances in the superpower relationship is that they might not remain peripheral. Major powers have frequently been drawn into wars which they had not sought. For example, the doctrine of 'limited nuclear war' endorsed in President Carter's Presidential Directive No. 59 of 25 July 1979, carries this danger. Under such circumstances, there is the danger that a local dispute in, for example, the Middle East or in any of the other areas of tension, could quickly escalate into a general United States-Soviet war. This was stated in testimony before the United States Senate Armed Services Committee in January 1980, when the Commander of the Strategic Air Command, General R.H. Ellis, said that so-called 'limited and regional nuclear options' could be used in response to Soviet conventional military activity in the Middle East-Persian Gulf region.[2]

1.10 Official Soviet statements have often been made to the effect that the USSR would respond to a nuclear attack with its own nuclear weapons. In Soviet military doctrine, the distinction between the use of conventional and nuclear weapons in war is

unclear. Furthermore, Soviet spokesmen have said consistently over the years that the Soviet Union makes no distinction between 'limited' and 'general' nuclear war:

> 'The idea itself of introducing "rules of the game" and of artificial limitations "by agreement" is based on an illusion and is without foundation. It is hard to imagine that nuclear war, if launched, could be held within the framework of the "rules" and not grow "into" general war.'[3]
>
> 'For the achievement of victory in a present day nuclear war, if it is unleashed by the imperialists, not only the enemy's armed forces, but also the sources of his military power, the important economic centers, points of military and state control, as well as the areas where different branches of armed forces are based, will be subject to simultaneous destruction.'[4]

1.11 Some Western analysts have argued that it would be possible to limit a nuclear exchange to so-called 'Counterforce' targets related to an opponent's ability to wage war, as distinct from merely targeting population centres. As many 'Counterforce' targets in the Soviet Union such as missile silos, airbases, military barracks, stockpiles of war materiel, command and communication centres are near population centres, Soviet fatalities resulting from such a 'Counterforce' attack would amount to several millions in the civilian population (depending on which of the large variety of Soviet 'Counterforce' targets are chosen and the level of fall-out protection assumed). Given casualties of this magnitude and the problem for the Soviet leadership of distinguishing unlimited war from a comprehensive 'Counterforce' attack - which could involve up to several thousand targets - then the notion of limiting nuclear exchange to a surgical 'Counterforce' strike would seem to be quite unrealistic (see also para 1.44).

1.12 The realisation that a limited nuclear war may very quickly escalate to an unlimited war, has led to a stress on

maximising 'damage limitation' capabilities. The most ambitious way of limiting damage to oneself is to develop a capability to launch a massive pre-emptive strike to totally disarm an opponent's nuclear forces. An obvious deterrent to such a pre-emptive strike is the knowledge that a proportion of the adversary's strategic nuclear forces would survive (para 1.7 refers).

1.13 It has been asserted frequently that the attainment by the Soviet Union of strategic nuclear equivalence with, and even superiority to, the United States has encouraged errant Soviet behaviour; a so-called 'window of opportunity' for the Soviet Union until such time as the new American arms acquisition program is fully implemented. Leaving aside the difficulties of trying to measure and equate the asymmetric military capabilities of the two superpowers, it is at least debatable whether the growing strength of Soviet strategic arms has conferred a political or military advantage which it can exploit during the next few years. Tables 1-1 and 1-2 show that the Soviet Union has a larger number of delivery systems than the United States with a greater total explosive yield, but this is not an adequate guide to the state of the strategic balance.

1.14 The new emphasis on 'damage limiting' strategies for fighting (as well as deterring) a nuclear war places a premium on maximising warhead numbers (as distinct from the number of delivery systems) and on their yield/accuracy, as well as on the reliability and readiness of their delivery systems, and on minimising the vulnerability of those systems. In each of these areas the United States seems to have a substantial advantage over the Soviet Union. Furthermore, with the exception of the current generation of ICBMs, the United States nuclear forces are well protected from a Soviet first strike.

TABLE 1-1

STRATEGIC BALANCE - 1981-1982

	Present levels		Predicted levels for 1985			
			With SALT II		Without SALT II	
SALT II limits	US	USSR	US	USSR	US	USSR
MIRV'ed ICBM's 820	550	820	495	820	700	1,400
MIRV'ed SLBM's 1,200	520	200	690	380	700	470
	1,070	1,020	1,185	1,200	1,400	1,870
Bombers with ALCM's 1,320	..	..	135	..	200	..
	1,070	1,020	1,320	1,200	1,600	1,870
	Landbased					
Missiles with single warhead or MRV's ICBM 2,250	500	580	500	420	350	..
	Seabased					
Missiles with single warhead or MRV's SLBM 2,250	..	760	..	540	..	710
Bombers without cruise missiles	350	150	210	100	145	150
Total operational delivery vehicles	1,900	2,500	2,030	2,250	2,090	2,730
Total warhead numbers	9,200	8,000	11,700	9,000	13,800	12,000

Source: Department of Defence, tabled in House of Representatives *Hansard*, 5 May 1981, p. 1951.

TABLE 1-2

NUCLEAR STRATEGIC FORCES

Type	Number of Delivery Vehicles Deployed	Total Warheads	Total Explosive (Mt)	Against Targets Hardened to 2000 pounds per square inch: Total Kill With Single Shot[a]	Total Kill With Double Shot[a]
U.S.A. *					
ICBM	1054	2154	1442	693	581
SLBM	656	5088	299	200	196
Heavy Bombers	345	2440	1592	1280	930
TOTAL	2055	9682	3333	2173	1707
U.S.S.R. *					
ICBM	1380	5220	5000	1628	1333
SLBM	932	1620	805	62	60
Heavy Bombers	155	270	570	76	62
Backfire	100	200	200	148	93
TOTAL	2567	7310	6575	1914	1548
Without Backfire	2467	7110	6375	1766	1455
France +					
ICBM	none				
SLBM	80	80	80	none	none
Heavy Bombers	none				
U.K. +					
ICBM	none				
SLBM	64	192	38.4	none	none
Heavy Bombers	none				
China +					
ICBM	4	4	4-12	none	none
SLBM	none (but one SLBM submarine without missiles)				
Heavy Bombers	none				

a. These estimates are a function of accuracy and yield. If one U.S. re-entry vehicle was assigned to each hardened U.S.S.R. silo target, it is probable that a total of 2,173 silos would be destroyed. If two re-entry vehicles were assigned to each hardened silo target, only half as many silos could be targeted, but of those, a higher proportion (totalling 1707) would be destroyed.

* Evidence, (Mr R.H. Mathams), 9 Feb 1981, p.1342.

\+ The Military Balance, 1980-81, pp. 25, 21, 62.

1.15 The Soviet Union's weapons program, like its United States counterpart, has its own internal momentum. Given the long lead times, it is determined in part by the long-term expectations of the possible achievements of the other side. Furthermore, the Soviet Union has to take account of the capabilities and intentions of China and the allies of the United States who have substantial military power of their own, including nuclear weapons in the cases of Britain, France and China.

Areas of tension that could disturb superpower balance

1.16 Europe remains crucial for the superpowers, but the clear divisions there between the two alliance systems and the involvement of the full might of the nuclear arsenals and massive conventional forces on each side ensure a measure of stability. A breakdown there would mean almost certainly a full-scale war. This was demonstrated when, with a Soviet invasion of Poland in prospect, the United States made it clear that there was no question of Western military involvement and that the Western response would be confined to political and economic measures. There is likely to be continuing instability in Eastern Europe. Even within the Soviet Union there are considerable uncertainties associated with the need to replace an ageing leadership, growing economic difficulties and problems associated with the non-Russian minorities who potentially out-number the Russians.

1.17 In northern Asia tensions continue between the Soviet Union and China and to a lesser extent between the Soviet Union and Japan. The Korean peninsula is the geographical point at which the strategic interests of the major powers in northern Asia intersect. Although the military and political balance in the Korean peninsula remains stable at present (and apparently it is not in the interest of the majors powers to disturb it), domestic factors within the two Korean states could have unpredictable consequences. The North maintains a strongly

hostile attitude to the South. This situation of regional tension is likely to continue at a time when the Soviet Union continues to strengthen its capabilities in North-East Asia and as co-operation between China, the United States and Japan is enhanced.

1.18 The Middle East and South Asian regions, including the Persian Gulf, the Horn of Africa and the north-western Indian Ocean, represent perhaps the most dangerous flash point because of the unstable interaction there of regional tensions and hostilities and superpower strategic interests. In addition to such long-standing rivalries as those between Israel and the Arabs and between India and Pakistan, and the overriding concern of the Western Alliance regarding the security of oil supplies, the region is further inflamed by the strong tensions between several rival Arab states, the war between Iraq and Iran, frequent crises in Lebanon and by the Iranian revolution.

1.19 The superpowers have always worked to ensure that their allies or clients in the Middle East are not subjected to serious defeats. The history of that involvement of the superpowers in the region indicates that the United States and the Soviet Union will only work for a solution to the Arab-Israeli problem if a serious situation threatens to draw the two superpowers into an actual conflict. This is a situation that they have always sought to avoid.[5]

1.20 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent pressures on Pakistan from the Soviet Union and other powers regarding Pakistani support for the Afghan rebels, as well as continuing Soviet efforts to build up and exploit its influence among radical Arab states and in the Horn of Africa, have had a further destabilising impact on the whole Middle East-South Asian area.

1.21 Southern Africa remains another area of tension. South Africa's racial policies and its continued occupation of Namibia

continue to make it the target of African states, and of international opinion generally. The efforts of radical states to enforce harsher measures, including economic sanctions, against South Africa are now creating problems between the West and the non-aligned countries. This will continue to provide opportunities for the Soviet Union 'to fish in troubled waters' which the West will feel compelled to counter, and the overall level of tension is likely to be raised.

1.22 Any substantial efforts by the Soviet Union or its surrogates to increase their influence in the Western Hemisphere also runs the risk of causing superpower tension. This was illustrated by the 'Cuban Missile Crisis' of 1962. The interests of the great powers in South East Asia is dealt with in a separate section commencing in para 1.25.

Trends in the 1980s in the global situation

1.23 Internal economic factors can be of overriding importance for the stability of particular countries and this can have an important impact upon neighbouring countries or major trading partners, and in the case of major powers such as the United States, upon the international scene as a whole. President Reagan considers that he has come to office with a firm mandate for change in United States foreign policy. He is giving expression to a more assertive stance internationally, which emphasises the overriding importance of the global strategic relationship with the Soviet Union. This is a relationship that the Reagan Administration believes can best be managed by:

(a) renewing United States military strength through increased defence expenditures, particularly in the conventional sphere, and arms sales and other defence assistance to 'endangered' countries; and

(b) improved consultation and co-ordination within the Western Alliance, linking progress in the central United

States-Soviet relationship, particularly on strategic arms limitation, with improvements in Soviet attitudes in other areas, such as Soviet support for revolutionary groups in Third World countries.

The net effects that the new policies of the Reagan Administration may have on stability and the global strategic outlook remain uncertain.

1.24 The following appear to be the likely trends in the global situation in the 1980s which have implications for Australia and its region:

(a) a continuing high level of strategic nuclear competition and military expenditure between the superpowers, but within the framework of restraint;

(b) continuing and perhaps increased superpower tensions and competition in regions of instability and confrontation, with the recurrent risk of escalation (paras 1.16 - 1.22 refer);

(c) continued tensions between the Soviet Union and the Western Alliance, China, and to a lesser degree, the larger part of the non-aligned group;

(d) less emphasis on a bi-polar structure internationally, giving third powers, or groups of powers, more room to manoeuvre;

(e) increased nuclear proliferation (paras 1.34 - 1.37 refer); and

(f) an international agenda largely devoted to the political and economic concerns of Third World countries, and to international economic issues with important

consequences for stability on a global and regional level; of utmost importance in this regard is the continued security of oil supplies.

(For likely developments in South East Asia see para 1.31.)

The great powers and Australia's region

1.25 The character of great power involvement in South East Asia has changed markedly since the United States' withdrawal from Vietnam. Intensified Sino-Soviet rivalry has been brought into sharper focus through the events of Indo-China, particularly in regard to the close relations established between the Soviet Union and Vietnam, and Soviet support for Vietnam's operations against the Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea.

1.26 Although it appears to have less strategic importance to Soviet military planners than many other regions in the world, including East Asia, South East Asia has become increasingly significant in terms of Soviet global priorities. The USSR regards the extension of its influence in South East Asia as a natural expression of its superpower status. In South East Asia its disposition to exert influence is reinforced by a number of factors: its alliance with Vietnam; its interest in containing China and to a lesser degree containing Western influence in the region; and its long standing policy of maintaining access to the Indian Ocean for its Pacific Ocean fleet. The USSR would like to dominate the region in ideological terms without being involved in active military operations. For their part, the ASEAN countries have continued to view the Soviet Union with considerable caution, not least because of Soviet support for Vietnam, and the Vietnamese invasion and continued occupation of Kampuchea.

1.27 In the wake of the Vietnam War the United States, whose influence was once predominant, has had no significant military

presence in mainland South East Asia, and the threshold of any future involvement of United States ground forces in the region is likely to be very high. The United States continues to maintain bases in the Philippines, which are significant for the support of the United States Seventh Fleet. It is evident that support for the five members that comprise the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) will be an important element in the emerging policies of the Reagan Administration. The ASEAN countries are seen by the Reagan Administration as friends of the United States in terms of global confrontation with the Soviet Union. However, these countries in varying degrees are reluctant to identify themselves publicly as allies of the United States, particularly in the broad context of United States global policies.

1.28 The policy of the Reagan Administration towards South East Asia has involved: a firm restatement of the United States' intention to retain its military strength in the Pacific area; proposals for the expansion of economic aid and concessional arms transfers to Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia; and political support for President Soeharto's government as part of an effort to build up bilateral relations with Indonesia. In general, ASEAN countries have reacted cautiously but favourably to United States policies under the leadership of President Reagan. They have welcomed the assurances of support and promises of greater supplies of conventional arms.

1.29 China regards South East Asia, particularly the ASEAN countries, as an area of prime strategic, political and to some extent, economic interest. As a result it has sought to strengthen and expand its relations with those countries. The main factors behind China's bid for improved relations with those countries have been the continuing Sino-Soviet dispute and also the desire to check Vietnam's influence in the region. However, China has continued to give some support for regional insurgency movements, albeit at a reduced level. It has sustained the fears

of some ASEAN countries of China's long-term intentions. Indonesian and Malaysian suspicions remain particularly strong in this regard. Such concerns are linked to past and present support for the Communist Party of Indonesia and the Communist Party of Malaya. The status and loyalties of overseas Chinese is another concern to several governments in the region.

1.30 The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in December 1978 had significant effects on the area of Australia's strategic interests. It prompted increased cohesion on political matters among the ASEAN countries as well as being an important consideration in China's 'lesson' to Vietnam in February 1979. The events of Indo-China have given a new emphasis to concerns of the ASEAN countries regarding both internal stability and external threats. Prior to the mid-1970s the defence capabilities of the ASEAN countries related primarily to internal security. There is now more of an emphasis on external defence capacity without being necessarily at the expense of the internal security role (the distinction cannot be clearly made). Defence expenditure by the ASEAN countries has doubled in the past five years but this was from a low base due to the rundown of defence spending in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It should be borne in mind that ASEAN is not a defence organisation or a military alliance and it is not likely to become one in the near future, although the regular contacts on a broad range of matters provide opportunities for consultations on matters of defence interest.

1.31 In South East Asia, the following are likely to be factors with strategic implications in the foreseeable future:

(a) Indo-China will continue to be the focus of great power rivalry in the region, particularly between the Soviet Union and China, which will retain potential for having a most serious impact on the region; however, rivalry between the superpowers in South East Asia is unlikely to affect their vital interests (as it continues to do in Europe and the Middle East);

(b) Vietnam's current serious economic problems are unlikely to force it to modify its policies in Indo-China (particularly in relation to its domination of Kampuchea and Laos) as long as the Soviet Union continues to provide economic assistance on a massive scale; however, large-scale overt aggression by Vietnam against Thailand is considered unlikely;

(c) China and the Soviet Union can be expected to continue to exploit any openings that will strengthen their position in relation to each other and to other powers in the region; for example, the Soviet Union has gained access in Vietnam to former United States naval and air facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and Danang respectively, and a Soviet radio intercept station has also been established near Cam Ranh Bay;

(d) there is the possibility of further large-scale Chinese military action against Vietnam (there has been animosity between the two countries for centuries);

(e) the United States, under President Reagan, is likely to pursue various supportive policies towards the ASEAN countries, and is likely to encourage Japan to play a more active, political role in the region;

(f) there will be generally favourable economic prospects in the ASEAN region (especially in Singapore and Malaysia) but they will be accompanied by some continuing serious social problems associated with population pressure, urbanisation, unemployment, unequal distribution of income and need for land reform; this may be complicated by communal tensions in Malaysia and to a lesser extent in Indonesia;

(g) despite any likely leadership changes in the ASEAN countries, their governments are likely to continue to pursue similar domestic and foreign policies as at present;

(h) there will continue to be insurgency problems but these are unlikely to threaten the stability of the ASEAN region;

(i) some outflow of refugees from Indo-China is likely to continue; and

(j) there will be increased potential for disputes over the settlement of maritime boundaries, ownership of islands (particularly in the South China Sea) and, certainly, passage through straits and archipelagos in the area.

1.32 In the South West Pacific the political transition to independence of several small states has been peaceful and smooth, with the exception of Vanuatu.[6] On present indications, their record of political evolution and political stability is expected to continue in the foreseeable future but there are risks of tensions, for example, in Fiji and New Caledonia. In each there are peculiar communal situations which have potential for trouble. In Fiji the leadership on both sides is moderate and anxious to avoid conflict, and there are good reasons to believe that existing understandings of power sharing and economic development will persist. In New Caledonia there has been majority electoral support for the Territory remaining under French rule, but there is also strong and growing support for independence among the indigenous Melanesian population, which now constitutes 44 per cent of the total, and which sees a change in political status as offering remedies for economic and social disadvantages. Following a visit by the Secretary of State for Overseas Departments and Territories, M. Henri Emmanuelli, during the period 6 to 21 August 1981, the Council of Ministers of the

Governmment of France issued a statement regarding New Caledonia which said:

> 'The permanence of outmoded structures underlines the unacceptable state of inequality among the various ethnic groups, on economic, social, political and cultural levels. This situation calls for a radical change of policy, based mainly on determined acceleration of land reform, and development of a package of measures within the framework of a plan for Melanesian development, including economic and cultural aspects.'

1.33 Although the South West Pacific states can be considered low on any Soviet list of priorities, Australia and New Zealand cannot take the pro-Western attitudes in the region for granted. So far the Soviet Union has no foothold among the small states, which in most cases have very limited economic resources. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union has been attempting to expand its influence in the region. It has been offering to develop fisheries resources, oceanographic and hydrographic services, and has shown interest in the self-determination process in the French territories. (For comments on the ANZUS obligations of the United States in the area of Australia's primary strategic concern, see para 1.67 - 1.73.)

Uncertainties caused by nuclear proliferation

1.34 The dangers of nuclear proliferation add yet another worrying dimension to the uncertainties in the global strategic outlook, particularly to the complex circumstances of the Middle East and South Asian areas. India exploded a nuclear device in 1974 but did not pursue an active nuclear weapons program. More recently there have been clear indications that Pakistan has been making a major effort to acquire a nuclear explosive capability. This has in turn prompted India to reconsider the pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. In the Middle East, Israel is reliably considered to have either assembled nuclear weapons or

to have the ability to do so quickly, and concern has been expressed about the longer-term nuclear intentions of countries such as Iraq and Libya. Colonel Gaddafi's earlier attempt to purchase a nuclear weapon from China (and subsequent interest in the development of a nuclear weapon in an Islamic country), despite Libya's ample supply of modern conventional weapons, illustrates the bizarre possibilities in nuclear proliferation.

1.35 Nuclear proliferation in the South Asia-Middle East area would have serious repercussions. Not only would it exacerbate regional tensions and rivalries and encourage pre-emptive strikes, but it could threaten the containment of proliferation on a global basis and the framework of the international non-proliferation regime. While the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has some 115 parties and continues to attract adherents, there are several states remaining outside the Treaty which either have a nuclear capability or which may perceive it necessary to develop nuclear weapons. These include France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, Brazil and Argentina.

1.36 The probability of nuclear weapons being used outside the superpowers' central relationship is probably greater than the chances of them being used by the superpowers. There are a number of 'adversary pairs' in the world in which there is a nuclear component or potential capability on either one or both sides. States falling into this category would be: North and South Korea; China and Taiwan, India and Pakistan, Israel and the Arab states; South Africa and the black nations; Brazil and Argentina. The nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan, and Brazil and Argentina, are well advanced.[7]

1.37 There has been general recognition by Australian governments that nuclear proliferation poses a threat to Australia in the long term, as well as to both regional and global stability. Like the majority of the other signatories to the Treaty, Australia wishes to have the assurance that its

neighbours will not develop nuclear weapons and that existing unstable areas will not be subject to local nuclear arms races with the attendant risks of the use of nuclear weapons and the inevitable involvement or intervention by outside powers. To date, both the superpowers have adopted rigorous policies against proliferation. If this were to break down, it would have serious implications. Furthermore, continued unrestrained nuclear weapons development by the existing club of five nuclear powers could provoke ambitions to have nuclear weapons among non-nuclear weapon states, or at least would serve as an ostensible justification for those ambitions. Australian Government policy on Non-Proliferation was stated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Hon A.A. Street, M.P., on 4 December 1980, when he said:

> 'The Government is determined to maintain its strong support for the goal of disarmament and the negotiation of balanced and verifiable measures on arms control. We will continue to give the highest priority to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons particularly through our continued support for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty which would ban the testing of nuclear weapons by all states in all environments and through the development of an international consensus on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.'[8]

Immediate threats to Australia arising out of general war

1.38 Australia's geographic position is such that it is unlikely to become automatically or immediately involved in a conventional conflict associated with a general war. This situation is made more likely by the fact that Australia no longer has a 'forward defence' posture and has relatively limited deployment overseas. Apart from perhaps the use of the Darwin airbase by United States B52 bombers, Australia contains no major staging points for the conventional forces of its allies (although the facilities at HMAS Stirling, Cockburn Sound, have been offered). The Australian Government has rejected an

invitation to become part of the United States Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), and the Australian forces are not part of any allied integrated force positioned for early involvement in a conflict between the superpowers. Given the likely short duration of a general war (which is likely to escalate to a nuclear war), and its likely concentration in the northern hemisphere, it seems unlikely that Australia would be directly threatened with invasion.

1.39 Furthermore, Australia would be unlikely to find its forces engaged during the initial stages of a general war, except in limited activity in its immediate environment. Any more active overseas involvement would be by deliberate decision by the Australian Government after hostilities commenced and this is a subject beyond the scope of this report.

1.40 With regard to the question of fallout in Australia resulting from a major nuclear exchange in the northern hemisphere, the then Director of Scientific and Technical Intelligence in the Joint Intelligence Organisation has stated:

> 'The immediate effect on Australia of a major nuclear exchange in the northern hemisphere would be negligible; in the longer term, levels of radioactivity in the southern hemisphere will increase as a result of fallout transferred from the northern hemisphere, but the effects of this could be relatively easily reduced by appropriate protective measures. In any event the amount of fallout would probably only be about twice that received in Australia from the combined atmospheric testing in the northern hemisphere during the early 1960s.'[9] (but see also paras 1.2 and 1.41)

For the nuclear risk to the joint Australian/United States facilities, see paras 1.52 to 1.61.

1.41 The damage that Australia would suffer in the first instance in a general war, aside from that associated with a possible nuclear attack, would be large scale disruption to our

economy because of the massive destruction inflicted on some of our trading partners, and the dislocation of world trade. The longer-term effects on the world of a large-scale nuclear war, including unpredictable genetic damage, are likely to be even more serious than the short-term effects. The enormity of destruction is indicated for example, in the Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons: Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, which describes some of the effects from a large-scale nuclear exchange in the following terms:

> '... There is very little reason to believe that the political and social situation in any country would be unchanged after a large nuclear war. Many nations among those we know today would probably disappear. Others might be virtually depopulated by famine and mass migration. The system of international security would have been destroyed, and so would to a large extent the traditional pattern of those states, nations and societies which might survive.'[10]

Powers theoretically capable of posing a nuclear threat

1.42 The methods by which nuclear weapons could be delivered against Australia include:

(a) inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM) systems;

(b) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) systems;

(c) long-range strategic bombers (potentially with cruise missiles); and

(d) short or medium range surface to surface missiles from surface ships or submarines.

Table 1-2 shows, in outline, the extent of the nuclear strategic forces of the five nuclear powers. There are many factors which outweigh theoretical capabilities in the difficult decisions on the choice of targets and delivery systems in a nuclear war.

1.43 As indicated elsewhere in this report, the nuclear strategies of the superpowers place a premium on the number of warheads, which are heavily committed to 'Counterforce' targets, as distinct to being committed to 'city busting'. Nevertheless, Mr R.H. Mathams, then Director of Scientific and Technical Intelligence, Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO), said in March 1978:

> 'Although the likelihood of strategic nuclear attack against Australia is not great it is none-the-less finite ...
>
> The most significant trend for Australia in strategic forces development is the large number of nuclear warheads available to the USSR, which now has sufficient warheads to adequately target the US and retain substantial reserves for use against secondary targets. We cannot determine the priorities the USSR attaches to targets in Australia, but joint US-Australian facilities would probably rank high, depending on Soviet perceptions of their strategic importance.
>
> In descending order of probability, Australia might receive strategic nuclear attacks against: US facilities in Australia; Australian defence establishments; industrial complexes and urban centres ...'[11]

In the very unlikely event of a nuclear attack on Australia, about half a dozen nuclear weapons could be sufficient to disable this nation because of the concentration of population and industry in a few cities.

1.44 Both superpowers have large numbers of nuclear weapons capable of being delivered by missile against targets around the globe. It has been estimated that by 1985, in the absence of a strategic arms limitation agreement (SALT II), the Soviet Union will possess 12 000 nuclear warheads compared with the United States 13 800. At that time the USSR might be expected to have 2730 nuclear weapons delivery vehicles.[12] There have been other estimates which assume that, due to the factors of reliability

and readiness, perhaps not more than 60 per cent (1638) of these delivery vehicles would be available for use at any one time. Whether any of these vehicles would be devoted to Australian targets, rather than targets in North America, Europe or China would depend on Soviet priorities at the time (see paras 1.54 and 1.80.) In this regard it has to be borne in mind that both superpowers have a large number of potential targets. For example, during the later years of the 1970s, in the Pentagon's Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) 5D for fighting a nuclear war there were reportedly some 40 000 potential nuclear targets in the Soviet bloc. Of these over half were Soviet military targets compared with some 15 000 economic-industrial targets and some 2000 leadership and control targets.[13] It is in Australia's interests that the superpowers agree to limit the number of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

1.45 Britain, France and China each have an independent nuclear missile capability which has been designed for deterrence against Soviet nuclear attack. In theory, it would be feasible for the capability to be redirected against other countries. Britain had 64 and France had 80 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in 1980. At that time China had an estimated four inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with a range of 3200 to 3800 nautical miles, and one SLBM submarine without any missiles.[14] (see also Table 1-2.)

1.46 It should be noted that the Soviet Union has not given nuclear weapons to other countries, including those in the Warsaw Pact. Unfortunately, a number of other states appear to be in the process of developing a nuclear weapons system (paras 1.35 to 1.36 refer). However, the delivery systems are likely to be designed for possible use against nearby adversaries, rather than to cover inter-continental distances. Although it would be against the provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it would not be impossible for a nuclear power to give a nuclear weapon or an associated delivery system to a regional power.

Possible motives to attack Australia as a consequence of a war between the superpowers

1.47 An argument can be put that in a nuclear war the Soviet Union may have a motive to destroy Australia's capacity to support or succour the United States (after the latter has been severely damaged in such a war), particularly as the Soviet Union is likely to need only an insignificant part of its nuclear arsenal to incapacitate a few Australian cities. This chapter has already cast some doubts on such a notion, and most speculation on whether Australia would be a target in a general war between the superpowers hinges on the perceptions, particularly likely Soviet perceptions, of the roles of the three joint Australian-United States defence installations. According to an answer to a question on notice given by the Minister for Defence, the Hon. D.J. Killen, M.P., on 10 October 1978[15], the designation and functions of these three installations (there are other joint installations), are:

- the North West Cape Naval Communications Station:

  'The function of the station is defence communication: in particular, communications for the submarines and surface vessels of the USN and RAN. The station is located at North West Cape Western Australia.'

- the Joint Defence Space Research Facility:

  'The function of the facility is defence space research. It is located at Pine Gap in Alice Springs.'

- the Joint Defence Space Communications Station:

  'The function of the station is defence space communications. It is located at Nurrungar, near Woomera.'

Possible motives to attack Australia as a consequence of a war between the superpowers

1.47 An argument can be put that in a nuclear war the Soviet Union may have a motive to destroy Australia's capacity to support or succour the United States (after the latter has been severely damaged in such a war), particularly as the Soviet Union is likely to need only an insignificant part of its nuclear arsenal to incapacitate a few Australian cities. This chapter has already cast some doubts on such a notion, and most speculation on whether Australia would be a target in a general war between the superpowers hinges on the perceptions, particularly likely Soviet perceptions, of the roles of the three joint Australian-United States defence installations. According to an answer to a question on notice given by the Minister for Defence, the Hon. D.J. Killen, M.P., on 10 October 1978[15], the designation and functions of these three installations (there are other joint installations), are:

- the North West Cape Naval Communications Station:

  'The function of the station is defence communication: in particular, communications for the submarines and surface vessels of the USN and RAN. The station is located at North West Cape Western Australia.'

- the Joint Defence Space Research Facility:

  'The function of the facility is defence space research. It is located at Pine Gap in Alice Springs.'

- the Joint Defence Space Communications Station:

  'The function of the station is defence space communications. It is located at Nurrungar, near Woomera.'

1.48 *The Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Hon. A.A. Street, M.P.*, responding on 20 August 1981 to a question on notice, said regarding joint installations at North West Cape, Pine Gap, Nurrungar and Smithfield:

> 'The JDSRF [Joint Defence Space Research Facility] and the Joint Defence Space Communications Station (JSDSC) at Nurrungar are not parts of a weapons system. Nor would it be correct to describe the functions of the TRANET Station at Smithfield, or the defence-related facilities as "part of a global nuclear weapons system". The primary function of the Naval Communication Station at North West Cape is the relay of very low frequency communications to United States submarines, including fleet ballistic missile submarines. As such it has an important role in that element of the United States nuclear weapons system.'[16]

1.49 Official discussion of the purposes of the facilities has been sparse. This has been a major inhibition on public debate on the matter in Australia. Most available public information in Australia has come from official and unofficial sources in the United States. The Committee is not in a position to provide any additional information as to the functions of the joint facilities, which could be regarded as coming from any official source. However, it has had available to it a range of non-departmental views, including one from Dr Desmond Ball, who has expressed the following opinions:

- North West Cape

> 'North West Cape is presently one of the most important links in the US global defence network. According to official brochures, the base "may serve several purposes. However, its main reason for existence is to maintain reliable communications with submarines of the US fleet serving in this area of the world [i.e., the Indian and Western Pacific Oceans]" - and, in particular, "to provide communication for the US Navy's most powerful

deterrent force - the nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine". The VLF facility for communicating with the American submarines is the largest and most powerful of the three principal VLF stations in the US world-wide submarine communication system - the other two are Jim Creek, Washington, and Cutler, Maine.'[17]

- Pine Gap and Nurrungar

'The two specific facilities are involved in so-called overhead surveillance - Pine Gap and Nurrungar - which are evidently involved in a range of satellite intelligence programs. There are four in particular: gathering intelligence by infra-red means principally useful from the point of view of picking up Soviet missile launches, therefore for early warning; gathering intelligence by photographic means, the normal reconnaissance satellite program taking pictures; gathering intelligence by interception of signals, radar emissions, other electronic emissions, interception of communications; and fourthly, the communication of this intelligence back from Australia to the United States.

Some of these operations are extremely critical and could not be done anywhere else because of *technical and geographic reasons*. This applies most specifically to Pine Gap. There is no doubt about the value of the intelligence they get from these places. In the case of the infra-red intelligence, for example, Australia is only one of two places where this intelligence is passed down to the ground, the other one being in Buckley, Colorado. In the case of signals intelligence there have been some of what I think are *probably the biggest* intelligence breakthroughs of the late 1970s;

...

Listening in on Soviet microwave communications, I think, was probably the biggest technical intelligence coup certainly of the 1970s. And again, that had to be done from Australia for technical reasons. ... There is no doubt that SALT was predicated on adequate and detailed verification

capabilities. You would not have had SALT unless you could have had a lot of the intelligence which comes down through satellites to the Australian ground stations.
...

Intelligence coming through satellites to Pine Gap is not used just for counting numbers of missiles in the Soviet Union or the numbers of radars or whatever. It is also used for *locating where they are and for allowing more* accurate targeting in the development of American nuclear war fighting capabilities rather than just simple nuclear deterrence capabilities.[18]

...

The principal means of monitoring SALT are basically photographic and signals. Photography to take photos of silos as they are being dug, possible mobile missiles as they are being moved around, and signals to listen in to missile telemetry to know whether the Soviets are putting on an eleventh MIRV warhead on the SS18 rather than the ten which they are allowed; or listening in to radar emissions, as the only item in fact that the Soviets have been pulled up in breach of SALT before the Standing Consultative Committee was when they used radars with their SA5 missile in an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) mode which is banned by SALT. That was picked up by monitoring their radar emissions ...[19]

... On the signals intelligence side, you cannot do some specific intercepts other than through bases in Australia ... there were intercepts of microwave communications which the Soviets *did not believe possible and so* they were not coding their microwave ... [the CIA] also had to send those signals back from Australia to the United States without the Soviets knowing that anything like that was *going on. That requires a site in the middle* of a continent like Australia which is electronically very, very quiet ...'[20]

1.50 It would seem from what has been said above, that the Soviet Union is likely to think that the North West Cape installation (which obviously is a facility for communicating with submarines), Pine Gap and Nurrungar are connected in one of the following ways with the American strategic forces:

(a) communications (in the case of North West Cape, including fire orders to ballistic missile submarines);

(b) early warning;

(c) target information; and

(d) signals intelligence.

1.51 It can be argued that at least the first two functions mentioned above mean that the facilities would be first order targets in a general war. In the case of North West Cape, the facility would be one of the few elements of the powerful United States submarine-launched ballistic missile system open to Soviet attack. On the other hand, there is a more optimistic view that North West Cape may be spared to obviate destruction of one important means of United States control of the individual commanders of its SLBM force, each of whom has the weaponry to destroy those cities which account for one third of the Soviet population. Such an optimistic view is different to that expressed in frequent Soviet statements such as the examples quoted in para 1.10. In the case of any joint installation connected with early warning, it would be very important for the Soviet Union to deny United States access to this if the United States developed any anti-ballistic missile capability.

The nuclear risk to the joint Australian-United States facilities

1.52 There have been few statements by the Government on what it considers to be the nuclear risk to Australia. On 25 March 1980, the Minister for Defence, the Hon. D.J. Killen, M.P., said:

> 'I might add that in the event of hostilities, risks for nuclear attack arise for Australia as an ally of the United States, whether or not it may be hosting particular United States

> facilities. Recognising this, successive Australian governments - I repeat, successive Australian governments - have taken the view that our primary concern should be to support the effectiveness of the United States deterrent to war itself. In this, we honour as well our responsibilities as an ally.'[21]

For the Committee's views on whether Australia could be a nuclear target, irrespective of Australia hosting joint Australian-United States installations, see paragraph 1.80.

1.53 In a speech in the House of Representatives on 5 May 1981, the Minister for Defence the Hon. D.J. Killen, M.P., agreed with an assessment given on 14 April 1981 by the Leader of the Opposition, the Hon. W.G. Hayden, M.P., to the National Press Club, following Mr Hayden's visit to the joint facilities in March 1981. Mr Killen said:

> 'I welcome particularly the honourable member's statements about the facilities at Pine Gap and Nurrungar and that the requirements of his party's policy are met at both facilities. The honourable member [Mr Hayden] said: "In certain conditions, industrial centres and military installations in Australia could - I repeat, could - become nuclear targets. Pine Gap and Nurrungar would be unlikely targets and, in our view, Smithfield [TRANET station 112, Smithfield, South Australia] not at all". I agree with this assessment.'[22]

1.54 The Sub-Committee on Defence Matters received a number of opinions regarding the risk of Soviet nuclear attack on the joint installations including the following:

(a) Mr Robert Mathams, the former Director of Scientific and Technical Intelligence, Joint Intelligence Organisation, Department of Defence, said:

> '... my view would be that the Soviet Union would certainly consider the North West Cape

installation (which obviously is a communications facility and involved with the command of submarines) and probably the other two facilities to be in some way connected with American strategic nuclear forces. As a result, they would feature on the Soviet target list. But I have never been able to assess if they would be near the top or bottom of the list. One could argue quite cogently for either depending on what one believes to be Soviet perceptions.

However, let us accept that there is a finite risk of their being attacked. We should next consider the circumstances that might lead to their being attacked. My belief is that they would be attacked only in circumstances of superpower conflict. I do not accept the hostage or blackmail threat theory. I think that theory cannot be sustained, in the light of improvements in nuclear weapon capability and the knowledge that each superpower has of the other.'[23]

(b) Dr Desmond Ball had this opinion:

'I have no doubt in my mind whatsoever that those three installations would be targeted by the Soviet Union. However, that should not be the whole point of the question. At least three other issues should be addressed. One is that whilst they would be targets in the event of a nuclear war, I do not see a nuclear war as being very likely. One could argue that the existence of these installations deters the outbreak of a nuclear war. But one still has to come to the conclusion that if a nuclear war does come, those stations are going to be targeted.

A second point is that the consequences of them being targets really are not so great. I do not like the idea of nuclear bombs falling on Australia, but the vision that some people have of what it would involve seems to be quite exaggerated. I cannot imagine any scenarios involving nuclear bombs falling on Australian cities. It seems that one draws the line at those three installations, but one has to include those installations as targets.[24]

... There is no doubt that the notion of limited controlled nuclear wars has been

> gaining acceptability. I think to that extent the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons becomes somewhat greater and the possibility of North West Cape, Pine Gap and Nurrungar being targets becomes somewhat greater. I would still put the possibility of a general nuclear war and even the growing possibility of limited controlled nuclear war over to one side in terms of practical considerations in the foreseeable future. I am very disturbed by the way the developments are tending, but I do not think the most horrendous prospects are really that imminent'.[25]

1.55 Taking into account the *assumptions made in paragraphs* 1.49 to 1.50, it would be prudent for Australian defence planners to assume that the joint facilities at North West Cape, Pine Gap or Nurrungar are on the Soviet target list and might be attacked in the course of a nuclear conflict between the two superpowers. In other words, there is a finite risk that one or all of the facilities would be attacked during a Soviet-United States war that involved their nuclear strategic forces.

1.56 It may be possible to give some definition of that risk if two further assumptions are accepted. The first of these is that, if the facilities were attacked, the Soviet objective would be limited to destruction of the actual facilities; the second is that any attack would be likely to occur only in circumstances of a major conflict between the United States and USSR which would be preceded by a period of increasing tension and, possibly, a period of conventional warfare.

Table 1-4

	US SLBMs			Soviet SLBMs		
	Polaris A-3	Poseidon C-3	Poseidon C-4	SS-N-6	SS-N-8	SS-N-18
Date introduced	1964	1970	–	1968	1973	–
Number deployed (estimates for Sep 1980)	80	432	88	464	326	144
Number of MIRVs	3 (MRV)	10	8	1 (or 2 MRV)	1	3
Range (nautical miles)	2 500	2 500	4 000	1 300–1 600	4 300	4 050
Propellant	s	s	s	l-st	l-st	l-st
Throw-weight (kg)	500	1 000		700	700	
CEP (m)	900	500	500	1 000–2 500	1 000–1 500	550–1 000

	US ICBMs			Soviet ICBMs					
	Titan II	Minuteman II	Minuteman III	SS-9	SS-11	SS-13	SS-17	SS-18	SS-19
[illegible]	1966	1970	1966	1966	1969	1977	1976	1976	
[illegible]	450	550	8	580	60	150	300	300	
1	1	3	1	1 (or 3 MRV)	1	4	1 or 8	6	
[illegible]	7 000	7 000	6 500	5 700	4 400	5 000	5 500	5 000	
1	s	s	l	st	s	l-st	l-st	l-st	
[illegible]	1 000	1 000	7 300	1 000	500	3 200	7 300	3 200	
[illegible]	400	300	1 000–1 300	1 000–1 800	1 300	300–600	300–600	300–450	

Key: Propellant fuel: l = liquid, l-st = liquid-storable, s = solid, st = storable.



Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), *World Armaments and Disarmaments: SIPRI Yearbook 1980*, London, Taylor and Francis, 1980.

1.57 The Soviet Union would have a number of options available to attack the joint facilities. These include designation of a single ICBM to one or more of the facilities, or less likely a MIRVed missile with sufficient warheads to destroy each of the three installations. Tables 1-1, 1-2, and 1-3 give details of Soviet strategic missile capabilities. Rather than use a missile such as the SS18 which Soviet strategic planners are more likely to allocate against 'hard' targets such as United States missile silos, the Soviet planners are more likely to allocate an SS11 against the joint facilities if they are to be attacked. The SS11 is relatively inaccurate and would thus be designated for 'soft' targets such as the joint facilities in Australia. It has an explosive yield between 0.5 and 1 megaton and has a Circular Error Probability (CEP) of about 800 metres. (The CEP is the radius of a circle centred on the target, within which 50 per cent of the weapons delivered will fall. It is a measure of the accuracy of the weapons). For optimum damage to the sorts of equipment and buildings at each of the facilities the warheads are likely to be set to detonate at an altitude of about 900 metres above the centre of the area of the facility. This would minimise fallout as distinct from a weapon set to detonate at ground level.

1.58 In the eventuality of such attacks the immediate damage effects could be expected to be as follows:

(a) North West Cape: complete destruction of the communications station and the nearby town of Exmouth;

(b) Pine Gap: complete destruction of the facility; marginal damage (broken windows, small fires, etc) to Alice Springs (which is approximately 20 kilometres away);

(c) Nurrungar: complete destruction of the facility; damage to windows, tiled roofs and wooden buildings plus 'spot' fires in Woomera Village.

1.59 If the assumptions in paras 1.56 to 1.57 are correct, then in each of the abovementioned cases there would be little, if any, local fallout. Nearly all the post-explosion, airborne debris would be carried into the stratosphere with subsequent gradual precipitation over the southern hemisphere. Australian urban areas would not be noticeably affected.

1.60 Casualties would be confined to three facilities and nearby inhabited areas, but these would be drastically reduced if the opportunity were taken during the period of tension (which would precede escalation to a nuclear war) to evacuate non-essential people from the facilities as well as from Exmouth and from Woomera Village. Evacuation of Alice Springs would not be necessary but might be undertaken if required. Relatively simple precautions in Alice Springs and Woomera Village, such as white-washing and taping windows, installing shutters, cleaning up combustible material and constructing simple shelters would significantly reduce non-lethal casualties that might be caused by heat or dislodged roofing. Casualties from fall-out are not expected from the use of an air burst as described in para 1.57.[26]

1.61 Australia uses the Joint Naval Communications Station at North West Cape for the very low frequency message traffic with the RAN's submarine force; this facility seems to be at risk in a nuclear war.

Likely warning time and deterrence to general/nuclear war

1.62 While it may take only forty minutes for an ICBM to travel from the Soviet Union, nuclear war is not likely to occur without a considerable period of warning, because such a momentous step would be preceded by severe crisis and confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. There seems to be insufficient understanding, let alone

certainty, in the defence communities of either superpower, of how to limit war or even of how to stop it once it had broken out. That there would be general destruction in an unrestrained nuclear war is well known, and therefore deterrence and avoidance, in circumstances of confrontation, of actions that could escalate to nuclear war have become essential components of the strategies of both the superpowers and their major allies.

1.63 The deterrent to a Soviet nuclear missile attack on Australia is part of the same deterrent against any action that might lead to an outbreak of general or nuclear war referred to in para 1.7. It is the established 'balance of terror', the fervent desire to avoid 'mutually assured destruction', and the belief that neither superpower can hope to attack the other without suffering unacceptable destruction itself.

1.64 Nevertheless, it should again be noted that a continuing and uncontrolled race in nuclear armaments between the superpowers based on rapid and inexorable technological improvements is destabilising to the international environment because it carries the risk of a pre-emptive strike. The United States strategic doctrines of 'limited and regional nuclear options' referred to in para 1.9 increase the unpredictability of general nuclear war.

1.65 Should limited nuclear war be seen as a serious option by the strategic planners of both superpowers, then the possibility that the facilities in Australia could be targets in a hostage-type exchange, exclusive of other elements of the American war fighting capability, must be considered. It is difficult to imagine the actual circumstances for such an exchange, but its possibility suggests a further Australian interest in ensuring that 'limited nuclear war' and 'damage limitation strategies' are not pursued by the superpowers.

1.66 This report has already indicated (in para 1.10) that the Soviet Union has stated publicly and often that it does not

accept that nuclear war can be limited. Whilst this situation prevails, it tends to support the notion that deterrence to nuclear attack on Australia is inseparable from deterrence to global or nuclear war in general. In those circumstances it is likely that if the Soviet Union considered certain places in Australia important enough to target for nuclear attack, the Soviet Union would take into account that the United States is committed to defend its allies against nuclear attack. This was indicated, for example, by former President Nixon at Guam on 25 July 1969.[27] However, there is no formal legal requirement in any American agreement with Australia to do so. This leads the Committee to make some further comments on the significance of Australia's alliance with the United States.

Australia's alliance with the United States

1.67 In other parts of this report, the deterrent value of Australia's alliance with the United States is presupposed. It is, therefore, useful to consider the obligations assumed by the ANZUS partners, and Australia's current contribution to that alliance. This could assist in an assessment of whether or not the United States would come to Australia's assistance if a particular threat developed.

1.68 The obligations assumed by the ANZUS partners under the ANZUS Treaty are defined in its Articles II, III, IV and V. (See Annex B.) Briefly, the commitments are: self help to develop the capacity to resist armed attack; co-operation to develop individual and joint military capacity; consultation when any party considers its own or another party's security to be threatened in the Pacific; and action in accordance with constitutional processes to meet an armed attack on any of the partners in the Pacific area.

1.69 Article IV patently does not of itself commit the United States to the use of military force were Australia subjected to

armed attack. Neither does it define in precise terms what is meant by 'armed attack'. This leaves open the possibility that the United States would decide to act by means other than the application of military force. Assistance could be provided, for example, through the supply of military equipment to Australia, or by diplomatic pressure on the aggressor, or by economic and political sanctions against the aggressor or by all these means.

1.70 However, Article IV clearly envisages the option of the use of military force by the United States. Moreover, the deterrence factor would increase to the extent that any aggressor would have to consider that the more effective an intended act of aggression against Australia, the more likely would become United States involvement in Australia's defence. It has been the judgement of successive Australian governments that the United States would see it in its own fundamental national interest to prevent Australia being overwhelmed by armed force and would act in whatever way was necessary to prevent this.

1.71 In considering the overall scope of the Treaty, it is important to recognise the lack of precision in some elements in the Treaty and also the nature of the overall relationship between Australia and the United States. Thus it may be possible to distinguish:

(a) the generally identifiable geographic scope of the commitments of the parties under Articles IV and V of the ANZUS Treaty (i.e. in relation specifically to armed attack);

(b) the provisions of Article II which define in general terms, and without specific restriction of geographic area or circumstances the commitment of the partners. The partners 'by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed

attack'. (Government to government agreements on the establishment of the joint Australian/United States defence facilities refer in their preamble to this article and, as has been noted previously, it is the formal foundation for wide areas of defence co-operation - see also para 1.74);

(c) the provisions of Article III which allow any party to call for consultation on virtually any matter, wherever occurring, which it sees to have the potential to give rise to threat to it or to other parties of the Treaty in the Pacific Area;

(d) other elements in the international relationship between Australia and the United States, which are not integral to the ANZUS relationship.

1.72 The geographic area to which the commitments are limited is not specifically defined by the terms of the Treaty. There are indications that the Australian Government was happy at the time the Treaty was signed that the area be defined in wide terms as the 'Pacific Area', without further definition. The notion was that to define the defence area with precision might invite an aggressor nation to believe that, outside such defined area, it was free to move as it wished. On the other hand, Article V of the Treaty leaves in no doubt that the metropolitan territories of the Parties are subject to the commitments undertaken in Article V and that these commitments extend as well to armed attack on their island territories, armed forces, ships and aircraft in the Pacific. On a strict reading the Treaty does not embrace Australia's island territories in the Indian Ocean.

1.73 There is general acceptance that the ANZUS Treaty does not apply in different ways to different parts of Australia's metropolitan territory, which includes the Australian littoral on the Indian Ocean. Article IV, because of Article V, clearly

applies equally to the West, North and South of Australia as it does to Australia's Pacific littoral.

1.74 Along with the specific commitments relating to the treaty area, the ANZUS Treaty allows also, formally, for consultation and co-operation among the partners in relation to developments anywhere which any of the partners see to have the potential to give rise to threat to one or more of them in the Pacific. For example, while Australia's surveillance activities in the Indian Ocean are individual nation (Australian) efforts, they are consistent with the objectives accepted by Australia and the other ANZUS partners under articles of the ANZUS Treaty.

1.75 Article II encourages defence co-operation in research, training, logistic support, communications and the exchange of intelligence and technology which benefits Australia in terms of cost saving and enhanced capability. Political co-operation among the partners is illustrated by the meetings of the Foreign Ministers at the ANZUS Council.

1.76 It is evident that neither superpower would engage in strategic arms limitation negotiations unless it was confident that it could adequately monitor its opponent's compliance with details of the subsequent agreement. The SALT agreements were predicated on adequate and detailed verification capabilities. It would seem that the part played in this regard by the joint United States-Australian facilities at Pine Gap and Nurrungar is vital. As a politically stable ally, Australia is a secure host for the joint facilities even though some of the functions performed by these installations in Australia could be carried out in other countries, closer to the Soviet Union. For other functions, Australia is ideal for technical and geographic reasons (see for example, para 1.49 regarding the location of Pine Gap).

1.77 As the margin of the independent advantage of the United States over the Soviet bloc has been reduced, Australia's

contribution to the maintenance of the central balance has become more important. As well as contributing substantially to what is called America's National Technical Means of Verification (NTMV) which is the means of monitoring the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear forces, Australia makes a further substantial contribution by hosting, at North West Cape, an important part of the command and control system of the American SLBM force. The importance of the facility for United States general purpose warfare was indicated by the reported intense activity there during the mining of Haiphong in late 1972, and the station's enhanced alert during the 1973 Israel-Arab war. In May 1978 it was revealed in The Australian Financial Review that the United States had planned to replace certain equipment at the North West Cape base without formally notifying the Australian Government. There is always the possibility of institutionalised defence arrangements being altered imperceptibly by developments in military technology.

1.78 Australia has declined to join the United States Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) and its attitude toward facilitating its deployment into the Middle East area has not yet been made clear. The availability of naval and air support facilities in Australia may somewhat reduce American requirements for such facilities in the Gulf countries themselves when undertaking operations in the Persian Gulf area, but Australian bases are too remote from the Middle East to be very satisfactory for this purpose. Nevertheless, the United States has found it convenient to use Darwin for B52 reconnaissance flights over the Indian Ocean, and to use Australian ports for rest and recuperation.

1.79 This section of the report has given some reasons why Australia is important to the United States and has commented on American obligations to come to Australia's assistance. Although these obligations, like those in most treaties of this nature, are not clearly defined, it would seem there is little doubt that the potential diplomatic, military and economic measures of the

United States have a deterrent value against any hostile action beyond Australia's capabilities to defend itself. Nevertheless, if United States resources were fully occupied in a major confrontation with the Soviet Union, then Australia would have to be prepared to fend off any threats from other powers with only incidental help from its American ally. Some of the advantages and risks to Australia associated with our contribution to the American alliance have been outlined, and the next section poses some fundamental questions in this regard.

Issues that need to be addressed

1.80 Some fundamental questions have been raised in this chapter in regard to the risks to Australia's security associated with Australia providing defence-related facilities to the United States:

(a) In a general war between the superpowers, would the joint facilities located at North-West Cape, Pine Gap and Nurrungar be nuclear targets?

The answer to this question is that the facilities are likely to be on the Soviet target list. However, how high on that target list would depend on Soviet perceptions at the time, particularly as to the role of the facilities. (See para 1.54).

(b) In a general war would the presence of the facilities attract hostile attention to other centres in Australia, particularly areas of high population density?

The answer to this question is probably no. If for no other reason this unlikelihood can be attributed to the need of the Soviet Union (which like the United States has less nuclear warheads than potential 'counterforce' targets) to concentrate on targets which are of a higher priority than Australian cities.

(c) In a limited nuclear war would the Australian targets be likely to be attacked in a process of 'hostage swapping'?

The answer to this question is probably no. It is difficult to envisage any joint facilities being selectively destroyed in a limited nuclear conflict between the superpowers, by way of warning to the United States, because it would be virtually impossible to prevent such a limited use of nuclear weapons from escalating into a general nuclear exchange. Furthermore, it could be argued that in a limited war it could be foolish to blind certain aspects of an opponent's information or communications system. In regard to the Naval Communications Station at North West Cape, it would probably be risky to degrade the effectiveness of an opponent's primary weapons system (para 1.51 refers). However, such calculations are influenced by the availability of ever-improving alternative communications to the region of conflict. It could also be argued that Australia's position as an ally might invite attention to any United States conventional facilities, should these be established in Australia.

(d) If the facilities were not in Australia, would Australia be a nuclear target in any case, whether it was a member of the Western Alliance or not?

The answer to this question is that it would be very unlikely (but see statement by the Hon D.J. Killen, in para 1.52). It should be understood that it is the presence of the joint facilities and the role they could be called upon to play in the event of war between the superpowers that provides the risk of nuclear attack. This raises the question of whether or not the presence of the facilities is justified. The justification is derived from the limited dangers of their presence and their contribution to the central balance and to arms control. It can be argued that by improving the effectiveness of American

communications and verification systems, Australia is helping to decrease the possibility of nuclear war.

(e) Are the risks associated with nuclear attack on Australia more than outweighed by the advantages of hosting the facilities as part of the alliance with the United States?

There are many nations regarded by the United States as part of the broader Western Alliance but which do not act as host nations for joint facilities. The hosting of joint facilities is not necessarily part of the ANZUS obligations. The benefits and disadvantages of the operation of the joint facilities have been previously canvassed (paras 1.52 - 1.61), as have the benefits Australia derives from the alliance with the United States (para 1.67 - 1.75). The ANZUS Alliance acts as a deterrent against those potentially hostile actions against Australia which are of such a magnitude that they are beyond Australia's own capabilities. Critics of the American alliance agree that any policy of non-alignment will need a much higher defence expenditure by Australia.[28]

1.81 Other issues that need to be addressed are:

(a) Would it be possible without serious breaches of security, for the Australian Government to make public, to a greater extent than it has done so far, the nature and functions of joint Australian/United States facilities, in order to enhance community understanding and support for them?

(b) With continuing improvements in technology, will the role of the joint installations become more or less significant in the next ten years? Will there be scope for greater Australian participation in their operation?

(c) What should be Australia's role in helping to maintain the central balance between the United States and the Soviet Union? This raises several aspects in addition to the joint facilities hosted by Australia. Their detailed discussion is mostly beyond the scope of this report but the following need to be considered:

(i) the role of the Australian Defence Force in the security of its area of strategic interest; for example, in the absence of a conventional threat to Australia, should Australia become more involved with defence co-operation in the region; and

(ii) as the world becomes increasingly a single strategic theatre, how can Australia contribute to an international attempt to reduce tension and preserve peace between the superpowers, including arms control and possible contributions to United Nations or allied peace-keeping efforts in other areas?

(d) Is Australia giving effective support for strategic arms limitation and for nuclear non-proliferation?

(e) Is Australia in a position to receive timely information on the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other powers in Asia?

(f) Is there any likelihood of a situation where Australia would have to acquire nuclear weapons? The possible counter-productive consequences of any steps toward this, in stimulating a regional arms race, would need to be carefully considered.

(g) Should Australia in times of increased global tension give more emphasis to civil defence, particularly to

those counter-measures which need not be very costly, such as for example informing the public of the location of buildings which would act as suitable shelters, and the provision of routine instruction on action to be taken if nuclear attack is imminent?

(h) What would be the role of Australia, including its armed forces, in the aftermath of a general nuclear exchange between the superpowers? As indicated in this report, a likely precondition of invasion of Australia would be a major disruption or breakdown in the existing world order, as a consequence of a war between the superpowers or other situations which pre-occupied the resources of the United States. Another consequence of such a disruption could be an influx of refugees landing on Australian shores.

Endnotes

1. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) World Armament and Disarmament - Yearbook 1979, Stockholm, 1979, p. 14.

2. United States House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture: Department of Defence Authorisation for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1981, Part 1, 25 January 1980, Washington, 1980, pp. 11-12.

3. Georgi A. Arbatov, 'The American Strategic Debate: A Soviet View', Survival, vol. 16, No. 3, May/June 1974, pp. 133-4. Arbatov was commenting upon US Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger's statement of 10 January 1974 announcing the American policy of 'limited strategic options'.

4. Colonel M. Shirokov quoted in Leon Goure and Michael J. Deane, 'The Soviet Strategic View', Strategic Review, vol. 8, No. 1, Winter 1980, p. 81.

5. See Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, THE MIDDLE EAST - Focal Point of Conflict, Parliamentary Paper No. 82/1977. Chapter 4, 'Superpower Rivalry in the Middle East'.

6. For details on the problems associated with the secessionist attempts in Vanuatu and on Papua New Guinean and Australian involvement, see Evidence of 21 August 1980.

7. Mr R.H. Mathams, Evidence, 9 February 1981, pp. 1333-4. Both Brazil and Argentina are parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967), which prohibits nuclear weapons in Latin America.

8. When presenting 'The Report of the Australian Delegation to the United Nations Committee on Disarmament' to the House of Representatives, Hansard, p. 428.

9. R.H. Mathams 'Strategic Weapons and Their Effects' in the Report on Civil Defence Study conducted at Canberra, A.C.T. 20-22 March 1978, Department of Defence (Natural Disasters Organisation) Annex B, p. 4.

10. United Nations General Assembly, Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons: Report of the Secretary-General, 12 July 1980, (A/35/393; E.81.I.11) p. 84.

11. 'Strategic Weapons and Their Effects' in the Report on Civil Defence Study conducted at Canberra, A.C.T. 20-22 March 1978, Department of Defence (Natural Disasters Organisation) Annex B, p. 3.

12. Australian Department of Defence; quoted in House of Representatives, Hansard, 5 May 1981, p. 1951.

13. Dr Desmond Ball, Counterforce Targeting. How New? How Viable? The Australian National university Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Reference Paper No. 67, pp. 6-7.

14. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance, 1980-1981, London, 1980.

15. House of Representatives, Hansard, pp. 1658-65.

16. House of Representatives, Hansard, 20 August 1981, p. 659.

17. Dr Desmond Ball, Current Affairs Bulletin, 'American Bases: Implications for Australia's Security', October 1978, p. 6.

18. Evidence, pp. 1565-67.

19. Evidence, p. 1568.

20. Evidence, p. 1569.

21. House of Representatives, Hansard, p. 1137.

22. House of Representatives, Hansard, p. 1943.

23. Evidence, p. 1356.

24. Evidence, p. 1561.

25. Evidence, pp. 1561-64.

26. cf. Commonwealth Directorate of Civil Defence, Survival from Nuclear Attack: protective measures against radiation from fallout, Canberra, 1964.

27. See 'Informal Remarks with Newsmen, July 25, 1969', Public Papers of the Presideents: Richard M. Nixon, 1969, Washington, 1970, pp. 548-9.

28. See for example Mr Max Teichmann, Evidence, 28 July 1980.

CHAPTER 2

INVASION OF AUSTRALIA

2.1 This chapter considers the possibility of a threat of a major assault on Australia, using conventional warfare, from a power or powers which have the aim of seizing considerable territory and resources, or the complete conquest of Australia. A threat of such a magnitude, were it ever to eventuate, would threaten the survival of Australia, and would require full mobilisation and an extensive national commitment of resources to counter it.

Level of capability needed to pose such a threat

2.2 Australia has no powerful neighbours across a land frontier and it does not threaten any other power. Surrounded by a large expanse of ocean it is relatively remote from the main areas of superpower competition. Furthermore, Australia's remoteness, particularly its main population centres on the south-eastern part of the continent, makes it difficult for a conventional enemy to gain strategic surprise, and may add the requirement for an aggressor to secure staging bases. This factor plus Australia's size means that any notional enemy has to overcome the problems of a long line of communications.

2.3 On balance, from the viewpoint of its defence, Australia gains considerable advantages from its geographical position, as any potential aggressor would need to possess a wide range of capabilities - quite apart from motives - to undertake an invasion of Australia. Some of the more important of these capabilities are described in the paragraphs that follow.

2.4 A notional enemy contemplating invasion of Australia could be expected to consider a ground force approximately three times as large as the land forces Australia could field against such an enemy. This is only a general yardstick which ignores several other factors such as surprise, relative technology and equipment levels of the opposing forces. Nevertheless, an Australian force which, for example, consisted of one regular division and two well-trained reserve divisions would cause a potential enemy to think in broad terms of a requirement for at least nine divisions, unless, of course, there were such other compensating factors as would allow the attacker to reduce this ratio of superiority.

2.5 The transportation of such an invader's considerable ground force would require a large concentration of troop transport vessels - a large target for maritime strike forces - requiring a large escorting force of warships and aircraft. In this regard it is interesting to consider the Japanese appreciation of March 1942 regarding the feasibility of an invasion of Australia, which was the basis for a General Outline of Policy on Future War Guidance. Among the reasons causing the Japanese to reject invasion were: it would require twelve Army divisions requiring 1 500 000 tons of shipping and the protection of the main body of the Combined Fleet; the drastic reductions required on other fronts; and the 'national character' of Australians who 'would resist to the end'. (See Annex C for more details and source.)

2.6 A notional enemy would have to be capable, perhaps through diplomatic means, of obtaining and then securing against attack, port and airfield facilities, probably in the Indonesian/Melanesian island chain to our north. He would also need to be capable of commanding the maritime and air approaches to Australia, which would require a large naval force, including a maritime airpower component, and large air forces based in the adjacent islands. These same maritime bases would, of course,

have to continue to secure the lines of supply of the invading force for the duration of the hostilities.

2.7 An invasion of Australia would involve a very difficult military operation - an amphibious landing - requiring an across-shore capability, unless the enemy was able to seize and maintain an Australian port or airfield.

2.8 An invading power's air force would need to be capable of achieving local air superiority, and should include ground attack, reconnaissance, anti-submarine and transport elements. The invading ground force would have to be balanced and highly mobile, with armoured fighting vehicles and supported by troop-carrying helicopters. Part of the force might require a paratroop capability.

2.9 Considerable logistic problems would need to be overcome after an invasion force had been landed. For example, as a relatively mobile force it would require about 150 tonnes of fuel and 200-250 tonnes of water for each 10 000 men per day.[1] Unless the invasion force was to 'wither on the vine' it would require the continuous support of a large tonnage of ships and transport aircraft. Because of the long distances involved, its lines of communications would be vulnerable to interdiction.

2.10 Finally, an invader, if he is to be successful, would require an occupation force sufficient to hold, control and presumably exploit the occupied area. This is unlikely to be a cost effective undertaking as the attitude of the civilian population could be expected to be actively hostile, and far from submissive.

Powers capable of posing a threat of invasion

2.11 Leaving motives or intentions aside, there would be only two nations at present which have the military capabilities to

mount a major conventional assault against Australia. These are the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has a much lesser ability to project force over sea than the United States, and for a conventional military invasion of Australia the Soviet Union would probably require an intermediate staging base in South-East Asia to provide an attacking force with effective air cover and to keep its shipping operational. Of the superpowers, only the United States has sufficient aircraft carriers to provide an adequate degree of air superiority for a successful invasion of Australia.

2.12 It is frequently asserted that the Soviet Union has developed a naval capacity for deep water operations and a heavy airlift capability that allows it to project military power and political influence to areas remote from the theatres of its primary strategic interest. While the Soviet Union's large armed forces are well adapted to project power across the Soviet Union's land borders, they are not well designed to undertake an opposed landing on a distant continent, as indicated by some further details of Soviet oversea projection capabilities:[2]

(a) Carriers. The USSR has three Kiev class aircraft carriers (including one undergoing trials). The 43 000 ton Kiev and her sister Minsk, carry 16 KA-25 anti-submarine helicopters plus 14 Yak-36 VTOL combat aircraft (which, because of weight restrictions are not believed to have a significant offensive capability). The Minsk has been stationed at Vladivostok. There are also two Moskva class anti-submarine cruisers which normally carry from 18 to 20 KA-25 helicopters.

(b) Amphibious lift. The Soviet amphibious lift capability consists of 28 vessels capable of open-ocean transit including 14 Alligator-class tank landing ships (LSTs) able to carry 25 to 30 armoured personnel carriers (APCs); 13 Ropucha-class LSTs able to carry 19 APCs; and

the new Ivan Rogov, able to carry 40 tanks and supporting vehicles. The Ivan Rogov and 10 of these LSTs have sometimes been stationed at Vladivostok.

(c) Naval infantry. This is a force of 12 000 assigned to Soviet fleets and river flotillas to provide the Soviet Navy with a limited amphibious assault capability. The main purpose of the Naval Infantry is to secure the coastal flanks of Warsaw Pact ground troops in Europe although presently two of the five regiments are assigned to the Soviet Pacific Fleet. Theoretically, these forces could also be used in a seaborne attack outside of the European theatre, but their small size, lack of organic air power and tanks would place them at a serious disadvantage in any assaults on heavily defended positions.

(d) Airborne forces. There are eight paratroop divisions of about 7500 men each, whose primary purpose is for use in a support role in the European theatre. For distant overseas deployment, they would be severely handicapped by the Soviet Navy's lack of true attack carriers.

(e) Air transport. The Military Transport Aviation service possesses about 1300 transport aircraft. These aircraft are capable of moving a significant quantity of troops and material over relatively long distances but are deficient in airborne refuelling capability and would be very vulnerable to hostile airpower.

Details of the strength of the Soviet Pacific Fleet are contained in Table 2.1.

TABLE 2-1

STRENGTH OF SOVIET PACIFIC FLEET

Major Combat Vessels and Aircraft
(at June 1980)

Submarines	Ballistic Missile submarine	Delta-class SSBN Yankee-class SSBN Hotel-class SSBN Golf-class SSB	10 11 3 6	30	110
	Cruise missile submarine	Charlie-class SSGN Echo II-class SSGN	17	23	
		Juliet-class SSG Whisky Long Bin-class SSG	6		
	Attack submarine	Echo I-class SSN November-class SSN Victor-class SSN	13	57	
		Whisky-class SS Foxtrot-class SS Zulu/Bravo-class SS	44		
Surface vessels	ASW Aircraft carrier	Kiev-class CVSG	1	1	79
	Cruisers	Kara-class CG Kresta II-class CG Kresta I-class CG Kynda-class CG Sverdlov-class CL	2 3 1 2 3	11	
	Destroyers	Krivak II/I-class DDG Kanin-class DDG Kildin-class DDG Kashin-class DDG Kotlin-class DDG	7 3 1 4 2	27	
		Kotlin-class DD Skory-class DD	10		
	Escort ships	Riga-class FF Grisha-class FFL Petya-class FFL	40		

Source: Research Institute for Peace and Security, Asian Security 1980, Tokyo, 1980, pp. 34, 35.

Surface vessels	Amphibious vessels	Ivan Rogov-class LPD	1	57	318
		Ropucha-class LST Alligator-class LST	10		
		Polnochiny-class LCT Other landing vessel	46		
	Patrol boats	Nanuchaka-class PGG Osa-class PTG Other missile-carrying patrol boats	55	166	
		Poti-class PCE Other patrol boats	111		
	Mine Warfare vessels	Natya-class MSF T-58 MSF T-43 MSF Yurka-class MSF	50	95	
		Other mine warfare craft	45		
Aircraft	Bombers	Tu-16 Badger Tu-22 Blinder	110		382
	Fighters	YAK-36 Forger	12		
	Patrol/ASW aircraft	Tu-95 Bear F Il-38 May Be 12 Mail Ka-25 Hormone Mi-14 Haze A	120		
	Tankers/Reconnaissance/ Electronic Warfare	Tu-16 Badger Tu-95 Bear D	80		
	Others (Utility)	Various	60		

2.13 The overseas deployment forces available to the Soviet Union provide a substantial capability for aiding friendly forces abroad, but only a modest capacity for long-range intervention against a well-armed opponent. The Soviet Union is capable of building up its amphibious assault forces, but as is shown elsewhere in the report it would be unrealistic to imagine that the USSR would do so for the purpose of invading Australia. There is little evidence to indicate a recent build-up in the overseas projection capabilities of Soviet Naval Infantry and Airborne divisions and/or of the Soviet Union being in a position to concentrate, so far from home, its small carrier force in order to gain local air superiority over Australian beaches.

2.14 Regional powers such as China, Japan, India, Vietnam and Indonesia, although they have large armies, currently do not have the capacity to mount a credible conventional attack on Australian territory as they do not have the air, sea and logistic capabilities that were mentioned (in paragraphs 2.5 - 2.8) as being a prerequisite. Except for Indonesia, each of these countries would have long lines of communication which would be vulnerable and would reduce the forces available for operations against Australia.

2.15 Indonesia has sometimes been mooted as a possible aggressor, particularly by part of the Australian media which contemplates a drastic change of direction in Indonesia's Government, or Indonesia acting in concert with another great power against Australia. There are serious limitations on the strategic military capabilities of Indonesia. Although Indonesia has numerically large armed forces they suffer major deficiencies which would make the risk of external operations prohibitive. As indicated by Indonesia's operations against Malaysia during 'Confrontation', and by Indonesia's East Timor experience, the Indonesians would need to improve their capacity for external operations before attempting such undertakings against larger neighbours.

2.16 Indonesia is acquiring some new ships and aircraft, but limitations persist in naval and air support, weak logistic backing and operational planning, and execution of operations above battalion level. According to some estimates, even with massive external aid and a determined effort to this end, Indonesia would be expected to take some ten years to fully rectify this situation. Any re-equipment of the Indonesian armed forces on a large scale would be readily detected at an early stage.

2.17 Ignoring other factors, Japan has the best economic potential - of the five regional powers mentioned above - to embark on a large-scale military build-up; however, this comment is far outweighed by the cogent points (in paragraphs 2.26 - 2.27) dealing with the absence of Japanese motives. Japan could not hope to control supplies of resources that would give it the sort of independence it would require to mount a major re-armament program for offensive operations. At present Japan's armaments production in many areas is made under licence and is still high cost compared with NATO production. To a degree Japan would also be dependent on the co-operation and defence technologies of her allies. It would be subject to the sorts of influence that the United States could bring to bear if it did not approve of the direction or extent of Japanese re-armament.

TABLE 2-2

CURRENT STRENGTH OF THE JAPANESE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES

	Item	Strength at the end of Fiscal 1979
GSDF	SDF Personnel Quota	180,000
	Basic Units Units deployed regionally in peacetime	12 Divisions 1 Composite Brigade
	Mobile Operation Units	1 Mechanized Division 1 Tank Brigade 1 Artillery Brigade 1 Airborne Brigade 1 Training Brigade 1 Helicopter Brigade
	Low-Altitude Ground-to-Air Missile Units	8 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Groups
MSDF	SDF Personnel Quota	42,278
	Basic Units Anti-Submarine Surface-Ship Units (for mobile operations) Anti-Submarine Surface-Ship Units (regional district Units) Submarine Units Minesweeping Units Land-Based Anti-Submarine Aircraft Units	 4 Escort Flotillas 9 Divisions 5 Divisions 2 Flotillas 16 Squadrons
	Major Equipment Anti-Submarine Surface Ships Submarines Operational Aircraft	 59 14 About 190
ASDF	SDF Personnel Quota	45,492
	Basic Units Aircraft Control and Warning Units Interceptor Units Support Fighter Units Air Reconnaissance Units Air Transport Units Early Warning Units High-Altitude Ground-to-Air Missile Units	 28 Groups 10 Squadrons 3 Squadrons 1 Squadrons 3 Squadrons - 6 Groups
	Major Equipment Operational Aircraft	 About 410

Source: Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan, 1980, Tokyo, 1980, p.104.

Who could have a motive for invading Australia?

2.18 An act of war is a decision of utmost significance for any government, and the use of military force is not a course adopted lightly by one nation against another. Worthwhile rewards must appear to be in prospect from military action, and there would need to be apparently favourable strategic circumstances. There would need to be compelling reasons or inducements before one nation decided to attack another and to accept all the consequences - military, political and economic - of that action. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that the leadership of a nation will always act rationally in this regard and this leads to uncertainty in defence contingency planning.

2.19 As already argued in this report, a decision to attack Australia by the Soviet Union or any other power would not be expected unless as a consequence of a preceding serious deterioration in relations between the two superpowers, and even then Soviet action is most unlikely to be in the form of a major invasion.

2.20 An event so dramatic as a trans-oceanic invasion of another country has enormous implications for the whole world. The development by a major power of a strategic motive to attack Australia would tend to engender equal and opposite strategic motives on the part of other powers which would be affected. A further discouragement to invasion of Australia would be that such action would seriously detract from the potential invader's capabilities in other areas, leading perhaps, to vulnerability of much more important interests. For example, during the Second World War, Japan had an army of 51 divisions but until the very end of the war, 40 of these divisions either were pre-occupied in China or were guarding the frontier with the Soviet Union.

2.21 Although the Soviet Union might further develop a desire to detach Australia from its alliance with the United States, the

Soviet Union would be unlikely to be motivated to allocate so much of its resources in an attempt for such a small gain, and thus risk a reaction from the United States. There are easier, less direct ways for the Soviet Union to bring pressure to bear upon Australia than by invasion. This was emphasised by the Chief of the Defence Force Staff on 18 March 1981 when he stated:

> 'If they are going to invade Australia they have enormous distances to cover from their bases. They might get operating bases by invading some intermediate country but this is all pie in the sky. Australia could be brought to heel in many other ways, but not by mass armed invasion. I am not dealing with the aftermath of a nuclear war where one could envisage unarmed invasion - that is a different question.'[3]

2.22 The possibility has been raised of powers wishing to exercise direct control over Australia's resources and industries, or of denying them to others, developing a motive for invading Australia.[4] To achieve such an aim would necessitate complete conquest of Australia: occupation of a limited area would leave the occupying force highly vulnerable to counter-attacks and irregular warfare, a state of affairs which would not be conducive to efficient exploitation of natural resources. As a trading country, Australia has been willing to make its resources available on commercial terms and instances of denial of one of our resources have been rare.

2.23 Australia's relations with neighbouring countries and most regional states are good despite some relatively minor irritations that develop from time to time. In fact, there are currently no serious disputes with any member of the international community which, in the foreseeable future, could develop into motives for warlike actions against Australia.

2.24 Given Indonesia's current strategic situation, its internal security commitments, and the policy orientation of

President Soeharto's government to economic and social development, Indonesian national policy is likely to avoid external commitments which could involve it in large-scale and open-ended military operations. Bearing in mind Indonesia's experience during 'Confrontation', a military attack by Indonesia on any of its neighbours is a remote possibility in the foreseeable future. Indonesia would be particularly reluctant to take any kind of military action against Australia, which is well placed to employ a variety of countermeasures. In fact, Indonesia wants a stable eastern and southern flank, so that it can devote full attention to the latent external threat to its security it sees coming from communist countries to its north.

2.25 From time to time there has been speculation that war could develop between Indonesia and Australia because Australia would feel obliged to assist Papua New Guinea if the latter became subject to Indonesian aggression. Quite apart from other factors, there is little likelihood of Indonesia adopting a policy toward Papua New Guinea similar to that which she adopted toward East Timor because Papua New Guinea is recognised by Indonesia, by Australia, and by the world community as a sovereign state. There are no indications that Indonesia has a desire for territorial aggrandisement with respect to Papua New Guinea. However, the implications of the continuing unsettled security and political situation in West Irian cannot be ignored within the context of examining potential sources of conflict in which Australia might become involved, in spite of the efforts so far of the Government of Papua New Guinea to contain the effect on public attitudes and political opinion in that country.

2.26 Japan is the other regional power most often speculated upon as a potential aggressor against Australia. The anti-militarist attitude which has dominated Japanese world views since the Second World War (after it was enshrined in the postwar constitution), is showing signs of modification. It remains strong nevertheless and is supported by general recognition of

the economic value of spending no more than one per cent of GNP on defence whilst under the American nuclear umbrella and by an acute perception of the dangers of war in the nuclear age. There is a more critical view of the American alliance now in Japan and pressure from the United States on Japan to assume greater responsibility for its own defence. The Japanese have, however, eschewed invitations to defend vital resource trade routes at a distance from Japan. The focus of Japanese interest has been on expanding Japanese capabilities to defend its maritime approaches. This limited area of strategic concern pre-occupies both those who support and oppose a continued American relationship. The Japanese have sought to protect access to resources by developing a variety of sources. Circumstances are unlikely to arise that would permit Japan to alter their essentially defensive outlook to seek a capacity to project massive power at a distance.

2.27 Although more recently there has been some willingness to discuss re-armament issues in Japan, that is a far cry from any indication that Japan is considering a major re-armament which would be likely to affect Australia adversely. Australia would be concerned were a close military relationship to be established between Japan and a regional power closer to Australia, though this, on current assessments, seems unlikely. One can hypothesise a Japanese decision to re-arm on a major scale and one can investigate the implications for Australia (we would be particularly interested if Japan acquired aircraft carriers); but the decision to re-arm with weapons primarily suited for offensive operations would itself attract a good deal of contention within Japan. Furthermore, as its implications became more evident, it would attract a great deal of attention in North East Asia where Japan sits in uncomfortable proximity to other substantial powers - particularly the Soviet Union.

2.28 It is also difficult to visualise one of the other regional powers such as China, India or Vietnam contemplating an

invasion of a country so remote as Australia. Quite apart from a lack of capability, each of them has a serious dispute with a formidable neighbour, and each of them has serious economic challenges.

Warning times

2.29 In a submission incorporated at a Sub-Committee hearing on 18 March 1981, the Minister for Defence, the Hon. D.J. Killen, M.P., stated:

> 'Periodic assessments of Australia's strategic position continue to conclude that the prospect of major direct assault on Australia is remote and improbable.'[5]

Since 1979 testimony from the Department of Defence has indicated 'that there is no assumption in defence planning, or in defence funding, that our defence force should be capable within five years of resisting unaided a major threat'.[6] This would undoubtedly be based on such factors as already mentioned in this paper. This policy was confirmed by the Chief of Defence Force Staff, Admiral Sir Anthony Synnot, at a subsequent hearing on 18 March 1981 when he said:

> '... from what I have said I think it is clear that to raise the sort of force which would be required for a mass invasion of Australia could not possibly be done in under five years by other than the Superpowers. It just would not be possible.'[7]

2.30 Where there is political instability, tension or military confrontation, a detailed course of events can be difficult to predict with reasonable confidence beyond a few years or even less. However, there is much continuity in Australia's strategic circumstances in relation to the military capabilities of potential aggressors, and Australia could be expected to have a reasonable warning time against a mass

invasion. Whether such warning time would be enough to allow for smooth expansion of our Defence Force - including the provision of long lead-time items of equipment - is another matter.

2.31 Not faced by powerful neighbours in close proximity, Australia's strategic situation is very different from, for example, that of Israel or Sweden, two countries with whose high level of defence readiness Australia has sometimes been unfavourably compared. Israel's three million Jews are surrounded by 130 million Arabs. It does not consider its boundaries secure against sudden attack from hostile neighbours. Although Sweden's national boundaries and independence are not opposed as are Israel's, Sweden's geographical location between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries necessitates a high deterrent posture. Israel and Sweden are greatly disadvantaged by their geographical locations, while Australia enjoys the advantages of being an island remote from centres of conflict. This was emphasised in testimony by the Chief of the Defence Force Staff:

> 'We are a long way from the centres of superpower rivalry. The areas of superpower rivalry are probably East Asia/Korea, the Middle East and the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Australia is not one of these areas. It would be ridiculous for those two superpowers, if they wanted to subjugate the country, to think of major invasion.'[8]

2.32 The Committee has already questioned the Soviet Union's ability to launch a sudden invasion of Australia. But even given that the superpowers have the capability, it is difficult to envisage the circumstances in which they would exercise it. A period of sustained and massive deterioration in current relationships would have to take place and presumably this would serve as its own warning time. Furthermore, the search for intermediate bases is likely to cause the Soviet Union to show its hand and thus give additional warning.

2.33 Even for an economically advanced regional power such as Japan, it would take at least five years to develop a capability to invade Australia. Other regional powers are more likely to take ten or more years. Defence contracts are very competitive and highly publicised, therefore the acquisition of the means necessary to invade Australia would give clear warning.

2.34 On 29 March 1979 the Hon. D.J. Killen, M.P., Minister for Defence, pointed out that the 'second tier' of maritime powers (like France or Britain, they are in most cases friendly to Australia) did not possess blue-water capabilities significantly greater, if any greater at all, than Australia's own. He went on to say:

> 'There is no way that a member of this second tier of maritime powers could acquire the kind of maritime strength necessary to dominate the sea approaches to Australia without its naval program becoming blindingly obvious, and without the process taking that country an appreciable span of years, and I stress the word "years".'[5]

2.35 Critics of the assumption that there is no major invasion threat sometimes mention a study completed in 1975 by the Central Studies Establishment (CSE) of the Department of Defence which analysed warning times associated with major conflicts, 1939-1973. The study found that the average time from the first indication of impending war to the firing of the first shot was 14.3 months. However, it can be argued with justification that this finding has little relevance to Australia, because the study tended to relate to contiguous states with long histories of friction rather than to cases of trans-oceanic attack. It is understood that the CSE study was not intended to have any predictive value.

2.36 Before an invasion of Australia could become a possibility, the world situation and Australia's relations with the notional enemy power, would have to alter substantially from

the current state of affairs; it would probably require a dramatic change of government in the other country. This is likely to give several years warning, but earlier in this report the Committee has noted some elements of uncertainty in the global strategic outlook.

Deterrent to invasion

2.37 This report has already drawn attention to the advantage of Australia's geographic position which is a formidable natural deterrent which imposes the need for an enemy to acquire significant maritime capabilities. Even if Australia were conquered, its control would be an extraordinarily difficult undertaking.

2.38 In a period of no imminent or foreseeable threat, the concept of deterrence should be central to Australia's defence planning, thus increasing the cost and risk of aggression against Australian territory. This process requires the identification of possible aggressive acts and the operations involved in responding to such acts in ascending order of cost and risk to the enemy. It requires us to plan national resource organisation and military operations so as to allow the least prospect of an enemy impeding our contingent force expansion, and to raise the enemy's costs and risks to the highest possible level. By its mere existence, the Australian Defence Force reduces the prospect of armed attack. This deterrent factor is enhanced if Australia is seen to have the capability to mobilise its reserves of manpower and materiel, even if they are never used in war.

2.39 Australia, for the foreseeable future, will restrict itself to relatively small standing forces backed up by relatively small reserve forces. In the event of a serious defence emergency, the Army may have to depend on the large-scale mobilisation of untrained manpower. The highly equipment-oriented Navy and Air Force will have to fight with the hardware in

Australia at the time. This makes the time available for defence preparation critical. This may be achieved by the concept of disproportionate response.

2.40 'Disproportionate response' is a concept, within the context of strategic deterrence, which advocates progressively incorporating into the Australian Defence Force specific capabilities that would cause a potential aggressor to respond disproportionately in terms of cost in one or all of money, time, materiel and/or manpower in order to gain the advantage. For example, it is conceivable that the purchase by Australia of some extra submarines might force a potential enemy to need anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities costing many times as much as those extra submarines. In addition to this extra cost incurred, the potential aggressor would need to extend his force preparation time greatly, since these capabilities require complex command and control facilities and procedures, logistic support, trained crews, and so on. If, in this example, the enemy is not deterred, Australia would still have the option of raising its level of deterrence by adding more of the same capability or others specially chosen in the light of their ability to cause the potential aggressor to make a disproportionate response.

2.41 It is true that deterrence may fail for any number of reasons - irrationality, miscalculation of the costs, or acceptance of the military costs in order to achieve non-military strategic objectives. Accepting this, care should be taken to ensure that the concept of disproportionate response is not only applied in the context of deterrence but is also taken into account when considering the military requirements for the actual defence of Australia. To be cost-effective, preparations should be suitable both for deterrence and for actual defence. Australia's force structure could well be tilted in favour of deterrence at the early stages when the likelihood of threat is low and potential enemies lack military capability to match their aggressive intentions. As threatening intentions are perceived to

be reflected in the potential enemy's emerging force structure, then forces would have to be developed along more balanced lines to be credible in the context of Australia's actual defence.

2.42 There are some well known military factors which require disproportionate effort on the part of an adversary. The Committee has already alluded to the fairly well accepted yardstick for combat ratios requiring an attacker in ground operations to have a 3:1 advantage over a defender. Such a yardstick cannot be applied to encounters on the sea or in the air. In any case, there are many qualifications to this numerical concept such as the relative morale of the adversaries, the use of surprise, superior tactics and application of technology. Such factors - sometimes referred to as 'combat multipliers' - obviously influence relative combat power so that relative numerical strength is not necessarily of paramount importance. 'Combat multipliers' are particularly significant to Australia with its relative shortage of military manpower. In the defence of Australia, we need to exploit superior use of firepower, mobility, knowledge of terrain, a high state of readiness, deception and electronic warfare. Most importantly, we need to have effective command arrangements and intelligence as to the enemy's intentions and order of battle.

2.43 Application of the concept of disproportionate response to deterrence is particularly relevant to our maritime forces, since it would be most unwise if Australia were to adopt a military posture which did not give priority to destroying an invading force on the high seas or in the air before reaching Australia. Giving priority in the first instance to capabilities designed to keeping an enemy at arm's length means giving priority to maritime forces, especially in the provision of high-cost advanced technology with long lead-times. To be effective as a deterrent, such capabilities must be 'in being' and be seen by a potential aggressor to be capable of imposing unacceptable risks and costs on his forces.

2.44 The role of the Army as a deterrent is less easily understood by many people. The Army (including the Army Reserve) has to be of sufficient size and capability to deter and, if necessary, repulse any landing forces which might be brought against Australia. In view of the generally accepted requirement for a three-to-one superiority to attacking over defending forces, it would be wise strategy for Australia to be capable of confronting the notional invader with a force large enough to compel him to assemble an invasion force so big and cumbersome that it presented, while in transit, an unacceptably vulnerable target to Australian maritime defence forces.

2.45 Another component in the deterrent Australia could offer to a notional invader would be a capability to strike against his home bases (in the case of a regional power) or forward operational bases with air and sea power. This would seem to be the principal justification for Australia's two strike and reconnaissance squadrons of F-111C aircraft.

2.46 The peacetime force-expansion base is the link between our deterrent force structure and our ultimate force structure for the defence of Australia. Ideally, the level of our deterrence should be escalated ahead of what is judged to be an emerging threat; the deterrent component of our overall defence posture should then more closely reflect the balanced force structure for fighting a war in the defence of Australia, against what would be by then an evident threat.

2.47 An essential element in the total deterrent to invasion would be the national will to resist.[10] A potential invader who could foresee a prospect of prolonged popular resistance in the form of guerilla warfare, even if he should succeed in destroying the Australian regular armed forces, would certainly think again before he proceeded with his plans. Development of the Army Reserve and other elements of the infrastructure for territorial

defence or irregular resistance, would provide visible evidence of the national will to resist. For this reason the Committee has been pleased to note that the Department of Defence has started to implement a suggestion of the Sub-Committee on Defence Matters for a more visible territorially based presence in north-western Australia, as foreshadowed by a Government announcement to establish NORFORCE.

Issues that need to be addressed

2.48 The following are some major issues that need to be addressed (on some of these issues the Committee will have more to say in later reports):

(a) agreement as to the area of Australia's strategic interest. This Committee considers Australia's area of primary strategic concern to be Australia and its territories, the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and near lines of communication. Also of strategic concern are the adjacent maritime areas, Papua New Guinea and the other South-West Pacific states and territories, and the South-East Asia Region, more specifically the countries of ASEAN and Indo-China;

(b) the deterrent capability of the Australian Defence Force and its capacity for timely expansion to meet a threat;

(c) the adequacy of Australian mobilisation planning, including the wide array of economic resources not encompassed within the portfolio of the Minister for Defence;

(d) the development of the 'territorial' defence concept and the associated infrastructure, particularly in Northern Australia, as a contribution to deterrence;

(e) the likelihood and extent of allied support and whether there is a need for greater self-reliance (this report has already considered the American alliance, see for example, para 1.77(e); and

(f) the question of closer defence co-operation or association with other regional powers and/or ASEAN.

Endnotes

1. Evidence, 2 May 1980, p. 172 (Brigadier H.J. Coates).

2. Statistics from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance, 1980-1981.

3. Evidence, 18 March 1981, p. 1678 (Admiral Sir Anthony Synnot).

4. Robert O'Neill, 'The Strategic View - Fears and Phobias', in Australia's Resources Future, ed. by Peter Hastings and Andrew Farran, Melbourne, 1978, pp. 219-228.

5. Evidence, 18 March 1981, p. 1658.

6. Evidence, 25 July 1979, p. 2091.

7. Evidence, 18 March 1981, p. 1682.

8. Evidence, 18 March 1981, p. 1677 (Admiral Sir Anthony Synnot).

9. House of Representatives, Hansard, 29 March 1979, p. 1325.

10. Robert O'Neill, 'Insurgency and Sub-National Violence', in New Directions in Strategic Thinking, edited by Robert O'Neill and D.M. Horner, Sydney George Allen & Unwin, 1981, p. 203.

CHAPTER 3

INTERMEDIATE LEVEL THREATS

3.1 Under this heading the Committee considers threats such as:

(a) lodgements on Australian territory that are limited (including in time); the areas that appear to be more vulnerable as targets for limited lodgements would be offshore islands and territories as for example the Cocos Islands, or the Torres Strait Islands, or areas of northern and north-western Australia such as Cape York Peninsula, Arnhem Land, parts of the Kimberley or Pilbara regions and Australian territory in Antarctica;

(b) major raids: targets for this level of threat are more likely to be military bases, key civil installations and facilities and the joint United States/Australian defence facilities. To be regarded as intermediate level threats, such raids would need to be on a continuing basis, or comprise seize-and-hold operations against major facilities or resource installations;

(c) external aggression against a regional country, the security of which is highly important to Australia; this would apply particularly to states and territories in the Indonesian/Melanesian archipelago and to New Zealand, (see also paragraphs 1.30 - 1.32);

(d) blockade of an Australian port or ports including by the relatively economical device of laying mines; and

(e) disruption of our lines of shipping communications, or closure of a strait either in isolation or in the context of Western lines of communications. As Australian trade is important to other powers and is mostly carried in foreign ships, it is difficult to envisage such a contingency occurring except as part of a more general conflict.

3.2 To be regarded as an intermediate level threat, it would have to have limited objectives (against Australia) under policy limitations as to the extent of the destructive power that might be employed and the extent of the geographical areas that might be involved. A response to most of the intermediate level threats mentioned would be likely to involve a substantial expansion of the Australian Defence Force.

Capability needed to pose an intermediate level threat

3.3 The capabilities needed by a notional enemy to carry out one of the intermediate level threats mentioned in paragraph 3.1 vary and in some cases are of a specialist nature such as, for example, the use of 'special forces' for raids or technical capabilities for minelaying. In order to effect a limited lodgement on the mainland, or even to seize a significant island territory, the notional enemy is likely to require the following capabilities:

(a) naval and air forces required for at least local superiority to cover the lodgement; in some cases they might have to be similar in magnitude to those already described as a requirement for mounting the first stages of a full-scale invasion. Any limitation of the requirement might result from the short time scale implied by limited lodgement, such as the reduced requirements for reinforcements and supplies;

(b) transport and protective forces from embarkation points to the part or parts of Australian territory selected for attack require a formidable naval and air capability, unless this is provided by another power or complete surprise is achieved;

(c) the ability to sustain and protect the force against inevitable countermeasures, for the duration of the operation.

Who could have capabilities or motives to pose an intermediate level threat?

3.4 If it had the motive, one of the superpowers would be capable of posing intermediate level threats to Australia. For example, the Soviet Union showed it was able to project military power to a very distant country when it intervened in the post-independence civil war in Angola. However, the circumstances were very different to an opposed landing on Australia. (See paragraph 2.12 for some Soviet limitations in capabilities for such a task). Certainly the Soviet Union and even some currently friendly European powers such as Britain and France, would have the capability, if not the motive, to impose some of the lesser intermediate threats mentioned in paragraph 3.1, but at considerable cost to their diplomatic standing and capabilities in regions more relevant to those powers. In order to launch a major raid against Australian territory, (as distinct from a limited lodgement), a hostile power would have to possess significant maritime capabilities.

3.5 Countries such as Japan, China, India, Indonesia and Vietnam could conceivably enhance some elements of their current capabilities so as to be able to pose one or more of the intermediate level threats against Australia, particularly if assisted by a superpower. Leaving aside motives, such action would entail a diversion of resources and military capability

from other areas. (Other reasons why these powers are unlikely to take hostile action were covered in paragraphs 2.22 to 2.28.)

3.6 The question of foreign countries developing a motive for armed action against Australia is at this time hypothetical. As already indicated Australia does not have serious disputes with any other members of the world community. Even the issues raised by the extension of national claims over the resources of the oceans under the evolving Law of the Sea, are being settled to a large extent peacefully, at least so far (when a comprehensive Law of the Sea Treaty enters into force the question of settling maritime boundaries is likely to pose some challenges to relations between states in the region).

3.7 Although difficult to visualise at this stage, countries could develop motives for mounting intermediate level threats against Australia for several possible reasons:

(a) in a period of great tension between the superpowers there might be a temptation to weaken Australia's commitment to the Western Alliance by posing intermediate level threats against Australia;

(b) a hostile country might wish to achieve short-term or long-term political or economic concessions from Australia, the nature of which it is difficult to specify at this time; such a country might have, or more likely contrive, serious disagreement with some aspect of Australia's domestic or foreign policy. A foreign power might wish to gain control of an Australian territory in order to increase its right to resources, including off-shore resources. Some of our island territories, such as Christmas Island or the Cocos Islands, might be seen to have strategic value as bases, as well as conferring rights to adjacent maritime resources which may not be so evident at this time;

(c) A foreign power might one day see the need to control directly the resources of an under-utilised or less populated part of Australia. This might perhaps occur if the situation ever arose where Australia were for some reason reduced to a condition of great internal disorder, and unable to satisfactorily supply foreign markets or organise a unified national defence against a power which sought to obtain supplies by force;

(d) in the event of serious ideological or other divisions - contrived or real - within Australia, a foreign power might attempt to exploit these divisions to its own advantage. External attacks are likely to be more successful when the country which is the object of attack is debilitated by internal disorder.

3.8 As already indicated the term 'limited lodgement' could be taken to mean that the lodgement was to be limited in terms of space or time. For example, a notional enemy could aim to seize the Kimberley region and have the annexation accepted by world opinion, as perhaps reflected by lack of support for Australia's case in the United Nations. However, it is difficult to envisage such an operation being so neatly limited in practice. Australia is an island continent far removed from other countries, with a relatively homogeneous population, and it would be very difficult for any Australian Government which retained control of the populated south-east and south-west to acknowledge the alienation of any of the mainland parts of the country. The logic of the situation would compel the notional enemy to choose between a full-scale invasion or withdrawal.[1]

3.9 With the exception of New Zealand, the island states of the South Pacific have very small defence forces, or none at all. This state of affairs is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. There is likely to be an expectation, including in South

West Pacific states, that Australia (and New Zealand) undertake the major burden of defence against external threats to the Melanesian and Polynesian states should such threats eventuate. Joint action with the defence forces of New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and Fiji might be especially significant in this context. Current defence needs in the South Pacific are small, because there is little evidence of external powers posing a security threat to the region. A willingness and perceived capability on the part of Australia and New Zealand to use their forces in the common interest of all of the South Pacific states helps to ensure the continuance of a secure environment.

Warning times

3.10 Warning times for intermediate level threats would be less than for a major invasion, but leaving aside, for the moment, any prospect of a global war, these threats would be considered years away rather than months. This is because Australia does not have serious disputes with any foreign power nor can we at the present time foresee any issue with any country which might develop into armed hostilities.

3.11 An intermediate level action against Australia could be expected to be preceded by a substantial period during which relations with the notional enemy state deteriorated. If the hostile state were other than one of the superpowers, it would in most cases take a considerable period to build up its capability to mount such an operation. If the hostile state were closely allied to a superpower, it could be assisted to build up its capability more quickly or be provided with technical and logistic support for warlike operations.

3.12 As with the case of a major invasion it is difficult to envisage intermediate level threats arising against Australia short of a situation where the existing world order was seriously disrupted, and where the attentions of Australia's main allies

were totally pre-occupied with serious military threats or large-scale economic disruption.

Deterrent to intermediate level threats

3.13 Taking into account that intermediate level threats may call for a greater need for Australian self-reliance, the military deterrents to these threats are not greatly different to those for invasion. Australia's naval and air forces must be seen to be capable of destroying the attacking forces while moving to or from Australia or of destroying their lines of communication with their home bases, and should pose an unacceptable risk for any regional state contemplating hostile action. Ground forces with strong offensive air and transport support, which could be rapidly deployed over long distances and be capable of destroying the attacking forces after they have landed in Australia, also have an important deterrent role. The deterrent effect is enhanced if our ready reaction forces demonstrate the ability - preferably in co-operation with allies - to make rapid deployments to those parts of Australian territory that are more vulnerable to intermediate threats. Furthermore, the capability to strike at the notional enemy's home or forward operational bases would constitute a very significant deterrent.

3.14 If Australia were seen to have an effective and integrated surveillance system, potential intruders or aggressors would be more likely to feel that their planned incursions or raids would be detected at an early stage. In addition, in the sparsely populated northern parts of Australia, an enhanced presence of 'territorial' forces - lightly equipped and highly mobile - would play an important role in surveillance and reconnaissance and limiting the scope of enemy operations until the full strength of Australia's ground forces could be brought to bear on any lodgement on the Australian mainland.

3.15 Any regional power considering a lodgement in Australia would have to give serious consideration to the ANZUS Alliance

and the possibility that the United States might intervene. Australia's standing in the world community could also play an important part in deterrence. If it were taken into consideration that Australia was likely to be supported by allies, who would see an attack on this country as a threat to their own interests, then a potential enemy would hesitate before taking hostile action. An increased vulnerability to attack is one of the consequences for a state which has become diplomatically isolated because its policies are unacceptable to world opinion (as, for example, present day South Africa or Iran).

3.16 Australia would be able by diplomatic means to arouse international condemnation of enemy action in regard to sea communications to this country. A potential enemy posing a threat to our sea communications would be aware that our trade is carried mainly in foreign-owned ships and ought to be deterred from interference in the belief that Australia would be quickly able to internationalise such a conflict.

Issues that need to be addressed

3.17 The following are some major issues that need to be addressed, perhaps in future Committee inquiries:

(a) the diplomatic and other non-military means of avoiding deterioration of Australia's relations with any country to such a level that that country sought a redress of its grievances by armed force;

(b) whether the Australian Defence Force is at a level of strength and capability sufficient to deter a considered or irrational resort to force by any country with which Australia might have a dispute;

(c) the need for greater self-reliance against intermediate threats (compared with major assault on Australia) and the extent of allied support;

(d) whether there is adequate provision for an effective and integrated system of intelligence and surveillance to deter incursions on Australian territory;

(e) the potential for greater co-operation, or alliances, with other regional powers; and

(f) whether Australia is giving sufficient support to the new states of the South Pacific.

Endnote

1. Robert O'Neill, 'Australia as a Target for International Violence', United Service (A.C.T.), October 1974, p. 10.

CHAPTER 4

LOW LEVEL CONTINGENCIES

4.1 In this chapter the Committee considers low level contingencies. Australia may be confronted by one or several of the following situations:

(a) sporadic attacks against key civil facilities and installations (which are sometimes referred to as vital points, as the orderly life of a modern society depends on them) for example, power stations, petroleum refineries, water supply pumping stations and computers;

(b) attacks against isolated military facilities;

(c) harassment of our shipping, fishing activities, and offshore exploration and exploitation;

(d) sporadic intrusions into Australia's air space by military aircraft or smugglers;

(e) military support for the illegal exploitation of our offshore resources;

(f) the planned introduction of exotic diseases or the support of illegal migrants or drug-runners;

(g) harassment of our nationals or a threat to their safety in overseas countries including seizure of overseas property and Australian embassies;

(h) external support for dissident elements in, or military pressures against, a regional country the security of which is important to Australia;

(i) covert or overt overseas support for Australian dissident or minority groups in Australia who might be encouraged to resort to terrorist action;

(j) overseas based terrorist groups using violence or threats of violence in Australia or on an Australian aircraft; and

(k) large-scale but non-violent intrusions into Australia's proposed Exclusive Economic Zone for the purpose of poaching scarce resources.

4.2 Generally, the low level contingencies described in this part of the report are those threats which can be dealt with within the peacetime organisation and structure of the Defence Force.

Who could have capabilities or motives to pose low level contingencies?

4.3 Any group or organisation trained in the use of small arms and explosives would be capable of mounting most threats mentioned in para 4.1. To pose a serious threat to national security, such a group would be likely to require overt or covert support from an overseas organisation or state. This assistance could be in the form of logistic and training support, as well as transport for insertion and extraction of activists (unless infiltrated on normal international transport).

4.4 A motive to pose the sort of threats we have classified as low level contingencies could be developed by any state, organisation or minority group which strongly disagreed with any

aspect of Australian national policy in any of a large number of areas - including Australian attitudes to minorities or certain organisations in Australia or overseas. In recent years some isolated actions by a minority group in Australia have demonstrated the potential for such development. In May 1979, the Hon. Mr Justice R.M. Hope, completed a Protective Security Review for the Australian Government. He stated in his report that:

> 'The present absence in Australia of national terrorism is likely to continue. Although from time to time polarising issues will arise in Australia, and domestic violence will wax and wane accordingly, it is not likely that the essential consensus of Australian society, and the unchallenged legitimacy of its governments, will be fractured in the foreseeable future.'[1]

The Committee agrees with this assessment, although it has not taken formal evidence on this matter.

4.5 With regard to international terrorism directed against Australia, Mr Justice Hope indicated that acts of international terrorism within Australia were not likely to diminish, and might increase. In assessing the long-term outlook, Mr Justice Hope said that, although the prospect of ethnic-based international terrorism within Australia in the long-term was very much guesswork, it was likely that the problems stemming from the Middle East might increase, and that those stemming from Yugoslavia would continue at the then current level. Mr Justice Hope also mentioned the possibility of greater instability in South East Asia in the future providing a higher risk of exposure of Australia to what he called 'the transnational character of modern terrorism'. The possibility of what he referred to as 'the new mercenaries' employing nuclear weaponry and biological warfare was raised, but Mr Justice Hope concluded that 'this is very much speculation'.[2]

4.6 Australia has been relatively free from such acts as hijacking of international aircraft. To a large measure, this is

probably due to Australia's remoteness from established centres of terrorism but this situation could change.

Warning times

4.7 It would take relatively little time for a hostile power or organisation to mount a low level type threat, once they had made the decision to do so. In that sense, a low level threat could arise with little or no warning. However, threats even of this kind do not arise without antecedent causes and developments and the Committee has already indicated that at this stage Australia does not have minority groups prepared to resort to terrorism on a significant scale. If perpetrated by agents of a foreign government, actions of this kind would constitute acts of war, and there would be the danger that the situation could develop into a full-scale war. Therefore, it is difficult to envisage a foreign state undertaking such action without a much greater degree of tension existing than exists now, or in the foreseeable future, between any country and Australia. Similarly, deterioration in Australia's relations with an ethnic or ideological movement based outside Australia would provide warning of an externally-directed terrorist campaign.

4.8 In a submission incorporated at the hearing on 25 July 1979, the Department of Defence stated:

> '...some lesser contingencies [e.g. terrorist activities involving a military response to assist civil authorities] are recognised as being likely to occur without identifiable pre-conditions. However, for the most part, the contingencies under study are seen as being possible initial actions against Australia resulting for example, from a deterioration in regional relationships or from disputes in maritime resources zones.'[3]

It would seem that the Department of Defence would expect to have some warning time for most low level contingencies.

4.9 The development of a situation in which a minority group within Australian society perceived itself as being oppressed to such a degree that it felt compelled to resort to terrorism as a justifiable or effective response, would also provide warning time of a likely outbreak of terrorism.

Deterrents to low level contingencies

4.10 Effective deterrents to the low level threats mentioned in this report include:

(a) an effective civil and military surveillance capability which is integrated under a central control, which also has quick access to suitable reaction forces;

(b) strong and efficient anti-terrorist capability, including in the airlines industry;

(c) continued provision for the lawful redress of grievances within Australian society;

(d) foreign policy directed toward avoiding serious deterioration of Australia's relations with other countries; a deterioration which could provoke them to instigate campaigns of low level aggression;

(e) provision for adequate protection of vital points in Australia's civil and military infrastructure which might prove attractive targets; and

(f) an enhanced presence of 'territorial' type forces in Northern Australia which could report on or react to low level incursions.

4.11 Referring to the role of the Defence Force in dealing with low level threats, the Department of Defence said in

evidence given on 25 July 1979 that the reaction of the Australian Defence Force to any contingent situation would be dependent on a number of factors:

> 'Firstly, there would need to be positive direction from the highest level of government authorising a military response to the situation. Actual force elements utilized in the situation, and the manner of their utilization, would be determined on a basis of military and other judgement depending on the nature of the event, i.e. its type, scale and location. In general, our studies indicate that the present force-in-being could cope with credible situations which may arise with scant warning. Certain elements of the force-in-being provide us with highly competent and flexible capabilities that could be deployed in contingent circumstances. These capabilities include maritime patrol aircraft, naval ships of various types and components of our land forces which, with tactical air transport, can be quickly deployed to remote areas.
>
> Difficulties may arise if incidents became widely dispersed, concurrent or protracted. However, such circumstances suggest a concerted campaign of harassment with overtones of increasing seriousness and escalation of threat, for which some substantial warning time could be expected.'[4]

4.12 The important question arises whether the Australian Defence Force should be structured with some emphasis on deterring low level contingencies. The Department of Defence stated in a submission that:

> '... it is important to realise that inferences which may be drawn from the study of specific contingencies exercise limited influence, guiding rather than dominating the force development process. Developing the core force against specific threats or contingencies of threat would risk the unacceptable distortion of that force to meet what could be the wrong threat, in the wrong place and at the wrong time.'[5]

Issues that need to be addressed

4.13 The following are some of the issues that need to be *addressed in regard to low level contingencies:*

(a) the adequacy of arrangements for the collection, assessment and dissemination of intelligence regarding low level contingencies; the adequacy of co-ordination between the several Australian intelligence services, as well as with those of relevant countries, to give timely warning of such threats;

(b) the effectiveness of present arrangements for coastal surveillance;

(c) the organisation that should be responsible for Australia's coastal surveillance; whether the present arrangements could be improved and greater deterrence achieved if the responsibility were allocated to the Defence Force;

(d) whether the current forces available for ready reaction to low level contingencies would be adequate if Australia came under increasing threat;

(e) whether Australia has a sufficient presence in some of the more isolated parts of her territory, so that potential intruders are aware that any incursions or raids are unlikely to go undetected;

(f) the adequacy of planning and provision of manpower for the protection of vital installations such as dams, pipelines, oil storage tanks and refineries, electricity generators, communications facilities, airfields and information centres;

(g) whether the right priority is being given to lower level contingencies - in deciding the development of the Defence Force in the shorter term - in view of the fact that they require of an adversary less military capability and preparation time, as well as a greater degree of self-reliance on Australia's part, as distinct from a global war or major invasion (but note also paragraph 4.12);

(h) whether the Defence Force is doing sufficient in its role of deterrence by exercising in pre-emptive deployments to Northern Australia and Australia's territories; and

(i) the role of active diplomacy, trade, aid and defence co-operation with regional states as an essential ingredient to meeting low level threats.

Endnotes

1. Protective Security Review, Report Canberra, 1979 p. 23.
2. ibid, pp. 23-26, passim.
3. Evidence, 25 July 1979, p. 2106.
4. Evidence, 25 July 1979, p. 2107.
5. Evidence, 25 July 1979, p. 2108.

CONCLUSIONS

1. In the introduction to this report the Committee identified its target audience as 'the reasonably well informed citizen who has made no special study of defence, and who has the impression that because of its vast coastline and small population Australia is fundamentally indefensible.' The Committee's study of the nature and probability of threats to Australia's security will provide some reassurance to such a person that Australia can be defended, and that its defence preparations in themselves make a substantial contribution through their deterrent effect towards reducing the number and level of threats to its security that Australia might possibly face. The Committee's conclusions deal firstly with the threat of full-scale invasion of the continent (perhaps the most long standing, yet in today's world least justified fear of many Australians) and with intermediate level threats that fall short of such an invasion. The more conceivable but still unlikely event of a general or nuclear war is then dealt with, followed by the most conceivable yet potentially least damaging threat of low level emergencies.

2. Because of Australia's remote location and lack of land frontiers with other nations, because of its own not inconsiderable capacity to deter potential aggressors and because its alliance with the United States of America involves the threat of American retaliation, Australia is a difficult invasion target. Currently only the United States would have the physical capacity to launch a full-scale invasion of Australia, and it clearly lacks any motive to do so. The Soviet Union would require South-East Asian staging bases and additional equipment to mount a successful invasion, and it is difficult to envisage any conditions outside general war that would make such a move worthwhile.

3. In the unlikely event that another power should develop a motive or intention to invade Australia such an assault would involve a very difficult military operation (paras 2.2 to 2.10 refer). Even for an economically advanced regional power, it could be expected to take at least five years to develop such a capability. Other regional powers would require at least ten years. Nevertheless, the Australian Defence Force needs to continue to sustain a technological level relevant to those of regional powers to include long lead-time capabilities which act as a deterrent to hostile action. Australia also needs to maintain the skills relevant to operations in the region and to have the capability for timely expansion of its forces.

4. Large-scale attack on Australia is therefore regarded as remote and improbable in the foreseeable future. It could be expected that such an eventuality would be preceded by a period of warning which is likely to include a severe crisis or confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States.

5. Although there is no discernible threat of invasion of Australia on which force structure can be based, there is the danger that the emergence of such a threat may take less time than is likely to be required to obtain long-lead items of important equipment and increased trained manpower. This places a heavy responsibility on our intelligence agencies and those responsible for planning for a smooth expansion of Australia's Defence Force. A nation that spends relatively little of its gross national product on defence requires a relatively large and competent intelligence effort.

6. Warning times for intermediate level threats would be less than for a major invasion, but leaving aside, for the moment, any prospect of a global war, these threats would be considered years away rather than months. This is because Australia does not have serious disputes with any foreign power

nor can we at the present time foresee any issue with any country which might develop into armed hostilities. As with the case of a major invasion, it is difficult to envisage intermediate level threats arising against Australia short of a situation where the existing world order was seriously disrupted, and where the attentions of Australia's main allies were totally pre-occupied with serious military threats or large-scale economic disruption.

7. There are currently several elements that contribute to an uncertain global strategic outlook (paras 1.8 to 1.22 refer). A deterioration in the global relationship between the superpowers, or possible conflicts in the region - which might attract the support of one or both of the superpowers - could affect adversely Australa's strategic prospects. It is difficult to envisage a serious strategic threat to Australia which would be unrelated to a major breakdown in the existing world order or to Australia's alliance with the United States.

8. There is likely to be continuing and perhaps increased tension and competition between the superpowers, particularly in regions where there is instability or confrontation. Nevertheless, on all rational calculations nuclear war between the superpowers should be regarded as an unlikely eventuality, given the immense devastation engendered in such a conflict which would negate any conceivable benefits to the belligerents. The dangers of nuclear proliferation add yet another worrying dimension to the uncertainties in the global strategic outlook. Unrestrained nuclear weapons development by the existing nuclear powers may serve as an ostensible justification for the ambitions of other states to have nuclear weapons.

9. Australia's security depends substantially on the maintenance of the global balance between the United States and the USSR and their allies. This balance would be catastrophically upset by nuclear war between the superpowers. Even if it were not directly targeted, Australia would be affected by a general

nuclear war between northern hemisphere powers. The disruption of the world order which would result from such a war could leave Australia exposed to enormous problems including an overwhelming influx of refugees. This would be at a time when the breakdown in international trade would have catastrophic consequences for Australia's economy. Even if Australia were not seriously affected directly by radioactive fallout from the northern hemisphere, there would be ecological consequences for the whole world which would necessarily affect Australia.

10. The joint Australian-United States facilities at Pine Gap, Nurrungar and North West Cape are likely to be on the Soviet nuclear target list. How high on that target list is likely to depend on Soviet perceptions at the time, particularly as to the role of the facilities and the alternatives available to the United States. The presence of the installations can be justified in terms of their contribution to the central balance between the superpowers, and because it can be seen to confer additional advantages on Australia in its alliance with the United States. Nevertheless, it could be argued that it is the presence of the installations, not the existence of the alliance, which may make Australia a nuclear target. However, it can also be argued that the risks associated with nuclear attack on Australia are outweighed by the advantages Australia derives from its alliance with the United States. The ANZUS Alliance is likely to act as a deterrent against those potentially hostile actions against Australia that would be beyond Australia's own capabilities. Any policy of non-alignment would need a much higher defence expenditure by Australia.

11. A conventional war between the superpowers and their allies is also unlikely because of the likelihood of its escalation into nuclear war. Although in circumstances of such a war, Australia would be likely to employ her forces in a complementary role with allied forces, especially in our own region, the contingency of global or nuclear war is not seen as a

major factor that should determine the structure of the Australian Defence Force.

12. Australia is more likely to suffer low level contingencies than the intermediate level threats mentioned in this report, or an invasion. These low level threats could arise at short notice and could give rise to challenging problems. There is uncertainty regarding the extent and timing of allied support for several contingencies in the regional environment that may confront Australia. This calls for continuing emphasis on self-reliance by Australia and the possession of well-balanced defence forces.

13. Irrespective of whether or not significant threats to Australia develop, the Australian Defence Force must be capable of undertaking foreseeable tasks, such as making a contribution to surveillance in peacetime, supporting the law enforcement agencies against terrorism and contributing to United Nations and other peacekeeping forces. Generally, our forces should be able to display our capability in our neighbourhood. This can be demonstrated by competence in military exercises with allies and with regional associates.

14. Overall the Committee's conclusions as to the nature and probability of threats to Australia's security are cautiously reassuring. However, the Committee cannot stress enough that the relative absence of short and medium-term threats arises not only from Australia's fortunate geographical isolation, but also from the success thus far of the war prevention strategy of the Western Alliance and from the comparative strength of Australia's own defence forces within our own region. Indeed, the primary aim of a defence strategy is to prevent war, not to fight it. Hence reassurance as to Australia's security is available only so long as the perilous balance between the superpowers is maintained, or

alternatively their armaments dismantled, and also so long as we continue to play our part in contributing to the Western Alliance and improving our own self reliance within our region.

By Order of the Committee

R.F. Shipton, M.P.
Chairman

ANNEX A

LIST OF PERSONS AND ORGANISATIONS WHO ASSISTED THE WORK OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE MATTERS

Witnesses

The Committee is grateful to all those who appeared in person before the Sub-Committee on Defence Matters. The following persons appeared before the Sub-Committee, in most instances after having presented a written submission (dates of hearings and relevant page numbers in official transcript of public evidence are shown in parenthesis):

ARMSTRONG, Mr J.M. - Chief, Animal Health Division, and Chief Quarantine Officer (Animals), Department of Agriculture, Government of Western Australia (1/9/80) pp. 1206, 1255-1260.

ARMSTRONG, Mr P. - Senior Clerk, Inspection and Boat Registration Branches, Harbour and Light Department, Government of Western Australia (1/9/80) pp. 1206-1274.

ATTWOOD, Mr N.J. - at the time evidence was given, Acting Secretary, Department of Defence, Canberra (18/3/81) pp. 1633-1806.

BALL, Dr D.J. - Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra (10/2/81) pp. 1398, 1505-1573.

BEAVIS, Mr C.J.F. - Sales Manager, Industrial Products, Westinghouse Brake and Signal company (Aust) Pty Ltd - (appearing as a private citizen) (29/7/80) pp. 629-702.

BENSON, Mr J.A. - Assistant Secretary, Executive Secretariat, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra ('In Camera' hearing).

BINSALLEH, Mr A.J.J. - Councillor, Broome Shire Council, Broome, W.A. (13/8/80) pp. 791-812A.

BROOK, Mr J.H. - Assistant Secretary, International Legal Branch, Legal and Treaties Division, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra (21/8/80) pp. 1106-1126.

BROOMHALL, Mr K.L. - at the time evidence was given, Acting President, Shire of West Kimberley, W.A. (13/8/80) pp. 868-898.

BROWN, Mr M.N. - Shire Clerk, Shire of Wyndham-East Kimberley, Wyndham, W.A. (14/8/80) pp. 953-977.

BROWNE, Mr N.J. - Assistant Shire Clerk, Shire of West Kimberley, W.A. (13/8/80) pp. 868-896.

COATES, Brigadier H.J., M.B.E. - at the time evidence was given, Director-General of Operations and Plans - Army, Department of Defence (Army Office), Canberra (2/5/80) pp. 158-208.

COLE, Mr B.W. - Councillor, Shire of Wyndham-East Kimberley, Wyndham, W.A. (14/8/80) pp. 953-977.

DADSWELL, Captain T.A., A.M. - at the time evidence was given, Aircraft Carrier Project Director, Department of Defence (Navy), Canberra (2/5/80) pp. 209-252.

DANES, Mr G.P. - Senior Pilot and Acting Base Manager, Trans West Airlines, Derby, W.A. (13/8/80) pp. 899-926.

ECCLES, Mr P.B. - First Assistant Secretary, Coastal Services Division, Commonwealth Department of Transport, Canberra (29/7/80) pp. 727-788K.

EVANS, Air Vice-Marshal S.D., AO, DSO, AFC, Chief of Joint Operations and Plans, Department of Defence, Canberra (21/8/80) pp. 1128-1202B.

EVANS, Commander F.G., MBE, VRD, RAN (Rtd) - Federal President, The Navy League of Australia (28/7/80) pp. 344-396.

FINGER, Mr M.R., C.B.E. - Director-General, Department of the Chief Minister, Government of the Northern Territory, Darwin, N.T. (14/8/80) pp. 1029-1104I.

GORHAM, Mr G.R. - Assistant District Engineer, Public Works Department, Government of Western Australia (14/8/80) pp. 928-952.

GRAZEBROOK, Commander A.W. - Federal Vice-President, The Navy League of Australia (28/7/80) pp. 344-396.

GUSTER, Mr A.F. - First Assistant Secretary, Satellite Project Office, Postal and Telecommunications Department, Canberra (11/9/80) pp. 1294-1326.

HAMILTON, Mr R.N., O.B.E. - at the time evidence was presented First Assistant Secretary, Strategic and International Policy Division, Department of Defence, Canberra (21/8/80) pp. 1128-1202B.

HAMILTON, Mr R.A. - Director, Office of Regional Administration and the North West, Government of Western Australia (1/9/80) pp. 1206-1274.

HARRISON, Mr R.P. - General Manager, Woodside Petroleum Development Pty Ltd (1/9/80) pp. 1275-1292.

HAYNES, Mr D.L. - Shire Clerk, Broome Shire Council, Broome, W.A. (13/8/80) pp. 791-812A.

HENDERSON, Mr I.M.H. - Assistant General Manager, Woodside Petroleum Development Pty Ltd. (1/9/80) pp. 1275-1292.

HILL, Mr D.L. - Chief Operations Officer, Western Australian State Emergency Service (13/8/80) pp. 813-858; (1/9/80) pp. 1206-1274.

HOBBS, Mr J. - Deputy President, Shire of Wyndham-East Kimberley, Wyndham, W.A. (14/8/80) pp. 953-976.

HUDSON, Commodore M.W., RAN - at the time evidence was given, Director-General Naval Plans and Policy, Department of Defence (Navy), Canberra (2/5/80) pp. 209-252.

JOHNSTON, Mr I.D. - Kimberley Regional Administrator, Government of Western Australia, Kununurra, W.A. (14/8/80) pp. 928-952.

KAHN, Brigadier C.N., DSO - Deputy Chief of the Army Reserve (15/5/80) p. 293.

KANE, Mr V.J. - First Assistant Secretary, Policy Division, Postal and Telecommunications Department, Canberra. (11/9/80) pp. 1294-1326.

LANE, Mr T. - Officer-in-Charge, Kununurra, Commonwealth Department of Transport, W.A. (14/8/80) pp. 928-952.

LANGTRY, Colonel J.O., DCM, (Retired List) - Executive Officer, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra (23/4/80) pp. 110-156; (10/2/81) pp. 1398, 1574-1629.

LONGDEN, Mr N. - Businessman, Derby, W.A. (13/8/80) pp. 922-926.

LOOSLI, Rear-Admiral R.G., C.B.E. - at the time evidence was given, Chief of Naval Operations and Plans, Department of Defence (Navy), Russell Offices, Canberra (2/5/80) pp. 209-252.

LYON, Mr M.E. - at the time evidence was given, First Assistant Secretary, South East Asia and South Pacific Division, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra ('In Camera' hearing).

McAULAY, Mr R. - Police Commissioner of the Northern Territory, Darwin (14/8/80) pp. 1029-1104I.

MACBRIDE, Colonel D.J. - Chief Engineer of Headquarters, Third Military District, Victoria Barracks, St Kilda Road, Melbourne, Vic. (appearing as a private citizen) (29/7/80) pp. 704-726.

McDONALD, Mr C.E. - Assistant Secretary, Papua New Guinea and South Pacific Branch, South East Asia and South Pacific Division, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra (21/8/80) pp. 1106-1126.

McDONALD, Mr P.J. - Surveillance Services Officer, Coastal Surveillance Branch, Commonwealth Department of Transport, Darwin (13/8/80) pp. 899-921.

McGAURR, Mr A.D. - Director of Cabinet Office, Premier's Department, Government of Tasmania (28/7/80) pp. 397-472.

McHENRY, Mr R.W. - Co-ordinator General, Department of the Chief Minister, Government of the Northern Territory, Darwin (14/8/80) pp. 1029-1104I.

McINTOSH, Mr J.L. - Manager, Dampier Mining Company Ltd, Yampi, W.A. (13/8/80) pp. 859-866.

McKENZIE, Captain R. - Naval Officer Commanding Northern Australia, Darwin (14/8/80) pp. 978-1028.

McLAUGHLAN, Mr N.E. - Chief Inspector, Department of Fisheries and Wildlife, Government of Western Australia (1/9/80) pp. 1206-1274.

McNAMARA, Mr C.R. - Executive Officer, Premier's Department, Government of Western Australia (1/9/80) pp. 1206-1274.

MAITLAND, Major-General G.L., AO, OBE, ED - Chief of the Army Reserve (15/5/80) pp. 293-341.

MARSHALL, Mr G.R. - Senior Assistant Secretary, Strategic and International Policy Division, Department of Defence, Canberra (21/8/80) pp. 1128-1202B.

MATHAMS, Mr R.H. - former Director of Scientific and Technical Intelligence, Joint Intelligence Organisation, Department of Defence, Canberra (9/2/81) pp. 1328-1395E.

MEDLAND, Mr G. - Councillor, Broome Shire Council, Broome, W.A. (13/8/80) pp. 791-812A.

MILLAR, Dr T.B. - Professorial Fellow, Department of International Relations, Australian National University, Canberra (2/4/80) pp. 2-54.

MORRIS, Mr A.G. - at the time eivdence was given, Acting Deputy Director-General, Department of the Chief Minister, Darwin (14/8/80) pp. 1029-1104I.

NEWHAM, Air Vice-Marshal J.W. - Chief of Air Force Operations, Department of Defence (Air Force Office) Russell Offices, Canberra (2/5/80) pp. 253-290.

NOBLE, Mr C.J. - Chairman, Australia Defence Association (28/7/80) pp. 473-539.

O'BRIEN, Mr D.B. - Manager, Ord River District Co-operative Ltd, Kununurra, W.A. (14/8/80) pp. 928-952.

O'CONNOR, Mr M.J. - Secretary, Australia Defence Association, Vic. (28/7/80) pp. 473-539.

O'DONNELL, Mr K.M. - Area Co-ordinator, Pilbara and Kimberley Regions, Western Australian State Emergency Service (13/8/80) pp. 813-858.

O'NEILL, Dr R. - Head, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, Canberra (17/4/80) pp. 56-107; (10/2/81) pp. 1398, 1530-1573.

PALTRIDGE, Mr G.F. - Director of Emergency Services and State Fire Commissioner, Premier's Department, Government of Tasmania (28/7/80) pp. 397-472.

PEEK, Vice-Admiral Sir Richard, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.C., R.A.N. - former Chief of Naval Staff, Council Member, The Navy League of Australia (28/7/80) pp. 344-396.

POWER, Mr K.W. - Chief Planning Engineer, Telecom Australia (11/9/80) pp. 1294-1326.

PRITCHETT, Mr W.B. - Secretary, Department of Defence, Canberra ('In Camera' hearing).

REID, Mr P.B. - President, Shire of Wyndham-East Kimberley, Wyndham, W.A. (14/8/80) pp. 953-976.

REID, Dr P.G.A. - President, Broome Shire Council, Broome, W.A. (13/8/80) pp. 791-812A.

ROBERTSON, Dr G.A. - Officer-in-Charge, Kununurra Region, Department of Agriculture, Government of Western Australia (14/8/80) pp. 928-952.

SIMMONDS, Group Captain A.J. - Officer Commanding Royal Australian Air Force in Darwin, RAAF Base, Darwin (14/8/80) pp. 978-1028.

SMITH, Mr R.J. - First Assistant Secretary, Legal and Treaties Division, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra (21/8/80) pp. 1106-1126.

SYNNOT, Admiral Sir Anthony, K.B.E., A.O., R.A.N. - Chief of Defence Force Staff, Department of Defence, Russell Hill, Canberra (18/3/81) pp. 1633-1808.

TEICHMANN, Mr M.E. - Senior Lecturer in Politics, Monash University, Melbourne, Vic. (28/7/80) pp. 540-586.

TELFORD, Mrs B. - Councillor, Broome Shire Council, Broome, W.A. (13/8/80) pp. 791-812A)

TEMME, Mr G.P. - Assistant Secretary, Legislation Branch, Policy Co-ordination Division, Department of Defence, Canberra (21/8/80) pp. 1128-1202B.

TROWBRIDGE, Mr M.F. - Councillor, Shire of Wyndham-East Kimberley, Wyndham, W.A. (14/8/80) pp. 953-977.

VAUX, Mr L.J. - Supervising Engineer, Long Distance Network, Transmission Planning Branch, Telecom Australia (11/9/80) pp. 1294-1326.

WALKER, Mr J.D. - Member of Executive Committee, Defence Manufacturers Association of Australia (29/7/80) pp. 588-628I.

WALSH, Mr F.S. - Executive Director, Defence Manufacturers Association of Australia (29/7/80) pp. 588-628I.

WESTERWAY, Mr P.B. - Acting First Assistant Secretary, Broadcasting Planning and Operation Division, Postal and Telecommunications Department, Canberra (11/9/80) pp. 1294-1326.

WILKINSON, Lieutenant-Colonel T., A.M. - Commander, 7th Military District, Larrakeyah Barracks, Darwin (14/8/80) pp. 978-1028.

WILSON, Inspector H. - Regional Police Office, Western Australian Police Department, and Liaison Officer with the State Emergency Service (1/9/80) pp. 1206-1274.

WITHERS, The Hon W.R., MLC - Kununurra, W.A. (14/8/80) pp. 928-952.

YOULL, Commander S.J., RAN - at the time evidence given, Staff Officer Plans (Co-ordination) Department of Defence (Navy), Russell Offices, Canberra (2/5/80) pp. 209-252.

YOUNG, Captain H.L., (Retired List) Kununurra, W.A. (14/8/80) pp. 928-952.

Written Submissions (without testimony)

The Committee is grateful to the following individuals and organisations who provided submissions and/or documents to the Committee, but have not given oral evidence:

ARTHUR MURRAY & SONS, West Brunswick, Vic.

BLOOD, Mrs Kay, Beringarra Station, W.A.

COLE, Mr N.H., N.H. Cole and Associates, Mineral Industry Consultants and Advisers, Sydney, N.S.W.

DROUYN, Mr P., Surfers Paradise, Qld.

FIRKINS, Mr P.C., JP, Vice-Chairman, Australian Defence Association (W.A. Division).

GELBER, Professor H.G., Department of Political Science, The University of Tasmania

GARDNER, Mr S.J., M.B.E., E.D., Ph.C., Ingham, N.Q.

HEAP, Mr G.J., Deakin, A.C.T.

HEYTING, Squadron leader, J., RAAF, Balmain, N.S.W.

HOINS, Mr L., Propartners (Australian) Pty Ltd., Cairns, Qld.

HOPKINS, Major-General, R.N.L., C.B.E. (Rtd), Walkerville, S.A.

McPHAIL, Mr G.K., Burwood, Vic.

MACK, Dr Andrew, Discipline of Politics, School of Social Sciences, The Flinders University of South Australia.

THE REGULAR DEFENCE FORCES WELFARE ASSOCIATION, Canberra, A.C.T.

RUSSELL, Mr J.B., Glebe, N.S.W.

TEAKLE, Mr W.F., Jondaryan, Qld.

WONDER, Mr J., Sydney, N.S.W.

ANNEX B

SECURITY TREATY BETWEEN AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The Parties to this Treaty,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific Area,

Noting that the United States already has arrangements pursuant to which its armed forces are stationed in the philippines, and has armed forces and administrative responsibilities in the Ryukyus, and upon the coming into force of the Japanese Peace Treaty may also station armed forces in and about Japan to assist in the preservation of peace and security in the Japan Area,

Recognizing that Australia and New Zealand as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations have military obligations outside as well as within the Pacific Area,

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that any of them stand alone in the Pacific Area, and

Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area,

Therefore declare and agree as follows:

Article I

The parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article II

In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty the Parties separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article III

The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific.

Article IV

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article V

For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on any of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.

Article VI

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article VII

The Parties hereby establish a Council, consisting of their Foreign Ministers or their Deputies, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council should be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.

Article VIII

Pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area and the development by the United nations of more effective means to maintain international peace and security, the Council, established by Article VII, is authorized to maintain a consultative relationship with States, Regional Organizations, Associations of States or other authorities in the Pacific Area in a position to further the purposes of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of that Area.

Article IX

This Treaty shall be ratified by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratifications shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of Australia, which will notify each of the other signatories of such deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force as soon as the ratifications of the signatories have been deposited.

Article X

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Any Party may cease to be a member of the Council established by Article VII one year after notice has been given to the Government of Australia, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of such notice.

Article XI

This Treaty in the English language shall be despoited in the archives of the Government of Australia. Duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of each of the other signatories.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE at the city of San Francisco this first day of September, 1951.

FOR AUSTRALIA:

PERCY C. SPENDER

FOR NEW ZEALAND:

C.A. BERENDSEN

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

DEAN ACHESON

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

ALEXANDER WILEY

JOHN J. SPARKMAN

RATIFICATIONS

Australia ... 29th April, 1952

New Zealand ... 29th April, 1952

United States of America ... 29th April, 1952

ANNEX C

JAPANESE CONSIDERATION OF INVASION OF AUSTRALIA, MARCH 1942

In their original war plan drawn up in 1941, the Japanese did not contemplate invading Australia. The overwhelming success of their arms in the first weeks of the war encouraged them to consider the possibility, and the question of invasion of Australia was intensively studied during late February/early March 1942. In a General Outline of Policy on Future War Guidance agreed on at an Imperial General Headquarters Army/Navy liaison conference on 7 March 1942, invasion of Australia was rejected on the basis of the following reasons put forward by the Army General Staff:

'. Australia covers an area about twice the size of China Proper and has a population of about 7,000,000. Its land communications are by no means well developed. If the invasion is attempted, the Australians, in view of their national character, would resist to the end. Also, because the geographic conditions of Australia present numerous difficulties, in a military sense, it is apparent that a military venture in that country would be a difficult one.

. According to the Army's study, the invasion would require the main body of the Combined Fleet and an infantry force of 12 divisions. The shipping required for the Army alone would amount to 1,500,000 tons. The progress of invasion might require the Army to make additional commitments of large strengths. Amassing the huge force necessary for the invasion would mean a far-reaching reduction in our military preparations against the Soviet Union in Manchuria, and a drastic cut at the fronts in China, which would be a serious drawback in our over-all strategic structure. The invasion would also force an extensive change in the over-all operation of our shipping, and this would lead to a serious handicap in the material build-up of our national power.

. Japan is now about to complete the conquest of the Southern Area, according to the original plan, and from now on, our total

national power must be concentrated in the prosecution of a protracted war, in accordance with the basic war guidance policy adopted prior to the outbreak of the war. It is vital, at this point, to develop resilience in national power and war potential under a sound plan. Consequently, the ships requisitioned by the Army will be gradually released, as the Southern Area Operations come to a close. The present plan calls for reducing the tonnage of requisitioned ships by half; from 2,100,000 tons at the outset of the war, to 1,000,000 tons by the eighth month after the commencement of the hostilities.

- In the light of the above-mentioned circumstances, to alter the plan already in force, and to employ a force larger than the one employed in the Southern Area since the outbreak of the war; to suddenly invade Australia, which lies 4,000 nautical miles away, would be a reckless venture, and is beyond Japan's ability. Above all, what must be most guarded against in a war is to carry the offensive close to the enemy, beyond one's capability, and have the offensive checked. The proposed invasion of Australia is risking the dangers warned against by the history of war."

Source: Hattori, Takushiro, Dai Tō-A Sensō Zenshi, Tokyo, 1953, Part III, p. 292.

PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE

(Sub-Committee on Defence Matters) Vol. 1

DEPARTMENT OF THE SENATE
PAPER No.
DATE
PRESENTED
24 NOV 1981
Clerk of the Senate

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE

(Sub-Committee on Defence Matters)

April 1980—March 1981

(OFFICIAL HANSARD TRANSCRIPT OF EVIDENCE)

In Two Volumes

Vol. 1

(Pages 1-926)

THE SENATE
24 NOV 1981
TABLED
PAPER

DEPARTMENT OF THE SENATE
PAPER No. 2761
DATE PRESENTED
24 NOV 1981
Clerk of the Senate

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE

(Sub-Committee on Defence Matters)

April 1980—March 1981

(OFFICIAL HANSARD TRANSCRIPT OF EVIDENCE)

In Two Volumes

Vol. 1

(Pages 1-926)

Printed by Authority by the Commonwealth Government Printer

MEMBERS OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE

Members:

Mr R. F. Shipton, M.P., *Chairman*
Senator R. C. Elstob
Senator R. Hill
Senator B. F. Kilgariff
Senator G. D. McIntosh
Senator J. R. Martyr
Senator K. W. Sibraa
Senator B. C. Teague

Mr R. Jacobi, M.P., *Deputy Chairman*
Mr K. C. Beazley, M.P.
Mr J. J. Carlton, M.P.
The Hon J. D. M. Dobie, M.P.
Mr P. D. Falconer, M.P.
Mr K. L. Fry, M.P.
Mr A. C. Holding, M.P.
Mr D. F. Jull, M.P.
The Hon R. C. Katter, M.P.
Dr R. E. Klugman, M.P.
Mr S. A. Lusher, M.P.
Mr R. M. McLean, M.P.
The Hon W. L. Morrison, M.P.

Terms of Reference:
To monitor 'the implementation of the Australian Government's announced Defence programs'.

(26 February 1980)

Members of the Sub-Committee on Defence Matters

(Sub-Committee C)

The following members of the above Committee investigated the terms of reference and reported to the whole Committee:

The Hon R. C. Katter, M.P., *Chairman*
The Hon. W. L. Morrison, M. P., *Deputy Chairman* (since 4 December 1980)
Senator B. F. Kilgariff
Mr K. C. Beazley, M.P.
Mr J. J. Carlton, M.P.
Mr P. D. Falconer, M.P.
Mr A. C. Holding, M.P.
} since 4 December 1980

The following were members of the Sub-Committee on Defence Matters until 18 September 1980:

Senator the Hon R. Bishop
Mr J. L. Armitage, M.P.
The Hon G. M. Bryant, E. D., M.P.
Mr M. J. Neil, M.P.
Mr G. G. D. Scholes, M.P.
Mr J. R. Short, M.P.

Secretary
C. H. Ducker, M.C.
Tel: 72 6906

INDEX TO WITNESSES

Armstrong, Mr J. M.—*Chief, Animal Health Division, and Chief Quarantine* Officer (Animals), Department of Agriculture, Government of Western Australia (1/9/80) (pp. 1206, 1255-1260).

Armstrong, Mr P.—Senior Clerk, Inspection and Boat Registration Branches, Harbour and Light Department, Government of Western Australia (1/9/80) (pp. 1206-1274).

Attwood, Mr N. J.—at the time evidence was given Acting Secretary, Department of Defence, Canberra (18/3/81) (pp. 1633-1808).

Ball, Dr D. J.--Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra (10/2/81) (pp. 1398, 1505-1573).

Beavis, Mr C. J. F.—*Sales Manager, Industrial Products, Westinghouse* Brake and Signal Company (Aust) Pty Ltd—appearing as a private citizen (29/7/80) (pp. 629-702).

Binsalleh, Mr A. J. J. -Councillor, Broome Shire Council, Broome, W.A. (13/8/80) (pp. 791-812A).

Brook, Mr J. H. —*Assistant Secretary, International* Legal Branch, Legal and Treaties Division, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra (21/8/80) (pp. 1106-1126).

Broomhall, Mr K. L.—at the time evidence was given, Acting President, Shire of West Kimberley, W.A. (13/8/80) (pp. 868-898).

Brown, Mr M. N.—*Shire Clerk, Shire of Wyndham-East Kimberley*, Wyndham, W.A. (14/8/80) (pp. 953-977).

Browne, Mr N. J.—Assistant Shire Clerk, Shire of West Kimberley, W.A. (13/8/80) (pp. 868-896).

Coates, Brigadier H. J., M.B.E.—at the time evidence was given Director-General *of Operations and Plans—Army, Department of Defence* (Army Office), Canberra (2/5/80) (pp. 158-208).

Cole, Mr B. W.—Councillor, Shire of Wyndham-East Kimberley, Wyndham, W.A. (14/8/80) (pp. 953-976).

Dadswell, Captain T.A., A.M.—at the time evidence was given Aircraft Carrier Project Director, Department of Defence (Navy), Canberra (2/5/80) (pp. 209-252).

Danes, Mr G. P.—Senior Pilot and Acting Base Manager, Trans-West Air Charter, Derby, W.A. (13/8/80) (pp. 899-921).

Eccles, Mr P. B.—First Assistant Secretary, Coastal Services Division, Commonwealth Department of Transport, Canberra (29/7/80) (pp. 727-788K).

Evans, Air Vice-Marshal S.D., AO, DSO, AFC, Chief of Joint Operations and Plans, Department of Defence, Canberra (21/8/80) (pp. 1128-1202B).

Evans, Commander F. G., MBE, VRD, RAN (Rtd)—Federal President, The Navy League of Australia (28/7/80) (pp. 344-396).

Finger, Mr M. R., C.B.E.—Director-General, Department of the Chief Minister, Government of the Northern Territory, Darwin, N.T. (14/8/80) (pp. 1029-1104I).

Gorham, Mr G. R.—Assistant District Engineer, Public Works Department, Government of Western Australia (14/8/80) (pp. 928, 930-932).

Grazebrook, Commander A. W.—Federal Vice-President, The Navy League of Australia (28/7/80) (pp. 344-396).

Guster, Mr A. F.—First Assistant Secretary, *Satellite Project Office*, Postal and Telecommunications Department, Canberra (11/9/80) (pp. 1294-1326).

Hamilton, Mr R. N., O.B.E.—at the time evidence was presented First Assistant Secretary, Strategic and International Policy Division, Department of Defence, Canberra (21/8/80) (pp. 1128-1202B).

Hamilton, Mr R. A.—*Director, Office of Regional Administration* and the North West, Government of Western Australia (1/9/80) (pp. 1206-1274).

Harrison, Mr R. P.--General Manager, Woodside Petroleum Development Pty Ltd, W.A. (1/9/80) (pp. 1275-1292).

Haynes, Mr D. L. -Shire Clerk, Broome Shire Council, Broome, W.A. (13/8/80) (pp. 791-812A).

Henderson, Mr I. M. H.--Assistant General Manager, Woodside Petroleum Development Pty Ltd (1/9/80) (pp. 1275-1292).

Hill, Mr D. L.—Chief Operations Officer, Western Australian State Emergency Service (13/8/80) (pp. 813-858); (1/9/80) (pp. 1206-1274).

Hobbs, Mr J. --Deputy President, Shire of Wyndham-East Kimberley, Wyndham, W.A. (14/8/80) (pp. 953-976).

Hudson, Commodore M. W., RAN—at the time evidence was given Director-General Naval Plans and Policy, Department of Defence (Navy), Canberra (2/5/80) (pp. 209-252).

Johnston, Mr I. D.--Kimberley Regional Administrator, Government of Western Australia, Kununurra, W.A. (14/8/80) (pp. 928-952).

Kahn, Brigadier C. N., DSO—Deputy Chief of the Army Reserve (15/5/80) (p. 293).

Kane, Mr V. J.--First Assistant Secretary, Policy Division, Postal and Telecommunications Department, Canberra (11/9/80) (pp. 1294-1326).

Lane, Mr T. --Officer-in-Charge, Kununurra, Commonwealth Department of Transport, W.A. (14/8/80) (pp. 928-952).

Langtry, Colonel J. O., DCM, (Retired List)—Executive Officer, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra (23/4/80) (pp. 110-156); (10/2/81) (pp. 1398, 1574-1629).

Longden, Mr N.- Businessmen, Derby, W.A. (13/8/80) (pp. 922-926).

Loosli, Rear-Admiral R. G., C.B.E.--at the time evidence was given Chief of Naval Operations and Plans, Department of Defence (Navy), Russell Offices, Canberra (2/5/80) (pp. 209-252).

McAulay, Mr R.—Police Commissioner of the Northern Territory, Darwin (14/8/80) (pp. 1029-1104).

Macbride, Colonel D. J.—Chief Engineer of Headquarters, Third Military District, Victoria Barracks, St Kilda Road, Melbourne, Vic.—appearing as a private citizen (29/7/80) (pp. 704-726).

McDonald, Mr C. E.—Assistant Secretary, Papua New Guinea and South Pacific Branch, South East Asia and South Pacific Division, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra (21/8/80) (pp. 1106-1126).

McDonald, Mr P. J. --Surveillance Services Officer, Coastal Surveillance Branch, Commonwealth Department of Transport (13/8/80) (pp. 899-921).

McGaurr, Mr A. D.—Director of Cabinet Office, Premier's Department, Government of Tasmania (28/7/80) (pp. 397-427).

McHenry, Mr R. W.—Co-ordinator General, Department of the Chief Minister, Government of the Northern Territory, Darwin (14/8/80) (pp. 1029-1104).

McIntosh, Mr J. L.—Manager, Dampier Mining Company Ltd, Yampi, W.A. (13/8/80) (pp. 859-866).

McKenzie, Captain R.--Naval Officer Commanding Northern Australia, Darwin (14/8/80) (pp. 978-1028).

McLaughlan, Mr N. E.—Chief Inspector, Department of Fisheries and Wildlife, Government of Western Australia (1/9/80) (pp. 1206-1274).

McNamara, Mr C. R.—Executive Officer, Premier's Department, Government of Western Australia (1/9/80) (pp. 1206-1274).

Maitland, Major-General G. L., AO, OBE, ED—Chief of the Army Reserve (15/5/80) (pp. 293-341).

Marshall, Mr G. R.—Senior Assistant Secretary, Strategic and International Policy Division, Department of Defence, Canberra (21/8/80) (pp. 1128-1202B).

Mathams, Mr R. H.—former Director of Scientific and Technical Intelligence, Joint Intelligence Organisation, Department of Defence, Canberra (9/2/81) (pp. 1328-1395E).

Medland, Mr G.--Councillor, Broome Shire Council, Broome, W.A. (13/8/80) (pp. 791-812A).

Millar, Dr T. B.--Professional Fellow, Department of International Relations, Australian National University, Canberra (2/4/80) (pp. 2-54).

Morris, Mr A. G.--at the time evidence was given Acting Deputy Director-General, Department of the Chief Minister, Darwin (14/8/80) (pp. 1029-1104).

Newham, Air Vice-Marshal J. W.—Chief of Air Force Operations, Department of Defence (Air Force Office) Russell Offices, Canberra (2/5/80) (pp. 253-290).

Noble, Mr C. J.--Chairman, Australia Defence Association (28/7/80) (pp. 473-539).

O'Brien, Mr D. B. --Manager, Ord River District Co-operative Ltd, Kununurra, W.A. (14/8/80) (pp. 928-952).

O'Connor, Mr M. J.--Secretary, Australia Defence Association, Vic. (28/7/80) (pp. 473-539).

O'Donnell, Mr K. M.--Area Co-ordinator, Pilbara and Kimberley regions, Western Australian State Emergency Service (13/8/80) (pp. 813-858).

O'Neill, Dr R.- Head, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, Canberra (17/4/80) (pp. 56-107); (10/2/81) (pp. 1398-1504, 1629A-1629E).

Paltridge, Mr G. F.--Director of Emergency Services and State Fire Commissioner, Premier's Department, Government of Tasmania (28/7/80) (pp. 397-472).

Peek, Vice-Admiral Sir Richard, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.C., RAN—former Chief of Naval Staff; Council Member, The Navy League of Australia (28/7/80) (pp. 344-396).

Power, Mr K. W.--Chief Planning Engineer, Telecom Australia, Melbourne, Vic. (11/9/80) (pp. 1294-1326).

Reid, Mr P. B.--President, Shire of Wyndham-East Kimberley, Wyndham, W.A. (14/8/80) (pp. 953-976).

Reid, Dr P. G. A.- President, Broome Shire Council, Broome, W.A. (13/8/80) (pp. 791-812A).

Robertson, Dr G. A.--Officer-in-Charge, Kununurra Region, Department of Agriculture, Government of Western Australia (14/8/80) (pp. 928-952).

Simmonds, Group Captain A. J.—Officer Commanding Royal Australian Air Force in Darwin, RAAF Base, Darwin (14/8/80) (pp. 978-1028).

Smith, Mr R. J.--First Assistant Secretary, Legal and Treaties Division, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra (21/8/80) (pp. 1106-1126).

Synnot, Admiral Sir Anthony, K.B.E., A.O., RAN—Chief of Defence Force Staff, Department of Defence, Russell Hill, Canberra (18/3/80) (pp. 1633-1808).

Teichmann, Mr M. E.—Senior Lecturer in Politics, Monash University, Melbourne, Vic. (28/7/80) (pp. 540-586).

Telford, Mrs B.--Councillor, Broome Shire Council, Broome, W.A. (13/8/80) (pp. 791-812A).

Temme, Mr G. P.—Assistant Secretary, Legislation Branch, Policy Co-ordination Division, Department of Defence, Canberra (21/8/80) (pp. 1128-1202B).

Trowbridge, Mr M. F.—Councillor, Shire of Wyndham-East Kimberley, Wyndham, W.A. (14/8/80) (pp. 953-977).

Vaux, Mr L. J.--Supervising Engineer, Long Distance Network, Transmission Planning Branch, Telecom Australia, Melbourne, Vic. (11/9/80) (pp. 1294-1326).

Walker, Mr J. D.--Member of Executive Committee, Defence Manufacturers Association of Australia (29/7/80) (pp. 588-6281).

Walsh, Mr F. S.--Executive Director, Defence Manufacturers Association of Australia (29/7/70) (pp. 588-6281).

Westerway, Mr P. B.—Acting First Assistant Secretary, Broadcasting Planning and Operations Division, Postal and Telecommunications Department, Canberra (11/9/80) (pp. 1294-1326).

Wilkinson, Lieutenant-Colonel T. A. M.—Commander, 7th Military District, Larrakeyah Barracks, Darwin (14/8/80) (pp. 978-1028).
Wilson, Inspector H. - Regional Police Office, Western Australian Police Department, and Liaison Officer with the State Emergency Service (1/9/80) (pp. 1206-1274).
Withers, The Hon W. R., MLC - Kununurra, W.A. (14/8/80) (pp. 928-952).
Youll, Commander S. J., RAN - at the time evidence was given, Staff Officer Plans (Co-ordination) Department of Defence (Navy), Russell Offices, Canberra (2/5/80) (pp. 209-252).
Young, Captain H. L., (Retired List) Kununurra, W.A. (14/8/80) (pp. 928-952).

CANBERRA

Wednesday, 2 April 1980

PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMMITTEE

ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE

Sub-Committee on Defence Matters
(Sub-Committee C)

Present

Mr Katter (Chairman)

Senator Bishop	Mr Armitage
Senator Kilgariff	Mr Bryant
	Mr Neil
	Mr Scholes

The Sub-Committee met at 9 a.m.
Mr KATTER took the chair.

Wilkinson, Lieutenant-Colonel T. A. M.—Commander, 7th Military District, Larrakeyah Barracks, Darwin (14/8/80) (pp. 978-1028).
Wilson, Inspector H.—Regional Police Office, Western Australian Police Department, and Liaison Officer with the State Emergency Service (1/9/80) (pp. 1206-1274).
Withers, The Hon W. R., MLC—Kununurra, W.A. (14/8/80) (pp. 928-952).
Youll, Commander S. J., RAN—at the time evidence was given, Staff Officer Plans (Co-ordination) Department of Defence (Navy), Russell Offices, Canberra (2/5/80) (pp. 209-252).
Young, Captain H. L., (Retired List) Kununurra, W.A. (14/8/80) (pp. 928-952).

CANBERRA

Wednesday, 2 April 1980

PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMMITTEE

ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE

Sub-Committee on Defence Matters
(Sub-Committee C)

Present

Mr Katter (Chairman)

Senator Bishop	Mr Armitage
Senator Kilgariff	Mr Bryant
	Mr Neil
	Mr Scholes

The Sub-Committee met at 9 a.m.
Mr KATTER took the chair.

Dr Thomas Bruce MILLAR, 7 Roebuck Street, Red Hill, Australian Capital Territory, was sworn and examined.

CHAIRMAN - I declare open this public meeting of the Committee. Welcome, Dr Millar. All of us at this table are familiar with your record but for the record I point out that Dr Millar is Professorial Fellow in the Department of International Relations at the Australian National University and former chairman of the committee of inquiry into the Citizen Military Forces. In addition to that he has been a consultant to the Defence movement, if I can call it that, in many capacities and has been abroad on a number of occasions. He is very much respected internationally as well as nationally.

You may at any time request that your evidence or part of your evidence or answers to specific questions be given in camera and the Committee will consider any such request. The Committee has before it your submission entitled 'Submission to the Sub-Committee on Defence Matters of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, 2 April 1980 by Dr T.B. Millar'. Is it the wish of the Committee that the document be incorporated in the record of proceedings? There being no objective it is so ordered.

(The document read as follows) -

Submission to the Sub-Committee on Defence Matters of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, 2 April 1980, by Dr. T.B. Millar Professorial Fellow in International Relations, Australian National University

Mr Chairman

I thank you for the opportunity to appear again before the Committee. May I say how delighted I was to learn that the Committee will be monitoring the implementation of the Government's defence policy.

As arranged with your staff, Mr Chairman, I propose to express briefly some views on two matters affecting the defence of Australia. The first is the implication of recent events in Afghanistan for our strategic environment and defence policies. The second, which is related, concerns the Australian Army Reserve, and the Report on it in 1973/74 by a committee of which I had the honour to be chairman.

As we all know, defence is not something of the moment. It is a continuing process, where decisions taken today may affect our capacity to defend ourselves during the next ten or twenty years, and where each change in the international balance will affect the world perhaps for centuries. We can all remember the world in 1960: it's not very long ago. It was a fairly peaceful time, and yet since then we have seen astonishing changes - the Vietnam war, Indonesia's war against Malaysia, three wars in the Middle East, three crises over Cuba, a small Sino-Soviet conflict, a war between China and India, two between India and Pakistan that led to the dismemberment of Pakistan, a war between Vietnam and Cambodia and another between China and Vietnam, a score of conflicts in Africa and a number in Latin America; and so on. We have seen the price of oil rise by a factor of 17. We have seen the communist world divide into warring camps. We have seen the Soviet Union achieve a general equality with the U.S. in nuclear weapons, 'a selective

superiority in some areas, and a conventional superiority over Western forces in Europe. We have seen the rapproachement of West Germany with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. We have seen the growth and decline of Eurocommunism. We have seen China and Japan reconciled after nearly 50 years of hostility, and China and the U.S. in a kind of partnership. We have seen Australia involved in and extricated from two wars. We have seen a President of the United States, a President of France, and a Prime Minister of Australia removed abruptly from office as well as a King of Kings and a sizable number of others of less powerful status.

These are but some of the remarkable changes that have occurred during the recent two decades, a period still very much in our minds, a period only as far behind as the end of the century is ahead.

Mr Chairman, in the light of these events, it is beyond reason to assume that the next two decades will be ones of international calm, with all changes foreseeable, foreseen, evolutionary in nature, and anticipated by our wise precautions. The reverse is much more likely, and the crisis in Afghanistan must be seen as only one of a whole range of events that will affect international peace and security with a speed and severity not likely to be matched either by our perceptions or by our preparations. Thus what we are concerned with is not simply Australia's strategic environment three months after the Soviet invasion of a particular country, but that environment as we can reasonably expect it to be during the next 10 years or more. For the stormy weather of which Afghanistan was one cloudburst is not going suddenly to disappear. The competition for power and influence, and above all for the control over the world's vital natural resources, will be with us for a long time, and will be a source of tension that will certainly require our best diplomatic skills and perhaps also our capacity to defend our interests and contribute to a common defence.

I do not wish to repeat the arguments canvassed on both sides of Parliament as to the implications of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It seemed to me that those arguments contained a great deal of common ground, and an ordinary citizen might have dared to hope that both major parties would have had the statesmanship to emphasise the common ground rather than the differences. If Australians are still not capable of developing a predominantly bipartisan foreign policy in an unambiguous, deplorable and relatively remote situation such as Afghanistan, God help us if we find ourselves in a perhaps more ambiguous but more imminent security crisis closer to home in an election year.

Australia's strategic and defence environment has many aspects, only one of which is the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. The question then is what difference that action makes to our strategic environment, and to our defence capacities and policies. The answers to this question are partly fact and partly guesswork. One can envy those who are confident that they know what was in the minds of the Soviet leaders when they ordered the troops into Afghanistan in late December. I do not pretend to know why they acted as they did, but we do know that they did not break wholly new ground when they invaded. Prior to this there were several thousand military and civil officials in the country, permeating the armed forces and those ministries with economic and educational responsibilities. The invasion was the last stage of a process begun twenty or more years earlier, a process which - whatever the degree of Soviet intervention - had repeatedly failed to produce the kind of government with the policies the Soviet Union wanted and with the authority to carry them out.

We do not know precisely how many thousands of Soviet troops are in Afghanistan but we do know that it is several scores of thousands, and that they have behaved at times and are continuing to behave with a horrifying degree of brutality against any overt expressions of Afghanistan nationalism, so much so that half to three quarters of a million refugees have poured across the border into Pakistan. We do not know whether the

Russians are pursuing a policy aimed at obtaining a port on the Indian Ocean, or at being able to command access to Middle Eastern oil, but we do know that if they have such an objective for the future they are now much better placed to achieve it, although Soviet Azerbaijan is much closer to the Gulf oil fields than Afghanistan is. It is similarly much closer to Tehran, and thus the invasion of Afghanistan has not noticeably changed Soviet capacities to react against any American rescue attempts for its diplomatic hostages. But the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan has made it far easier for the Russians to take over Iran, if they so wished. Indeed their very presence on two sides of Iran must have a debilitating psychological effect on Iran, as on Pakistan. Who likes to have a bear breathing down his neck!

This brings me to what I believe to be the two fundamental points about the Soviet action. One is that the invasion was the first of its kind since 1945, i.e. the occupation by Soviet troops of territory outside of Soviet controlled Eastern Europe, an extension by force of the Soviet bloc. The second point relates to oil. Here are the world's largest suppliers, and the largest reserves, of oil, and the economies of the Western industrialised countries (except, temporarily, Britain) plus Japan, depend upon them: Middle East oil is vital to the West. The Soviet Union is a net exporter of oil, from which it derives about a third of its hard currency requirements. Thus the West, which is several thousand miles from the Gulf and has no secure "beachhead" there, must have access to Gulf oil, but the Soviet Union, which is only a few hundred miles from large Gulf oil fields, does not presently require that oil. No-one knows how large are the Soviet oil reserves, but they are becoming increasingly costly to exploit, and some Western sources state that, on present Soviet production and consumption patterns, the Soviet Union will begin to run out of oil (though not of natural gas) early in the next century. If this is so, we can surely expect that any Soviet government, living as it does alongside these major Middle Eastern reserves, will seek to ensure favoured access to them, one way or another. Over the next 20 years, therefore, it seems inevitable that Soviet diplomatic and other pressures on Middle East oil producers will increase.

President Carter has made clear that any interruption to Gulf oil supplies to the West will produce a Western military response, and he has transferred naval and marine forces to the region, and arranged access to small naval facilities in Oman, Somalia and Kenya, as well as upgrading Diego Garcia. There is now an American "ready reaction" force available to go into the area. I think we need to be clear that these forces, which may perhaps deter any further actions of the kind that happened in Tehran, which could mine or blockade the Gulf but only at the expense of alienating friend or foe alike and at the risk of launching a major war, and which could probably take over a capital or a port, are not capable of ensuring control over the oil flow in any of the major Gulf states. Oil facilities are very vulnerable to interdiction, and only a massive occupation could secure them. Only the Soviet Union is capable of such an occupation, but it would be at enormous political and economic costs. The invasion of Afghanistan has already cost the Soviet Union dearly. It has brought the condemnation of the Islamic world, the resentment of virtually all non-communist states, the further alienation of Romania and Yugoslavia, a stronger relationship between China, Japan and the United States, the deferral and perhaps end of SALT II and SALT III, the reduction of American credits, technology, and grain supplies, and the loss of the unanimous international seal of the olympic games.

We do not know whether the Soviet leadership foresaw these reactions, or the resistance of the Afghanistan people, but it is reasonable to assume that, had they foreseen them they would not have behaved any differently, from simple raison d'etat. And what they have done once, they may do again.

There is no easy profit-and-loss account drawn up from the Afghanistan invasion, but it has clearly further distabilized the region. It has brought Soviet and American naval forces in the region of the gulf into potential confrontation. It has brought a warning of war from an American President who at present has insufficient forces available to fight such a war, who could not control the escalatory process, and who could not

in any case use that force to control local domestic political change inimical to the West's interests. It has demonstrated once again that the ultimate basis of Soviet diplomacy is military power and that no Soviet neighbour can feel secure.

Mr Chairman, the Soviet Union is not about to do to Australia what it has just done and is doing to Afghanistan. we are in a very different situation. Australians are concerned, I believe, about Afghanistan basically for these reasons:

1. The Russians have demonstrated once again a readiness to swallow neighbouring territory by brutal military action - a process it has been engaged in for nearly three centuries. This is directly contrary to the morality of our times, and its success is a defeat for international morality.

2. It is part of a process of expanded Soviet military activities world wide, including the use of Cuban mercenaries in Africa, and obtaining access to former British bases in Aden and former American bases in Vietnam. This is at least a quasi-imperial hegemony in the making.

3. These activities have raised international tension and increased the possibility of conflict at many levels, especially tension over the control of vital and apparently depleting global natural resources.

4. They have raised the level of international military activity in the Indian Ocean region which we share.

It seems to me that Australia's reactions need to be of several kinds, - diplomatic, economic, strategic - at different levels, and in many places, and such that none runs counter to the others. We are right to stand by the United States; we would be wrong to be the surrogate of the United States. Thus I believe we were right to refuse to contribute to the American "ready reaction" force - even if we would have done so significantly, which is in some doubt. We are right to help the United States protect Western interests in the Indian ocean

region, but we would be wrong to do so in ways that detract from our own sovereignty and our capacity to conduct an independent diplomacy as a sovereign, regional power.

If you will forgive my repeating the point, Mr Chairman: I do not believe that Australia is able or should try to make any military contribution to the security of the Persian Gulf region. We have enough on our hands in our own immediate environment. We are troubled but not primarily concerned by the events in Afghanistan; we are concerned by what those events mean for the international political and strategic climate, for the prospects for peace or the possibilities of war. In this respect, the measures which the government has announced to improve our defence capacity are welcome - not because we will need to defend Western Australia against Soviet attack, for that is extemely unlikely; - an unforeseeable contingency nor because we will need to defend Iran or Saudi Arabia, for we cannot do so; but rather because we must be able to keep secure our own continent and its maritime surrounds; we must be able to help the United States in its role as principal in the Western alliance system, as the only power capable of containing Soviet military expansion; we must be able to support our friends in the region, protect to a degree our trade and lines of communication, and demonstrate that although our diplomacy does not depend on military power it is not vulnerable to military threats.

In this respect, Mr Chairman, I believe that the defence measures which the government has twice announced in recent weeks, welcome as they are, are not directly relevant to Afghanistan except inasmuch as Afghanistan made them possible, and that once implemented they will bring us approximately to where we ought to have been if Afghanistan had never occurred.

The second matter under discussion, Mr Chairman, is the Australian Army Reserve, and the extent to which the Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Citizen Military Forces, presented to the House of Representatives by the Minister for Defence in (as I recall) April 1974, have been implemented.

This, as you can imagine, is a subject of considerable interest to me, but I would not wish this Committee to think that I or other members of the Committee of Inquiry felt that its recommendations were sacrosanct and could not be improved upon. They were the best that we could come up with at that time, but I must say that in almost all respects I feel that they are essentially valid today.

It is pleasing to report that most of the Committee's recommendations have been implemented partially or completely. I present for the Committee's consideration a statement prepared by Army staff in the Department of Defence which sets out the degree of implementation. The brief "comments" on the right hand side of each page may need some amplification, which I am sure the Army would be happy to provide where I cannot. I know that Brigadier Kahn, Deputy Chief of the Army Reserve, could do this to the Committee's satisfaction. But you can see, Mr Chairman, that in the broad, what we proposed has been done, and although it caused some heartburning among the CMF, was not wholly welcomed by the Regular Army, and caused problems in the implementation process, I believe it has led to a more effective and larger military reserve. The Army assures me that there are now 22,000 effective members of the Reserve, nearly 50% more than there were when we conducted our Inquiry. May I here pay tribute to Lieutenant General Sir Donald Dunstan, who was a member of our Committee and is now Chief of the General Staff, who has had a direct hand in most of the processes whereby the Reserve has come to where it is.

Yet it would be improper to claim that all is well with the Reserve. Indeed it is in some respects astonishing that it is as good as it is. I have talked with Reserve officers at most levels and with NCOs, and with Regular officers involved in the Reserve, and they have had much to be disheartened about. It is not generally known how both the Reserve and the Regular Army have been constrained in their training by financial limitations. Equipment of all kinds is in a parlous condition, frequently needing repair which the funds cannot allow. Transport vehicles, radios, engineering equipment, ammunition, petrol have been totally inadequate for serious military training except for a few special cases. The Reserve operates out of pools of equipment which are quite inadequate. The efficiency of combat units is generally higher than that of support units for this reason: the support units have not had the necessary capacity, including repair capacity, either for their own training or for their support role. Some support units, by the civil professionalism of their personnel, could be made efficient quite quickly, especially within a Regular Army environment.

The Army Reserve appears to have little problem in attracting recruits. As ever, the problem is to retain them. A 1977-78 survey gave the following results of wastage from the Reserve:

Less than 1	year's service	29%
1-2	years' service	29-30%
2-3	years' service	12%
3-6	years' service	13%
6-10	years' service	9%
10+	years' service	8%.

Although I understand some units have a much less satisfactory ratio, this is by no means a disaster situation, and the figures are not significantly worse than those of the Regular Army. Yet retention is the vital element of service, the in-built cost factor. Improved retention could be achieved, I believe, by several measures that require funds to implement them: the

use of better, and different, training areas; the provision of satisfactory equipment, adequate ammunition, more petrol, etc.; and financial inducements to re-enlist. Incidentally, in spite of our Report, Army Reserve officers tell me that Reserve unit administration - and especially pay - is still cumbersome, inefficient and wasteful.

There are a few areas where the Committee's recommendations were not implemented. One was to set up a Reserve Staff College. General Dunstan has told me that this is at last in train, and should be established late this year. Another was that the name of the force be changed from "Citizen Military Forces" to "Army Reserve", and I find it difficult to understand why, although this has happened de facto, it has not yet, after six years, been the subject of legislation.

A more vital area, Mr Chairman, is the question of liability to call-up. Our Committee recommended that members of the Reserve should be liable to call-up in situations short of a defence emergency. The Government has finally rejected that advice, and I would like to invite it to reconsider the matter. I invite your support for such reconsideration.

Finally, I believe there is one area where we have made inadequate progress, and this is in the overall relationship of the Regular Army and the Reserve. In some cases it is excellent; in some it is deplorable. The concept of a single Army, a "total force" depends on a mutual respect between the Regular and Reserve components. That respect does not exist sufficiently for the best interest of the Army or the country.

MILLAR COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS

IMPLEMENTED OR PARTIALLY IMPLEMENTED

(Reference Committee Report Pages 130-132)

Serial	Recommendation	Recommendation	Comment
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1	1	That the Citizen Military Forces be retained as the country's immediate reserve of Army units, and be renamed the "Australian Army Reserve", or more customarily, the 'Army Reserve'.	Implemented to the extent that the title "Army Reserve" is now in general use. Draft legislation to formalise the title is being prepared by the Department of Defence.
2	3	That the role of the Army Reserve be strengthened and given more immediate relevance by making the Reserve directly responsible with the Regular Army for the ground defence of the Australian continent, with appropriate field force, logistic, training and planning capacity.	Implemented. The role of the Army Reserve is now the same as the role of the Australian Army as a whole.
3	6	That the Army Reserve and Regular Army work together within the concept of a single "Total Force" which takes account of the different conditions of service, but provides the maximum amount of mutual assistance and combined activity in training and planning.	Implemented. This is reflected in the new role of the Army Reserve. There is increasing participation by Army Reserve units in exercises with the Regular Army, both in Australia and overseas.
4	7	That the Army Reserve be reorganised to fit into the Functional Command system of the Army, whereby Field Force, Logistic and Training elements will be grouped under the relevant Commands, the Reserve providing an Assistant Commander in each Command.	Implemented except for the appointment of an Assistant Commander, Field Force Command. See Serial 13.

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
5	8	That units of the Army Reserve be reorganized in such a way as to bring them and their sub-units to a minimum 70 percent of establishment.	Implemented. Although the 70 percent figure was used as a guide only, some units and sub units were retained at strengths below this level; the main consideration was whether or not the units were capable of fulfilling a useful training role.
6	9	That formations be reorganized to fit into the Functional Command System with:	
		a. Division and Task Force headquarters being assimilated within a Field Force Group headquarters in each State, with an additional headquarters in North Queensland because of the distance and strengths involved; Division Planning Groups to be raised by Headquarters Field Force Command and to be located in New South Wales and Victoria.	a. Implemented. Planning cells have been included in the headquarters of divisional field force groups.
		b. Base logistic units being brought into Logistic Command (see Recommendation 11).	b. Implemented.
		c. All Reserve training units and university regiments coming under a Headquarters Reserve Training Group in each State, commanded by Reserve officers, these in turn to be responsible to Headquarters Training Command.	c. Implemented.

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
7	10	That Field Force logistic units be grouped by corps into "battalions" or equivalent, and come directly under Field Force Group headquarters; Communications Zone Planning Group be formed in Field Force Command in New South Wales, with an element in Victoria.	Implemented in part. Company or Platoon level logistic units have been retained in field force groups. A separate Communications Zone Planning Group has not been formed but a Logistic Planning Group is now part of Headquarters Field Force Command. The element in Victoria has not been raised.
8	11	That attention be given to raising Reserve elements within Logistic Command, either being sponsored by Regular units, or on the supplementary reserve principle, and by drawing on appropriate expertise within the civilian community.	Implemented in part. Base logistic units have been transferred to Logistic Command. The concepts of extending the supplementary reserve principle and creating a pool of logistic experts is still being examined.
9	12	That individual training of recruits, specialists, senior non-commissioned officers, officer cadets and officers be centralized within each State, under the Headquarters Reserve Training Group, and within an expanded training system with members of field force or logistic units engaged either as students or staff in the training system and being separated from their units for this purpose.	Implemented, except for the training of specialists which remains a Unit/Army School responsibility.
10	14	That at all Reserve or integrated formation headquarters there should be staffs engaged in planning in the context of the defence of Australia requirement, with Reserve officers taking a significant part, particularly where civilian expert knowledge is relevant.	Implemented to the extent that Reserve planning staffs are on each of the command headquarters working in this context.

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
11	15	That a Reserves Branch be established within the Department of Defence (Army Office) to be headed by a Regular Officer of the rank of major general and with the designation "Chief of Army Reserves", similar branches being established in other appropriate headquarters.	Although initially implemented, it has been necessary to appoint a Reserve Officer as Chief of the Army Reserve.
12	16	That a Reserve Officer be appointed "Inspector-General of Army Reserves", with the rank of major general, some of his functions being those currently exercised by the Citizen Military Forces Member of the Military Board.	Although initially implemented, it has been necessary to abolish the appointment of Inspector General of the Army Reserve. The Officer holding that appointment is now Chief of the Army Reserve.
13	17	That the rank of the Assistant Commander, Field Force Command and the Assistant Commander, Logistic Command be major general, and that the Assistant Commander Training Command be a brigadier.	Implemented except that no Assistant Commander has been appointed in Field Force Command. Instead, the appointment of Commander 2nd Divisional Field Force Group has been established in the rank of major general.
14	18	That the Commanders of the Field Force Groups in southern Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria, the Commandant of the Reserve Command and Staff College and the Commanders of Division and Communications Zone Planning Groups and of the Evaluation Group be Reserve brigadiers.	Implemented except for: a. Commander 2nd Divisional Field Force Group (now major general); b. The proposed Communication Zone Planning Groups have been replaced by the Logistic Planning Group on Headquarters Field Force Command. This group is headed by a brigadier; and c. Reserve Command and Staff College and evaluation groups which have not been raised at this stage.
15	19	That an Army Reserve Advisory Council be established to advise the Chief of the General Staff on matters affecting the Reserve and the civil community, and to present an Annual Report on the state of the Reserve.	Implemented.

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
16	20	That a Committee for the Employer Support of the Army Reserve be established, with an element in each state.	A committee titled "The Committee for Employer Support of Reserve Forces" has been established. Its role is to encourage employers to promote service in the three Arms of the Defence Force.
17	21	That members of the Army Reserve enlist for a period of three years, subsequent re-engagements being of the same duration.	Implemented.
18	22	That members of the Reserve be paid at the same rates as members of the Regular Army, with appropriate adjustment to allowances.	Implemented. Close relationship exists between the two rates of pay.
19	25	That uniforms and dress be identical between the Regular Army and the Army Reserve, to the limit of their respective requirements.	Implemented.
20	26	That administrative procedures be simplified, with greater delegation of authority to commanding officers.	Implemented to the extent that a number of new policies and procedures designed to simplify administration have been introduced. This is an on going task. Other administrative procedures are being examined with a view to simplifying them.
21	27	That the Army Reserve provide expanded opportunity for employment of women members, whose conditions of service should be comparable with those of men.	Implemented to the extent that the employment categories available for female soldiers of the Army Reserve are the same as those applying to female soldiers of the Regular Army. The general principles governing the employment of servicewomen are being aligned with those of servicemen wherever practicable.
22	28	That provision be made for diverse methods of entry into the Reserve, and flexibility in conditions of service, in order to encourage the enlistment of civilians with relevant skills.	Implemented to the extent that new conditions have been introduced for some categories of officers and others have been clarified. Flexible conditions of service exist for officers and other ranks and further extension is not contemplated at present.

MILLAR COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS

NOT IMPLEMENTED AS AT 31 JANUARY 80

(Reference Committee Report Pages 130-132)

Serial (a)	Recommendation No (b)	Recommendation (c)	Comment (d)
1	2	That the members of the Regular Army Reserve, the Regular Army Emergency Reserve, and the Reserve Citizen Military Forces be brought into this single Army Reserve organization, either on the strength of formed units, or on an Unallotted List.	Draft legislation to give effect to this recommendation is being prepared by Department of Defence.
2	4	That the existing role in connection with defence emergency or mobilisation be retained; that planning be directed to that objective; that it be declared national policy that if the Regular Army is committed at home, or overseas, the Army Reserve should be activated as the force next to be employed.	The policy to activate the Army Reserve next after the Regular Army must remain as a decision to be made by the Government at the time.
3	5	That Army Reserve units or sub-units be available for use if necessary in civil emergencies, within a pre-arranged system while remembering that the primary aim of the Reserve is to prepare for military operations.	The Government has decided not to proceed with this recommendation.
4	13	That a Reserve Command and Staff College be established, having Junior, Intermediate and Senior Wings, and with elements in each state.	Preliminary research has been done on a charter, role and organisation of a Reserve Command and Staff College. Training Command has been tasked to establish the Reserve Command and Staff College.

(c)	(d)
That the Efficiency Grant be restyled 'Efficiency Bonus', and be a bonus paid at the conclusion of each three years of efficient service for other ranks only.	An incentive system of pay levels on a proficiency basis and time in rank has replaced the Efficiency Grant in accordance with recommendations of the Committee of Reference for Defence Forces Pay.
That a housing loan scheme be introduced, to be applicable to all serving and future members of units in the Reserve.	On 17 Nov 76 the Prime Minister, in an address to the CMF Association, stated: "On the matter of defence Service homes, this particular matter has to be taken into account with other government housing programmes. In the present economic climate it is difficult for the government to provide a special benefit for any particular group of people."
That a central computer system be introduced for personal and pay records for all Reserve personnel, including those on the Unallotted List.	A central computer system for personal information is being planned. There is presently insufficient computer capacity to handle Army Reserve pay systems in the foreseeable future. Trials are currently being conducted on a computerised pay system for the Army Reserve.

CHAIRMAN - Dr Millar, the usual procedure is for you to address the Committee and to give us a rundown on the content of your submission. The Committee will then address questions to you to develop the submission.

Dr Millar - I wish to make two brief corrections. They are typographical errors but they do affect the meaning of the paper. On the first page in the third paragraph the fourth line reads: '...twenty years, and where each national change in the international balance...'. It should read: '...where each change'. The word 'national' should be omitted. Then on page 4 the second line reads: '...being able to command across...'. It should be 'access' of course and not 'across'. I am sorry, these are only small points but they are points of significance. On page 6 the third line says 'the ultimate bans' but it should say 'the ultimate basis'. My bad writing disturbed the typist. I appreciate your inviting me to speak. I will say two or three things briefly about the first part of the submission and then, because the second part was written in considerable haste, I wish to add briefly to it. There is also one other point, a personal question which reflects my ancestry. My name should be spelt with an 'a' in the title of the submission. My father who was a Scot came from the Scottish line of Millars and there is also a question of confusing me sometimes with my colleague, Professor Bruce Miller.

What struck me thinking about this and reading reports of the considerable and interesting debates which have taken place on this subject of the implications of Afghanistan was that we are dealing with not only Afghanistan or the strategic implications of Afghanistan and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan but with the whole question of a strategic environment of which Afghanistan and the Russian invasion is only one part. It has become a very prominent and dramatic part but nevertheless it is only one part. It is important not to let our reactions to Afghanistan overshadow our wider view of the environment and what we ought to be doing about it in any case.

I felt, too, that the extent to which the modern world is revolutionary in nature is not often thought through in Australia and I include some official areas when I say that. There is a tendency in intelligence circles to consider the world as basically evolutionary and one in which we can see what is coming because everything is a result of what has just gone before. This is the historian's approach but, in fact, if you look back at the last 20 years, as I suggest here, the number of things that have happened suddenly and dramatically and with a marked effect on the world is really quite considerable. Consequently, when we look at our strategic situation for the next 10 years or 20 years we have to assume that dramatic events and events affecting our environment can happen unpleasantly and quickly and such events may not give us time to prepare from scratch to meet them. It is essential that, in considering our defence policies, we appreciate that. The Army Reserve is part of the process of trying to meet that fact.

I also express my uncertainty as to why the Soviet Union has acted as it has in Afghanistan. I did not develop this at any length but I confess I do not know whether it wishes to obtain a port on the Indian Ocean - Peter the Great wished to and Mr Molotov certainly expressed such an interest in 1939. We have seen a pressure towards that area but we do not know if this was in the minds of the Soviet leaders when they launched the invasion

of Afghanistan. I say I do not know whether they wish to have control of the major oil producing areas of the Middle East but I say that, by the Afghanistan invasion, they have put themselves in a far better position to achieve both those objectives if they so desire. I am afraid that the record of Soviet activities over recent times cannot but make one think that they may have such an intention.

It is an action of a kind different from anything Soviet leaders have done since 1945 and it has caused enormous disturbance to the region and indeed to the world. The basic problem which I see for the West, including ourselves, to arise from the Afghanistan situation, is that it is an area which is the producer and reserve of one of the vital resources of the West. Yet it is an area from which Western powers are removed by several thousand miles. It is an area which currently is not of vital importance to the Soviet bloc because the Soviet Union is itself a major exporter of oil, for purposes of obtaining hard currency. Yet the best predictions we can find about Soviet resources - and nobody knows what they add up to, not even the Russians - suggest that the Soviet Union is finding increasingly costly the extraction of oil. Consequently, somewhere early in the twenty-first century the Soviet Union will have to start restricting considerably its consumption and export of oil. And in those circumstances - particularly with an economy which is gradually industrialising and developing all forms of transport and so on in the way the West has done much earlier - any Soviet government will be forced to look for alternative sources of oil. The most likely and most adjacent sources are those in the Middle Eastern states, on which the Western industrialised powers and Japan, rely.

So in terms of our strategic position, I do not think the Soviet invasion has created a situation to which Australia must immediately consider sending an expeditionary force or any other kind of military force. It has rather created a situation of much greater instability as between the super powers and as between the Eastern and Western blocs, raising the level of tension and the

possibility of conflict. The Soviet Union is not about to attack Western Australia, although I am sure it would do wonders for our defence efforts if they were. We are not about to go off to defend Iran or Saudi Arabia; we have no possible capacity to do so. But we do have a much more stormy international climate. We have a general situation, not only throughout our region but throughout the world, where people are talking with greater concern about the possibilities of war. In such circumstances we would be intensely unwise not to do something about it in terms of our own defence preparations.

I have expressed concern that we have not developed in the Parliament a bipartisan policy on this matter. This may be an easy thing for a non-parliamentarian to say, yet what I am concerned with here is not party politics of one side or the other but the national interest. Frankly, I was disturbed by the fact that here was a situation which was unambiguous, totally deplorable, not in our immediate vicinity, yet a situation on which we seemed unable to develop a national policy. I felt this did not augur well for future circumstances which may be somewhat more ambiguous but much closer to home.

CHAIRMAN - May I intervene with one comment? If in their wisdom the Government handed over the defence of this country to this Committee, it would have a bipartisan approach.

Dr Millar - I am delighted to hear that, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRMAN - We work very cohesively, I am very pleased and proud to say. I just took the opportunity to get a little propaganda across.

Dr Millar - I hope the Press duly takes notice of that. Please forgive me for raising that point but I do it as an outsider. Accordingly I feel that the Defence measures which the Government has generously told us about twice in recent weeks are such that we should have been taking them anyway, even if Afghanistan had not happened. As these start to take effect I hope this Committee will look at the question of further increasing our defence measures, to meet not only the situation which has developed because of Afghanistan but the whole strategic situation in the region. Would you like me to go on and discuss the Army Reserve part of my submission?

CHAIRMAN - Yes.

Dr Millar - Until I came this morning I had not seen the actual typed copy which you have in front of you. I finished it very late last night and gave it to Mr Ducker. He gave it to a typist who stayed until a late hour typing it up. Consequently I have not had time to read it through. Mr Ducker has read it through for typographical errors. I would prefer not to read it now but if I do come across typing errors may the record be adjusted accordingly?

CHAIRMAN - Yes.

Dr Millar - As you will appreciate I am most grateful for the extent to which the report of the committee of which I was chairman has been implemented. I believe this is very much due to the fact that General Dunstan was a member of that committee. He helped generate the ideas which came into its report. As Chief of Field Force Command and then of the General Staff he has been in a position to implement its recommendations and has indeed done so to a great extent. But some parts of it have not been implemented. As I say in the statement in front of you, I do not believe it was the last word for all time about the Reserve. It was the best we could do at the time. But on re-reading it recently I thought it was basically a sound

document and well based. Almost all its recommendations and principles still stand.

I frankly do not think, however, that it is sufficiently appreciated throughout Australia, by Parliament and indeed by much of the regular Army, how vital a component of our defence forces the Army Reserve is. If we assume, as I believe we must, that there may at some time be a requirement for our forces to defend our country, our people and our important national interests, we must also accept certain possibilities. Firstly, such a threat may develop quite quickly. We have seen case after case of this in recent times. Secondly, it may require the use of forces considerably larger than those we have in regular service. In such circumstances the Army Reserve is the basis for expansion of our ground forces. Indeed it would initially be that expansion. It would provide a large component of those forces, including officers. We have a small population occupying a large, wealthy and vulnerable continent and it is essential that we be prepared to use and to deploy all available resources of professionally trained manpower for our security on the most cost effective basis. On such grounds the enthusiasm and dedication of Reserve personnel and the professionalism which many of them bring from their civilian occupations are assets we cannot afford to waste, leave unused or use inadequately.

I referred earlier to the notion that the Government should be able to call out the Reserve or some part of it in times other than a defence emergency or war. Our committee had in mind here contingencies such as the following, and this is not an exclusive list. Firstly, a deterioration in the international situation, either generally or within our region, of a nature that caused disquiet in this country and that caused the Government of the day to feel the need to increase the level of defence preparedness, but without a fanfare, without the raising of international alarms and without the declaration of a 'defence emergency', which to my mind is a relic of a bygone era. At present all the Government could do would be to invite members of the Reserve to undertake camp training. Some would go and some would not. I find it

difficult to understand why the Government, unlike most other governments around the world, should deny itself the option to call out whole units of its Reserve at such times, especially as in these days conflicts develop in far more complex ways than in the past and without necessarily any declarations of hostile intention or of war such as were good form in times past.

A second contingency would be a major national disaster in which there is no appropriate regular Army capacity available but there is a reserve capacity available. I am thinking here of something like the Darwin cyclone, for which a reserve sub-unit was brought in on a voluntary basis. I believe it would be desirable to have a call-out capacity for such circumstances. A third contingency might be a terrorist attack in an area in which there were inadequate local police, no local regular Army but a local reserve unit or sub-unit. A call-out capacity could enable the Government to take prompt action.

I appreciate that there are problems associated with this concept. Some people may fear that the government of the day would use the Reserve as strike breakers in industrial disputes. Quite clearly present regulations forbid such use and I have no doubt they would continue to apply. Some people feel that employers would resist the notion because it would disrupt their processes. I believe this fear to be largely ill founded. The committee for employer support of the Reserve has found that there is considerable support for the Reserve among employers. Some employers indeed may be reluctant to give time off for reserve training if their employees are not going to be used for essential community assistance in an emergency. The self-employed may find a call-out highly inconvenient, perhaps impossible.

This is something they would have to consider before enlisting. During a civil disaster some Reserve members may already be protecting or salvaging their own property. It is not beyond the wit of the Army or the Government to make allowance for such situations. Some opponents fear that the power to call up the Reserve would be used frivolously. This can be prevented also by sensible procedures and the proper processes of authority.

However, the most important aspect is the question of principle. This question has bedevilled our military forces since they started. Do we have one army or two armies? Do we have one force or two forces? The Government appears to believe the latter. At least, the Reserve assumes the Government believes this. Technically, the Reserve has the same role as the regular Army, yet in practice it does not, and cannot have the same role under present law. The Army is moving slowly - and would move faster with more funds - to making one operational force. However, it is totally constrained by existing legislation. It cannot plan adequately the use or training of the Reserve except in a national crisis. This, I believe, is an absurd position, unintelligent in concept, unprofitable in application, and unworthy of us as a people and as a nation.

CHAIRMAN - Thank you. May I ask Senator Bishop to proceed with his questions and then we ask the formal questions.

Senator BISHOP - Dr Millar, in the statement you have given to the Committee you refer on page 6 to the increased international tensions and military activity. You know, of course, that people talk about the Afghanistan issue as being a threat to Australia and a threat to world peace. To what extent do you see the Soviet occupation as a direct threat to Australia and generally a threat to world peace? Your paper says that while it increases tensions and concern in Australia it is not a direct threat to Australia. Is this your position?

Dr Millar - I do not believe it is a direct threat to Australia. I do not see how one could say that it is. It is quite clearly a direct threat to the sovereignty of Afghanistan.

It has caused the question of security to become imminent. It raises the question of the security of Pakistan and Iran and it raises the question of the future control of the Middle Eastern oil resources. In those respects it has raised the level of tension and apprehension of war throughout the region of which we are part. It raises tension regarding supplies upon which we depend. Because of the United States reaction and President Carter's assertion that the interruption to the flow of oil would be a casus belli - by the dispatch of forces into the area and consequently by the dispatch, also, of increased Soviet forces into the area - it has increased the possibilities of superpower confrontation.

All of these indicate a much heightened level of international tension and therefore an increased possibility of conflict - a conflict which undoubtedly would affect us. But the invasion of Afghanistan is no direct threat to this country - it is simply an exacerbation of the international situation in a way which affects this country.

Senator BISHOP - If Australia becomes very closely tied again to the United States objectives and the machinery of military activity, is that likely to produce a reaction among our neighbours? They are anxious to see an area of peace, not of division, and not get mixed up in global warfare with the super powers.

Dr Millar - In that respect our neighbours are a diffuse lot. I do not know that we can put them all into one basket. Quite clearly every one of our neighbours has been very disturbed by the Soviet action in Afghanistan. If I recall rightly, all of them condemned it at the United Nations. Those which are Islamic have condemned it at the special Islamic meeting of states in Pakistan. So I do not think there is very much sympathy for the Soviet position. There is also throughout our neighbourhood a general sense that only the United States has the capacity to prevent the Soviet Union from engaging in indefinite expansion. Therefore there is in some sense a dependence upon United States military power even though it is an indirect dependence. At the same time there would be some concern amongst several of our neighbouring states and perhaps states across the other side of the Indian Ocean that the United States should not engage too easily in precautions against a conflict which might thereby be exacerbated.

There is no doubt that the aggressor in this situation is the Soviet Union. However, the processes of constraining that aggression and perhaps even turning it back slightly while they may have a military basis, must be primarily diplomatic. As I mention in my paper and as I said elsewhere over this last weekend as reported in the Press, it is terribly important that Australia,

while taking all responsible actions to help the United States in providing the countervailing power we all need, should not itself become a surrogate of the United States. I believe it should not provide an American home porting base in Australia. We have to be and be seen to be an independent sovereign state in this region. Wider questions are at stake than simply Afghanistan or even simply oil. We have to be a loyal ally but able to contribute to the common defence and to provide for our own defence.

CHAIRMAN - Let us suppose we become closely associated with a super power such as the United States. As Senator Bishop pointed out that could cause our neighbours to adopt a different attitude towards us. How would that balance with the fact that we no longer have traditional support from Great Britain and such places, and if we were to look at just one ally, it would have to be the United States? What is your comment on the balance between those two aspects of the question?

Dr Millar - I see that the question of balance is extremely important here. I think it is a balance that we can manage, particularly because we are not - as countries of Western Europe are - facing an enemy across a line for which we need desperately a major power presence. We are not facing a hostile power on our off-shore islands, as Japan is. We are separate from the Asian continent, we are well away from any major potentially hostile power and this gives us a different situation. Therefore I do not think we need a direct, significant great power or super power presence in this country; but more than that, I think that our efforts to ensure our own security and to ensure the common security are strategic, diplomatic and economic. We must pursue all three activities simultaneously, without any one of them overriding the other, unless we get into a situation where we are under direct threat. The United States understands this, I am sure. They do not want - and it would not serve their purpose - Australia to become identified as an American satellite in this part of the world. We have to be seen to be ourselves, we have to pursue our own policies and we are doing so on the whole. At

the same time we can be a loyal ally to the United States, providing at our own expense those facilities which will help the United States to fulfil its role in this region.

Mr SCHOLES - I am concerned that Afghanistan has all the appearance of a convenient Aunt Sally whilst the significant, potentially destabilising influence in Iran is now being totally ignored in all public assessments of the developing situation. It appears that the Soviet Union's presence in Afghanistan, whilst it constitutes a major shift in the understandings between East and West, does not have the same potential for international conflict as the completely unpredictable situation of Iran and of current United States-Iranian relations. More importantly, Afghanistan does not have the potential for destabilisation with regard to the Soviet Union as does Iran if it were to threaten oil and gas supplies to the southern areas of Russia, which has already occurred on one occasion. Do you see the internal conflict within Islam and the completely new phenomena of a totally unpredictable international power, as more likely to be a destabilising influence than the relatively predictable aspects of the Soviet Union?

Dr Millar - That is a big question. I have some difficulty with the term 'Aunt Sally'. It has been a very nasty operation in Afghanistan, a brutal situation which has aroused enormous concern around the world and particularly in the Islamic world. I think Mr Scholes is quite right to say there is a degree of fluidity about the situation in Iran which must be intensely destabilising for the whole region. It provides an example of a kind which must have given great thought to the rulers of Saudi Arabia although it is a totally different kind of country in most respects from Saudi Arabia. It is a different part of Islam with a different approach to the role of religion in government.

CHAIRMAN - Will you enlarge on that a little? I am very interested in that comment and on the difference in the Islamic allegiances.

Dr Millar - I do not claim to be an authority but it does seem that the Shi'ite branch of Islam has traditionally been much more involved in pursuing the Islamisation of politics within a country than the Sunni branch of Islam and one has seen this, I think, in a number of the Islamic states. I see the Afghanistan situation as compounding the problems of Iran and those which Iran makes for the world because it has put the Soviet Union in a position where it could intervene on two sides of Iran immediately if something happened. This may have the effect of reducing the likelihood that the United States would take any military action in Iran. My understanding is that in any case the United States is really incapable of taking the kind of action it would want to take to free the hostages who have been so illegally, and indeed brutally, constrained for so long, a situation which the Soviet Union has done nothing whatsoever to alleviate but on the contrary has tried to exacerbate.

The whole question of what is happening to Islam at present is an interesting and complex one. I have a colleague whom you may wish to speak to about that, Dr Mohammed Ayoob, who has made this a special subject, but it is quite clear that what is happening to Islam is not a single process. What is called the

radicalisation of Islam is taking place in different ways in different countries and one cannot, I think, easily predict how it will take effect in any of the states of the region. We have seen a group of Islamic states which is not simply undergoing the process of radicalisation in probably both directions, left and right, but is primarily moving towards a more significant exercise of religion in political affairs. This has taken place concurrently with the development of their financial capacities to exercise international power through their oil revenues. The combination is undoubtedly one which is destabilising for Western interests whatever it may do for the governments concerned. This destabilisation is something which presumably the Soviet Union would have wished to play upon except that it runs counter to two Soviet interests. One is that any assertion of Soviet power in the region runs against the national interests of the countries concerned - as we have seen overwhelmingly in Afghanistan - and consequently has brought about its condemnation. Secondly, the Soviet Union has a Moslem population of 45 to 50 millions who are subject to some of these same ideas drifting across the Soviet borders from its Islamic neighbours. I have no doubt that the Soviet Union has some concern about that. So this is acting as a restraint on Soviet activities in the area. What the Soviet Union is concerned about overwhelmingly is its own national interest and exercise of power. It has come to the conclusion long ago - and has acted on the steady belief - that the exercise of power relates primarily to military force and not to diplomacy. This is the basis of it. That belief is the danger which we have primarily to confront.

Mr SCHOLES - Do you see a danger of overemphasis in our defence arrangements as they are developing on the Indian Ocean western reaches of Australia? Bear in mind the role Australia will be expected to play in the Pacific area with the substantial removal of British influence at a time of direct American influence and a likely decline of French influence and - more importantly - French military presence over the next 10 years.

Dr Millar - The Western Australian area has been very neglected for a long time. What we have seen is a readjustment of the balance. The upgrading of Cockburn Sound for instance is something that should have taken place a long time ago. Indeed it should go further than the Government has indicated. The notion of Australian ships being base ported in Western Australia is desirable. Whether this will lead to a permanent split of the Australian forces - particularly naval - between the eastern and western oceans, I do not know. What this has done is make the Government aware - and the Government is sitting in Canberra in the south east corner - that there are strategic problems off the west coast, and that it has to do something about them. In the long term perhaps the immediate reaction will be seen as a slight overreaction. Yet if we are to make some kind of contribution to the United States naval reconnaissance and maritime air reconnaissance of the eastern Indian Ocean, then we obviously have to deploy more power than we have at the moment in the western coast area. So I do not think this is going to upset our total capacity. It will split it a bit but it will also demonstrate that our total capacity has been very inadequate up to date and that we have to do something to upgrade it so that we can operate in both areas.

CHAIRMAN - If there was any hostility, what would happen along the western coast? I know it is hard to set up a scenario but I have often wondered whether there would be an assault or whether missiles would be used. I am not thinking of missiles with atomic warheads but of missiles which have less impact and which would merely be used to soften up the great cities. Can you visualise that? We think in terms of physical assault but could there be a new approach which would not involve so many bodies but only those lying around Sydney or Melbourne?

Dr Millar - Do you see these missiles as coming from a major power?

CHAIRMAN - There are about 300 Russian submarines. They are all electrically driven and many of them have atomic warheads.

Senator BISHOP - Are you thinking of a dispute between the United States and the Soviet Union?

CHAIRMAN - I am not suggesting the circumstances, but sometimes it is interesting to think of the practicalities, of what would really happen.

Dr Millar - One does have to consider all kinds of options but such a development would, it seems to me, be part of a wider conflict. I cannot see any point in the Soviet Union engaging in such activities in the absence of any other kind of conflict.

CHAIRMAN - I will tell you what prompted that question. Last year I had five or six days in and out of the Pentagon. One of the discussions at a very high level concerned this very question. I was told that American precision is quite unbelievable. One general told me that they could blast a factory in Moscow without breaking the windows of the Kremlin. No doubt the Russians have something of a lesser capacity. We will use the Russians as an example. What would prevent them from picking out targets and shooting them up without landing a soul? Our capacity is such that it would not take much to bring us to our knees. I do not want to waste time on this but it would satisfy my curiosity.

Dr Millar - Yes, I do not see this happening except in a major conflict. Whether the Soviets would select Australia as a

target for some purpose I do not know. I find it difficult to see a situation in which that would happen. When I was in South Africa giving some lectures a couple of years back the South African Government talked to me about the possibility of South Africa being selected as a special target by the Soviet Union. When I asked why it should be so selected they said it could be because of all of their minerals. That does not seem to me an adequate reason to launch what might be initially a minor conflict but which might escalate into a major war. The Soviet Union, after all, does have a few minerals of its own. I cannot quite see the circumstances in which the Soviet Union would want to launch such a selective attack upon this country.

CHAIRMAN - There must be another reason so I can sleep a little more comfortably in the city of Mount Isa which is now the largest mining complex of its kind in the world.

Mr ARMITAGE - Before asking questions I would like to correct one aspect which Dr Millar mentioned - that was the lack of a bipartisan approach as far as the political sides are concerned. The Opposition attitude - I speak as an Opposition member - has been just as concerned as the Government about the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union forces. We have been equally concerned about the lack of consultation and also about some of the immediate reactions without consultation with the Opposition. I want to make it quite clear - that has been the position. When the invasion occurred everybody tried to work out the Soviet motivation. In coming around to my views, I kept in mind that the Soviet have been in effective control of Afghanistan for two years - and to this extent it is extraordinary that there has not been more reaction to that effective control long before this - and I have attempted to look at the two aspects which govern their motivation. One involves the Islamic minority living within the Soviet Union and is connected with the events which occurred in Iran and the tendency of the Soviet Union leaders at any time to be quite psychotic about minority groupings and for that reason to react to the events in Iran and be

concerned about overflow of that from Afghanistan into its own minority groupings in the Soviet Union. I would like to know your views on that.

The second aspect has received very little publicity and concerns the fact that Afghanistan is a country very rich in resources; it is rich in minerals and in oil or potential oil resources. I cannot help but wonder whether that is also part of the motivation of the Soviet Union leaders. I would like firstly your views on that, and then I have another question which deals with this region. I concur with your view that, as far as Afghanistan is concerned and the Soviet is concerned, there is no immediate threat to Australia involved but - reading between the lines of your statement - it has possibly made some of our Defence planners or our people responsible for our Defence planning realise that something had to be done in bringing us up to date in defence preparations and possibly it has made them look at areas closer to Australia where we could have problems. What are your views on that?

Dr Millar - I am not sure that you would call 45 million to 50 million people a minority but, frankly, I do not think we can tell whether concern about the Soviet Islamic population was a basic reason for the Soviet Union moving into Afghanistan. One may say it is reasonable, and yet I would have thought that if the United States were concerned about its troubles within its black population nobody would think it a reasonable basis for invading any of the black Caribbean states which are its neighbours. Maybe it is a rationalisation

the Soviet Union has used. It must be concerned about what happened in Iran, but I think the Soviet must be concerned on several bases, one of which is the fact that Iran is one of their neighbour countries over which for a period the Soviet Union exercised a part control, and over which it sought, on occasions, to obtain a degree of sovereignty and a degree of control over the oil supplies - as it did last at the end of World War II. It would also be concerned that this country should have developed a form of government which was unresponsive to super power pressures of any kind - whether Western or Eastern. This may have troubled it, but it does not form a basis for invading a neighbouring State. My own view, for what it is worth, about the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, is that it was felt to be the lesser of two evils. Mr Armitage said that it had been in effective control of Afghanistan for more than two years from the time of the April 1978 coup. That is not a phrase I would use. I would have thought the control was initially at one remove and gradually became more effective in the sense that more and more Soviet advisers and military forces entered the country so that by December 1979 there were approximately 8000 military personnel and several thousand civilian personnel in the country. I would have to check the exact figures. The interesting thing was that, although the Soviet Union had advisers in the armed forces down to platoon level and right through the government - including and especially in the economic ministries - the state of the country was steadily deteriorating and its national security and domestic peace were steadily deteriorating. The government which was in many respects a surrogate government was losing control of the country. After weighing the international situation and after weighing the various constraints and the implications of all kinds, the Soviet Government decided that it could not afford to see the country go down the drain when so much Soviet effort had already been put into it. The Soviet leaders saw it going down the drain in the sense of becoming less dependent and less responsive to Soviet pressures and in the sense of having a government of almost

total anarchy. I see that as the way they probably felt about it. On the question of resources I must say Mr Armitage surprises me. The sources which I have read on this subject indicate that while there is some natural gas which is being and has been for some little time transported to the Soviet Union-----

Mr ARMITAGE - I am not speaking of the developed resources; I refer to underdeveloped resources.

Dr Millar - I have not seen any authoritative references to suggest that they have considerable undeveloped resources either. Most of the reports about Afghanistan say that it is one of the intensely poor countries of the world. This is one of the LLDCs, the least developed countries. You say that is a question of development and you may be right. I was not aware that they had resources of oil which have yet to be developed. You may be right and I am prepared to accept it but I was not aware of it.

Mr ARMITAGE - I think it might help Dr Millar to refer to Mr Jacobi about issues which were brought up in the full Committee.

Senator BISHOP - You could reveal the evidence now or mention it so that we know what you are putting forward.

CHAIRMAN - We have less than half an hour left. We could sit here for a whole day with Dr Millar and it would be of benefit to us all but as our time is so short perhaps we could shift across to the question of reserves.

Mr ARMITAGE - If a nation considered that Papua New Guinea did not have stable government and decided to move against it militarily what would your attitude be? What should Australia's reaction be to that? Do you wish to answer that?

Dr Millar - It is a very complex and difficult question. Australia's reaction would have to depend on the nature of the foreign intervention, the state of the defence situation, the degree of control which the government had over the country, the relationship between that government and our government and the nature of any arrangements into which we had entered to cover various contingencies of this kind. I accept what you are getting at. A neighbouring government may feel impelled to go to the assistance of its neighbour in certain circumstances. I have in fact written a bit about this and suggested some guidelines under which external intervention to assist the legitimate government of a country against an illegitimate external intervention may be proper. I could dig those out for you. It is a complex and difficult question. It is one to which we would have to give a lot of thought. I do not think the Australian Government should,

in principle, wipe its hands in advance of any situation which might develop in Papua New Guinea involving an external takeover and say that this would be purely the responsibility of Papua New Guinea.

Mr ARMITAGE - In other words, you think we should continue some support of Papua New Guinea or adopt a supportive attitude towards it?

Dr Millar - Our attitude has to be supportive. What we do would depend on the circumstances.

Mr NEIL - We may have to put these questions to Dr Millar in writing but there are two quick points. On Afghanistan, you say the Russians talk about the possibility of the country having gone down the drain-----

Dr Millar - In their terms.

Mr NEIL - Yes, in their terms. That is all I wanted to clarify. Do you accept my view that what they believe to have been going down the drain was in fact an attempt by the people to walk the road of freedom and to get rid of a rigid regime?

Dr Millar - There is no doubt that there is intense resistance by Afghanistan people to the regime which had been imposed upon them, and this was the factor, causing the domestic situation to deteriorate. Of course, Afghanistan has never been a coherent nation in the way that many other countries have been. It has been essentially a group of tribal states with a very limited acknowledgement of a central government. But on the other hand, quite clearly the current use of the term insurgents, for example, indicates that these people are somehow rebels against Afghanistan. Yet these people are Afghanistani nationalists seeking to control their own country.

Mr NEIL - On the question of the Indian Ocean naval response, what do you understand by the terms 'home porting' or 'base porting'? Do you see this as relating to Australia's interest to provide assistance to American responses in the Persian Gulf or do you see it more as relating to Australia's interest in having a presence of a generally stronger type in the Indian Ocean, particularly off the coast of Australia and south of the

South East Asian area? I ask this because the base itself seems to have some potential for assisting the Americans in the Indian Ocean generally, but not so in the Persian Gulf. Perhaps you can enlighten me. I would have thought it was further away than the Philippines and might take two weeks to get to by ship - a minimum of 10 days I am told - and I question its immediate capability for reaction to the Persian Gulf. But if it is to be related to the Persian Gulf, does that not imply that it would have to be of such a nature as to be able to carry major overhauls and be, in fact, almost a substitute for some of the very, very large scale American bases such as exist in Hawaii?

Dr Millar - To take your first point - the difference between base porting and home porting. I understand base porting to apply to particular vessels returning periodically from exercises for significant overhauls, maintenance, replenishment and R&R. Home porting is a much more significant operation, with the provision of housing for dependants and a much larger base of the kind you were talking about for larger ships and so on.

It is the second one which I have trouble with - the notion of having some thousands of American families sitting around the Perth metropolitan area. I feel that would create problems and an American base in Western Australia would affect our diplomacy considerably.

For example, I was in Moscow a few months ago. An official of the Foreign Ministry said: 'Why do you have an American base in Australia?' I said: 'What are you talking about?' 'Cockburn Sound', he said and I said: 'That is not an American base. It is not even a base, it is a small port facility. It will take a couple of ships at a time but it is Australian and as an ally of the United States obviously we must allow the United States to use it and we want to do so.' So I see that distinction and I think we should provide significant berths in Cockburn Sound for the use of the United States if it feels it could have such use.

Mr NEIL - Do you favour base porting and not home porting?

Dr Millar - Yes. On your second point, I agree it is a long way from the action, although one must assume that the action will not necessarily be only in the Gulf area. It could be in other parts of the Indian Ocean if we are talking about naval activities. It is a big ocean and there is also the question of the straits, which are the most vulnerable part of the eastern Indian Ocean, where we would want to see secured naval power deployed. I understand that the United States is considering a number of options, of which Cockburn Sound enlargement is one, another is the enlargement of Subic Bay, another is the possible use of Singapore and yet another is the possible expansion of bases in Spain, which are not all that much further away and yet are on a quick route through the Suez Canal where ships would be more vulnerable. I do not know what the United States will come up with. Obviously there is no best easily discernible answer. Cockburn Sound is a long way from the Gulf and it would take days of sailing. It is not all that much further than Subic Bay but there is one difference, which is that Australia is considered a basically stable and reliable ally whereas the United States Government may not necessarily feel that successive Filipino governments will have such an attitude.

Senator BISHOP - The Soviet Union, the United States and I suppose we too say that detente should be achieved if possible but, recognising all the complexities and the critical things happening and as you have mentioned the tension has been heightened by Iran and Afghanistan, is there something diplomatically Australia could do? You seem to bring this into focus in your paper where you say Australia should be active in a number of areas - diplomatic, economic and strategic. Is there some way in which we with western Europe can intervene or take a positive role other than following closely behind what the United States is trying to do?

Dr Millar - I think our diplomatic activities should certainly range into western Europe but also into the Arab states. We now have for example quite good relations with Iraq and Saudi Arabia, which are two very important states in this region. I think we could use those relationships not to turn them in one direction or another, because we do not have that power, but to present a policy of sanity, balance and reasonableness and to encourage them towards such policies, without trying in any way to obscure the fact that we are an American ally. We cannot obscure that fact but we can present ourselves as an independent Indian Ocean state and as an Indian Ocean state I think we have a reasonable role, a publicly understandable role in this situation, not as a major power but as a significant small-to-middle power. As you say, in our own region we have two close neighbours who are Islamic states - Malaysia and Indonesia - with whom on the whole we have good relations. I believe we can exercise our diplomacy with those states and with the other ASEAN powers in a way that helps to create a climate of international opinion here which is, if you like, hostile to the kinds of hostilities in which the Soviet Union has been engaging.

Mr ARMITAGE - Dr Millar, you will be aware that for 12 months prior to the events in Iran there were sources in the United States warning the Government what was going to happen and they were ignored. I understand that those same sources are now making similar noises regarding Saudi Arabia. Have you heard that?

Dr Millar - I do not know whether they are the same sources but there is no doubt that a significant body of opinion in the United States and elsewhere is troubled by the possibility of destabilisation of the present regime in Saudi Arabia. Of course, other people feel that it would be a highly desirable event. It is what one does about such a situation that is so difficult, particularly if one is an external power? Whatdo you do? You do not rely on it so extensively as your principal political associate in the region. I think the United States has shown that it does not so rely. The plain fact is, of course, that Saudi Arabia is the key to this whole problem because it is the principal present supplier of Gulf oil to the Western world - something like 40 per cent - and has by far the largest known resources of oil. It is in a very different situation from Iran. The power is far more diffused among a very considerable ruling elite; it is a Sunni country rather than a Shiah country. There are also radical elements within it and there are competitive forces within the overnment itself. There is a considerable difference between the rich and the poor. There is the ostentatious display of wealth.

These are all conducive to internal instability. Whether or not they will have such an effect I certainly do not know. Quite clearly all the countries concerned about the continuing supply of oil must be giving this considerable thought and looking at the possibilities for change and what they should do about them. I am afraid I am no oracle to tell you what Australia should do.

Mr Bryant - Australia would be the more significant military and industrial power with surplus capacity on the Indian Ocean, would it not? India has a great mobilisation capacity, but is there anybody with greater strength than ours in the whole area?

Dr Millar - India certainly is a major industrial power as well as a significant military power. I know of no other state except Australia which has comparable industrial and military power within the range.

CHAIRMAN - Are Reserve officers now taking part in planning for the defence of Australia at Reserve or integrated headquarters as recommended in your report?

Dr Millar - I understand that they are.

CHAIRMAN - The Government has announced its intention of increasing the Reserve from 22,000 as it is at present to 30,000 by 1985. It has been suggested that in order to have the extra 8,000 in 1985 the Reserve will have to recruit a total of 40,000 personnel over the next five years. Would you comment on the proposal?

Dr Millar - I thought it was an admirable intention. Whether it is capable of being realised I do not know. The first thing to do is to make the present Reserve efficient. While it is technically efficient it has very considerable gaps in its expertise and considerable weaknesses. I support in principle the notion of increasing the strength of the Reserve. An important factor in doing that would be the increased efficiency of the existing Reserve. People like to go into something which is working and working well and doing something useful. I think the Army would have considerable difficulty in raising those numbers although I know that there are senior Army officers who

do not share that view. I would like to see the present Reserve much better supported by government - much better financed. Then it will be able to perform its normal activity. At present it is contrained by lack of ammunition, transport, fuel and even, in some units, things like boots. It needs to be able to train effectively. I would like to see the first money go into that rather than into recruiting additional recruits. On present indications many of them would be likely to leave the Reserve quite soon after joining.

Senator BISHOP - Your report recommended that the Reserve be made directly responsible with the Regular Army for the ground defence of Australia with appropriate field, logistic and training power. To what extent has this recommendation been accepted by the government?

Dr Millar - I do not really know enough to answer you in detail but to my understanding it is a recommendation honoured in principle but not in practice.

Senator BISHOP - I think you went into the question of whether or not the Reserves should be available for a call-up during peacetime or in national emergency disasters and so on. To your knowledge, what examination has that been given by the Government and what recommendations are being considered?

Dr Millar - I am not privy to the confidential discussions which took place within the Defence Department or the Cabinet. My understanding is that while there was strong support for the notion within the Army, it received less than adequate support in the other two Services and very considerable opposition within the Department of Defence, and that a recommendation not to have such a change went forward to the Government, which accepted it.

Senator BISHOP - There seems evidence that there are a number of delays or bureaucratic invasions in satisfying the Reserves entitlements and I have had occasion to go into the matters of compensation for Reserve men, housing policy and pay. You investigated this question. To what extent is it possible to improve that situation, which seems to me to have a very bad effect on the volunteering of Reserve people?

Dr Millar - It is very hard to know what causes people to volunteer or not to volunteer. There is no doubt that there is considerable resentment in the Army Reserve on the matters you raised. I do not believe the Government has thought through adequately the notion of compensation to Reserve people on active training. Similarly, from what my friends in the Reserve tell me, the pay procedures are still gruesomely antiquated, cumbersome and counterproductive in many ways. How these matters affect recruitment, for example, or retention I do not know. I tend to think the key question is retention, not recruitment, and that the key aspect of retention is interesting training. You cannot do interesting training, for example, if you have only seven rounds per man per year or 5 miles' worth or whatever it is of petrol for each armoured personnel carrier driver. It is that

kind of thing which has to be adjusted if the Reserve is going to have the kind of retention rate it ought to have. It is very unproductive and costly to have a quick flow-through in the Citizen Military Forces. You bring people in, you put an intensive training program upon them which in itself is quite costly and they leave again quickly. You have lost everything you have put in. Whereas a little more effort initially into providing interesting and adequate training programs will help retain those people and so obviate the expenses of training non-productive people.

Mr ARMITAGE - You spoke of the intention to lift the Reserve from 22,000 to 28,000 and looking at page 9 of your original submission I notice that the wastage of recruits with less than one year's service to less than six years' service totals 83 per cent. Do you anticipate that percentage being lessened, thus helping to lift the Reserve from 22,000 to 28,000, or do you anticipate that a similar wastage would occur? If so, it sounds almost impossible to lift it to 28,000 in five years.

Dr Millar - As I was suggesting to Senator Bishop, it seems to me that the improvement of the existing Reserve is the primary requirement and will be fundamental to the retention of any additional men who come in under the Government's program. I am not worried about the people who leave after, say, four, five or six years. If they have served in the Reserve for three or four years they have learnt a great deal and they have made a contribution. The structure of an army being as it is, you need a degree of flow through at the lower levels. What I am worried about are those who leave in the first two years. This is a time when a man is learning to become something of a soldier and in that period we lose roughly 60 per cent of these men. They are the people on whom we are wasting an awful lot of money, because we are not keeping them. If we can provide adequate funds for interesting training in varied training areas, with adequate transport, ammunition and so on, our retention rate will go up considerably.

Mr BRYANT - The first three divisions or thereabouts of the Second AIF were largely officered by citizen soldiers. Almost from General Officer Commanding down, if you can call General Tom Blamey a Citizen Military Force soldier at that stage, they were people taken out of the Citizen Military Forces. How would we fare today in trying to do that to a field force?

Dr Millar - We do not have the numbers for that kind of force. Indeed I am not sure of the proportion of other ranks who were in the CMF at the time but certainly the CMF did provide

a big proportion of them. With only 22,000 in the Reserve I doubt whether we could provide even one division from them.

Mr BRYANT - The little contact I have had with people joining the Service suggests that one of the difficulties has been that they go in and have a bit of training from people who may not be very keen on training, with equipment which is inadequate. They are then, at least in one case I can think of, slotted into regular units in a way in which they sit there like the rest of them when things are happening. So the training seems to be inadequate. I visited the New York State National Guard and I understand its first recruits are likely to get up to about 90 days of full time training of real significance after joining. I take it that is fairly expensive commitment, but they do it. Would that be a good way of getting our people more attuned to the military system than the present way of drifting in and drifting off hopelessly or whatever they are doing?

Dr Millar - I am not sure that a lot of them drift off hopelessly.The table shows you that in the first year of service 29 per cent leave, which means that 71 per cent stay. There are problems in having about three months full time training - it would be difficult and costly. It is undoubtedly a highly effective process. If we seriously wanted to create a Reserve which could be called up quickly and be effective quickly, we would have to do that. We would have no alternative. That is one of the reasons why I am troubled about the Government refusing the option of call-up except in a defence emergency when the crisis is already upon us. I am troubled because it is before the crisis that we want to have these people trained.

Mr ARMITAGE - This is a very important question. I believe that when looking at priorities we must consider not so much call-ups immediately, as equipment. We must modernise. On the question of equipment or acquisition of equipment, what are your priorities?

Dr Millar - For the Reserve?

Mr ARMITAGE - Yes.

Dr Millar - I am not competent to answer that. I understand that across the range of army equipment now there are considerable inadequacies with vehicles, ammunition, repair vehicles, repair facilities, clothing - although quality of clothing is good. In this whole area there has been a slowing down during the last few years. It has had an extremely deleterious effect upon both the Reserve and the regular Army. This effect has not really had much publicity. My understanding is that across the board, with one or two exceptions, there is a great need for updating and improvement of equipment in quality as well as quantity. This applies particularly to the state of readiness of the equipment.

Mr ARMITAGE - Looking right across the board of the Australian forces, can you give any priorities?

Dr Millar - I know that there is a considerable shortage of artillery, in fact a virtual dearth of modern artillery.

Mr ARMITAGE - Could we make that a question on notice?

Dr Millar - Yes.

Mr BRYANT - It would be fair to say that, in a system which has been neglected, the citizens' reserve forces are the Cinderellas.

Dr Millar - I am not sure that I would use that word but I think they certainly need considerable attention and sympathy from the Government and, I hope, from this Committee.

Mr BRYANT - Yes, at least Cinderella did get one good set of slippers.

CHAIRMAN - Dr Millar, we appreciate your presence. We have questions that we have not had time to ask you. May we send them to you for written replies?

Dr Millar - Yes.

CHAIRMAN - We would like you to appear before the Committee again, at a time of mutual convenience.

Dr Millar - Thank you. May I say that I have come to Parliament briefly during sitting hours to help where I can with Foreign Affairs and Defence. I would be delighted to talk with

any of you and note your views on the legislative research service. If you feel I could improve my report to the Parliamentary Librarian, I welcome your suggestions.

Sub-Committee adjourned at 10.28 a.m.

JOINT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE

SUB-COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE MATTERS

Addition to Evidence by Dr T.B. Millar,
Australian National University

Circumstances of Possible Military Assistance
to Papua New Guinea

It is never easy to define the circumstances in which intervention by one country in the affairs of another is proper, reasonable or desirable. To say that all military intervention is wrong does not help, as a country subjected to external attack from one quarter may only be able to survive invasion or even possibly genocide by external assistance from another. Similarly a country may require help to defend itself against an insurgency stimulated by an outside power.

Australia's long, changing, but continuing relations with Papua New Guinea, as well as the latter's strategic importance to Australia and the 30,000 or so expatriate Australians in Papua New Guinea mean that whether we like it or not the two countries are interdependent in their security. At the time of Papua New Guinea's independence, Australia was careful not to enter any obligations to defend her neighbour, but for some years Papua New Guinea will need Australian assistance with training and equipment, and with logistics for operations in islands or remote areas.

Over some years I have been trying to establish acceptable principles for deciding whether external military assistance is justified and likely to be effective. My latest refinement of these is as follows, adapted to the situation under consideration:

1. Intervention, or military assistance, must be specifically requested of Australia by the lawful government of Papua New Guinea.

2. It must appear to the Australian government at the time that the PNG government has the clear support of a majority of its population, and is itself acting with intelligence, vigour and humanity; the PNG government must be demonstrably more responsive to the needs of the people than is any revolutionary administration.

3. The attack, or insurgency, must unquestionably be substantially supported, directed or controlled, by an external power.

4. Intervention must have, so far as one can tell, at least the acquiescence of the majority of the Australian electorate; and must be believed by the government to promote the Australian national interest.

This may be a counsel of perfection and it begs various questions, but it perhaps gives a basis for consideration of any request for military assistance from Papua New Guinea.



Dr. T.B. Millar: Written questions and answers

1. Is the increasing threat to oil supplies from the Gulf States due more to:

   a. internal instability (perhaps encouraged by the U.S.S.R.); or

   b. the likelihood of Soviet disruption?

I do not feel competent to assess the comparative weight of these factors, which are inter-related. One should also distinguish between the short-term and the long-term. The Soviet Union does not at present need Gulf oil, although it does buy a small amount, which I understand is re-exported. Within ten years, it will almost certainly need much more, and on present trends by the end of this century it will have a major demand for Gulf oil. Thus Gulf oil as a factor in East-West relations will become steadily more important, and the Soviet "threat" to oil supplies and its involvement in source countries, will increase over this period.

Internal instability is a present and continuing factor, short-term and long-term. Iran's oil exports have more than halved since the revolution against the Shah. Further, Iran is domestically in a highly unsettled state. Power is split among many groups, with no clear overall central authority, not even the Ayatollah. There are various forms of insurgency, including the Kurdish rebellion. Unemployment is high, widespread and growing; inflation is rife; the armed forces are greatly reduced in capacity and morale. A complete breakdown of law and order is entirely possible with a second "revolution", and no one can foretell what would come out of that. An authoritarian left-wing government could well be the next or the next-but-one government of Iran, and in the process of obtaining sole power such a government could invite assistance from its Soviet neighbour.

None of the oil-producing states of the region can be said to have stable government certain to continue, and an upheaval in any of them would affect oil flows. The key state of course is Saudi Arabia. It is virtually impossible for an outsider to know what is happening in Saudi Arabia, but there have been signs of unrest in the leadership and dissent against its authority across the nation. If these were to grow to significant proportions - and one certainly cannot rule out such a possibility - it would almost certainly have an immense and damaging effect on oil flows to the Western powers and on the whole balance of power in the region. This would be a highly unstable situation with world-wide repercussions. The "worst case" would be a Soviet-American struggle for the control of Saudi oil.

Other intra-regional tensions - such as Iran/Irak, North/South Yemen - could also pose a threat to stable oil supplies, especially if one side or other invoked superpower intervention.

2. Under what future circumstances might the Soviet Union take military action to disrupt the oil flow from the Persian Gulf?

   What effect would such an extreme scenario have on the deployment of Australian forces?

I consider it most unlikely that the Soviet Union would take military action to disrupt the Gulf oil flow in situations short of war, and to take such action would be an act of war. The deployment of Australian forces beyond our immediate environment would be only as part of an allied operation, if it occurred at all. A much more likely acenario would be for the Soviet government to encourage disruption by political means of relations - and the supply of oil - between Gulf states and the West. In those circumstances there is very little any Western government could do.

3. Could you comment further on the significance of Soviet access to a port in say, Baluchistan. Would this not be a tenuous and vulnerable line of communication?

The importance of naval access to a port depends on the facilities the port offers, its strategic position, the stability of its political environment, and the terms of use. It also depends on the international climate. Soviet use of Berbera, for example, with a small dock and missile storage, changed the strategic balance in the North-west Indian Ocean. In the event of war it would have been vulnerable, but it was a great nuisance to the West in situations short of war. As it happened, the local government ejected the Russians - showing the port's vulnerability to domestic pressures. Access to Gwadar, a small Pakistani port, would be moderately useful to the Soviet Navy. Use of Chah Bahar, in Iran, if the political climate were congenial, would be far more valuable because of the nature of its facilities. Either would change the strategic balance in the Gulf in situations short of war.

Again, it is important not to assume that any war in which either superpower is involved will be a nuclear war, and that in such circumstances one nuclear missile or bomb would wipe out a base. This is unprovable in advance, but such a war is unlikely. Outside Europe, conflict is far more likely to be fought with conventional weapons (in the absence of a European war), in which case bases are much less vulnerable. Land communications to both Gwadar and Chah Bahar would be tenuous, and their vulnerability would depend on who controlled the intervening territory.

4. Would an up-grading of the defence facilities in Diego Garcia be an appropriate U.S. response to the current strategic situation?

I believe it to be an essential response, especially enlarging and strengthening the airfield to take B52s, and enlarging the port facilities.

5. Do you think the invasion of Afghanistan gives greater weight to the argument for increased Australian co-operation with the United States in countering the Soviet nuclear capability through the development of joint monitoring and communications facilities in Australia?

I am not familiar with the technical requirements for U.S. monitoring and communications facilities in Australia, but unless we are to opt for a policy of neutrality we have no alternative to sheltering under the American nuclear umbrella, and should be prepared to provide whatever facilities are necessary for that purpose. I am not aware that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan increases the possibilities of nuclear war or the quality of the Soviet threat to Western (including Australian) interests. What it increases is the Soviet outreach in the direction of the Gulf and the Indian Ocean, and the degree of international tension in the region and in the world.

6. As a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Australian Government has decided to offer H.M.A.S. Stirling to the U.S. Navy as a home port. Could you comment further on the defence implications of this for Australia?

I do not know on what terms the offer has been made, nor whether it is likely to be accepted. If it were accepted, and Stirling became the U.S. naval base on the eastern Indian Ocean seabord, this would:

(a) greatly strengthen Australia's West Coast defences, and the facilities supporting those defences (such facilities would have to be available to the Australian forces);

(b) make it easier for the United States to mount maritime operations in the Indian Ocean, and help protect Australian trade routes across that Ocean in time of tension or conflict.

But "defence" goes wider than this, and the implications are not all conducive to a single conclusion. If one can conceive of a military attack upon Australia (comparable with or more severe than occurred in World War II), the existence of an American base on Australian soil might well act as a deterrent. On the other hand, in the event of

nuclear war between the superpowers, one could imagine that any significant American military installation might be a target for Soviet action.

But further, there is the question of Australia's continuing relations with and influence upon the countries of this region, a question with considerable implications for our security. In that respect I believe it is important that we be seen as an independent sovereign state, exercising that independence through diplomatic as well as military means. For that reason I feel it is best to have our own facilities to which U.S. ships have access.

And finally, perhaps most important of all, is the point that we as Australians must be determined to stand on our own feet. We must, in our own minds, abandon the traditional notions of vulnerability and dependence - not to shed alliances but not, also to use them as a substitute for our own proper efforts. The cultivation of this state of mind is essential for the long-term survival of this nation.

7. What do you see as the key implications of the Australian-United States Memorandum of Understanding on Logistic Support signed on 18 March 1980 (with some emphasis on Article 16 of the Memorandum).

I am not competent to speak in detail on this Memorandum; I have no inside knowledge about it. Its purpose seems clear: to make it more likely that the United States as our largest supplier of military equipment will give us a measure of priority in terms of further supply or resupply, spare parts, overcoming bureaucratic problems, export constraints, etc., should we need such priority; that it will help us to stockpile some items in Australia; and that it will assist us in our defence logistical co-operation with small South Pacific states or territories who have no military alliance with the United States.

We must offer something in return for such favours, and there is not a lot we can offer. We are obviously not in a position to provide the United States with the kinds of sophisticated equipment it sells to us. We can and would want to provide services to American ships or aircraft operating in our area, and we can and would want to provide Australian-made components of American arms or equipment.

The Memorandum is a declaration of mutual intent, each government undertaking to "use its best endeavours" to the declared ends. It does not spell out specific commitments of a watertight nature. Its value will thus depend on the goodwill and determination of the two governments and their officials.

8. What would be your priority for major new equipment purchases for the Australian Forces?

I would not feel able to give such a priority without a far more detailed examination of the options and their evaluation by experts.

9. Could you comment further on what may be significant shortcomings in equipment, organisation or training of the Army Reserve.

Again an adequate answer would require me to undertake detailed inquiries which I do not have the time or the authority to undertake. There have been major improvements in the Army Reserve in the past few years, but financial constraints have had a serious effect on equipment and training. With respect, I would recommend to the Sub-Committee that it call expert evidence on the subject, if necessary in camera.

10. Under what circumstances would you recommend another National Service (or Conscription) Scheme?

This involves a judgment by the Government on the degree of international tension and the likelihood of conflict. I commend to the Sub-Committee that it look at the problems of mobilisation, as discussed for example in the evidence of Mr J.O.L. Langtry. I believe that if at any time the Government believes that within three years Australia could be involved in international conflict requiring the use of significant forces, it should immediately engage in a rapid expansion of the forces, if necessary (i.e. if voluntary methods prove inadequate) by the use of conscription.

CANBERRA

Thursday, 17 April 1980

PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMMITTEE

ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE

Sub-Committee on Defence Matters
(Sub-Committee C)

Present

Senator Bishop (Acting Chairman)
Senator Kilgariff
Mr Armitage
Mr Bryant
Mr Neil
Mr Scholes

The Sub-Committee met at 6.46 p.m.
Senator BISHOP took the chair.

Dr Robert O'NEILL, Head, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, Australian Capital Territory, was sworn and examined.

ACTING CHAIRMAN - We welcome Dr O'Neill who has appeared before the Sub-Committee on Defence Matters before. As you know, you may at any time request that your evidence, part of your evidence or answers to specific questions be given in camera. The Committee will consider any such request. The Committee has before it your submission, which we have entitled submission No. 2. Would you like to make any alterations or additions to the submission?

Dr O'Neill - No.

ACTING CHAIRMAN - Is it the wish of the Sub-Committee that the document be incorporated in the record of proceedings? There being no objection, it is so ordered.

(The document read as follows) -

THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS
OF AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE PROGRAMS

Submission to

The Parliamentary Joint Committee on
Foreign Affairs and Defence
(Sub-Committee on Defence Matters)

by
Robert O'Neill

Head
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
Research School of Pacific Studies
The Australian National University

14 April 1980

Following the enunciation of the Guam Doctrine and the withdrawal of British and United States forces from the mainland of South-east Asia, we all know and accept that Australia has to do more than was done previously to secure her national interests. Some notable advances have been achieved in the past decade: the gradual development of a rational policy of regional deterrence to replace that of Forward Defence; the building of an effective policy formulation system within the Department of Defence; the improvement of effective financial control within the Department; the development of new skills and capabilities by servicemen and associated civilians; the expansion of the Service staff colleges, particularly to include the RAN and Joint Services Staff Colleges; and co-operation with regional friends and major allies outside Australia's neighbourhood. Yet, until very recently, the amount of financial support provided to meet the increased responsibilities of the 1970s remained substantially unchanged from the era of Forward Defence. The Government chose, wisely, not to increase greatly the numerical strength of the Australian Defence Force but the additional money required to purchase equipment and build facilities essential for meeting the new tasks was not provided. The equipment needs of the Services are well-known and include items such as:

a tactical fighter force;

an airborne early-warning system;

a control and reporting radar system;

tanker aircraft;

modernisation of the Macchi trainer aircraft;

stand-off weapons for the F-111s, the TFF and LRMP aircraft;

modernisation of the F-111s and P3Bs;

additional strategic and tactical air transports;

survey aircraft;

basic training aircraft;

follow-on destroyers;

modernisation of the DDGs;

patrol craft;

helicopters for the FFGs;

increased afloat support for the RAN;

additional submarines;

mine counter measures vessels;

hydrographic ship;

surface-to-surface missiles;

trials and research ship;

ASW equipment;

stand-off weapons for the DDGs, FFGs, follow-on destroyers and submarines;

fighting vehicles and transports for the infantry battalions;

equipment for the Army Reserve;

battlefield precision-guided missiles;

mobilisation stocks of Army equipment;

ground-based surveillance equipment;

increased ammunition stocks;

medium artillery;

electronic warfare equipment;

fire control and data processing equipment;

combat-zone and rear-area communications equipment;

a fixed nation-wide communications system;

and logistic support vehicles.

There was no way in which a balanced, up-to-date inventory of these items could have been assembled and maintained from a vote of some $300 million per annum, the level of expenditure averaged in recent years. Yet without any of these items, quite apart from others which may prove desirable, such as an aircraft carrier and naval aircraft and a satellite communications system, there will be major gaps in Australia's deterrent capacity. The recently announced $17.6 billion five year program will enable a good start to be made on reducing the backlog of equipment deficiencies which has accumulated through the 1970s, but, even if the level of expenditure achieved for equipment in the fifth year of the program is continued for another five years, I doubt that the Government will be able to fund the purchase of all the items listed above.

Furthermore, let us not forget Defence facilities. In addition to those already under construction, the Australian Defence Force requires at least the following:

expansion of HMAS Stirling;

patrol boat facilities in north-western Australia;

expansion and modernisation of dockyards;

new air base facilities in north-western Australia;

expansion of air base facilities at Darwin, Tindal, Cocos Is. and probably Townsville;

new army training and operational facilities in Western Australia, Northern Territory, Queensland and New South Wales;

a Defence Force Academy;

increased housing, particularly in remote areas;

command, control and communications facilities; and

fuel and equipment storages.

Again, the $17.6 billion program will enable a good start to be made on building many of these facilities, but it will be surprising if they can all be constructed within a further five years of funding at fifth year expenditure levels.

Despite widespread public approval of the recently announced program, the time will come when the Australian people realise that a further increase in expenditure must be made if the above items are to be procured or built. When this time comes, public criticism of the Department of Defence will probably rise, however fairly or unfairly. The Department generally has performed creditably during the phase of transition from one defence posture to another but it has been accorded little acknowledgment for its innovations, improved management techniques and, above all, its sheer hard work over recent years. This is not to say that there might not be some defects in its procedures. Some faults are inevitable in any vast organisation. But for as long as a situation of insufficient expenditure continued, the

Department was likely to be suspected of wastefulness, of procrastination and of not exerting itself enough to convince the Government to provide more money for defence. Hence the Department will continue to have an interest in demonstrating to the Australian people that it is working as effectively as possible within the limits of assigned resources and is not encouraging the Government to be complacent about future security requirements. Recent indications suggest that the Department is more aware of its need to protect its reputation and is taking appropriate action.

The pressure on the funding available for equipment and facilities also means that great control must be exercised over manpower and administrative expenditure. Reductions of a few per cent in either of these categories of expenditure would enable a much greater increase in equipment procurement. I am not arguing for any reduction in service manpower but stringent re-appraisals must be made continually of the effectiveness of all personnel, both service and civilian, and all administrative procedures, particularly those which require large numbers of people working over many years. In these times of stringency, no-one, particularly people who are paid from the public purse, is above the need to justify his existence. This state of affairs is appreciated in universities, amongst politicians and, I believe, increasingly within the Department of Defence. If the Sub-Committee can suggest ways in which savings might be effected in the areas of manpower and administration, which might then be used to equip the

Services more quickly to meet their new roles, the cause of Australian security will be well served by this inquiry.

Although this submission is concerned largely with the equipment and facilities of the Australian Defence Force, sight should not be lost of the need to develop appropriate operational doctrines, command and control systems, training institutions, mobilisation capabilities, logistic support and industrial infrastructure. In particular, it is important that the Services, both regular and reserve, should be able to exercise in a more testing and challenging way than at present, so that in a time of peace we master the techniques necessary for the defence of Australia's interests and territories, which extend through many different physical environments. Further, it is essential to the future development of Australia's defence skills that a separate, tri-service academy should be established. It is the cheapest way to train and educate people to the degree necessary to lead the Services in the 21st Century. Single Service education is uneconomic and limited in the choice of subjects available. Australian universities, except for the Faculty of Military Studies of the University of New South Wales at Duntroon, lack the capability to provide vocationally oriented professional education for the Services. It is no solution to the problem to graft all officer trainees onto courses designed for other professions. If the ADFA can be brought into being on the basis of the Faculty of Military Studies, in co-operation with an existing university, preferably the University of NSW, there should be no doubts of its independence, integrity or academic standards.

My suggestion that the planned level of expenditure might not cover the program outlined above should not be taken as criticism of the recent increases. Rather it should serve to underline the long-term, serious effects of the failure of all Australian governments from the late 1960s onwards to maintain that steady commitment of resources which is vital to the effective modernisation of the Australian Defence Force. Even less are these ideas a criticism of the Department of Defence, although until more recently that Department did not go out of its way to explain its problems to the public and hence still bears a measure of opprobrium for the current limitations of our defence capacity. It must be remembered that even the most efficient Department of Defence in the world cannot manufacture security without money.

Finally, is it not time that we had another Defence White Paper? The 1976 White Paper was well received as a step in the right direction. Recent changes in the international environment and the Government's defence program call for the exposition at length of the Government's policies and appraisals of the situation. When the next paper is being prepared, we might take as a model the excellent annual White Papers produced by the Government of Japan. As we have seen in the 1970s, effective long-term defence policies depend more than ever on the support of the people.

ACTING CHAIRMAN - I now invite you to address the Sub-Committee. At the conclusion of your remarks I will invite members of the Committee to question you.

Dr O'Neill - Thank you very much for the opportunity of appearing before this Sub-Committee. There is a broad concensus amongst both sides of Parliament that Australia faces a much more complex strategic situation in the 1980s than we have in the past and that we can be somewhat less sure of the support that we will get from our great power friends. More things can happen in the region at relatively short notice which might disturb us. So we have to do a little more than we have done previously to secure our national interests.

Although many criticisms have been made of major aspects of defence policy in the 1970s it is fair to point to some advances. Among these I would list: The replacement of the old, outmoded policy of forward defence by what I have called in the submission a 'rational policy of regional deterrence'; the development of a policy formulation system within the Department of Defence; the improvement of financial controls within the Department; the development of new skills and capabilities by servicemen and associated civilians; the expansion of the Services staff colleges, particularly the newly established RAN Staff College and the Joint Services Staff College which, although it has been going for a decade, went through a major revision and refocusing some five years years ago. That has been very much to the good. Other advances have included co-operation with our regional partners in our bilateral defence co-operation arrangements and co-operation with our major allies. They have all been relatively high points.

Although we have accepted the fact that we have to do more to defend ourselves, until very recently we were not spending enough on defence. I am still not sure that we are spending enough. You will see from the long shopping list of equipment I have listed that there are many, many things that our forces require if they are going to remain credible. If they are going to to retain the capacity to deter and if they are going to be reasonably ready to respond to contingencies which could threaten

our interests as they occur then it is very difficult to exclude any of the items on this list. Indeed other items might be added by other people such as the more controversial item of another aircraft carrier and the aircraft to go with it. Some people think we should take part in a satellite communication system for the defence forces.

Previously our financial arrangements were not coping with our requirements. We were not even able to stand in the same place. The problem was spelled out very well by Frank Cranston in a chart in the 'Canberra Times' on 19 March 1979. We were at that stage funding defence equipment procurement at about three hundred million dollars a year.



(published in the 'Canberra Times', Monday, 19 March 1979)

We are moving towards the end of the program with expenditure of more than $700m. With this funding there will still be problems, partly because some of the costs have gone up since this was done and partly because this was a conservative estimate anyway and does not include many of the things I have on my list. I should stress that I have done my calculations simply on the basis of ball park figures. The Committee can take this up with representatives of the Department of Defence. They may be able to satisfy you that all the things that have been talked about are being looked at by the Government. Some of these other things could be fitted into 10 years of procurement at the final year level of the current 5-year program. But I am inclined to doubt whether this will be done.

We must not forget defence facilities. Generally in the remote parts of Australia we are sadly lacking in facilities. Irrespective of the requirements of the Americans we have to do something to expand HMAS 'Stirling'. We must have adequate patrol boat facilities in the north. We must expand and modernise our dockyards if we are going to keep the capacity to produce substantial warships here. New air base facilities are needed in the north-west and we must expand existing air bases, particularly at Darwin, if we are going to be able to bring the two Mirage squadrons home. I think one of them should be stationed up there. The Army is very badly off for both training and operational facilities right across the north and down to New South Wales. The question of the Defence Force Academy must be settled. There is also a need to provide increased housing, particularly in remote areas, so that the Services can station more people in the areas which will receive foreign attention if someone brings pressure to bear on us. So the $17.6 billion program might well fall short of those essential requirements.

When this Committee was working on its previous reference everyone knows that there was a great deal of public criticism of the Department of Defence. That criticism has been somewhat muted in the past few months and I suggest that this is largely due to the increase in defence expenditure. Everybody is looking

at the extra things that can be bought and not looking so closely at the way in which they are bought or the problems which occur in the decision making process. That might well be a temporary phase. The Department of Defence might be very much in the public eye again. I suggest that the Department should continue to demonstrate to the public that it is working as effectively as possible within the limits of assigned resources. It should not put up the shutters and try to keep the world at bay on the assumption that everyone is hostile. Some of the steps that the Department of Defence has taken in the last year towards becoming more outward going are steps in the right direction. I hope they can maintain this.

The areas of expenditure that I have been discussing in this submission, those dealing with equipment and facilities, amount to only a small fraction of our total defence expenditure. Something like 75 per cent goes on manpower and administrative expenditure. If some small reductions in those areas can be achieved that will make a very big proportionate difference to the amount of equipment we can buy and the facilities we can build. Those are the two most crucial areas of deficiency in our current structure. It is very difficult for someone in my position to probe the administrative effectiveness of the Department of Defence. This Committee could look into this in greater detail. I think small increases in efficiency there will make major contributions to Australian security in the next two decades.

Apart from the hardware for the Defence Force and the places for it to be accommodated and trained, we must not lose sight of the need to develop appropriate operational doctrines for the defence of Australia. It is a complex military problem and we still have a long way to go in developing the land, sea and air doctrines that are necessary for its defence, for response in particular contingencies and for deciding the priorities that we allocate to defence of various parts of Australia. Which threats do we respond to and which do we not? How much of the Defence Force do we decide to move out of its current area of concentration in the south-east? How much emphasis do we place on

regular defence techniques and how much on territorial techniques and so on? All of these questions are still very open as we consider our doctrinal policy.

Command and control systems, I think, need a good deal of further development. If the Defence Force had to produce a joint force tomorrow or in the next few months it could only do it on the basis of improvisation. I think we need to do more to develop a joint command structure which can be put into operation at much shorter notice. The logistic support and industrial infrastructure in the country also needs a great deal of attention. The Services should be able to exercise in a more testing and challenging way than at present. The major limitation, as I understand it, is on finance and some more money is necessary there, particularly to enable people to operate and exercise in the remote parts of Australia and to enable elements of the Services, particularly the Army, to station people, say, in the Northern Territory on a prolonged basis, so that they really get to know the country.

In addition to better training, I will put my head into the lion's mouth and say that I still think we should have a separate tri-service academy. I think that it is the cheapest way to train and educate people effectively to lead the Services into the next century. The situation we have with the single-service colleges at the moment is very unsatisfactory. A lot of money will be required to bring them up to the required standard and they would be very limited in terms of the choice of the academic curricula available. If one is to go in the other direction - say, one of the options that was put forward by the Public Works Committee - and rely essentially on existing civilian universities, that runs into the problem that the universities are really not geared to meet the needs of the military profession. They are marvellous at providing a straight scientific or arts or legal or engineering education but one would not think of dismembering a faculty of medical studies and attaching people to scientific faculties all round the country because one did not think that the medicos could run something like that properly. There is a special vocational requirement for the Services. It is a profession of its own and a

good deal of the time that is taken in intellectually training people can also be used beneficially in introducing them to the sorts of problems they are going to be dealing with professionally for the rest of their lives. So I still hope very much that the Defence Force academy can be brought into being. The existing Faculty of Military Studies at Duntroon is expert at handling this sort of problem. It has achieved a high reputation; it has been a successful operation.

I hope that the University of New South Wales might revise its attitude towards continued co-operation with the Department of Defence in this way. If some extension or expansion of the existing agreement with the University of New South Wales can be achieved then I think that would solve the problem as far as academic respectability, independence and integrity are concerned.

In conclusion, we are facing a problem that is not one that has crept up on us suddenly. Right through the 1970s we did not devote enough expenditure to defence, particularly to equipment and facilities. What we need is a long haul policy to get that hump out of the system and get back to something we can cope with on a regular basis. I wonder whether it is not time for another Defence White Paper. The 1976 White Paper was well received and was a major step in the right direction. We now have changes in the international environment and changes in the Government's defence policy. This all calls for more public explanation and I think it could do a lot to improve the quality of public debate. When this is being considered we might look at somewhat more ambitious White Papers than the 1976 one. Members of the Committee have probably seen the annual Defence White Papers that the Government of Japan produces. They are first class documents and I find them extremely informative, not only about Japan's defence policy but also about defence matters in the region at large. They are well argued intelligent documents which do the Japanese Self-Defence Agency a great deal of credit. Another type of document which I lay before the Committee - unfortunately it is in Swedish and I cannot read Swedish but I have been taken through it by a member of the Swedish Embassy - is a book that is produced for public information setting out in fairly graphic form why Sweden has a defence force. It sets out the sorts of nasty things that happen if your country gets taken over by someone else, the contributions that individuals can make, why the force is structured the way it is, what people should do in time of emergency and, finally, it brings it back to the man in the street that effective defence is really a matter for public support.

There is one specific point I wish to bring to the

Committee's notice. I only found out about it this afternoon. One of my colleagues, Lieutenant-Commander Max Speedy, who has been detached from the Navy to work with us for a year, is working on the energy requirements of the Defence Force. He drew my attention to the Liquid Fuel Defence Stocks Act 1949-66. It seems to me that this Act really needs recasting because the main thrust of it is in terms of people who import liquid fuel into Australia. Most of our liquid fuel is no longer imported, so it seems to me that the Act has an enormous loophole in it.

ACTING CHAIRMAN - Does your present thinking and submission - particularly the shopping list, which is very extensive - reflect any new accent because of the Afghanistan situation? As we read the evidence, with the Prime Minister's statement and the Minister of Defence's statement, there is no doubt interest in defence has been reactivated and to some extent there is less resistance to the general budgets. If that is so, and in the event of there being a lessening of tension or heightening of tension in that area, what would your position then be?

Dr O'Neill - This shopping list does not include any changes as a result of the Afghanistan situation. I do not think that what has happened in Afghanistan, serious though it is, carries any special implications for the force structure of the Australian Defence Force.

ACTING CHAIRMAN - When Dr Millar was before a public hearing of our Committee last week he was asked whether he considered that the Afghanistan crisis posed a threat to Australia and I think his answer was conclusively no. In relation to the question of regional accord with what we were doing he said he thought that the region's neighbours would support what we were doing. Does that position suit your viewpoint?

Dr O'Neill - Yes, I would be in broad agreement with that. While the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is not a direct threat to Australia it is a threat to the Western alliance broadly and calls for greater cohesion and solidarity in meeting it. But as far as being a security threat to Australia, something that

requires some response in terms of the way in which the defence forces are organised, it is not that sort of threat.

Mr SCHOLES - In your paper you mention the command structure of the Defence Force. What sort of command structure would you see as being an appropriate response to our existing defence aims and requirements?

Dr O'Neill - I think we have two broad functional problems, one is the defence of the maritime region and the other is the defence of the continental region. The defence of the maritime region is carried out essentially by air and naval forces and they would have to be commanded together. They would need not only joint command but also joint control of a fairly elaborate nature, of the sort that we are developing Jindalee to carry out, enhanced by better radar capability and perhaps by an airborne early warning system and so on. All of these things would need to be geared in to the one command system which could then decide whether it was best to respond with surface naval power, air power, submarine naval power and so on. We do not have that sort of command structure readily available for the maritime defence of Australia. The continental defence of Australia is broadly the responsibility of the Army and the air defence and transport side of the RAAF, therefore we should have a functional command which links those elements together without a great deal of readjustment of existing single-service channels.

Beneath each of those two functional commands I would see three or four area commands - after all the oceans around Australia are quite vast and specialised in their requirements. One might see initially a western maritime defence command, a southern maritime defence command and an eastern maritime defence command. Similarly, I would see the continental defence command being divided in four ways because the geographic requirements of the northern, the western, the eastern and the southern segments of Australia are all quite different and lend themselves to a degree of functional expertise which can be properly developed in this way.

Mr SCHOLES - In any argument at a time when defence becomes topical the almost immediate reaction of a very substantial proportion of commentators relates to manpower requirements, hence we have conscription and all these types of suggestions in order to increase manpower. Given our current problems, especially with equipment, and our not greatly less pressing problems with facilities, do you see increases in the levels of manpower in the various Services other than those necessary to meet changed circumstances as being more important than or equally important to the need to devote defence resources to equipment programs, especially in order to avoid the galloping obsolescence which is very much upon us?

Dr O'Neill - Broadly, I do not think we should increase the manpower of the defence forces substantially except where there is a new functional requirement. For example, we need to provide more air crews for increased maritime patrolling. But we are talking about a few hundred people for each Service. If we do not spend more on equipment then in 10 years we are not going to have very much in the way of ships, aircraft and land vehicles into which to put the Defence Force.

Mr SCHOLES - Invasion of Australia is at least a low likelihood and other forms of lesser incursion seem likely to be more of a problem. Australia's defence is substantially dependent on mobility and the ability to move equipment and Defence Force personnel. In your list of equipment and in the Government's announced programs there does not appear to be any suggestion of increasing the amount of transport capacity available to the Defence Force. The Caribous are on the end of the line. Do you place a low priority on increasing that mobility, or do you think that we would have to survive for some time with the existing mobility because of other priorities?

Dr O'Neill - I said in the list that we need additional strategic and tactical air transport and that we need fighting vehicles and transports for the infantry battalions and logistic support vehicles. Our transport requirements are very badly met by the existing establishment. We have to do a lot more in that area.

Mr SCHOLES - Is there a very high degree of vulnerability in the whole Defence Force structure because of our substantial dependence on the Hercules aircraft?

Dr O'Neill - I do not feel uneasy about that aircraft; it is very versatile.

Mr SCHOLES - I mean the ability of someone to take those out and virtually render the Defence Force immobile and impotent.

Dr O'Neill - That is a problem for any small defence force. There is a degree of functional redundancy beyond which you cannot go. But I would like to see much better ground mobility. For

example our capability to support major exercises was highlighted in Kangaroo 3 last year when it was simply decided to rule the logistics side out of the exercise because we could not do it in an operational way. It is going to take us years to overcome that sort of deficiency. We know that towards the end of the 1980s we have to think about replacing the Caribous; we will probably need more Hercules and we will probably need more of a sea lift capacity to land people and stores over beaches in order to be able to react to contingencies in remote areas.

ACTING CHAIRMAN - With regard to manpower, you were talking about the petty costs - the 75 per cent ratio. Does that thinking of yours in ensuring that there should be a heavy restriction on manpower apply to expanding the Reserve or a general call-up? Do you have a different position with respect to the cost of operations of each of those?

Dr O'Neill - The manpower costs of the Reserve are just a tiny fraction of the overall manpower costs of the Defence Force. We should move as decisively as we can to increase the strength of the Reserve of all three Services. This is an area in which my colleagues Dr Millar and Colonel Langtry have done a lot more work than I have; I support their conclusions very strongly. Our mobilisation capacity is really crippled by the inadequacy of our Reserve. We could expand that without any great cost.

Mr NEIL - I am indebted to Dr O'Neill for the list of items he has provided. Could you establish an order of priority for purchasing those items in relation to their intrinsic importance to our forces and in relation to time? By that I mean how they dovetail with the phasing out of existing equipment. We would then have an indication of which items you would include in the current 5-year program if funds were available and which items you would include in your second phase, taking it through to the 10 years.

Dr O'Neill - I have made a list of priorities. The first thing I put in category 1 is the tactical fighter force. Other category 1 requirements are the stand-off weapons for the F111s, the

tactical fighter force and LRMPs and modernisation of the F111s and P3Bs to take those stand-off weapons. Then come follow-on destroyers, modernisation of the DDGs, patrol craft and helicopters for the FFGs, and stand-off weapons for the DDGs, FFGs, follow-on destroyers and submarines. We need fighting vehicles and transports for the infantry battalions, equipment for the Army Reserve, battlefield precision-guided missiles, mobilisation stocks for the Army, ground base surveillance equipment, increased ammunition stocks, medium artillery, electronic warfare equipment and fire control and data processing equipment. They are what we really need if we are going to have to fight at relatively short notice. Then I would move into the program the airborne early warning system, control and reporting radar systems and tanker aircraft, additional submarines, mine counter-measures vessels, the combat zone and rear area communications equipment and the fixed nation-wide communication system. Once those were taken care of I would move in with the key elements of logistics support. These are absolutely necessary, but the teeth elements must be purchased first or we will never purchase them. Then I would follow in with the other items that I have not mentioned.

Mr NEIL - If I cut it down to category 1 and category 2 of your priorities, how much as we go down the line is capable of being obtained within the $17.6 billion 5-year program recently announced?

Dr O'Neill - That is a very difficult question for me to answer. As I said earlier the only figures I have are really ball park figures. Some of them are derived from purchases of equivalent equipment by other countries in slightly different circumstances and so on. I really cannot be precise about this at all. We could order all the category 1 equipment during the current 5-year program but we could not pay for it. We need not pay for some of it. The follow-on destroyer program would take probably 10 years to work through. With regard to the tactical fighter force, we know we will not get all the aircraft on line until 1986 or 1987.

There are several major items there than can be spread over something like a 10-year period. I would think in the course of the 10-year period we could also include everything I mentioned in the second category. But I am concerned that thereafter for the third and remaining categories we would be scratching around.

Mr NEIL - By that, I take it that the current 5-year program plus a reasonable projection thereafter based on the 3 per cent per annum that the Government has announced would enable you to reach the level you have spoken about for your first five years and your second five years, but you would need to go beyond those projections financially to achieve the stages 3 and 4 of your priority list. Is that right?

Dr O'Neill - That is my feeling. But, as I said, it is something that I cannot be sure about because I do not have access to really precise data.

Mr NEIL - This is purely an attempt to draw out a matter which I consider very important. If we look at the other way, if we start at the bottom of your priority list and work back up, how far do you go with the category that you are pretty sure we could not get on the present projections? If we chop them off from the bottom, how much do we chop off and be pretty certain that we cannot have those unless we project at a higher financial level than the announced projections?

Dr O'Neill - It depends on how you set your priorities. The Department of Defence's priorities might be totally different from mine. What would probably happen is that they would take some out of each area and say: 'We cannot have as much in the fighting area, we cannot have as much in the communications area, we cannot have as much in the logistics support area,' and shave 10 per cent to 25 per cent off each.

Mr NEIL - The Chief of the Defence Force Staff is reported to have said - I think the report was to do with some statements that he may have also said to this Committee in public - but he was certainly reported to have said something to the effect that he considers we will have a pretty effective Defence Force in about 15 years based upon our recent announcements. What

would you say about that statement? If he did not say it - and I think he did - but if he did not I put it to you as a statement of my own. Secondly, what do we do in the meantime? What do we do in 10 years time if some of the scenarios that you have postulated at various times come up?

Dr O'Neill - I think the statement is correct broadly speaking. But unless we still lift the level of defence funding a little we are still not going to get in all of the things I have mentioned here. And I do not see anything in that list that could easily be regarded as expendable or optional. Some of these are very long lead time equipments and during the next five years we are going to be very short of capability in some areas. Air defence is the most obvious one. Fortunately it is very unlikely that an air threat to Australia will present itself during that period. But you just have to put the range payload templates for the Mirage 3s on the map to see the tiny areas of the north-west they would cover if there was any contingency appearing there that needed a response by these aircraft. The ability of the Navy to keep substantial numbers of ships on station and replenished at sea is also extremely limited. So is the Army's capability to provide more than a couple of battalions. We are going to be locked into this situation for several years to come so the quicker we start getting out of it the better.

Mr NEIL - The Government has announced a program and said that expenditure will be kept at 3 per cent of GDP from there on. Accepting that criteria and accepting your statement that we would have to increase expenditure a little, what percentage of the GDP would you suggest we ought to increase by over and above that 3 per cent?

Dr O'Neill - That depends how well our GDP goes, of course. If we get back to a time of reasonably rapid economic growth - 6 per cent a year or something like that - then the requirement is very small indeed. If we remain in a state of very low growth or if it deteriorates, we will have to think about increasing that percentage, but we have to do it in such a way that it does not harm the economy overall. We have to be careful we do not take

substantial numbers of resources out of productive employment. But subject to all those caveats and unless there is very rapid growth in the next five to 10-year period, I think we would need to look at something like 3.5 per cent.

Mr ARMITAGE - I wish to deal with the question of aircraft carriers. It has been said that Australia requires some form of sea-going platform for aircraft. If you are going to follow that case logically we would actually need three - one on the east coast, one in the Indian Ocean and one on refit. It has even been suggested that we ought to go for a smaller type of Italian aircraft carrier. Some time ago there was a project by the Italians on quite small aircraft carriers. What are your comments on that?

Dr O'Neill - The aircraft carrier question is an extremely difficult one. I have not made up my mind finally for it or against it. I think the Navy has really yet to make its case effectively for a carrier. I can see more problems in the proposition than I can see answers at present. The chief problem with the carrier is its expensiveness. If that is going to be slid into the program as one major item costing about $1 billion, perhaps $1.2 billion depending on what sort of ship and aircraft we get with it, then you have got to slide a lot of other things out. And these are things that I think are very important particularly to the continental defence of this country. Another problem is the vulnerability of a relatively large single ship and the proportion of the fleet required to defend it. Some people say that in a climate of medium level threat, you would probably need one only destroyer with the carrier. Other people say you might need two or three. In a fleet which can probably maintain only six destroyers on station for a lengthy commitment, that is a very substantial part of the force.

The main argument for a carrier is that it is essential to provide air cover for the surface strike component of the Navy. Without an aircraft carrier you may as well not have destroyers at all because you will not be able to use them in a concentrated fashion in any area of any substantial enemy air threat. There is a proliferation of tactical air power going on in the region. People are acquiring aircraft such as F5Es, which are pretty up to date and can be given a sizable sting with the right sort of development and the right technology. I think we ought to see that very serious argument developed much more.

I have been somewhat distressed in the whole debate about the tactical fighter force - there has been no mention of the role of naval air power in the tactical fighter force and how the tactical fighter force would affect the decision or not to acquire naval air power. We should ask just what is the capability of the various major contenders for the tactical fighter force in relation to the defence of the surface ships of the RAN and what are the implications of various types of aircraft for the basing requirements we need near the coast and on off-shore islands. We need to know what sort of trade-offs we would be in if we were to buy some more aircraft for tactical fighter force and improve the basing infrastructure rather than spend so much money on a aircraft carrier. These sorts of questions must be addressed in the public debate in the coming year. The Minister has put on notice that he hopes to take a decision about the future of naval air power by the end of this year and I think the time is getting very short.

Mr ARMITAGE - I, myself, have been concerned at the possibility of an aircraft carrier, costing around a thousand million dollars, representing too many eggs in one basket for the defence forces, and I have wondered whether one would be far better off going for long range aircraft and better facilities for those aircraft - for example up in the north, north-east and north-west of Australia. What are your comments on that?

Dr O'Neill - That is precisely the trade-off which I would like to see examined. I cannot say more at this stage than that it is a very good question to which answers have not been given satisfactorily. People can raise very good objections going either one way or the other. Naval people to whom I have spoken say that you would not get a shore-based aircraft on station above a ship quickly enough for it to be of use. Attacking aircraft can come into a ship's immediate environment, strike and go out again within a couple of minutes and unless you have shore-based aircraft really waiting around above on a cab rank system ready to deal with intruders, the fleet will be effectively naked as far as enemy air attack is concerned. Maybe we can provide that sort of cover with more aircraft and with better basing facilities. It is a crucial question to which we ought to require a very systematic answer from the Minister for Defence before a decision is taken in this area.

Mr ARMITAGE - Do you think Australia's maritime forces have sufficient resources to assert sovereignty over our territorial waters? Do you think off-shore installations, such as we are likely to have in north-west Australia, the North West Shelf and beyond the North West Shelf, have the capacity to do that - that is, on the basis of the expanded program?

Dr O'Neill - The defence of off-shore resources is a major headache. Even countries disposing of much greater force than we do - particularly the western European countries - have not satisfactorily solved the problem of defence of major oil rigs or, indeed, the approaches to port installations. We face particular problems in the north-west because most of the main oil ports are approached by long channels. If you were to sink a major carrier when it was laden with ore in one of those channels it might take months to clear it out and unblock the channel again. We have to think very hard about these problems because I think they are the subtle ways in which people can bring pressure on us in future - they do not involve nations going to full scale war with each other but hit at economic pressure points and hurt at very little cost and very little

risk to the attacker. The increased patrol boat program is a step in the right direction. I imagine the Navy will have to develop some kind of special force for defending not only the rigs on the North West Shelf but also those in Bass Strait. It would just need someone to blow up the pipeline coming out of one of the major rigs there and we would be in a very serious situation in a short time.

Senator KILGARIFF - With the new initiatives which are now being carried out in our defence forces, how effective do you think we would be in defending ourselves?

Dr O'Neill - We could put up a good defence for a short period. We are crucially short of mobilisation and logistic capacity. If a large force were sent in this direction - I think most of us would agree that is not a likely prospect - we would be very hard pressed. We would be heavily dependent upon our allies to cope with it. It is probably fair to postulate that a large force would not be attacking Australia simply in a one on one situation. It would be the result of a general breakdown in world order and our allies might be involved anyway. However, their attention may be drawn off to other parts of the world - for example, I think they would have to give western Europe, the Middle East and perhaps north east Asia greater priority than they would give to Australia. We have to think very seriously about how we would stand up to threats - either of a regional nature or from outside the region - which do not involve the full force of a super power. Once the program that is under way comes into effect and if we continue to build in that direction I think we will have a formidable capacity. We will make someone think twice and three times about having a go at us or not. I think Admiral Synnot is right when he says it will take us about 15 years to reach that capability.

Senator KILGARIFF - If we wish to shift Army units from the east coast where most of them are to the north-west and if we wanted to shift artillery - particularly tanks - with the poor condition of our railways and national highways, how quickly do you think they could be moved? We have in the north-west national highways which are not even sealed.

Dr O'Neill - There are two problems here. The first is the slowness of movement because we do not have high speed trunk roads connecting our capital cities. Secondly, and this worries me even more, is the doubtful capacity of our roads to stand up to the traffic that would be required in any lengthy commitment. Our roads would fall apart in remote areas. Their usefulness after rain is also doubtful. These sorts of problems will require a lot of infrastructure in the next decade or so. They must not be dealt with exclusively in defence terms either. We need some wider authority which can look at our national security, economic and social needs and can put them all together and work out rational ways of doing things effectively and killing two or more birds with one stone.

Senator KILGARIFF - That is what concerns me in the areas we are discussing now. If a railroad or a highway is to go in people look at its economic viability. But surely other factors should be considered such as development and defence. How would you get a tank from our eastern coast to, say, Broome or Wyndham, along the north-west?

Mr BRYANT - To take them from Puckapunyal to Port Hedland, you would have a job in front of you.

Senator KILGARIFF - I understand the Leopard tank cannot be sent by rail. Perhaps I am wrong in that.

Dr O'Neill - I think you can, but you could not put it on the light railway going north from Perth.

ACTING CHAIRMAN - On the standard gauge it would be all right.

Mr SCHOLES - You would have to drive it from Puckapunyal to Melbourne because it is too wide for the gauge, unless you remove all other rail traffic from the adjoining lines on each side of every siding.

Senator KILGARIFF - The Stirling naval base is going to be upgraded. This is a good thing. What is the range of FFG destroyers? If they are operating way up in the Indian Ocean would it be essential for the base at Darwin to be upgraded to service them? At the moment there is no suggestion of this.

Dr O'Neill - I do not think so. The FFG has a range of several thousand miles. It is a ship which can travel at fairly high speed. It would make more sense to keep their main servicing facilities for the western side in one place, provided it can be defended properly. It is always delicate if you have only one or two repair facilities in the whole country for a major item of equipment. At the moment those maintenance facilities invite attack because we have so few of them.

Senator KILGARIFF - How would the satellite system that you have mentioned operate in our defence context?

Dr O'Neill - Probably the Department of Defence would have its own transponders within a national satellite which was serving many other purposes. I do not think it would be necessary, for the amount of traffic that the Department of Defence is likely to have, for the Department to have its own satellite. One could get very reliable, high capability circuits with one or two transponders.

ACTING CHAIRMAN -I understood that in the original submissions the Department of Defence were interested.

Senator KILGARIFF - Could that be associated with satellites presently being used for various purposes over Australia?

Dr O'Neill - We do not have a satellite with the right capacity to enable it to be readily taken up by the Defence Force. If we do then I certainly do not know about it. From the interest that the Department of Defence has taken in the national commercial satellite project I assume that it is the one on which they are pinning their hopes. But we have heard very little about it in the last year or so. It seems to have gone down a hole.

Mr BRYANT - The background necessary for action and the ability to deter, which includes mobilisation capacity, includes reserve or citizen forces and stocks and stores. I notice you mention here the mobilisation stocks. My impression is that they are at a much lower level than they used to be. Is that so?

Dr O'Neill - After the Second World War and for quite some time into the 1950s the Army maintained mobilisation stocks for

about five divisions. I do not know exactly what the situation is now but I think they would be lucky to be able to mobilise one division and its equipment would be vastly inferior to the equipment of the regular Defence Force.

Mr BRYANT - I regard that as a fundamental question. Even if people are called up, registered and given minimal training you will at least have a few months start in turning them into something of use as a deterrent. Mr Armitage asked a question about aircraft carriers. We have two deterrents at sea, submarines and an aircraft carrier. Without something that can cart the aircraft around and give you a 300 or 400 mile start when acting as a convoy for ships coming in or protecting them when they are leaving you will have an uphill struggle. I cannot think of any satisfactory was of doing it except with some sort of carrier, perhaps like the 'Melbourne' or like the ones the Italians told us about. There must be lots of easier ways of doing it than spending millions of dollars on a ship.

Dr O'Neill - Admiral Sir Victor Smith has suggested using container ships with a flat top for this. These ships would not be capable of carrying aircraft for any lengthy period or of servicing them but they could refuel them and replenish them with amunition. There is a lot of sense in that idea.

Mr ARMITAGE - Yes.

Mr BRYANT - They are all over the place, are they not?

Dr O'Neill - A lot of modern ships can be given a reasonable defence capability by proper clip-on modules which will give them a stand-off, highly accurate strike capability. You can put a Harpoon missile on a great variety of different platforms. Cargo ships would have a great deal of viability if they stuck together in convoys, as we learnt in both world wars.

Mr BRYANT - Yes. The 'Kormoran', which sank the 'Sydney', was a German merchant ship. The captain of the 'Sydney' obviously made a tactical error but the 'Kormoran' must have had a hell of a punch if it knocked the 'Sydney' out before it could get in any reply.

Dr O'Neill - The 'Kormoran' probably could not carry very much cargo. I suspect that it was loaded to the gills with guns and ammunition. But in the 1980s one could devote a relatively small area of the deck space of a modern ship to surveillance and precision guided missiles. Such a ship would be able to give other people within 10 kilometres a good fright.

Mr BRYANT - Regarding your point about the mobilisation of men, stores, the reserve army et cetera, have we really examined the capacity of the ordinary base stocks of the country to support a Defence Force effort such as the use of the various air forces, even our own airlines and things like that and the background of repair facilities, particularly, on land et cetera?

Dr O'Neill - Probably there are people in the Department of Defence whose job it is to do this but one never hears about it so it is a question well worth asking. It may turn out that for all sorts of good reasons like pressures in other directions these important things are not being done. We learned last year that the war book system had gone into abeyance and I understand there are one or two people now looking at it but it is a much bigger problem than it was 20 years ago. It sets out all the actions that the various agencies of the Commonwealth Government need to take if a defence contingency arises to get mobilisation and effective defence preparations under way. We were lucky in the Second World War. Sir Frederick Shedden had just finished his book in early 1939 - it was not absolutely finished and there were a couple of gaps in it. We had a good one I think in the early 1950s but it lapsed thereafter.

Mr BRYANT - I have suggested to the Committee that they look at the structure which existed by 1914 in the universal defence force training system. That was one thing and the capacity was developed even in 1939, but I have a feeling that we go for the expensive and sophisticated things when, unless there is a major superpowered effort against us, what we have to do is to look to people and say we can look after ourselves on the home ground and deliver a fair sort of punch if they will run harassment tactics on the route into Australia across the Indian Ocean.

Dr O'Neill - I think we really have to try to do both. We have to demonstrate - and this is part of the credibility of our defence posture - that we can mobilise forces effectively and quickly without falling apart in the process and that we can maintain them. We also need, I think, quite a lot of the higher technology weaponry because we are a small population defending a big country.

Mr ARMITAGE - Regarding the F111, have you heard, keeping in mind that the US F111s have flown a lot more hours than ours have, of any reports that they are getting some stress problems, particularly regarding the motors and that they are beginning to think over there about the question of phasing them out, which could cause a few problems on our side regarding spares, et cetera?

Dr O'Neill - No, I have not heard about that problem. I have heard from the United States Air Force that they are still very pleased with F111s. We have explored the prospects of buying some additional ones, I understand, and have been given a pretty firm no, being told that they want all that they have.

Mr ARMITAGE - I think it is worth inquiries and they were some fairly good sources who came to me recently.

Dr O'Neill - It is something I have not heard.

Mr SCHOLES - I think the aircraft you are talking about are the F111As, which are different from ours, with the analogue computers and I have an idea that they were the original naval versions. They have flown a high number of hours but I think the United States Air Force is not going to change the computers over because of the life expectancy and the fact that they would have to get a new type.

Mr ARMITAGE - They are not going for digital computers for that very reason. Can you see circumstances where Australian forces could become involved in the protection of Papua New Guinea or a separatist Papua because, let us say, another nation was concerned about the stability of the government there or from their interpretation the stability of the government there? Could you see such circumstances arising where we would need to move in to assist Papua New Guinea, or what would be your attitude towards assisting, in effect facing attack from another country?

Dr O'Neill - Papua New Guinea remains very important to the defence of Australia. It is immediately proximate to us and it would be a very convenient area for a hostile power to establish base facilities in, so we retain the strongest interest in seeing that Papua New Guinea remains free and independent and that we

keep a close friendly relationship with it and help it in every way we can. If some external power is putting pressure on Papua New Guinea I think we should show our hand pretty soon in order to get the other party to back off. We should leave no doubt whatsoever in anyone's mind that we would not contemplate anyone else taking over Papua New Guinea.

Mr BRYANT - One thing which has puzzled me for a long while is the non-acceptance of the Harrier or principles such as that into the general defence systems of the world. I take it it can take off from an aircraft carrier or from some cargo ship transformed a little, possibly by strengthening decks.

Dr O'Neill - Yes, indeed. They do need fairly elaborate support installations but I think the Harrier has been undergoing a fairly rapid rate of technological improvement in the past few years. This explains why people have been reluctant to buy it until now. They saw that they were looking at a rapidly moving picture and wanted to get to the end of the process. Now I think the United States Marines derivative, the AV8B, will be a very formidable aircraft. I have seen information which suggests that its range payload capabilities are similar to those of the F16. That is a vast difference from the first version of the Harrier. They have not gone into production yet. McDonnell-Douglas are still working on the prototypes. They have two aircraft, I understand, and the development phase will go on for another three or four years. The British are also working on a new development with a wider wing, which again will greatly increase its lifting and range capabilities, so I think that sort of technology has a lot of relevance, and we will see more countries buying into it.

The Chinese are strongly interested in it. The United States Air Force is becoming interested in it. Other NATO powers are interested in it because it is so readily dispersible and so you can protect it from surprise attack. It would always have problems for a country like Australia, because it uses so much of its fuel in getting off the deck - either in a very short run or, even worse, a vertical take-off - and range is vital to us. You would need some kind of mobile platform to use it with. But there are a great range of options for the platform.

Mr BRYANT - I will just take that a step further. I have the impression that we are not very innovative. There does not seem to be anything around about which we said: 'This is for us'. I think the adoption of Leopard tanks is a case in point. We shopped for it instead of sitting down and saying we would design something ourselves. It was the same with destroyers and patrol frigates et cetera. Is it valid, do you think, if we regard ourselves as having a very different defenca environment from anybody else who is a major manufacturer? Therefore we ought to start developing our own resources further - not just the manufacture of them, but the real thinking behind it.

Dr O'Neill - It depends on the level of technology involved and the length of production run. For some things you are suggesting, like a simple floating platform for a Harrier to land on, refuel and take off, we could do that. There is no question about it. I do not think we would be in the hunt for designing a tank. It is such a complex business. Our production run would be so short. We would really deprive ourselves of doing a lot of other things. It would cost so much money and probably would not provide much employment.

Mr BRYANT - One of the big motor car manufacturers told me they could do that sort of thing.

Dr O'Neill - I think we could get into the business of making armoured personnel carriers; aluminium hulled vehicles with high cross-country mobility, either wheeled or tracked. I think we could also get into the field of producing our own artillery.

Mr BRYANT - We have done a little of that.

Dr O'Neill - Yes. Battle-field missiles is another area. We have done a lot of basic research at the Defence Research Centre, Salisbury.

Mr BRYANT - Yes. The Acting Chairman is expected to know these sorts of things.

ACTING CHAIRMAN - You mean, can we make a tank, is that what you said? Of course we can.

Mr BRYANT - Yes. But what is the biggest earthmoving machinery we make in Australia? Do we not make some of the very big machinery ourselves?

ACTING CHAIRMAN - We are not making it now. We did make it at one time. It is the question of a market, is it not? It is a question of whether you can produce enough to sell to a neighbour. But the Army designed a tank during the last war. They made the gun-carriers and weapon-carriers. But that is the whole question. Who am I, talking? It is not for me to talk. The question, of course, that Mr Bryant is asking - which has been asked more than once - is: Do we need a lot of sophisticated equipment when we might well be building aircraft with simpler technology? Perhaps we should be copying the Israelis who adopt the patterns of other companies, and they can mix aircraft. Should we be doing that rather than buying things?

Dr O'Neill - We just have to buy major items of equipment from overseas. We cannot produce fighter aircraft, bomber aircraft, tanks, some types of surface ships and submarines with any hope of economy in the numbers we want. But we can do a lot more about the follow-on destroyer program, transport aircraft, armoured fighting vehicles and communications equipment.

ACTING CHAIRMAN - In 1976 you came before the Hamer committee and supported the idea that to whatever extent possible we should have an industrial capacity within our own country for production of various items of equipment. Have your views changed about that?

Dr O'Neill - No, not at all.

Mr SCHOLES - In your paper you mentioned the need for

development of facilities at Cocos Island, Tindal and possibly Townsville. Do you see Christmas Island as having any defence significance specially in view of its location? Tindal seems to be the hardy perennial. Do you think it is a viable proposition given difficulties with water and other things at Tindal to develop an Air Force capacity 120 miles inland? We can realistically expect to develop only Darwin to proper fighting strength for all Services. We cannot expect to do a good job on two.

Dr O'Neill - It is some time since I looked at a map of Christmas Island. It would be difficult to put a much bigger airfield on the Island. The airfield is like a bench on the main range of hills that goes down the Island. It also suffers from the disadvantage that it is very close to Indonesia. It would be quite easy to strike at it from elsewhere. I would not advise putting any heavy investment of resources there. It might be the sort of place where we put in a refuelling facility for aircraft with more modest landing and takeoff requirements. But we should not base aircraft there or subject it to heavy usage.

Mr SCHOLES - There is no naval application?

Dr O'Neill - I do not know enough about the harbour facilities there but what little I do know suggests that they are minimal. It would be better to put some more resources into developing Cocos and installations on our own north-west coast. The main purpose of Tindal is to provide some depth for the Darwin position. If everything is at Darwin it makes a very attractive target. If Tindal is there as an alternative deployment field the forces can be split. Redundancy can be built in. It is much harder to attack because the coastline based warning systems give much more response time.

Mr SCHOLES - It is also a lot harder to get aircraft over the coast as they are flying so far. You mentioned in your priorities the follow-on destroyer program. However, in the most recent Defence statement the follow-on destroyer program has gone back a further five years to 1990 from a projected commencement of 1985. This seems to indicate delivery somewhere

in the mid-1990s. That means that if we maintain our existing plans we will have only the four FFGs which are viable vessels by about 1990 unless we spend an enormous amount.

Do you think that we can, in fact, afford to defer the follow-on destroyer program for that long, given that you have put it in your first rank of priorities?

Dr O'Neill - No, I do not. I was unaware of some announcement that the commencement of that project has been put back to 1990.

Mr SCHOLES - No, the most recent statement says that it is anticipated the program will now commence in the late 1980s, early 1990s.

Dr O'Neill - If we are going to maintain our current naval capacity, quite apart from increase it, those ships have to start coming on line at the end of this decade, so we need to get the project under way in the next few years.

Mr SCHOLES - The 1976 announcement set out a financial arrangement which indicated levels of expenditure, which, to say the least, have not been met. This particular program indicates, not only levels of expenditure which are fairly comparable with those set out in 1976 in actual terms, but it also reflects a change in the relativity between capital equipment expenditure and the defence force expenditure of some significant order. On average over a number of years the equipment program has run to about 12 per cent - higher and lower according to deliveries. Is it possible to fit within the Defence budget a continuing 25 per cent expenditure on capital equipment, given the fact that we cannot expect the cost of manpower to drop and it is difficult to see the cost of other operations, such as training, et cetera, going down unless they are extraordinarily restricted?

Dr O'Neill - Broadly speaking, yes, I think we can spend 20 per cent to 25 per cent of the Defence vote on equipment in the current range of funding without reducing defence manpower. With this new program our rate of increase of money for defence has been put up to something like 7 per cent, as I understand it. When that is applied mainly to equipment and facilities, it does make an immense difference to the rate at which you can procure things. It virtually doubles it from the $300m to $400m bracket to the $700m to $800m bracket. I think with careful management

we can probably achieve somewhere in the 22 per cent to 25 per cent level as far as expenditure on equipment is concerned, but even that - and I come back to my original point - probably will not buy all the equipment that we need.

Mr SCHOLES - So, in fact, if there is any slippage our equipment program will be well and truly down the drain.

Dr O'Neill - Absolutely.

Mr SCHOLES - In what time frame could we place a relatively small but effective force in a remote area of Australia to deal with either a major entrenchment or a series of hostile acts against isolated areas. Do we currently have the infrastructure to maintain a force to protect those areas over any extended period?

Dr O'Neill - I take it you are talking about something that would require a response capability bigger than a single battalion?

Mr SCHOLES - At least of that size.

Dr O'Neill - We could put a single battalion in the field very quickly, within a week or so. Probably we could not maintain it in action, if it was an intense rate of action, for more than a few weeks with current stocks as we are currently organised and equipped. But if it required a larger force, if there were several pressure points to deal with and we had to move in a task force, then there would be a lead time of some months and the material backup required would cause severe dislocation, I think.

Mr SCHOLES - I think - and it may or may not be an accurate thought - that we will have to accept responsibility for military activities in the South Pacific region within the next 10 years. The British have left; I think the United States is unlikely to fill that vacuum and I think it is also likely that the French will have moved on before the end of this decade. Given the type of responsibility which I feel our allies will expect us to accept, do you see any major changes in the current direction of planning for the defence forces in order to cope with that responsibility?

Dr O'Neill - We would need to develop a much greater capacity than we now have for operational plans involving the forces of other nations. We would need to get into this business very quickly and decisively. We tried our hand at this once before, as you no doubt know, under the ANZAM arrangement when it was Australia's responsibility to plan for the maritime defence of what was called the ANZAM area. We messed around a bit for years and years and drew up plans for the preparation of plans and anything but the plans, and finally people got tired of us and that arrangement just quietly folded up. We would need, I think, to set up a special group within the Defence Department to handle that and it would need outriders in some of the regional countries and with our major allies. We would also need to be able to get from our allies a pretty clear statement of what they would be likely to provide by way of assistance in certain contingencies, even though we carried the main responsibility for planning and direction. Of course, that was another one of the pitfalls into which the ANZAM arrangement fell. The Americans would never give us any idea as to what they would provide in the event of certain contingencies.

ACTING CHAIRMAN - Do you agree with that forecast?

Dr O'Neill - Yes, I think we are going to have to take a much bigger role in regional defence planning without appearing chauvinistic. We will have to do it rather delicately but we have to realise that we must stand on our own feet more. This is a big region and our allies have many other more important problems elsewhere in the world.

Mr SCHOLES - A lot of them are defenceless nations too.

ACTING CHAIRMAN - And do we maintain what we now call a strong, independent Australian position?

Dr O'Neill - We must increase our independence particularly in the strategic and operational planning areas. I also come back to the point we were discussing earlier about command and control systems. Our present systems would be ludicrous for taking on any wider responsibilities of that nature.

Mr NEIL - I take it your comments about the length of time we could maintain a one battalion force would apply to the two battalion reaction force - as to the maintenance of it. That force could be maintained for only a matter of a few weeks.

Dr O'Neill - It depends on the level of operations in which we engage. If it were a very low level operation we could probably maintain it indefinitely but at a Vietnam level of operations we would run out of logistic power very quickly indeed.

Mr NEIL - On the force structure, I understand what you have said about maritime and continental defence. Is there any other improvement required by way of the force structure?

Dr O'Neill - Given that the Army has recast its own internal structure I think we are not far off it now. I would still like to see further development in the Army and the production of a special remote area defence force based on long range desert group concepts - a force which is not designed to hold ground against heavy attack but to inflict a very heavy damage on anyone who tries to poke his nose in without being asked. It does not take a large amount of manpower but the forces have to be highly trained and know what they are doing or they will not survive in that very harsh environment.

Mr NEIL - You do not see the Townsville force as having that role, do you?

Dr O'Neill - No. That is part of the conventional Defence Force. I am talking about something more on the lines of the Special Air Service only perhaps not as elaborately equipped, not as highly capable in the wide ranging roles of SAS, and probably Reserve force based.

Mr NEIL - You were talking about substantial increases in the Reserve. Do you think the 30,000 which we have allocated as

manpower for the Reserve is adequate for the purposes you had in mind? If not, for what do you think we ought to aim?

Dr O'Neill - We have to see whether we can achieve the 30,000. That is a first stage. It is a substantial increase of approximately 28 per cent.

Mr NEIL - Do you see the 22,000 as a real figure at the moment?

Dr O'Neill - The Army say it is but it is very hard to know absolutely.

Mr SCHOLES - The figure we work on is nearer to 16,000 - as an effective strength.

Mr NEIL - On notice from me yesterday the Minister answered a question which could be looked up. I asked him what was the strength which he gave and what was classed as effective and he said about 21,700.

Mr BRYANT - I think that is on paper. There were 80,000 in 1939. It has been accepted over the period of a couple of years. You may say-----

ACTING CHAIRMAN - Yes, but you were responsible for that.

Mr BRYANT - One of the things that intrigues me - in fact it would depress me if I were a depressable type - is the way in which we face nearly every proposition with difficulties. We have six battalions in the regular forces at the moment, and if we could not keep one of those indefinitely in the field 2,000 miles from home there is something wrong with us. I can see we may well have allowed our ammunition stocks to run down but that would not be so difficult to fix - although it might be if some of the weapons were obsolete. In the peace force in Namibia, even an ambulance apparently unbalanced the whole system. Some atmosphere inhibits us doing constructive thinking and it goes right across the board from designing or making things and appearing as if we could be on the ground in action.

Mr SCHOLES - We would have had to remove our only field hospital to send to Namibia if we had but we have a reserve field hospital which could be operational almost immediately if it were

required. It is just a case of there being no advantage in keeping more than one in operation in peacetime.

Mr BRYANT - We are very restrictive about putting on real exercises, are we not?

ACTING CHAIRMAN - You mentioned exercises in more challenging ways.

Dr O'Neill - Yes.

ACTING CHAIRMAN - That means under what appears to be more active conditions, does it?

Dr O'Neill - Yes. I mentioned, too, exercises further out in the remote parts of Australia where some threat, at least in a low level contingency, is likely to appear. I also had international exercises in mind.

ACTING CHAIRMAN - That raises a question which the Committee would like to ask and which you may wish to answer in camera. Can you foresee any threat to Australia by any country or combination of countries?

Dr O'Neill - I would prefer to answer that in camera.

Senator KILGARIFF - I refer to your comments on the long range reconnaissance patrols. Would you consider that we make too much of a hard job of surveillance of the north when you consider how well the bush patrols and the coastwatchers operated in the last war - bearing in mind that while the north coast is supposedly empty you can hardly wiggle your ears anywhere along the coast without the Aboriginal people being able to tell from 100 miles away what is going on? It seems to me that inexpensive means of patrolling, although not up to the skills of the SAS, could be well developed by using in the north local people who would be only too happy to participate. For instance, at Croker Island situated off Arnhem Land, Aboriginal people are very keen on the Army and have joined up and it gives them a tremendous lift in life. Would you not think this could be developed on a very inexpensive basis?

Dr O'Neill - Yes, indeed. We had a marvellous coastwatcher organisation during the Second World War, as you say. We have

an embryonic one still in existence but it is only the barest skeleton. These patrols can be put into practice very easily, as you say. In the north it is difficult to move without attracting some attention because you leave a great dust trail everywhere you go for about 10 months of the year. Also, people have to come to water sooner or later.

With a little intelligence we could design a very effective land-based surveillance system. It would not necessarily solve the problem of the drug runners with light aircraft and high speed boats and that sort of thing. But as far as people getting ashore with hostile intent were concerned, it would go a long way.

Senator KILGARIFF - We were discussing the point that the war book system had lapsed and that our basic stock for re-arming and re-equipping appears to have dwindled away considerably. How do you feel regarding the command arrangements for the Australian Defence Force? Do you think at present that they would be likely to prove satisfactory in time of war?

Dr O'Neill - They would need a lot of further development, as I said earlier. We lack a comprehensive joint service command structure. We have the essential elements at the top now with the creation of the position of Chief of Defence Force Staff and the staff which works directly to him in the Department of Defence. But he could not go out and be the joint force commander. He would still be needed here to run the show from Canberra. We need substantial joint force headquarters, not with everything existing in time of peace but manned to some extent, which can be quickly deployed to take over control of an emergency situation. We lack these headquarters. By and large we also lack the other headquarters that would have to be dovetailed into this system.

Senator KILGARIFF - Do we lack young leaders?

Dr O'Neill - No, I do not think we do. For a force of the size we have, we are adequately supplied with leaders of high quality. Keeping them is another problem.

Senator KILGARIFF - It has been suggested that the morale of the forces is low. I myself think it is reasonably high. How do you see it?

Dr O'Neill - At present it is very high. People have had a shot in the arm as a result of the recently announced program. In the past couple of years some disillusion was working its way in when people confronted the prospect of how the force would be

equipped in 10 years' time if we continued to spend only 12 per cent of the Defence vote or less on equipment. That at least has been turned around and we have a new prospect. The general indications are that this has wide popular support. I think people in the defence forces feel the game is worth the candle now.

Mr SCHOLES - About 18 months ago your organisation put out a document on future officer training. One of the more significant chapters concerned the role of the Army in time of a major national emergency if the Navy and the Air Force had failed. Do you see a necessity for that type of specialised training? Do you see any evidence that it is fact being brought into being within the defence forces for small unit isolated operations in time of occupation, for harassment, guerrilla type operations and survival operations?

Dr O'Neill - I still believe we should have such a force. It is very important to how we appear to a potential opponent. If we do not have it, he knows that all he has to do is to knock out the maritime defence force because we cannot provide a protracted continental-wide defence force by land. We can defend one or two key points and that is all. So a force like this is essential. The Army is doing something about it. There have been some exercises in remote areas. But more needs to be done, particularly to train the Reserve in these sorts of tasks. One of the very good points of the Millar report on the Army Reserve was the notion that you would give specific Reserve units responsibility for the defence of particular areas and they would get to know these areas well. In time of peace they would conduct their exercises there. They would get to know the lie of the land in great detail and be masters of it from a tactical point of view. That would give us an enormous advantage.

Mr SCHOLES - In 1974 a requirement was placed on the Defence Department to produce a study of the defence of Australia. That document has, to my knowledge, gone through the shredders

rather than the system. As far as I know there is still no adequate document to give the basic information to commanders who obviously would expect to operate in areas where they were not directly familiar with the terrain or the resources available. Is preparation of such a document still one of the urgent needs of the force?

Dr O'Neill - Yes, very much so. The situation is not as bad as it was in 1974, of course, because quite a number of studies have been done which have given us a clearer picture and have helped the individual Services in planning their own structures. Each of the Services has itself thought more about its role in the new strategic posture. But there is still a need for more integrative guidance. We have not really gone very far in developing joint force doctrine. Although there have been some joint warfare manuals produced, from what I have seen they relate very much to questions of detailed organisation and technique rather than strategic principle and how you go about flexibly responding to the broad range of contingencies that may arise.

Mr SCHOLES - We were both present at an argument about who would control the air space over a battle field on one occasion, which was rather terrifying to me.

ACTING CHAIRMAN - Are you arguing now that as a result of the defence reorganisation, this notion would be more essential than before?

Dr O'Neill - It always was essential. As a result of the reorganisation we have a better capacity to produce the document, but it still requires a lot of work.

Mr SCHOLES - The mere increase in the numbers of the reserves will be totally meaningless if the end result is what we have now. Two or three things appear obvious. Firstly, as you have already mentioned, it seems important to give a specific task to Reserve units and ask them to carry those tasks out or at least to prepare to be able to do so. To what extent is that a practical consideration? Secondly, do you see any validity

in making it a term or condition of service that officers on request spend a period of time serving with Reserve units after they have, in fact, opted out of the force before the normal retirement age? These are two different questions; nevertheless they are related.

The third question is that we are again running through a series of officer losses at especially the middle rank. Do you see a need for incentives or a very serious study of the Defence Force structure in order to maintain officers in the Defence Force and to maintain people generally in the Reserves because the loss ratio is enormous?

Dr O'Neill - On the question of the allocation of reserve forces to the defence of particular areas, I do not see great problems. There will be some additional financial costs in moving people who are allocated to some of the more remote parts. The great bulk of the population is concentrated in the south-east and a lot of the problem areas are in the north-west. That problem would have to be faced. But these people have to train somewhere. Once they are moved into the area, I do not see that their training there would be any more expensive than it is down here for the sort of role we are thinking about - highly dispersed, portable, 4-wheel drive stuff rather than tanks, heavy artillery and so on. On the question of requiring officers to serve with the Army Reserve once they resign, do you mean to make it compulsory?

Mr SCHOLES - If required, yes. Not as a condition of service. We certainly would not want the lot.

Dr O'Neill - If a defence contingency occurred, I think that would be a reasonable requirement. But in the normal situation I think that would be a bit counter-productive because people would tend to resent it. And the last thing the Army Reserve needs is resentful ex-regulars floating around. I think the Army Reserve has had a little too much of that in the past. On the question of officer losses, this is really the retention problem. Do we need some extra carrot for people to stay in? I think we need less of an incentive for people to get out. I mean, the revisions made to the DFRB scheme when Mr Barnard was Minister for Defence were a great step forward for the Defence Force. But it has given people very little incentive to stay after 20 years, and it is a phenominally generous scheme.

Mr SCHOLES - Not according to the letters I get.

Dr O'Neill - I think it bears looking at from that point of view. The other side of the coin is that if you have a fairly rapid flow through of people, you are broadening the numbers who have some familiarity with the Defence Force. They are still a national resource and you are not cluttering up the Defence Force with people who really ought to be superannuated.

Mr SCHOLES - You could probably give them a fortnight's retraining per year just to keep them in touch.

Dr O'Neill - Yes. This was another angle of the Millar report, which I have not heard anything more of since he wrote it. His idea was that everyone of the reserve of officers should be called up once per year for a weekend to show that they were still alive.

Mr BRYANT - They would probably like it.

Dr O'Neill - I think they would love it.

Mr SCHOLES - It would be like old home week.

Dr O'Neill - A lot of beer would be consumed but it could also serve some practical use. They could be brought up to date on current developments.

(Evidence was then taken in camera.)

Committee adjourned at 8.32 p.m.

CANBERRA

Wednesday, 23 April 1980

PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMMITTEE

ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE

Sub-Committee on Defence Matters
(Sub-Committee C)

Present

Mr Katter (Chairman)

Senator Bishop

Mr Armitage

Mr Scholes

The Sub-Committee met at 6.45 p.m.
Mr KATTER took the chair.

Colonel John Osborne LANGTRY, (Reserve List), 10 Melbourne Avenue, Deakin, Australian Capital Territory, was sworn and examined.

CHAIRMAN - I declare this public meeting of the Committee open. We are very pleased to have you with us, Colonel. For those of you who are perhaps not aware, Colonel Langtry is executive officer of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University, hence his association with Dr O'Neill.

You may at any time request that your evidence or part of your evidence or answers to specific questions be given in camera. The Committee will consider any such request. The Committee has before it your submission - our Submission No. 3 - which is entitled 'Australia's Defence Manpower and General Mobilisation Policies'. Are there any alterations or additions you would like to make to the document at this stage?

Col. Langtry - No.

CHAIRMAN - Is it the wish of the Committee that the document be incorporated in the transcript of evidence? There being no objection, it is so ordered.

(The document read as follows) -

SUBMISSION NO.3

AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE MANPOWER AND GENERAL MOBILISATION POLICIES

Submission to

The Parliamentary Joint Committee

on Foreign Affairs and Defence

(Sub-Committee on Defence Matters)

by

Colonel J. O. Langtry, DCM, BSc., (RL)

15 April 1980

Executive Officer
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
Research School of Pacific Studies
The Australian National University

Mobilisation - the timely marshalling of a nation's resources for war - is a process of expansion and coordination.

Australia's defence posture as it stands today is one of limited forces-in-being backed up by limited reserves which should have the capacity to expand, hopefully sufficiently and faster than threats can materialise. The fact is that Australia's Defence Forces are unlikely to be capable of this.

Whereas defence planning has proceeded on the basis that we could expect to have a minimum of two years' warning time and, more likely, five to seven years' warning time, analyses of warning times preceding all conflicts since 1939 lead to the general conclusion that the Defence Forces should plan on there being only a 50 per cent chance of receiving more than 12 months' defence preparation time and almost no chance that defence preparation time would exceed two years.

The Army's fundamental problem is its inadequate capacity for timely and sufficient expansion of its manpower. The only Reserve element available for rapid call-out is the Australian Regular Army Emergency Reserve (ARAER). Although it can be called out in about 14 days, its manpower level has been permitted to decline from 500 in 1973 to about 100 today. There is probably potential enough to lift this very important element of the Army Reserve to a steady state of 4,000 by initiating a more positive recruiting drive aimed at persuading the 2,000 or so ex-Regular other-ranks who each year complete their three or six year periods of

engagement. It could probably be bolstered further by varying the nature of other-rank engagement in the Regular Army - by offering the option of a six year engagement or a three year engagement plus an obligation to transfer to and remain active in the ARAER for an additional three years.

However, even if the ARAER were lifted to 4,000 it would do little to bridge the yawning credibility gap which would exist until the second stage of defence prearedness was complete - the promulgation of a defence emergency and the call-out of all or part of the rest of the Reserves. There could be considerable delay before the second stage was initiated and even then there would be a delay of up to six months before these Reserves could be brought up to combat readiness - too little, too late!

The third level of defence preparedness - the call-up of all persons eligible between the ages of 18 and 60 - is a very lengthy process indeed. It could take anything from two and a half to five years, provided much of the Regular Army and the Reserves were available to act as the 'mobiliser'.

Although the Government's recent announcement that the 'active' CMFs (ACMF) manpower strength is to be raised from 22,000 to 30,000 by 1985, there must be doubts as to whether this target can be achieved. The wastage rate is appallingly high. Even if the target of 30,000 were to be achieved, in the event of the Reserves being called-out, perhaps as many as 40 to 50 per cent are likely to be exempted for one reason or another. It is essential that some form of manpower

alternative to the Army's existing voluntary reserve system be implemented.

The notion of Universal Conscription is quite popular - for something of the order of three and twelve months compulsory military service - but only in situations where there is a clear and imminent threat to the nation. That aspect aside, there are more practical problems, the chief of which is the fact that during the 1980s and 1990s a reasonably constant 130 to 140,000 young men will reach the age of 18 each year, and probably about the same number of women! Even assuming that 30 to 40 per cent would be exempted, it would be beyond the Regular Army's capacity to cope with such an annual intake. It barely coped with the 28,000 or so who were recruited annually in the 1951-57 National Service Training Scheme. There would have to be a very significant increase in Regular Army manpower. Costs alone are likely to be prohibitive.

Selective Conscription - the compulsory call-up of a manageable percentage of the military manpower potential - is an unattractive and probably, in the light of our Vietnam war experience, an unacceptable alternative, both politically and socially.

A further, novel alternative which warrants serious consideration is a system referred to as the 'Voluntary Latent Force System. A supposition underlying the proposal is that sufficient young men and women would be prepared to volunteer for training on a contractual basis - to undergo continuous training in specific skills for varying periods

of, say, six to twelve months in return for a good wage and fringe benefits. Their obligation would be one of being required to remain on the Reserves list for a specified period of, say, three to five years, subject to short-term, occasional refresher training, and contractually liable for call-out at short notice in the event of a national emergency including in situations short of 'times of defence emergency'. Suppose the Army could attract 20,000 such carefully selected volunteers each year, after five years it would be possible to call-out at very short notice (about 14 days) a force of 100,000 to flesh out specified key elements in the Army's force structure. An expensive system, but one that would be considerably less expensive than increasing the size of the Regular Army and probably more effective than trying to boost the size of the ACMF to 30,000.

Seemingly the only other, and only partial at that, realistic alternative to some such voluntary latent force manpower solution to the Army's force expansion problem must reside in the area of boosting firepower without, at the same time, boosting proportionately the associated manpower - firepower versus manpower. Trends in new technology favour such an approach, as does the changing nature of the land battle. It is now possible to consider seriously the development of small, lightly manned and equipped, self-contained, modular forces with very considerable combat power.

In short, a firepower rather than manpower option is realistic for combat units, but there are limits to which firepower can replace manpower in ground forces. Obviously the substitution of firepower for manpower cannot be more than a complementary solution in that many of the non-combat elements of the Army will continue to remain manpower intensive, And, of course, such a move would necessitate a complete rethinking of our traditional operational concepts - a complete break away from our traditional perceptions of manoeuvre and combat power towards reducing the size of combat units and sub-units without a corresponding reduction in their integral fire power.

To sum up - clearly the Army's current manpower is inappropriate for our new strategic circumstances. There is an urgent requirement to reassess thoroughly the future utility of the manpower policies and structures inherited from the 'forward defence' era. Furthermore, if the Army is to be seen as a credible element in Australia's overall deterrence posture, steps will have to be taken positively and quickly towards the adoption of an effective, expansion-oriented ground force posture in which a very much larger and better trained reserve element will be the linchpin.

Whatever may be adopted as the new model for Army manpower expansion, it is most important that due allowance is made for the fact that by the time force expansion (mobilisation) is perceived to be inescapable, the

Regular Army Field Force plus its emergency reserve (ARAER) may well be deployed operationally and, therefore, would not be available to participate exclusively in the general mobilisation process.

The Navy's problem is essentially one of having to fight with whatever it has in the way of capital ships at the onset of conflict - the lead-times for construction or acquisition of capital ships are longer than likely warning times. Furthermore, once major conflict is joined, it will be fast and furious, and attrition rates will be high. Nevertheless, it should be assumed that there will be no time for fleet expansion once the conflict has started. The emphasis must be on having adequate naval forces 'in being' before the event.

The Air Force is similarly placed to the Navy, but, in addition, it is currently also seriously deficient in manpower to support a more intensive rate of operations and has a limited capacity to mobilise trained manpower quickly. At current manpower levels, the RAAF could not operate its full complement of combat and surveillance aircraft around-the-clock without a significant expansion of both aircrew and ground staff - for the Air Force in particular, a lengthy process because of the exceptionally high standard of skills required. The RAAF's immediate problem has been in part recognised by the Government in that additional manpower has been directed to the manning of the surveillance squadrons, but at the expense of other capabilities. The RAAF's fundamental manpower expansion problems, no less than the Army's, require urgent resolution.

Manpower mobilisation tends to be the focus of popular attention, but in practice the Achilles Heel of general mobilisation proves to be, more often than not, the provision of materiel. The key to rapid mobilisation is the availability of weapons and equipment and an infrastructure adequate to support the combat forces. It is more important to have materiel-in-being and a proven defence infrastructure than to have unequipped and un-supportable forces-in-being.

In the wake of the Afghanistan invasion, the equipment deficiencies are being addressed with urgency. Nevertheless, the whole program cannot be completed within the five-year period. Some items would require up to 10 years for delivery. More significantly, $17.6 billion is not enough to purchase all items.

The recently announced Defence program also takes some account of the need for new, up-dated or extended defence facilities during the next five years. These developments, too, are encouraging, but the announced program is merely the tip of an iceberg in terms of what is necessary to develop Australia's defence infrastructure. Strategic roads, railways and ports in particular, and associated facilities are woefully inadequate. The lead-times associated with remedying these deficiencies are very long indeed, and, needless to say, very expensive. The current Defence program of $17.6 billion will not cover the full requirement even if the level of funding in its fifth year (1985) were to be continued right through to 1990.

In addition to the very important questions of Australia's capacity to mobilise military manpower and to

ensure that it is adequately equipped, there are many other critical aspects of defence preparedness which warrant equally urgent attention.

The capacity of this country to mobilise its defence industry for war may be lower than at any time since the Second World War. Hence Australia's capacity to wage protracted military operations without large-scale support from allies may have been reduced to a period of weeks rather than months. Whatever organisations and procedures are adopted, one fact is certain - an improvement to Australia's defence industry mobilisation potential is essential.

Civil defence - assistance to the civil community and emergency repair to and restoration of community services in time of war - although officially accepted as being an integral element of Australia's defence posture, has been given little more than lip service by successive governments since the Second World War.

Also neglected are the energy requirements of supporting a mobilised Australia. Our strategic reserves of critical fuels, as far as one can tell, are needlessly and dangerously low, especially in terms of support for defence industry. There is no point in having fuel reserves for the forces without commensurate reserves for the supporting defence industries! Furthermore, our energy production and stockholding facilities are extremely vulnerable.

Aside from questions of mobilisation potential, there would appear to be grave deficiencies in Australia's ability to plan and coordinate the general process of mobilisation

itself. The range of resources involved in mobilisation is so broad that the coordination needed would involve most aspects of Australian public policy. The War Book has not been kept up to date since about 1950. It was designed to provide, in concise and convenient form, a record of all the measures that are involved in passing from a state of peace to a state of war; and to ensure not only that all departments in any way concerned with defence of the Commonwealth shall know the precise measures required of them at each stage of the process, but also that the actions of the Defence Forces and departments shall be closely and continuously coordinated. Some interest in the War Book has been revived of late within the Department of Defence. This is encouraging, but more than that is needed. Mobilisation planning must be initiated and coordinated at Cabinet level, with the advice of inter-departmental committees at Permanent Head and Chiefs of Staff level. These Committees in turn should be serviced by a small policy and executive staff established within either the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet or the Department of Defence, which can call on the services of persons from other government departments, agencies, private industry and universities.

Another neglected element of mobilisation is public involvement. Australia's extremely limited defence resource-base means that, perforce, civil resources must be used to the maximum. For Australia, military capability overall is a function of efficient mobilisation of civil resources. The defence of Australia should be based on what the Swedes refer to as 'total defence' - a defence posture which

includes as a principal element greater public information and active public debate of defence matters. Such an element must also be considered an essential part of mobilisation in defence of Australia.

A demonstrable capacity to mobilise a nation's total resources for war is in itself a powerful deterrent. Mobilisation is central to both deterrence and operational capability; the rate at which mobilisation can proceed is often the crucial variable between success and failure.

Greater public appreciation is essential concerning the nature and demands of mobilisation in an era in which we are trying to achieve greater self-reliance. The existing machinery and procedures for national mobilisation are rudimentary. Gone are the days when we can count on mobilising over a period of two or three years under the protective umbrella of 'great and powerful' allies.

In drawing attention to the problems of mobilisation in defence of Australia, I do not imply that Australia faces an imminent, definable major threat to its security, although it is hard to conceive of a more potentially unstable world situation than we face in the coming decade. What is important to grasp is that it will take a very long time indeed to develop a coherent, coordinated and effective process for the mobilisation of Australia's national resources for war. Such is the nature of modern conflict that it would be the height of folly and irresponsibility to defer mobilisation planning any further. Now is the time to do it.

General footnote:

Most of that which is put forward in this brief Submission is derived from Problems of Mobilisation in Defence of Australia, edited by Desmond Ball and J.O.Langtry, and published by Phoenix Defence Publications, Canberra, 1980.

CHAIRMAN - I invite you to enlarge upon any aspect of the submission that you wish and to give us a general rundown of its contents.

Col. Langtry - Thank you very much for this opportunity to appear before you. Before summarising very briefly my written submission, I would like to enlarge upon the Army's dilemma, as I see it, in terms of its capacity for timely expansion of its manpower. As matters stand today, there are credibility gaps in the Army's capacity to deter and in its capacity for combat should deterrence fail. These deficiencies become evident when one considers three dimensions of force expansion. The first is warning times, or more correctly, defence preparation times. The second is the rates of expansion in each stage of defence preparedness, and there are three such stages, and thirdly, the combat capacity of the force mobilised in each stage. The Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence in 1974 noted the following:

> ...some estimates of the warning times which could be expected between the detection of a future threat to this country and the maturing of that threat are relatively short. A few estimates suggest a minimum of about two years while the official view seems to be that Australia would have at least five to seven years warning.

The Department of Defence Central Studies Establishment - and I would like to make the point that the chapter in the book that deals with this does not make mention of the source and it should have made mention of it - had a look at all the conflicts since 1939.

It established that the average time taken from what is perceived to be the first indications of an impending war to the firing of the first shot has been just over 14 months. If the smaller scale conflicts since World War II are indicative of a future Australian conflict, the combined perception and warning times of these conflicts since 1950 may be more meaningful. The average time has now been drastically reduced to 10.6 months and as far as I can see there is nothing to show that Australia can assume that these statistics will not apply to her.

Of the conflicts which 'evolved' - rather than those which were deliberately provoked, such as the Yom Kippur war - there is a 50 per cent chance that war could begin within 16 weeks of the emergence of a conflict. This is not meant to be a prediction but a probability, and we must face as a fact that we are dealing with very short periods of defence preparation time - much shorter than was assumed to be the case by the Senate Standing Committee in 1974. I use the words 'defence preparation time' and I think it requires definition because it is important. It is generally accepted as being the time from government acceptance of a perceived threat to the time it is judged an operational response will be required. It is true that there may well be a period preceding defence preparation time when there may be indicators of a potential threat during which a government would or should be reluctant to issue the order to mobilise. Not only are warning periods shortening but the actual duration of conflicts is also tending to become shorter and combat itself more devastating. So much so that, once combat starts, there could be little opportunity to mobilise on anything like the scale of our experience in World Wars I and II. The emphasis must be on large standing forces and/or combat ready, rapidly deployable sizable reserves. This is not to say that a demonstrable capacity to mobilise our total resources would be a useless exercise. A capacity to mobilise in depth - and thus to be seen as being capable of protracted resistance - will remain as an important element in deterrence.

The Army's dilemma, as I see it, is its inability to expand sufficiently and fast enough. The stage I forces, which really means the Regular Army as it is today, reinforced with its potentially important supplement - not much is heard of this, which is called the Australian Regular Army Emergency Reserve - is small in numbers or should I say the combination of the two is small in numbers even at its authorised planning ceiling of 36,000. Its ready reaction capacity is miniscule when considered in the light of the whole range of threats - in particular widespread harassment which could develop quickly. In the Department of Defence submission to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence in July 1973, it was stated that:

> If the Army size were 36,000 with a total of 14,000 in the Field Force, Army would have a capability with one month's notice, to deploy and sustain in the field a force of about 3,700. If the deployment were of a short duration, the Army could deploy a task force of about 5,100.

This level of combat capacity would not go far in coping with even very low level harassments, if they were widespread.

Between stage I and stage II of defence preparedness - stage II being when a defence emergency has been declared and the Reserves are called out - there could be a considerable delay. Furthermore, there would be a further delay of up to six months before the reserves could be effectively brought to bear operationally. The risk of their being too little, too late, would be very real. The introduction of legislation enabling the call-out of the reserves in situations short of a defence emergency would have closed this credibility gap, at least to some extent, but the requirement for up to six months further training of the reserves would still remain. It is also important to realise that of the 30,000 or so reserves which might be nominally available for call-out in 1985 some 40 per cent to 50 per cent may be exempted from call-out for a variety of very proper reasons, such as medical or compassionate reasons or holding key positions in industry, the civil service, police and so on. Hence the net increase in the Army's combat

capacity would only be increased marginally, and very likely insufficiently to bridge the gap between state II and stage III.

Stage III in defence preparedness - the declaration of a state of war permitting the call-out of all males between the ages of 18 and 60 - is the last step. The mobilisation of all or part of this potential would be a very long process indeed, taking anything from two and a half years to five years or more, depending on the numbers allocated to the Army.

These credibility gaps, as I see them, in our deterrence posture, should be filled in one way or another sooner, rather than later. The probable solution is to increase the size of the operationally ready reserves. The Government's decision to authorise the raising of the size of the active CMF - commonly referred to as the ACMF - from 22,000 to 30,000 by 1985 is to be welcomed. On the basis of wastage rates and the current manpower composition of the ACMF available to me it would seem that the Army will have to lift its recruiting rate from the current figure of about 7,000 per year to about 12,000 to 13,000 per year for the five years in order to get to a figure of 30,000. Then even after reaching the figure of 30,000 it will require an average annual intake of the order of 10,000 per year to maintain the ACMF at the target figure of 30,000. I have doubts that the target of 30,000 can be reached, unless a dramatic reduction in the wastage rates is achieved, especially the high levels of wastage currently occurring in the first and second years of service.

I argued in the written submission that national conscription is not a workable proposition. I further argued that selective national service is not a politically or socially acceptable solution and I proposed that a voluntary latent force system - for the want of better words - might prove to be a sensible and effective option to pursue, especially if such a force were to be contractually liable for call-out at very short notice in situations short of a defence emergency. To be able to call out, say, 60,000 such reservists with a relatively very small wastage

potential to supplement the Regular Army would do much to enhance deterrence and, should deterrence fail, it would go a long way towards buying the time needed for successive stages of mobilisation as provided for in current legislation.

In the short term, however, I would strongly recommend that the full potential of the Australian Regular Army Emergency Reserve be realised as quickly as possible. In recent years it has been allowed to run down from 500 to about 100 today, which is almost an administrative liability.

However, as I look at the source of the people who would go into that reserve, it seems that in five years they could get it up to 4,000. This Regular Army Emergency Reserve supplement can be called out in situations short of a defence emergency, that is within about 14 days.

Shifting from the Army, in my submission I maintain that the Navy's problem is essentially one of having adequate operationally ready naval forces in being before the event. There would be no time after the event to do anything about mobilising significantly more naval power. The Air Force is similarly placed to the Navy. But it also has an immediate problem in that currently it has insufficient manpower to operate its combat and surveillance aircraft to anything like full capacity. Now despite my emphasis on the manpower aspects of mobilisation, I see the achilles' heel of general mobilisation being more often than not the provision of equipment, war-like stores, and an adequate supporting infrastructure.

Moreover, there are many other critical aspects of defence preparedness which warrant urgent attention. For example the capacity to mobilise defence industries is sadly lacking. The energy requirements of supporting a mobilised Australia warrant very close attention. Civil defence has been almost totally ignored. The ability to plan and co-ordinate the general process of mobilisation itself, as exemplified in the 'War Book', has not been kept up to date since the early 1950s. Also, in any form of mobilisation there is a need for public involvement from the outset. But it will take a very long time indeed to develop a coherent, co-ordinated and effective process for the mobilisation of Australia's national resources for war. Such is the nature of the turbulent world around us and the nature of modern conflict, that it seems to me it would be irresponsible to defer mobilisation planning any longer. As I see it, now is the time to do it.

Senator BISHOP - I am sure the Committee understands your attention to mobilisation, but do you perceive today that there is a more direct threat or the chance of an attack on Australia than

in the last five years? For example is the situation in Iran or Afghanistan and the threat of dropping mines in the Iranian ports an urgent need to discuss Australian mobilisation?

Col. Langtry - No. I think we have been negligent in not addressing the problem of mobilisation long before this event. To my way of thinking it is entirely fortuitous that it popped up and helped us to focus attention on this mobilisation deficiency. For a long time we have not been credible in terms of mobilisation.

Senator BISHOP - Is it fair to say that the threat is not so imminent as to justify extremely urgent steps to mobilise on a conscription basis or on this force you call the voluntary latent force system? Are you making a more regular long-range assessment rather than an urgent response of international position today?

Col. Langtry - I take your point. I see it really from the stance of deterrence. If we are credible in that we can field combat-ready forces at short notice, at the various levels of escalation, then we are in a strong position to deter people using that sort of option against us. If we do not have that capacity we are incredible in terms of deterrence. Therefore people looking to embarrass us in some way will not easily rule out the military option. It becomes a feasible option to them. Whereas deterrence in the defence sense is trying to close off military options - certainly the devastating ones, certainly the high level ones.

Senator BISHOP - Your position in respect to the imminence of a threat is not much different to that of the Government, I take it?

Col. Langtry - I think not.

Senator BISHOP - You talk about the needs if there is some mobilisation on any of the constructions that you suggest. You also talk about the need to have weapons and equipment freely available. Do you recommend that productive activity be engaged upon immediately, or does it have to follow the mobilisation

schemes you have mentioned in your submission?

Col. Langtry - I am inclined to put the equipment program that has been announced at a very high level priority principally because of the lead times involved in acquiring this equipment. Having launched that program, then it makes sense to me to look next at our manpower problems to make use of the equipment in a timely way. And further to that, to look at the question of planning how we would go about mobilising resources, and being clear about what time frames within which we are trying to mobilise. We must get away from this notion that mobilisation is exemplified by what we did in World War I and World War II. I find those two examples entirely inappropriate to our present-day circumstances. In those days, in one case we had the British Empire out in front holding the fort while we did what we could, which was not inconsiderable. In the latter case of World War II much the same thing applied with the Americans holding the fort out in front. We are talking about mobilisation here and now in the spirit of self-reliance. That is a very different matter when time is against you all the time.

CHAIRMAN - You mention 10.6 months as a current evaluation of the time that would be available. How would that apply now in the case of Russia's invasion of Afghanistan? Is this general lead time that would apply throughout the world, or is this just something peculiar to Australia?

Col. Langtry - These statistics were done by the central studies establishment and I think if you want to take this question further, they would be the appropriate people from whom to get the answers. I am aware that they have updated these figures, which were compiled three years ago. A lot has happened in three years. The occurrence in Afghanistan underlines the shortness of warning time. Did anybody perceive it months before? I do not think so.

CHAIRMAN - No.

Col. Langtry - If one goes back to China having a go at Vietnam, that happened very quickly, unpredicted and unperceived

by the world at large. So these figures are really not predictions. They are saying that things are happening much quicker and without the notice one got years ago when I mentioned that the Senate Standing Committee had a look at the question. We are not talking about years; we seem to be talking about weeks and months rather than months and years. So the whole dimension has changed. Hence my emphasis on the timeliness of mobilisation in the various stages. It is no good being ready after the event.

Mr SCHOLES - Do any of the studies on which these times are fixed involve substantial movements across water?

Col. Langtry - Not to my knowledge.

Mr SCHOLES - It does change the time-table considerably.

Col. Langtry - Yes. If one is looking at one level of conflict in our region and somebody wants to mount a high level threat it would take them a long time to amass the array of equipment and the armada necessary to get here. So hopefully our intelligence would have every opportunity to notice this build up and to decide whether it is aimed at us or not. The second question is whether or not the Parliament would read the signs in the same way. But there are many levels of harassment, all of which are admitted by the Government and by the intelligence community at large. You do not need a vast armada and vast quantities of equipment to launch low level, widespread harassment.

CHAIRMAN - We have prepared a list of formal questions which we hope and think will develop your submission. How does the enthusiasm, interest and general attendance at CMF parades, manoeuvres, bivouacs, camps and so on now compare with the situation before 1939? I was in the CMF then and it was a pretty regular business. How does the general set-up now compare with that?

Col. Langtry - I cannot speak of the present day. There have been significant changes in the last few years because the nature of the leadership and membership of the CMF has changed. No longer are the members boribboned World War II people, Korean veterans and so on. By and large they are militarily inexperienced. I suspect that they have a different attitude to the CMF, probably a better one. In 1939 the whole climate in Australia was very different.

CHAIRMAN - This Committee feels a responsibility in all of its inquiries to involve the Australian people generally in matters of defence. We want to stir up their interest and get them to take a real interest, even if no threat exists. Can you detect at this stage a general interest in defence and a sense of patriotism? Can you detect a sense of the importance of defending our country, comparable with what we are told is happening in the United States? What is your general assessment of that? It is tied up with mobilisation. You either have a ready reaction or a

sluggish, tedious reaction.

Col. Langtry - I have a hunch that among the people in the country, particularly State by State or region by region, there is a growing interest in the question of the defence of Australia. I notice this working in the university. Our mailing list has gone up dramatically from 50 or 60 to well over 600 in a reasonably short time.

CHAIRMAN - That is most encouraging.

Col. Langtry - That is one aspect of it. I think there is a growing interest in defence matters, a desire to be informed and a desire to do something about it, something sensible and which we can afford, no doubt.

Mr ARMITAGE - I think it would be reasonable to say that the Government policy and in fact the policy of the Defence Department is, in accordance with the present budget rearrangements, very limited. Concentration is placed on obtaining the necessary up-to-date equipment. In fact, I have heard expressed - and you may have been there, Mr Chairman - in most graphic terms how wasteful conscription would be. Already more than half the defence budget goes in wages. You would be using the defence budget virtually for training people for cricket bats. Considering your emphasis upon increasing the defence forces, particularly as far as the Army is concerned, do you not think your approach conflicts with that of the Defence Department and of the Government? On one hand, you advocate moving fairly quickly into increasing the reserves; on the other hand, the Department and the Government advocate purchasing the equipment first. How do you equate those two attitudes?

Col. Langtry - It seems to me the Government has done two things at the one time. It has certainly launched a re-equipment program and at the same time, has authorised raising the level of the 'active' Citizen Military Forces, the Reserves, from 22,000 to 30,000 over five years. That is a considerable task in itself and will take time. It will take the five years in my opinion. Whether we have five years to do all this, I do not know. In

this turbulent world, it is anybody's guess as far as I am concerned. And I am not thinking of invasion as such.

Mr ARMITAGE - So you are advocating a considerable increase in the defence vote? Forgetting for the moment the extra 8,000 Reserves, you are advocating a considerable increase in the defence vote in order to re-equip and to increase the forces?

Col. Langtry - If one looks at the total equipment program and the implications about the Reserves and so on, I do not think that the $17.6 billion, if that is the figure, will cover the lot, any more than it will cover the facilities which go along with such things - refurbishing air bases, increasing patrol bases and proceeding with stages II or III at Cockburn Sound, et cetera. It will go a long way, but not all the way.

Mr ARMITAGE - In other words, you come down basically on the side there should be an increase in the defence vote?

Col. Langtry - It is inescapable.

Mr SCHOLES - The fact is that there has not been an increase on the 1976 figure.

Col. Langtry - I think that is true.

Senator BISHOP - You would not trim the equipment program to enlarge the manpower side? Your plan of mobilisation means a very expensive proposition, does it not?

Col. Langtry - Not necessarily. I am wondering, for example, whether increasing the ACMF from 20,000 to 30,000 is the best possible answer. First of all, it is still hampered through lack of legislation permitting call out in situations short of a defence emergency. Secondly, I am not so sure it is the most economical way to fill that gap which the Reserve is intended to fill.

Senator BISHOP - You mentioned two other operations - this voluntary latent force system which you discuss, and the Emergency Reserve. How do you expand those without spending hundreds of thousands of dollars?

Col. Langtry - It would certainly be hundreds of thousands of dollars. I am not advocating an increase in the Regular Army. It is a supplement to the Regular Army I am talking about. The Regular Army Emergency Reserve is there now. It is little; its manpower is 100. Such reserves are not very costly to maintain. What is needed to be done, I think, is to put more effort into recruitment.

Mr SCHOLES - They have no substantially retired persons and so on.

Col. Langtry - By and large they are people who have finished their 6-year or their 3-year engagements. I do not think a positive approach has been made to ask people to consider signing on for four years, to be available for a minimum training commitment, perhaps a fortnight a year, merely a matter of reporting in.

Senator BISHOP - The same as the Army Reserve or something less?

Col. Langtry - One can be confused about alternatives, can one not? There is the Regular Army Reserve as well.

Senator BISHOP - But do you intend to train them in the same way as reservists would be trained?

Col. Langtry - That is what they do now. They go to camp and so on with the CMF.

Senator BISHOP - Do they not become a force in the Army Reserve or do you mean something less costly than that?

Col. Langtry - I think they have been regarded, if they have been regarded at all, as part of the reserves in general. One hundred men did not make much difference. They were useful when they went to camp with the CMF because they were well trained, experienced soldiers. But now I think the Army would be thinking more critically, particularly since the failure to pass recent legislation, about how on earth we are going to fill this gap. If we run into a jam, such as a number of bombs in rubbish tins outside several pubs in several States at the one time, it is not very difficult to see that the forces immediately available could not cope with the situation. What could the Army

do? It could look at this Reserve which can be called out merely by a gazettal, by the Governor-General. That is only 100 men, a drop in the bucket. I believe it could go to 4,000 by means of an active program to recruit these people on the day they take their discharge at the end of their 6-year or 3-year engagement period.

Senator BISHOP - In addition to that, would you set up this voluntary system that you speak about and if so, how are the men to be trained? Does any other country have such a supplementary force?

Col. Langtry - It differs from country to country very much indeed. From my limited knowledge of the overseas situation, I believe that countries such as Switzerland, Sweden and to an extent the United States, use this program of bringing particular skills in and giving the volunteers sufficient training to do the job in the military fashion very adequately indeed. But I am principally interested in the voluntary latent system as a means of overcoming this gap between the Regular Army plus its immediately available Emergency Reserve and, before legislation is passed, those Reserves which require six months to be brought to operational readiness. How do we fill it? Perhaps we set up another kind of emergency reserve going out to the community, selecting the skills needed and offering a contract for them to do some training for six to 12 months - whatever is needed to convert their civil skills to military skills - and to stay in that reserve for three or five years. Make it understood that contractually they are obliged to respond to a call-out at short notice, such as seven days notice. Now these people could also come from within the CMF as it stands today. There may be a number of people there who would be happy to undertake such a contract.

CHAIRMAN - As you mention these matters in reply to Senator Bishop, I think a very clearly defined example of just how you can use trained people for ever and a day was at evidence in Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe. During the crisis period which extended over a period of about six or seven years there was no age limit. Men of 60, 65 and 70 years of age were giving damn

good service. In addition to that, getting more on to the political side of it, I would say the average age of the Brits who came over to conduct this election would have been about 60 to 65 and they gave tremendous background assistance to all that was going on. Incidentally, the Prime Minister of Mauritius who greeted us was 87.

You imply in your submission - at least we gained this impression - that you feel very little mobilisation planning is being carried out at the moment in Australia. Do you think this is a product of lack of guidance from the Government or is it because of a fault in the Services' mobilisation planning, if there is a fault?

Col. Langtry - It is a very tedious task to maintain a war book, particularly when the number of Commonwealth departments changes almost overnight from government to government. It is a very detailed, bewildering, tedious exercise to keep it up. One only has to look at the one I had a look at - it is the 1939 document - to realise what is involved. But when they were doing that until 1950 and beyond, Australia was involved, with very little respite, in action after action overseas. The focus of attention was on a couple of emergencies in Malaysia, the Korean War, the Vietnam War and so on, so mobilisation in the context even as we knew it in World War I and World War II was not relevant. I imagine that plain priorities precluded its being given very much attention and probably it hit the stage where it seemed an impossible task to update it. I am guessing this, that is all, but in that situation many things were going on - Vietnam and so on - to distract attention from such unlikely things as mobilisation being necessary. Our posture was forward defence and we sent out smaller or larger expeditionary forces, but that was not mobilisation. So the focus of attention shifted away the further and further away World War II got.

I put this emphasis on mobilisation but I wish to point out that at this stage it is not a money problem but a planning problem for the existing staffs to find out what is required should we have to mobilise, to comprehend the stages that are

imposed on us by legislation as it stands and to look at the countless number of items that have to be looked at. In fact, in the back of this book we included the table of contents to the 1939 'War Book'. Cast your eye over that and think what is involved and realise that it is not in being today in that detail and that it would have to be in being if we wanted to mobilise effectively, efficiently and quickly. To my knowledge, the Department of Defence has for some time had one person at a reasonably low level working on this problem and I believe it is clearly beyond him to cope with it. It would be beyond any single man that I know of but not beyond the wit of the bureaucracy working together, given the stimulus, given the direction, say, at Cabinet level to get on with it. They could do it and I believe it should be done, and quickly.

Mr SCHOLES - Given efficient computers it should be able to be done fairly simply now.

Col. Langtry - Hopefully a lot more simply, but there is a lot of unravelling to do because it is not always clear that some of the mobilisation responsibilities have shifted with the changes and splits in government departments and so on.

CHAIRMAN - In view of the fact that we will not have the lead time of anything near what was being comfortably thought of five or three or even two years ago, would you say there was a need for the wider aspects of our national defence to be co-ordinated by a special national security division, located for instance within the Prime Minister's Department, where military requirements could be co-ordinated with a wide array of economic resources - in other words there would be a general view of our economic resources in relation to the demand made on them in time of an emergency - and bringing into action, I suppose, responsibilities that would fall within other Ministers' portfolios, such as the Minister for Administrative Services?

Col. Langtry - I have been advocating such a national security council for a long time. I believe it is something that is missing. I am attracted to the notion of a bipartisan body which is responsible for all aspects of national security and is able to co-opt, if you like, the resources of all the departments that might be involved, including the Minister for Sport or whatever. What I am really saying is that national security is much bigger than defence. There is economic security; there is psychological security; there is physical security if you like.

CHAIRMAN - I suppose if you look at the various portfolio's there would hardly be one that would not come into the general consideration.

Col. Langtry - At one time or another they could all be affected, therefore I rather like the notion of there being a council, if you will, which is charged with the responsibility of of the nation's security in all dimensions.

Mr SCHOLES - What do you see as being bipartisan?

Col. Langtry - Regarding the national security council, which would be dealing with matters of national gravity, I would see both sides of the House being privy to what is going on and, hopefully, supportive of the action decided in that council, that is, whether action should be taken in a preventative sense or in a deterrent sense over a long period of time, or whether action

should be taken in response to something that blows up quickly, such as the Iranian situation.

Mr SCHOLES - Have you any evidence - other than the United States Congress, where a quite different political system operates - where the opposition is in fact involved in the decision making process? That is in fact what it would mean.

Col. Langtry - I believe this is so but I have not researched it personally. I have just not had the time. But I have talked to someone recently who is doing research on it and my understanding is that a large number of other countries have something equivalent or akin to a national security council.

Mr SCHOLES - I think it is reasonable to assume that Switzerland and Sweden would have that type of operation, but again they are quite different in context. They are not likely to be involved in any action other than in defence of their own territory at this stage.

Col. Langtry - They maintain a very strong deterrance posture based on total defence and that affects every aspect of national life in those countries. And I imagine something akin to a national security council would operate.

Senator BISHOP - What powers would you give the council? The Chairman has asked whether it should be a council to co-ordinate the necessary action in national defence. Is it to be a council that can override the decision of the defence council or the Chiefs of Staff or is it simply a discussion area?

Col. Langtry - I would see it as something more than a discussion area. I would see it as a body charged, in an accountable way, with the responsibility of looking at intelligence inputs, from whatever source, and making a decision as to what should or should not be done, whether it should be noted or acted upon or whether it should recommend or even initiate studies or gather further intelligence information. I would rather see it operating in the American way, perhaps because of my experience there. The President can be advised but he does not have to accept the advice. Therefore I would put the Prime Minister and Cabinet in a somewhat separate

position. But this would be a more broadly based council. It would look at all the aspects, hopefully before the event. So we would be less of a reactive society in many ways.

CHAIRMAN - My next question refers to the scheme that you suggested on page 1. I think it has a lot of merit. The scheme, as you mention, is to bolster the Australian Regular Army Emergency Reserve by persuading ex-Regular other ranks to make themselves available for call-up after they complete their full time engagements. I do not want to keep talking about Zimbabwe but I was there for four weeks during the pre-election period and had a very close view of the way in which they had called up everyone, of any age. So perhaps you could go even further than this.

Col. Langtry - One way of going further without making it compulsory would be by rephrasing the options open to people going into the Regular Army. One might take on a 6-year engagement or a 6-year engagement to be served in two parts, three in regular service and three as a member of the Emergency Reserve.

CHAIRMAN - That makes sense.

Col. Langtry - You could offer two options. Both would be for six years but one would involve three years in the standing Army followed by three years in the Reserve.

Mr SCHOLES - The CMF has, for a number of years, had real problems with the Regular Army. There is a very serious conflict in individual units, especially with the CMF officers who would in this case have to directly serve with Regular Army officers. Could that be resolved without serious damage to the CMF, because all of the CMF people I talked to had a different scheme? They rejected the scheme on the basis that the conflict between the full time Army people and the part time soldiers would be detrimental to the CMF and that these disadvantages would not be outweighed by the benefits gained.

Col. Langtry - We are not talking about the direct benefits to the CMF. We are talking about the benefits to the Army as a whole. That is what we are aiming for. The Regular Army has

come to terms with the fact that it has to be an expansion-oriented Army and that the size of the Regular Army is not going to increase significantly. Therefore its viability in all contexts depends upon the citizen soldier. Members of the Army Reserve are citizens first. There will be for some time to come some difficulties arising from the different backgrounds and the different standards of competence of the two elements. Leadership must resolve that, and I think it can.

Mr SCHOLES - Can it?

Col. Langtry - Certainly. There has been a lot of prejudice and in my own time I have been party to it and part of it if you like. I do not think that has been a major deterrent.

CHAIRMAN - In the case of creating the new approach you mention on page 1 in this plan, would the Army have to provide some financial incentive under such a scheme?

Col. Langtry - Do you mean the voluntary latent force system or do you mean the Australian Regular Army Emergency Reserve?

CHAIRMAN - If we were going to bring in former regular fellows and other ranks, would they have to be offered some financial assistance unless they undertook an obligation when they were first recruited?

Col. Langtry - At the moment the Regular Army Emergency Reservists are rewarded to the extent that they go to camp for a fortnight. They are paid the CMF rates of pay appropriate to their rank, in addition to which in their first year they are given a $200 bounty, and thereafter a figure which is variable and currently stands at about $50 per annum in increments to that bounty. This is all tax-free and it is not an insignificant sum from their point of view, so there is incentive in that sense. They can earn pay for 14 days at CMF rates of pay, tax-free, plus the bounty.

CHAIRMAN - I think we have covered the other points.

Mr ARMITAGE - In your submission on page 7 you mention the $17.6 billion defence program and you say:

> ...even if the level of funding in its fifth year (1985) were to be continued right through to 1990...

According to you it would not cover the deficiencies in defence equipment and facilities. What items in the program announced on 25 March this year would you consider run the risk of slippage or of not being completed?

Col. Langtry - I do not see the equipment program having any slippage. For example there is talk of replacement of the aircraft carrier 'Melbourne'. That is a very big bill indeed and I just cannot see you can purchase 75 tactical fighter force aircraft, plus all that goes with them - the radar et cetera - and

at the same time still have an aircraft carrier. If you have an aircraft carrier, there is no way in the world I can see you can also get a follow-on program for your destroyers. I have not done finite sums on this at all. Dr Bob O'Neill in fact has looked at this much more closely than I have, but over the years I have looked at it - not just when the program was announced - and it seems to me there is not enough money in the kitty to meet those problems, in addition to what has been approved, in respect to the aircraft carrier 'Melbourne' and the follow-on destroyer program. On top of that one thinks that a certain amount is being done to facilities around the country but there are many more to be considered. For example, our defence infrastructure is woefully inadequate. Our strategic roads are just not there; our strategic railways are very unusual railways to say the least - with the change of gauge and all the rest of it. Some of our ports are not adequate for military operations. Our communications repeater points between, say, here and the west coast - something like 50 at a guess - are all vulnerable. There is the question of satellite communications, and whether defence should have secure access to the proposed satellite programs.

Mr ARMITAGE - I refer to actual programs announced and which you think will not be fulfilled.

Col. Langtry - I think that it has been announced firmly. My guess is that it will probably make it. At the same time, with that $17.6 billion, it depends which way it pushes it - how much it puts into that equipment; how much it puts into facilities; how much it puts into Cockburn Sound and how much it puts into improving Learmonth. The figures are not out so it is hard to say.

Mr ARMITAGE - Have you any ideas of other items which should have been on the program and which you consider should have been there but which are not there?

Col. Langtry - Yes. I am a little concerned about the Army in particular. The Army equipment program I would rate rightly in my mind as being a lower priority to Navy and the Air Force for a long time to come. This is not to say that there are not some grave deficiencies still in the Army equipment program so

somewhere along the line it will have to catch up - in medium guns for one thing. Beyond that, there is a whole generation of combat surveillance required; a whole generation of communication equipment has to come in; a whole range of weaponry has not been considered - guided missiles, for example. We are very weak on air defence, and in anti-tank defence. We are very weak in a whole host of areas in the Army. Fortunately it seems these are comparatively cheaper and comparatively much quicker to obtain. Therefore the consideration of the Army side of the equipment, except in certain key areas, can be pushed up towards the 1990s. The key ones with the long lead times and the big bill are for the Navy and Air Force.

Mr ARMITAGE - You saw Dr O'Neill's shopping list.

Col. Langtry - Yes. We have discussed it.

Mr ARMITAGE - Are you in disagreement with anything on that list?

Col. Langtry - No I am not. I do not have any point worth commenting on.

Mr ARMITAGE - I would like to know your priorities for Defence equipment purchases. What do you consider are the most urgent according to your level of priority? Would your attitude on those be at variance with that of the Department of Defence and its priorities?

Col. Langtry - It depends what their priorities were. Dr O'Neill and I discussed the list but I cannot hold it in my head. I have no great divergence from his viewpoint on this.

Mr ARMITAGE - I understand you mean from Dr O'Neill's submission.

Col. Langtry - It crossed my mind that I had no argument with that. I cannot recall it offhand, and I have not brought any notes about it.

Mr ARMITAGE - I refer again to aircraft carriers. One of my concerns has been about having all one's chickens in the one basket. After all, if you lose that you lose a big chunk of your armed forces. Dr O'Neill proposed that we should have a

container ship type of platform which could go to various points for landing and refuelling. Have you thought about that proposition at all?

Col. Langtry - That would be a cheap carrier.

Mr ARMITAGE - Yes, it would be very cheap.

Col. Langtry - Yes. If you are looking at a high performance modern carrier, such as the American type or the sophisticated English type, you are talking about a lot of money. If we could only afford one, that does mean a lot of eggs in one basket and I would have to regard it as being vulnerable. Therefore it is natural to look for an alternative, and wonder if we can have two operating plus one more and thus be less vulnerable. I was persuaded that if we had provided everything else and if there was still the question of the carrier, I would opt for three and not one.

Mr ARMITAGE - One in the Pacific Ocean, one in the Indian Ocean and one on refit.

Col. Langtry - Yes.

Mr ARMITAGE - Do you think the proposition for a container ship-type platform as a cheap way of doing it would be effective?

Col. Langtry - I am not a naval expert. There are persuasive arguments, that is all I can say. I take a rather different approach, though, to the question of a carrier. A carrier comes into focus really when you want to project power over a long range. In my reading of the various strategic bases it is not too clear whether we should in a sense hang our breeches on a long-range capacity to project power as being a fundamental element of our defence forces. I do not see it being at all feasible, for example, to convoy our trade from, say, the Persian Gulf area to Australia. America finds it cannot do much in that direction. It is bound to be able to do it as far as Europe. It is bound to be able to do it as far as Hawaii. It gives up the notion of being able to guarantee its trade routes wider than those areas. Japan has not developed a navy to protect its convoys of oil from the Middle East. It cannot afford it. It is not practicable to do it. So if a carrier is proposed with that as a major platform in the argument I would tend to knock it. If we are talking about a shorter range, then one is up against the argument: Could land based air power do it as well?

Mr ARMITAGE - Do you envisage that Australia could become involved in assisting if Papua New Guinea was attacked or was subject to terrorist activity? Secondly, do you believe - putting it quite bluntly - that if Papua New Guinea was attacked Australia should go to its assistance?

Col. Langtry - It is a very hard question to answer. First of all in anything to do with Papua New Guinea, there are enormous political and emotional ties between the two. I think if that situation occurred they would be major factors in deciding-----

Mr ARMITAGE - There is the defence aspect too.

Col. Langtry - From the defence aspect, the first point is that we should structure our forces and our defence posture primarily to look after ourselves. If something blows up in Papua New Guinea or any other country to which we feel inclined to give aid, it should come in the first instance from within our forces designed for the intimate defence of this country. In other words, I am saying we should not in any sense go overboard in developing capabilities on the supposition that we will fight in Papua New Guinea on behalf of Papua New Guinea. Secondly, one's mind does not have to wander too far to think of the sorts of trouble Papua New Guinea could get into in what is a very difficult terrain. There could be a question of very large numbers of ground forces involved by a person tangling with Papua New Guinea. It swallows up manpower. I would be very disinclined to offer assistance which would put us into major dependence upon Army operations with the risk that we would be sucked into a situation rather like Vietnam. Looking at it hypothetically, I would be inclined to look first at the assistance the Navy and Air Force could provide, more clinical assistance in the first instance than thinking of putting in the Army to resolve the position. But all of these things are dependent on what you have at the time, what happens at the time, and the context of it.

Mr ARMITAGE - Would you concede that Papua New Guinea could be of vital interest to Australia's defence?

CHAIRMAN - Do you mean from the point of view of an enemy establishing a base there and posing a threat to us?

Mr ARMITAGE - Yes.

Col. Langtry - I have looked at this from time to time. It is difficult to judge. It would be a disadvantage if an enemy was operating from Papua New Guinea, just as we would be disadvantaged by a nation across the border operating from West Irian. The distances you are talking about are notional; it is a line. So when does eastward become more important than westward? I am not too certain that we are talking about Papua

New Guinea. We should be talking about the whole of the island of New Guinea in strategic terms. I think then you alter your evaluation of how important Papua New Guinea in itself is.

Senator BISHOP - I suppose that question is related to what you think and perhaps your answers in camera about whether there are any possible short term or long range threats to Australia?

Col. Langtry - Generally speaking I do not see any imminent threats to Australia that are in any sense tangible. But I am mindful of the increasing violence in the world. I am mindful of terrorism. I am mindful of what can be done by small groups of people not even directly connected with another country. But it is what independent, quasi-national movements of one sort of another can do, and I do not see how we should assume that this country can go on untroubled in that context. From a strategist's point of view, it would be the height of folly not to assume that the worst would happen and therefore we should be able to do something about it rapidly and with sufficient numbers.

Mr ARMITAGE - Do you think that a wider debate on defence issues, which allowed for greater participation by civilian and uniformed officers of the Defence Department would increase public support for more and more expensive defence programs? In other words, as a public relations proposition in itself?

Col. Langtry - I think the support is there, if the case can be properly put.

Mr ARMITAGE - Would that be the way of going about it?

Col. Langtry - I do not see how in this modern day and age you can expect to get along with a highly secretive, bureaucratic decision-making process dealing with our defence on the assumption that the people will automatically respond to situations as they occur. You have to take them along with you the whole time. National security is the concern of everybody. Whilst I realise that some things cannot be said, an enormous amount can be said. We should be quite open about what we are doing; what we are hoping to do; how far the money might go; if we have this we cannot have that; or if you want both it is going to cost more. You must put the case.

Mr SCHOLES - Government policy, as announced by the Minister, is that the present poor condition of the Australian Defence Force should not be altered. Do you see that as a realistic approach to our future defence needs, given that the Defence Force will have not only to provide total defence but also a rapid response, surveillance and a fairly substantial maritime operation?

Col. Langtry - A concept for the defence posture of the country is emerging. As far as it has gone I have no great argument with it. I believe the emphasis of action against major threats should take place in a maritime environment, through a maritime strike. You cannot do anything without surveillance so that has to fit in. What does concern me is the concept of the defence of this country. What should it be? The fact is emerging that we certainly are not going to have a large standing army. The emphasis seems to be towards reserves of one sort or another. So that is making some progress. How do we employ these reserves and how do we see these reserves being equipped? To what extent will the desired operational concept affect their equipment and tactics? To what extent will the equipment dictate the concepts and tactics they will employ?

One is aware of the philosophy, and I think it is admitted publicly, that our Defence Force structure will be a two-tiered structure. The top tier will probably be composed of the Navy and Air Force and a relatively small element of the Army equipped with a long lead time and hard to get, costly, high technology equipments. The balance of the Force will be called up in the latter part of stage II and certainly in stage III. It will be equipped with a shorter lead time and less expensive though not necessarily less technologically sophisticated equipments. If the bulk of those stage III forces are to be put to use they will have to have a different posture and a different concept of operations. Probably one could argue that they will have to be smaller modular forces rather than divisions as we know them, armoured and mechanised. There will be a limit to the number of those.

Mr SCHOLES - Smaller modules were set out in one of the

papers which came out of your Centre about a year ago. We are more interested in whether the command structure of the forces is adequate to meet future demands or whether the changes advocated in some of the publications of the Strategic Studies Centre should be implemented. Should there be changes in other areas such as the introduction of a maritime and continental command structure? Should there be an integration of Force command at different levels from those of the Department of Defence?

Col. Langtry - I am attracted to the idea of a national security council. I would like, as a private citizen, to be able to look to a body which can be held accountable. This is a growing trend in the world. People are looking for greater public accountability. I would like to see some changes in our command and control organisation. For example, I would like to see a maritime commander commanding all of the resources necessary to do his job. He would be the man who could be held accountable for the emphasis he gives and the priorities he gives to the relevance of this type of capability in the Navy, to that type of capability of the Air Force, to that capability among the shore-based forces, in the discharge of his function as a maritime force commander. Similarly, I would like to see an air defence commander who would be charged with the responsibility for defending whatever is to be defended in this country in that sense, from the ground, from the air and so on. He would command people from the three Services. He would be the person whom a committee like this could question. At present there is a natural tendency for the Services to bid for fragments and make their own provisions. Nobody is saying that they do not want or need something to be part of their function. Dr O'Neill has said a lot more on this. I have arrived at my conclusion from rather a different standpoint from him but I have come up with the same answer.

Mr SCHOLES - Do you see a need for greater integration of our Defence Force operations with those of, say, New Zealand or

other countries in our region? Or do you see that as peripheral?

Col. Langtry - I do not regard it as entirely peripheral. It seems to me to make very good sense for Australia and New Zealand to co-operate, as they do to a large extent, for example, in surveillance of the Tasman Sea area. One should work in perhaps with the Americans and the Malaysians and accept a share of responsibility and collaborate to that extent. Wherever this is possible without any loss of national sovereignty or national feeling I would do it.

Mr SCHOLES - Currently do you think we would be able to move a substantial task force to any area of Australia and maintain it in operations over an extended period, with all of the backup material it would need, including tanks?

Col. Langtry - No. I think you will be getting a talk about this from Brigadier Coates. I did quote the Senate Standing Committee assessment that was provided by the Army. It is very poor. I might have got my figures wrong there. We have a very, very poor capability. One of the big elements, and I certainly noticed this when I attended exercise Kangaroo III, is the big deficiency in the logistics capacity support, as well as insufficient combat troops. The logistics capacity is not there, let alone over an extended range, to support something several hundred miles away from base areas.

Mr SCHOLES - You mentioned a second qualification on the number of reserves that would be available for call-up, that is those reserves who are already in occupations that would not be called up in a limited conflict because those occupations are fairly vital to defence anyhow. Do you think the reserves could effectively be called up at the moment? You mentioned 40 per cent being called up. Of the current nominal 22,000 Defence personnel the Minister has said that 21,000 are operational. Have you any information on that?

Col. Langtry - The terms can be misleading. The Minister often refers to them as being effective. The Army definition of effectiveness is that this particular soldier, regardless of his

background or his health and so on at the time, has attended the requisite number of camps and parades and therefore is eligible for an efficiency grant. He is effective but this does not necessarily mean that he would be available when called up.

There is a whole host of reasons. I have forgotten the figures now but of the number of young Australian men called up for national service, a frighteningly high figure was judged ineligible and unfit. If you take the unfit, plus the policemen, the public servants, a few people in industry - of which there are a lot in the CMF because it seems to attract that sort of person - will they be available?

Mr SCHOLES - If one in three are being rejected as unfit now-----

Col. Langtry - The usual figure is 40 per cent or 50 per cent but if it is not 40 per cent or 50 per cent, it is 30 per cent or 40 per cent - not below that.

Mr SCHOLES - If I can go back to your method of increasing the size of the Reserve. You mentioned 30,000 reserves with an extra 5,000 in five years. I doubt if you would get an extra 5,000 servicemen. Do you think the contract system and short service Reserve component offer to people some forms of incentives other than just salary - because they may well be able to get that outside? Would incentives be provided by cadetships to universities or something of that nature and help you obtain a fairly high degree of commitment to training? Would those incentives be valid means for encouraging the participation of technical people whom you would require in very great numbers or officers who would require a far greater capacity of training than you can get in three years?

Col. Langtry - You have touched upon one important feature - you certainly have to pay the going wages. On top of that it may be necessary to have certain fringe benefits but I have not thought them through. Since the ACMF system does not seem to be too effective, as matters stand, I am asking if there is another way of filling that gap. I propose we go to the community and put it to people that they can come into a reserve - a different reserve - where they can do training for six to eight months, or nine to twelve months and they will be paid very well in that period. They then will be contractually

obligated for call-out at very short notice for a limited period - it may be three years. A person may well say: 'That is no bad thing as far as I am concerned. I will take the risk of being called out. If I am called out I will not buck the issue - I will go.' One will never know until one tries it.

Senator BISHOP - How do you appoint your maritime commanders? Do you change the Defence Amendment Act and re-organise defence organisations to provide that? Do you do it by mutual arrangement between the present Chiefs of Staff?

Col. Langtry - I think the Chief of Defence Force Staff has the power to do it now, if he wishes. It is conceded that he will probably have to do it in wartime. It will be a joint force command - for example, it will be a field force with air force elements and perhaps the naval under its command or it will be a naval force with air force under command. I do not know but I imagine if he has it in that instance he could also do it now.

Senator BISHOP - You talked about logistics, supply and the difficulties in the exercises and in answering questions earlier you discussed roads and railways being imperfect. Do you see our present transport communications as being the main defect in respect to the defence of Australia?

Col. Langtry - I do. I am not an expert on it but I am advised on it. I have worked for a long time with Brigadier Phil Greville who wrote the chapter in the book and he has persuaded me that there are very serious bottlenecks.

Senator BISHOP - Which in particular?

Col. Langtry - Roads and railways, particularly rail. Rail is the big bulk mover of things, the economical way of doing it.

Senator BISHOP - How do you transport Army tanks and task forces from Puckapunyal to the west coast, for instance?

Col. Langtry - As matters stand, it is a very difficult problem to move the tanks across. One way, given the chance and the freedom of threat on the seas, is to take them round by ship and put them ashore.

Senator BISHOP - You talked about having weapons and equipment available in Australia. As you know, this Committee was very interested in the question of industrial support and made a report about it. We asked Dr O'Neill last week if he still thought that we had to maintain the maximum capacity to produce what we can produce within Australia. What is your view on defence factories being able to produce, if not the most sophisticated equipment, then reasonably effective equipment?

Col. Langtry - I agree, particularly in the context of deterrence. We must be seen to be able to do it. One cannot assume these days - in fact, we do not assume - that we will get support from outside under every circumstance.

Senator BISHOP - As I understand it, you consider that to be something we could be doing now, even before we determine what kind of mobilisation procedure to adopt?

Col. Langtry - I believe so.

Mr ARMITAGE - Do you favour an Australian Government offer to the United States of HMAS 'Stirling' as a home port, not as a base port?

Col. Langtry - No, not if by home port you mean a base such as on the Philippines, with accommodation, the whole lot, where they have a slice of our territory. I do not think it is necessary from the Americans' point of view and I think it is undesirable from our point of view. We are in a sense ceding some of our national integrity, our independence, unnecessarily. That is not to say that I do not think we should help the Americans all we can, but not to the extent of putting a base of that magnitude on our territory. I would want to ask them a lot of questions about where else they could go, and not put this country at such risk.

Mr SCHOLES - Cockburn Sound seems to me to have extreme limitations as a naval base because of the difficulties of entering it as a port and of dispersing naval units if it came under air attack, for instance. There is a 10-mile channel or thereabouts. Do you think that a major expansion of Cockburn Sound is militarily advisable?

Col. Langtry - I do not think I have the competence to answer that.

Mr SCHOLES - That is fair enough. I wanted to ask the question because it seems to be like putting a naval base at Port Melbourne where you have two hours sailing time to get to the sea. Cockburn Sound is not much different.

Mr ARMITAGE - How would we get our tanks up to the north west of Australia in the event of an emergency? How long would it take?

Col. Langtry - If it was the wet you would not be able to overland them; you would have to take them round by ships or you would have to put them into C130 aircraft and so on. It is a big problem.

Mr SCHOLES - There is no rail area in Australia that can take tanks unless you limit all other traffic and remove all adjacent stationing?

Col. Langtry - The problems are not insurmountable. It is a matter of examining the problems and setting a program to overcome them.

CHAIRMAN - I drove the Leopards when they were being tested and accidentally drove across a bitumen road. You should have seen what the tank did to that bitumen road. It made one hell of a mess of it. There are a few questions that we did not cover. Would you mind if we sent them to you for your written answers?

Col. Langtry - Not at all.

CHAIRMAN - Thank you very much indeed for your continuing interest.

Sub-Committee adjourned at 8.8 p.m.

CANBERRA

Friday, 2 May 1980

PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMMITTEE
ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE

Sub-Committee on Defence Matters
(Sub-Committee C)

Present

Mr Katter (Chairman)

Senator Bishop

Mr Armitage
Mr Bryant
Mr Neil
Mr Scholes

The Sub-Committee met at 8.35 a.m.
Mr KATTER took the chair.

Brigadier Henry John COATES, Director-General of Operations and Plans - Army, Department of Defence (Army Office), Russell Offices, Canberra, Australian Capital Territory, was sworn and examined.

CHAIRMAN - I call the Sub-Committee to order and declare open this public hearing. It may resolve itself into an in camera hearing. If we do go into camera at the request of a witness, the only person present with the Sub-Committee will be strictly the witness involved. We will have to clear the room of all others. This is regrettable because I am sure there are people present who are completely and utterly reliable and who would be interested in what the witness had to say, but I am obliged to recognise the very strict procedure.

May I say at the outset, on behalf of my Sub-Committee, that we accept the additional responsibility which we think our task involves considering the world situation. The work of this Sub-Committee will stimulate rational debate in Australia on defence matters.

We have on the Sub-Committee people of considerable experience in different avenues. We can go to consultants and to people such as the witnesses who are here today. The Sub-Committee recognises with pleasure how important these hearings today will be, because we believe the witnesses will draw the curtain aside and bring us into the picture so that we can look at it in relation to what we hear from people outside the departmental sphere. I refer to people such as Dr T.B. Millar, Dr R.J. O'Neill and the usual people such as Colonel Langtry, whose views one would expect to seek. It is refreshing to get a diversity of opinion so we can try to relate it to the existing circumstances within the Department.

Members of the Sub-Committee are inclined to be a little worried about the late arrival of the submissions to this hearing. None of us has yet seen them - we were offered the Navy submission only late last night. But the Sub-Committee

does recognise that the Defence Department - like most Government departments but much more so - labours under tremendous pressure. A note from the Minister was handed to me this morning expressing his regrets that the submissions were not available until so late last night. I think we all share a degree of understanding and hope that on future occasions we have submissions more quickly. Being unfamiliar with the contents of the submissions, we will have to go more closely into them. We consider this morning's contribution so important that if we have to go beyond the allotted time we will have to hold a further hearing rather than deal in an irresponsible manner with the submissions.

Brigadier, welcome to this hearing. We appreciate that where policy is concerned there are restrictions, so you will not be asked to comment on reasons for policy decisions, or the advice you may have tendered in the formulation of policy. You may at any time ask for certain parts of your evidence to be heard in camera and the Sub-Committee will give that due consideration. We have your submission, although we have not had time to peruse it. Do you wish to make any alterations to it?

Brig. Coates - No.

CHAIRMAN - Will you please read your submission?

Brig. Coates - Yes. My submission reads as follows:

COMBAT POWER IN THE AUSTRALIAN ENVIRONMENT

INTRODUCTION

1. GENTLEMEN, THIS PRESENTATION EXAMINES CURRENT PERCEPTIONS OF COMBAT POWER IN THE AUSTRALIAN ENVIRONMENT FROM ARMY'S PERSPECTIVE. IN PARTICULAR, IT EXAMINES ARMY'S CAPABILITIES AND LIKELY ROLE IN ANY FUTURE CONFLICT. WE DON'T KNOW WHERE OR WHEN THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE WILL NEXT BE INVOLVED IN COMBAT OR WHAT THE NATURE OF THAT COMBAT WILL BE. WHAT WE DO KNOW HOWEVER, IS THAT MODERN TECHNOLOGY PROVIDES THE MEANS OF WAGING WAR AT EVER INCREASING LEVELS OF INTENSITY AND LETHALITY.

2. THE PRESENTATION IS NOT RELATED TO A SPECIFIC SCENARIO, BUT IT DOES PREDICATE A LEVEL OF THREAT THAT WOULD REQUIRE AUSTRALIA'S BEING PLACED ON A WAR FOOTING, WITH AT LEAST SOME EXPANSION OF THE DEFENCE FORCE.

3. CONTEMPORARY WISDOM REGARDS A MAJOR THREAT TO AUSTRALIA IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE AS UNLIKELY. IT IS NOT MY PURPOSE TO DISCUSS THE PROBABILITY OR OTHERWISE OF THE POSTULATED THREAT, BUT IT DOES NO HARM TO RECALL THAT SUCH A THREAT WAS ALL BUT REALISED IN 1942. THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY PUNDITS OF THE LATE 1920S AND THROUGHOUT MOST OF THE 30S ALSO REGARDED THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MAJOR THREAT TO AUSTRALIA AS UNLIKELY; AS NORMAN LINDSAY CAPTURES IN THIS 1936 CARTOON. THE VILLAINS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED BUT APATHY FROM THE WORLD IN GENERAL AND AUSTRALIA IN PARTICULAR PREVAILS.

4. IN THE PRESENTATION I WILL DISCUSS SOME OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF MODERN WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT ON THE PLANNED DEVELOPMENT OF COMBAT POWER IN THE AUSTRALIAN ENVIRONMENT. IN DOING SO, I PROPOSE TO TOUCH ON A NUMBER OF RELATED MATTERS WHICH I BELIEVE CAN AFFECT THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR COMBAT CAPABILITY. FIRST LET US LOOK AT OUR DEFENCE POLICY AND FORCE STRUCTURE.

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE POLICY

5. OUR FORCE STRUCTURE AND CAPABILITIES ARE DETERMINED BY THE INTERACTION OF ROLES AND RESOURCES. THIS IS A CONTINUING PROCESS IN THAT, AS THE STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT CHANGES, SO ALSO MAY THE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES.

6. CURRENT POLICY REGARDING FORCE STRUCTURE PLACES EMPHASIS ON THE DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA AND ITS AREA OF STRATEGIC INTEREST. IT REQUIRES A CAPACITY TO BE ABLE TO EXPAND AS CIRCUMSTANCES DICTATE WHILST AT THE SAME TIME BEING ABLE TO UNDERTAKE A RANGE OF SHORT-TERM, LOW-LEVEL CONTINGENCIES. IT DOES NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF OPERATIONS, PARTICULARLY OF A CONTINGENCY OR PEACEKEEPING NATURE, BEING CONDUCTED IN AREAS REMOTE FROM AUSTRALIA AND ITS PERIPHERY.

7. ALTHOUGH THE MANIFESTATION OF A THREAT OF MAJOR MILITARY INCURSION INTO AUSTRALIAN TERRITORY WOULD CLEARLY WARRANT AUSTRALIA INVOKING THE ANZUS TREATY, CIRCUMSTANCES MAY PRECLUDE UNITED STATES OR NEW ZEALAND ASSISTANCE AT A SCALE AND WITHIN THE TIME THAT WE WOULD WISH. IN OTHER WORDS,

IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT AUSTRALIA WOULD HAVE TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS FOR SOME PERIOD WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT ASSISTANCE FROM ITS ALLIES. IN DISCUSSING OUR DEFENCE POLICY AND STRATEGIC CONCEPTS, THESE CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND.

8. WHILE WE HAVE NO IDENTIFIABLE THREAT WE HAVE A RANGE OF POSSIBLE THREATS. WE THEREFORE NEED TO PLAN TO DEVELOP AN ARMY CAPABLE OF RESPONDING TO THIS RANGE OF THREATS, SOME OF WHICH ARE REMOTE IN TIME AND PROBABILITY. WE MUST MAKE A JUDGEMENT ON THE BALANCE BETWEEN THOSE CAPABILITIES NEEDED TO MEET SHORT TERM CONTINGENCIES AND THOSE REQUIRED IN THE LONG TERM AND THEREFORE, TO BE INCLUDED IN THE FORCE-IN-BEING AS A BASIS FOR EXPANSION.

9. IMPLICIT IN THIS CONCEPT IS THE ASSUMPTION THAT WARNING TIMES OF FUTURE CONFLICT WILL BE ADEQUATE TO EFFECT EXPANSION. THE AMOUNT OF COMBAT POWER THAT COULD BE AVAILABLE AT ANY ONE TIME IS REDUCED BY WHATEVER RESOURCES ARE ALLOCATED TO PROVIDE FOR EXPANSION. I INTEND TO DISCUSS WARNING TIMES AND EXPANSION OF THE FORCE LATER. SUFFICE TO SAY NOW THAT THERE IS A NEED TO PRESERVE A BALANCE BETWEEN A COMBAT READY ELEMENT AND THE ELEMENT PROVIDING THE EXPANSION BASE.

10. GENERALLY, THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA ENVISAGES ACTIVITY TO MEET A THREAT IN THREE STAGES:

A. STAGE 1. DETERRENCE AIMED AT DISSUADING A POTENTIAL ENEMY;

B. STAGE 2. COMBAT OPERATIONS AIMED AT KEEPING OPEN SEA AND AIR COMMUNICATIONS AND PREVENTING A LODGEMENT;

C. STAGE 3. DEFEATING A LODGEMENT.

11. STAGE 1 INVOLVES ALL THREE SERVICES, AS WELL AS DIPLOMACY, ALLIANCES AND OTHER GOVERNMENTAL ACTIVITIES. DETERRENCE IN THE MILITARY SENSE IS NOT JUST A MATTER OF THE SIZE OF THE FORCE OR HOW IT IS EQUIPPED - ESSENTIAL AS THEY ARE. THE FORCE MUST ALSO HAVE, AND BE KNOWN TO HAVE, A HIGH ORDER OF MILITARY COMPETENCE, EXPANSION CAPACITY, ENDURANCE AND MORALE.

12. STAGE 2 IS PRIMARILY A MATTER FOR THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE, ALTHOUGH THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT OPERATIONS INVOLVING THE ARMY MAY HAVE TO BE UNDERTAKEN IN THIS PERIOD IN SUPPORT OF SOME COUNTRY IN OUR REGION. THIS DOES NOT NECESSARILY ENVISAGE A RETURN TO THE POLICY OF FORWARD DEFENCE WHICH WAS AN ESSENTIAL ASPECT OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM ERA, EVEN IF THIS WAS POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE. WHAT IT DOES MEAN IS THAT A SENSIBLE WAY TO PREVENT AN ENEMY FROM OPERATING IN CONTINENTAL AUSTRALIA IS TO DENY HIM THE USE OF BASE AREAS AROUND OUR STRATEGIC RIM AS SPRINGBOARDS FOR HIS ULTIMATE ASSAULT. THIS WILL OBVIOUSLY REQUIRE ADROIT DIPLOMACY: IT MAY ALSO REQUIRE OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF OUR ALLIES NOT ONLY IN THE IMMEDIATE

REGION, BUT PERHAPS EVEN FURTHER AFIELD IN ORDER TO PRE-EMPT OR CONTAIN AN EVENTUAL THREAT TO AUSTRALIA. THIS REQUIRES US TO RETAIN AND REFURBISH OUR SKILLS IN TROPICAL WARFARE AND IN PARTICULAR JUNGLE WARFARE. STAGE 3 IMPLIES THAT STAGE 1 AND STAGE 2 HAVE BEEN LESS THAN FULLY SUCCESSFUL, AND ITS CONDUCT IS PRIMARILY AN ARMY RESPONSIBILITY. IN PRACTICE THE STAGES WOULD TEND TO OVERLAP.

13. I WOULD LIKE TO INDICATE TO YOU THE STRUCTURE OF THE ARMY AND DEVELOPMENTS TAKING PLACE AT THE PRESENT TIME.

14. AT AN AUTHORIZED CEILING OF 32,010 FOR THE REGULAR ARMY, THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY IS AT ITS HIGHEST EVER PEACE-TIME, ALL VOLUNTEER STRENGTH. SINCE 1973 THE ARMY HAS BEEN ORGANIZED ON A FUNCTIONAL BASIS THAT INCLUDES THREE MAJOR COMMANDS, WHICH HAVE UNITS SPREAD THROUGHOUT AUSTRALIA, AND SEVEN MILITARY DISTRICTS WHICH ARE ORGANIZED ON A STATE BASIS AND PERFORM ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS THAT ARE ESSENTIALLY STATE ORIENTED.

15. THE THREE MAJOR COMMANDS (EACH COMMANDED BY A MAJOR GENERAL) ARE FIELD FORCE COMMAND, LOGISTIC COMMAND AND TRAINING COMMAND; THE FUNCTION OF EACH BEING INDICATED BY ITS TITLE:

A. FIELD FORCE COMMAND, SOME 12,500 STRONG, INCLUDES THE FIGHTING ELEMENTS OF THE ARMY PLUS THOSE ELEMENTS REQUIRED FOR THE IMMEDIATE LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF THE COMBAT UNITS IN THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS.

B. LOGISTIC COMMAND CONSISTS OF THE GENERAL SUPPORT LOGISTIC UNITS AND INSTALLATIONS IN AUSTRALIA.

C. TRAINING COMMAND IS RESPONSIBLE FOR INDIVIDUAL TRAINING THROUGHOUT THE ARMY. IT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR INITIAL RECRUIT TRAINING AND FOR THE SUBSEQUENT SKILL AND SPECIALIST TRAINING CARRIED OUT BY THE VARIOUS SCHOOLS, SUCH AS THE CORPS SCHOOLS, THE LAND WARFARE CENTRE AT CANUNGRA AND THE ARMY STAFF COLLEGE.

16. THE 22,700 MAN ARMY RESERVE IS INTEGRATED INTO THESE THREE COMMANDS, WITH THE GREATER PROPORTION IN THE FIELD FORCE.

17. THE COMMAND THAT IS OF MOST INTEREST TO US IS THE FIELD FORCE AND WITHIN THAT COMMAND THE MAJOR REGULAR ARMY ELEMENT IS THE FIRST DIVISION. A DIVISION IS INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTED AS THE BASIC SELF CONTAINED ORGANIZATION ON WHICH ARMIES ARE STRUCTURED AND DEFENCE CREDIBILITY ASSESSED. OUR FIRST DIVISION IS NOT A COMPLETE DIVISION BUT IT PROVIDES A FRAMEWORK FOR TRAINING IN PEACE AND A BASIS FOR EXPANSION IN TIME OF THREAT. THE COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS STRUCTURE OF THE DIVISION PERMITS FLEXIBLE INTERNAL GROUPINGS TO COPE WITH VARYING OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS. THIS FLEXIBILITY IS EXPLOITED BY USING TASK FORCES TO ACCOMPLISH SPECIFIC MISSIONS.

18. WITHIN FIRST DIVISION WE HAVE THREE TASK FORCES - THE FIRST, THIRD AND SIXTH TASK FORCES BASED IN HOLSWORTHY, TOWNSVILLE AND BRISBANE RESPECTIVELY. EACH IS BASED ON TWO INFANTRY BATTALIONS - FULLY MANNED, THEY WOULD HAVE THREE BATTALIONS - WITH ARTILLERY, ENGINEER AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT. THE MAIN NON-DIVISIONAL UNITS OF THE FIELD FORCE ARE:

A. AN ARMOURED REGIMENT EQUIPPED WITH LEOPARD TANKS;

B. TWO CAVALRY REGIMENTS EQUIPPED WITH LIGHT ARMOURED VEHICLES, ONE OPERATES AS A RECONNAISSANCE REGIMENT, THE OTHER AS AN ARMOURED PERSONNEL CARRIER REGIMENT;

C. A SPECIAL AIR SERVICE REGIMENT, A LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE UNIT LOCATED IN PERTH; AND

D. AN AIR DEFENCE REGIMENT AT WOODSIDE, SOUTH AUSTRALIA.

19. ALTHOUGH BASED ON A STANDARD INFANTRY DIVISION, THE FIRST DIVISION IS CURRENTLY UNDERGOING MODIFICATION WHICH WILL PROVIDE GREATER DIVERSIFICATION IN CAPABILITY, ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING. MORE PARTICULARLY IT WILL ENABLE THE ARMY TO DEVELOP VERSATILITY OF OPERATION OVER A WIDE RANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES, AND TO MAINTAIN A FLEXIBLE BASE FOR EXPANSION.

20. TO THIS END A PRIMARY ROLE HAS NOW BEEN ALLOTTED TO EACH TASK FORCE AND IT WILL ORGANIZE, EQUIP AND TRAIN FOR THAT ROLE. THE TASK FORCES HAVE ALSO BEEN ALLOCATED SECONDARY

TRAINING ROLES TO ENSURE THAT THE APPROPRIATE RANGES OF SKILLS ARE RETAINED WITHIN THE ARMY. IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THIS DEGREE OF SPECIALIZATION WILL NOT DETRACT FROM THE CAPABILITY OF ANY OF THE THREE TASK FORCES TO OPERATE AS PART OF A STANDARD INFANTRY DIVISION SHOULD THE NEED ARISE.

21. AS ANNOUNCED RECENTLY BY THE MINISTER FOR DEFENCE, 6TH TASK FORCE WILL CONTINUE IN THE STANDARD INFANTRY ROLE WITH ONLY MINOR CHANGES TO ITS ORGANIZATION. IT IS TO CONCENTRATE ON WARFARE IN OPEN COUNTRY ALTHOUGH IT WILL STILL RETAIN THE CAPABILITY TO OPERATE IN OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES.

22. THE 3RD TASK FORCE IN TOWNSVILLE IS TO RECEIVE AN ADDITIONAL 600 - 700 MEN TO BRING IT TO FULL OPERATIONAL STRENGTH AS A TWO BATTALION TASK FORCE, INCLUDING ITS INTEGRAL COMBAT AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT ELEMENTS. IT WILL BE ORGANIZED ON LIGHT SCALES AND WILL PROVIDE THE READILY DEPLOYABLE AIR PORTABLE ELEMENTS WHICH WILL BE NEEDED IN LOW LEVEL CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS. THE 3RD TASK FORCE WILL ALSO TRAIN IN THE TECHNIQUES OF OPERATING IN THE TROPICAL PARTS OF AUSTRALIA AND ITS AREAS OF INTEREST.

23. WITHOUT DETRIMENT TO ITS CAPABILITY TO DEPLOY FOR OTHER TASKS, THE 1ST TASK FORCE AT HOLSWORTHY IS TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR DEVELOPING THE SKILLS AND TECHNIQUES REQUIRED FOR MOBILE OPERATIONS APPROPRIATE TO AUSTRALIAN CIRCUMSTANCES. IT WILL WORK CLOSELY WITH THE 1ST ARMOURED REGIMENT AT PUCKAPUNYAL IN VICTORIA.

24. WHILE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEVELOPING EXPERTISE IN AMPHIBIOUS DEPLOYMENT WILL REST WITH 6TH TASK FORCE, ALL THREE TASK FORCES WILL TRAIN WITH THE RAN IN THESE TECHNIQUES USING SUCH RESOURCES AS THE NEW AMPHIBIOUS SHIP, HMAS TOBRUK.

MANPOWER AND EXPANSION

25. IT WILL BE OBVIOUS TO YOU THAT THE ARMY AT TODAY'S STRENGTH CANNOT DEAL WITH ANYTHING OTHER THAN QUITE LOW LEVEL CONTINGENCIES. WHILE WE CAN DEPLOY A BATTALION GROUP FAIRLY QUICKLY AND SUSTAIN IT INDEFINITELY IN THE FIELD, IT WILL TAKE MUCH LONGER TO DEPLOY A TWO BATTALION TASK FORCE OF ABOUT 3,000 MEN. THE TASK FORCE WOULD NEED TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY ITS LOGISTIC SUPPORT GROUP AND POSSIBLY A FORCE HEADQUARTERS, THUS THE TOTAL DEPLOYED FORCE (EXCLUDING RAAF AND NAVY COMPONENTS) WOULD BE IN THE ORDER OF 4,700 MEN. HOWEVER IT WOULD BE BEYOND OUR CAPABILITY TO SUSTAIN IT FOR A PROTRACTED PERIOD. YOU MAY RECALL THAT AN ARMY SIZE OF ABOUT 45,000 WAS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN A THREE BATTALION FORCE OF ABOUT 7,000 MEN IN VIETNAM. WE WOULD THEREFORE NEED SUBSTANTIAL EXPANSION OF THE ARMY IF WE WERE TO CONTEMPLATE MORE EXTENSIVE OPERATIONS.

26. I WOULD NOW LIKE TO MAKE SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE AUSTRALIAN ENVIRONMENT.

27. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS HAVE A MAJOR BEARING ON THE DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA. THEY ARE WELL ENOUGH KNOWN, BUT LET ME SUMMARIZE THE SALIENT POINTS:

A. FIRST, AUSTRALIA IS PRINCIPALLY A LARGE ISLAND MASS WITH AN EXTENSIVE COASTLINE EQUIVALENT TO HALF WAY ROUND THE WORLD. PERHAPS THE SIZE IS BEST ILLUSTRATED BY THESE COMPARISONS WITH CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE.

B. LARGE AREAS OF THE COUNTRY ARE EXTREMELY ARID, ALTHOUGH FROM DECEMBER TO APRIL THE NORTHERN HALF AROUND THE COASTAL STRIP IS SUBJECT TO CYCLONIC RAINS CAUSING SEVERE FLOODING.

C. APART FROM THE OIL AND NATURAL GAS IN BASS STRAIT AND COAL DEPOSITS IN THE SOUTH EAST, MOST OF OUR NATURAL RESOURCES, FOR EXAMPLE IRON ORE DEPOSITS, ARE LOCATED IN THE NORTH AND WEST REMOTE FROM THE MAJOR POPULATION AND INDUSTRIAL CENTRES.

D. THE POPULATION OF JUST OVER 14 MILLION IS SMALL RELATIVE TO THE LAND AREA AND TO OTHER POPULATIONS IN THE REGION, AND IT IS HIGHLY URBANIZED.

E. THE PRINCIPAL DEFICIENCY IN STRATEGIC RAW MATERIALS IS OIL; THERE ARE ALSO DEFICIENCIES IN CERTAIN ELEMENTS REQUIRED IN THE MAKING OF SPECIALIZED ALLOYS.

F. THE INDUSTRIAL BASE AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT DEFENCE IS SMALL AND UNSOPHISTICATED COMPARED WITH, SAY, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY AND NORTH AMERICA. AND FINALLY,

G. THE TRANSPORT COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM IS SPARSE PARTICULARLY IN THE NORTH AND THE WEST.

AND NOW, ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND THE NATURE OF THE THREAT

28. LET ME TRY AND DESCRIBE THE CAPABILITIES A FUTURE ENEMY WOULD REQUIRE TO UNDERTAKE A MAJOR INCURSION INTO AUSTRALIAN TERRITORY. A NOTIONAL ENEMY WOULD NEED TO POSSESS A RANGE OF CAPABILITIES, WHICH CAN BE DEDUCED AS FOLLOWS:

A. HE MUST HAVE PORT AND AIRFIELD FACILITIES. PROBABLY LOCATED IN THE ISLAND CHAIN TO OUR NORTH.

B. HE WOULD HAVE TO POSSESS A CONSIDERABLE SHIPPING CAPACITY INCLUDING LOGISTICS OVER THE SHORE AS WELL AS A CAPACITY TO PROTECT A LARGE NUMBER OF TRANSPORTS IN TRANSIT.

C. HIS LAND FORCES WOULD BE BALANCED AND HIGHLY MOBILE - WITH ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES AND TROOP CARRYING VEHICLES, PROBABLY SUPPORTED BY TROOP CARRYING HELICOPTERS AND/OR PARACHUTE UNITS.

D. HIS AIR FORCE WOULD NEED TO BE CAPABLE OF ACHIEVING LOCAL AIR SUPERIORITY, AND WOULD INCLUDE GROUND ATTACK, RECONNAISSANCE, ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE AND TRANSPORT ELEMENTS.

E. HE WOULD HAVE AN EFFECTIVE ELECTRONIC WARFARE CAPABILITY. THAT IS THE CAPACITY TO DETECT OR INTERCEPT OUR RADAR AND RADIO EMISSIONS AND TO JAM THEM OR DESTROY THE EMITTER.

AND

F. WE SHOULD NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT AN ENEMY OF THIS GENERAL CAPABILITY WOULD HAVE CHEMICAL WARFARE WEAPONS.

29. AN ENEMY WOULD NEED TO OVERCOME A CONSIDERABLE LOGISTIC PROBLEM, FOR EXAMPLE THE SUPPLY AND STORAGE OF FUEL AND WATER. AS A RELATIVELY MOBILE FORCE IT WOULD NEED ABOUT 150 TONNES OF FUEL AND 200 - 250 TONNES OF WATER FOR EACH 10,000 MEN EACH DAY.

30. THE ENEMY FORCE WOULD BE WELL TRAINED, WITH HIGH TECHNOLOGY EQUIPMENT (PROBABLY THE EQUAL OF OUR OWN). POSSIBLY IT WOULD BE A SECOND RANKING POWER AND A CLIENT OF ONE OF THE MAJOR POWERS. NO REGIONAL POWER HAS THIS CAPABILITY AT PRESENT, BUT THE YOM KIPPUR WAR HAS DEMONSTRATED HOW QUICKLY THAT CAPABILITY CAN BE ACQUIRED AND ASSIMILATED.

31. THE ENEMY CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS MIGHT BE ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

A. FIRST A DECEPTION STRATEGY TO CREATE A MIS-LEADING IMPRESSION OF HIS CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS;

B. CONCURRENTLY HE WOULD BE GATHERING INTELLIGENCE;

C. HE WOULD LAUNCH A CAMPAIGN OF ANTI-AUSTRALIAN PROPAGANDA TO NEUTRALIZE OR ALIENATE WORLD OPINION;

D. HE WOULD SECURE ESSENTIAL BASES FROM WHICH OPERATIONS AGAINST AUSTRALIA COULD BE MOUNTED AND MAINTAINED;

E. HE WOULD BUILD UP LOGISTIC SUPPORT IN HIS FORWARD BASES;

F. HE WOULD SEEK TO ESTABLISH SEA CONTROL AND AIR SUPERIORITY, INCLUDING THE INTERDICTION OF AUSTRALIA'S SEA, LAND AND AIR COMMUNICATIONS;

G. NEXT THERE WOULD BE A LODGEMENT IN ONE OR MORE LOCATIONS (THIS MAY INCLUDE THE OCCUPATION OF CERTAIN OFFSHORE AUSTRALIAN TERRITORIES, EITHER AS A PRELUDE OR SIMULTANEOUSLY);

H. THIS WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY THE BUILD UP OF FORCES IN THE AREA OR AREAS OF LODGEMENT; AND FINALLY,

I. THERE WOULD FOLLOW THE BREAK OUT, AND/OR THE PURSUIT OF NEGOTIATIONS WHILST STILL IN POSSESSION OF AUSTRALIAN TERRITORY.

FROM ALL THIS WHAT ARE THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY'S REQUIREMENTS

32. CONSIDERATION OF OUR ENVIRONMENT AND THE CHARACTERISTICS OF A NOTIONAL ENEMY CAN PROVIDE US WITH SOME POINTERS TO OUR OWN REQUIREMENTS, PARTICULARLY IN RELATION TO DEFEATING A LODGEMENT. I PROPOSE TO DEAL WITH THESE UNDER THE HEADINGS OF OPERATIONAL ASPECTS, LOGISTICS ASPECTS AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS.

OPERATIONAL ASPECTS

33. AN ENEMY HAS A WIDE CHOICE OF POSSIBLE ENTRY POINTS TO AUSTRALIA MANY HUNDREDS OF KILOMETRES APART AND WE SHOULD ANTICIPATE THAT BEFORE THE ACTUAL LODGEMENT OR LODGEMENTS ARE MADE, HE WOULD PRACTISE DECEPTION TO DRAW OUR FORCES INTO THE WRONG PLACE. WE THEREFORE NEED A FULLY INTEGRATED SYSTEM OF SURVEILLANCE AND A HIGH LEVEL OF STRATEGIC MOBILITY TO DEPLOY AND REDEPLOY OUR FORCES RAPIDLY OVER LONG DISTANCES.

34. DESPITE WHAT IS NORMALLY A VERY EFFICIENT INTELLIGENCE SERVICE AND ACCESS TO THE OUTPUT OF SOME OF THE MOST MODERN SURVEILLANCE DEVICES, THE ISRAELIS WERE CAUGHT NAPPING AT THE START OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR. SURPRISE WAS ACHIEVED LARGELY THROUGH DECEPTION MEASURES. NEVERTHELESS IT INDICATES HOW QUITE A COMPREHENSIVE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM CAN BE MISLED.

35. THE AUSTRALIAN SURVEILLANCE PROBLEM IS SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT. AN ENEMY WOULD BE INVOLVED IN A RELATIVELY LENGTHY APPROACH BUT COULD CHOOSE TO MAKE A LANDING AT ONE OR MORE OF MANY PLACES OVER A WIDE FRONTAGE. THERE IS A NEED FOR OVER-THE-HORIZON-RADAR, LONG RANGE MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT AND SO ON. THERE IS ALSO A NEED TO DEVELOP A REGIONAL MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE NORTH OF AUSTRALIA TO AUGMENT COASTAL SURVEILLANCE AND PROVIDE THE OPERATING KNOWLEDGE OF AN AREA NEEDED, BEFORE AND DURING THE EMERGENCE OF A THREAT. HAVING RECOGNIZED THAT NEED, ARMY IS EXAMINING THE FEASIBILITY OF APPLYING PART OF THE AUTHORIZED INCREASE IN ARMY RESERVE STRENGTH TO THE RAISING OF ONE OR TWO NEW RESERVE UNITS IN THE NORTH AND NORTH WEST.

36. NOW WHAT ABOUT STRATEGIC MOBILITY TO ENABLE THE ARMY TO REACT TO AN INCURSION? FIRST, WE NEED A NATION-WIDE INFRASTRUCTURE OF AIRFIELDS, PORTS, ROADS AND RAILWAYS WITH AIRCRAFT, SHIPS, ROLLING STOCK AND ROAD TRANSPORT TO USE IT. AS I HAVE DISCUSSED IN OUR CONSIDERATION OF THE AUSTRALIAN ENVIRONMENT, OUR TRANSPORT COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM PARTICULARLY IN THE NORTH AND NORTH-WEST IS AT PRESENT SPARSE TO SAY THE LEAST. IT IS BEING IMPROVED BUT OBVIOUSLY IT WILL TAKE MANY YEARS TO MAKE ANY SIGNIFICANT IMPRESSION. IT IS ALSO WORTH NOTING IN PASSING THAT A GREAT DEAL OF MODERN SHIPPING IS NOT IDEAL FOR THE SUPPORT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN REMOTE AREAS. IT HAS BEEN AGREED THAT OUR NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE SHOULD BE DEVELOPED.

37. IN ORDER TO REACT AND DEPLOY QUICKLY OVER LONG DISTANCES AS IMPLIED BY THE TERM STRATEGIC MOBILITY, A FORCE HAS TO BE HIGHLY MOBILE AND PROBABLY AIR MOBILE. TO ACHIEVE THIS, ITS EQUIPMENT MUST BE LIGHT.

38. AS WELL AS STRATEGIC MOBILITY WE ALSO NEED TACTICAL MOBILITY - THAT IS THE ABILITY TO MOVE AROUND THE BATTLEFIELD. TACTICAL MOBILITY IS ONE OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF COMBAT POWER AND IS CONFERRED IN A GENERAL SENSE BY THE USE OF TANKS, ARMOURED PERSONNEL CARRIERS, WHEELED VEHICLES AND AIRCRAFT.

39. WE THUS HAVE TWO CONFLICTING FORCE STRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS. WE REQUIRE HEAVY FORMATIONS WITH HIGH COMBAT POWER (THAT IS FIREPOWER AND TACTICAL MOBILITY) BUT SUCH FORMATIONS TEND TO HAVE LIMITED STRATEGIC MOBILITY. ON THE OTHER HAND, LIGHT FORMATIONS ARE MORE EASILY DEPLOYED BUT ARE GENERALLY LOWER ON COMBAT POWER. THIS HAS LED US TO ADOPT TWO ORGANIZATIONS - A LIGHT, READILY DEPLOYABLE REACTION FORCE - 3 TASK FORCE - AND A HEAVIER FOLLOW UP FORCE BASED ON 1ST TASK FORCE.

40. THE GREATER NEED IN THE FUTURE FOR DISPERSION INDICATES A NUMBER OF EQUIPMENT NEEDS. CLEARLY WE REQUIRE GOOD COMMUNICATIONS WHICH MAY HAVE TO OPERATE IN A HOSTILE ELECTRONIC WARFARE ENVIRONMENT. WE ALSO NEED TO COVER GAPS WITH AN ALL WEATHER SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM AND A CAPACITY TO BRING FIRE TO BEAR ON ENEMY INTRUSION - PERHAPS HEAVY

SURFACE ARTILLERY FIRE, ARMED HELICOPTERS AND HIGHLY MOBILE COUNTER PENETRATION FORCES. IN FACT DISPERSION REINFORCES THE NEED FOR TACTICAL MOBILITY.

41. ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY HAVE REACHED THE STAGE WHERE THE CAPABILITY OF ARMIES TO "SEE", MOVE AND FIGHT AT NIGHT IS NOT MUCH LESS THAN THAT OF DAYTIME. CONTINUOUS OR ROUND-THE-CLOCK OPERATIONS ARE NOW TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE AND ARE AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THE WARSAW PACT CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS WHICH ENVISAGES SUFFICIENT FORCES AND ENDURANCE TO FIGHT DAY AND NIGHT UNTIL VICTORY HAS BEEN ACHIEVED. IT IMPLIES OVER-WHELMING MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT SUPERIORITY IN QUANTITATIVE TERMS, AND IT ALSO IMPLIES CONSIDERABLE USE OF NIGHT FIGHTING AIDS AND OF COURSE TROOPS TRAINED IN NIGHT OPERATIONS.

42. APART FROM THE FORCES OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT, THE CAPACITY OF MOST COUNTRIES TO ENGAGE IN CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS OF A HIGHLY MOBILE NATURE, IS MINIMAL. LOGISTIC CONSIDERATIONS LIMIT THE CAPACITY OF MOST ARMIES UNDERTAKING CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS BEYOND, SAY, TWO OR THREE DAYS AND EVEN THEN THE ABILITY TO REPLACE LOSSES IN MEN AND MATERIEL QUICKLY IS NOT HIGHLY DEVELOPED. A WELL DEVELOPED CAPACITY TO FIGHT AT NIGHT DOES NOT OF ITSELF CONFER A CAPACITY FOR CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE POINT SHOULD BE MADE THAT A CAPACITY TO FIGHT TO BEST EFFECT AT NIGHT IS A HARD WON SKILL REQUIRING HIGH TECHNOLOGY AND TROOPS TRAINED TO EFFECTIVELY EXPLOIT ITS ADVANTAGES.

43. I NOW WANT TO MENTION BRIEFLY THE USE OF FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN THE GROUND ATTACK ROLE IN SUPPORT OF GROUND TROOPS. WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THAT THESE VERY VALUABLE AIRCRAFT WOULD BE USED IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF ARMY OPERATIONS AS WE HAVE GROWN TO EXPECT IN THE PAST. NOT ONLY WOULD THEY BE VULNERABLE TO MISSILE AND OTHER DEFENCE MEASURES BUT THEY WOULD PROBABLY BE NEEDED FOR HIGHER PRIORITY TASKS ELSEWHERE.

44. BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR, AMONG OTHER COUNTRIES, HAVE BEEN DEVELOPING THEIR ARMED HELICOPTER FORCES. ARMED HELICOPTERS EQUIPPED WITH MODERN WEAPONRY AND FLYING NAP OF THE EARTH ARE A VERY POTENT WEAPON SYSTEM AND ARE RELATIVELY HARD TO DESTROY. I DOUBT IF WE COULD AFFORD A HELICOPTER LIKE THE NEW AMERICAN ATTACK HELICOPTER BUT WE CERTAINLY COULD EXAMINE THE USE OF SOME OF OUR EXISTING HELICOPTERS IN SUCH A ROLE, IF REQUIRED.

45. SUMMING UP OUR DEDUCTIONS FROM THE OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS, WE CAN SEE A NEED FOR A LAND BASED SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENT, A READILY DEPLOYABLE REACTION FORCE AND A HEAVIER FORCE, GOOD COMMUNICATIONS, LONG RANGE FIRE POWER AND A NIGHT FIGHTING CAPABILITY. THE FORCE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO CALL ON THE SUPPORT OF FIGHTER GROUND ATTACK AIRCRAFT TO THE EXTENT IT COULD IN THE PAST BUT ARMED HELICOPTERS IN CONJUNCTION WITH LONG RANGE ARTILLERY COULD BE AN EFFECTIVE SUBSTITUTE FOR MANY TASKS.

LOGISTICS ASPECTS

46. THERE ARE FORMIDABLE LOGISTICS PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS OVER MUCH OF THE AUSTRALIAN CONTINENT - PARTICULARLY IN THE NORTHERN HALF. THAT AN ENEMY WOULD HAVE SIMILAR OR PERHAPS WORSE PROBLEMS IN NO WAY DIMINISHES OUR OWN. PROBLEMS INCLUDE:

A. THE CONSIDERABLE DISTANCE THAT EXISTS FROM THE SUPPORT AREA IN THE SOUTH-EAST;

B. THE VULNERABILITY OF THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION, PARTICULARLY SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION;

C. THE LACK OF PORTS, ROADS, AIRFIELDS AND RAILWAYS;

D. THE DIFFICULT NATURE OF MOST OF THE TERRAIN FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS INCLUDING THE EFFECTS OF DUST OR FLOODS;

E. THE LACK OF AN ASSURED WATER SUPPLY IN MUCH OF THE AREA FOR MUCH OF THE YEAR;

F. THE LACK OF ESTABLISHED BASE FACILITIES IN LIKELY AREAS OF OPERATIONS; AND

G. THE PROBABLE DISPERSION OF UNITS.

47. A DIVISION IN OPERATIONS NEEDS, AS A ROUGH GUIDE, ABOUT 400 - 600 TONNES OF ASSORTED SUPPLIES EVERY DAY. SEA IS AN ECONOMICAL WAY TO MOVE LARGE TONNAGES TO THE AREA OF

OPERATIONS PROVIDED THAT THE SEA LANES CAN BE SECURED. HOWEVER, THERE ARE FEW DEVELOPED PORTS AND THERE IS A LARGE TIDAL RANGE ALONG MUCH OF THE COAST. A LOGISTICS OVER THE SHORE CAPABILITY WHICH WE NOW HAVE WITH THE HEAVY LIFT SHIP WILL BE AN ESSENTIAL ADJUNCT.

48. DISTRIBUTION WITHIN THE AREA OF OPERATIONS MUST BE BY ROAD AND AIR. THERE ARE SOME RIVERS THAT COULD BE USED IN A MINOR WAY TO AUGMENT ROAD AND AIR, BUT IN THE MAIN THEY ARE UNRELIABLE AND THEIR POTENTIAL IS LIMITED.

49. LOGISTIC COMPLEXES WITHIN THE AREA OF OPERATIONS WILL BE VULNERABLE TO ENEMY ATTACK AND DESTRUCTION. DISPERSION WITHIN THESE COMPLEXES WILL BE ESSENTIAL.

50. AUSTRALIA IS ABOUT 70% SELF SUFFICIENT IN LIQUID FUELS. THIS DEGREE OF SELF SUFFICIENCY MAY INCREASE IF FURTHER DISCOVERIES ARE MADE AND SOME ESTIMATES IN THIS REGARD ARE PROMISING. HOWEVER, THERE WILL ALWAYS BE A NEED FOR AUSTRALIA TO IMPORT HEAVY BASED CRUDE OIL FOR SUCH PURPOSES AS HEAVY MACHINERY LUBRICANTS.

51. IN SUMMARY, THE LOGISTIC DIFFICULTIES CAN BE OVERCOME, BUT THE AVAILABILITY OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT MAY WELL BE THE MAIN LIMITING FACTOR ON THE NATURE AND SIZE OF THE FORCE COMMITTED TO OPERATIONS, AS WELL AS THE SCALE, INTENSITY AND DURATION AT WHICH OPERATIONS CAN BE SUSTAINED.

ECONOMIC ASPECTS

52. MOST HIGH TECHNOLOGY EQUIPMENT IS VERY EXPENSIVE BUT ACQUISITION CAN OFTEN BE JUSTIFIED ON COST EFFECTIVENESS GROUNDS. THUS A HARPOON MISSILE COSTING ½ MILLION DOLLARS CAN OFFER A HIT PROBABILITY OF BETTER THAN 50% AT A RANGE OF GREATER THAN 50 MILES AND CAN DESTROY QUITE A LARGE SHIP COSTING PERHAPS $100 MILLION DOLLARS OR MORE. AGAIN THERE IS A TOW MISSILE COSTING ABOUT $4000 THAT WITH A 90% PROBABILITY OF A HIT CAN DESTROY A TANK COSTING 1 MILLION DOLLARS. THESE TWO EXAMPLES ILLUSTRATE A HIGH LEVEL OF COST EFFECTIVENESS AND THEIR ACQUISITION OR THE ACQUISITION OF COMPARABLE WEAPONS WOULD OBVIOUSLY ENHANCE COMBAT POWER.

53. OPINIONS VARY AS TO THE EXTENT THAT EQUIPMENT CAN SUBSTITUTE FOR MEN IN BATTLE BUT WHENEVER THE NEXT WAR OCCURS AND WHATEVER SHAPE IT TAKES, THERE ARE COGENT REASONS TO BELIEVE THAT AUSTRALIA'S FORCES MAY HAVE TO BE SMALLER THAN SAY THOSE WE FIELDED IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR. NOT LEAST IS THE COST OF EQUIPPING A LARGE FORCE TO EVEN THE MOST BASIC SCALE. WE MUST BE PREPARED TO USE ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY TO SUBSTITUTE FOR MANPOWER WHENEVER POSSIBLE.

WARNING TIMES

54. THE PROCESS OF ORDERLY EXPANSION TO MEET A THREAT RELIES ON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DAY PERCEIVING THE THREAT AND TAKING THE APPROPRIATE POSITIVE ACTION IN SUFFICIENT TIME TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY FORCES WHEN REQUIRED. THIS IS SELF-EVIDENT BUT DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS ARE HISTORICALLY NOT NOTED

FOR THEIR ABILITY TO PERCEIVE THREATS AND TAKE TIMELY ACTION. *THERE HAVE BEEN SOME UNOFFICIAL STUDIES MADE RECENTLY OF THE* PERIOD OF TIME THAT ELAPSES FROM PERCEPTION OF A THREAT TO POSITIVE GOVERNMENT ACTION TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT. WHETHER ONE ACCEPTS THE DETAIL OF THE STUDIES OR NOT, THE OVERALL CONCLUSIONS PAINT A SOMBRE PICTURE AND CONFIRM THE CONTENTION THAT NATIONS OF GOOD WILL ARE INVARIABLY ILL PREPARED FOR WAR. AS AN INSTANCE, IN THE 1939-45 WAR IT WAS NOT UNTIL 1943 THAT AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRY BECAME PROPERLY GEARED TO DEFENCE PRODUCTION. THE DIVISIONS SENT OVERSEAS TO THE MIDDLE EAST AND MALAYA IN 1940 AND 1941 RELIED HEAVILY ON BRITISH EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED IN THEATRE.

55. THE CAPACITY OF OUR FORCE TO EXPAND TO MEET A THREAT DEPENDS ON THE PERIOD OF WARNING, THE SIZE OF THE EXPANSION BASE AND THE SIZE OF THE OBJECTIVE FORCE THAT WE ARE AIMING FOR. WHAT EMERGES FROM ALL THESE CONSIDERATIONS IS THAT THE PERIOD OF WARNING MAY BE INADEQUATE FOR INDUCTING MANPOWER TO THE FORCES, AND EQUIPPING AND TRAINING IT, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE ANTICIPATED CONSTRAINTS ON GOVERNMENT ACTION. THE SIZE OF THE OBJECTIVE FORCE REFLECTS THE NATURE AND SIZE OF THE THREAT. THE ONE VARIABLE OVER WHICH THE GOVERNMENT HAS CONTROL IS THE SIZE OF THE EXPANSION BASE, INCLUDING THE CAPACITY FOR RELATIVELY SHORT TERM REACTION. A CASE CAN BE *MADE THAT THE PRESENT BASE LEVEL NEEDS TO BE RAISED, AND* INDEED IT IS WITH THE ANNOUNCED EXPANSION OF THE ARMY RESERVE.

CONCLUSION

56. TO SUMMARIZE, WE ARE DEVELOPING OUR STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL MOBILITY AND OUR ABILITY TO REACT QUICKLY TO DISTANT AREAS. THE SPECIALIZATION BEING INSTITUTED WITHIN THE TASK FORCES OF 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION WILL PROVIDE A BASIS FOR GREATER FLEXIBILITY OF RESPONSE INCLUDING THE CAPABILITY TO DEPLOY LIGHTLY EQUIPPED READY REACTION FORCES AND TO FOLLOW THEM UP, IF REQUIRED, WITH FORCES MORE CONVENTIONALLY AND HEAVILY EQUIPPED. IN CONSIDERING THE LIGHT REACTION FORCE, IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT MODERN WEAPONRY CAN CONFER ON SUCH FORCES CONSIDERABLE STRIKING POWER. THE SAME FORCE COULD ALSO BE DEPLOYED QUICKLY OVERSEAS IF CIRCUMSTANCES AROSE THAT REQUIRED SUCH ACTION.

57. I HAVE INDICATED THE IMMENSE LOGISTIC PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS OVER MUCH OF AUSTRALIA, PARTICULARLY IN THE NORTH AND WEST. FROM AN OVERALL NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POINT OF VIEW, AS WELL AS FOR PURELY DEFENCE PURPOSES, THERE IS A NEED TO PRESS AHEAD WITH BUILDING UP OUR TRANSPORT FACILITIES.

58. FINALLY I BRIEFLY DISCUSSED WARNING TIMES IN TERMS OF OUR CAPACITY TO EXPAND, EQUIP, AND TRAIN A FORCE TO MEET A THREAT. THERE CAN BE LITTLE DOUBT THAT THE CONSTRAINTS ON A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT TAKING POSITIVE AND EFFECTIVE ACTION TO PREPARE FOR WAR, ALL TOO MANIFEST IN THE PAST, WILL CONTINUE AND INCREASE IN THE FUTURE.

CHAIRMAN - Thank you. I am sure there is a host of questions to come. Rather than go question by question I will ask the basic questions and you can go ahead on the basis of that particular question. Also, no doubt, you have many questions of your own to ask. I would like to clear up one matter which seems to have come up during many of our hearings, not under this monitoring role, but prior to that. This is the size of the expansion base. I think this is becoming more fundamental and certainly more significant with the trend of world events. Do you feel that the size of the expansion base, first of all, is adequate, and the means to expand it are approaching adequacy?

Brig. Coates - I think that in terms of the sorts of threats we are facing up to now, the size of the expansion base which was in the 1976 White Paper - a 36,000 man army manned to 34,000 - would be adequate. It really depends on the warning times we expect. We believe, for the type of high level contingency that I was postulating, we would need an army of about 250,000. That is about five divisions. We believe that to reach that figure we would need about five years in order to have a relatively well trained army of roughly that size. The size of the army might vary, depending upon our perception of threat. In general terms, provided we are guaranteed that sort of warning time, we believe that the size of the base that I referred to would be adequate.

Mr NEIL - I am interested in this expansion base from the point of view of deterrents, not only from the point of view of our capability eventually, if we do expand. Is it correct to say that the size of your force at any particular time requires a potential enemy to make an assessment of the strengths he would need to overcome your particular force? I take it that is a fundamental question.

Brig. Coates - Yes, I think at any point of time that is correct. We would work on the ratio - and I regard this as a rule of thumb, but it has been established by historical practice if by nothing else - that you can probably see off an enemy three times the size of your defending force. So if, for example, we were ultimately considering in Australia a five division force - something of that nature - we would believe that we could see off

a force of about 15 divisions. That is a very large force to try to transport to Australia. So at any time, extrapolating down from that worst case, the size or the plateau of the force that you have at that time, has to be able to contend with whatever threat you think is on the horizon.

Mr NEIL - If an enemy looking at Australia today, looked at one division that we have - I will exclude reserves for the time being - would it be fair to say that he would look in terms, if he had the capacity, of using three divisions?

Brig. Coates - Yes, I think if you were postulating that sort of enemy he not only has to have the capacity, he has to have the intent. We just do not see any enemy at the moment that does have both of those factors in his arsenal.

Mr NEIL - A potential enemy looking at the situation today would look at the need to have a minimum of three divisions, bearing in mind our expansion capability. He would be looking at 15 divisions at such a stage as we might have five divisions available. Is that the way the numbers work?

Brig. Coates - As a general rule of thumb that would be the way the numbers work. Our perceptions of threat have to be ahead of his ability to put those sorts of forces around our coast.

Mr NEIL - If the Army Reserve in some way or another is expanded substantially and maintains a reasonable level of capability, would an enemy, when making his estimates of our situation, consider our order of battle to include the Reserve forces?

Brig. Coates - Yes, he would. As far as we are concerned the Reserve forces have precisely the same functions and roles as the Regular Army. They provide part of the expansion base.

Mr NEIL - Is it correct to say, as a very rough rule of thumb, that for every factor by which we expand our own forces, including our Reserve forces, we force a potential enemy to plan a theoretical requirement of an increase by a factor of three?

Brig. Coates - It would probably be of that order. He would have to make a value judgment of the efficiency and effectiveness of the Reserve vis-a-vis the Regular Army in Australia, and indeed the effectiveness of the whole force. He would have to make that value judgment.

Mr NEIL - If we had a force that consisted of one Regular and two reasonably competent Reserve divisions he has to start looking at nine divisions. Is that right?

Brig. Coates - It gets back to the question of value judgment. It depends on the effectiveness he attributes to Reserve forces as against Regular forces, remembering of course that they get far less training time each year and simply cannot be as proficient. It would take longer to get them up to snuff, so to speak.

Mr NEIL - I am trying to work out the extent to which the expansion of our order of battle is likely to result in a significant increase in our deterrent capability, whether or not there is the same physical increase on the ground in Australia.

Brig. Coates - I think it would proceed in the way I said earlier. The enemy has to look at what our forces are like, how they are structured, how effective they are and how long it would take to flesh them out to their proper size, remembering that even in the 1st Division at the moment we have the framework of a

division rather than a full division. So the most appropriate answer is that it will depend on your threat perception, the degree to which you expand and his perception, as a value judgment, of the effectiveness of your forces. So you need to keep ahead of the game. You need to be ahead of his ability to expand or move towards you.

Senator BISHOP - In the light of your answer this morning are there urgent things we should do first? Is it a question of being able to steadily develop the forces you have mentioned this morning, having regard for the obstacles and logistic support and transport and so on, or do we need to do something urgently in respect to surveillance, transport or support before we face either a major threat or a minor threat?

Brig. Coates - We believe that the sorts of things we are doing now, particularly the creation of the Operational Deployment Force, do provide an immediate first line, cutting edge against the sort of enemy we might have to face up to now, which essentially is a low level enemy. At the same time we should be fairly prudently building up our capacity for surveillance, particularly in the northern part of the continent. We are looking at the raising of new Reserve units in the northern part of the continent. These will not be structured in precisely the way in which our current conventional infantry battalions are structured. They will have a much greater surveillance and reconnaissance role. At the same time we do need to look at our transport infrastructure, as I said in my presentation, one of the problems is the need to move around quickly. The Operational Deployment Force can do that because it is basically air mobile. But once you start to move heavier forces it takes longer and your threat perceptions have to be much keener. If you want to move tanks from Victoria up to the north you have to do that ahead of the game or you have to pre-position them somewhere in the north from where they can react in various directions.

CHAIRMAN - My questions constitute a formal attempt to develop the submission. I have about 12 questions here.

The present financial and manpower constraints prevent desirable changes being made to the command structure of the Army. That may seem an obvious statement but would you give us your reactions to that?

Brig. Coates - If we were considering fighting a large scale war in Australia then we would probably see the need for several Joint Force Headquarters in various parts of Australia that could control operations in that segment of Australia. We are not facing that threat and we do not believe we will be for a considerable period.

CHAIRMAN - Would that involve much greater funding?

Brig. Coates - It would involve much greater funding and it would involve the creation of headquarters for the sorts of contingencies we believed we had to face. We have been looking at this during exercises such as Kangaroo III and other exercises held the previous year. We were looking at an alternative to a joint force headquarters, which you would really need to control a major operation. We used basically the headquarters of the principal Service involved and then augmented it with the Navy and Air Force representation we might need in order to get all three Services into the act. We did that by using, in one case, a task force headquarters which was augmented by Air Force and Navy representation. This acted as a joint forces headquarters. During exercise Kangaroo III we used the headquarters of the 1st Division as a joint force headquarters and added elements to it. We believe that in the short term and for low level and perhaps medium level contingencies those sorts of headquarters would be adequate. If we move to something more extreme then that we will need to create joint force headquarters.

CHAIRMAN - I notice, more particularly in the latter part of your submission, you mention the necessity for some concentration on the north and north west. I, for one, do not have to be convinced of that. The three Army task forces are presently concentrated on the eastern seaboard. What are the advantages and disadvantages of this arrangement as opposed, for example, to locating an Army command in Darwin, where we have practically nothing from any of the Services?

Brig. Coates - I think it is probably more important that we have the capability to move a headquarters to Darwin, if we need it, rather than to have the units there at the moment. There is no doubt from the Army's perception that we need to retain a greater presence in the north and we intend to do that by the Reserve measures that I mentioned and also by exercising in the northern part of Australia more frequently than we have done in the past. There is a penalty in doing that in peace time in that it costs money to get there. As to actually stationing forces there right now, I do not believe that we see the need but we do see the need to deploy there very quickly and we would be looking to an organisation like the Operational Deployment Force to get there quickly. Then if we need to build it up we could move the heavier forces, which by that time would have greater warning, so we are not going from a cold start in every direction.

CHAIRMAN - What about the theory that is put forward by some of our more eminent theorists in relation to the distribution of logistic bases at this stage? I do not mean grand structures, I mean something on which you could concentrate if an emergency does arise, rather than having to go from point A which could be down in Adelaide somewhere to an emergency that might arise up around Darwin or the Gulf of Carpentaria.

Brig. Coates - If you are talking about low level contingencies - which we would perceive to be the sort of problem at the moment - you do not really need large bases in the north to combat them because a lot of your dependency can be on the local infrastructure for combat supplies such as water, food and POL. In the event that you are facing up to something more substantial than that, you would need to do some stocking in the north. For example, you would probably need to move something to a place such as Tennant Creek which on the map allows you to go in three directions - back into Queensland, north to Darwin or north-west into the Kimberleys. So those areas as focal points logistically would become increasingly important.

Mr BRYANT - There has been a general theme running here which I would like to see expanded. The general theme ever since

I started to take note of military affairs, which is some time back, has been a pessimism about our capacity to do things. I can see the 5-year problem, that is, we are setting out in peace time gradually to expand our forces to be able to put 250,000 men in the field - 250,000 people, I suppose you have to say these days. It is not a great problem, either by conscription or enlistment. I can recall that they managed to get 80,000 into the citizen forces back in 1938 or 1939. One of the weaknesses seems to me that we have no practice structures. If I look up the records of the 1914 situation when the old universal training system had just got underway, or even the 1939 one, there was a formidable paper strength on the ground, with some skeleton forces, which must have had an effect upon a potential enemy when they looked at it. Potential enemies looking at us will say, firstly, that we have 14 million and, secondly, that we can call up so many people. And they would have to look at something like our fighting record, whatever it is, in their considerations. So when looking at the north it seems to me that the substantial mining projects in the north-west of Western Australia running through to Arnhem Land, Cape York and Mount Isa would give us a substantial support base for the maintenance of equipment, even if not exactly its manufacture. How do we judge those fitting into our scene? The industrial civilian support would be a major logistical consideration, surely? Is it all lined up?

Brig. Coates - Yes. We have had a series of logistic exercises and we did just that. For example, we looked at a place like Gove and we found that Gove from our points of view has about six months reserves for the towns people which really the Army could tap into.

Mr BRYANT - Are they reserves of fuel and things like that?

Brig. Coates - Yes. Therefore the only things that we would be required to move up would be our immediate spare parts and ammunition. The normal run of combat supplies and hospital facilities would allow you not to have to move massive logistic organisations up there. In fact we could move the Operational

Deployment Force very rapidly and then tap in to the local infrastructure for many of the things that we need to sustain ourselves in that area.

Mr BRYANT - If you put the armoured division in one of these areas - I have not been to look at areas such as Port Hedland, could those areas keep it in business with general minor things that need to be done to that sort of heavy equipment?

Brig. Coates - When you are talking about tanks, as you well know, you are talking about a more sophisticated piece of kit. Many of those things are inherent in the Armoured Regiment itself. It takes its own technical support squadron which can, for example, do almost anything for the tanks within that regiment, save rebuilding them. It can replace major unit assemblies such as engines, power packs, gearboxes and so on, therefore most of that would be there. The lighter vehicles could be put out to local industry for repair and indeed food and other essentials could be got from that local area.

Senator BISHOP - As to the mobility of the units that Mr Bryant is talking about - whether they are personnel carriers, light cover vehicles or tanks - I suppose you are faced then with a longer transportation time. In the case of the tanks it would take weeks and weeks to organise, would it not?

Brig. Coates - It would take us 11 days to get tanks from Puckapunyal to Mount Isa on the railway. We would need some priority to do that but essentially it would take us 11 days to do it. We would then need to position transporters, say, at Mount Isa to feed them up to Darwin or wherever we wanted them.

Senator BISHOP - You mentioned Gove. If you decided to transport them to Gove would it require an operation by sea?

Brig. Coates - It would have to be an operation by sea. We would need the 'Tobruk'.

Senator BISHOP - That means it would not be a quick operation.

Mr SCHOLES - How long would that take?

Brig. Coates - I may need to ask one of my naval colleagues but I think it would take about two weeks to get them to Melbourne, get them loaded and get them around. But again I think we would be operating against warning times and threat perceptions. If you are going to use tanks you are going to have a pretty sizable enemy against which to use them.

Mr BRYANT - I will just take up that matter of 11 days. It is not very flattering to a railway system, is it - even the Queensland one. I refer to capacity. I suppose it is very difficult to organise a real exercise if you decide to shift a squadron there just for practice. Every railway system between Puckapunyal and Mount Isa would have to stop in its tracks for a day or so as you went through, would it? What is the hold up?

Brig. Coates - Not necessarily. For example, we held a series of exercises at Woomera and in order to get the tanks out there they had to come up through Sydney and then go west through Cobar and so on. But that did not seem to cause the railways any significant disruption. They carried on their operations. I do not know what they were saying under their breaths but the tanks got there on time. They moved there without a great deal of dislocation.

Mr SCHOLES - We transported Centurion tanks from Melbourne up to Bonegilla at one time and the railways had to move every piece of railway equipment out of every siding between Melbourne and Bonegilla. The tanks would not go through the sidings with trains or trucks in the adjacent sidings because they were too wide.

Brig. Coates - I take the point. There is no doubt that we would need priority but if we were talking about some emergency I hope we would have that.

Mr NEIL - Have we rehearsed road and sea moves of tanks to Darwin or Gove?

Brig. Coates - We have not done so yet because the cost of doing it in peace time is very large. For example, we planned an exercise that we were going to undertake either in western New South Wales at Cobar or at Woomera. The difference in costs for

the same exercise was a quarter of a million dollars. They are pretty substantial funds, of which we do not have much to spend.

Mr NEIL - Although no doubt these tanks are excellent there is still an impression in the public mind, albeit inaccurate, that the capacity to move the tanks over long distances is doubtful. The usual example is Darwin. Would it not be worth while, as a matter not of public relations but of testing the system and at the same time dispelling any apprehension from the public mind, for us to embark upon such an exercise? It could be part of an exercise held up there, not done just for its own sake.

Brig. Coates - We could do that. The doubt could be dispelled by alternative means, however. As I said we could move a tank with the 'Tobruk', we could move it by tank transporter or we could move it by rail. There are three different options. Admittedly all of them take time but the problem is really one of conquering distance. It is a long way to go.

CHAIRMAN - When I was Minister and we did the ordinary routine operation of taking the tanks to Selheim to be tested, we were all agreeably surprised at how quickly they were brought into the area by rail.

Mr SCHOLES - I have two questions about the size of the force. The basic assumption is we have about 31,000 permanent Army personnel, between 20,000 and 22,000 Reserve personnel and I assume, although they are not counted in the figures, about 5,000 or 6,000 recently non-reinlisted personnel who are sufficiently close to their training periods and would have sufficient Service life left to be available if they were desperately required. Firstly, are those 21,000 persons assessed to ascertain what percentage would not in fact be available to the armed forces because their current positions would be deemed high requirement occupations, so they would be maintained in their civilian positions as a matter of national consequence? Secondly, do we at present have sufficient reserve equipment adequately to equip a force the size of the one which is notionally in being at the moment, without taking into consideration any expansionary factors?

Brig. Coates - If we were to flesh out the 1st Division now we could equip it except for a couple of areas, but we would have to redistribute equipment from elsewhere to do it. Regarding your first question, we do make provision for that in the Regular Army Emergency Reserve. There is no doubt that over recent years we have allowed that to reduce in size. In about 1973 it was over 500; it moved down to about 100. We are on the way now towards re-expanding it. We let it reduce for purely economic reasons and the lack of a threat. Now with a greater threat perception than we had before - not a direct threat but the uncertainties which are occurring in places such as Afghanistan - we are looking very actively at increasing the size of the Regular Army Emergency Reserve.

Mr SCHOLES - Regarding warning times, almost all the material I have read deals with a basically European situation. Because of the obvious geographic advantages which Australia has in defending itself against a potential enemy, do you see that time lapse being elongated because of the need to build up a transport capacity?

Brig. Coates - In a sense I do, but I would also say that where a major land threat is concerned Australia is more insulated than anywhere else. We have that advantage. As I read it, however, we have entered an era of uncertainty in Afghanistan, Iran and on the Sino-Vietnamese border, for example, where changes are occurring in a far more revolutionary than evolutionary manner. We have reacted to that partly by increasing the size of the Army Reserve from 22,000 to 30,000. Such a mechanism reflects precisely what we say we are going to do.

Mr SCHOLES - There is, I believe, an overconcentration on the potential threat to the north. Obviously the north is convenient to what we would see as a potential enemy. Would it, however, be relevant to a potential enemy who was seeking to make a major - not a minor - incursion against Australia to land on the north or north-west of Australia? If the capacity existed to make an initial landing, would not military planners be looking at making that landing at a point where a bridgehead would be of ultimate value strategically and also would foreshorten the supply lines which needed to operate?

Brig. Coates - Yes, there are two ways in which we would look at it. The first is that the protection of the heartland of Australia, down in the south-east corner is, of course, extremely important because that is where most of our industry is located. But we would be very ill-advised to concentrate purely on the protection of the heartland because if someone did lob in Darwin or the Kimberleys they might have no intention of going all the way to the heartland. It might be a case of resources diplomacy. They might want to get hold of an area in the north-west, grab it and stay there and not move south. If, in our planning and the preparation of our capabilities, we had denied ourselves the ability to react to that sort of incursion then we would be very badly placed. So we have to have a bet both ways. There would be the possibility of someone trying to seek bases much closer to Australia, for instance in New Guinea, with the aim of making landfall on the north Queensland coast and then moving south towards Sydney. But at the same time I do not think we can deny the possibility of a landing in the north-west by an enemy with no intention of coming any further than that. The enemy might simply colonise that area and utilise it. Therefore we must be able to get there.

Mr SCHOLES - What Army forces are now positioned in Darwin or any other part of the north-west, excluding the Townsville region?

Brig. Coates - The only force in that area at the moment is the 7th Independent Rifle Company in Darwin. We intend that all of those forces, which are Army Reserve forces, will be expanded.

Mr ARMITAGE - How many personnel are in that Company?

Brig. Coates - In the 7th Independent Rifle Company there are about 150, but the number is growing.

Mr NEIL - You talked about people lobbing in. If somebody lobs in 500 people lightly equipped with small arms and mortars and they turn up in Gove on a merchant ship or submarine totally unexpectedly, take over the town, sit there for six months because there is plenty to live on, grab hold of the plant and start talking about resources, diplomacy and embarrassing us in the

eyes of the world, not necessarily with a further military objective but as part of a propaganda assault upon Australia, what would be our capacity to get rid of them?

Brig. Coates - If our intelligence service had not picked up the possibility of that, it should have done so. If it did not, then that would be a classic commitment for the Operational Deployment Force. That is frankly what it is being structured for. In other words, it would be able to move very quickly. It would not need to use a port. It could go in by air. That would be the first force to handle that situation. If that did not work we have a heavier follow-up force. Meanwhile, the heavier force would be prepared and moved by sea with its tanks.

CHAIRMAN - This would involve the development of suitable airstrips. I remember during World War II our intelligence people were able to tell us that the Japanese at any rate would pick the worst possible areas and the worst possible times to come in. Presumably this could happen again so we would need many more all-weather airstrips than we have at the moment, unless you are visualising a parachute landing or helicopters.

Brig. Coates - We would be using helicopters. We would probably stage initially through Darwin by Hercules medium range transport aircraft. But from there we would be air mobiling and supplying by air.

Mr ARMITAGE - I will give an example of a possible scenario, keeping in mind the development of our gas reserves in the North West Shelf and the possible development of oil reserves further out on the Shelf. If an enemy decides to move in with a comparatively small force, to cut down our industrial capacity, how long do you think it would be before you could move in and take action to repel such a force? The same thing would apply of course in other northern areas. I am thinking of some outlandish movement which wants to set an example, not only to Australia but to the world, of its capacity and accordingly makes a landing in the boom area with this purpose in mind.

Brig. Coates - We would be able to have a battalion of the

ODF moving in a matter of days rather than weeks. I believe that we would continue to pile on. That is, of course, assuming we had no prior intelligence of that happening. The number of times that something like this is going to happen out of a very clear blue sky would be limited. We would have some perception that someone was intending to do that. He has to stage from somewhere to get there. We hope to get an intelligence assessment that will allow us at least to decrease the reaction or warning times needed by our forces before they can move.

Mr ARMITAGE - Do you think we would be there within a week?

Brig. Coates - No, I prefer not to say that. I would prefer to answer that later, if you really want specific information.

Mr BRYANT - When we airlifted from Darwin we got 30,000 to 40,000 people out in about four days.

Mr ARMITAGE - You mention the increasing of the Army Reserve from 22,000 to 30,000.

Brig. Coates - Yes.

Mr ARMITAGE - In view of the wastage which occurs now, how practical is that? How many years will it take, in view of the extraordinary wastage which occurs now?

Brig. Coates - Undoubtedly the wastage rate is high. At the moment for every 1,000 net increase we need to recruit 7,000. It is a ratio of about 1 : 7.

Mr ARMITAGE - So we need to recruit 56,000 people?

Brig. Coates - It is going to be a case of 'suck and see'. I think that with the plans that we have for the Reserve, the more significant role it will have and the greater availability of equipment - I believe we will just have to wait and see.

Mr ARMITAGE - Would you have to look at the improvement of conditions of service for a Reserve in order to enhance the capacity to hold men and women? For example, would you have to consider pay conditions, et cetera?

Brig. Coates - We are looking at this all the time. We are actively considering that particular matter at the moment.

CHAIRMAN - If an Australian task force were committed to a limited operation - short of war - would the Army not find itself short of junior leaders? That is taking into account a need for follow up or relieving units and perhaps a need to assist progressively with the training of a larger army which could then, in the sequence of events, be called up. What would the position be regarding junior leaders?

Brig. Coates - I do not believe that this would be an immediate problem, remembering that at the moment we are increasing the size of the Operational Deployment Force and increasing the size of its battalions to full war strength. We would have to reinforce that deployed task force from other task forces, as we needed to. I do not believe it would be an exceptional problem.

CHAIRMAN - There is a khaki sort of atmosphere building up. This Committee has always aimed at a much greater sensitivity among the people of Australia to defence generally. We regret the circumstances, but we accept that there is a new atmosphere in the air, we hope, in relation to public responsibility concerning defence. Have you been able to detect - and I would be interested to know from each of the Services - whether there has been greater enthusiasm for enlistment, and a building up of the tempo?

Brig. Coates - There is evidence of a very recent trend: Greater interest and awareness among people applying for, for example, the Royal Military College, Duntroon, et cetera. We have no lack of applicants for Duntroon; the application rate is very high indeed.

CHAIRMAN - What is your opinion of the Babbage study? This has often come up, naturally, in relation to the two and a half to five years suggested to provide a trained force of 150,000, or the old four to eight years suggested to provide a force of 250,000, which I think is a little outdated now. Your earlier comment indicates that you have a somewhat different attitude now.

Brig. Coates - I think the study that we apply mostly is a departmental study of 1975. This postulates that from our present strength it would probably take us two years to move to 38,000 men, and this would be with no dilution at all of the present standards. We would be aiming particularly to consolidate the training of middle ranking officers in that two years. It would take another year to move to 50,000 which would flesh out, certainly, the whole division, and more than that. There would be a further year to move to 75,000, and another year to 250,000. So I think that the departmental study and Dr Ross Babbage's study, in their essentials, are about the same. Dr Babbage is saying it would take four to eight years to go to 250,000; the departmental study is saying it would take five years to go to 250,000. I think that the latter figure is fairly accurate from our point of view. This is keeping in mind the fact that you would have to keep 'recycling' people to provide a greater training base as you increased the pyramid size of the force. So it would take, in our opinion, about five years to reach 250,000.

CHAIRMAN - Recognising the fact that we will always need ground forces in fairly substantial numbers, is it your opinion that, as we are looking at five years - and God knows what can happen in five months under the present circumstances - we should be concentrating on the more technological side of warfare and new generation-type facilities? We are talking about the Harpoon - is it now $500,000? I remember the Minister saying some months ago it was $300,000, so apparently that item has gone up considerably in price. Within our limited finances should we

be creating more specialised facilities - and I do not want to break into the Academy argument - to produce people who are highly trained in the scientific side of warfare? This might compensate for the lack of the required numbers of ground forces, et cetera. In other words, should we have science versus the more conventional type of facilities?

Brig. Coates - I would like to say that from the Army's perception, the Army's trained manpower is its greatest resource. I think the difference perhaps between us and the other two Services is that we tend to equip the man whereas the Air Force and the Navy tend to man their equipment. That is a broad generalisation. There is no doubt that we must examine areas where we can get technology to take over from manpower and we are doing this. But I think there is an elastic limit to that. There is a threshold almost below which you simply cannot go. An infantry battalion must cover ground; it must be able to hold ground, and to do that you need men. You can certainly give yourself a greater edge by using weapons of high technology, but nevertheless, there are many parts of Australia where infantry battalions, for example, will always be needed. This is despite the fact that in other areas it might be more cost effective, and certainly more economical in manpower, to use a mechanised battalion. But even then I would say that there is a threshold below which you cannot go.

CHAIRMAN - Perhaps I have given the impression that I am referring more to the 'Flash Gordon' type of warfare. Let us find a compromise. I remember well General Lawson's rundown on the new organisation of the task force in Britain. I was particularly impressed by the number of helicopters that are attached to that task force and armed, I think, with Milan missiles. Is that right?

Brig. Coates - Yes.

CHAIRMAN - What about that 'in between' area - between the laser-type of new generation weaponry and the ordinary, conventional artillery, et cetera? Are we going into that? Are we likely to have that type of support?

Brig. Coates - As I said in the presentation, I think, from the Army's point of view - because we do not believe, with the high cost of modern fighter aircraft, that we are going to get a lot of them to help us - we certainly need to be looking at armed helicopters, for example. This includes, eventually, armed helicopters that are equipped with the sorts of missiles to which you refer.

At the moment we do not have a need. In the RAAF we still have helicopters which, with add-on equipment, can act as armed helicopters. They do not have things like the TOW missile or the Milan missle. If we needed to do so we could introduce these very quickly because they are items which have been in service, are proven and can be made add-ons, for example to an Iroquois helicopter, as the Americans have done. So if we had the need we could do it.

CHAIRMAN - I am not familiar with the TOW missile. Would you be able to give us something on it?

Brig. Coates - Yes. TOW is an acronym.

CHAIRMAN - Is it a particular missile?

Brig. Coates - Yes, it is. It is tube launched, optically tracked and wire guided. It is basically an anti-tank missile with a range of just over 3,000 metres.

CHAIRMAN - Is that a shoulder weapon?

Brig. Coates - No, it is too big for that. It is either ground mounted on a tripod or it can be helicopter mounted. It is essentially a long range, anti-tank weapon. For example, in World War II we had enormous problems in New Guinea with massive Japanese coconut log bunkers. The only way we could really deal with them was by using tanks but it was very difficult to move tanks around New Guinea. But with a TOW missile fitted in an armed helicopter you could stand off and whack something like that at about 3,000 metres, provided you can get through the canopy. Usually you can because in order for the enemy to fire out he has to clear fields of fire. So that if we were faced with that type of contingency, it would be a very effective weapon system.

Mr ARMITAGE - Where are they used?

Brig. Coates - Most of the American attack helicopters in Europe are equipped with the TOW missile. They use them very much in a tank destruction role, to supplement their tanks. There is an enormous exchange ratio between them and the Russians. It is something like 12 : 1 in tanks so they have to try to make

up the edge. One of the ways in which they are endeavouring to do this is with attack helicopter units equipped with TOW missiles.

Mr SCHOLES - During a presentation on exercises last year it was suggested that the most effective weapon against tanks is in fact tanks. Do you see the helicopter, because of its mobility, as a major substitute? How far has the armed helicopter system been developed? You have mentioned the Americans and I understand the Russians have gone a long way further than that.

Brig. Coates - Both of those countries have integrated the armed helicopter, particularly the tank-destroying helicopter, into their armouries. But I do not think either of them really thinks they are in any way an effective substitute for tanks. They are supplementary to tanks and they are particularly valuable when you have wide flanks and you are trying to hold someone on your flank. Their ability to rough it when a major tank battle is going on is yet to be tested but I do not think anyone seriously contemplates using them in that way.

Mr SCHOLES - Throughout your submission you mention high technology equipment. There is an argument that a small quantity of quality equipment is not necessarily as effective as greater amounts of lower level equipment. Given that we will probably have to expand our Defence Force by 10 and that this larger Defence Force will have to be protected and armed, do you see a high-low level mix of equipment as valid for the Australian Army? What low level equipment have we in the pipeline? What are the lead times for large quantities of low level equipment as opposed to the long lead times required for high technology equipment?

Brig. Coates - The lead times for low level equipment, which is basically protective equipment and small arms and so on, are not great. We do not have many problems in manufacturing those in Australia, or we would not have a problem in doing so. But the other part of the question is most important. I do not believe that we can easily have a poor man's conventional force. If we are confronting a first class enemy we ourselves need first class weaponry. Therefore, although I see territorial forces as

extremely useful for the static protection of air fields, key points and ports, I do not believe we would be wise to contemplate using those more lowly equipped forces to confront a major enemy in the open field. I repeat that I do not believe you can have a poor man's conventional force in that sense.

Mr SCHOLES - Are we considering or have we considered the use of fuel-air explosives as a primary offensive weapon for the Army?

Brig. Coates - We are monitoring very closely the American development of fuel-air explosives, particularly their cannon launched and helicopter launched fuel-air explosives. At the moment we do not have a requirement for it but it is not a highly sophisticated thing to produce provided you have the plans necessary to produce it. The best thing for us to do is to make sure that we have the capability to produce it in Australia but not necessarily to do so, or certainly not right now.

Mr SCHOLES - Will the type of artillery with which we are going to replace our medium artillery have the capability which is now being built into modern artillery pieces, of operating with a wide range of weapons systems, as opposed to conventional artillery?

Brig. Coates - Yes, it will. We are actively considering the replacement of our present medium artillery. If we did replace them we would replace them with medium artillery which would be longer range, have higher rates of fire and a greater capacity to produce a greater variety of weapons including, for example, Copperhead. This is a cannon launched, guided projectile that can be terminally directed onto a target using a laser designator. All of those capabilities would be inherent in the artillery pieces we chose, and we would be able to move to that.

Mr BRYANT - Can I go back to that manpower question? I take it that the prime element involved in getting our strength up to 250,000 is producing the officers and NCOs required. Is there anything to be said for training them separately, for starting a program and giving them special training?

Brig. Coates - I think it is very difficult to train commanders without having the troops there with them. There are many things that you can do in training commanders to get around the problem. You can use much more simulation; you can use command post exercises; you can use war games. But sooner or later, for any commander - a middle ranking officer or NCO - to be proficient, he has to be there with troops and he has to be doing it in the field, so I do not think there is any simple way to disengage the two. Collective training is collective training. To have a proficient force you have to have the officers within it and the matrix of experienced officers within it to undertake the training. I think it is very difficult to train them in parallel. They have to be together.

Mr BRYANT - I would like to see it tested. I am not suggesting it is not a fundamental element of the situation but it seems to me that in a modern force an enormous amount of administrative and executive skill is needed, integrated into the needs of an army, to make it operate. On plenty of occasions well-led, well-equipped, well-trained, properly staffed small forces have beaten off others. The other thing is, do we underrate the capacity of the community to produce highly skilled young people who are very versatile and gifted in the handling of mechanical things, even if it has nothing to do with their ordinary daily devotions? In fact the less it has to do with them the more skilled they become. I have seen this happen with people I have known in the motor car rallying business and that type of thing. I think somewhere in the system we are terribly pessimistic about it. I take the point Mr Armitage made as far as the Reserve forces are concerned. With over 40 or 50 years looking at it I cannot see any advantage to the ordinary fellow in joining the citizen forces or the Reserve forces because of the trouble he gets into with his employer, his wife and all the rest of it. But that is a different question. I am talking about the back drop of training and so on.

Brig. Coates - I think one of the surprising things in the Reserve is that very often a man does not want to go into the

Army Reserve to do what he is doing in civilian life. You find doctors as infantrymen and they prefer to be that way. If someone suggested to them that they join some medical unit they would be horrified. There are very many individual skills that we can use but the problem is to make them all coalesce and the only way you can really do that is by collective training.

Mr NEIL - Regarding the question of manpower, assuming that the program you have suggested of various stages of expansion was authorised, what steps would you take to recruit 38,000? What steps would you take then to recruit 50,000? What steps would be taken to recruit 70,000 and then what steps would be taken to recruit the 250,000?

Brig. Coates - I think very early you would need to know that the funds were going to be available to buy the equipment because in many cases it is not only a question of the manpower expansion, it is also a question of matching the equipment to the manpower and matching the facilities to the manpower, but particularly the equipment, because a lot of the lead times for equipment bought overseas are from two to four years. In Army's case, the lead time for tanks that we buy from overseas is four years; for other items, such as air defence artillery, the lead time would probably be less than that - down to two years. But the real problem in moving from plateau to plateau as you expand is one of getting the equipment at the right time. Very early in that expansion process we would need to have the Reserve called out, I believe.

Mr NEIL - The Reserve called out?

Brig. Coates - Yes.

Mr NEIL - The Reserve is only 20,000.

Brig. Coates - But once you have taken the step to do that you now have 20,000 people full time that you did not have before. You have only got them part time now.

Mr NEIL - How could you call them out without a defence emergency being declared?

Brig. Coates - I am postulating that that would be the case. If that were not the case you could either take one or two years

to move to 38,000, and that would be almost the make-weight. If the Reserve were called out you could move to 38,000 probably in one year rather than two. If it were not called out it would take you two years.

Mr NEIL - But if there were a defence emergency sufficient to warrant calling out the Reserve, would you not really be looking to expand very much faster than five years?

Brig. Coates - I believe you would still be constrained by the problem of matching the equipment with the manpower expansion unless you had already stockpiled enormous quantities of equipment.

Mr NEIL - So in order to get to the first 38,000, or even 50,000, you would have to call out the Reserve. To do that you need a defence emergency. You may nonetheless find that you have not got the equipment, even in times of a defence emergency, to equip that force.

Brig. Coates - No, I think I said that you could decrease the time for 38,000 from two years to one year if you call out the Reserve. If not it would take you two years. Whatever you did you would still be faced with the problem of matching it to the equipment expansion.

Mr NEIL - Once you have used up the Reserve and you have called out the whole of the 20,000 and you want to go to the 70,000, how do you recruit the rest.

Brig. Coates - I think that we would be almost in a state of defence emergency. I think Professor Borrie's study which we still believe is-----

Mr NEIL - You cannot call out the Reserve unless you have a declared defence emergency. You have no power.

Brig. Coates - I take your point. If we are not moving to a state of defence emergency, we are still in an all volunteer situation. We do not believe from Professor Borrie's study that we can go beyond 38,000 in a volunteer situation anyway.

Mr NEIL - You cannot go beyond 38,000 without some form of recruitment other than volunteer recruitment?

Brig. Coates - Yes.

CHAIRMAN - It might be of interest to our witnesses to know

that we are going to be looking very closely at this on the Committee. After the Hilton incident when it became fairly apparent that these things could happen in this country the Government did fire off a general revision of the whole of our anti-terrorist activities. Did this produce any great change in relation to the Army's responsibility to assist the police in such an emergency - a terrorist emergency?

Brig. Coates - Yes, it did. We established response forces in each of our three task forces on the eastern seaboard in Townsville, Brisbane and Holsworthy, and we also established immediately a response force in Western Australia. In addition to that we have since established a group within the SAS Regiment which would deal with a high risk last resort situation. But in general terms anti-terrorist activities are primarily a police problem. The terrorist is, after all, another criminal and each of the State police forces has its own anti-terrorist squads. In case we need to confront a terrorist situation we do have a last resort, high-risk force and in order to complement the abilities of the police we do, in the areas I have mentioned, have response forces that are at a very high state of readiness.

CHAIRMAN - Thank you, Brigadier Coates.

Short adjournment

Rear-Admiral Robert Geoffrey LOOSLI, Chief of Naval Operations and Plans, Department of Defence (Navy), Russell Offices, Canberra, Australian Capital Territory,

Commodore Michael Wyndham HUDSON, Director-General Naval Plans and Policy, Department of Defence (Navy), Russell Offices, Canberra, Australian Capital Territory,

Captain Thomas Alfred DADSWELL, Aircraft Carrier Project Director, Department of Defence (Navy), Russell Offices, Canberra, Australian Capital Territory, and

Commander Stephen John YOULL, Staff Officer Plans (Co-ordination), Department of Defence (Navy), Russell Offices, Canberra, Australian Capital Territory,

were sworn and examined.

CHAIRMAN - I welcome Rear-Admiral Loosli, Commodore Hudson, Captain Dadswell and also Commander Youll, who is appearing to give evidence on Royal Australian Navy combat capabilities. We really have an excellent representation from the Navy. Gentlemen, will you please state your home addresses?

Rear-Adm. Loosli - My address is 15 Brinsmead Street, Pearce, Australian Capital Territory.

Cdre Hudson - My address is 34 Munro Place, Curtin, Australian Capital Territory.

Capt. Dadswell - I live at 87 Parkhill Street, Pearce, Australian Capital Territory.

Cmdr Youll - I live at 4 Leichhardt Street, Kingston, Australian Capital Territory.

CHAIRMAN - Gentlemen, you will not be asked to comment on the reasons for certain policy decisions or the advice you may have tendered in the formulation of policy. You may at any time request that your evidence, part of your evidence or answers to specific questions be given in camera when matters of public interest are involved. The Sub-Committee will of course consider any such request. May I mention for those who are wondering about any in camera questions which we may have had for the Army that I thought it would be better, rather than clear the

room from time to time to consider all the in camera matters at the end of the hearing? We have very recently received your submission. Do you wish to make any alterations or additions to it?

Rear-Adm. Loosli - No.

CHAIRMAN - Will you please read your submission?

Rear-Adm. Loosli - Yes. We welcome the opportunity to inform the Sub-Committee of the Royal Australian Navy combat capabilities and we would like to do this in the form of a presentation which Commodore Hudson and Commander Youll will make.

Cdre Hudson - I would like to preface our presentation with the remark that none of the Services in fact produced its respective presentation in conjunction with the others. Therefore some of our general remarks may overlap with those of the Army and the Royal Australian Air Force. Our submission reads as follows:

THE COMBAT CAPABILITIES OF THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY

A Submission to

THE PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE (SUB-COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE MATTERS)

by

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE (NAVY)

2 May 1980

THE COMBAT CAPABILITIES OF THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY

Mr Chairman, Gentlemen,

The aim of this presentation is to brief members of your Sub-Committee on:

a. the naval combat capability requirements to satisfy the maritime defence of Australia and her vital interests as currently perceived;

b. the extent to which our existing force structure meets those requirements; and

c. the degree to which approved acquisitions will complement or supplement existing elements.

I would like to preface my remarks by stating that although this presentation only addresses naval combat capabilities no service can operate in isolation from the others. Our capabilities must complement and supplement each other, and that requirement is nowhere more apparent than in the maritime environment which requires great flexibility and versatility in the employment of forces.

We also need to ensure a degree of compatability and interoperability with our major ally to enable us to support and co-operate with US forces in our region.

Naval Combat Capability Requirements

From previous evidence presented to your Sub-Committee you will be well aware that the development of capability requirements is a lengthy process. It starts with a Strategic Assessment, from which the more likely contingencies are established. Examination of those contingencies will indicate a range of tasks and these lead to characteristics and capabilities.

In the case of Australia our geographic environment is a major factor providing elements of both security and vulnerability. A hostile power planning a major assault on Australia would require substantial air and naval forces capable of crossing the ocean barriers, and maintaining local air superiority and sea control for the assault and subsequent re-supply operations. Only major powers could muster such a capability against Australia. On the other hand, our vast, sparsely populated coastline, limited and dispersed infrastructure and the remoteness of northern areas from the population centres present Australia with difficult surveillance and operational response problems. These characteristics could be exploited by a proximately located adversary possessing only modest military capabilities, intent on conducting lower level operations contrary to our interests.

Major assault is seen as unlikely but within our maritime geographic environment Australia is vulnerable to

military pressure against our maritime trade, and interdiction of our coastal and overseas shipping might, in some circumstances, provide an adversary with a practical option, potentially less demanding in resources than major territorial assault and occupation.

The protection of resources is also assuming added importance as we extend jurisdiction over, and exploitation of, our coastal resource zones extending in some places several hundred miles from our shores.

In summary there are three more likely contingencies on which we base our capability planning. Those are:

a. Regional threat to Australian Territory and Australia's direct interests projected from or through the archipelagic environment to our north;

b. Threat to Australian overseas trade and coastal shipping; and

c. Threat to Australia's maritime resources.

The aims of Australia's maritime strategy to deal with these contingencies are firstly, to ensure that Australia is able to use that part of the sea which it needs for its own purpose and secondly, to deny a potential enemy the opportunity of using the sea to his own advantage. In other words we must be able to exercise Sea Control.

Exercising sea control does not involve control of all of the sea all of the time. It would clearly be an impracticable and unattainable objective even if we wished to do so; but we would wish to exercise control over that part of the sea which is essential to our purposes at a particular time. The concept of sea control is applicable to all maritime operations and contingencies, including regional threats to Australian Territory, threats to our overseas trade and coastal shipping and threats to our maritime resources.

The exercise of Sea Control requires a capability for a range of tasks to be carried out, both of an offensive and defensive nature.

In the regional maritime contingencies mentioned earlier Navy see a possible need to conduct a number of operations, including:

a. intelligence gathering;

b. surveillance and reconnaissance;

c. offensive operations, including strategic and tactical strike against maritime and land targets, interdiction of enemy shipping, anti-submarine warfare and mining;

d. defensive operations, including the control and protection of shipping, mining and mine countermeasures;

e. submarine warfare;

f. amphibious operations; and

g. support for land forces, including close air support.

These operations reflect Navy's war fighting, or combat capability requirements. There are, of course, a number of national tasks to which we should also be able to contribute. These are:

a. Civil coastal surveillance;

b. aid to the civil power;

c. assistance to the civil community;

d. oceanography and hydrography; and last but not least

e. support of foreign and defence policy, including defence co-operation, display and combined exercises with ships of other navies.

The Sub-Committee will be aware from previous Departmental evidence that the Australian Defence Force is structured on the Core Force Concept. That is, the force-in-being is required to provide deterrence to development of a threat to Australia, the capabilities to meet lower levels of threat which could arise with little warning, and the base for timely expansion should that be required to cope with higher level contingencies. Additionally, characteristics to be developed in the force structure

include greater self reliance from operational dependence upon allies, whilst retaining interoperability, the capability for sustained operations around the continent and in the neighbourhood, but distant from main bases and logistic support areas; in other words, long endurance; the capability for independent operations against targets in the neighbourhood; versatility; and high mobility.

In general terms our existing naval force structure meets the capability requirements I have mentioned earlier, although in some cases the level of present capability is considered to be inadequate and the timely acquisition of replacements for ageing units is a matter of some concern, but steps are being taken to redress this situation. Having said that I would also stress that Navy consider the effectiveness and operational readiness of our fleet is good. Training of our officers and men is of a high standard and the Royal Australian Navy has a reputation with our allies of demonstrating a high degree of professional skill.

Having established the requirement for our Naval Combat Capabilities Commander Youll will speak on the existing naval force structure, its capability to meet those requirements, and some of our plans for the future.

Mr Chairman and Gentlemen,

For many years the nucleus of the Royal Australian Navy has been the Carrier MELBOURNE and her mix of aircraft, including A4 fighter strike aircraft, Tracker ASW aircraft and helicopters for ASW and utility tasks.

MELBOURNE is ageing and expected to reach the end of her economic life in the mid to late 1980s. Despite this she makes a major contribution to our maritime combat capabilities which could not be fully or effectively replaced by other elements of the defence force, nor would it be cost effective to attempt to provide these capabilities in lesser platforms.

MELBOURNE's primary function is the operation of various combinations of aircraft types as an anti-submarine and maritime strike carrier. Her primary roles are:

- firstly, as an anti-submarine Carrier to provide fixed and rotary wing aircraft for ASW surveillance and patrol, and to detect, deter and/or destroy submarines.
- secondly, as a maritime strike carrier the provision of fighter/strike aircraft
  (1) for limited air defence;
  (2) to deter and/or destroy shadowing aircraft;
  (3) to attack surface vessels;
  (4) for offensive air operations against enemy ground forces and installations; and
  (5) limited air reconnaissance and surveillance.

The replacement of these capabilities provided by MELBOURNE and her organic aircraft is currently under review

within the Department of Defence. It is Navy's strongly held professional view that the absence of integral seaborne air would seriously jeopardise our capability to conduct effective maritime operations in our areas of interest and significantly reduce the options open to Government.

In saying that, I think it is important that you note that there has been tri-service agreement that a seaborne air capability is essential, or important, for a number of tasks. The use of anti-submarine helicopters is essential for quick reaction tasks requiring accurate localisation of, and attack on, submarines close to surface shipping. Important tasks include the use of seaborne fixed wing aircraft to provide quick reaction capabilities at sea for:

a. tactical maritime reconnaissance;
b. maritime strike for the protection of naval and merchant shipping, and for offensive operations at sea;
c. counter-air reconnaissance; and
d. air defence, where the employment of land based aircraft may be impracticable or uneconomic.

The nature of modern warfare at sea, which permits even small nations the potential for possessing sophisticated weapon systems, including surface, sub-surface and air launched missiles, demands defence in depth and quick reaction.

Australia's ocean areas of interest are vast, but without seaborne fixed wing air capabilities for counter-air reconnaissance, air defence, maritime strike and tactical air reconnaissance, naval forces would be limited to coastal operations within the assured cover of land based fighter/strike aircraft, unless high vulnerability and low effectiveness is to be accepted. This could have serious consequences for the protection of trade.

I talked earlier about leaving options open to Government. A well recognised and effective use of maritime forces is the demonstration of a graduated response in situations short of open war. The possession of seaborne air adds significantly to our ability to support foreign policy by providing a naval presence. A major element of our increased Indian Ocean presence will be naval task group deployments, including MELBOURNE, as an independent, national effort directly in support of Australian Government policy.

A decision on the capabilities to be acquired when MELBOURNE phases out is expected probably later this year.

The Members of the Sub-Committee may care to explore this matter further during questions.

Turning to our Destroyers

Our general purpose capability is principally vested in the destroyer force which consists of the three

guided missile destroyers (DDGs) and six River Class destroyer escorts (DEs)

The DDGs are excellent ships, with balanced anti air, anti submarine, command and control and interdiction capabilities. They will be modernised later in the decade to incorporate the Harpoon surface to surface missile system, and to ensure their maintenance as major combatants through to the late 1990s.

The River Class are primarily anti submarine escorts with their IKARA missile systems and sensors, but also have limited surface, interdiction and close range air defence facilities. The Class is being progressively modernised to improve sensors, fire control systems and anti submarine warfare capabilities by the fitting of the MULLOKA sonar and ship launched torpedoes.

The first two of four guided missile frigates (FFGs) are planned to enter service within the next twelve months. Their anti surface, anti air and tactical surveillance abilities will enhance the destroyer force.

The major concern relating to our destroyer force is the maintenance of the capability beyond the 1980s. The Rivers and DDGs will phase out during the decade commencing in 1987 concurrent with our submarines and other force elements. Given the demise of MELBOURNE and SUPPLY in the mid to late 80s, the only inventory, or approved, major combatants to survive the 20th century will be the four FFGs and two AORs.

As recommended in the Sub-Committee's Procurement Report, consideration of the destroyer capabilities has been exhaustive in its study of the strategic requirement and available options. The process is continuing. Navy would be concerned if delay occurred in commencement of a viable destroyer building programme to replace the River Class frigates. Any delay would exacerbate the problems of block obsolescence foreshadowed in the 1990s.

Plans are proceeding to permit construction to commence at Williamstown Naval Dockyard of destroyer type ships, the first to enter service in the late 1980s.

Submarine Force

Submarines are most effective weapon systems and our six OBERON Class are particularly good examples. With the completion of their current weapon and sensor updates they will probably be the most efficient and best equipped conventional submarines in the world.

Our submarines have capabilities for offensive strike and strategic and tactical reconnaissance and their endurance and autonomy are commensurate with the nature of our environment. They can be both overt and covert and contribute significantly to our intelligence capability.

A force of six is considered to provide an adequate core force expansion base and deployment options. Expansion of any major force element beyond this level must be critically examined with regard to the availability of resources for other important capabilities and the maintenance of a balanced force.

Afloat Support

Afloat support includes the provision of repair and replenishment services to combatant forces and the current capability is provided by the replenishment tanker SUPPLY and the destroyer tender STALWART. The aircraft carrier also contributes to afloat support.

An afloat support capability is central to the nature of Australia's maritime operations as it enables the deployment of deterrent forces, sustained operations, protection of shipping, contribution to combined operations and assistance to the civil community.

Further, afloat support enables combatant units to remain at sea, tactically deployed. In removing the requirement for warships to return to harbour to replenish afloat support applies a multiplier effect to a given number of ships or available combat capabilities.

Concurrent and dispersed contingencies would require a dual replenishment capability and to this end two AORs, one stop ships capable of providing fuel, ammunition and stores, are planned to enter service in the mid 1980s.

Mine Warfare

Australia has a fairly wide mineable belt and mining could be a particularly attractive, simple and cheap weapon for an enemy to use against Australia. In order to keep our vital ports and straits open during a mining offensive, a mine countermeasures force is necessary.

To preserve the state of the art and particularly to retain a trained core of men, we have already extended the lives of our three ageing TON class vessels.

The new mine countermeasures force is planned to comprise Australian designed fibreglass mine hunting catamarans with containerised weapon systems, a sweeping version of the catamaran and a new class of ocean minesweepers and support vessels.

We are also pursuing a mining capability.

Patrol Boat Force

Our 12 ATTACK Class patrol boats will be initially augmented and then replaced by the FREMANTLE Class of which 15 have been ordered.

A further 10 have been approved, and some of these may have potential for assisting our regional neighbours through Defence Co-operation Programs.

Of the 12 ATTACKs, nine are dedicated to civil coastal surveillance, as response assets, and are based principally in Darwin and Cairns.

As the ATTACKs are replaced by the FREMANTLES it is planned that some of the former will have their lives extended, and be transferred to Reserve Port Divisions.

Amphibious Force

The RAN Amphibious Squadron will, with the commissioning of TOBRUK in October, consist of one amphibious landing ship and six heavy landing craft, based in Brisbane.

TOBRUK will provide a military sea lift capability and be able to tactically insert troops and equipment by helicopters and landing craft.

The heavy landing craft are responsive to Army tasks around our coast and Defence Co-operation requirements in our neighbourhood. The LCHs will phase out in the late 1980s.

Our marine science force consists of two hydrographic ships, and the oceanographic ship HMAS COOK, which is completing at Williamstown Naval Dockyard. We also have a limited trials and research capability in HMAS KIMBLA.

The small Hydrographic Service maintains the National Oceanographic Data Centre, and provides a modern national chart production capability. Regional training assistance is also undertaken.

A hydrographic and oceanographic capability is important, to enable us to accurately chart, and understand, our maritime environment. The extent and range of conditions which pertain to the ocean surrounds of Australia present a formidable task.

An airborne laser depth sounding system being developed by the Defence Research Centre for shallow water charting has considerable promise, and potential for overseas sales. Additional inshore survey craft are also being acquired.

We also contribute to, and co-operate with, civilian marine science agencies by the provision of ship time and other forms of assistance. Priority is accorded to those activities of national significance, or those which could contribute to the advancement of Defence capability.

Our future requirements for a trials and research ship are also being determined.

Addressing Manpower

The Navy is an equipment oriented service, requiring a high level of skill from both its uniformed and civilian manpower. The capability of the Navy at any time is therefore fully dependent on the skills available at that moment. Achieving and maintaining those skills is a continuous process of training and practice.

Our policy is to man ships as closely as possible to their full complement and to bear any shortages ashore. There are thus no immediate manning implications in the deployment of operational capabilities.

Six thousand of our thirteen thousand active billets are at sea and we require over two thousand trainees per year to replace natural wastage.

The matter of retention of trained men and availability of adequate numbers of trained personnel to meet our commitments is particularly important. This is being actively addressed.

The manning of new equipments such as the fourth

FFG requires a balance of skills, of which many take years to acquire.

Navy believes that the introduction of successful incentives to hold men who have become attractive to civilian occupations by virtue of the skills and maturity which Navy has helped develop is probably the most important manpower factor in improving our capability and in meeting our increasing commitments.

The Navy employs a larger proportion of civilians than the other Services. One reason is that naval servicemen exist by reason of their essentiality to occupy sea billets and to be experienced at sea in the higher ranks.

Navy is critically dependent upon its civilian manpower for the acquisition and management of new equipment projects and support generally. To this extent, we are severely limited by the civilian manpower ceilings, and the time taken to recruit specialist skills, once growth is allowed.

We are expanding the roles of our Reserve Forces to provide the expansion base for lesser lead time skills and activities. Our amphibious, patrol and mine countermeasures capabilities have particular relevance in this regard.

Facilities

The maintenance and support of our combat capabilities also depends heavily on facilities and bases. The support infrastructure must be developed and responsive to changing strategic requirements and technology.

To this end we have several major undertakings underway which include:

- the modernisation of Garden Island in Sydney as a Fleet base and repair and refit facility;
- the development of Williamstown Naval Dockyard as a modern major warship building yard;
- the upgrading of the facilities at HMAS STIRLING in the West to support increased activity in the Indian Ocean and to enable the base and home porting of destroyers there;
- the development of the amphibious base in Brisbane and
- modern patrol boat bases in Cairns and Darwin.

Summary

Mr Chairman and Gentlemen,

In Navy's presentation this morning, which through constraints of time has necessarily been restricted to a broad overview, we have drawn on current strategic guidance to establish the present naval combat capability requirements for the maritime defence of Australia and her vital interests. We have also indicated the extent to which our existing force structure meets those requirements and the degree to which future acquisitions will complement or supplement existing elements.

In Navy's view we have a reasonably balanced maritime force, at an adequate level of operational readiness consistent with strategic assessments of likely contingencies and perceived threat. There are weaknesses and some of our ships are approaching the ends of their lives, but projects are already in the pipeline to remedy most of these deficiencies. We are supported by skilled manpower and a developing infrastructure.

In making these judgements it is important to bear in mind that peacetime maintenance and refit programmes do not give a clear indication of ship availability in war. The peacetime schedule is designed to maintain ships at peak operational effectiveness throughout comparatively long lives. In time of developing threat such programmes can be modified or accelerated to ensure maximum availability when and where ships are required.

However, even in peacetime, the Royal Australian Navy has a marked capability to exercise sea control in our region. Our operational ships are fully stored and ammunitioned and ready to go anywhere. At present forty of our 47 fleet units are operational, many are at sea today, many could be at sea within less than 8 hours; all of those 40 could be at sea within 48 hours. The remaining seven are undergoing modernisation or major refit; and even they could be made operational in a matter of weeks.

It is important that this capability level be maintained if Government is to be provided with all necessary options to support their policies.

Gentlemen, we would be happy to answer your questions or expand on points made in this presentation.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN - In the final part of the submission you mention the number of Fleet units. Does this include submarines?

Rear-Adm. Loosli - Yes, it does.

CHAIRMAN - Has the refitting of those submarines been completed?

Rear-Adm. Loosli - Are you referring to the updating program?

CHAIRMAN - Yes.

Rear-Adm. Loosli - No, that has not. The first one is in the initial stages of its trials now. The final and sixth submarine will not receive this additional new equipment until 1985.

CHAIRMAN - The Committee is led to believe that when this is completed they will be among the most modern submarines under the water within their category.

Rear-Adm. Loosli - As far as conventional submarines are concerned, that is correct. The conventional submarine, of course has limitations on its ability to remain below the surface, compared with a nuclear submarine. It has to come to the surface to get air from time to time and it has far less capability of proceeding at high speeds under the water.

CHAIRMAN - There was a worrying message abroad recently that we were having some trouble in manning our submarines. Could you comment on that?

Rear-Adm. Loosli - This is true. There has been general dissatisfaction among submarine personnel about the conditions under which they live and the amount of time they spend on operations. They believed they were getting an inadequate additional submarine allowance. Lack of satisfaction led to a low retention rate of people in the submarine service. The general feeling of dissatisfaction tended to spread from the submarine personnel to those in the surface Navy so that there was little transfer into the submarine arm. The increase in allowance which was recently announced by the Government has overcome that basic problem but in the meantime, because shortages did occur earlier, a lot of sailors have had to spend more time at sea than they would normally have expected and that

tended to exacerbate the problem and increase the dissatisfaction.

We have introduced an intensive campaign to recruit into the submarine service and we are having some success in that. However, it will take more than a year to overcome the shortfalls. In order to overcome the shortfalls we have to increase our capacity to train. Consequently we have decided that one of the submarines will be reduced in its operational availability and will carry only two watches as opposed to three. This will allow it to take 20 or 30 trainees to sea and thus get more trained men. This is quite acceptable in the current situation. The submarine can carry out the training tasks, which submarines have to do at this time, for surface ships and aircraft. At the same time if that submarine needed to become operational we could use personnel from shore billets to bolster the trained crew. It could immediately be brought back to an operational state.

Cdre Hudson - It is significant that since the increased allowances were announced a number of trained and senior submarine sailors have revoked their applications for discharge. So we have already seen an increase in submarine manpower.

CHAIRMAN - I would like to put the same question to you as I put to the Army. Do you find accelerated interest in recruitment to the Navy in view of the present international circumstances?

Rear-Adm. Loosli - There has been an increased recruiting rate into the Navy in the last six months or so. In fact we have 400 recruits waiting to enter the Navy. Whether this is the result of international events or whether it is the result of a coincidental increased effort on the part of Navy to recruit personnel is not really evident. It has just happened to coincide. We have been very pleased with the results of our increased recruiting effort but at the same time its success could well have been in response to the international situation.

Senator BISHOP - In the submissions there is a rather heavy accent on the replacement of the 'Melbourne'. You report that an examination is being currently undertaken but it seems that the

Navy considers it is essential that the carrier be replaced. Is it true that the present operational doctrines of the Navy are built around naval air power to the extent that all other units of the Fleet are primarily designed to facilitate the operations of the aircraft carrier? Is it not vulnerable?

Rear-Adm. Loosli - It might help if I describe for the Committee something of the nature of maritime operations and the concept of how we foresee we would operate. I think that this possibly may put things in perspective. In the nature of all maritime operations we have to operate in three dimensions - on the surface, underneath the surface and in the air. The various weapons and sensors which will allow ships to operate in these three dimensions require a variety of weapons and sensors and none of these can all be put into any one ship. So in general the concept of naval operations is to bring ships together to enhance each other's capabilities, so that the total unit which is together will be far stronger than just an addition of the capabilities of those four, five, or six ships. So we would not really envisage one of our ships operating singly unless circumstances forced it to do so. We would normally have our ships operating together. By having a group of ships together you can also disperse them in various tactical situations to overcome certain deficiencies which there may be in sensors and weapons systems. Again, the total capability of the force then becomes far greater than it would be just by a simple addition of these weapons and sensors.

The nature of warfare as it is foreseen in the maritime environment has changed somewhat since World War II because of the advances in technology. Apart from the increased performance of various vehicles, one of the most significant aspects is the fact that practically any navy now, large or small, can easily gain the capability to fire at targets over the horizon. We have countries to our north acquiring frigates from the Netherlands which have surface to surface missile capabilities built into them which allow them to be able to fire at a range of 40 miles or more at a surface target. The ranges at which submarines can now fire their torpedoes and at which they can fire their missiles have also increased virtually to over the horizon. The tendency really is that in a situation of opposing maritime forces it will be very important for your force to stop the other force from locating it prior to your force locating the other. It is a matter of knowing where the others are

and being able to get targeting information which is over the horizon. Ships are inherently limited in obtaining information from the various sensors on board the ship. None of those really extend beyond the horizon except for the air warning system. It goes up into the air but it has a gap lower down. So it is becoming more and more important for naval task groups to have available to them air power which will enable them not only to ascertain the position of ships in their vicinity but also to gain the targeting information necessary to enable them to fire on these ships. You will appreciate that it is very important before you open fire on anyone to be quite certain of your target. The only way in which the Navy can ever hope to gain any supremacy in this way is by having organic air available to the commander at sea. The alternative is the use of shore-based land aircraft, the P3s, which have an enormous surveillance capability. They are large aircraft and they are primarily built to carry out large area surveillance. It would be wrong to employ them close to a naval task force and to give them the tactical reconnaissance task because they have a much greater capability and can be used to cover much larger areas remote from the force.

The Navy believes it is essential for it to have this air power available to the groups of ships it would put into hostile situations. There are obviously alternative ways of providing that air power. There are helicopters or fixed-wing aircraft. Helicopters can operate from various vehicles. The FFGs, which we are acquiring from the United States, will carry two helicopters. This is the first time that we have had ships of that size carrying those aircraft. There are other ways in which helicopters could be carried. In time of war you could use merchant ships to carry them after making some adjustment to their configuration. But all the studies we have made show that it is far more cost-effective to provide the aircraft from one ship which is designed to carry and maintain those aircraft. Maintenance problems on a small ship with limited facilities become difficult. So if you have a ship such as an aircraft carrier with all those facilities this is the best and cheapest way of doing it.

Let us look now at fixed-wing aircraft. I have emphasised the need for reconnaissance and the need to prevent an opposing force locating you. This highlights the need for immediate defence against enemy reconnaissance. A fixed-wing aircraft can provide this faster than a helicopter, which is relatively slow. It highlights the need for us to have a task force which can prevent reconnaissance aircraft sitting over the horizon or flying just out of our reach and being able to take down all the information they wish; to relay it back to their own forces, and indeed to provide targeting information to them.

We need the ability to stop that. We also need to provide air defence for our own forces. Air defence in depth can only be provided initially by some sort of fixed-wing aircraft and by the sensors which are organic to the force at sea. We believe that this fixed-wing capability can be provided by the new innovation of STOVL aircraft - short take off and vertical landing aircraft.

Mr ARMITAGE - It has been argued that the replacement of the 'Melbourne' by another aircraft carrier would mean that we would have a lot of eggs in one basket. The new aircraft carrier will cost about $1,000m on present estimates. It was suggested to this Committee previously that we might be better off, keeping in mind the fact that we might require not one aircraft carrier but more than one for different areas such as the west, the north and the east, to go instead for container platforms for the refuelling of aircraft. In other words, we should buy land-based aircraft with container platforms for refuelling purposes in lieu of an aircraft carrier. It was suggested that we would have greater capacity in that way.

Rear-Adm. Loosli - I want to discuss vulnerability, which you mentioned in connection with having all our eggs in one basket. Commodore Hudson could speak to that.

Cdre Hudson - I would like to make some general comments on vulnerability because this worries a lot of people and I suppose it worries us as well. There is no simple answer to the question. If you are facing a threat or a war then any combatant unit be it a ship, an aircraft or an army platoon, is at risk to some extent. The extent of the vulnerability varies widely with the area of the threat and its nature. It is determined by the degree to which the ship may be exposed and the damage that it may sustain. It is also dependent on the extent to which a particular ship can survive action damage. The degree to which it may be exposed is a command decision and the level of that command decision will vary all the way up the hierarchy, ending with the Prime Minister.

The command must decide the risk to which its military forces must be put in order to achieve a particular aim. If it decides that achievement of the aim is worth while then it may be prepared to put those forces at greater risk. The decision to put that ship at risk is a major factor in the assessment of any military operation. In other words, you weigh up all the factors. Any ship at sea is vulnerable to enemy action. As the Admiral explained, the manner in which we operate maritime forces is based on the task group principle. I think the right term to use is the synergistic effect, that is, the effect of the force as a whole is greater than the sum of the individual units and it is a very real factor in projecting power at sea. The other aspect of vulnerability is the extent to which a unit can survive action damage. We all know that ships of all sizes sink when they are damaged and it would be foolish for us to suggest that the bigger the ship the safer it is. But it is a fact that all the information available to us on World War II and World War I experience - and we seem to have a lot of information on those two wars but none since - suggests that the larger the ship the safer it is.

CHAIRMAN - A point was going through my mind when you made the comment that we have not had much information since World War II. But we would be fairly well assured that if we have the Harpoon then our potential enemies - the Soviet, for instance, and perhaps some nearer home - would have something fairly similar, which means that no ship would be really safe from this sort of sophisticated missile, does it not?

Cdre Hudson - That would be quite right. I think one must credit any potential enemy with having the same capabilities that you do and all ships are subject to a form of damage if you put them in a position where they can be attacked with that form of weapon. This comes back to the defensive measures that can be offered by a group of ships and also the requirement for tactical air at sea to project the defensive reach of your surface elements. I am not sure whether that has answered your question, Senator Bishop.

Senator BISHOP - I think the Admiral's argument was that you get a comprehensive force with the carrier and with other vessels, and the ship does not operate on its own anyway.

Rear-Adm. Loosli - No, and I think that the way some people feel that a carrier immediately has to have an escort and so therefore you are committed to providing an escort for the carrier is not correct. It is just that that is the way in which we would operate. We see that as the best way in which to provide a force at sea so that all the capabilities of each of the units will complement each other. Destroyers are not necessarily there to protect the aircraft carrier. That is certainly part of their role but you do not have to have them there just because you have an aircraft carrier, and it does not mean you would not require them if you did not have an aircraft carrier.

Mr BRYANT - Looking at the map I was just thinking of the reach a carrier gives you. I suppose you could operate a couple of thousand miles out in the Indian Ocean and its environs. Added to your air capacity, that gives you great scope to see what anybody else is up to.

Rear-Adm. Loosli - It is very significant.

Mr BRYANT - It would be part of your warning systems, apart from anything else.

Rear-Adm. Loosli - That is one of the most important aspects of this.

Mr ARMITAGE - We still do not have the answers to the question of more effective use of container platforms. The proposition has been put that this could be effective for refuelling purposes. You would get far greater spread of your resources. You could operate in more areas at sea with aircraft.

Rear-Adm. Loosli - I understand that a lot of study has been done in regard to this because the cost of aircraft carriers to operate conventional aircraft did reach enormous proportions. As you know, Great Britain has stopped having aircraft carriers in the conventional take-off role. People were then concerned about getting aircraft to sea because of the immense importance of this. There is a project referred to as the Arapaho concept, in which the United States Navy and the Royal Navy are examining using a container ship and, in fact, providing containers which would carry workshops and extra fuel. The ship would also provide facilities for carrying helicopters in the first place. I think they are also considering putting STOVL aircraft on too. But it really has not reached a stage where they believe that this is a viable concept, other than the possibility of using this concept in time of war to provide the means of quick expansion. Once aircraft are airborne they need control, and to put these facilities of command and control into another container becomes very, very complicated. I think that the concept of being able to put containers on board and pull them off, changing the role of a ship and just having a very basic-type hull, has always been

attractive. But there have always been many very difficult problems to solve which no one has successfully done up to this stage.

Mr ARMITAGE - I understand the British and Americans are looking at this. Is the Australian Navy looking into it?

Rear-Adm. Loosli - We have examined it from all the material we can gather. I think that if this concept is pushed any further in the United States, we could be invited to participate in some of their experiments. But I do not believe that it is something we would like to do on a permanent basis. For example, to have a container ship in this sort of configuration would be permanently wasting a container ship's capabilities. And, of course, you need to be able to have it available to you permanently to retain your skills as pilots.

Senator BISHOP - Was that a study rather than a physical test?

Rear-Adm. Loosli - No, it was a physical test.

Capt. Dadswell - The 'Arapaho' was actually a ship and they experimented on it. But the problem is that you have to differentiate between types of aircraft. Either you are talking about a conventional aircraft or you are talking about a STOVL aircraft. To fly conventional aircraft from a container ship you would have to move all the superstructure to one side or you would have a lot of crumpled heaps down the back. Actually the idea is to provide 'Arapaho' ships in convoys where your aircraft carrier operates well clear of the convoy. It puts ready-use aircraft into the convoy and air direction control can be given to them by one of the escorting destroyers. So you have a platform, you have the aircraft and you have the means of controlling the aircraft. But the carrier which would have to do any repairs and maintenance on aircraft is some distance away.

Senator BISHOP - Would that unit be necessary in order to carry out such an operation?

Capt. Dadswell - The carrier would be necessary because maintenance and all the other things that keep an air force going would need to be installed in the carrier.

Rear-Adm. Loosli - The concept does allow for quick expansion in time of war. I think there is no doubt it is something to think of in that context, but in that context only.

Mr NEIL - What is the naval tactical doctrine for the requirement of air defence capability in a situation where naval ships are operating in a potentially hostile environment? By this I mean that in the Army it would be unusual to allow a battalion to go out of gun range. This is a matter of 'laid-down' doctrine. There might be exceptions for obvious reasons, not least of which is that we do not want it said that we unnecessarily incur casualties. I am asking: What is the tactical doctrine; when may a ship enter a potentially hostile environment without some air cover; and to what extent does that doctrine affect the question of another carrier? In other words, in practice, how far out from Australian shores can you go without taking your own integral air power for air defence purposes?

Rear-Adm. Loosli - It is not necessarily an easy question to answer because I think you need to relate this to a scenario. I think that ships will go where they have to go for whatever purpose is necessary. There is no particular doctrine to say that ships will not be sent into areas under certain circumstances. It is really a tactical situation or tactical decision which is made by the commander at the time, depending on all the existing factors.

But if enemy aircraft were going to operate in an area where we did not have air superiority there would be great hesitation to send ships into such an area. We would use any other tactical means we had in order to avoid doing so, if we did not have the support.

Mr NEIL - You would want a minimum of air parity, I take it, before you would commit surface ships to an environment?

Rear-Adm. Loosli - One would hope for at least that but, as I say, it would depend upon particular circumstances when certain decisions had to be made.

Cdre Hudson - Air defence depends not only on the presence of one's own aircraft. Our doctrine is defence in depth and air defence in depth starts with one's own fighter aircraft. The next ring of defence is the area air defence surface weapons such as those carried in the DDG destroyers. Then there are the point defence systems, the close-in weapon systems and finally the guns of each individual surface unit. It is possible for surface units to operate in an area of air threat without one's own air cover, provided one has reasonable air defence systems on those ships. Ideally you would wish to have local air superiority provided by your own aircraft. It is highly desirable and very important to provide that defence in depth but it would not be correct to say that you can operate only in an area where you have air superiority. It depends on the risk you are prepared to take. The doctrine is one of defence in depth.

Mr NEIL - Does it flow from that that if you do not have a seaborne integral air capability your flexibility and your capability for operations must be substantially limited?

Cdre Hudson - It will be substantially limited. We made that point quite clearly in our presentation. Your question was posed in black and white terms, however, and I was trying to suggest that in fact there is a shade of grey throughout it.

Mr NEIL - I am interested in the statement that there has been tri-service agreement that seaborne air capability is essential or important for a number of specified tasks. Does

that tri-service agreement include agreement on integral seaborne air capability? You use the word 'integral' early on page 8 of your original submission but not so much further down the page. In other words, do you have tri-service agreement on the carrier?

Rear-Adm. Loosli - That is the agreement as it stands at the moment. How that would be provided has yet to be decided.

Mr NEIL - If there is tri-service agreement that seaborne air capability is essential or important for air defence where the employment of land-based aircraft may be impracticable or uneconomical, does it not mean that you either stay in the area of land-based coverage or get a carrier?

Cdre Hudson - It could mean that but the point at issue is how that air capability is to be provided. There are alternative platforms and that is part of the review that is going on at present. It is possible to provide air power from shore and that is another way of providing that capability. Those are the questions we are trying to resolve at present.

Mr NEIL - Do you expect to make a decision this year?

Cdre Hudson - Yes, that is what the Minister has announced.

Mr NEIL - In what circumstances is the employment of land-based aircraft impractical or uneconomical?

Rear-Adm. Loosli - It depends on the distance from an air field. It also depends on the availability of air fields and the air field capabilities. For instance, I think that airstrips in themselves have a lot of deficiencies and I am not sure whether it has been proven how long high technology aircraft can operate from what is basically an airstrip with just a fuel supply. The whole question is one of geography. Whether an aircraft can operate 500 miles from a land base or not generally resolves itself into whether there are replenishment tanker aircraft in order to keep it there longer. But then you come back to an aircraft endurance factor. There are many factors to take into account but considering the size of Australia and the number of air fields which are available, and the number of land-based aircraft which may be available to go on to those

air fields, our resources would be scattered immensely to try to cover the sea routes which we believe will need some sort of protection.

Mr NEIL - I think an American senior naval officer said a couple of years ago that the American navy could not necessarily guarantee the sea lanes west of Hawaii. If we undertook the role of protecting the sea lane between Sydney and Hawaii and we wished to protect convoys, would it be sound to do it without an aircraft carrier capability? Could we go over there and back every few days or weeks or whatever it takes to do it?

Rear-Adm. Loosli - This again would depend on the circumstances at the time but I suspect there are probably some areas where you could, over that distance, accept that you could escort without an aircraft carrier. There are some areas, however, where you would say it was essential. We could, perhaps, provide for the near area of it and the United States could do the far area.

Mr NEIL - I am assuming that the task, for various reasons, was given to and accepted by Australia. Would we need an aircraft carrier to perform that task?

Rear-Adm. Loosli - It would be a very important factor.

Mr BRYANT - I am looking at our major sea routes. They seem to head north towards Japan and north-west, south of Java and Sumatra and so on. How far out could we expect the land-based aircraft to operate and give proper surveillance and protection? If you are looking at northern Sumatra then that is probably getting out beyond our capacity. There is an awful lot of sea and not much land within reach if you are facing up to submarines, surface craft and aircraft. I do not know what order of threat they pose. But it seems an awful lot of sea and you would need a long reach. I must admit you sound slightly persuasive to me but a rival department might turn up directly. Over what distance could we expect our land-based people to give us real surveillance and some protection? I am thinking of the Indian Ocean and the area north of Papua New Guinea and so on.

Rear-Adm. Loosli - The P3 aircraft can give extensive surveillance support. There is no doubt about it. The new tactical fighter force could give somewhat less support than that and again it would depend on whether they had tanker support for in-flight fuelling. The question might be better directed to the Air Force.

Cdre Hudson - The range of the land-based aircraft is not always a measure of their effectiveness. For us at sea reaction time is even more vital. In modern warfare a missile threat can develop in a matter of minutes, in one, two, three or five minutes. Unless you had organic seaborne air equipment available you could not respond to that threat and you would most definitely be highly vulnerable in the absence of seaborne air.

Mr SCHOLES - If a potential aggressor arrived off Sydney out of range of our current fighter aircraft with the necessary back-up units such as an aircraft carrier and, say, two or three frigates moderately well equipped, not Russian or American equipped but moderately well equipped, could we destroy the carrier with our present capability?

Rear-Adm. Loosli - We believe so.

Mr SCHOLES - Throughout your paper you have listed a number of requirements which are now desperately needed by the Navy. These include the destroyer program, which I think has slipped back further than your immediate projections indicate are desirable; the need for the commencement of studies on the new submarine program in the very near future and unhappiness about some capabilities which will disappear, such as landing craft and naval air support. If these needs are to be met about three billion dollars worth of equipment will be required. Have you any indications of priorities in equipment given $3,000m to Navy and $2,000m to the tactical fighter force and some considerable amounts to make the F111s a viable operation? It adds up to more than the likely budgets over the next 15 years if we are using current terms. I forgot about the Army.

Rear-Adm. Loosli - I wish you could tell me the likely budget over the next 10 to 15 years. We would then be able to answer your question more accurately. Anout $1,000m was mentioned earlier as the cost of a carrier. The gentleman concerned must have been referring to two carriers not one, although I am not in a position to state what cost will be involved. The projected funds will allow us to obtain these additions to our force and replacements of aging craft. It will be over 20 years before all those ships will be in our inventory. I believe that the budget can stand it.

Mr SCHOLES - You mentioned that a lesser figure for a carrier is a more likely figure. I know the figures range from about $300m for carriers. Would a small carrier with an extraordinarily limited capability provide the Navy with the flexibility it would need in order to protect its fleet at sea and to carry out the tasks you have mentioned? Some of the things being mentioned as carriers are the sorts of things they used in the North Atlantic for carrier escorts during the war. With STOVL aircraft they obviously have an improved capacity but this is still a very low level of aircraft operation and there is not much capacity for sophisticated equipment.

Rear-Adm. Loosli - We have studied this and we have come to the conclusion that the smallest number of aircraft which would be viable in an aircraft carrier would be 14, with a mix of helicopters and STOVL aircraft. But an aircraft carrier carrying about 22 aircraft would, we feel, be necessary in any time of conflict.

Mr SCHOLES - Is that an approximate one to one mix?

Rear-Adm. Loosli - Ten to 12, so it is not far from it.

Mr BRYANT - What does the 'Melbourne' carry?

Rear-Adm. Loosli - What mixes do you mean?

Capt. Dadswell - It depends on the mix of aircraft and the exercise or role being undertaken. She is capable of taking twenty A4s, as an absolute maximum. Most of her life she has carried 20 aircraft but at the moment she is down to 16.

Mr SCHOLES - We were negotiating with Air New Zealand, which is to service the turbines for our FFGs. I assume a carrier would have the same sort of motivation. If Air New Zealand moves out of the field leaving New Zealand without a ready capacity for turbine operation, are there at present, Australian firms which are sufficiently closely aligned to the type of turbines we are using, to service them economically?

Rear-Adm. Loosli - Firstly, may I point out that Air New Zealand does have existing contracts with a lot of other countries besides Australia. Air New Zealand representatives have not informed us that they will not be able to do this. They have not told us they cannot accept the contract which we are currently negotiating with them. There has been no indication from them that they cannot continue. However, if it becomes apparent that they are unable to do it, I think the answer to your question is no, there are no facilities in Australia at the moment to do it. I think we would always have the option of sending the aircraft engines back to the United States.

Mr SCHOLES - The ships' engines?

Rear-Adm. Loosli - The ships' engines are basically aircraft engines. So they could go back to the United States as an alternative to setting up a facility in Australia. But I think that as the number of engines become more common in our fleet, we will have

to consider establishing a facility in Australia.

CHAIRMAN - We just do not seem to be able to cover this evidence as we would wish. I suggest to the Committee that perhaps we send Rear Admiral Loosli questions that have not been answered. If Rear Admiral Loosli would be kind enough to comment in writing it would be greatly appreciated. They are questions that have been prepared. Perhaps Committee members would like to add some more. What is the minimum number of destroyers you think we should have in the Navy?

Rear-Adm. Loosli - We have aimed at having 12 in our Navy for some time. We have found that this has been adequate to fulfil all our commitments within the circumstances. I think that in foreseeable circumstances, we would say that this is about the right number, also the minimum number. We would not like to fall below that in any planning. On occasions, I suspect, because of shortfalls there may be a temporary drop, but we would never like to see that number fall below 12. In circumstances where there might be a greater need we would simply see an increased number, possibly up to 15 or 16. But at the present stage we believe that 12 is an adequate number for the core force capabilities. Ultimately I suspect we could move to 16, but-----

Mr BRYANT - Does 12 to 16 give you the current capacity you think we need?

Rear-Adm. Loosli - Yes, this number gives us the capacity to fulfil our commitments.

CHAIRMAN - How significant is HMAS 'Stirling' to Australia's defence capacity and what are the implications if it is used for base or home porting, used for the Royal Australian Navy or the United States Navy in the Indian Ocean?

Rear-Adm. Loosli - I think if we are going to operate in the Indian Ocean it is extremely important. The requirement for us to move and operate there now, in the present circumstances, highlights the importance of this base. We could not allow our ships to be based in the east coast if they are going to operate in the Indian Ocean, because of the distance.

The facilities there are not sufficient for us to home port our ships there at the moment. We just do not have the facilities. But they can be provided and it is important that they are provided and that we eventually do have ships based there and operating from there. It is the most economical way to do it. The United States Navy sent a team out there to have a look at it, as you will be aware. You should also be aware that they were looking at many other bases around the world. Whether they will wish to base themselves there is entirely their decision and we have no indication one way or the other.

CHAIRMAN - Thank you, Admiral and gentlemen. We are beginning to encroach into the next time slot. If the in camera questions cannot be dealt with today we may try to arrange a hearing of a couple of hours to deal with them later.

Air Vice-Marshal John William NEWHAM, Chief of Air Force Operations, Department of Defence (Air Force Office), Russell Offices, Canberra, Australian Capital Territory, was sworn and examined.

CHAIRMAN - We welcome Air Vice-Marshal Newham to give evidence on the subject of Air Force combat capabilities. Air Vice-Marshal, will you please state your private address?

Air Vice-Marshal Newham - My address is 39 Steinwedel Street, Farrer, Australian Capital Territory.

CHAIRMAN - You will not be asked to comment on the reasons for certain policy decisions or the advice you may have tendered in the formulation of policy. You may request that your evidence, in part or in whole, or answers to specific questions be given in camera when matters of public interest are involved and the Sub-Committee will consider such requests. The Sub-Committee has before it a document from you. Do you wish to make any alterations or additions to the document?

Air Vice-Marshal Newham - Yes, there are minor amendments which I will make as I read the presentation. I will also read an additional page which you have not yet received.

CHAIRMAN - Will you please read it now.

Air Vice Marshal Newham - Yes. The submission reads as follows:

AIR FORCE COMBAT CAPABILITIES

INTRODUCTION

1. GENTLEMEN, THE PURPOSE OF MY PRESENTATION TO YOU TODAY, IS TO ACQUAINT YOU WITH THE CURRENT COMBAT CAPABILITIES OF THE RAAF. I DO NOT INTEND TO HYPOTHESIZE A SPECIFIC THREAT SCENARIO, BUT TO ADDRESS COMBAT CAPABILITIES IN RELATION TO AUSTRALIA'S STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND THE RAAF'S CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. SPECIFICALLY, I WILL SUMMARIZE OUR CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS, OUTLINE PRESENT COMBAT CAPABILITIES OF THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE AIR FORCE AND INDICATE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF AIR FORCE COMBAT CAPABILITIES TO BEST SERVE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS.

RAAF CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

2. THE RAAF CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS, AS PART OF AUSTRALIA'S MILITARY STRATEGY, IS DESIGNED TO:

- PREVENT AN ENEMY LODGEMENT ON AUSTRALIAN SOIL;
- PREVENT ATTACKS ON AND INTERFERENCE WITH AUSTRALIA'S OFF-SHORE TERRITORIES, RESOURCE ZONES AND NEIGHBOURHOOD LINES OF COMMUNICATION;
- MAXIMISE AUSTRALIA'S TECHNOLOGICAL EDGE TO THE MOST COST AND MANPOWER-EFFECTIVE ADVANTAGE;
- INITIALLY, ATTAIN AND THEN HOLD THE INITIATIVE AGAINST AN ENEMY IN THE EVENT OF WAR; THEN

- EXPLOIT SUCH FAVOURABLE DEFENSIVE FEATURES OFFERED BY AUSTRALIA'S GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION AND NATURE.

3. FOR THE RAAF, THIS ENTAILS EXPLOITING TO THE FULLEST POSSIBLE EXTENT THE CHARACTERISTICS OF AIR POWER IN APPLYING OFFENSIVE ACTION, THE CONCENTRATION OF FORCE, SURPRISE AND MOBILITY. IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, THE RAAF IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE RAN WOULD BE REQUIRED TO PREVENT AN ENEMY LODGEMENT ON AUSTRALIAN TERRITORY. THE TYPES AND PHASING OF RAAF OPERATIONS CAN BE SUMMARIZED AS:

A. PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS (BEFORE THE ONSET OF HOSTILITIES) WOULD INVOLVE DEPLOYMENT, LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE;

B. AIR STRIKE OPERATIONS AGAINST ENEMY INSTALLATIONS, FORCE CONCENTRATIONS AND VITAL LOGISTIC FACILITIES, INCLUDING COUNTER-AIR ACTIONS AS MAY BE REQUIRED;

C. MARITIME OPERATIONS: STRIKE, MINING AND ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE:

D. AIR DEFENCE OPERATIONS;

E. AIR TRANSPORT; AND

F. OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF A LAND BATTLE.

STRIKE OPERATIONS

4. IN THE DETERRENCE CONTEXT THE SIGNIFICANT ELEMENT IS THE POSSESSION OF FORCES DEMONSTRABLY CAPABLE OF OFFERING ACTION OR COUNTER ACTION UNACCEPTABLE TO AN ENEMY. IN THE CASE OF THE RAAF THE MEANS IS OFFENSIVE AIR POWER.

5. TO PROVIDE A CREDIBLE DETERRENT, OFFENSIVE AIR POWER MUST BE CAPABLE OF ALL WEATHER, DAY/NIGHT STRIKE OPERATIONS AT LONG RANGE AGAINST AN ENEMY'S MARITIME FORCES, HIS OFFENSIVE AIR CAPABILITY, ADVANCED BASES, AND POSSIBLY AIR TRANSPORT.

6. THE COMBINED DEMANDS FOR OFFENSIVE AIR OPERATIONS IN THE FACE OF A MAJOR THREAT TO THE NATION'S SECURITY HOLD IMPORTANT IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STRUCTURE OF THE RAAF. THE STRIKE FORCE MAY BE LIMITED IN SIZE AND UNABLE TO MEET ALL DEMANDS PLACED ON IT. THE RAAF MUST THEREFORE PLAN FOR OTHER FORCE ELEMENTS - SUCH AS TACTICAL FIGHTER AND MARITIME PATROL - TO SUPPLEMENT STRIKE FORCE OPERATIONS. TOGETHER, WE SEE THE THREE ELEMENTS CONSTITUTING A TRIAD WHICH FULLY EXPLOITS THE OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES OF AIR POWER FOR THE DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA.

7. SHOULD THE ENEMY SUCCEED IN MAKING A LODGEMENT, AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE OPERATIONS WOULD BE AIMED AT MAKING THAT LODGEMENT UNTENABLE. OPERATIONS DURING THIS PHASE WOULD INVOLVE CONTINUED STRIKES ON SUPPORTING BASES, INSTALLATIONS AND FORCE CONCENTRATIONS, INTERDICTION OF THE LODGEMENT'S SEA AND AIR LINES OF COMMUNICATION, ATTACKS ON THE LODGEMENT ITSELF, AND CONTAINMENT OF THE ENEMY PERIMETER SUFFICIENTLY TO PREVENT CAPTURE OF SUBSTANTIAL LOGISTIC RESOURCES. OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES FALL UNDER ONE OR MORE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL DIVISIONS OF AIR OPERATIONS, THESE BEING SURVEILLANCE/RECONNAISSANCE, STRIKE OPERATIONS, MARITIME OPERATIONS, AIR DEFENCE OPERATIONS, OFFENSIVE AIR SUPPORT/ARMED RECONNAISSANCE, AND AIR TRANSPORT OPERATIONS.

SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE

8. ADEQUATE AND TIMELY INTELLIGENCE IS ESSENTIAL TO SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS. INTELLIGENCE GATHERING WOULD INCLUDE THE SURVEILLANCE OF MARITIME AREAS, AIR SPACE, THE POTENTIAL ENEMY'S TERRITORY, HIS BASES AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION. THESE ACTIVITIES WOULD PRECEDE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AND WOULD INCREASE, AS TENSION HEIGHTENED. ONCE CONFLICT STARTS, TARGET INFORMATION AND PRE- AND POST-STRIKE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS WOULD ASSUME MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE. THESE TASKS WOULD BE CONDUCTED BY RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENTS OF THE STRIKE, TACTICAL FIGHTER, AND LONG RANGE MARITIME PATROL FORCES.

9. THE ABILITY TO GATHER INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE IS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE RAAF CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. IN THE PAST, IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO PROVIDE THE LEVEL OF CAPABILITY NEEDED TO GUARANTEE COVERAGE OF THE LARGE AREA OF STRATEGIC INTEREST. CONSTRAINTS HAVE BEEN IMPOSED BY FORCE AVAILABILITY, LIMITED MANPOWER AND ENGINEERING RESOURCES AND VEHICLES AND SENSOR TECHNOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS. RECENT ADVANCES IN SENSOR TECHNOLOGY PROMISES, FOR THE FIRST TIME, AN AUSTRALIAN AREA SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITY. EXPLOITATION OF THOSE ADVANCES MUST BE A MAJOR RAAF OBJECTIVE.

AIR DEFENCE OPERATIONS

10. THE CREDIBILITY OF THE RAAF'S DETERRENT CAPABILITY IS HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON ITS SECURITY. AN ENEMY MUST BE PREVENTED FROM NEUTRALISING THE STRIKE FORCE OR THE AIRFIELDS FROM

WHICH IT OPERATES. THIS PRESUPPOSES AN EFFECTIVE AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM WHICH IS CAPABLE OF PROTECTING BOTH DEPLOYED OFFENSIVE FORCES, AND OTHER HIGH VALUE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN TARGETS.

11. AN AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM CAPABLE OF LARGE SCALE AREA DEFENCE COULD TAKE MANY YEARS TO DEVELOP, GIVEN THE SIZE OF THE CONTINENTAL AND MARITIME AREAS TO BE PROTECTED AND THE AVAILABILITY OF RESOURCES. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS, RELATED TO OVER THE HORIZON RADAR AND AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING, MAY EASE THE AIR DEFENCE PROBLEM, PROVIDED THESE SYSTEMS ARE INTEGRATED INTO AN ADEQUATE COMMAND AND CONTROL ORGANIZATION.

12. IN THE INTERIM, AIR DEFENCE OPERATIONS WILL BE NECESSARY TO PROTECT OUR REMOTE AREAS. SOME MEASURE OF AIR DEFENCE MAY BE NEEDED FOR AUSTRALIAN COASTAL SHIPPING AND FOR RAN OPERATIONS WITHIN COVER OF LAND BASED FIGHTER AIRCRAFT. THE AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM MUST BE MOBILE AND ABLE TO AFFORD REASONABLE PROTECTION FOR SELECTED AREAS WITHIN WHICH IT WILL NEED TO MAINTAIN AIR SUPERIORITY.

MARITIME OPERATIONS

13. A DETERMINED ENEMY CAN BE EXPECTED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE VULNERABILITY OF AUSTRALIA'S SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION TO DISRUPT THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND DEGRADE DEFENCE CAPABILITY. PROTECTION OF SHIPPING - THE RESPONSIBILITY OF RAN WITH SUBSTANTIAL RAAF SUPPORT - WILL BE AN IMPORTANT OPERATIONAL TASK.

14. OPERATIONS TO PROTECT OUR SEA LANES MAY REDUCE THE ENEMY'S OFFENSIVE EFFORT, AS WELL AS DIRECTLY DEFENDING OUR SHIPPING. HENCE AIR OPERATIONS WILL INCLUDE ANTI-SHIPPING

STRIKE, INTERDICTION OF ENEMY LINES OF COMMUNICATION, OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE MINING, AND ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE. THE ENORMOUS AREAS INVOLVED MAKE IT ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO PROVIDE COMPLETE PROTECTION AGAINST SUBMARINES, SURFACE CRAFT AND AIRCRAFT. HOWEVER, ROUTING OF INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING WELL SOUTH OF CURRENT TRADE ROUTES IN BOTH MAJOR OCEANS CAN VIRTUALLY ELIMINATE THE THREAT IN TRANSIT FROM AIRCRAFT, AND SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE THE THREAT FROM SUBMARINES AND SURFACE SHIPS. ANTI-SUBMARINE ACTIVITY BY OUR LONG RANGE MARITIME PATROL FLEET COULD CONCENTRATE ON OPEN OCEAN OR FOCAL AREAS, AND CHOKE POINTS, AS DICTATED BY THE THREAT. MISSILE EQUIPPED MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT COULD BE COMPLEMENTED IN ANTI-SHIPPING OPERATIONS BY THE STRIKE AND TACTICAL FIGHTER FORCES.

AIR TRANSPORT SUPPORT

15. THE NATURE OF AUSTRALIA'S GEOGRAPHY, THE PAUCITY OF INTERNAL LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS, AND THE DISTANCES BETWEEN LIKELY OPERATIONAL AREAS AND THE SUPPORT BASE IN THE INDUSTRIALISED SOUTH-EAST WILL PLACE A HEAVY DEMAND ON THE RAAF'S AIR TRANSPORT FLEET FOR THE DEPLOYMENT AND SUSTENANCE OF FORCES IN THE FIELD.

16. THE AIR TRANSPORT FORCE WOULD BE ENGAGED IN LOGISTIC SUPPORT FROM BASES IN THE SOUTH-EAST TO FORCES DEPLOYED ANYWHERE BETWEEN LEARMONTH AND TOWNSVILLE. THE MAGNITUDE OF SUCH SUPPORT MAY DEMAND SUPPLEMENTATION BY CIVIL AIRCRAFT. TACTICAL TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT, BOTH FIXED AND ROTARY WING, WOULD DISTRIBUTE SUPPLIES FROM THE AIRFIELDS TO FORCES DEPLOYED TO MORE REMOTE LOCATIONS. ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT WOULD BE NEEDED TO UNLOAD SUPPLY SHIPS STANDING OFF-SHORE IN THOSE AREAS WHERE PORT FACILITIES DO NOT EXIST. IN ADDITION, THERE COULD BE A NEED FOR THE DEPLOYMENT BY AIR OF QUICK REACTION ARMY UNITS AGAINST ENEMY COMMANDO TYPE INCURSIONS.

COMBAT CAPABILITIES
STRIKE OPERATIONS

14. AS PREVIOUSLY STATED, LONG RANGE OFFENSIVE AIR POWER CAPABLE OF ASSURED RETALIATION IS VITAL TO AUSTRALIA'S DETERRENT POSTURE. THE F111 STRIKE FORCE IS THE ESSENTIAL PART OF THIS DETERRENT. 24 F111 AIRCRAFT WERE PROCURED IN THE 1960s BUT DELIVERY DID NOT TAKE PLACE UNTIL 1973 DUE TO TECHNICAL PROBLEMS. SINCE THEN, FOUR AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN DESTROYED IN ACCIDENTS, AND FOUR MODIFIED TO THE RECONNAISSANCE ROLE LEAVING A TOTAL OF 16 AIRCRAFT FOR THE BASIC STRIKE ROLE.

15. ALTHOUGH THE F111 HAS NOT BEEN MODIFIED TO KEEP PACE WITH THE LATEST STRIKE AIRCRAFT TECHNOLOGY, ITS UNIQUE DESIGN FEATURING A 'SWING-WING' AND TERRAIN FOLLOWING RADAR PROVIDES A FORMIDABLE STRIKE PLATFORM WHICH CAN PENETRATE DEEP INTO ENEMY TERRITORY AT LOW ALTITUDES IN ANY WEATHER, DAY OR NIGHT. HOWEVER, A NOTABLE DEFICIENCY IN CAPABILITY IS ITS LACK OF A RANGE OF STAND-OFF WEAPONS AND ASSOCIATED DELIVERY SYSTEM. AS ANNOUNCED BY THE MINISTER FOR DEFENCE ON 25 MARCH 1980, ACTION IS IN HAND TO HAVE THE F111 WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEM UPGRADED BY ACQUIRING A PRECISION GUIDED MISSILE DELIVERY CAPABILITY. THIS WILL INCREASE SIGNIFICANTLY WEAPON ACCURACY, AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY AND, CONSEQUENTLY, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR SMALL STRATEGIC STRIKE FORCE.

16. INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE NEW TACTICAL FIGHTER WILL HAVE THE POTENTIAL TO PARTIALLY SUPPLEMENT THE F111 FORCE IF SUITABLE WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS ARE FITTED AND AN AIR-TO-AIR REFUELLING CAPABILITY OBTAINED. ADDITIONALLY, THE LONG RANGE MARITIME FORCE IS EMERGING AS A POTENTIAL MARITIME DETERRENT FORCE.

SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE

MARITIME SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE

17. MARITIME SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE TASKS INCLUDE: OPEN OCEAN AND COASTAL SURVEILLANCE (INCLUDING CIVIL ASSOCIATED SURVEILLANCE), INTELLIGENCE GATHERING, AND OBSERVATION OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES. THE DECLARATION OF THE 200 MILE AUSTRALIAN FISHING ZONE HAS GREATLY INCREASED THE AREA OF CIVIL SURVEILLANCE RESPONSIBILITY - THE FUTURE IMPLICATIONS FOR SURVEILLANCE EFFORT OF THIS INCREASE HAS YET TO EVOLVE. THE FOREGOING TASKS ARE PERFORMED IN THE MAIN BY THE LONG RANGE MARITIME PATROL FORCE AND ELEMENTS OF THE STRIKE FORCE. C130, CARIBOU AND HS748 AIRCRAFT ALSO PROVIDE SOME ASSISTANCE IN CIVIL SURVEILLANCE TASKS. WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF THE NEW TACTICAL FIGHTER, ELEMENTS OF THE TACTICAL FIGHTER FORCE COULD ALSO BE EMPLOYED.

18. PATROL FORCE. THE LONG RANGE MARITIME PATROL FORCE CONSISTS OF 12 P3B ORION AIRCRAFT AND 12 P3C ORION AIRCRAFT. THE P3B's WERE INTRODUCED INTO RAAF SERVICE IN 1968 AND, SINCE THEN, HAVE BEEN THE RAAF's PRIME MARITIME SURVEILLANCE VEHICLE, UNDERTAKING THE MAJORITY OF BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SURVEILLANCE TASKS. THE P3C AIRCRAFT WAS PROCURED IN 1978 AND HAS BEEN EMPLOYED ON SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES SINCE EARLY 1979. THE PRESENT P3 ORION FLEET IS ADEQUATE IN TERMS OF AIRCRAFT NUMBERS TO FULFIL CURRENT AND PROJECTED SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS. HOWEVER, MODERNIZATION OF NAVIGATION AND

SENSOR EQUIPMENT IN THE P3B AND AN INCREASE IN MANPOWER IN THE TOTAL FORCE WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE THE PATROL FORCES EFFECTIVENESS AND AVAILABILITY. ACCORDINGLY, THE RAAF HAS A P3B MODERNIZATION PROGRAM UNDERWAY WHICH WILL PROVIDE A FULLY EFFECTIVE DAY/NIGHT, ALL WEATHER SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITY FOR THAT AIRCRAFT. ACTION IS ALSO IN HAND TO SUPPLEMENT THE P3 FORCE WITH ADDITIONAL AIRCREW AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL. BOTH OF THESE ACTIVITIES WERE ANNOUNCED BY THE MINISTER FOR DEFENCE ON 25 MARCH 1980.

19. STRIKE FORCE/TACTICAL FIGHTER FORCE. THE FOUR AIRCRAFT RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENT OF THE F111 FORCE HAS A GOOD MARITIME SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITY. ADDITIONALLY, AN ELEMENT OF THE NEW FIGHTER FORCE WILL BE EQUIPPED FOR TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE, AND THUS COULD SUPPLEMENT THE P3 AND F111 CAPABILITIES.

STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE

20. AS A RESULT OF THE MODIFICATION OF FOUR F111 AIRCRAFT TO WHICH WE HAVE GIVEN THE DESIGNATION RF-111C, THE STRIKE FORCE NOW HAS A DAY/NIGHT STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITY. AUGMENTATION OF THE F111 ELEMENT MAY BE PROVIDED BY THE NEW TACTICAL FIGHTER, HOWEVER, AIRCRAFT SIZE MAY LIMIT THE RANGE OF SENSORS THAT CAN BE FITTED.

SURVEY OPERATIONS

21. THE CANBERRA FLEET HAS BEEN IN-SERVICE SINCE 1954 WHEN 48 WERE ACQUIRED AS BOMBER AIRCRAFT. 15 CANBERRAS REMAIN IN THE RAAF CONDUCTING AIR DEFENCE SUPPORT, A WIDE RANGE OF PHOTOGRAPHIC TASKS INCLUDING AERIAL SURVEY. SIX AIRCRAFT WERE SPECIFICALLY MODIFIED TO PERFORM THE LATTER TASK, AND IN THAT ROLE HAVE MADE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE COOPERATION PROGRAMME BY CONDUCTING AERIAL SURVEY OPERATIONS IN INDONESIA AND PNG. THESE

AIRCRAFT WILL REACH THEIR EXTENDED LIFE OF TYPE AND BE WITHDRAWN FROM SERVICE BY JUNE 1984. THE REPLACEMENT OF THIS AIRCRAFT IS BEING EXAMINED TO ENSURE THE CAPABILITIES AND CONTRIBUTION PRESENTLY PROVIDED BY THE CANBERRA ARE RETAINED.

MARITIME OPERATIONS

MARITIME STRIKE

22. THE RAN AND RAAF SHARE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MARITIME STRIKE OPERATIONS. THE RAAF'S MARITIME STRIKE CAPABILITY IS INVESTED IN THE STRIKE FORCE, LONG RANGE MARITIME PATROL FORCE AND, IN THE NEAR FUTURE, THE TACTICAL FIGHTER FORCE. WITH SUITABLE WEAPONS, AND PARTICULARLY TANKER SUPPORT THIS TRIAD WILL PROVIDE A VERY EFFECTIVE LONG RANGE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND, CONSEQUENTLY, A VERSATILE AND SIGNIFICANT MARITIME DETERRENT.

23. PATROL FORCE. THE 10 P3C AIRCRAFT ARE EQUIPPED WITH THE CAPABILITY TO LAUNCH THE HARPOON STAND-OFF ANTI-SHIPPING MISSILE. HARPOON MISSILES WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR P3C USE IN AUSTRALIA IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE PRIME MINISTER ANNOUNCED IN PARLIAMENT ON 19 FEBRUARY 1980, THE FITMENT OF HARPOON TO THE P3B AIRCRAFT. ACCORDINGLY, THE ENTIRE PATROL FORCE WILL BE HIGHLY CAPABLE IN THE ANTI-SHIPPING ROLE AT VERY LONG RANGE FROM BASE, AND THUS, PROVIDE A CREDIBLE MARITIME DETERRENT FORCE.

24. STRIKE FORCE. THE 16 F111 AIRCRAFT OF THE STRIKE FORCE HAVE HIGH POTENTIAL IN THE ANTI-SHIPPING ROLE BUT CURRENTLY LACK SUITABLE WEAPONS. A HARPOON DELIVERY CAPABILITY IS SEEN AS THE LOGICAL AND MOST APPROPRIATE ADDITION TO INCREASE THE MARITIME STRIKE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS PLATFORM; AND THIS IS BEING EXAMINED.

25. TACTICAL FIGHTER FORCE. THE MIRAGE AIRCRAFT HAS ONLY LIMITED CAPABILITY IN THE MARITIME STRIKE ROLE AND THEREFORE, EMPHASIS HAS NOT BEEN PLACED ON THIS. HOWEVER, MARITIME STRIKE WILL BE AN IMPORTANT ROLE FOR THE NEW TACTICAL FIGHTER. THIS AIRCRAFT, COUPLED WITH SUITABLE WEAPONS AND TANKER SUPPORT, WILL PROVIDE A GOOD LONG RANGE STRIKE CAPABILITY AGAINST SHIPS AND SMALL MANOEUVRABLE TARGETS SUCH AS FAST PATROL BOATS.

26. MINING. THE RAN AND RAAF SHARE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MINING OPERATIONS. THE 16 F111 AIRCRAFT PROVIDE A HIGHLY EFFECTIVE OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE MINE DELIVERY CAPABILITY; THE 20 P3 AIRCRAFT AN HIGHLY EFFECTIVE DEFENSIVE AND IN SOME CIRCUMSTANCES, OFFENSIVE MINE DELIVERY CAPABILITY. THE C130 AND NEW TACTICAL FIGHTER HAVE A MINING POTENTIAL WHICH COULD BE EXPLOITED GIVEN A REASONABLE LEAD TIME TO MEET TRAINING AND ENGINEERING REQUIREMENTS. THE PLANNED UPDATE TO THE P3B NAVIGATION SYSTEM DURING THE P3B MODERNIZATION PROGRAM WILL SIGNIFICANTLY ENHANCE THE P3B MINE DELIVERY CAPABILITY.

27. ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE. THE RAN AND THE RAAF SHARE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROVIDING ANTI-SUBMARINE FORCES.

THE 20 AIRCRAFT P3 ORION FORCE ARMED WITH TORPEDOES IS THE ONLY ELEMENT OF THE RAAF SUITABLE FOR ANTI-SUBMARINE OPERATIONS.

28. WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF THE BARRA SONOBUOY, THE P3C ORION AIRCRAFT IS EXPECTED TO BE HIGHLY EFFECTIVE IN DETECTING BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL SUBMARINES. THE P3B's EARLY GENERATION ANTI SUBMARINE EQUIPMENT HAS DEGRADED AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE CONSIDERABLY RELATIVE TO MODERN POTENTIAL SUBMARINE TARGETS. HOWEVER, PLANNED IMPROVEMENTS TO P3B EQUIPMENT SHOULD RESTORE THIS CAPABILITY.

AIR DEFENCE OF MARITIME AND CONTINENTAL AUSTRALIA

29. THE RAAF HAS A PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY UNDER NATIONAL DEFENCE POLICIES TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF SOVEREIGN AUSTRALIAN AIRSPACE AND TO CONTRIBUTE TO AIR DEFENCE NEEDS IN SUPPORT OF ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED INDEPENDENTLY, OR UNDER TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS, OUTSIDE SOVEREIGN AIRSPACE.

30. UNDER EARLIER NATIONAL DEFENCE POLICIES OF FORWARD DEFENCE TWO AIR TRANSPORTABLE POINT AIR DEFENCE SYSTEMS (HUBCAP) WERE PROCURED. THESE IN CONJUNCTION WITH A STATIC POINT DEFENCE INSTALLATION AT DARWIN REPRESENTED RAAF AIR DEFENCE ASSETS UNTIL CHRISTMAS 1974 WHEN CYCLONE TRACY DEMOLISHED THE DARWIN INSTALLATION.

31. ABOUT THAT SAME TIME, RECOGNITION OF EQUIPMENT DEFICIENCIES, THE NEED TO PROVIDE TRAINING FACILITIES, SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT CAPACITY AND THE LIMITATIONS OF THE OLD CABINIZED EQUIPMENT LED TO PROJECT RECAP: - UNDER THAT PROJECT THREE NEW RADAR HEADS WERE ACQUIRED. THESE, ALONG WITH REPLACEMENT PROCESSING EQUIPMENT ARE BEING INSTALLED INTO PERMANENT BUILDINGS AT WILLIAMTOWN AND DARWIN TO BE OPERATIONAL BY THE END OF 1981.

32. NEW AIR TRANSPORTABLE COMMAND AND CONTROL CABINS ARE BEING ACQUIRED AS A TACTICAL AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM ELEMENT NEEDED TO SUPPLEMENT FIXED SYSTEM CAPACITY.

33. IN MORE RECENT YEARS, STUDIES HAVE HIGHLIGHTED THE INADEQUACY OF POINT AIR DEFENCE SYSTEMS TO MEET THE NATIONAL NEED. AS A RESULT NEW CONCEPTS BASED ON WIDE AREA SURVEILLANCE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMAND AND CONTROL FACILITIES RELEVANT TO THE NEEDS OF SOVEREIGN AIRSPACE SECURITY ARE BEING DEVELOPED, AND

REORGANIZATION OF AIR FORCE CAPACITY FOR AIR DEFENCE IS BEING UNDERTAKEN.

34. THIS ACTIVITY INCLUDES PREPARATION TO RECEIVE AND USE SURVEILLANCE DATA WHICH MAY BECOME AVAILABLE FROM ALL POSSIBLE SOURCES INCLUDING STAGE B OF PROJECT JINDALEE - OHR. HOWEVER RECOGNIZING THAT OHR CANNOT BE DEVELOPED TO OPERATIONAL STATUS UNTIL MUCH LATER IN THE DECADE AND THAT IT WILL NOT BE A PANACEA TO ALL THE PROBLEMS OF AREA AIR DEFENCE AND SURVEILLANCE, THE USE OF AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING AND CONTROL AIRCRAFT IS BEING EXAMINED. THIS TYPE OF AIRCRAFT HAS THE CAPABILITY TO DETECT AND PLOT COURSE AND BEHAVIOUR OF STAND-OFF MISSILES - A CAPABILITY WHICH WILL BE OF GROWING SIGNIFICANCE IN THE FUTURE. BUT, IMPORTANT AS THAT MAY BE, IT IS THE UNIQUE INBUILT CAPACITY OF SUCH AIRCRAFT TO PERFORM A WIDE RANGE OF FUNCTIONS AS A COMPLEMENTARY ELEMENT OF AN AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM, COMPENSATING FOR INHERENT DEFFICIENCIES IN GROUND ELEMENTS, THAT IS ITS REAL ATTRACTION.

35. THE PRINCIPLE APPLICATIONS OF AN AEW AIRCRAFT SUCH AS THE E2C IN AIR DEFENCE INVOLVE A WIDE RANGE OF ACTIVITIES:

A. EARLY WARNING AND THREAT DEFINITION USING PASSIVE AND ACTIVE SENSOR SYSTEMS TO PROVIDE LOW LEVEL DETECTION WELL BEYOND THE RANGE OF STATIC MICROWAVE RADARS SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVE WARNING TIME ANDMAKE POSSIBLE THE TIMELY RESPONSE BY DEFENSIVE FORCES.

B. MONITOR THE NATURE OF AN AIR THREAT BY ANALYSING DISPOSITION AND STRENGTH; EXPOSE FEINTS AND DECOYS

C. CO-ORDINATE AND CONTROL AIR COMBAT ACTION AT MAXIMUM RANGES, THUS AFFORDING A DEFENCE COVER NOT PREVIOUSLY POSSIBLE.

D. MINIMIZE THE EFFECTS OF ELECTRONIC JAMMING IN AERIAL COMBAT OPERATIONS,

E. REDUCE RISKS AND ATTRITION TO ALL FRIENDLY ELEMENTS THROUGH TIMELY WARNING OF ENEMY ACTION,

F. PROVIDING AIRSPACE AND RECOVERY CONTROL AS NECESSARY,

36. OTHER FUNCTIONS THE AIRCRAFT CAN PERFORM, EITHER IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN AIR DEFENCE AIRSPACE CONTROL SYSTEMS, OR AUTONOMOUSLY ARE:

A. LONG RANGE STRIKE AIR DEFENCE ESCORT,

B. LONG RANGE STRIKE CO-ORDINATION,

C. AIR DEFENCE FOR SEA SURFACE UNITS,

D. MARITIME SURFACE SURVEILLANCE, AND

E. SUPPORT OF GROUND OPERATIONS.

36a. TURNING TO A CONSIDERATION OF WEAPONS SUBSYSTEMS, OUR PRESENT CAPABILITIES RELY ON THE MIRAGE WHICH AS YOU KNOW IS OLD; AND, IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN REASONABLE CAPABILITY IT HAS BECOME NECESSARY TO REPLACE SOME OF ITS WEAPONS BETWEEN NOW AND WHEN THE AIRCRAFT IS PHASED OUT OF SERVICE TO MAKE WAY FOR THE NTF. THE CHOICE AND CONFIGURATION OF THE NEW AIRCRAFT WILL DECIDE OUR CAPACITY AND GOVERN THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR SYSTEMS OVER THE NEXT 20 YEARS. MORE THAN EVER BEFORE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE RETAIN A CAPABILITY FOR ALL WEATHER OPERATIONS. CURRENT PLANNING CALLS FOR THE NEW TACTICAL FIGHTER AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS TO PROVIDE THAT INHERENT CAPABILITY AND VERSATILITY IN OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS, BUT TO GAIN MAXIMUM BENEFIT FROM IT WE PLAN TO PROGRESSIVELY DEVELOP OUR GROUND INFRASTRUCTURE.

37. SURFACE TO AIR MISSILES ARE COMPLEMENTARY TO FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN FORMING OUR WEAPON SUB-SYSTEMS. THE ARMY RAPIER LOW LEVEL POINT DEFENCE MISSILE SYSTEM IS INTEGRATED INTO OUR NATIONAL AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM. AIR FORCE HAS A RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIGHER CAPABILITY MISSILE SYSTEMS AND CONTINUALLY MONITORS

DEVELOPMENTS IN THAT FIELD WITH A VIEW TO SATISFYING STAFF REQUIREMENTS.

OFFENSIVE SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCES

38. RAAF'S RESPONSIBILITIES FOR OFFENSIVE SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCES ARE EXTENSIVE, BUT FOR SAKE OF DISCUSSION THEY CAN BE DESCRIBED AS DIRECT AND INDIRECT. THE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO IS THAT DIRECT SUPPORT INVOLVES CONTINUAL CONTACT WITH, AND INTIMATE INTEGRATION INTO THE GROUND FORCE OPERATION, WHEREAS INDIRECT SUPPORT CAN USUALLY BE CONDUCTED INDEPENDENTLY. APART FROM THAT DISTINCTION, THERE IS AN ESSENTIAL SIMILARITY IN AIR FORCE OPERATIONS WHICH INVOLVE TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE AND THE DELIVERY OF AIR TO GROUND WEAPONS AGAINST A WIDE VARIETY OF TARGETS.

39. THE MIRAGE IS THE PRIMARY AIRCRAFT FOR TACTICAL PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE. IN THIS ACTIVITY RESULTS ARE LIMITED TO THOSE OBTAINABLE FROM ONE PANORAMIC CAMERA. IT IS A GOOD CAMERA AND PRODUCES GOOD RESULTS BUT THE SINGLE SENSOR DOES NOT COVER THE FULL SPECTRUM OF RECONNAISSANCE NEEDS. VISUAL OBSERVATION IS AN USEFUL AUGUMENTATION: WE PLAN A MORE COMPREHENSIVE AND CAPABLE FIT FOR THE NEW FIGHTER.

40. DIRECT OFFENSIVE SUPPORT IS PROVIDED BY THE MIRAGE. REALLY AN AIR DEFENCE AIRCRAFT, IT HAS A SMALL WEAPON LOAD AND RADIUS OF ACTION WHICH OFFERS ONLY LIMITED CAPABILITY IN THE MODERN BATTLEFIELD. WE HAVE ACQUIRED LASER GUIDANCE KITS TO IMPROVE BOMB ACCURACY, AND THE 30 MM CANNON REMAINS A USEFUL WEAPON AGAINST MANY GROUND TARGETS. IN SHORT MIRAGE WEAPONS AND DELIVERY TECHNOLOGY ARE RATHER DATED.

41. SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE NTF INCLUDE COMPREHENSIVE AIR TO GROUND WEAPON DELIVERY CAPABILITIES. IT WILL BE ABLE TO CARRY A LARGER AND MORE DIVERSE LOAD OF WEAPONS OVER MUCH GREATER RANGES, AND IN ADDITION WILL HAVE MUCH IMPROVED WEAPON ACCURACY OVER A WIDER OPERATIONAL SPECTRUM, WHICH WILL PROVIDE A QUANTUM JUMP IN CAPABILITY.

42. FORWARD AIR CONTROL AIRCRAFT ARE STILL AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE DIRECT OFFENSIVE SUPPORT SCENE. THE RAAF USES, WINJEELS

TO RETAIN SKILLS. REPLACEMENT PLANNING IS RELATED TO NEW TRAINER AND HELICOPTER PROJECTS.

43. THE F111C AND RF111C COULD ALSO BE USED IN DIRECT OFFENSIVE SUPPORT IF THE URGENCY OR PECULIARITY OF A SITUATION SO DEMANDED. FOR EXAMPLE WE HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO DELIVER LASER GUIDED BOMBS ONTO DESIGNATED TARGETS BY DAY OR NIGHT GIVEN REASONABLE WEATHER.

AIR TRANSPORT SUPPORT

FIXED WING

44. OUR 24 C130 HERCULES ARE EXCEPTIONALLY SUITED TO AUSTRALIA'S TRANSPORT SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS. WHILE NOTIONALLY A TACTICAL AIRCRAFT, THEIR 3000-5000 NAUTICAL MILE RANGE CAPABILITY ALLOWS THEIR USE IN THE STRATEGIC ROLE FOR URGENT CARGO, TROOPS AND AEROMEDEVACUATION. IMPROVEMENTS WITHIN THE TACTICAL ROLE ARE PLANNED, ESPECIALLY IN THE FIELDS OF AERIAL DELIVERY EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES, WITH THE AIM OF REDUCING AIRCRAFT VULNERABILITY. MOST AIRFIELDS IN AUSTRALIA ARE C130 CAPABLE AND THOSE TOO SHORT COULD BE LENGTHENED AT RELATIVELY SHORT NOTICE.

45. THE 22 CARIBOU AIRCRAFT CAN CARRY SMALL LOADS INTO ALMOST ANY AIRFIELD IN AUSTRALIA AND ARE PARTICULARLY SUITED TO WET SEASON OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH. HOWEVER, THE LIMITED AVAILABILITY OF AVGAS, AND THE APPARENTLY LESSENING REQUIREMENT FOR AN AIRCRAFT OF CARIBOU'S CAPABILITY ARE MAJOR FACTORS INFLUENCING DECISIONS ON THE FUTURE OF THE ELEMENT. IN SHORT, EXCEPT FOR SPECIALIZED CIRCUMSTANCES THE C130 CAN DO THE JOB FASTER AND CHEAPER.

46. TWO B707 ARE NOW IN RAAF SERVICE, THE FIRST IN MARCH 1979. WHILE AIR FORCE IS STILL IN THE LEARNING PROCESS, INDICATIONS THIS YEAR ARE THAT ABOUT 62% OF FLYING WILL BE ON DEFENCE AND NATIONAL TASKS, WHILE 38%

WILL BE ON VIP RELATED TASKS. IN MILITARY USE, THE AIRCRAFT IS A LONG RANGE STRATEGIC TRANSPORT WHICH CAN BE OPERATED BETWEEN MOST ESTABLISHED MILITARY AND CAPITAL CITY AIRPORTS. TO DATE, THE RAAF B707 HAVE BEEN USED ONLY AS PASSENGER TRANSPORTS, BUT THE ACQUISITION LATER THIS YEAR OF A CARGO KIT AND ASSOCIATED GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT WILL ALLOW THEIR USE IN THE STRATEGIC CARGO TRANSPORT ROLE, IF NECESSARY RELIEVING THE C130 FLEET OF SOME OF THE WORKLOAD. THESE AIRCRAFT ADD CONSIDERABLY TO OUR TRANSPORT CAPABILITY AND PROVIDE A SOUND BASE FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT.

ROTARY WING

47. THE RAAF FIRST ACQUIRED IROQUOIS HELICOPTERS IN 1963. THEY ARE CURRENTLY USED TO SUPPORT AUSTRALIAN ARMY PEACETIME TRAINING, FOR PILOT TRAINING AND SEARCH AND RESCUE. OF A TOTAL OF 66 ACQUIRED (NOT ALL IN 1963), 21 HAVE BEEN DESTROYED DUE TO ENEMY ACTION AND OTHER CAUSES. 14 OF THE LOWER CAPABILITY MODELS OF THE IROQUOIS (UH-1B) ARE DUE TO REACH THEIR LIFE OF TYPE IN 1983, AND THEIR REPLACEMENT, TO MEET THE RAN/RAAF HELICOPTER PILOT TRAINING ROLE IS BEING EXAMINED. THERE IS YET NO REQUIREMENT TO REPLACE THE REMAINING IROQUOIS (UH-1H).

48. TWELVE CHINOOK MEDIUM LIFT HELICOPTERS WERE ACQUIRED IN 1972, the NEED FOR THIS CAPABILITY BEING

ESTABLISHED DURING THE VIETNAM WAR TO PROVIDE A MEDIUM LIFT CAPABILITY. INITIALLY SIX CHINOOKS WERE PLACED INTO STORAGE; SINCE THEN ONE HAS ALREADY BEEN RETURNED TO OPERATIONAL STATUS AND WE PLAN TO BREAK OUT A FURTHER TWO OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS. ALTHOUGH THIS AIRCRAFT WILL NEED SOME MODERNIZING OVER THE YEARS, IT IS EXPECTED TO MEET DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS OVER THE NEXT DECADE.

AIR-TO-AIR REFUELLING

49. AS PREVIOUSLY STATED THE ACQUISITION OF AN AIR-TO-AIR REFUELLING CAPABILITY WILL SIGNIFICANTLY ENHANCE F111 AND NEW TACTICAL FIGHTER CAPABILITY TO PROJECT OFFENSIVE AIR POWER AT LONG RANGES AND, THUS SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE THE CREDIBILITY OF AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE POSTURE. THE POSSESSION OF B707 AIRCRAFT IMPROVES OUR ABILITY TO MORE QUICKLY ACQUIRE THIS CAPABILITY THROUGH THE PURCHASE AND MODIFICATION OF SECOND-HAND AIRCRAFT.

SUPPORT CAPABILITIES

50. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE RAAF SUPPORT ELEMENTS IS TO ENSURE THAT THE RAAF'S COMBAT UNITS HAVE THE SUPPORT NECESSARY TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH SHORT NOTICE LOW-LEVEL CONTINGENCIES, AND THAT THE SUPPORT FUNCTIONS ARE CAPABLE OF EXPANDING TO MEET THE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF A LONG-TERM THREAT.

SUPPLY

51. IN PERFORMING ITS SUPPLY FUNCTION, WHICH INVOLVES TECHNICAL AND NON-TECHNICAL SPARES DETERMINATION AND ACQUISITION, MOVEMENTS AND TRANSPORTATION, CATERING SERVICES, BARRACKS AND POSTAL SERVICES, THE RAAF EMPLOYS THE MOST MODERN MANAGEMENT METHODS AND SYSTEMS. THESE RANGE FROM FULLY-AUTOMATED MATERIAL HANDLING SYSTEMS TO ELECTRONIC DATA PROCESSING METHODS OF INVENTORY CONTROL.

52. THE MAGNITUDE OF THE RAAF'S INVENTORY AND STORAGE PROBLEM IS ILLUSTRATED BY THE FACT THAT THERE ARE AT LEAST 642,910 LINE ITEMS IN THE SUPPLY SYSTEM AT ANY ONE TIME.

53. ONE IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE SUPPLY VERSUS AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY EQUATION IS THAT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COST OF SPARES SUPPORT AND FLYING EFFORT IS NOT LINEAR. PROVISIONING LEAD TIMES MAY BE AS HIGH AS THREE YEARS, WHICH MEANS THAT SAVINGS ARE NOT IMMEDIATELY APPARENT IF FLYING HOURS ARE REDUCED. FURTHERMORE, PRIOR PROVISIONING ACTION IS REQUIRED FOR SUSTAINED INCREASES IN EFFORT.

ENGINEERING

54. THE PRIMARY FUNCTION OF THE TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION IS TO ENSURE THAT RAAF AIRCRAFT AND EQUIPMENTS ARE DESIGNED

AND MAINTAINED TO A STANDARD WHICH ENSURES THEY COULD RELIABLY AND SAFELY PERFORM THEIR MISSION. IN TERMS OF MANPOWER, THIS DIVISION IS THE LARGEST ELEMENT OF THE RAAF - EMPLOYING OVER A THIRD OF THE AVAILABLE SERVICE'S MANPOWER.

55. THE SCOPE OF AIRCRAFT TECHNICAL SERVICES PROVIDED RANGES FROM THE OPERATING LEVEL PREPARATION OF ON-LINE AIRCRAFT, TO BASE MAINTENANCE WHERE PERIODIC SERVICINGS ARE UNDERTAKEN TO AIRCRAFT DEPOTS WHERE MAJOR OVERHAULS, REPAIR AND MODIFICATION OF AIRCRAFT AND OTHER EQUIPMENT ARE CARRIED OUT. THERE IS NO SURPLUS CAPACITY TO EFFECT RAPID EXPANSION; THEREFORE TRAINING LEAD TIMES WILL PACE EXPANSION.

TRAINING

56. HISTORICALLY, THE RAAF'S CAPABILITY AND COMPETENCE FOR OPERATIONS HAS BEEN BASED ON THE CONCEPT THAT HIGH QUALITY TRAINING AND AN EXPERT, EXPERIENCED BUT SMALL MANPOWER FORCE BEST ENABLED THE RAAF TO MEET ITS DIVERSE RESPONSIBILITIES. MOREOVER, THIS CONCEPT WAS AND STILL IS SEEN AS BEING OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE TO RAAF PRESTIGE, ESPRIT DE CORPS AND WORK-FORCE MOTIVATION. IN ADDITION, HIGH QUALITY TRAINING AND AN EXPERT MANPOWER FORCE ARE ESSENTIAL FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF INCREASED SELF-RELIANCE AND INDEPENDENCE.

57. IN RESPECT TO RAAF TRAINING, SOME 400 DIFFERENT COURSES ARE CONDUCTED FOR MEN AND WOMEN RANGING IN LENGTH FROM A FEW DAYS TO TWO YEARS COVERING INITIAL RECRUIT TRAINING THROUGH COURSES OF A SPECIALIST AND ADVANCED NATURE. THE RAAF TRAINS ALL ITS OWN AIR CREW. ADDITIONALLY, IT TRAINS

PILOTS AND NAVIGATORS FOR THE NAVY AND PILOTS FOR THE ARMY. IN RECENT YEARS IT HAS ALSO PROVIDED AIRCREW TRAINING UNDER DEFENCE CO-OPERATION PROGRAMMES FOR MANY SE ASIAN COUNTRIES AND PNG.

MANPOWER

58. SKILLED AND EXPERIENCED MANPOWER IS A COSTLY BUT ESSENTIAL COMPONENT OF THE RAAF'S OVERALL CAPABILITY AND IS A KEY FACTOR IN THE RAAF'S ABILITY TO EXPAND THE FORCE AND ABSORB NEW EQUIPMENT. DE-EMPHASIS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF SKILLED AND EXPERIENCED MANPOWER INEVITABLY DEGRADES OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY; WITH TIME THIS TREND CAN CAUSE DETERIORATION IN COMPETENCY LEVELS TO THE EXTENT THAT RECOVERY TO A HIGH LEVEL OF OPERATIONAL EXPERTISE IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT, COSTLY AND PROTRACTED. AIR FORCE BELIEVES THAT ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF A SOLID TRAINING BASE IS FUNDAMENTAL TO FORCE VIABILITY. CURRENT MANPOWER SHORTAGES WILL BE OVERCOME TO A LIMITED DEGREE WITH PROPOSED MANNING INCREASES FORESHADOWED BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENCE ON 20 FEBRUARY 1980.

59. AS OF 1 APRIL 1980, THE TOTAL RAAF FORCE INCLUDED SOME 21,591 PERSONNEL.

RESERVES

60. THE AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE RESERVES, INCLUDING THE ACTIVE CITIZEN AIR FORCE (ACAF), IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE RAAF AND IS VIEWED AS A VALUABLE SOURCE OF MANPOWER TO

AUGMENT THE PERMANENT AIR FORCE IN TIME OF DEFENCE EMERGENCY. HOWEVER, A SIGNIFICANT LIMITATION ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF RESERVISTS IS THAT THEY CAN BE RECALLED TO COMPULSORY DUTY ONLY UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES DECLARED BY THE GOVERNMENT TO BE A DEFENCE EMERGENCY OR WAR. IN LOWER LEVEL CONTINGENCIES, ACTIVE SERVICE WOULD THEREFORE BE VOLUNTARY AND WOULD DEPEND ON THE RESERVISTS MOTIVATION VERSUS CIVILIAN OCCUPATIONAL INTERESTS OR PRIORITIES. HENCE THE RAAF HAS BEEN HITHERTO RELUCANT TO PLACE SIGNIFICANT RELIANCE ON THE RESERVE.

61. NEVERTHELESS, THE RAAF RECOGNISES THE COST AND CAPABILITY BENEFITS OF MAKING BETTER USE OF RESERVISTS TO HELP MEET SURGES IN ACTIVITY LEVELS DUE TO MAJOR EXERCISES OR LOW LEVEL CONTINGENCIES. INDEED WE ENJOY THESE BENEFITS IN SEVERAL IMPORTANT AREAS. HENCE, THE RAAF HAS BEEN DEVELOPING AND MAKING INCREASED USE OF THE ACAF SQUADRONS IN THIS REGARD, WITH MODERATE SUCCESS.

62. CURRENT MANPOWER LEVELS IN THE ACTIVE RESERVE AND INACTIVE RESERVE ARE 487 AND APPROXIMATELY 6800 RESPECTIVELY.

SIR,

I HAVE STATED OUR OPERATIONAL CONCEPT SO THAT YOU MIGHT BE AWARE OF THE LOGIC OF AIR FORCE DEVELOPMENT.

I TRUST MY OVERVIEW OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE FORCE AND STATED PLANS FOR ITS DEVELOPMENT PRESENT THE PICTURE AS YOU HAVE SOUGHT. I HAVE NOT PRESENTED A COMPLETE PICTURE OF AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE: IT IS COMPLEX AND RANGES OVER A NUMBER OF AIR FORCE ESTABLISHMENTS, GOVERNMENT FACTORIES, AND CIVIL CONTRACTORS. I HAVE ON THIS FIRST OCCASION ALSO NOT DONE JUSTICE TO THE MANY FACETS OF RECRUITING, TRAINING, CAREER DEVELOPMENT AND RETENTION OF THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO PRESENT THE MOST IMPORTANT MEASURE OF OUR CAPABILITY. THESE MATTERS WOULD BE BETTER ADDRESSED BY THE RESPONSIBLE DIVISION HEADS.

Senator BISHOP - You have mentioned not only the capability for surveillance but also its objectives. I suppose that in the minds of most Australians the question is whether what seems at present to be an ad hoc system of coastal surveillance partly performed by civilian personnel is a satisfactory arrangement. You have mentioned civil operators in this area. Is it a task which can be performed by other than the Air Force or should it be a task mainly for the Services, and is it an adequate service in view of the world situation?

Air Vice-Marshal Newham - I have not personally studied the adequacy of it. I would have to take notice of that question and supply you with an answer. There is a high degree of capability in the present civilian coastal surveillance. I have not been able to measure its success fully or accurately. It performs a different function from the Air Force contribution. We in the Air Force recognise, of course, that given other circumstances there is a defence application in what is being done. We certainly have an interest in that activity from that point of view. We have not formed any policies at the moment on augmenting or taking over or getting involved in the activity being performed by the new aircraft coming in and by the contract civil operators. We believe we perform a very useful function in the overview type of surveillance provided by our long range marine patrol aircraft which circumnavigate the country every week or so to add to the total intelligence picture. A review of the whole coastal surveillance situation will be made, probably next year, and we will be very much involved in that review together with the Navy which, of course, is highly active in that area.

Senator BISHOP - Are the present activities by your long range patrols a task which could be taken over wholly or in part by someone other than the Air Force?

Air Vice-Marshal Newham - No other vehicle in the country could do the job which the P3 Orion is doing. The Navy tracker force which operates in one particular area has the next highest

capability but it is range limited. I am not saying it has short range but it does not have the range of the long range aircraft.

Senator BISHOP - Your paper seems to me to convey that air defence systems are generally unsatisfactory. Whilst the systems are being studied, no early settlement or satisfactory solution to it is expected and you talk about the E2C aircraft. Does that put the position fairly accurately? Is the system at a situation which should be more urgently handled? Are you being hamstrung by the lack of funds?

Air Vice-Marshal Newham - Not at all. In the phasing section of the paper I placed it down a few steps and in our assessment of immediate threats the time scales would seem to be about right. There is some nice timing involved. You may acquire expensive equipment which is outdated by the time you come to use it and has to be replaced straight away. That is a problem we have with all equipment.

Senator BISHOP - Will you tell us about the E2C aircraft you were talking about?

Air Vice-Marshal Newham - We are rather taken with the characteristics of that type of aircraft in that it can deploy a very effective capability - a look-down or low level detection capability - very quickly in pure air defence terms. It has other significant capabilities which I did spell out. We are very interested in what we will get out of the over-the-horizon radar system. That has been tried, as you know, in other parts of the world but nothing has emerged at the moment. Even if it adds a moderate level of intelligence into the system that will be significant. With a flexible force of, say, airborne early warning aircraft one can quickly get a measure of early warning into any particular area.

CHAIRMAN - You mentioned the matter of training in the latter part of your submissipn. Have we any liaison with the Nellas air base in Nevada, which has a very sophisticated training program? If we have, is it the sort of liaison to permit some of our officers in that very specialised field to be involved in the training program there?

Air Vice-Marshal Newham - Yes. The air attache staff monitors have open access to that whole training complex. Many of us who have trained in America or have exchanged posts at Nellas and at other bases have trained with and used a wide variety of equipment which are put on their electronic warfare ranges and air combat manoeuvring ranges. We observed the Red Flag exercises about which you will have read.

CHAIRMAN - As a matter of fact I was there last year and was taken through the whole process.

Air Vice-Marshal Newham - We would be hopeful of joining in those exercises actively on a selective basis. We see them as very valuable and indeed, given the resources, we would like in a modest way to build a similar facility in the middle of this country.

CHAIRMAN - It would be splendid if that could happen. It has been approved that this Sub-Committee play a monitoring role rather than have specific terms of reference. In the short time in which we have been engaged on what we think is a far greater responsibility for the Sub-Committee than it has had in the past, we have had some evidence which indicated that according to at least one line of thought we should not replace the 'Melbourne' with another aircraft carrier or perhaps with two or three smaller aircraft carriers. It was suggested that we should examine the possibility of having a greater air screen of sophisticated aircraft such as the F16,F18 and so on. Would you care to comment?

Air Vice-Marshal Newham - The answer to your question depends on how far we should project air power beyond Australia into either our near neighbourhood or else our total area of interest. In the near neighbourhood, the Air Force analysis is that it would be more economical and more effective to use highly capable aircraft operated from a chain of land bases.

Mr BRYANT - How far would the F16 and F18 be able to reach?

Air Vice-Marshal Newham - There is a range of answers to your question. If they were not air refuelled they could have 800 miles radius of action. On the other hand they might have 500 miles for an air defence loiter situation.

Mr BRYANT - We obtained the Chinooks in 1972 and we have had them stored. I think that is a good idea. If we wanted to buy them new now, what would be the difference in the cost? I would just like to pay a compliment to whoever bought them or thought we needed them.

CHAIRMAN - We should have bought more.

Senator BISHOP - You are complimenting the Government which stored them.

Mr BRYANT - Yes, it was a very good government if I remember rightly.

CHAIRMAN - There was a very good assistant Defence Minister.

Air Vice-Marshal Newham - It would have at least doubled in that period, probably more.

Mr BRYANT - In addition these are the first friendly words I have heard about the Qantas Boeings. Ever since I heard Qantas was taking them out of service I have been puzzled why the RAAF did not just take them. It seemed to me immediately that this was the most sensible thing to do with them. Why did we take so long about it?

Air Vice-Marshal Newham - The Air Force wanted to get 707s some time ago. I think it was a matter or priority and financial constraint at the time, with the competing demands of a narrow program. It is a bit of history I am not terribly well informed on but I certainly know that we were very grateful for getting them and we believe they confer a considerable capability to the Defence Force.

Mr BRYANT - That has been my view of it. It is incidental that the Prime Minister uses them a little. I feel that this is the way we should operate. The impression I have got this morning from the three Services is of a general service with a good deal of strength, et cetera, but just on the edge of not being quite satisfactory to everybody. That might have to be the way all the Services have to operate in the present climate. I was wondering about the Reserve forces. Do you have airborne reserve people any more?

Air Vice-Marshal Newham - We have not had them for about 10 years.

Mr BRYANT - They are ground staff. I had a look at the Americans in a fairly perfunctory way. A very large number of the members of the air wing of the National Guard in the State of New York are flying helicopters and aircraft of various sorts and I saw people in Hawaii on one occasion who were flying jet fighters.

Why can we not do that? A large number of people in the civilian service are highly trained for that field. Is it a very great difficulty to transfer into the Service situation and back again?

Air Vice-Marshal Newham - No, I would not think so, once it was established. But we are small and we are on a core-force expansion concept, so we really could not, I think, justify a similar level of training for a number of reserve units in competition with the expenditure of funds on permanent forces. I think once we had built up our permanent units a little then that would be the next step. It is certainly in our thinking and indeed our policy on use of the Reserve is being reviewed. But we do see, if we were to get, say, a situation near full mobilisation, that the total air assets of the country would be requisitioned. I think the two government airlines plus the Ansetts would merely change their uniforms and we would just put new decals on the aircraft. We do have a bunch of people who are now doing precisely what they would be doing in a war situation and they are beautifully trained, and most of them have been in the Air Force or the Navy.

Mr BRYANT - In all the Services, particularly the Air Force and the Army, I think it would be a good deterrent to the people looking at us with eager eyes for us to have some structure which looks like the formed units because I am sure that would have an impression on people.

My feeling after this morning is that perhaps we should start to look at the Reserves as a fourth active arm, but do something about it differently. To you chaps who are going to be in Cabinets and things, the Reserve forces ought to be taken as a separate budgetary system by Cabinets to make sure that we build them up.

Air Vice-Marshal Newham - We are conscious of it and there are a number of trades and a number of officer categories which provide an extremely useful service for us, particularly in exercises where we find it hard with our permanent force manpower to hack the job.

Mr SCHOLES - Has the Air Force examined strike aircraft with a soft landing capability such as the Jaguar, and to what extent would that add to flexibility in the use of aircraft?

Air Vice-Marshal Newham - We would like to have that feature on many aircraft that we acquire. The Jaguar was examined some years ago when the fighter project was in its infancy in the middle of the last decade but it did not meet our requirements.

Mr SCHOLES - I did not mean the Jaguar in particular. Would that type of operational capacity significantly add to the Air Force's flexibility?

Air Vice-Marshal Newham - We do not believe with the internal communications structure of this country that there is a lot to be gained by sprinkling aircraft on every second-grade air field or country airport.

Mr SCHOLES - I was not thinking about stationing, I was thinking about the areas from which you could operate.

Air Vice-Marshal Newham - That is what I am getting at. The main difficulty in operating from dispersed fields is that of getting munitions and fuel to them. It is a tremendous problem getting our munitions and fuel into the established air fields. For example, the Harrier in the NATO context consumes five times its own weight a day.

Mr SCHOLES - Given the fact that on the west coast, where we are currently looking, we have probably only three airstrips

capable of operations, certainly the Mirages do not have a cover. General Dynamics claims a cover for the F16 which is rather extensive, going beyond Indonesia.

Air Vice-Marshal Newham - That is with air refuelling.

Mr SCHOLES - Yes. I am not sure about McDonnell Douglas. I have not seen that promotional film.

Air Vice-Marshal Newham - It is as good or better.

Mr SCHOLES - Is the current air field situation sufficient to enable operations in that area, if it were a hostile environment?

Air Vice-Marshal Newham - The short answer is no. We have a program, as you know, to build an air field at Derby, to develop Learmonth further, particularly in terms of passive defence, and Darwin. We have our eyes on Gove; we have plans for Weipa. That gives us a chain of air fields about 500 miles apart, which is a rather nice spread for the type of aircraft we are looking for.

Mr SCHOLES - Within the surveillance area, is Darwin's radar fully operational again?

Air Vice-Marshal Newham - The only radar operational at Darwin at the moment is an air traffic control radar with about 90 miles range at the best. The Recap system is being installed now and will be operational next year.

Mr SCHOLES - What will be at Amberley?

Air Vice-Marshal Newham - The mobile radar system will be developed at Amberley. It is caught up in the refurbishing and upgrading of equipment at the moment. The Amberley system has been pulled apart and put into Williamtown, and the Williamtown system is being pulled apart to go up to Darwin. There is only one air defence radar land base serviceable in this country at the moment. The Navy has six to 12 excellent systems floating around.

Mr SCHOLES - We will have to get them to fly their battleships.

Mr BRYANT - Are we maintaining our remote airfields such

as the one on Thursday Island at a satisfactory level? I have the impression they are well maintained by the Department but is that adequate?

Air Vice-Marshal Newham - They are maintained by the Department of Transport, not by us. They are certainly adequate for operations such as we carry out with the C130 and Caribou aircraft. We could operate tactical fighters from Weipa but it would punish the strip somewhat. We would need to strengthen it a bit and we would prefer to lengthen it and put in dispersals.

Mr SCHOLES - There seems to be an adequate airport system on the east coast of Australia because of the civilian operations. From Adelaide across to Perth are there any reasonably operational airports which would enable operations over sea?

Air Vice-Marshal Newham - No. There are air fields such as Forrest and Kalgoorlie from which we would operate C130 aircraft and Canberras, which have lower tyre pressures. You could operate the other aircraft but they would cut them up with the higher tyre pressures, causing extensive rutting.

Mr BRYANT - What about the Orion?

Air Vice-Marshal Newham - It is too heavy.

Senator BISHOP - Does the heavy emphasis on what you are doing on the west coast indicate more importance regarding Woomera? Trials have been held by the Army and yourselves. Does it offer an advantage if it has increased use?

Air Vice-Marshal Newham - It is a good half-way point. We are advancing plans to develop Woomera mainly for specialised training and for trials. We are carrying out quite a number of trials there at present and we have a resurfacing program going on for one of the runways.

CHAIRMAN - In the various submissions we have received much has been said regarding the core force concept. As far as the RAAF is concerned is the core force seen as a minimum force which could be expanded in a time of threat? How is the figure of 75 aircraft arrived at? Does it take into account a maximum threat?

Air Vice-Marshal Newham - I do not think very much expansion was considered in the calculation of that number. That was made up of three squadrons of 16 aircraft each plus the training and operational conversion unit plus sufficient attrition aircraft for the half-life of the aircraft type. We believe that three squadrons of that complement is the minimum number of aircraft or the minimum force capability we should retain to meet the diverse number of contingencies that do front the tactical fighter force. If we had fewer aircraft we would be very poorly placed in terms of flexibility and a credible force to put into an air defence situation or one of the other tactical air power situations.

CHAIRMAN - Supposing an attack was made on the mainland on one of our cities. Have we the capacity in defence systems other than air mobile defence systems - I am talking about missile launchers, ground to air missiles and things such as those - to cope adequately with an attack on Melbourne?

Air Vice-Marshal Newham - What sort of attack? A missile attack from a submarine would be very difficult to counter if we had no prior knowledge or prior intelligence of such a vehicle.

Mr BRYANT - Nearly everybody would be in that position.

CHAIRMAN - I asked that question because recently elements of the RAAF were moved from the north down to Adelaide and so on and I was wondering whether that sort of thing was in mind. I find it a little difficult to be convinced that we should have the great northern part of this continent without very significant air or naval defence. Take away Townsville and there is not much left. I rather wondered whether this was to provide an adequate deterrent but when we talk of missiles being launched possibly from South East Asia it is a bit irrelevant.

Air Vice-Marshal Newham - A mobility capability is a prime requirement in the acquisition of the new fighter. We have specified the capability that all three squadrons should be mobile for certain periods at certain force levels. Indeed, we have gone for split deployments so that we can shift forces round. We believe we are flexible and we do it from day to day with the strike force and the LRMP force.

CHAIRMAN - I meant to mention when I opened this hearing that the purpose of our current inquiry is to select priorities in relation to this monitoring role. I am sure things have emerged from the three groups of witnesses today which will help us considerably to perform the role - which we think is valuable not only to us but also to the Department, to the Minister and to the nation - of providing a pipeline and a forum, although not just for the dissentients and the people who have some sort of axe to grind. It is not that at all. On one hand, we equally regard with some apprehension the possibility of a witness being leaned upon. We want the best of both worlds. We want to have the advantage of providing a forum for people who would not normally be in the conventional streamline and, on the other hand, to deny the forum to people who would want to use it purely for less worthy motives. I would foreshadow - and I have already spoken of this with our Deputy Chairman - that we will set up a special hearing for the in camera questions which are set out here. It may then be possible for you to give us some rather more in-depth information on one or two matters. We have met at least one sub-committee of the defence structure in the United States, chaired by Mr Richard Ichord. They were able to exchange some rather valuable information with us in regard to Afghanistan and Iran. But that was some three months ago and a lot has happened in the meantime.

Senator BISHOP - You have covered the points that I was going to raise that should be dealt with in camera.

CHAIRMAN - Mr Bryant, do you have any further comments?

Mr BRYANT - No, I have had a very informative and educational morning, and a very satisfactory one because of the way things have fitted together to give us a picture.

CHAIRMAN - Gentlemen, thank you. Your evidence is greatly appreciated.

Sub-Committee adjourned at 1.5 p.m.

CANBERRA

Thursday, 15 May 1980

PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMMITTEE
ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE

Sub-Committee on Defence Matters
(Sub-Committee C)

Present

Mr Katter (Chairman)

Mr Armitage Mr Neil
Mr Bryant Mr Scholes

The Sub-Committee met at 6.30 p.m.
Mr KATTER took the chair.

CHAIRMAN - I declare open this public meeting of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Sub-Committee on Defence. The Committee has a great concern for the Reserve Forces. I think that in earlier days all of us would like to have seen much greater attention given to the Reserve Forces, whatever they might have been called over the years. I welcome General Maitland, Chief of Army Reserves, and Brigadier Kahn, the Deputy Chief of Army Reserves. We are delighted to have both of you here. We know something of your background and we think it is a great privilege to have you with us.

Major-General Gordon Lindsay MAITLAND, Chief of Army Reserves, Russell Offices, Canberra, Australian Capital Territory, and

Brigadier Colin Nicholas KAHN, Deputy Chief of Army Reserves, Russell Offices, Canberra, Australian Capital Territory,

were sworn and examined.

CHAIRMAN - Gentlemen, you will not be asked to comment on the reasons for certain policy decisions or the advice you may have tendered in the formulation of policy. You may at any time request that your evidence, part of your evidence or answers to specific questions be given in camera when matters of public interest are involved. The Sub-Committee will consider any such request. The Sub-Committee has before it a document from you which we have entitled Submission No. 13. As distinct from your opening remarks, do you wish to make any alterations or amendments to the submission?

Major-Gen. Maitland - No.

CHAIRMAN - Is it the wish of the Sub-Committee that the submission be incorporated in the transcript of evidence? There being no objection, it is so ordered.

(The document read as follows) -

SUBMISSION NO. 13

THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY RESERVE

SUBMISSION TO
THE PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMMITTEE
ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE

(Sub-Committee on Defence Matters)

by

MAJOR GENERAL G.L. MAITLAND AO, OBE, ED

CHIEF OF ARMY RESERVES

15 May 1980

BRIEF ON THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY RESERVE

BACKGROUND

Introduction

1. In order to refresh the Committee on some basic aspects of today's Army Reserve this section on background is included.

2. It is not proposed to cover this section in detail but simply to highlight some aspects leaving any areas of particular interest to the Committee to be enlarged upon if required during questions.

The Millar Committee Report

3. Dr Millar has appeared before this Committee and spoken at some length on the implementation of his Committee's report. It is not intended to cover that ground again but some further comment is in place. The recommendations of the Millar Committee which were accepted in principle have now been actioned, one way or another, most having been adopted.

4. Only one, the change in title from "Citizen Military Forces" to "Army Reserve", requires resolution. Because of the general structure changes inherent in the change in title, the matter is currently receiving active consideration in the Department of Defence. Delay in this matter was occasioned by the need to resolve first the question of call out of the Reserve.

5. Preliminary consideration regarding the establishment of a Reserve Command and Staff College has also been completed and Training Command is currently involved in a detailed examination of the resources requirement.

6. The Army Reserve is now integrated into the 'total force' concept and has been reorganized to fit into the Functional Command system of the Army. The outline organization is shown diagrammatically at Annex A to this paper. Within the 'total force' concept there is undoubtedly room for advancement but as with so many things in the Reserve this is and should be an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary process. There is increasing participation by Army Reserve units in exercises with the Regular Army, especially in those areas where there is a heavy concentration of Regular Army units

namely, Townsville, Brisbane, Sydney. In all areas, the amount of Regular Army assistance in the form of loan of instructors, equipment, involvement in Officer tactical training exercises (TEWTS) is showing a heartening upsurge. Army Reserve Officers are also now participating in the Regular Army overseas short term individual exchanges such as Exercise 'Long Look' in the UK.

7. Dr Millar would be the first to say and indeed, has done so to this Committee, that the Millar Committee recommendations were not sacrosanct and that they could be improved upon. Some changes, which identify the need to keep up with current requirements, have been made. My position as a Reserve Officer, occupying the position of Chief of Reserves, represents one such change - a change that we in the Reserve have taken as a vote of confidence in our ability to fully participate in Army matters and planning at the highest levels. Other logical changes may need to follow in time.

8. Reserve Branch, which I now head, was originally established within Army Office commanded by a Regular Major General. A Reserve Major General was appointed as Inspector General of the Army Reserve. In mid 1979, to meet the changing needs of the Reserve, the position of Inspector General was abolished and the Chief of Reserves became a Reserve Major General's appointment. Reserve Branch is staffed by members of the Regular Army.

9. Dr Millar spoke of the continuing cumbersome nature of Army Reserve administration especially regarding pay. The criticism is accepted. We still rely on the old laborious manual preparation and compilation of personal data, returns and pay sheets. When computer capacity and the staff effort necessary to convert the data becomes available we will move to a computer system. Trials are currently being conducted on a computerised pay system for the Army Reserve. In addition a number of Senior Reserve Officers are currently examining the existing administrative procedures in the Army Reserve with a view to recommending to me measures for streamlining.

Strength

10. The Army Reserve consists of 210 units in some 186 owned and 15 leased depots spread from Gove to Hobart and Cairns to Albany. The total effective strength as at 1 Apr 80 was 21,839 which includes 3091 Officers and 2762 females.

Role and Purpose

11. The role of the Army Reserve, as part of the 'total force' is that of the Army, namely:

a. to organise, train, equip and maintain forces for the conduct of timely and sustained combat operations on land;

b. to provide specific services and support to the other Australian Services; and

c. to provide general area ground defence of Service installations and low level air defence in designated areas.

12. The purpose of the Reserve is:

a. as part of the Australian Army, to participate in the defence of Australia and its interests in time of war and defence emergency; and

b. with the Regular Army, to provide the basis for expansion of the Australian Army.

Functional Organization

13. Field Force Units. The command structure of Field Force units in the Army Reserve is based on field force group headquarters located in each State. These headquarters have no operational role but are organized and responsible for the training and administration of Reserve units. They also provide some opportunity for Reserve officers to be trained in staff appointments.

14. Logistic Units. Most Army Reserve logistic units are commanded by Headquarters Logistic Command.

15. Training Units. Under Headquarters Training Command, there are six Training Groups. One Training Group is located in each State of Australia to serve the Reserve units in that state.

16. Training Groups conduct courses for recruits, selected non-commissioned officers, officer and officer of cadets in leadership, instructional techniques, tactics, weapon handling and in virtually the full spectrum of general military skills. In addition, some specialised training for cooks, storemen and clerks is also conducted.

17. Commanded by the Training Groups are a number of University Regiments. The role of the University Regiments is:

"To provide military training for undergraduates including officer training for selected members."

Active Reserve

18. The Active Reserve Establishment caters for three main types of units:

a. Standard Reserve Units. These are units with normal training obligations.

b. Supplementary Reserve Units. Certain industries and government bodies have a high degree of expertise in areas which are not essential for the Army to be proficient in during peacetime but are of considerable importance in any period of mobilisation. Consequently, a number of units known as Supplementary Reserve Units have been raised, under sponsorship of civilian organizations. These Supplementary Reserve Units include such specialities as forestry companies and construction regiments. Supplementary Reserve Units have a reduced training obligation by comparison with normal conditions units.

c. Special Conditions Units. Special Conditions Units are established to cater for volunteers who live in areas remote from the training depots set up for normal conditions units. Members of Special Conditions Units have no home training obligation but normally attend two camps of continuous training each year.

19. Training Obligation. Army Reserve training is divided into Unit Training and Additional Training:

a. Unit Training. Covers programmed activities for a unit as a whole and is normally scheduled to permit an annual maximum of 33 training days per man. Of this 14 days is conducted in camp and known as continuous training.

b. Additional Training. Certain members of a unit may be given approval to perform training in addition to their 33 days unit training. Currently, no member may serve more than a total of 100 days in any year for pay.

20. Pay. Members of the Army Reserve receive tax free pay for attendance at approved activities. For the purpose of pay, activities are authorised at the following scale:

2 hrs duration	⅓ day's pay
3 hrs duration	½ day's pay
6 to 24 hrs duration	1 day's pay

RETENTION

Introduction

21. The major continuing challenge facing the Army Reserve is that of retention. Recruiting for current strengths is not as great a concern as retention except that with more applicants coming forward the Reserve could be more selective and enlist more recruits who we believe showed better prospects of giving longer service.

22. The pattern of enlistment and discharges in 1978/79 is indicative of the situation in recent years. In order to maintain the current effective strength of approximately 22,000 we recruited 6700 and lost approximately the same number. Of the 6700 new recruits, 29% left in their first year of service and a further 29% leave in their second year, thereafter the discharge rate drops noticeably in subsequent years. Soldiers who we can retain for more than two years tend to serve for lengthy periods.

A Universal Pattern

23. The retention pattern outlined above needs to be put into perspective. It is not confined to Australia alone, nor indeed to Reserve forces alone. The same pattern exists in identical proportions in the US, UK, Canada and New Zealand. We recently had senior US and New Zealand Army Reserve Officers at my annual conference in Sydney and they confirmed that what we are experiencing is happening in their armies. This is of course no consolation to us but does show that the pattern appears universal.

24. Late last year, the British Defence Secretary said in reference to the British Volunteer Reserves (TAVR): "Although the strength of the TAVR has remained relatively stable in recent years this conceals the fact that the annual rate of turnover is over 30%." The British Army was at the time launching a drive to raise its 60,000 strong TAVR to a strength of 75,000.

Effects of High Turnover

25. The major adverse effect of this high turnover is on training. All training to be worthwhile, interesting and meaningful must be progressive. The individual must first be taught to master the individual skills that all soldiers require and then the individual skills special to his Corps. From there he progresses to training which welds these skills into the team - the rifle group, the section, the platoon, the company, etc.

26. Because of our loss rate in early years of service it is frequently difficult to progress as we would wish in the training cycle because of the need to continually train new arrivals in basic skills. To avoid repetitive training destroying the interest of longer serving soldiers is a major challenge to our Reserve NCOs and Officers.

27. An additional effect is on the cost of clothing and training. It would cost less to retain soldiers than to continually clothe, equip and train new ones.

What Can Be Done

28. Our most recent survey of 18 months ago showed that the most frequently stated reasons for joining and staying in the Army Reserve were:

a. It was a hobby and was enjoyable.

b. An opportunity to meet new friends.

c. Pay.

d. It was worthwhile.

I believe that in the last six months it is likely that the number who are joining because of 'worthwhileness' - a growing awareness of the need to improve our defence capabilities, has increased.

29. The same survey showed that the main stated reasons for leaving the Reserve were:

a. Job change.

b. Increased job demands.

c. Discontent with some aspect of the Reserve.

30. Many of the problems associated with a soldier's civilian job have been enthusiastically and successfully tackled by the formation of the Committee for Employer Support of Reserve Forces, headed by Mr Alan Edwards and assisted by leaders from many different areas of the community - including the political, business, ACTU, and rural fields Not only does the Committee through its State branches seek the active support of thousands of employers for their employees in the Reserve, but in addition their TV advertising has reached most homes in Australia making people aware of what the Resetve Forces of all Services are doing. This TV campaign will I believe provide a significant spin off towards retention. I have been spoken to by many Reserve members whose morale has been bolstered in an unprecedented way after seeing their political, union and business leaders making public statements in support of their activities.

31. There are, inter alia, other factors which have a major effect on retention, these are:

a. Interesting annual training.

b. Adequate equipment and clothing.

c. Government and Parliamentary statements of support for Reserve Forces to show the Reserve member, his family and friends that what he is doing is worthwhile.

d. Emphasis on leadership training.

e. Depot, in particular armoury, improvement.

32. Each of the areas outlined above can be enlarged upon should you so wish but at this stage I would briefly say:

a. Recent Government initiatives in the release of additional monies for Army Reserve equipment will considerably assist in the provision of more equipment for training even though because of lead times these may not become immediately available. We are seeking quick action regarding the upgrading of armouries, to enable greater holdings of equipment in depot locations.

b. Facilities for more interesting training are needed and interesting training involves, inter alia, training in different locations. The Army Reserve now needs to train in more diverse and interesting locations than those where previous financial constraints have forced them to remain. Annual training for the Army Reserve in such areas as the North and Northwest of Australia is being examined. We have already commenced an annual exchange of a sub-unit for training in New Zealand and are currently examining a further overseas exchange. The creation of these exchanges provides a fillip to the Reserve completely out of proportion to the numbers and the costs involved. Training at the Land Warfare Centre Canungra and participation in major Army exercises such as the Kangaroo exercises will remain essential to the Army Reserve.

EXPANSION OF THE ARMY RESERVE

Introduction

33. The Army Reserve has been given the task of increasing its effective strength by 8000 to reach 30,000 within the programme period.

34. I have no doubt that the increase can be achieved but I would be foolish to say there are no problems - there obviously are. I will briefly address the problem areas and what we need to do about them.

Reason and Purpose

35. In the same way that the Committee for Employer Support organization has assisted employers to see the purpose in releasing its employees for Reserve training, a general community awareness will need to be generated to attract large numbers of recruits to the Army Reserve. This will require funds for advertising and an organization to run the recruiting campaign and efficiently process and receive applicants. We are working on these matters now.

Retention

36. We will need to improve our current retention rate by:

a. Increased and improved training of leaders.

b. Timely provision of all items of clothing.

c. Provision of better and more equipment for training.

d. Providing more interesting annual training as frequently as possible either -

Intra State,

Inter State,

Overseas,

or

at LWC or major Regular Army exercises.

Fulfilment of this key requirement will be costly in both finance and flying hours.

37. Funds are to be made available for equipment and clothing and we are examining ways to ensure timely availability. In some areas this may create problems. Increased assistance from the Regular Army will be needed in some areas of training.

Organization

38. It is intended that the increase in strength be allocated to assist in the raising of some new units and to flesh out existing units, many of which are under-strength, towards full strength. This will assist in achieving more meaningful training within units. Additional Regular Army Cadre is to be provided.

ANNEX A

OUTLINE OF THE ARMY RESERVE ORGANIZATION



ARA units or HQ Commanding Reserve Units
Trg Gps also exist in SA, WA, Tas and Townsville

CHAIRMAN - We were given three terms of reference originally. We have deviated a little to a monitoring role, mainly because of the present situation and we considered that our area of responsibility had become far more significant than it was, say, six months ago. Another contributing factor was that a lot of work had been done on the terms of reference which was coming up regarding more particularly surveillance. The Committee then decided that it would like, not to go right through the strategic assessment again - because we have done that rather laboriously - but to have an updated version of the situation.

Very much in our minds was the matter of the Reserve Forces to such an extent that we could, after we have had these preliminary monitoring operations, set up a far more significant approach to the Reserve Forces. The message I am trying to get across is this Committee is very very sympathetic and very interested in the whole matter of the Reserve Forces. I ask you now to speak to the submission.

Major-Gen. Maitland - Looking at the gathering I am addressing I am not too sure where to start because I see before me those who have served for some considerable time and those whose involvement still continues. I am mindful of Mr Scholes' recent kind participation in one of our advertising commercials for a committee for employer support. I have prepared a brief, which is quite a short statement on the Army Reserve. To conform with the Department of Defence requirements it is a somewhat dry document and I congratulate anyone who gets to the end of it. At any rate it covers the Millar report, the role and purpose of the Reserve, its functional organisation, conditions of service and one of our principal problems - that of retention. It concludes on the note of the expansion of the Reserve.

As I say it is something of a dry document and there is nothing dry about the Army Reserve - and I am not trying to be funny. I would like to touch on the fact that the Army Reserve is a very vital organisation with a complement of 22,000 men and bound to increase to 30,000. There are 210 units in 200 locations throughout Australia and when I say throughout I mean right across the width and breadth. It is important perhaps that you understand the type of people in the Army Reserve. It is a far better educated thinking group than in the normal community. The people in the Reserve have what I would call considerable qualities over a wide and various range. It is interesting to note the senior Army Reserve people in each State. In Queensland the senior Army Reserve officer is the chief of the Emergency Service; in New South Wales he is a Q.C.;

in Melbourne he is the senior partner in a city firm of solicitors; in Tasmania he is a farmer, in Adelaide a judge and in Western Australia he is running a family business. I mention that because it is evidence of the diversity that you also find in the Army Reserve. They are quite dedicated to their responsibilities. Indeed I have just heard from New South Wales, in commenting on the pressures that exist there on the unit commanders, that they are currently programmed for 25 weekends out of the next 50.

That brings me to the capability of the Army Reserve because many people do not really comprehend how the Army Reserve can be as efficient as some of us see it. First of all, apart from the people we have - which is its strength - we work in a geographical environment. Whereas in the Regular Army it is necessary because of career progression for people to move considerably, in the Army Reserve they stay in the one spot. So that the fellow who belongs to, say, the unit at Parramatta develops considerable skill in that unit. It must also be appreciated that we work in a much narrower field than the professional Regular Army. We concentrate solely on tactics and regimental duties. Again, because of career progression the regular officers and senior non-commissioned officer moves from staff jobs to regimental jobs, to training jobs and does not spend that period of concentrated training in the regimental position that the Army Reserve does. Finally we are supported, as I am here tonight, by a most loyal, hard working and equally dedicated Regular Army.

I suppose those are the good parts; we have some warts too. Obviously there is some unevenness in our geographic spread. You might find a platoon at some location doing very well. It is strong and well led. Then the platoon commander is moved in his civilian occupation and we have not perhaps the right replacement and that particular sub-unit falls on bad times. The training cycle gives us some problems because we have a

considerable outflow in the first year of service. This means some going back to ground work again and not going on with the full training cycle. Perhaps that is the negative way of looking at it. On the positive side more than half of these troops are in their third year or more of service. We have been squeezed for funds over recent years and that is certainly reflected in all sorts of ways in our training and general performance. We work from quite antiquated premises that we have inherited over the years. I would not say that has affected our performance overmuch but in some

places it has inhibited training. But by and large I think the Army Reserve has developed a form of Rats of Tobruk attitude - we will get over the problems, no matter what they are. They even take some pride in these run down premises because of the fact that they are just run down. Sense of purpose has tended to be a little confused over the years and clarification of that would help immensely. Finally, peacetime administration is a little frustrating and causes problems for those who are anxious to get on to training. I give you those points as an expansion of the dry matter contained in my brief, and in the knowledge that you would probably prefer to ask questions anyway.

CHAIRMAN - Within the range of the activities of the reserve forces these days, is there very much scope for the training of people for the new generation type of warfare? I do not mean on the extreme scientific side of it but, say, to use the Red Eye missile and such types of advanced weaponry? Do we have people in the reserve forces who are capable of promptly playing an active role in an emergency?

Major-Gen. Maitland - No, we do not. But then again we have only a very small number in the Regular Army. I think that basically the major skills that are required by an army in war exist at the moment in the Army Reserve. There are weaknesses in certain areas but those are being looked at at the moment. So we are emerging from a period when we were somewhat constrained. It was not a time for overmuch expansion of the scope of the Army Reserve or the scope of its training.

CHAIRMAN - Since there has become over the past few months a greater national awareness of the necessity for a meaningful defence role for Australia, what effect has this had on recruitment generally?

Major-Gen. Maitland - The Army Reserve or the militia as it used to be known is just a mirror of public attitudes. It reflects the national attitudes and resolves. Last month's recruiting I think was our highest for some considerable time, although I could not say for how many years. It certainly is on the increase at the

moment. I was not altogether joking when I said earlier that public acceptance is very important to the Army Reserve. It is the attitude of the people in the street. Fathers are telling their children that service in the Army Reserve is worth while; employers also are telling them. Among their own generation there is a feeling that they are doing something worth while. With that feeling of national emergency, you might say, the response is very evident.

CHAIRMAN - There is a very strong feeling on this very bipartisan committee that at all times we want to encourage community involvement. When I was Minister all of us were very keen on this but that was in a different category. On this Committee underlying all our activities is the desire that the Australian people - more so now perhaps than before - have an awareness that we have this overall responsibility of defending the country realistically and to make the most use of the little we have. We feel that this can best be done by the Reserve because it has greater flexibility. The non-commissioned officers and officers who camp for a weekend or go bivouacking are back among the fellows. Forgive me stressing this point, but I think it is important. Have you seen a buildup in that sort of tempo over the last three or four months? Are fellows saying: 'We have to get our bloody numbers up and get the unit up to strength' and is that the sort of approach?

Major-Gen. Maitland - Yes. As you go around Australia there is a growing awareness of this. That is interesting because as I was coming here I received a letter and because I had already locked up my office safe I popped the letter in my pocket. It is from my senior fellow in South Australia, and he says to me:

> Thank you very much for your most exciting letter of 30 Apr 80 concerning growth of the ARES and matters ancillary to it.
>
> You may rest assured that action is already under way in 4 MD to meet this challenge.

The following paragraph supplies the answer to your question.

> There is an infectious leap in enthusiasm in the air and this is as apparent with the ARA staff as with the ARES personnel. There is a degree of commitment which has not before been seen.

CHAIRMAN - What strikes me is that this is tremendously important. In our desire as a Committee of this nature we would love it to be heralded from one end of the nation to the other that there is this great infectious interest in the defence of this country. Does it see the light of day? Are the media sufficiently interested in defence matters or in the necessity to arouse the nation to a defence awareness to publicise that very exciting comment?

Major-Gen. Maitland - You are tending to put the onus on to me. I really think that the onus rests-----

CHAIRMAN - If you can tell me where the onus should go we will try to develop it.

Major-Gen. Maitland - It is on this very House. This is the place where the Press and the nation listen and this is where the mood needs to be set.

CHAIRMAN - I now address myself to my Committee. Perhaps we should look at some way of tapping and gauging the enthusiasm.

Mr BRYANT - We could retain the Russians as recruiting officers or something.

CHAIRMAN - If we are going to build up this enthusiasm for the defence of the country this sort of response is very important.

From the evidence received by the Sub-Committee it would seem that the full time Australian Army would have difficulty expanding beyond 38,000 in under one year or two years in a situation short of a declared defence emergency. To reach even 38,000 would require greater use of the Australian Regular Army Emergency Reserve. It would be necessary for the Parliament to pass legislation enabling the call out of your Reserve - again short of a defence emergency. What would be the attitude of employers and soldiers if we suddenly built up this tempo and made an all-out effort? I am going over the same ground again but in a different way.

Major-Gen. Maitland - The attitude of employers has been pretty well canvassed. Mr Alan Edwards, through his committee for employers' support of the Reserve Forces, probably had more contact with employers than anyone and he has stated very clearly that employers would accept it very well. Indeed, I am concerned that employers, at the moment, are not fully aware that the obligation and the ability to be mobilised does not exist. If they were to be more aware of that and if they did not think it was going to be used to good purpose I believe that they might not be so happy about letting people have time off to undergo military training.

CHAIRMAN - How do you strike a compromise in this particular difficulty? All governments seem to steer clear of anything that is even suggestive of compulsory military training. How do you get this awareness? Wherever I go people say that this country needs a call-up to get the fellows into the Army and have them trained. They say it will take up the unemployment, fine young men will be getting around the country and we will be rid of a lot of louts from around the streets. Talk of this kind goes on. Is there a way of encouraging the sort of fever about which he speaks and of putting that into material shape without the actual introduction of some form of compulsory military training?

Major-Gen. Maitland - I certainly think it is worth while trying. No one has really taken up the cudgel yet but I think

it is a matter of national motivation. Anyone who has served with young Australians and mixed with them will affirm that they are as patriotic as any member of the older generation and given the lead and given the message they will respond quite positively. But they have to have the message. All that we have had over recent years is the 'no threat' so the obvious deductions are drawn and joining the Services seems to lack purpose. That whole mood has to be changed.

Mr ARMITAGE - On this whole issue, taking into account the budgetary limits which, it is strongly argued, could be greatly improved, which is the greater need for the reserve forces - more men or better equipment?

Major-Gen. Maitland - I hope it is not a choice. In fact our manpower is inadequate and our equipment is inadequate. I would not like to be faced with the choice.

Mr ARMITAGE - Making a choice?

Major-Gen. Maitland - No. We cannot afford to manage without more manpower and we cannot afford to manage without more equipment. A compromise of that nature is just disaster.

Mr ARMITAGE - Taking it around another way, there have been arguments - which the Chairman mentioned - for the introduction of conscription or legislation, or some method of calling up the Reserve, et cetera.

Major-Gen. Maitland - They are two different subjects, of course.

Mr ARMITAGE - Yes. That idea has, of course, in other evidence, been placed against the need for equipment. The argument is that we are so outdated as far as equipment is concerned that there needs to be - first things first - equipment. What would you move for yourself, taking into account the three alternatives as it stands now? They are one, improving equipment; two, calling up the Reserve, or three, introducing conscription, with its strain on resources as far as equipment is concerned.

Major-Gen. Maitland - First of all, I think to retain the people we have, we have to improve our current equipment. This does not necessarily mean solely replacing it with other equipment

and newer equipment, it means also repairing what we have. That is for retention purposes. From there on it needs to be a planned expansion with manpower and equipment matched. You always have to bear in mind that your lead times for equipment are a lot worse than for manpower. You have to have a very carefully thought out plan leading well into the medium term, so that you can have equipment supply arriving as the manpower grows and requires that equipment.

Mr BRYANT - What do the Reserves now cost? Is there a figure on the total cost?

Major-Gen. Maitland - These are rather rough figures based on the 1979-80 appropriation to Defence, but the amount that we estimate for the Reserve would be about $34m.

Brig. Kahn - I think that overall you could get it up to about $61m.

Major-Gen. Maitland - That is, if you added, for example, the regular cadre that supports and trains the Army Reserve - $61m would be the figure.

ACTING CHAIRMAN (Mr Neil) - The figure would be $61m?

Major-Gen. Maitland - Yes. It would be $34m for the Army Reserve in itself and for its Regular Army support, another $27m, making it $61m.

Mr ARMITAGE - I refer to the announced intention of the Government to increase the Reserve forces, the CMF et cetera to 30,000 from the present 22,000, during five years. Once again we have received evidence of the high degree of wastage. Do you consider that this is a realistic proposition? Under the present system, as it now operates, the intention is to increase the forces by 8,000, taking them up to 30,000.

Major-Gen. Maitland - I see it as quite achievable, provided that the target is matched by government attitudes, and this is what I was getting at earlier. I am the Chief of the Army Reserves, and the Reserves are the people who are in the Reserves. You are talking about that large mass of young people out there who are not in the Reserves. You are talking about how you get them into the Reserves. As I say, it is the mood of the country that will motivate them to join. We will mount our advertising campaigns but if the statements by the Prime Minister, by the Minister for Defence, and by the Minister for Defence's opposite number, Mr Scholes, set the right mood, then I feel that is able to be achieved. But having said this, I feel that if the Army Reserve needs to go from 22,000 to 30,000 and nothing more is said, and I am just given the job of doing it, then my task is very, very difficult indeed.

Mr BRYANT - And the 80 per electorate?

Mr ARMITAGE - That is on actual recruitment of new personnel. But the level of wastage as it exists now, is quite dramatic. What would you do to endeavour to prevent that or at least to reduce that weight?

Major-Gen. Maitland - First of all I would mention that it is not all that dramatic. It is interesting to look at all forms of activity. Look at some of the business houses and see their wastage rates, look at the Regular Services and their wastage rates. Look at volunteer organisations like the life

Lifesaving clubs et cetera and their wastage rate, and particularly look at overseas armies and their reserve forces. Against that background it is not all that dramatic but, of course, it still worries us considerably. There are a number of things that can be done to alleviate it. For example, the increase in strength that we experienced last month was due not only to higher recruitment, but to better retention, and that comes, again, from the mood of the country. In more tangible ways, I think we spend so much on a recruit that it makes a lot of sense to pay a retention bonus, perhaps, to keep those that we have gone to the trouble of training. There are other ways. At the moment we are still labouring under some of the constraints of tighter budgets. So there is a limit to where we can go for training. Going to better training areas - interstate, intrastate and even overseas - will be a substantial inducement to retention. Better equipment is another one. In recent years training has needed to be modified on a number of occasions because of inadequacies in equipment.

Mr ARMITAGE - That is understandable.

Major-Gen. Maitland - These things will all help improve retention.

Mr BRYANT - Let me take that a little further. The Reserve has always been the Cinderella in equipment. At times the Army itself has not been very well shod and I have been associated with them since 1934, so my consideration of it spreads over a fair span. Should we have a full set of equipment in good order, separate from equipment waiting for usage? At the moment we use regular stocks of things of this nature, but should we set out a specification of what we need for training equipment? What has happened to the Centurion Tanks? Have they been replaced, retrofitted or sent off to the breakers? Our people are not in tanks at the moment, but they were for a time while I was serving.

Major-Gen. Maitland - We have gone through considerable changes since the Second World War. Perhaps in those days one could say that the Army Reserve, the Citizen Military Forces as it was then known, was somewhat of a Cinderella. Attitudes to

both the Regular Army and the Reserve have changed a lot, particularly over recent years. I would not class us as the Cinderella force any more. On the other hand, there must be degrees of priority. For example in the Army we have an operational deployment force that has to be away at very short notice. Quite obviously it has to have priority in equipment. It has to be followed up by other Regular forces, and it is appropriate that they have the next priority. After that the Army Reserve often receives priority over other Regular elements, where the claim of the other Regular elements is seen as less than that of the Army Reserve. I just wanted to put that in perspective. Over recent years the Services have been so constrained that they have had to prune things quite dramatically. Equipments, both in the Regular Army and the Army Reserve, is certainly not of the order that is considered desirable.

We are scampering at the moment to equip what we have. I am aware of some of the problems with tanks but that is not my responsibility. But I am convinced that in our present environment it would not be wise to resurrect the Centurion.

Mr BRYANT - Should we consider establishing a fully equipped Reserve force? Should we equip one of them in readiness for war? This equipment would then become the basic equipment for the whole Reserve.

Major-Gen. Maitland - An Army Reserve unit would not wish to have its complete war entitlement sitting in its depot or camp. The strain of maintenance of that would be beyond it. The equipment is pitched to full time use and they are there only part time to maintain it. If you are suggesting that it should be put aside somewhere as mobilisation stocks, I could not agree more. But in that context we are talking about Army mobilisation stocks. The Army as a whole would like to see those, I am sure.

Mr BRYANT - If there were adequate training equipment for one force and the force moved to the equipment for camps and things of that nature - staggered round the year - the equipment would get a fair amount of use. However, I recognise from your paper the physical difficulty of moving them.

Major-Gen. Maitland - That is precisely what we have now. We have problems in our training pools which are pools of the kind you described. When you are squeezed for money, about the first thing on which you start to economise is the training pools. You try to eke them out as far as you can. We started doing that years ago and now they have been eked out. We do expect to see those substantially improved because of the extra funds allocated.

Mr ARMITAGE - Paragraph 24 of your submission states:

> ...the British Defence Secretary, said in reference to the British Volunteer Reserves (TAVR): 'Although the strength of the TAVR has remained relatively stable in recent years this conceals the fact that the annual rate of turnover is over 30%'. The British Army was at the time launching a drive to raise its 60,000 strong TAVR to a strength of 75,000.

How effective was the drive?

Major-Gen. Maitland - They had a special committee set up on wastage in the Territorial Army at that stage. I have studied it all very closely; I did not learn much from it or see much that we could employ to good purpose. As to the current strength of the British Territorial Army, I cannot tell you - I just do not know.

Mr ARMITAGE - You do not know how effective their drive was; their methods are much the same as the methods being used in Australia. Is that the point you are making?

Major-Gen. Maitland - Yes.

Mr ARMITAGE - Would conditions of pay, compensation and so on play a big part in preventing the wastage which occurs and in attracting new recruits?

Major-Gen. Maitland - Pay is an interesting subject. I talked earlier of the dedication of the Army reservist, which has nothing to do with pay; on the other hand, there would be many dedicated members of parliament whom I doubt would still turn up here if you stopped paying them, despite their dedication. To that extent you cannot ignore the pay question. But the current rate of pay is one which I do not think anyone in the Army Reserve would question or complain about. As to whether monetary inducements would assist retention, I suppose that the young fellow who is thinking of getting out for various reasons, if confronted by a bonus at the end of the year, would stay to get that bonus. I think that this would be a powerful factor. You also touched on the matter of compensation.

Mr ARMITAGE - I would include housing as well.

Major-Gen. Maitland - Housing has tended to go off the boil a bit as an inducement in that Defence Service homes are not as attractive as they once were. On the matter of compensation, there is a set of provisions for the Army Reserve should reservists become injured or incapacitated during their service. There is nothing wrong with the provisions except for the amount, which is under the basic wage, in fact. For the first 26 weeks

there is an arrangement that is not so disadvantageous but after the 26 weeks this switches to a rate determined under the Commonwealth Compensation Act. This rate does not apply solely to the Army Reserve but to Commonwealth public servants and others, and is less than the basic wage.

That concerns me. Suppose a young volunteer soldier is incapacitated through serving his country in the Army Reserve. Through his civilian employment he has undertaken certain commitments which were formerly quite within his ability to handle. Nevertheless, he has to sell his home and go through considerable traumas because of the inadequacy of the current compensation rates.

ACTING CHAIRMAN - We will certainly look at this; it seems very much in need of attention.

Mr SCHOLES - I understand that there is available a relatively cheap insurance offer of about $1 a month per man which would correct this situation.

Major-Gen. Maitland - Yes, that is so. On the other hand I believe that when we take somebody in we are responsible for them. I do not want to say to one of my soldiers: 'We will look after you. Just give me an extra $1 a week to do so'.

Mr SCHOLES - I was thinking it would be available for investment by the Reserve. There is a political problem with having compensation for different types of Commonwealth employees. There is a special problem in this case which probably could be resolved. We will be talking about that in the Parliament.

ACTING CHAIRMAN - We will certainly look at this question.

Mr BRYANT - We ought to make available something equivalent to Defence Service housing in such a way as to mean something. What influence has Defence Service housing had on general retention rates and recruiting of servicemen in the system?

Major-Gen. Maitland - In the regular Army?

Mr BRYANT - Yes.

Major-Gen. Maitland - I would prefer not to answer that. It would be purely subjective thinking.

Mr BRYANT - As a banker, you would have no difficulty administering the scheme.

Major-Gen. Maitland - If anyone gives me money I will have no difficulty in administering it.

Mr SCHOLES - There is a simple problem with Defence Service homes. The loans are too low to make them relevant and the delays are too long. However, I now wish to ask some questions about the Reserves. Firstly, the turnover rate is very high. I also assume that this turnover rate is exaggerated by short term turnover of a larger percentage than appears in the figures. What level of recruits, in fact, complete their second year? What period of time does a recruit need to spend in the Reserves before he has received what would be considered to be useful military training, should mobilisation be undertaken in the reasonably short term after his resignation?

Major-Gen. Maitland - That question is not easy to answer because it is largely related to how long afterwards he might be required to remember all these various skills. If we had somebody for two years, at the end of that time he would be starting to be quite proficient and would be quite useful if he were recalled. Three years, which is the engagement time, is a far better length of time. Those who left at the end of three years, if we could hold everyone for that period, would form a considerable resource within our community.

Mr SCHOLES - How long would you need to retain the recruit before he was potentially able to be developed in a reasonably short term into a junior officer in an expanded regular army? I am talking about mobilisation.

Major-Gen. Maitland - It would take two years as a minimum.

Mr SCHOLES - What advantage would you see in a scheme which allowed recruits who were able to do so to do a limited period of full time training at the time of their recruitment, and what minimum period would be useful?

Brig. Kahn - Would it be like the New Zealand system, for example?

Mr SCHOLES - I am not sure of the New Zealand system. You may get a person who is prepared to put his first annual leave of, say, four weeks into full time training. Would that serve a useful purpose or would it just be disruptive?

Major-Gen. Maitland - The New Zealand system has been mentioned. That is not such a good system because after your recruit training you have to go to a further developmental training period and then onto your specialist training, according to what corps you are in. That is not easy to handle for small numbers on a full time basis under our present system. Numbers play an important part in what you are proposing. As it stands even now we have a most flexible system. One of the things which made me pause a little before replying to your earlier question was the fact that it depends on the amount of service which the soldier does within the year, not whether it is one year or two years. Some soldiers become most enthusiastic and they can find the time. They give up their annual leave, or get additional leave from their employers. Some put in a lot of time in a year. They can do up to 100 days, in fact.

Under the present system there is that flexibility for somebody who wants to do an extended period of training. In fact we do it in the university regiments, where they are limited by the university calendar. They come in and do a recruit course in, say, November and then take a pause for the Christmas vacation before they go back into the unit in January and February for further training. So we actually do that now.

Whether or not you could introduce it in general largely depends more on national attitudes and the attitudes of employers. Many of our recruits are not people who are getting leave. Some begin while at school. Our enlistment age is 17 years and we have a lot of secondary school students.

Mr SCHOLES - Is the major function of the Reserve to provide experienced personnel for a future expansion of the Army or to reinforce existing Army battalions?

Major-Gen. Maitland - The unfortunate problem is that to train officers and NCOs you need soldiers. You are suggesting that we try to build an infrastructure. We have done that to a degree. Even the regular Army at the moment is built on an infrastructure rather than a fully fleshed out basis and the Army Reserve is like that to an extent. But to develop the NCOs and officers whom you would be using for an expansion, you must have soldiers for them to practise with. You really cannot divorce the two.

Mr SCHOLES - The effective strength of the Reserve includes about one officer in every seven soldiers. Is that the maximum reasonable ratio of officers to men that the Reserve can support without virtually running out of privates for training purposes, or could that ratio be increased?

Major-Gen. Maitland - Without doubt it could be increased but not to a very large extent.

Mr SCHOLES - Would it assist officer development if some junior officers requiring continuing experience were able to spend short periods attached to regular Army units for training purposes? I notice that does happen but I am thinking of a more regularised situation. I am thinking of means by which the number of officers or potential officers available to the Army for an expansion can be regularly available. Obviously the Reserves offer the best opportunities.

Major-Gen. Maitland - That is an interesting possibility. One of the problems of the Regular Army, however, is that its proportion of chiefs to Indians is not altogether perfect and it is looking for as many opportunities as possible to give practical

experience to Regular Army officers. So there is not much scope to put in Reserve officers as a substitute. You could give them an understudy role perhaps, but that is pretty unsatisfactory. It is really not teaching well to give someone an understudy role. The Army Reserve gets in people who are achievers. I think that is one of the best descriptions of the Army Reserve officer and NCO. He is there because he is getting a lot of satisfaction out of what he is achieving. As soon as you develop a training scheme of any duration for officers in which they have no prospect of going back and commanding again they will automatically fall out and see themselves as being without a sense of purpose. We have done it on two occasions, thinking it was a marvellous idea to concentrate on training officers and NCOs with no problems about troops but they are not at all attracted to that. They see it as lacking purpose.

Mr SCHOLES - Last week I presented some of those certificates and the first two people up were the Chief of Police in Victoria and the Chief Officer of the Country Fire Authority, and the next gentleman came from one of the major companies in Melbourne. To what extent do you have, especially in your long-term structure of the Reserves, persons who would be almost certainly classified as in reserved occupations in any war?

Major-Gen. Maitland - That is certainly valid for some individuals, but I do think that line of thought is, and I do not say this disrespectfully, an academic, not the practical, one. You are really asking how many of the Army Reserves will not be available or how many you can count on. One of the interesting things is that those localities where war industries exist are not strong supporters of the Army Reserve now. I do not know the background to that, but it is a fact. Secondly, I think they tend to sort themselves out a little even in peacetime in that no employer can let too many of his people go off to an Army Reserve camp. So there is some filtering even in peacetime, but the main thing is that when a war comes you are talking about people's behaviour. I watched it all happen in the Second World War and I think I can truthfully state that there was no one in the Second

World War who wanted to go away to the War and was in a reserved occupation who did not go. It reminded me of Pitt Street at midday - there were those in reserved occupations who were saying to their employers 'I want to go' and the employer, knowing that there is no good in holding an unhappy employee, said 'Off you go', and off he was going in that direction. There were also those who said 'I do not like the look of this war' and they were busy getting into reserved occupations.

Mr SCHOLES - I could tell you stories of people who did try to go, did not get away and were punished for it because they worked for governments after the war, but that is completely another argument. My main question there was as to what type of non-availability there was.

Major-Gen. Maitland - I think we certainly have individuals in that position but not to the extent that we need to worry.

Mr SCHOLES - To what extent do you see it as being practical for Reserve units to be regionally based and to operate on some form of charter of being responsible for a specific geographical area which would give a location-orientated responsibility and do you think that is feasible to the extent of using fairly sophisticated equipment on a Reserve basis?

Major-Gen. Maitland - It is eminently feasible. First and foremost, I think you should use your resources to the best advantage and particularly someone who lives in a remote area is more familiar with his area than anybody else and is a good fellow to have. Secondly, there is the sense of purpose. If you give somebody an assignment his attitude will improve immeasurably. He has a specific part of Australia to look after. Thirdly, I did mention earlier the advantage that the Army Reserve has by being in the one place and doing the one thing all the time, and whereas you might say he is doing the job part time, that, the reservist would best not be employed on a sophisticated piece of equipment - he will not have the same skills as the regular soldier who is able to devote his full time to that equipment, but, as I say, if you take the long-term view, he is there for 20 or 25 years in that unit and he can become very skilled indeed on sophisticated equipment.

Mr SCHOLES - Is there any validity or do you see any advantage in a scheme by which officers who are retiring relatively young after what is less than their full service - who have a useful military life - have an obligation to spend some time annually serving with the Reserve in reorientation or some other form of training, or do you see that as best performed in the active Reserve under some other scheme?

Major-Gen. Maitland - I certainly see it as valid in the right environment. You are talking about, say, a major at 47 years. He is possibly a little too old to be charging up a hill leading his rifle company, which is a major's appointment, say, in an infantry battalion, but he can still be most valuable in mobilisation or even in a situation short of that. If we

were faced, for example, with a rapid expansion, that sort of fellow could be invaluable in a training role. I certainly agree with that.

Mr BRYANT - The Country Fire Authority in Victoria, which has a specific task in a perceived threat, and I suppose a deliberately well-organised direct function, has over 100,000 people who answer the bells or whatever we use these days to call them out. Therefore I think that somewhere along the line we must find some machinery by which people feel the same urge in this scene. Part of this relates to what the cost is of serving in the citizen forces. One of the costs is that if you become damaged you are likely to end up incapacitated, as you pointed out earlier, and I take it that the average young fellow does not think about that anyhow. But the other one is that there are disadvantages: You leave your family at weekends and things like that.

Mr SCHOLES - I suppose that is one point of view.

Mr BRYANT - That is right. On the question of housing, it would seem to be fairly easy to establish a housing project for the Reserve forces, based, say, upon the banking system with guaranteed loans and things. So that those people who served for five or six years or whatever was deemed necessary could get some special advantage. I will leave that question with you because you have the experience in both areas.

I come now to the importance of the equipment and this Sub-Committee's role as adviser to the Government. I do not recall any specific statements about re-equipping the Reserve forces for a long time. I am speaking of giving them new guns and other new equipment. If we wanted a specification of what was required - how many artillery pieces, how many pieces of armoured equipment and such things - could we get a specification at some time in the near future, although not necessarily an absolute commitment, though that would be desirable, so that we could stand up in the Parliament and sponsor the idea? Next, is it really to the advantage of the system to have Reserve forces,

so-called, integrated into the general army structure? Would you be better off with a totally separate command, perhaps not called the Reserve because that to me always means the second line of defence where I look upon it as part of the first line of defence, set up in such a way that it was a definite unit in everybody's mind, very closely located to the local units, local area, with perhaps even the workshops and all the rest of it based upon local industry in major towns and provincial towns?

Major-Gen. Maitland - On the last part, of course, the Millar committee looked at this very matter and it came out very strongly in support of a totally integrated army. We have now seen that being developed over six years. I touched earlier somewhat obliquely on the improvements in attitudes that have taken place, Army Reserve vis-a-vis the Regular Army and vice-versa, and I do not think you would find any serving reservist or regular who would advocate now going in any direction other than becoming more integrated. I would like to hear what Brigadier Kahn has to say about that.

Brig. Kahn - I can only agree completely. I think we are heading in the right direction now. It has taken a long time to do it, and there has been, as you would know, a lot of animosity in past years between the two elements of the service. I think it would be a great mistake if we allowed the division that existed in the past to continue because it is closing and it is closing more rapidly than many people, even some other witnesses have thought. It is closing dramatically.

Mr BRYANT - I would like to put on record that the arithmetic shows we get our soldiers cheaply at $1,500 or $1,600 per head per annum in the first figure and less than $3,000 in the other one.

Major-Gen. Maitland - When you think that they are going to put their heads on the chopping block, I think you get the Regular Army cheaply too.

Mr BRYANT - That is right. I have always held the view that we underrate what we are asking of people when they put on uniforms. It has nothing to do with being a clerk in the Public Service or even a member of the Parliament. We ought to have a totally different compensation system, perhaps like the repatriation and the housing.

ACTING CHAIRMAN - In the case of a defence emergency or war, which obviously would be serious, how do you see your 30,000-man Reserve being used? Will it fight part of the battle? Will it train the citizens? Will it flesh out the Regular Army? What is it going to do and how is it going to carry out the various roles it may be asked to take on?

Major-Gen. Maitland - I suppose the answer to that is what is the build up. To look at two opposite sides of the picture, if we had a situation where we suddenly had to commit the Regular Army division and if we had a reserve division at that stage and we had to commit that also, we would be in disastrous straits because there would be no one left to train those who enlisted later. That is one horrible side of it. On the other side, you may well have ample time for everyone to engage in training of others and we would be able to build up

a most adequate force. What I would like to see happening is a progressive build-up as the need is seen to arise, perhaps even before the need is seen to arise if you could possibly do it. So that your growth is such that commitment of the required number of people overseas presents no problem and still leaves you with a cadre to continue to train reinforcements and other expansionary forces.

ACTING CHAIRMAN - The Regular Army submission which was given to this Sub-Committee a week or so ago included the evidence - or it was in question - that the official position stated that the Regular Army could not be expanded beyond 38,000 without some form of compulsory service. The question of whether or not there would have been a declaration of a defence emergency allowing call-up of the Reserve was discussed. I do not want to get you into policy areas, but if you assumed a defence emergency allowing call-up of the Reserve into the Regular Army, what is left of the Reserve? Assuming there is a defence emergency which must be serious and you call up the Reserve in a panic situation, could the Reserve disappear from under you as it goes straight into the Regular Army and off?

Major-Gen. Maitland - That would be certainly the worst situation. We have had a look and have evaluated the training requirements for a large Army within the Army Reserve, but it all rests on certain warnings and preparation times.

ACTING CHAIRMAN - Without that declaration you simply cannot call up your Reserve as it stands. How else do you envisage a buildup, of both the Reserve and of the Regular Army? How will you achieve this buildup as matters now stand without some declaration of defence emergency? Will the public flock to the flag in the face of a presumed threat - even if we have not declared an emergency?

Major-Gen. Maitland - We are hoping for that and I have spent some time emphasising that this House should promote that sense of need so that people do enlist.

ACTING CHAIRMAN - To what percentage of establishment are the Reserve infantry battalions now manned?

Major-Gen. Maitland - Overall our strength is slightly better than two-thirds up to establishment. I have not looked at infantry battalions individually, but I would say they probably reflect the same percentage.

ACTING CHAIRMAN - A figure of 8,500 recruits per year into the Reserve has been suggested as being necessary to reach the 30,000 in five years - taking into account the current wastage rates. This is allowing you to take five years to move from 22,000 to 30,000. Is 8,500 a year recruit intake an accurate figure - or what is the figure?

Major-Gen. Maitland - I suppose you cannot work it out per year because it will be a sliding scale. In the first part your wastage will not be as high as when you have finally built up; your wastage is going to be much higher at the end. Of course you are talking about a situation where the mood will change and retention will hopefully improve. It is certainly a grave problem and we are not just recruiting the straight 8,000 increase - we are recruiting sufficient to handle our normal wastage plus the additional wastage out of that 8,000. It could well average out at 8,000 a year.

Brig. Kahn - It may be a bit more. I personally would be inclined to think we are talking more about 10,000.

ACTING CHAIRMAN - So that would be up to 10,000 per year.

Mr ARMITAGE - What was the wastage per annum on the last available figures?

Brig. Kahn - It is just under 7,000.

ACTING CHAIRMAN - What have you to say about the Millar view about the change from divisional structure down to field force groups? He says:

> We hope very much that this will be temporary, and we provide for future expansion, as strengths grow, by developing embryonic divisional and task force headquarters within the Reserve staff of Headquarters Field Force Command and the headquarters of Field Force Groups. We have not abolished the divisions; the divisions had ceased to exist. If they come again the structure is there to provide for them.

Does this 30,000 plan imply, in your opinion, that the divisions have come again and the structure should be re-expanded?

Major-Gen. Maitland - I would not like to be precise. You mentioned divisions. Certainly there will be need for a restructuring. Out of that one would certainly see an overall development and at least one division emerging.

ACTING CHAIRMAN - That would include at least one division - including a proper division headquarters.

Major-Gen. Maitland - Yes.

ACTING CHAIRMAN - I wish to talk about names from the point of morale and community interest. If there is an expansion why should not units have some of the traditional names restored - for example the Ballarat Rifles or names of that kind. There may still be some such used. I do not think you would call the St George football team 'the South-west Sydney Rugby League' team and get as big a crowd.

Major-Gen. Maitland - There is a lot more common sense abroad today about some of the things which are important to the Army Reserve than there was years ago. I think any sensible proposal would be acceptable.

ACTING CHAIRMAN - The Regular Army Emergency Reserve is apparently 100 persons at present. It has been put to us that it would be possible to lift that manpower level to a steady 4,000 by taking more positive steps aimed at retaining the 2,000 or so ex-regular other ranks who each year complete their 3-year period or 6-year period of engagement. Can you comment on that particular point about the Regular Army Emergency Reserve? Would it be better to use those persons in the Reserve, as we understand it?

Major-Gen. Maitland - The key to that is to work out their purpose. As I understand it the purpose is to supplement specialist responsibilities. To that extent one does not need a very large number, but I do see the need to have a number of specialists in the Regular Army Emergency Reserve to ensure that deployments in the Regular Army are not held up for minor reasons. Beyond that it is ridiculous to be trying to float competitive forces - which is really what it is. We are looking for recruits into the Army Reserve from civilian life and these people in civilian life can be better employed - I am talking now about the untapped group - by being brought into the Army Reserve. That trained group can, on what we in the Army call 'the buddy system', be of considerable value in advancing young recruits quickly. The buddy system is simply somebody who fosters a young recruit along and shows him at night how best to put up his gear so he does not get wet and points little things he is doing wrong and otherwise helps him. His training is virtually going on 24 hours a day whereas otherwise it may be only for the period when he is receiving instructions.

ACTING CHAIRMAN - What is being done to implement the policy move to 30,000? Is it proposed to do it over five years? Is it proposed to do it in any shorter time phase? What bids are being made for the necessary equipment and finance to make sure that the Government is aware of what is needed and is capable of making decisions to assist the Reserve to have that policy implemented?

Major-Gen. Maitland - The requirement is to do it within five years. That is the maximum time but it does not mean that if we can do it within one week we will not do it. The program is geared very much to equipment and we have to do our sums and put the options to the Government. Brigadier Kahn has been losing his sleep lately by looking at this very issue of the equipment needed to match the growth and strength.

ACTING CHAIRMAN - Was a specific costing announced with respect to the cost of the move from 22,000 to 30,000.

Major-Gen. Maitland - An amount of $70m was provided.

ACTING CHAIRMAN - Thank you.

Mr ARMITAGE - What is the ratio of applicants accepted for service in the Reserve to those who apply?

Major-Gen. Maitland - I thought that was a question you would ask and I have noted down the figures. For 10 inquiries and four applications we get one recruit.

Mr ARMITAGE - It is basically four to one.

Major-Gen. Maitland - The 10 is important because that is where you start. You have to attract 10 people to start making inquiries to get the one recruit.

Mr ARMITAGE - Do four actually apply and is one only accepted?

Major-Gen. Maitland - Yes.

Mr ARMITAGE - What are the major reasons for non-acceptance, health or educational capacity?

Major-Gen. Maitland - Yes. We have exactly the same standards as the Regular Army: Health is one, education is another. Of course, we ask some who complete the application to see their employers, for example, to ensure that they can get leave. In some cases we have had problems there. In other cases it could be a parent who does not give a consent or something like that.

Mr ARMITAGE - Is the ratio higher for females or lower?

Major-Gen. Maitland - I do not think we have differentiated between them, have we?

Brig. Kahn - No.

Mr ARMITAGE - Has morale increased with the introduction of more females into the Reserve?

Major-Gen. Maitland - Morale has never been a problem in the Army Reserve. As I said, we have a Rats of Tobruk attitude. But it certainly has been a good influence in many ways and I think there is great scope for women in the Services.

ACTING CHAIRMAN - What is happening about the proposal for the Reserve Command in the Staff College?

Major-Gen. Maitland - That is being processed through the system now. Certainly it has gone through Army. I was about to say approval has been given but the full process has not been gone through yet, although I imagine that there will be no problem in that happening.

ACTING CHAIRMAN - What has been your experience with the school cadets since the new system was brought in? What is the Reserve doing with and for cadets now? How do you think it is working?

Major-Gen. Maitland - I will ask Brigadier Kahn to answer that as he has a much closer association with the cadets. I apply myself principally to the Army Reserve and not to the cadet part of it.

Brig. Kahn - The cadet system is working. It is a completely new system, as announced by the Minister, which basically puts the onus back on to the school to do the type of activity that it wishes to do. It is different from the

former, military-type cadet system. Today the school chooses what it wants to do and my experience is that 50 per cent want to carry out military-type activities and 50 per cent want to do their own thing, which is generally of a non-military nature, such as adventure training. There are currently 19,000 cadets in the system with something like 150 schools. It is working; we have 100 regular soldiers committed to it. To answer your specific question about reserves, some Army Reserve units go out of their way to assist cadet schools very much. It depends on the affiliation and association between the school, the local Army Reserve unit, what the school desires and what the unit can do.

Mr SCHOLES - Is there validity in some form of association between local reserve units and cadets, and is there a basis for establishment of regional cadet structures? Now they are limited to schools with cadet units which, in some cases, are restricted to adventure training which does not necessarily meet the requirements of cadets. Certainly they are closed off to some persons who would like to participate. The reserves of the other two forces, whilst not anywhere near as extensive, are almost all organised on regional bases rather than school bases.

Brig. Kahn - We have conducted one trial in South Australia with what we call an open unit. That has proved to be successful and will probably be the forerunner of other open or regional units.

Mr SCHOLES - Would it be seen as advantageous to have them in some way associated with the local Army Reserve unit, where such exists in close proximity?

Brig. Kahn - Again, I think this is very much a matter of choice on both sides, particularly on the school side. I am sure you will find that in those areas where the school is keen, the local unit generally comes to the party to assist that school. If it is a military-oriented school, the Reserve may look to it for potential recruits. But a lot of schools do not wish that type of connection. I repeat, I believe there are probably as many schools that do not want any military connection, any purely

military connection, as there are that do.

Mr SCHOLES - I am concerned about the school-oriented issue, but have not gone into it far enough to comment. I revert to my earlier question about turnover ratios which, to say the least, seem unreal in that I think they are probably exaggerated by short term turnover. What proportion of the Army Reserve remains for the 3-year enlistment period, and beyond?

Major-Gen. Maitland - I do not know whether our figures are sufficiently clear on this. One of our problems is trying to weed out those who are not sincere in wanting to join the Army Reserve. Somebody who says that he wants to join may really be looking for temporary employment during a holiday, to make extra money or something of that nature. Then he goes. There is no way we have found to psychologically determine such people. I have discussed the problem with some of my counterparts in other countries who have not been able to fathom it out either. But I think a good 60 per cent, about two-thirds, are quite sincere and will stay or intent to stay. Events can always overtake them - transfers away. Of course - and I have not touched upon this yet - we are a major recruiter for the Regular Army, and some of our short term recruits find that they like it so much they go off. There is nothing bad about them. Indeed, I spoke to at least three girls as I travelled around earlier this year who were going into the Women's Royal Army Corps Officer Cadet Training Unit in February.

ACTING CHAIRMAN - What percentage of Regular recruitment has previously served in the Reserve?

Major-Gen. Maitland - We have that figure but I cannot remember what it is.

Brig. Kahn - It is certainly sizable.

ACTING CHAIRMAN - We would be grateful if you would provide us with that information.

Mr SCHOLES - In your paper you mentioned the problem of book work. I know from talking to your commander in New South Wales, for instance, and some other officers that the mere signing of the chits is almost a full time occupation for a senior Reserve officer. How close are you to resolving that problem and minimising the work, especially for command level officers who have to sign the chits for almost everything?

Major-Gen. Maitland - We are about to make some progress because attitudes are becoming more enlightened. I touched upon this earlier. But we live in a peace time environment. This is one of our problems and it applies to the Regular Army too. You have war time procedures and you have peace time procedures. In peace time things become progressively inbuilt. This may happen for very good reasons. As a banker I know the need for security, the correct handling of tendering and all these things. They tend to become built-in in peace time and are difficult to eliminate because there is so much justification for their retention. But they certainly do add greatly to the load. We are currently studying this and now that attitudes are somewhat more enlightened we may get somewhere with the study.

Mr SCHOLES - On the same general topic I wish to ask about something which I know is a problem for the Regular Army. Special payments are made as allowances for various reasons such as training functions and sometimes involve very small amounts of money. To what extent are such payments valid in that the result reflects a reasonable input of time from the officers who have had to do the book work? My understanding is that it might be far better to pay people a small additional amount in lieu of allowances to save time.

Major-Gen. Maitland - I suppose we are locked into a Regular Army system. One of the main thrusts of the Army Reserve and the Millar Committee was to develop a system which was compatible between the Reserves and the Regulars and did not leave too many anomalies there. It is hard to suggest that we depart from that principle but as one of those who have gone through all this,

I certainly believe that we would do better to cut out much of the work that goes on for little benefit to the soldier. He could either have a supplement to his pay or even forego it completely.

ACTING CHAIRMAN - How does the standard of training of the special conditions units compare with that of the standard units?

Major-Gen. Maitland - One of the interesting things about the 'standard' units now is that they are no longer standard. They have a range built into them now and there are a lot of soldiers doing different periods of training. I would not be able to differentiate. The difference between units is largely related to the commander. You may see good units which have put in less time than a badly commanded unit. I would not see any difference between special and standard units or for that matter by comparison with the supplementary Reserves.

ACTING CHAIRMAN - You said you did not think we should bring back the Centurions. Does that relate to tank training generally or just to that particular piece of equipment?

Major-Gen. Maitland - That piece of equipment.

ACTING CHAIRMAN - I would have thought it would be valuable for the Reserve to have tank training - assuming it could be given some tanks - in order to fulfil its role as part of the Australian Army in the defence of Australia and its interest.

Major-Gen. Maitland - I agree with that. What you are getting at is what I believe to be right. In terms of backup to the Regular Army we need to have Army reservists with skills in those key areas. I do think we need to develop some ability and skills in use of the tank.

ACTING CHAIRMAN - Thank you for the very detailed submission and the helpful way you have answered questions over a lengthy period.

(Evidence was then taken in camera.)

CHAIRMAN - Is there any statement that either of you would like to make as a final comment on any matter that we have dealt with?

Major-Gen. Maitland - I have been so busy answering questions that I do not know whether I have omitted any statement. I do not think so.

Brigadier Kahn - I would not have anything to add at all.

Major-Gen. Maitland - May I finish up, at the risk of being completely boring, by saying that our problem is the mood of the country. I think we tend to underestimate the young people of Australia and, given the right mood and the right example, I think we will get a very good response from them.

ACTING CHAIRMAN - Political leadership with or without the spur of threat. Thank you.

Sub-Committee adjourned at 8.25 p.m.

MELBOURNE

Monday, 28 July 1980

PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMMITTEE
ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE

Sub-Committee on Defence Matters
(Sub-Committee C)

Present

Mr Katter (Chairman)

Senator Bishop	Mr Armitage
	Mr Neil
	Mr Scholes

The Sub-Committee met at 10.20 a.m.
Mr KATTER took the chair.

Commander Frank Geoffrey EVANS, Federal President, The Navy League of Australia, 26 King Street, Melbourne, Victoria,

Commander Anthony Worrall GRAZEBROOK, Federal Vice-President, The Navy League of Australia, 26 King Street, Melbourne, Victoria, and

Vice-Admiral Sir Richard PEEK, Council Member, The Navy League of Australia, 26 King Street, Melbourne, Victoria, were sworn and examined.

CHAIRMAN - I declare open the public meeting of the Committee. Welcome gentlemen. The Committee has, at the moment, a very wide term of reference - that is, to monitor the implementation of the Australian Government's announced defence programs. I am sure I speak for the members of our Committee when I say we were pleased to find we were quite uninhibited in our general approach to the whole defence spectrum. The result is likely to be reflected here in Melbourne. I have been on this Committee and other committees over a long period and I do not know when there has been a greater diversity of fairly valuable evidence. I have read the submissions and, in the aggregate, I think they make a very significant contribution - and that very much applies to yours, by the way. I ask you to state your private address.

Cmdr Evans - My private address is 8 Knutsford Street, Balwyn, Victoria.

Vice-Adm. Peek - My private address is 'Rothlyn', Monaro Highway, via Cooma, New South Wales.

Cmdr Grazebrook - My home address is 2 Lucifer Street, North Balwyn, Victoria.

CHAIRMAN - You may at any time request that your evidence or part of your evidence or answers to specific questions be given in camera and the Committee will give consideration to any such request. The Committee has before it your submission, which is submission No. 11 in our records. It is entitled: 'The Tactical Fighter Force and Maritime Airpower'. Do you wish to make any alterations or amendments to it at this stage?

Cmdr Evans - No.

CHAIRMAN - Is it the wish of the Committee that the submission be incorporated in the transcript of evidence? There being no objection, it is so ordered.

(The document read as follows) -

THE NAVY LEAGUE OF AUSTRALIA

1 APR 1980

THE TACTICAL FIGHTER FORCE AND MARITIME AIRPOWER

BY VICE ADMIRAL SIR RICHARD PEEK AND COMMANDERS

GEOFFREY EVANS AND A. W. GRAZEBROOK

In a wide-ranging statement on foreign affairs and defence in the Parliament on 19th February, 1980, the Prime Minister referred to two major defence equipment projects which have been the subject of much discussion in and outside the Defence Department for a number of years - replacement of the Mirage fighters (the TFF project) and the options available to project airpower at sea when HMAS MELBOURNE retires in 1985 or soon after. The relevant parts of the statement are:-

> "We will enter into a commitment later this year for 75 new tactical aircraft"

and,

> "Projects under consideration include: Capabilities we might acquire when our aircraft carrier HMAS MELBOURNE retires...."

The Prime Minister's statement needs to be read in conjuction with two other statements concerning the TFF, both by the Defence Minister in Parliament, which read in part:-

> "TFF capabilities encompass air defence, air superiority, interdiction - including anti-shipping capability, tactical reconnaissance and close support of ground forces" (April 1978).

and announcing a short list of four aircraft in October 1978 -

> "The short list of contending aircraft has been chosen taking full account of their capabilities in the air-to-air role. In addition, an important consideration has been the potential these aircraft offer in the air-to-surface roles of interdiction (including anti-shipping operations) tactical reconnaissance and the close support of ground forces"

The list was later reduced to two United States aircraft, General Dynamics' F16 and the McDonnell Douglas F18A, both essentially air superiority fighters. It is not the purpose of this study to query the strategic reasons prompting the need for this particular type of fighter - it is noted that the Prime Minister's statement does not appear to commit the Government to either of the aircraft nominated - but it does raise the question of their effectiveness in Australia's maritime environment, and it is to this matter that we address ourselves.

The answer to the question involves a number of major factors:-

(1) To what extent in a conflict involving Australia the air superiority role would be relevant to maritime warfare, the outcome of which would almost certainly determine our country's future.

(2) The practicability of equipping, arming and training the replacement fighter squadrons so as to be effective in maritime warfare. For example, throughout their service life Mirage squadrons have had extremely limited opportunities to be controlled by naval ships or to participate in maritime exercises.

(3) Whether the relatively limited radius of action inherent in air superiority fighters could be extended sufficiently for maritime operations, either by use of air-to-air refuelling or by the construction of additional airfields, or by a combination of both.

Also to be taken into account are the types of operation in which our maritime forces are likely to be involved, quite possibly on their own, during the 1990s and beyond. This in turn depends to a large extent on an assessment of the forces likely to be in the hands of regional powers at the time. In this latter regard a number of assumptions can be made:-

- By 1990 the USSR will have made available to any regional country which had been unable to obtain the West's Sea Harriers, VSTOL aircraft of the Forger (or descendant) type. Small aircraft carriers are already available from Britain, France, Spain and Italy to any buyer prepared to pay the relatively low price.

- Soviet designed and manufactured land-based aircraft of the Bear - and possibly more sophisticated - type will be available. With a radius of action of some 2500 miles, the propellor driven Bear Long Range Maritime Patrol (LRMP) aircraft can range the Indian and Western Pacific Oceans but is vulnerable to air defence fighters and cannot be escorted by land-based fighters in Australia's maritime approaches.

- The now 18-years old Soviet KYNDA class cruisers, and the succeeding KRESTA I class, will have found their way into regional navies by 1990. They will bring with them not only the comparatively short-range SS-N-2 surface-to-surface guided missile but the much longer range (150-250 nm) SS-N-3 "Shaddock" system, and area defence anti-aircraft missiles supplementing the point defence anti-aircraft missiles already in service in regional navies.

- Apart from the threat posed by Soviet nuclear powered and armed submarines to any country at any time, modern and very effective diesel-electric submarines are available for sale from a number of Western and other countries. There is little doubt that regional navies will continue to move forward technologically and that the number of such craft in Australia's sphere of interest will increase.

- Mines, of which tens of thousands exist around the world, will continue to threaten the free movement of trade in the confined waters through which ships must pass at some time or another during their voyages.

To summarise, it must be assumed that the coming years will see a considerable growth of regional maritime power:-

- Guided missile equipped surface forces
- VSTOL aircraft for offensive and defensive purposes
- Submarines and mining capability

It must be assumed that all these forces will be available irrespective of any forces "outside" powers might deploy.

As the safe passage of ships and their cargoes to and from Australia is a pre-requisite to the country's survival, it must be asked:-

- How best is this to be ensured?
- Is the planned tactical fighter force relevant to the task?
- Is it in the right place in our order of priority for defence equipment?

The Tasks of the Maritime Forces

The tasks of Australia's maritime forces - air, surface and sub-surface - in order of probable need are:-

(1) To protect our overseas trade against attack by submarines or mines.

(2) To protect our coastal trade against attack by submarines or mines.

(3) To protect our overseas trade against attack by seaborne aircraft (VSTOL), long range maritime patrol aircraft, surface forces, or by a combination of all three and submarines.

(4) To assist in deterring or defeating an attempt to invade Australia.

If these tasks are to be successfully performed in the face of hostile maritime forces of the kind listed above, quite possibly without the assistance of allies (who could be otherwise occupied) or allied bases overseas, distance and the range of our equipment become of paramount importance. It must also be appreciated that there are significant strategic differences in the tasks required of our maritime forces, differences misunderstood or unrecognised in the Australian community and not least by the media.

The protection of coastal shipping requires virtually constant watch over all the sea and air space in the vicinity of Australia so that ships carrying vital cargoes such as fuel, ore etc. can use the local shipping lanes. A rather similar requirement exists in an "invasion situation" - the ability to move personnel and materials to any part of the continent under threat with the greatest possible freedom. Land bases, including airfields, facilitate this type of operation although the latter in particular are restricted in both number and capability.

On the other hand overseas cargoes, generally in convoys of ships, must travel great distances and once they leave the Australian coast steadily remove themselves from the protection of land-based facilities including aircraft, and in most cases will be out of reach of them for some time. These convoys will require "on the spot" protection in certain areas, but unoccupied parts of the route will not need constant protection.

It is important that the distances involved in transitting the overseas routes be recognised. Trade to the west of Australia will require safe passage for some 2500 miles towards the Cape of Good Hope, and northwards towards the Suez Canal and the Straits of Hormuz at least as far as the equator.

In trade with Japan it would be unwise to count upon safe passage through the Indonesian Archipelago even with the goodwill and support of our Indonesian neighbours. Such trade may well have to be routed north-east into the Pacific, 1100 miles or so towards the Santa Cruz Islands before turning northwards.

Trans-Pacific trade, including replacement ammunition and spares for the US made or designed ships and aircraft which by the mid 1980s will constitute a substantial part of our equipment, will probably follow a similar route - towards the Santa Cruz Islands and then north-east across the Pacific. Even our trans-Tasman trade must transit 1000 nautical miles.

The TFF and the Maritime Task

Brief reference has been made above to limits imposed by the number and capability of airfields available to enable assistance to be provided for maritime operations. As Map 1 shows, even if a new airfield is constructed at Townsville, it would not provide the proposed replacement aircraft with sufficient range to reach much more than halfway to the Santa Cruz Islands. Furthermore, as surface forces move away from Australia they draw closer to islands which may well become involuntary hosts to submarines, surface or air forces in time of war.

To the north and northwest, our bases are better placed to make a major contribution as can be seen from Map 2. However an air superiority fighter (even those likely to be in service in the 1990s) would not be "long-legged" enough to provide cover for forces operating in the approaches to the Lombok or Sunda Straits - even when the proposed new airfield at Derby is completed.

In the Indian Ocean area our mainland airfields will provide nowhere near the cover needed to protect overseas trade. Maps 2 and 3 show that the existing airfields at Learmonth and Pearce, together with the proposed Derby airfield, provide cover only for the coastal routes and final stages of the overseas approaches.

Our off-shore Territory, the Cocos Islands, is better placed, at least as far as traffic from the Persian Gulf is concerned. The Cocos Islands however exemplify the difficulties which obtain at other airfields on our west coast. Whilst runways and some fuel storage facilities exist they are really little more than staging posts. Further, unlike ships and submarines, they are in a fixed position which will be well known to any potential enemy, resupply problems in the face of an enemy maritime threat would be formidable, and it will be necessary to guard them, if possible, against any attack. The Cocos Islands in particular are an ideal point for an attack by submarine based Commandos or by surface and seaborne air forces. To guard against such an attack it would be necessary to deploy a significant number of troops and combat aircraft for the defence of the Cocos Islands.

As remarked, the facilities currently available are limited and in general consist of runways able to take aircraft up to the size of the ORION P3 and the HERCULES C130 (take-off weights of 60 and 70 tonnes respectively) at Pearce and Learmonth, and reserves of some types of fuel. There are virtually no reserves of ammunition and spare parts, and personnel accommodation is limited in capacity and in habitability. They have air traffic control facilities, but no capability for the tactical direction of combat aircraft, air early warning capability etc.

Modern control communications and sensors, accommodation for the essential rest of aircrew and for base staff, reserves of ammunition and maintenance equipment to avoid time-consuming and frequent returns to the RAAF's bases in southern and south-eastern Australia - all are essential for these airfields to function as anything other than staging posts. The facilities can either be bought and pre-positioned in peacetime, a fairly costly exercise (and it must be remembered that Learmonth, Derby and Darwin are liable to cyclone damage) or moved in as a war need arises. The limited information published indicates the latter course is envisaged but presents its own problems.

The aircraft available for personnel/equipment moves is the HERCULES C130 of which the RAAF has twenty-four. In an emergency no doubt civil aircraft would also be available, their use to some extent governed by runway capacities. With a take-off weight of approximately 47 tonnes the DC9 could use runways suitable for the HERCULES (70 tonnes) and probably the slightly heavier 727 (86 tonnes); the 747 at 340 tonnes is in a somewhat different category and its use would appear to be restricted to major bases and airports. The projected use of civil aircraft would also involve fuel storage considerations.

In the unlikely ultimate of an invasion attempt, the time taken to move (say) a dozen air superiority fighters, their essential radars, control equipment etc. and their maintenance personnel is such that the extremely mobile enemy invasion forces could vary the point of attack to outside the range of the new fighter location. Flexibility in air operations involves far more than merely flying in aircraft from one base to another.

Air-to-air refuelling has been suggested as a method of increasing the range of air superiority fighters to enable them to play a worthwhile part in maritime operations. The United States Navy is familiar with the practice and the nuclear-powered attack carriers normally include four KA-6 INTRUDER aerial tankers in their aircraft complements; however it is generally acknowledged that there are a number of problems including:-

- The vulnerability of the tanker - at all times.
- The vulnerability of the fighter during refuelling operations.
- The great difficulty of establishing rendezvous positions without breaking communications silence.
- Limits imposed by aircraft crew fatigue, and re-ammunitioning problems.

A vitally important requirement in air-sea operations is the capability to fully integrate the tactical operations of supporting aircraft with those of other maritime forces; this involves not only equipment but command arrangements.

In Australia the operations of the RAAF's ORION P3 aircraft are frequently and effectively integrated with maritime forces, and the RAN and RAAF have a good deal of experience in the matter. The very nature of the aircraft's equipment however commits them to maritime operations full time; their communications and sensor facilities are designed primarily, if not exclusively for that purpose, and there is very little use for the ORION other than for operations over the sea.

This is not so in the case of the proposed TFF, the primary purpose of which, as an air superiority fighter is to destroy other aircraft relatively close to its own base. Operations in an attack or strike mode to support maritime operations would be secondary unless command arrangements were made to ensure that a suitably equipped part of the TFF was committed to maritime operations to the extent and for the period required. Bearing in mind the distances involved, such operations may well last for several weeks and it would be manifestly unacceptable to despatch maritime forces on an operation on the assumption that air support would be available, only to find after the naval or merchant ships were irrevocably committed that the air forces have been arbitrarily assigned to some other activity.

This may seem obvious but the tactical control of elements of the armed forces with separate navy, army and air force commands has been a vexatious issue since the advent of "the flying machine" and the perceived need of naval and army commanders to have air support for sea and land operations. So far as the former is concerned some nations have overcome the difficulty by assigning shore-based combat aircraft to their navies on a permanent basis e.g., the USSR (which also operates a growing sea-borne air force), China and West Germany. The United States Navy overcomes this difficulty with its own very large air force operating from naval air stations ashore and carriers at sea. Australia, with a single defence force commander and provision for a maritime commander (whose wartime role is exercised in peacetime in operations such as Kangaroo III) is, theoretically at least, better off than some countries in the matter of overall command arrangements.

However problems arise when a task group commander at sea has to ask another commander to provide tactical air support, which he will usually want urgently. There will be many occasions when that other commander decides that he has other more important demands, with the result that the group at sea may receive air support too late or not at all - clearly a highly unsatisfactory situation pointing out the need for a commander afloat to have air power on hand and under his control.

Maritime Suitability of the F16 and F18A

The fact the the primary purpose of the air superiority fighters on the short list is to control local air space, and that strike operations are secondary not only in name but in weapons and sensor equipment, increases doubts about their suitability for maritime operations.

In maritime operations of the type likely to be undertaken by Australia over the rest of this century, an air superiority fighter as such is unlikely to be required outside the Timor and Arafura Seas and in the north-western part of the Coral Sea (in passing, it might be asked whether missile defence would be a viable proposition for the protection of the important base of Darwin). At the same time there is a requirement for an aircraft capable of keeping hostile aircraft (both strike and LRMP) at a safe distance from our naval and merchant shipping, but this requires air defence rather than air superiority fighters. In foreseeable circumstances certain types of seaborne aircraft (e.g. the A4 SKYHAWK and SEA HARRIER) would appear to be adequate for this purpose, and the F16 and F18A unnecessarily sophisticated and costly.

There is clearly a strike as well as an air defence role for maritime airforces - among other things to destroy hostile units as far away as possible from the operation under way - but given the limitations referred to in previous paragraphs, principally of range and the difficulty of achieving tactical integration, the F16 and F18A appear to be inadequate. In a sense, for maritime air defence they are too good, but not good enough in a strike role.

Maritime air power is in fact best projected from mobile seaborne platforms and particularly from aircraft carriers. Although the F18A is designed to operate from United States carriers it requires a large carrier not altogether appropriate for Australian circumstances. Smaller aircraft carriers are quite capable of handling a comparatively wide range of less sophisticated aircraft which, together with the resources of the ship, can respond to a variety of situations such as:-

- Anti-submarine warfare
- Air Defence
- Afloat Support to Escorts
- Mining Capability
- Deployment and Landing of Combat Troops by Helicopter
- Reconnaissance & Surveillance
- Maritime Strike
- Strategic Support
- Long Range Search & Rescue operations
- Logistic Support to Troops

Conclusion

As stated previously the purpose of this study is not to suggest that Australia has no need for a tactical fighter force; that is a matter involving an assessment of threat to our land establishments and the resources available to acquire and maintain a TFF. It is however contended that acquisition of the fighter types proposed is unlikely to materially assist in ensuring the maritime security of the nation.

Under no circumstances should the TFF project be seen as an "option" for replacing HMAS MELBOURNE and the ability to project air power at sea. They must be considered separately. It is safe to say however that if Australia loses control of its ocean approaches in either peace or war, Australians will simultaneously lose their independence.

(Vice Admiral Sir Richard Peek was Chief of the Naval Staff from 1970 to 1973, and Commanders F. G. Evans and A. W. Grazebrook are Federal President and Federal Vice President respectively of the Navy League of Australia)

Federal President,
The Navy League of Australia,
8 Knutsford Street,
BALWYN, Victoria 3103. Tel: (03)836 3379

MAP 1



MAP 2


MALACCA STRAIT
SINGAPORE
SUMATRA
SUNDA STRAIT
JAVA
CHRISTMAS ISLAND
COCOS ISLANDS
LOMBOK STRAIT
TIMOR SEA
DARWIN
AUSTRALIA
LEARMONTH
PERTH
FIRA - Area Coverage
FIRA - Area Coverage
100 degrees
CEYLON
MALDIVE ISLANDS
DIEGO GARCIA
INDIAN OCEAN
EQUATOR
20 degrees
60 degrees

MAP 3


LOMBOK STRAIT
JAVA
AUSTRALIA
LEARMONTH
PERTH
FIRA - Area Coverage
FIRA - Area Coverage
COCOS ISLANDS
To Europe via Cape
To Europe via Cape
To Europe via Cape
To Europe via Cape
DIEGO GARCIA
INDIAN OCEAN
MAURITIUS
MADAGASCAR
100 degrees
80 degrees
60 degrees
20 degrees

CHAIRMAN - I invite you to speak to the submission.

Cmdr Evans - On behalf of the Navy League I would like to refer, very briefly, to Australia's defence policy because one needs to be clear about this before discussing programs which follow from it. We assume that our defence policy is to be found in the 1976 White Paper 'Australian Defence'. There have been a number of ministerial statements since that time but I do not think they change the basic policy substantially. The only difference is that one hears the words 'deterrence' and 'deterrent capability' emphasised more often. The policy, as we see it, is that, in the absence of a perceived direct threat to Australia but at a time of fairly widespread instability, or world instability, Australia requires the nucleus of a defence force which can be expanded as a real threat develops. We would not disagree with this and our only reservations would be that we feel a little nervous about the time element and about the time which it might take to develop the force. Events can develop quite rapidly. As we are depending on a fairly high level of technology in our nucleus or core force, the material we may require may not be available, because, presumably, other people would want it, too.

CHAIRMAN - How much time do you think it would take to develop this core force? It is commented on in most of the submissions now coming forward.

Cmdr Evans - There are tremendous time delays in the case of ships and aircraft. For instance, we have on order four FFG7s. We hope that we will build this type of ship in Australia in the near future. If we wanted to expand this particular element or this particular class of ship we would have considerable difficulty in getting additional FFG7s from the United States. I use this purely as an example. In the first place the core force has to be fairly substantial.

Vice-Adm. Peek - I agree.

CHAIRMAN - It has been claimed that in time of an emergency - we are near enough to that now, I guess - if we

depend on the United States, as would be the logical step, we could be in real difficulties in getting the equipment and, more important, the parts, because of unusual demands which would be made by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and others. Would you like to comment on that?

Cmdr Evans - I cannot comment on that except to agree that we would have difficulty. I think it can be assumed that an effort will be made to build up in Australia a supply of the parts which are most likely to be required but I am thinking of complete items of equipment. If we require the kind of helicopter that the Navy may wish to see on the FFG7s then these are not going to be found quickly.

Vice-Adm. Peek - Things may have changed since I left the Defence organisation but certainly at that time when buying American equipment the Navy was included in the United States Navy inventory. If we wanted a part of a Tartar missile it came from the American inventory. It was not something we had to order specially. I imagine, although I do not know, that this sort of purchase still goes on. It obviously does not apply to complete ships or complete aircraft or new purchases in time of emergency.

Senator BISHOP - In this case the only real problem is interference with transportation between the United States or whichever country is supplying the part and Australia. What is your view on that? Do you think there should be a safer way than the one which exists today in respect to the supply of parts and equipment from the United States?

Cmdr Grazebrook - You have hit on a very important aspect. We would be dependent on lines of communication. Some things, of course, can be flown but the larger things would have to come by sea and that can present difficulties.

Senator BISHOP - How could we improve that? How would you rectify that?

Cmdr Grazebrook - Make the parts locally or carry a larger local inventory of parts purchased overseas. Making them locally can be expensive, of course.

CHAIRMAN - May we develop that a little further? Over the period during which I have been associated with this Committee I have wondered about the possibility of adopting a uniform approach to equipment with our inflexible allies or with a group of nations that would be associated with us in time of emergency. I have questioned the Minister about this too. Is it possible to get agreement on components and to get agreement on Australian industry participation? For every man on this Committee that is the essential factor. Is it possible for us to at least develop components in Australia? You could not have a little factory here, one in the Philippines and one in Singapore and so on but do you think such an arrangement is possible? I have encountered a lot of scepticism about this. How do you feel about it?

Cmdr Evans - I doubt whether any country, except possibly the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, could hope to be completely independent of other countries in this day and age. As I have remarked, we are looking for a fairly high degree of sophistication, particularly in our naval and air equipment. I would not think it possible to carry every spare part required. There is a tremendous degree of interdependence at present and I see this increasing. We agree with many aspects of the '1976 Defence White Paper'. In particular we agree with the need for the closest possible co-operation with the United States. I think the present Defence policy of buying or tending to standardise American equipment is probably very sound in all the circumstances.

CHAIRMAN - If it is not, what is the alternative?

Cmdr Evans - There is no alternative, really. In our December 1978 submission perhaps we were thinking too far ahead but we suggested that there was a considerable need for all the common interest countries to work together - not simply two or three countries - throughout the world. There is a need for the co-ordination of security effort. This theme, which we mentioned in 1978, has been developed. As you no doubt know, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Hill-Norton recently - about 12 months ago - called for a world-wide maritime alliance to counter the growing Soviet threat to the trade routes. The same theme is being developed in the United States. But rather than a world-wide alliance of the type that Hill-Norton foresaw, which is a rather futuristic idea and full of political problems, we see room for a regional grouping with the regions co-operating where they interface. We are getting on to a rather broad subject at the moment but this is as we see it. There is a great need for the development of regional associations and, as far as Australia is concerned, it has to be particularly with Japan and the Association of South East Asian Nations. We simply do not believe that in this day and age we can be completely independent. We do not subscribe to the fortress Australia thinking which prevailed a few years ago. We do not see that as realistic at all.

We agree with all those parts of the Defence White Paper which refer to the need for adequate surveillance and reconnaissance facilities. We particularly agree with the very considerable attention that the White Paper gives to the need for a very good maritime capability. By maritime capability I am referring not only to ships but also to aircraft. We are at a loss - we agree with this, and the Paper proposes it - to understand the very considerable delay that has attended the decision on replacing HMAS 'Melbourne'. This matter has been under discussion now for at least 12 years. We have not yet taken a decision. It is a fundamental decision which will affect the entire Australian defence effort. At the moment we have a very useful, flexible and well balanced Navy which is very highly

respected in this region. It is respected by other countries with whose services we exercise from time to time. But if we forgo this blue water navy and have a navy which is dependent entirely on shore-based aircraft the whole defence effort will be affected. That is why we have paid much attention to this tactical fighter force matter. It is difficult for us to understand the delays attendant on this decision.

Vice Adm. Peek - To give you the genesis of this paper, I became concerned at repeated statements, some emanating from the Minister for Defence, that the primary role of the tactical force replacement fighter for the Mirage was air superiority. I had been brooding on this for some time when the 'Bulletin' in 1979 had an article by Peter Samuel which asked the vital question, and I quote:

> The most vexing question remains - for what purpose does Australia require the beautiful, fearsome and expensive flying machines? The Defence Department strategic thinking and doctrine appears so vague that outsiders must suspect they are simply equipment to keep pilots occupied.

I wrote a very critical paper on this which the Navy League considered and very rightly said was not the business of the Navy League; the League's business was maritime support for our country. But this is the basis on which the paper began to be written. You probably have not had time to read the paper in any detail so I will go through what seems to me to be the main points of it. Firstly, at the bottom of the first page we talk about the effectiveness of the two nominated replacement fighters, the F16 and the F18A, in Australia's maritime environment. At the top of page 2 we ask three questions which I will try to answer briefly. My answer to question (1) is I do not think that an air superiority fighter has any revelance in Australian maritime defence.

CHAIRMAN - No relevance at all?

Vice-Adm. Peek - I am talking about an air superiority fighter. Perhaps I had better make clear the difference as I see it, between an air superiority fighter and an air defence fighter. When we talk about an air superiority fighter we are

talking about fighters fighting fighters, both under some form of control. In Australia's case the only form of control that fighters can have from an enemy point of view is control by an aircraft carrier or other seaborne aircraft. They cannot be controlled from any land base. That is the point. And an air superiority fighter must be controlled to be effective. So you are faced with the question: What countries can operate air superiority fighters from an aircraft carrier over our country? At the moment, and as far ahead as one can see, the only country that can do this is the United States. As you said, being required to defend ourselves against American air superiority fighters is unthinkable. So you come back to the air defence fighter.

The air defence fighter takes on bombers, which in certain areas of Australia can strike our towns and people, but they do not have to be such sophisticated, high performance fighters as the air superiority fighter has to be. As I say, we think there is no possibility of an air superiority fighter being used over our country. We find it difficult to see any relevance of a fighter with air superiority capabilities to the defence of Australia.

Senator BISHOP - Related to that is the argument that even refuelling of the aircraft we will take does not increase their availability in the way you mention. Is that correct?

Vice-Adm. Peek - No. It is not that I am suggesting that our air superiority fighters would not be effective if they had any other enemy air superiority fighters to take on although I could discuss that point. One can envisage a situation in which they would then have to use an air defence capability against bombers. But unless we take on the United States neither I nor the Navy League can envisage a situation in which Australian aircraft operating out of Australia would have to fight against an air superiority fighter.

Mr ARMITAGE - Would they be operating out of Butterworth? I have just come back from there.

Vice-Adm. Peek - It is possible. It depends upon the Government's intention as to whether the Butterworth operation is to continue.

Mr ARMITAGE - Do you realise that at present the Mirage is basically inferior to the F5s owned by Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and so on?

Vice-Adm. Peek - Yes, I know.

Mr ARMITAGE - The only advantage the Mirage has is that it is a much faster plane and if it has to get out of the way it can do so. Apart from that it is an inferior aircraft. Can you not envisage that we could be placed at a very serious disadvantage to the countries north of Butterworth if we do not have air superiority?

Cmdr Evans - I do not think we are really querying whether we purchase it. Whether Australia needs a tactical fighter force

is a matter for the Government to decide. We are trying to say only that it does not have that relevance to the maritime defence capability.

Senator BISHOP - You were, because Admiral Peek went further and said it did not have relevance in the region.

Vice-Adm. Peek - I do not think I said region; I said Australia.

Senator BISHOP - As I interpret your argument it is that there is no conceivable threat within the region to involve these aircraft at present. Is that part of your calculations?

Vice-Adm. Peek - No, you are going much further than I attempted to go. I was trying to be specific. We cannot see any requirement for an air superiority role for the continental defence of Australia.

Senator BISHOP - That is one of the problems. Your paper deals precisely with the choice of the aircraft to which the Government is committed, but you have not yet developed a substitute sea force excepting that you are arguing about the 'Melbourne'.

Cmdr Evans - No. Admiral Peek is about to come on to the VSTOL - vertical short takeoff and landing aircraft.

Vice-Adm. Peek - Yes.

Senator BISHOP - On page 3 of your paper you talk about the growth within the region and you say that it must be assumed that in the coming years there will be great growth within the region for certain effective weapons, including submarines and mining capability. But apart from criticising the aircraft purchase it seems to me that you are basing most of your argument on the question of determining what will happen to the 'Melbourne'. Is that correct?

Cmdr Evans - No. Later on we suggest that less capable aircraft would be sufficient to deal with this kind of problem.

Senator BISHOP - Does that mean you have made up your minds that we do not need the F16 or F18?

Vice-Adm. Peek - No. I do not think it is proper for the Navy League to have a view on that. But it is proper to point out,

as we say on page 6 that:

> In foreseeable circumstances certain types of seaborne aircraft e.g. the A4 Skyhawk and Sea Harrier would appear to be adequate for this purpose, and the F16 and F18A unnecessarily sophisticated and costly.

Senator BISHOP - You mean the deterrent factor.

Vice-Adm. Peek - Yes. But in the strike role we feel the F16 and F18A do not seem to be good enough.

Senator BISHOP - Are you saying we should not buy the aircraft but should buy more ships?

Vice-Adm. Peek - No, I am not saying that at all.

Cmdr Grazebrook - We are saying whether or not we buy the F16 or F18A, we need a seaborne air capability. The F16 and the F18A may be needed for the defence of our cities and so forth.

Senator BISHOP - That is one of the things you may be developing but you have not said what you want. What do you think is required?

CHAIRMAN - As I see it, you do not want in any way to deal with the F16 or the F18A in their land-based role. Apparently what you are concerned about is the vulnerability of not only our sea lanes in relation to defence generally but in keeping open our trade routes - which you refer to as being very substantial. Am I right in saying that you see it in two separate compartments? You see the F16 and the F18A as having a particular role in conventional warfare involving a TFF, and yet you feel those particular aircraft and that whole concept is not thinking in terms of a maritime requirement. Is that right?

Vice-Adm. Peek - That is largely true.

Cmdr Evans - We attach greater importance to the acquisition of a platform to take aircraft to sea.

Vice-Adm. Peek - The tactical fighter force concept has great relevance, irrespective of the type of aircraft ultimately chosen, for the defence of coastal waters.

CHAIRMAN - Finally, do you think, quite frankly, that we should be thinking of an aircraft carrier and if we should, then what type of aircraft should it carry?

Vice-Adm. Peek - On page 3 we outline what we see as the tasks of Australian maritime forces. Perhaps I could add one which you may think should not appear in the Press; I leave that decision to you. A peacetime role which may arise is the evacuation of civilians from trouble spots in our near neighbourhood. One thinks of Espiritu Santo the other day. It might have been necessary.

CHAIRMAN - Some years ago we were thinking in terms of Bougainville.

Vice-Adm. Peek - Yes, these are possibilities. It is a peacetime possibility.

CHAIRMAN - Gentlemen, do you see any objection to that being discussed in open hearing?

Senator BISHOP - No.

Vice-Adm. Peek - Perhaps we should not tie it specifically to the New Hebrides. As I see it - I am probably on my own in this - the only way we can safely assure that is by having some form of aircraft carrier. You can argue that in an unopposed situation you can evacuate people in a whole variety of means. But if you are considering the necessity to evacuate people you have to give weight to the possibility that the evacuation might be opposed. The only way you can do this in the various situations in our area is by an aircraft carrier.

Having established those four tasks could we turn to the maps at the back of our submission. The first one, using the existing bases and the glossy brochure radius of action of the F18A of 600 miles, looks at the aircraft coverage obtainable from an F18A on the routes to North America and Japan. There is an awful lot of space where there is no air cover at all from the F18A. Let me make two points about the radii of action which apply to all three maps. Firstly, we are talking of single seater fighter aircraft going 600 miles over the sea. In my experience this just does not happen, whether or not they have the capability. That is asking too much of the air crew. Secondly - and perhaps I am teaching my superiors what they already know - one gets the idea from a picture like this that the arc centred on Townsville can be covered completely by F18As. A number of aircraft are needed to cover that. One aircraft cannot do the whole lot; one aircraft merely goes out to the edge and comes back. Do I make that clear?

CHAIRMAN - Yes.

Vice-Adm. Peek - Let us turn to the second map, bearing in mind the same two points about the glossy brochure. It covers trade routes to south-west Asia and the Persian Gulf. It is an important area, as 40 per cent of our oil comes from the Persian Gulf, does it not?

Cmdr Grazebrook - Forty per cent of our imports by weight are oil.

Vice-Adm. Peek - A lot of it comes from the Persian Gulf, and the remainder comes from Indonesia. We have covered in the paper the problems of basing aircraft on Cocos Island and the need for a substantial defence force to protect the aerodrome and the aircraft. Incidentally, this goes for the Mirages or any other aircraft in Malaysia.

Finally, the third map gives the important routes of Europe via the Cape and America via the Cape. As you can see there is virtually no coverage for that. Trade is vital to Australia - and I am using 'vital' in its real sense. Without

trade, both imports and exports, we cannot go on for very long. One could make a number of guesses as to how long we could go on. I am not even going to make one, but it would not be very long. Without one or more seaborne aircraft platforms, armed with anti-submarine helicopters and vertical or short takeoff aircraft of the Harrier type, we just will not have a blue water navy any more. It is rather like worrying that you are going to be burgled and waiting for the burglar to come in the front door rather than clobbering him as he comes in the front gate. Even to suggest that we can protect our trade and our resources within the short range for which shore based aircraft can provide cover is almost irresponsible.

Senator BISHOP - What capability do you think is necessary? You mentioned earlier that you thought the present Navy complement was satisfactory and efficient. In respect of the platforms that you want in the region at present, what do you propose as an effective force?

Cmdr Evans - The present Navy is quite a well balanced force. The 'Melbourne' is still operational. We have quite a reasonable destroyer force and the Oberon class submarines. We have a small patrol boat fleet as well. Certainly we see problems coming up, particularly with the destroyers, but you really cannot decide what you are going to do about destroyers or any other type of ship until you decide what is going to happen to the 'Melbourne'. The 'Melbourne' is obviously going to pay off soon and if the 'Melbourne' pays off and no carrier is ready to replace it within 12 months we will lose our present maritime-air capability. If it is decided that the 'Melbourne' will pay off and that there will be no replacement then the pilots are going to give their opinions with their feet. They will hastily depart to civil airlines.

Senator BISHOP - If the replacement is agreed upon in a short time would that constitute a satisfactory force in the area?

Cmdr Evans - Yes. It would enable forward planning to take place.

Senator BISHOP - Do you propose cuts in the other Service programs?

Cmdr Evans - No, I do not think so. Australia is not spending an unduly large amount on defence compared with other countries. I can see no reason why this should result in cuts to the other Services.

Cmdr Grazebrook - I do not see why acquiring a replacement for the 'Melbourne' should require cuts to the other Services. I do not think it is the place of the League to suggest that. I would like to add to what Commander Evans has said. He talked about the Navy having a reasonably satisfactory force in the present circumstances. That is quite true, with the possible exception of mine clearance capability. The real point when deciding whether or not to replace an aircraft carrier is to work out what the Navy is going to have to do in 10 years, 20 years or 25 years time. That is what we have to be concerned about because just as our technical abilities are increasing so are those of other regional powers. We have outlined in our paper two or three instances and two or three of the kinds of things we can see happening. It is those which concern us. We need lead times of eight years from decision to the first commissioning of a new destroyer.

CHAIRMAN - What do you see as the alternative to another 'Melbourne'? Many countries are now looking rather seriously at the lighter type of aircraft carrier such as those they are building in Italy and other countries. With three oceans to cover how do you feel about putting all our eggs in one basket? If we purchase a lighter aircraft carrier would we be forsaking something of solid strength for something of less importance? How do you see this?

Mr ARMITAGE - You have asked part of my intended question.

CHAIRMAN - If you care to develop it, we can both get the one answer.

Mr ARMITAGE - I would go one further than the Italian type of project which was displayed to the Sub-Committee some time ago. We also had evidence that instead of one aircraft carrier, which does put a lot of eggs in one basket - if that were lost we would have lost a very big proportion of our Defence Force - container platforms could be used. Instead of only one carrier we would have a number of container platforms on which the planes could land and be refuelled. How do you feel about that project as well as the smaller type of aircraft carrier?

Cmdr Evans - When we talk about a replacement for 'Melbourne', which is a fairly sophisticated carrier, we are not thinking of a ship of precisely the same capabilities but possibly a lighter carrier. One type of ship which interests us at present is the American landing platform for helicopters - the LPH. As a backup the container type of platform is well worth considering.

Senator BISHOP - As a substitute?

Cmdr Evans - Not as a substitute but additional, as a backup.

Mr ARMITAGE - It was put up to us as a substitute.

Cmdr Evans - No, I do not see it as a substitute at all. There are all sorts of problems in trying to convert a vessel.

Senator BISHOP - Admiral Peek, what do you think about choosing a lighter-----

Vice-Adm. Peek - That is what I have been arguing for. I specifically used the term 'seaborne aircraft platform' and I am thinking about the Italian, the French, the British or the American possibilities. The choice is obviously not one on which, after 10 years out of the Navy, I could make a rational judgment, but it is that type of ship with helicopters and vertical or short takeoff aircraft, not the catapult-operated, arrester-operated aircraft which 'Melbourne' has. I have heard it argued that we should be going for that but you are going for an enormous ship, enormously expensive with a very large crew

and there you really do have all your eggs in one basket. You probably have the whole Navy in one ship. This is, I believe, out of the question.

Mr ARMITAGE - In other words, to replace the present carrier with a similar type of project or similar type of ship would be placing too many eggs in one basket.

Vice-Adm. Peek - A similar type of ship does not exist. If we replaced the 'Melbourne' with a fixed wing capability, arresters and catapults, we would be going into a ship of 50,000 tonnes with a complement of 3,000 or 4,000, and such ships just do not exist.

Senator BISHOP - That is not your proposition, however, is it?

Vice-Adm. Peek - That is not the proposition at all.

Mr ARMITAGE - What about the container ship?

Vice-Adm. Peek - Like so many of these ideas it is very attractive in some ways but there are problems. One does not know whether it is going to work. What you can be certain of is that there will be large research and development costs. It certainly is not going to be as battle worthy as a ship which is designed as a naval ship. If the world ever gets into a conventional shooting war, the container ship is the sort of thing which America will start rolling off the slipways, one a week, like the liberty ships. It is a nice concept and a new concept, although it has been talked of for a few years, but I do not think it is the sort of basket into which we should put our eggs. I hope that is a reasonable explanation of my point of view.

Mr ARMITAGE - It is only your point of view, is it not?

Vice-Adm. Peek - Yes, I am not suggesting it is anything else.

Senator BISHOP - You spoke about trade routes and the security of shipping to and from Australia. You would know that this Committee on two occasions spoke about the need to keep a shipbuilding capacity within Australia, but I saw nothing in

your submission to emphasise the need to do that. A situation might develop whereby the security of Australian owned or overseas owned shipping is affected. What are your views about that aspect of our previous examination and report? Do you think that a shipbuilding capacity is essential?

Cmdr Grazebrook - We do not believe that it would be appropriate to build in Australia the small sea-borne air platform. However, we most certainly believe it is important that Australia has a shipbuilding capability for those types of ships and craft of which we are likely to require considerable numbers, such as patrol boats and underway replenishment ships, two of which are to be built in Australia. We believe the follow on destroyer should be built in Australia. Possibly, submarines are another type of craft which should be built in Australia. We certainly do support the maintenance of that capability.

Vice-Adm. Peek - I had the idea that you were asking about merchant shipbuilding.

Senator BISHOP - Yes, I was.

Cmdr Grazebrook - I think the League needs to give further consideration to merchant shipbuilding. It has attractions. In Australia there is some ability, of course, to build merchant shipping, but I think we would have to go into that a bit further.

Cmdr Evans - As a matter of fact, we have just set up a study group to look at the merchant shipping side of things.

Senator BISHOP - One of the things the Committee has had evidence on is Australia's shipbuilding capacity. Commander Grazebrook, I noticed that your statement, on the weekend or during last week, complained about supply problems, I think, to Williamstown and elsewhere. You said the problems were caused by the procurement section of the Department of Administrative Services and that projects were being held up by the bureaucracy. Does that represent what you said? What is the position? What do you know about this matter?

Cmdr Grazebrook - The information I collected related to shipbuilding and modernisation projects in government owned dockyards at Williamstown and Garden Island. I am informed by a wide cross-section of informants that the component parts required to build or modernise ships are not coming forward at the right time to ensure their availability for installation in ships. I am informed that there are a number of reasons for this but that the tendering procedure is the major contributory factor. I emphasise greatly the importance of fair tendering procedures, no one would question that there must be fair tendering procedures. But they should not be at the expense of the timely and economic arrival of the component parts. At the session to which that article refers, I gave two major examples of the consequences of this. The construction of the oceanographic ship 'Cook' was ordered in 1973 for completion in 1977. The ship will not be complete until at least September 1980. The modernisation of the destroyer escort 'Parramatta', which I think began in March 1977, and should not have taken two years, will not be completed until at least September 1981.

Senator BISHOP - Are you satisfied from the information you received, that that is because of the quality of the equipment and the specifications that apply to it or because of bungling?

Cmdr Grazebrook - I think it is due to inadequate procedure in collecting the information which the procurement people require; in calling tenders for it and providing potential manufacturers with details they need; in getting the quotations back; in studying them within the required time; in getting the orders out and then ensuring the material is delivered. I would like to emphasise to the Committee that when I say 'I think this', it is not me who thinks it, it is a summary of the views of people who are involved and who really do know what they are talking about.

Senator BISHOP - You mentioned generators. Which items?

Cmdr Grazebrook - Generators are one example. There are a number of examples. The 'Cook' was delayed by a further six months because electrical equipment did not arrive in time. Another example of what I mean in the tendering procedure is the manufacture of non-magnetic anchors for mine counter measures vessels. That is the only application in the world for which you need non-magnetic anchors. Making them is a very specialised skill and there are, I think, only two potential manufacturers in the Western world. Yet anybody who could do castings was invited to tender. Lots of them did and all those tenders had to be evaluated. This was costly and time consuming.

Senator BISHOP - We have had witnesses from the Department of Administrative Services before the Committee. Perhaps we could get them back again on that question.

CHAIRMAN - Following what Senator Bishop has said, have you had a chance to have a look at the report we tabled on procurement procedures?

Cmdr Evans - Yes, I have seen it.

CHAIRMAN - I do not know how closely you are associated with what has happened in the past, and with the current procedures. I only had one practical example and that was in the early part of last year when I was looking at the F18. People were commenting on that. Admittedly, they had a wheelbarrow to push. They said Australia's procurement procedures and general contracting techniques had been very remiss during past years, but

during that subsequent year they had been improved to a point where they compared with any procedures anywhere in the world. That was only the opinion of one particular organisation but they were very emphatic because it was at a semi Press conference and so they could be quoted on it. After all, they were looking at orders from Sweden and God knows where. We spent months and months and months taking evidence and finally submitting what we think is not a bad report on these procedures generally. What we want to know is this: Has there been an improvement in what was described as tedious and rather lumpy procedures? Do you know that? Have you an opportunity of gauging that?

Cmdr Grazebrook - It is possible. There may have been an improvement in some areas. However, I believe the ultimate measure is the result and in that context I have to point out that the completion of the modernisation of HMAS 'Parramatta' has just dropped back again by several months.

CHAIRMAN - I come from the north and there is one question I would like to ask. You mentioned on page 5 of your submission that facilities can either be bought and pre-positioned in peacetime, a fairly costly exercise, or moved in as a war need arises. You mention here the possibility of cyclone damage in the areas of which I am thinking. Could there not be a compromise there? For instance, if we were thinking of a rocket launcher, could not the bases be put up there now in strategic positions and then the more technical, sensitive equipment brought up at a later date? Could there not be a compromise in that very valid submission that you made in that second paragraph on page 5?

Cmdr Evans - Do you refer specifically to a rocket launcher?

CHAIRMAN - No, I meant that comment purely as an example. I mean the bulk of the equipment associated with more delicate equipment.

Senator BISHOP - Are you talking about the cyclone prone areas?

CHAIRMAN - I am talking about any areas really, but more about the cyclone prone areas. Could we be ready to some extent?

I constantly have in mind the core force concept. It is worrying because of this talk of a threat in five years. We used to talk about a threat in 17 years. Who can say? It could be five months. On that basis, could we not find a compromise somewhere?

Vice-Adm. Peek - I shall expand on the submission. We have not mentioned fuel for aircraft. It is my understanding that unless petroleum products are turned over, there is condensation. Tractor tanks have to be emptied from time to time. Fuel, which is really bulky, has to be turned over in peacetime if it is stored at remote, partly developed defence sites. I believe - I think quite properly - that people cannot fly modern aeroplanes without comfortable and, in tropical climates, air conditioned accommodation because they must have their proper rest. I am not being at all anti-Air Force in this comment. It is an absolute requirement in a bad climate that they should have these comforts.

Mr ARMITAGE - Is it not happening?

Vice-Adm. Peek - I do not know if it is happening. Imagine two or three aerodromes on the west and north-west coast with unoccupied, air conditioned buildings. Those buildings either fall apart or maintenance personnel have to be stationed there.

Senator BISHOP - Whatever we do with the airstrips themselves, if modern aircraft are to be used on them they have to be equipped with the most effective accommodation and technical maintenance.

Vice-Adm. Peek - Technical maintenance is the third point. There is a fourth point. They must have radar and control mechanisms. It is possible to get mobile control outfits, but they are mobile only in the sense that they might take a month to set up. To answer your question specifically, I think again it is a concept at which we should try to aim, but there are many, many problems. One problem that I have not mentioned is that if a permanent force of people is to be maintained there they have to have special conditions of service. At North West Cape our people get extra allowances. There are problems with wives and families in these areas in peacetime. It certainly is a problem that should be looked at. I imagine the Department of Defence is looking at it.

CHAIRMAN - Are you satisfied with the facilities provided and planned for the Royal Australian Navy at Cockburn Sound?

Vice-Adm. Peek - I could not answer that question. I am not up to date.

Cmdr Evans - What was the question?

CHAIRMAN - These facilities receive so much publicity. Is the provision and planning for Cockburn Sound adequate?

Cmdr Evans - It is adequate for the immediate purpose of allowing ships which are up to a destroyer or frigate size to have short maintenance periods. It is not a suitable place from which a substantial force of ships could operate at present. The facilities are fairly limited, but those that are there are very good.

CHAIRMAN - What about future planning?

Cmdr Evans - As you say, there has been a lot of publicity about the possibility of United States forces operating from there. I think there would be no objection to the Americans using the facilities in Australia for recreational purposes as they did during the Vietnam War. We cannot see the Americans wanting a home port for carrier forces there. This would be a very big exercise. They would have to bring the families out to live in this country. This is not done lightly. We were discussing this last night. As you said, if the Americans want to rest a ship there for a short period they are more likely to fly the wives out and house them in the Hilton or the Parmelia. This is also home porting. There are degrees of it.

Senator BISHOP - Leaving that aside, I understand the Americans have said they do not want to use it for home porting.

Cmdr Evans - No.

Senator BISHOP - Is it a satisfactory establishment for the current strategic position?

Cmdr Evans - Yes, as far as the RAN is concerned.

Senator BISHOP - Are you recommending any expansion or changes?

Cmdr Evans - No, we see no reason for doing so.

CHAIRMAN - It has been suggested that there is a great need for fast missile armoured patrol craft in the RAN. Would you like to comment on that?

Cmdr Grazebrook - Admiral Peek would be far better qualified than I to comment on this. The first point about acquiring any new craft is that it must be suitable to meet the threats we expect to encounter. In the view of the League the type of threat that would justify a missile armoured fast attack craft is not very likely to be faced by Australia. The second point about them is that they have a limited range and we are concerned with very great distances. The third point is that they are vulnerable to air attack. There could be a need for them if there were a threat of major invasion and so forth. We in the League do not see them as high priority items which should be acquired.

CHAIRMAN - You talk about vulnerability to air attack. Could we not look at that in another way? Highly sophisticated, laser-type weapons are being perfected every day. If we are going to have very limited resources then we will have to look at the new generation of weapons. If those patrol boats tearing around the coastline were armed very effectively, not only to defend themselves but to seek out enemy fighters or bombers or whatever then surely this whole galaxy of new generation weapons would include some homing device such as a smaller version of the Red Eye missile? Can you comment on that?

Cmdr Grazebrook - As far as I know, fast attack craft have not been armed with effective anti-aircraft weapons. As far as I know there are no plans to do that. The size of the fast attack craft limits the options very considerably. You can take off your surface-to-surface guided weapons but that rather defeats the purpose of the fast attack craft.

Mr ARMITAGE - There is a question raised here on the Australian Government's intelligence service. Do you consider it satisfactory?

Vice-Adm. Peek - I do not quite follow the question.

Mr ARMITAGE - The question concerns the Australian Government's intelligence service, and of course we are talking of this as far as the defence services are concerned. Do you consider it satisfactory? There has been quite a bit of controversy on the issue.

Vice-Adm. Peek - I am out of date on the whole thing but, purely from reading Press reports and so on, I have a feeling there may be a bit of duplication. I am speculating rather than giving evidence but I feel the Office of National Assessments was grafted on top of existing intelligence organisations and I am doubtful whether such an organisation was necessary. But as I say, I am speculating rather than giving evidence.

Cmdr Evans - There is no reason to think that the Services' intelligence is anything other than fairly efficient.

Cmdr Grazebrook - I do not think I would like to comment.

Senator BISHOP - That is an opinion. Have you examined the issue enough to justify the comment that it is not necessary?

Vice-Adm. Peek - No.

Mr ARMITAGE - Let us go back to the discussions earlier on the question of the TFF project versus the aircraft carrier project. I assume, from the way you carried on afterwards, that you do not want to make it a question of one versus the other. Would you say that a sophisticated tactical fighter force such as has been proposed, for example, the F18 and the F16, is an unaffordable asset in Australia's strategic environment? To put it another way, in view of your concern about the need for an effective carrier force, does it become an unaffordable asset in view of the resources available?

Cmdr Evans - To give a personal opinion, I think it would be a very brave government which decided not to replace the Mirage fighter. One does not know what is going to happen in 10, 15 or 20 years' time, by which time the Mirage will be out of date. I think it would be a very brave government indeed which is not seriously thinking of doing this. Again, speaking on a purely personal basis, I think that if the Mirage is to be replaced, the reasons why we need 75 of them are not for us to say. However, one reads a good deal about the problems the F18 project is running into. The F16, the Hornet, is in service, I notice. This would seem to be perhaps the more attractive. This is expressing a purely personal view.

I think it is very much a political question but under no circumstances should it be seen as a replacement for maritime air power.

Mr ARMITAGE - You realise that the Mirage today, particularly in tropical conditions, is becoming quite an old aircraft. Even when it is phased out it will be about 27 years or 30 years old. If we are talking of a TFF project we are talking of an aircraft which will have to last us 30 years or 40 years. That is what it amounts to. Forgetting the political aspects and looking at it purely from the point of view of military considerations, do you think we could afford to phase out the Mirage - it will have to be phased out simply because of stress and wear - and not replace it on purely military grounds?

Cmdr Grazebrook - Again we have said it is not the role of the League to express views, so this is now a personal view and not the Navy League's view. I agree with Commander Evans that it would be an unwise government which did not give very serious consideration to replacing the Mirage.

Mr ARMITAGE - On political or on military grounds?

Cmdr Grazebrook - I am talking wholly on military grounds. I think that, as with the carrier, when you are considering replacing the TFF you have to look 10 years, 15 years or more years ahead. I do not think we can be so sure of the position 10 or 15 years ahead as to be able to say now that we can do without a tactical fighter force. The League's case is that the tactical fighter force cannot do the maritime job. It is not that it is not necessary or it cannot do the job of defending our cities. That is another matter altogether.

Mr ARMITAGE - It was mentioned earlier that you are not too sure about the 75 aircraft. Keep in mind that we have three effective operational squadrons at present and that some wastage must take place. Three squadrons is 57 aircraft alone. If we got 75 aircraft we would have only 18 spares for the future. Do you still maintain that should not be so, that it is too large a number?

Cmdr Evans - This is not really for the League to judge. One must leave this to the people in Defence, I think. I sometimes wonder why there is the magic number - why there should be 75.

Cmdr Grazebrook - We do not express an opinion as to whether 75 is the right number or not. We do not know what operational availability you will get from the F18 compared with that from the Mirage and other factors, so we do not have a view.

CHAIRMAN - Do you ever think of reducing that number to the advantage of maritime aircraft?

Vice-Adm. Peek - I have never thought specifically of reducing the number. As Mr Armitage says, the numbers are worked out by the experts who advise government and government decides. I do not query the number, but I do say how much I agree with the personal views of Commander Evans and Commander Grazebrook about there being no question of not having a replacement for the Mirage. I do not agree, however, that it is a question of affording it. If you want an insurance policy you have to pay what the going rate is. Similarly I do not believe the country has to choose between affording a replacement for the Mirage and affording one for the 'Melbourne'. We have tried to make it clear we think that the two projects are quite separate and if it became a question of the Government saying we can only afford one or another - which God forbid - I think the League might then step in and have some views.

Mr NEIL - I can see the argument that one carrier is essential for the core force concept. This Committee has suggested that we move more to the force-in-being doctrine because of the changed circumstances. What is the minimum number of carriers we would require if we decided to purchase a replacement carrier - or carriers? What is the minimum number required for a force-in-being system to cater for times when your carrier is in refitment or during other contingencies?

Cmdr Evans - Sooner or later Australia must have a two-ocean Navy and so two carriers are needed to start with.

Mr NEIL - Will two carriers adequately provide for a two-ocean Navy?

Cmdr Grazebrook - The improved quality of intelligence which will become available, for technological reasons, over the period to which we are looking forward will mean more notice and more knowledge of the enemies' actions and of enemies' options. Bearing that in mind, one carrier will go a good deal further than it has. Two carriers will also go further than two carriers would have done in the past. You have to consider also whether or not we would be operating in conjunction with allies. If we were operating with the United States, for example, it would perhaps have a carrier and we would have a carrier and between us we have two and there would be one on station all the time.

Mr NEIL - What do you do if you have one in refit and one in the East and a failure of intelligence or something happens in the West?

Vice-Adm. Peek - Five days later your carrier is in the West - this is the short answer. There is an inherent mobility.

Mr NEIL - What would happen if your carrier in the East is near Hawaii and the problems arise near Cocos Islands?

Vice-Adm. Peek - That would take eight days.

Mr NEIL - Why do you not want three?

Cmdr Evans - The essential point, at the moment, is to get one to keep the skills alive.

Mr ARMITAGE - With tax up so much-----

Mr NEIL - I am asking about the strictly military, correct appreciation of a minimum carrier force for a force-in-being to handle either likely or even unexpected contingencies involving a maritime response over the next 20 to 25 years. In advising the Government on military grounds, what advice would be given on a minimum number?

Cmdr Evans - Obviously the person to answer that is the former Chief of Naval Staff.

Vice-Adm. Peek - That is a pretty nasty one. The Government would be advised by its proper advisers. If I were advising them I would say that they should be aiming for a minimum of two which would ensure that there would always be one on station. Part of

the reason for the Navy's very extensive refitting programs is to build in some fat so that, faced with an emergency, you can go on operating much longer than you could otherwise. In a refit you go about it in a way which you would not do as a motorist.

You pull things to bits to make sure that nothing is going wrong rather than waiting for it to go wrong. The whole process of naval refitting builds in fat so that, when the moment of emergency comes, you have your second one in the time it takes to close up any of the machine being examined. It would take a week, four days or five days - that would be the time range. If I were advising the Government, I would say you should be aiming in the long term to have a minimum of two.

Mr NEIL - I take the view that a responsible Government must plan for achieving air superiority and only, at best, accept air parity over the potential battle field - whether it is the land or the fleet. What is the air superiority capability of the Harrier combined with the systems with which it would operate in circumstances without allied forces?

Cmdr Grazebrook - With respect, the League would disagree with your view that we would have to establish air superiority over the fleet. Having said that, our view is that we must have air power to keep, say, air to surface missile armed hostile aircraft out of range of the fleet or out of range of our merchant ships. The sea Harrier is very capable of doing just that and further generations of this craft are coming out.

Mr NEIL - Of what are they capable?

Cmdr Grazebrook - They can keep the types of hostile strike aircraft which we are likely to encounter in our region at a safe distance from our fleet - in other words, far enough away so that they could not launch missiles of the harpoon type.

Mr NEIL - Would you define that as having achieved air parity inthe region of the fleet?

Cmdr Grazebrook - I would define that as having achieved a viable satisfactory air defence.

Mr NEIL - You would not consciously send the fleet into an environment without that type of capability, would you?

Cmdr Grazebrook - Do you mean without a satisfactory air defence?

Mr NEIL - Yes.

Cmdr Grazebrook - No, we would not.

Mr NEIL - Did you say that you do not favour the construction of a carrier in Australia?

Cmdr Grazebrook - We believe that the further development of naval ship building resources in Australia is an important task and that those resources should be developed for the construction, in particular, and the repair of ships of which a fair number will be required - destroyers, patrol boats, replenishment ships et cetera. The carrier which would be a once-off or, at the most, a two-off type would be better built overseas. I have asked a number of senior technical people in the ship building industry about this and that is their view. At Vickers Cockatoo Dockyard Pty Limited in Sydney, for example, you would need to build up the labour and construction capabilities quite considerably to build one carrier - and then what would you do with them after you had done that?

Mr NEIL - This is one of your problems, is it not? I take the view that it is totally unsatisfactory and, in fact, almost a national disgrace that we cannot design this type of ship in this country. We are looking at designs from overseas because we have lost design capability. That is a historical fact. How is the chicken and egg problem to be solved? If we do not get on with this kind of job we will never have the capability to build in the case where we have to build in the future. Surely it is not impossible to build in Australia the type of carrier which the Spaniards or the Italians or the Americans can build, is it?

Cmdr Grazebrook - It is ultimately possible if we are prepared to put enough resources into it - resources of design, construction and labour. We drew the attention of this Committee at the hearing in December 1978 to our concerns about the lack of design capability in Australia. However, such a capability could not be developed to design an aircraft carrier within the time left to us to have a replacement aircraft carrier available.

Mr NEIL - I accept that as regrettably inevitable. But if we do take an overseas design, is there any impediment of a

substantial nature that could not be overcome, given the allocation of finance to enable us to build the carrier or carriers in this country?

Cmdr Evans - No, I do not think there is any real impediment.

Cmdr Grazebrook - We have people who are pretty bright. Given the time and very substantial sums of money it could be done. We certainly do not have the time and whether that is the best employment for the substantial sums of money is another question.

Cmdr Evans - You are touching on an extremely important point. It is a long time since Williamstown has built a major ship and there has been a tremendous wastage of design skill from the yard. This is due to past lack of attention or lack of foresight - whether in government or Defence I do not know. At Williamstown a good deal of money is being spent to build ships which we will need fairly soon. There will be a follow-on destroyer and the natural thing is to look to those ships we are getting from the United States. The FFG7 is the pattern ship. In other words, we will build the FFG7 here, simply because we do not have the time to build up the skills and the technical ability Commander Grazebrook mentioned. But there is a qualification. Williamstown is a very restless yard industrially. We have already discussed the delays - some due to procurement problems, others to industrial trouble - in refitting the ships.

Senator BISHOP - Some would be due no doubt to continuity of loading?

Cmdr Evans - We suggested in a paper on the dockyards that it is quite likely that given continuity of work there would be a different atmosphere at Williamstown.

CHAIRMAN - Yes.

Mr ARMITAGE - It would protect their jobs.

Senator BISHOP - But you are not against building in Australia. It is simply that you want this one soon and it would be quicker to get it overseas.

Cmdr Evans - If we are to build more FFG7s there is a tremendous advantage in commonality of training, equipment,

design and so on. Frankly I would have liked to see us build and design our own ship for our own purposes. That would be the ultimate; we should have done it.

Mr NEIL - What is more difficult - to design and build aircraft carriers or to design and build submarines? We have given Vickers some assistance to assess whether that company could build the new generation of submarines. That would be a pretty complicated job, would it not? I would have thought that if we can do that in Australia we could do a carrier.

Cmdr Evans - Williamstown cannot take a carrier. The only yards that could take a carrier would be Vickers and probably Whyalla. But Whyalla no longer exists so we are really back to Vickers.

Cmdr Grazebrook - I did check out this. If one checks the dimensions of the AOE which was to be built at Vickers against the dimensions of the Garibaldi type from Italy, the answer would be yes. Vickers could do it.

Mr NEIL - We have all assumed a move to a smaller carrier and to vertical and short takeoff and landing, and I think there is a great deal to be said for that. Is the concept of fixed wing, however, completely out for a relatively small carrier? The 'Melbourne' weighs 15,000 tonnes or 16,000 tonnes, does it not?

Cmdr Evans - It is 20,000 tonnes.

Mr NEIL - It is smaller than one tends to imagine yet it takes substantial fixed wing aircraft. The Americans would call that very small for a carrier, I would have thought.

Cmdr Evans - It is, by American standards.

Mr NEIL - Is this option completely out for a small carrier?

Vice-Adm. Peek - It is out because there are no aircraft to operate from such a small carrier. In operating the Skyhawks in particular and to a lesser extent the Trackers, the 'Melbourne' is operating at the absolute limit of her equipment. One does not want to think about aircraft accidents on the deck, but the captain of the 'Melbourne' operating Skyhawks and Trackers has this possibility in his mind all the time because he is right at

the limit of his equipment. Moreover there is not another generation of aircraft like the Skyhawks available. The Americans go in for big carriers, heavy aircraft, much higher performance, higher landing speeds and higher takeoff speeds. You could build a carrier like the 'Melbourne' to operate fixed wing aircraft but there would not be any fixed wing aircraft to operate from it.

Mr NEIL - I am reasonably satisfied to accept that but I wanted to confirm the point.

Cmdr Grazebrook - It is also a matter of looking ahead. We can see, looking ahead, further generations of Sea Harriers and improved VSTOL aircraft but we cannot see improved A4s and S2s capable of operating from a ship of that size.

Mr NEIL - What do we do to replace the Tracker capability in the smaller type of aircraft carrier? Do we not suffer some problems if we cannot replace the Tracker type capability?

Vice-Adm. Peek - We lose a certain amount of reconnaissance capability. We lose a certain amount of the anti-submarine capability, but with improved sonars from the helicopters we do not lose very much anti-submarine capability. Certainly we lose some reconnaissance capability by not having the Trackers.

Mr NEIL - Is it lost without an optional form of replacement? Is there any capability to make up the difference?

Vice-Adm. Peek - I know of none.

Cmdr Grazebrook - At this stage there is not. To do that you would need a VSTOL anti-submarine aircraft and there is not one in existence. If the United States goes ahead with its development program for the VSTOL type B, however, and if that program is successful, then later in the ship's life there will be a VSTOL fixed wing anti-submarine aircraft.

Mr NEIL - In military terms how important is the loss of that amount of Tracker capability, considering warning time, vulnerability and similar factors? From the point of view of the captain of the ship or the admiral, what has he lost?

Vice-Adm. Peek - I may not be up to date enough to answer that properly, but with the improvements in various electronic devices I do not think it is a very important reduction in capability.

Cmdr Grazebrook - The Sea Harrier will have a reconnaissance capability, but just what that is, we do not know.

Vice Adm. Peek - Talking about ship building, I would like to put in a plug for what I hope will come out of this Committee. The points made about the slowing of the hammers, the industrialised unrest and the management thing are all perfectly valid, but the important one is the slowing of the hammers when there is no program. I do hope that one of the results of this bipartisan committee is a bipartisan approach to naval ship building: When the decision is made, it goes ahead. This will make all the difference in the world to Williamstown dockyard. If the people there know they have a continuing program management is in the position to say: 'You have a continuing program; stop belly-aching'.

CHAIRMAN - The sort of muscle given in evidence to this Committee by people like yourself will also assist the Committee to achieve that objective. Be assured of that. Before we finish this segment of our hearing, we should incorporate in the transcript of evidence the answers on surveillance given last year. There being no objection, it is so ordered.

(The document read as follows) -

FA&D Sub-Committee on Defence Matters:
Navy League of Australia
Answers to Questions on Coastal Surveillance

FEBRUARY 1979

1. Before attempting to reply to the Sub-Committee's questions on surveillance and related matters, the Navy League considers it desirable to define the subject on which we are offering our comments.

2. As we understand, the task is to detect incursions into Australia's sea, land and air spaces and if we disapprove of a particular incursion, to be able to do something about it.

3. In this regard various proposals have been put forward and at the moment the Minister for Transport and his Department have authority to co-ordinate the activities of several Federal Departments and to extend existing surveillance facilities using civilian equipment when appropriate.

4. Among the proposals put forward is one to establish a 'separate' Coast Guard; by this we assume the proposers envisage an organisation which would have responsibilities now spread among several authorities. We assume this but cannot be sure as we have not seen the details of the proposed new organisation spelled out, e.g., the responsibilities to be transferred or given to the organisation, the Minister who would ultimately be responsible, etc.

5. A number of countries maintain Coast Guards and they vary greatly in size and in the range of their responsibilities. Far and away the largest Coast Guard and the one providing the most comprehensive services, is that of the United States. The USCG is often suggested as a model for an Australian Coast Guard and we wish to comment upon this suggestion before going any further.

6. On the surface there is some merit in the idea of an Australian organisation patterned on the USCG. Continental USA and Australia have a similar length of coast-line; a Federal system of government with numerous Federal, State and local authorities with responsibilities which often impinge one upon the other; and similar civil (as opposed to military) incursion problems. Here we believe the similarities end and that the very much larger population and greater wealth of the United States enable that country to provide a specialised para-military maritime service in addition to military forces which Australia could not possibly afford to do, nor indeed does any other country attempt to do on such a scale.

7. It should not be implied from the foregoing that <u>some</u> of the functions of the USCG could not be performed in Australia and reference to this will be made in the answer to the Sub-Committee's Question 7.

8. We believe therefore we are discussing the possibilities of:-

(a) Continuing with the present arrangements, with the Department of Transport acting largely as a co-ordinator;

(b) Forming a Coast Guard with limited responsibilities;

(c) Augmenting the equipment of the Armed Forces, thus increasing the responsibilities of the Department of Defence;

the object being to determine the most cost/effective way of finding out who or what is coming our way and having the capability to cope with whatever situation develops.

Q1. Do you have any disagreement with the present arrangements for coastal surveillance operating through the Australian Coastal Surveillance Centre under the Minister for Transport?

A. The Navy League has for some time past believed there was a need to co-ordinate coastal surveillance activities and considers the present arrangements satisfactory as a temporary measure.

The League however does not believe military and civil surveillance can be regarded as separate functions. Military surveillance is clearly a more sophisticated activity and may well be carried out a very long way from Australian coastal waters but it certainly does not exclude them. Incursions into our sea and air space (particularly the latter) may happen very quickly and require a rapid response. The facilities and trained personnel to detect incursions and determine the form of response are more likely to be available in Defence than in a civil Department - they should be already there for military purposes, and can be supplemented for civil use.

The League therefore considers responsibility for both the 'watching process' and the 'reaction decision' lies with Defence and not Transport.

Q2. What is your opinion of the usefulness of satellites in surveillance?

A. The League doubts that surveillance of our sea approaches by satellite would be a cost-effective activity at

the present time if carried out by Australia alone. It is for consideration whether local surveillance could become part of a larger ANZUS operation as technology improves, with Australia/New Zealand perhaps contributing to American facilities.

We envisage a much earlier use of satellites for communication and navigation purposes, both essential parts of the surveillance function.

The League also considers it important to press on with the development of over-the-horizon radar, from which it would seem more immediate benefits are likely to be obtained.

Q3. Do you agree that the main problems in civil coastal surveillance lie in the four areas of; fisheries control, prevention of drug smuggling, detection of unauthorised and illegal immigration, and quarantine? Do you see the problems in these areas increasing in magnitude?

A. 'Yes' to both questions. We suggest the term 'fisheries control' be replaced by 'resources control' as without doubt the sea and sea-bed as a source of food and energy are becoming increasingly important to all countries.

With regard to fisheries supervision we note that some countries, including Canada and New Zealand, have introduced measures to make supervision easier; the latter for instance requires licensed countries, among other things, to:-

- Have identification marks painted in large letters on top of the bridge and on the sides;
- Call at a New Zealand port before commencing to fish (for inspection of nets, gear etc.) and on completion for inspection of the catch;
- Embark a fisheries inspector in mother ships to inspect and check weight of catch transferred.

It would seem sensible for Australia, New Zealand and our immediate neighbours to have identical requirements in matters such as those mentioned, both to ease their own supervision problems and to simplify the measures foreign fishing fleets would have to take when visiting our region. The League suggests this is a matter requiring the early attention of the Sub-Committee.

Q4. What do you consider the role of State Police Forces to be in civil coastal surveillance?

A. The role and value of State Police Forces will obviously vary in different parts of Australia. We see a continuing need for police to report "unusual happenings" to defence authorities, but we would not expect Police Forces to be increased for this particular purpose.

Q5. Does your information lead you to believe that the present Defence Force commitment to civil surveillance is having a harmful effect on anti-submarine warfare training and on the Force's capability for other kinds of military surveillance?

A. No, not seriously so far. However if our relatively small number of ships and aircraft is constantly scattered on civil patrol duties it is inevitable that training for their specialised military role will suffer.

Q6. Do you think the Defence Force should be equipped with boats and aircraft specifically designed to meet the needs of civil surveillance, instead of, as at present, simply using equipment already procured for purely military purposes?

A. Yes. As previously stated the League firmly believes surveillance is essentially a Defence function, but it is very wasteful to use expensive units of the Navy and Air Force in tasks which could be performed quite as well by less costly equipment.

We see a gap between the Navy's high-capability destroyers and frigates in service or on order, and patrol boats which have a limited endurance. Similarly we see a gap between the Orions operated by the RAAF and aircraft such as the Nomad which as a locally built product is clearly a contender for surveillance duties, but like the patrol boat has limits to its capacity for sustained off-shore work. Both of course have a place in the inventory.

While choice of equipment is a matter for professional advice, we have noted the recently formed (1977) Norwegian Coast Guard, a part of that country's Ministry of Defence, has on order several vessels of a type which should be of interest to Australia and would fill the gap to which we have referred. For the record, these vessels (or "cutters" in Coast Guard parlance) displace about 2,700 tonnes, have a range of 7,500 miles at 15 knots and 1,650 miles at 22-23 knots, and are manned in peacetime by about 45 officers and sailors. They carry a helicopter and are designed for easy conversion to naval use in wartime.

We envisage that all cutters and aircraft acquired for Coast Guard duties in Australia would be built locally and be suitable for wartime use. We would also expect a number of the vessels to provide sea-training billets for naval personnel; these are currently in short supply due to the small-complement type of ship now in service in all but the major navies.

Q7. What are your arguments against establishing a separate Coast Guard?

A. The League does not oppose the formation of a Coast Guard; it opposes the establishment of a separate surveillance/reaction organisation under any name outside the Defence Department. Our opposition is based largely on economic grounds although we do see practical difficulties as well.

Without going into the question of precisely what responsibilities an Australian Coast Guard would have, to perform only the surveillance/reaction task more or less independently of the Armed Forces the Coast Guard would require vessels ranging from patrol boat to destroyer-escort/frigate size, aircraft of good endurance, and shore-based equipment and facilities. If this force was operated, let us say by the Department of Transport, we would in effect have a small "civil" navy and air force and a medium-size "military" navy and air force each with it's own infrastructure. Bearing in mind our small population and limited financial resources we do not believe such an arrangement would be economically or administratively sound. We will not dwell on the inevitable competition for funds between Transport and Defence.

In practical terms it is inconceivable that a DoT Coast Guard would operate independently of Defence and it's facilities; it is therefore not difficult to foresee complicated lines of command and complex administrative arrangements between the two departments. In this regard the Commandant of the USCG, Admiral John B. Hayes, recently commented on the amount of staff work required to ensure a satisfactory working relationship between his command and the numerous Federal and other agencies with maritime interests of one kind or another (the USCG operates in the US Transportation Department in peacetime and in Defence in war).

The Navy League sees merit in the formation of a Coast Guard with limited responsibilities in Defence operating either:-

(a) Along the lines of the Natural Disasters Organisation, i.e. as a largely co-ordinating authority, using a

variety of equipment including cutters and aircraft manned by specially enlisted personnel who would also be members of the Reserve Forces;

(b) As an additional arm of the Defence Forces, again a co-ordinating authority but with all personnel being members of the regular forces.

We believe responsibilities of the Coast Guard in either case would include:-

- General supervision of the Australian EEZ.
- Fisheries supervision.
- Oil rig protection.
- Search & Rescue operations.
- Aid to customs and immigration authorities.
  and possibly
- Oil pollution detection and transport of clearing materials to the site of a spill.

The Navy League recognizes reservations in some parts of the Defence Department concerning the relationship between the Armed Forces and the Civil Power: However we do not believe these are such as to be irreconcilable and we consider it only commonsense in Australia's circumstances to augment our existing military forces with appropriate equipment and to operate it from the Defence Department where all the back-up facilities are available.

27/2/79

Cmdr Evans - I was looking last night at a speech made by the Chief of the Defence Force Staff, Admiral Synnot, at the ANU on Thursday. I think these words are very relevant. He said:

> In any case it is worth remembering that it is better to deter war rather than to plan on winning it after it has started.

I think we subscribe to this.

CHAIRMAN - A very worthy quotation. If you feel at a later date you would like to submit something further, just drop us a note. I do not guarantee it will go into the report later, but it would help us in future considerations. Thank you, gentlemen, for a very productive session.

Mr Arthur Darcy McGAURR, Director of Cabinet Office, Premier's Department, Hobart, Tasmania, and

Mr Gayle Francis PALTRIDGE, Director of Emergency Services and State Fire Commissioner, Premier's Department, Hobart, Tasmania,

were sworn and examined.

CHAIRMAN - I welcome you both and ask you to extend the thanks of the Committee to your Government. It is not easy to come across to the mainland and we appreciate the effort you have made. You will not be asked to comment on the reasons for certain policy decisions or the advice you may have tendered in the formulation of policy. You may at any time ask that your evidence or part of your evidence or answers to specific questions be given in camera when matters of public interest are involved. The Sub-Committee will give full consideration to any such request. The Sub-Committee has before it a document from you which is our submission No. 22. Do you wish to make any alterations or additions to the document?

Mr Paltridge - No.

CHAIRMAN - Is it the wish of the Sub-Committee that the document be incorporated in the record of proceedings? There being no objection, it is so ordered.

(The document read as follows) -

SUBMISSION BY THE TASMANIAN GOVERNMENT ON ASSISTANCE BY THE ARMED SERVICES TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES

AUGUST 1979

INTRODUCTION

The Armed Forces do not have a permanent unit based in Tasmania. In total, fewer than 250 people are deployed throughout the State. Despite the small direct involvement of the Defence Forces in Tasmania, there is a long history of co-operation between State authorities and the Defence Forces.

That spirit of co-operation, however, has of necessity, found its fullest expression in the provision of assistance for less immediate State needs - when the course of events has allowed time for personnel and equipment to be transported from the mainland to Tasmania.

The State has received less assistance from the Armed Forces where there was an urgent or immediate need for such assistance.

Assistance for Non-Urgent Needs

The State has fared well with the provision of assistance where the sequence of events giving rise to that need has been less immediate and more predictable.

In the past the Armed Forces have provided assistance at a number of State ceremonial occasions, including Royal visits, visits of Governors -General, Openings of Parliament and State funerals.

Although the Armed Forces were also involved in the Military Tattoos held in Hobart in 1976 and 1977, the cost of providing assistance to Tasmania was greater than if the same assistance had been provided to other States because of the need to transport personnel and equipment from interstate.

The State Government suspects that the high cost of assistance to Tasmania is part of the reason for a reduction in the level of assistance in recent years. In line with the Federal Government's commitment to reduce spending, it would appear that the procedure for granting requests for assistance has been changed. Previously, most requests were processed locally, now most are done through Canberra and fewer appear to be granted. Such a policy could well fall more harshly on Tasmania than on other States.

During the 1967 bush fires, the State received the full co-operation of all three Armed Services. Support by the Army included assistance in the transport of fire fighters and materials, the provision of administrative support, and the provision of welfare accommodation at Brighton Camp for victims of the fires. RAAF aircraft also made a number of flights to Tasmania with blankets and other provisions.

This major commitment by the Armed Forces was made possible at that time because quite by coincidence, most Army Reserve units were in camp. Other Reserves were also mobilised to provide assistance, although no such authorisation is provided for in the Defence Act.

Following the collapse of the Tasman Bridge in 1975, the Army supplied landing craft and crew for transporting the sick and injured from the Eastern Shore to hospital facilities on the Western side of the Derwent River.

The Army later erected a temporary Bailey bridge which was used by motorists travelling between the Western and Eastern shores of the Derwent. The bridge is still in use.

The Citizen Military Forces (CMF) have provided assistance with transport to remote areas of the State on a number of occasions. The RAAF has also provided assistance to the Police Department in searches for missing ships in Tasmanian waters.

The Commissioner of Police believes that his Department has received every co-operation and courtesy whenever the assistance of the Armed Forces has been sought.

However, the capacity of the Armed Forces to provide immediate and urgently needed assistance to civil authorities is severely limited because of the lack of a permanent defence unit in the State.

Assistance for Immediate Needs

In the event of a large scale natural disaster, or in other situations where urgent assistance is required, the State is not well catered for. The level of assistance available in these situations is very low because insufficient defence force personnel and equipment are permanently stationed in Tasmania.

Such permanent defence personnel as there are in the State number less than 250 and are spread throughout the State. In the main, they provide training and administrative support for Defence Force Reserve units.

In this respect, the Callaghan Report notes that "...Tasmania has relatively less defence expenditure and training activities than other States". (1) Present plans to involve the Services in combating large scale natural disasters have to take account of relatively long delays in moving personnel and equipment to Tasmamia from the mainland.

(1) Inquiry into the Structure of Industry and the Employment Situation in Tasmania. Report by Sir Bede Callaghan, CBE.

Unless provision is made to call up Defence Reserves in the case of a natural disaster, only limited assistance from Defence Forces could be expected in such a situation.

Although Reserve units were mobilised at the time of the 1967 bush fires, such action was taken without the official sanction of the Defence Act. The State Government believes that amending legislation should be passed by the Federal Parliament to authorise the use of Reserve units at the time of natural disasters.

Defence Forces communications within Tasmania are also limited; put simply, the Army does not have the radio equipment available within the State to provide a reasonable standard of communication in an emergency.

Naval representation in Tasmania is limited to twenty-two permanent personnel, one training vessel and a forty-two foot auxiliary work boat. No RAAF aircraft are based in the State.

The State Government strongly supports the establishment of a permanent Army battalion in Tasmania and notes that this would be in line with the Federal Government's previous commitment (since rescinded) to increase defence employment in the State.

Although the need for Armed Services assistance in coastal surveillance is not always as urgent as in the case of a natural disaster, proper control of Tasmania's coastal areas requires regular and frequent air and sea surveillance. Where unauthorised foreign vessels are sighted in coastal waters, quick apprehension by personnel with appropriate powers of arrest is essential.

The current programme of surveillance is co-ordinated by the Australian Coastal Surveillance Centre. The present level of surveillance is regarded as inadequate. In part, this is due to the refusal of the Commonwealth Government to devote sufficient resources to the task; it is due also to a failure on the part of the Commonwealth to take advantage of local knowledge and expertise in planning a surveillance programme. For example, while ninety per cent of squid fishing takes place at night, there is a complete lack of night surveillance around Tasmania.

Currently, the RAAF mounts two sorties around the State every month, and the RAN undertakes patrols once every two or three months. For one reason or another, many of the scheduled RAAF flights do not take place, and even when they do, many foreign vessels known to be fishing lawfully in Tasmanian waters do not appear to be sighted.

Lack of any real co-ordination of sea and air patrols, and the lack of any input from local fishermen and fisheries authorities, seriously reduces the effectiveness of even these few patrols.

The Chairman of the Tasmanian Fisheries Development Authority reports that there have been a number of occasions on which naval vessels have been unavailable to assist any investigation of reported sightings of illegal vessels.

In March 1975, a squid fishing vessel was sighted off Tasmania's east coast. At the time, naval vessels were unavailable to assist with investigation.

In November 1978, two large foreign fishing vessels were reported trawling on the north west coast of Tasmania. Reports to the Australian Coastal Surveillance Centre and to the Commonwealth Department of Primary Industry invoked little response.

These two examples indicate the delays, and sometimes complete lack of action, in responding to sightings of foreign vessels in Tasmanian waters.

Attention is drawn to Appendix 1 of this submission, which details the case for increased coastal surveillance of Tasmania. This information was presented by the Tasmanian Government to the Commonwealth in October 1978.

Since that submission was prepared, substantial progress has been made in negotiating with foreign countries on a number of joint fishing ventures. These are likely to involve areas of the southern ocean near Macquarie Island and the South Tasmanian rise.

Although it could be argued that the use of local fishing vessels and merchant vessels provides some secondary surveillance of coastal areas close to Tasmania, clearly this is not true of areas such as Macquarie Island and the South Tasmanian rise. These areas can only be satisfactorily patrolled with assistance from the Armed Forces.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Commonwealth Government should act immediately to set up a permanent Armed Forces Battalion in Tasmania. This recommendation is in line with a previous commitment made by the Commonwealth Government to increase Defence employment in Tasmania. That commitment has since been rescinded.

2. The Commonwealth Government should take immediate steps to change the Defence Act to allow for mobilisation of Defence Force Reserves in case of natural disasters.

3. In line with a previous submission by the Tasmanian Government to the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth should base at least one large patrol vessel and an aircraft in the State for use primarily in coastal surveillance of the southern ocean.

APPENDIX 1

COASTAL SURVEILLANCE OF TASMANIA

Submission by
Government of Tasmania

October
1978

COASTAL SURVEILLANCE

of

TASMANIA

Submission

by

Government of Tasmania

October, 1978

CONTENTS

Subject

Summary

The Tasmanian Situation

Recent Inquiries

The Problem

Surveillance Needs
- Search and Rescue
- Fisheries
- Customs
- Quarantine
- Immigration
- Environment
- Exploration/Exploitation

Marine Data Collection
- Weather and Sea State
- Oceanography
- Fisheries

Current Surveillance Methods

Experimental Programme
- Recommendation

Co-ordination of Federal and State Government Resources
- Recommendations

Benefits to other States

Appendix A
- Mr. Nixon's Statement of 9 July 1978

Appendix B
- Local Processing Facilities

Appendix C
- Chart of Tasmania

* * * * *

SUMMARY

The coastal surveillance of waters surrounding Tasmania being undertaken by the Federal Government is not sufficient. More needs to be done.

The Government of Tasmania considers an experimental programme should be carried out over two years to determine

i) the most efficient means of undertaking future coastal surveillance in South-East Australian waters

ii) the level of coastal surveillance that is necessary to protect resources within the 200 mile zone surrounding Tasmania, including Macquarie Island. Such an evaluation could then be extrapolated to the whole South-East Australian region

The following recommendations are made:

- a Nomad aircraft be provided by the Federal Government for aerial surveillance
- a RAN Patrol Boat be stationed in Hobart for surface patrols
- State fisheries and police vessels be used in the programme
- a committee of Commonwealth and State officials be established to implement the programme

* * * * *

THE TASMANIAN SITUATION

Tasmania is concerned that not sufficient is being done by the Federal Government to increase the surveillance of South East Australian coastal waters. Indeed, the surveillance of foreign fishing in this area, including the waters surrounding the State, has never been properly undertaken.

It could be said that in the past there has been no justification to patrol these waters but this is no longer the case. 200 Japanese vessels call at Hobart each year whilst fishing off Tasmania and a number of sightings of European vessels have been reported. Earlier this year a Russian research mother ship accompanied by a submarine called at Hobart.

With the declaration of the 200 nautical mile Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ), the State Government is concerned that the recently announced programme to upgrade the Federal Government's coastal surveillance has not included Tasmania.

Mr. Nixon's announcement of 9 July 1978 (see Appendix A) makes no provision for the increased surveillance of waters surrounding Tasmania.

A meeting of Commonwealth/State officials was held in Canberra on 13 September to discuss ways in which the States could supplement the additional surveillance measures being taken by the Federal Government.

This meeting was advised the State would be prepared to consider making available facilities of its Police Department, the coastal patrol boats of the Tasmanian Fisheries Development Authority and for secondary surveillance, the Transport Commission's Bass Strait vessel "Straitsman".

This advice was based on the presumption, arising from Mr. Nixon's announcement, that any supplementation by Tasmania would result in an increased surveillance activity by the Federal Government.

To this end, the State Government proposes that one RAN patrol boat be stationed permanently at Hobart for surface coastal surveillance operations to the south and off the east and west coasts of Tasmania and that a Nomad Searchmaster should be made available by the Federal Government and positioned for a two year period at Hobart to take part in an experimental programme (refer pages 12 to 22).

RECENT INQUIRIES

In his report of 30 June 1977 on the Structure of Industry and the Employment Situation in Tasmania, Sir Bede Callaghan refers (pages 109/110) as follows:

> "It is true that, as the State Government claims, Tasmania has relatively less defence expenditure and training activity than other States.
>
> The question whether Tasmania should be utilised to a greater extent by the armed forces needs to be decided mainly on strategic grounds. The grounds for defence preparedness in the remote south of the nation are not strong, if I interpret the recent White Paper on Defence accurately.
>
> However, that paper appeared not to say anything about the relative implications of the possible extension of the Australian territorial waters to 200 miles. When this occurs, there will be the added difficulty of patrolling southern waters where vessels of other nations already operate. The patrolling responsibilities will be accentuated by the further 200 mile extension around Macquarie Island (which falls within Tasmania's boundaries and jurisdiction). Macquarie Island is located about 800 miles south-east of Tasmania and lies approximately halfway between Tasmania and Antarctica. The implications may call for some strengthening of the very small existing naval base at Hobart but the defence authorities will doubtless consider this in the normal course."

In its report of 2 May 1978, the Sub-Committee on Territorial Boundaries, Joint Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, refers to the exploitation of Australian waters by foreign fishing interests and specifically refers to the need to maintain a presence all around Australia.

The Sub-Committee's report, in particular, deals with the arrest on 6 February 1978 of the Japanese squid trawler "Eikyu Maru" for operating within the twelve mile limit off the northern coast of Tasmania. This was the first instance of a Japanese ship being apprehended.

In its Report on Surveillance and Reaction (May 1978), the Government Members Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee refers particularly to the fishing areas off the coasts of Tasmania, and states the principles underlying the need for adequate coastal surveillance are equally applicable to these areas (as to the waters off northern Australia).

The Committee classes Tasmanian waters up to 100 nautical miles off the coast as deserving the same level of surveillance as the waters between Cape Arnhem and Cape York; from Cape York to Townsville and from North West Cape to Broome.

The Committee is of the view that a package deal of a Nomad Searchmaster and patrol boats, as proposed by the State Government, would provide a suitable test project.

THE PROBLEM

To carry out low to medium surveillance operations in the 200 mile zone surrounding Tasmania (see Appendix C), requires resources which are certainly not available to the State at this stage.

This zone, apart from Bass Strait, could be used by foreign fishing vessels coming into the zone with the express intention of illegal fishing. It could also be used by foreign fishing vessels which traverse the zone to get to more distant waters.

Vessels of Eastern Bloc countries are known to have been undertaking research in the zone so that it is possible other maritime resources either on or under the seabed could also be found and exploited illegally in this area. With the relocation of the Antarctic Division of the Department of Science to Hobart, both Federal and State Ministers have recently highlighted the possibility of Antarctic vessels of other nations calling regularly to Hobart.

Most fishing takes place within 50 miles of the Tasmanian coast, although this range is extended to the fishing grounds on the Cascade Plateau to the south-east of Tasmania (120 miles) and the Tasman Rise (180 miles) and tuna fishing to the north-east of the State. There is a need, therefore, to supervise all foreign fishing vessels licensed to operate within the zone) including all vessels engaged in joint ventures and feasibility studies.

The Tasmanian Fisheries Development Authority (TFDA) carries out regular patrols of inshore Tasmanian waters using three small boats (between 40/70 feet in length), but aircraft in conjunction with patrol vessels of better seagoing capabilities are necessary to cover the area of approximately 134,000 square miles lying in the 200 mile zone to the west, south and east of Tasmania.

Tasmania simply does not have aircraft or seagoing patrol vessels for this work.

Any increase in surveillance activities in this 134,000 square mile area would, of course, not only help to protect marine resources but would also assist other organisations in carrying out marine research and survey activities in such fields as meteorology, oceanographic studies, mapping and fishing.

To carry out effective coastal surveillance, the use of aircraft flying regular routine patrols must be combined with surface seagoing patrol vessels. In order to ensure that a reasonable degree of detection probability is achieved in areas around Tasmania, it would be desirable for the aircraft to cover the complete area every 3 to 4 days.

When a particular contact appears to be illegal or suspicious, it should be possible for an intercept to be made by the surface vessel within 12 hours at the most.

It follows that due to the location of Tasmanian ports vis-a-vis the State's coastal topography that any surface surveillance vessels must have a reasonable speed consistent with good seakeeping ability so that intercepts may be made promptly and the crew still remain efficient and alert during the patrol.

Aircraft on the other hand are not greatly affected by weather conditions, other than those affecting visibility, and on most occasions their missions can be carried out with reasonable ease.

The type of aircraft used for surveillance, if fitted with appropriate radar, communication and navigation aids, could range from small twin-engined civil units to expensive military surveillance and anti-submarine aircraft.

The problem, therefore, is to carry out a low to medium level surveillance patrol in the 200 mile zone off Tasmania in as cost-effective a way as possible. To achieve maximum cost benefits, aerial and surface surveillance activities should cover all surveillance needs and also be available for marine data collection.

The surveillance needs include the following:

- search and rescue
- fisheries
- customs
- quarantine
- immigration
- environment
- exploration/exploitation

SURVEILLANCE NEEDS

Tasmania's surveillance needs differ from those of Australia's northern waters in as much as the problems of refugees direct from South East Asia do not exist. Furthermore, whilst it appears that drug running is not undertaken to the same extent as takes place in northern parts of Australia, it is still a significant problem.

Search and rescue operations and fisheries patrols, however, pose greater problems in waters to the south and west of Tasmania because of the nature of the coastline and the generally rougher sea state offshore.

Search and Rescue (S.A.R.)

Most S.A.R. operations in Tasmania's coastal waters are undertaken initially by the Tasmania Police who are usually the first to be advised of any inshore maritime emergency. Commonwealth authorities arrange S.A.R. operations in respect of ships or foreign fishing vessels at sea, but initial action is taken immediately by the authority first becoming aware of the emergency. There is specific legislation, the Marine Search and Rescue Act 1971 which authorises the Commissioner for Police to take action. The division of responsibility between the Commonwealth and the State is set out in an Agreement.

To assist in maritime emergencies, Tasmania Police have two police boats "Alert" (7.6m) and "Vigilant" (15.8m) stationed in the south of the island, a Shark Cat (7m) at Lady Barron and a runabout (5m) at Georgetown. In addition, the fisheries patrol boats "Challenger" (21.3m), "Penghana" (15.2m) and "R.H. Scott" (12.2m) plus 4 or 5 runabouts) are available - and the Tasmanian fishing fleet.

A helicopter on retainer to the State Government, of 3 hour endurance (but currently without winching gear), is available and light aircraft from local Aero Clubs are hired as required. Communications are provided from the Police radio network, O.T.C. and limited coast stations (fish processing factories) and the fishing vessels' radios, the TFDA radio network and, to an increasing degree, volunteer emergency C.B. radio links.

During the year 1977/78, maritime S.A.R. operations were conducted by Tasmania Police on 68 occasions, and 17 underwater searches for bodies were carried out. There were 75 maritime S.A.R. operations in the previous year.

The cost of S.A.R. operations carried out by the Police is low, as a great deal of assistance is provided without charge by the owners of fishing vessels and private light aircraft. Apart from the salaries of the officers of the Police Search and Rescue Unit, the principal cost is for the chartered helicopter, for which a retainer of $65,000 is paid by the State Government, plus flying fees last year of $14,544.

Fisheries

: Areas and Species of Fish

Apart from traditional inshore fisheries, about which a great deal is known, it is difficult at this stage to identify any particular new fishing areas around the Tasmanian coast.

Most Tasmanian based fishing will take place on or near the Continental Shelf within 50 miles of the coast, with the exception of areas known as the Cascade Plateau and the South Tasman Rise which lie some 120 miles and 180 miles to the south-east and south of the State respectively.

Some fishing operations such as the Japanese tuna long lining and skip jack tuna purse seining will range widely throughout and beyond the 200 mile zone and into the Tasman Sea.

Appendix C shows the 200 mile zone and Continental Shelf.

: Value of Local Catch

The Tasmanian local industry involves some 1,446 licensed fishermen and their crews who operate some 655 fishing vessels. The species which comprise the annual catch include scale fish, sharks, scallops, oysters, abalone and rock lobster.

In 1977/78 the catch of a mixture of the above species totalled approximately 7,181 tonnes. This figure is about half the record catch for 1973/74 when 14,828 tonnes were harvested. The high catch during this period was due to purse seining for Jack Mackerel for a fish protein factory at Triabunna on the East Coast which has since closed down. The TFDA is actively promoting the re-establishment of this fishery.

The gross value of edible fishery products from the 1977/78 local catch:

Particulars	1977/78
Fish	$2,604,000
Crustaceans	5,019,000
Molluscs	5,152,000
	$12,775,000

As can be seen, the value of the catch at over $12 million represents a considerable sum being fed into the Tasmanian economy and when it and the number of persons employed directly and indirectly in the local industry are taken into account it is obvious that Tasmania's fisheries must be protected. In addition, a joint Australian/Japanese squid fishery will begin operations in November 1978.

: Local Fishing Fleet

The following table lists details of the local fishing fleet for the year 1977:

Particulars	1977
Number of vessels	655
Value of vessels	$15,464,000
Average value per vessel	$23,610
Total value of fishing gear	$1,438,000
Value of fishing gear per vessel	$2,195
Total number of crew	1,466

The few vessels used for estuary fishing are small vessels propelled by diesel or petrol motors of low power. Most of the fleet are offshore vessels ranging in length from 9 to 30 metres and powered by diesel engines.

Refrigeration of the catch at sea is becoming more common, the main types being ice cooling, brine tanks and dry refrigeration. Almost all vessels have wells or deck tanks which serve to keep catch such as lobster and abalone alive.

: Local Processing

The Tasmanian fishing industry is served by 23 shore facilities distributed throughout the State. 16 of these are processing factories.

Details of these facilities and the services available are contained in Appendix B.

Most of the processing factories handle a wide variety of species and are presently gearing up to handle landings of demersal fish from the developing trawl fisheries. The expansion of these factories will, of course, depend on the extent to which new fisheries are developed.

The following table shows the proportion of fish landed in the four main areas of the State. It must be noted that this table does not necessarily relate to area in which fish were actually caught:

Area	1976
Derwent and Channel	19.8%
East Coast and Peninsular	26.3%
Bass Strait and Islands	53.7%
West Coast	0.2%
Total	100%

The following table shows the production of the types of fish caught in Tasmania during 1977/78:

Type	Live weight ('000 Kg)
Tuna	45
Shark	1,075
Australian Salmon	1,117
Flathead	112
Barracouta	146
Trevally	14
Garfish	20
Other	395
Southern Rock Lobster	1,192
Squid	2
Oysters	138
Scallops	400
Abalone	2,525
TOTAL	7,181

: Local Boat Building Industry

The boat building industry in Tasmania, although less buoyant over the past year, still appears to be growing at 10% per annum.

Although the industry caters mainly for commercial fishing boats, runabouts, yachts and dinghies, several yards could produce inshore surveillance patrol craft. At least one, Tamar Steel Boats Pty. Ltd., Launceston, has the capability of producing 30 metre steel boats and three yards in southern Tasmania have the capability of producing vessels in steel, fibre glass and wood in sizes up to 18 metres for fibre glass and steel, and 33 metres for wooden construction. This type of vessel would be suitable for inshore patrols.

Any upgrading in Tasmanian coastal surveillance, especially that requiring offshore vessels of a design suitable for continuous patrol in the 200 mile zone, could result in additional or at least continued employment for the existing boat building yards, and an expansion of their capacity.

: Foreign Fishing Fleets

Accurate information is not available to the State regarding the value of the catch taken by Japanese long liners in waters to the south of Tasmania. However, catches from around Tasmania realise more than $40 million annually of which more than $10 million is believed to come from within the 200 mile zone.

The squid fishery potential is expected to be determined within the next two years following a feasibility fishing study which will commence during November 1978. Catches are likely to be worth well in excess of $1 million.

Eight foreign fishing vessels will be participating in the squid feasibility study and when this is combined with up to 200 Japanese vessels fishing for Southern Blue fin tuna, it represents a considerable number of foreign vessels fishing inside or close to the 200 mile zone.

Customs

Federal narcotics control is undertaken in Tasmanian coastal waters by Bureau of Customs officers from the Department of Business and Consumer Affairs, operating under the authority of the Customs Act.

Customs and narcotics control officers have the function of intercepting any illegal traffic in prohibited imports, or dutiable goods on which there is an intention to avoid duty.

To assist them, they have available in southern Tasmania the small Customs launch "Biaga" (7.6m) and access to the Police launches "Alert" and "Vigilant".

RAAF aircraft are utilised by Customs as a matter of course when required, and to date there has never been any difficulty in obtaining the use of such aircraft at short notice.

Communications are maintained through the internal Customs radio network and through the radio facilities of associated organisations, e.g. RAAF, Police etc. Coastal surveillance operations undertaken in Tasmanian waters are very infrequent and the Bureau estimates that its present requirement for use of the type of coastal surveillance facilities proposed, e.g. radar equipped aircraft and sea-going patrol vessels, would be of the order of once every three years. However, the Bureau believes, if the proposed facilities were available, that they would be used more frequently than this. In this event the Bureau would be prepared to provide at their cost compatible radio facilities on the vessels and aircraft involved.

The Bureau points out, however, that it is at present restricted by law to enforcement activity within the territorial limits, i.e. 3 miles from the shore and that this limitation would to some extent govern the use which they would make of coastal surveillance facilities.

It is understood the Bureau is currently considering the building of three offshore patrol vessels, for delivery by 1984, and that if a uniform hull design could be settled, there could be scope for economies of scale if additional orders were to be placed. Specifications which the Bureau has in mind are:

Length Overall	: About 100 ft.
Maximum Speed	: 26 knots
Cruising Speed	: 15 knots
Minimum Speed	: 4 knots
Range	: About 2000 nautical miles at cruising speed
Construction	: Steel

The Tasmania Police Drug Squad has some difficulty in policing the running of illegal drugs to Tasmania because of the limited means at their disposal to police what amounts to an under-populated State.

Police are often advised that illegal drugs are to be imported from interstate by private vessels or aircraft but find it extremely difficult to verify the intelligence or to detect or apprehend the runners. The intelligence that does come to hand suggests that this type of activity is most prevalent in the north of the State, presumably due to the proximity of this area to the mainland of Australia.

A further problem is the location and seizure of illegal plantations of hemp located on isolated islands or areas of Tasmania's coastline inaccessible by land transport.

One other factor which needs to be considered is the export of illegal drugs, as recent intelligence suggests that because matured Tasmanian hemp has a greater concentration of tetrahydro cannabinol than that grown in other areas of Australia, there is a market for the Tasmanian product extending as far north as Brisbane.

Since 30 June, 1972, a total of 71 charges relating to breaches of the Poisons Act have been laid against persons employed as fishermen, and reports of drug smuggling by fishermen suggest that the size of the problem is much greater than these figures suggest.

For the above reasons the Police Drug Squad would make use of any improved coastal surveillance resources to be provided.

The tightening of control in the northern areas of Australia could well increase the flow of illegal imports into southern areas of Australia, and it is quite possible that Tasmania could be used as a clearing house for the receipt and distribution of smuggled goods, including drugs.

In order to monitor this situation, and to counter any development of the trade in illegal imports, it will be necessary to increase the effectiveness of coastal and aerial surveillance in the Tasmanian area.

Regular patrols by radar equipped aircraft and the availability of seagoing patrol vessels must assist in this task.

Quarantine

Because of Tasmania's geographical situation, it is considered extremely unlikely that there is any serious risk of breach of the quarantine and immigration laws.

So far as quarantine precautions are concerned, the most likely risk is the unauthorised landing of livestock from foreign vessels, and so far as is known none of the foreign fishing vessels which work off the Tasmanian coast line carry livestock. Quarantine authorities are more apprehensive of breaches of quarantine by the mailing of seeds or other agricultural or farm produce from overseas, or by the indiscriminate landing of ships' garbage.

Immigration

It is most unlikely that illegal immigrants would attempt to enter the State by other than conventional carriers, and the Department of Immigration has never contemplated a coast watch on small vessels or light aircraft.

Environment

The Department of Environment, which is responsible for the maintenance of the coastal environment, does not at present employ any staff or facilities in coastal surveillance, although it does own the 7 metre "Monitor II", and may use this vessel for limited offshore work in the future. Each annual budget includes an item (about $2,000) for the hire of charter aircraft for this purpose, but to date the amount has not been expended for coastal surveillance.

In general, the Department takes the view that most pollution at sea from ships is not usually detectable (with the exception of oil) and that the need for control of dumping in coastal waters is generally restricted to dumping by pipeline (e.g. the Titanium Dioxide Plant at Burnie), and to the dumping by ship of acid residue from the Burnie plant. Jarosite from the Electrolytic Zinc Works at Risdon is also dumped at sea on a regular daily basis. The Department is also interested in the dispersal of river borne pollutants carried to sea in the Tamar and Derwent rivers.

If coastal surveillance facilities in the form of aircraft and patrol vessels are available, the Department would make use of them to study the dumping pattern spread at the ends of submarine pipelines, river estuaries and from hopper ships.

The present costs of environmental coastal surveillance are negligible, but it is probable that the Department would be prepared to contribute to the costs of the studies which would become possible if proper coastal surveillance facilities become available. The Department is limited to some extent in the expenditure of funds by the policy of the Government that its costs should be borne by industry.

In the event of a major oil pollution disaster, the availability of coastal surveillance facilities would be a major benefit in the initial stages of the crisis by providing immediate on the spot observation communication and control. Furthermore, the patrol vessel could be used as a main vessel for containing and/or dispersing the oil and especially fitted for this task.

Exploration/Exploitation

It is unlikely that in the foreseeable future any illegal exploration or exploitation of the sea bed resources will be undertaken around Tasmania.

So far as mapping and geophysical surveys are concerned, charter aircraft and vessels are normally used. These activities could well be undertaken using coastal surveillance facilities but there are, of course, obvious difficulties with respect to availability.

MARINE DATA COLLECTION

Facilities provided for coastal surveillance may also play a useful role in marine research. This applies in particular to the following areas:

- weather and sea state
- oceanography
- fisheries

: Weather and Sea State

Information regarding weather conditions affecting Tasmania is compiled on a regional basis by the Bureau of Meteorology at Hobart.

The Bureau compiles weather forecasts from information supplied by:

- Surface observational stations situated throughout Tasmania
- Satellites

- Upper wind and temperature observation at Launceston and Hobart

- Ships at sea to the west, south and east of Tasmania

Due to the geographical position of Tasmania, very few ships travel routes to the west, south and east of this State and, therefore, little data is received regarding the weather in these regions. This is especially important in recording surface observations of temperature, pressure, wind direction and force, and sea and swell state which would be valuable in compiling weather forecasts and, of course, improve their accuracy.

In general the weather affecting Tasmania is influenced in the Summer by the anticyclones travelling on their most southerly tracks which lie across the sea. During this period, the seas southward of Victoria and around Tasmania have reasonably long periods of settled weather. However, during this period Tasmania is still subject to the 'roaring forties' especially to the west and south of the Island.

After March, the anticyclones follow more northerly tracks and the seas southward of Australia in general and Tasmania in particular, become more liable to the affects of the depressions of the Southern Ocean.

Unsettled and stormy weather increases and lasts for longer periods. Occasionally two or three deep depressions follow one another eastward across or southward of Tasmania without any intervals or relatively high pressure, and westerly gales blow for several days.

At other times depressions take a more northerly route, through Bass Strait or across Victoria, or develop in the Bass Strait or its vicinity.

In these cases the winds on the southern sides of the depressions are not as a rule so strong as the westerlies on their northern sides but nevertheless can reach gale force.

It must be noted because of the uncertainty of the weather and sea state in waters surrounding Tasmania, particularly to the west, south and south-east, that the types of vessels used by the TFDA and the Tasmania Police are simply not suitable to undertake offshore surveillance patrols. This applies especially in the case of exposed waters not to mention more distant areas, that is, beyond 20 miles anywhere around the coast.

In the absence of reliable weather and sea state for Tasmanian waters an evaluation of the log-books of two small State Transport Commission trading vessels was undertaken which shows the following wind strengths and sea states experienced in the course of a year's voyaging between Melbourne/King Is/Stanley and between Flinders Is/Hobart:

Beaufort Wind Force	Bass Strait	East Coast
0	-	3%
1	4%	1%
2	15%	6%
3	24%	15%
4	22%	19%
5	11%	18%
6	13%	18%
7	6%	11%
8 & over	5%	9%
	100%	100%
Sea State		
1	19%	10%
2	24%	15%
3	22%	19%
4	11%	18%
5	13%	18%
6	11%	20%
	100%	100%

It can be seen from the above that in Bass Strait, bad weather (that is, wind force 5 or above; sea state 4 or above) can be expected for 35% of the year, while off the East Coast it can be expected for 56% of the time.

Two points emerge from the above, namely, that:

i) no suitable local vessels are currently available to undertake coastal surveillance within the 200 mile zone, more than 20 miles offshore

ii) any vessels provided to patrol the 200 mile zone need to be of a design capable of withstanding the uncertain and varying weather and sea state conditions which prevail around Tasmania

: Oceanography

Work in this area is carried out by units of the R.A.N., C.S.I.R.O. and Department of National Development, all of which are associated with the Federal Government.

The Department of National Development, through its Division of National Mapping frequently uses Department of Transport lighthouse supply vessels to carry out various tasks. These tasks have included surveys off Western Australia on the N.W. Shelf, Gulf of Carpentaria and in the Great Barrier Reef.

The R.A.N. has recently completed survey work on currents and eddies off the east coast of Tasmania and the C.S.I.R.O. is carrying out similar research well to the south of Tasmania, on a continuing basis.

Comparatively little survey, oceanographic or mapping work has been carried out in the 200 mile zone lying to the west, east and south of Tasmania apart from the section lying between the coast and the 200 metre contour line.

Because of the general lack of oceanographic data outside the 200 metre line, it follows that any vessel carrying out surveillance duties in this area could also be used to advantage in the marine research field.

: Fisheries

At present fisheries research is being directed towards developing fisheries such as otter trawling and Danish seining. However, it is planned that a great deal of effort will be later diverted to our pelagic fish stocks, such as skip jack mackeral and skip jack tuna, so that Australian fishermen can be encouraged to utilise these resources in our 200 mile zone.

As in the case of the other marine research fields on which there is a paucity of data any coastal surveillance vessel could also be employed in collecting fisheries data.

CURRENT SURVEILLANCE METHODS

The current surveillance methods employed by the Federal Government through the Australian Coastal Surveillance Organisation in respect of waters surrounding Tasmania can only be regarded as unsatisfactory.

The primary surveillance undertaken consists of two RAAF air patrols and one RAN surface patrol per month.

The RAAF air patrol is carried out by a P3 Orion flight leaving Edinburgh, South Australia, in the morning, and proceeding in a south-easterly direction over Cape Willoughby towards the North West of Tasmania, thence down the West Coast, around the South and South East and up the East Coast to Flinders Is., Bass Strait over Wilson's Promontory into Gippsland waters. The flight then patrols waters off Cape Howe (Gabo Island) and thence up the East Coast of New South Wales to the RAAF Williamstown base near Newcastle.

This flight which covers South Australian, Tasmanian, Victorian and New South Wales waters lasts some 8 hours (9 a.m. to 5 p.m.) and is the first leg of a seven day round Australia coastal surveillance sortie.

The total flight time over Tasmanian waters is to the order of some 3 hours. Given two flights per month this means that Tasmania receives 6 hours aerial surveillance each month out of a total of 720 hours (30 day month). This represents a total surveillance dedication of 0.833%. Given a self-assessed security of search of 90% for the P3 Orion the total detection capability for Tasmanian waters cannot exceed 0.75% per month.

This result can only be considered totally unsatisfactory, especially when one takes into account that no surveillance is undertaken during the hours of darkness when squid fishing takes place.

The RAN surface patrol is carried out by an Attack Class Patrol Boat based at H.M.A.S. "Cerberus", Westernport, Victoria. The patrol, when it takes place, lasts up to 12 days and purports to cover Victorian, Tasmanian and South Australian waters. 6 to 7 days of this period is specifically allocated to Tasmania.

The Routine Coastal Surveillance Programme for the five month period June to October 1978 lists the following RAN surface patrols for Tasmania:

June	Nil
July	7 days
August	6 days
September	Nil
October	Nil

On the above basis, the theoretical total surveillance dedication by time is to the order of 8.5%. It must be pointed out, however, that the patrol boat's operations are mainly confined to a Westernport/Flinders Is/East Coast/Hobart voyage and return. The South and West Coasts are not normally patrolled and only occasional patrols are made in waters to the North-West of Tasmania.

The actual total surveillance dedication by time for the above five month period was 4.6% as the 6 day patrol in August did not take place.

While 4.6% appears a significantly better result than the 0.833% achieved by the aerial patrol, it must be remembered that the patrol boat has a very limited range of radar detection coverage for small vessels compared to that of an Orion aircraft. The differential can be expressed by a factor of 0.03 (360 nautical mile^2/ 12,000nautical mile^2). In real terms, therefore, the comparison between the dedication of a patrol boat and an Orion aircraft to the coastal surveillance of Tasmania is:

RAN Patrol boat	0.138%
RAAF Orion	0.833%

It can be seen that the Federal Government's efforts in undertaking the coastal surveillance of Tasmania are only a token gesture as the combined programme of aerial and surface patrols is set at an extremely low level which can only result in an unsatisfactory level of detection.

Furthermore, the haphazard system employed for secondary surveillance, namely, reliance on the co-operation of coastal and offshore fishing vessels, merchant ships and Government vessels which happen to be in the area, cannot be considered satisfactory.

The outline Programme for secondary surveillance for the five month period June to October 1978 lists the following vessels:

June	HMAS Bass	30 days
July	HMAS Bass	30 days
August	HMAS Bass	30 days
September	HMAS Bass) Sprightly)	No. of days not allocated
October	Sprightly)	

Whereas this listing on face value appears reasonable, it must be pointed out that HMAS Bass was actually out of service, undergoing annual refit from 10 June to 4 August. Apart from this fact, HMAS Bass is not normally active at sea but is kept berthed alongside the naval base in Hobart and is mainly used only on weekends for reserve training.

The CSIRO research vessel "Sprightly" is not regularly employed in Tasmanian waters. From 23 September when it departed from Hobart to 8 October when it arrived in Launceston this vessel was engaged in secondary surveillance when it went south to Latitude 53° to undertake data collection on the 140° East meridian.

Apart from the inadequacies of the above listed vessels, it must be pointed out that very few Australian registered merchant ships ply routes off the West, South and East Coasts of Tasmania on a regular basis. These are:

"Seaway Prince"	(Melb/Hobart)	East
"Seaway Princess"	(Sydney/Hobart)	Coast
"Mary Holyman"	Adelaide/Hobart	West Coast

The frequency of passage is:

"Seaway Prince"	Weekly	(for 40 hours)
"Seaway Princess"	Weekly	(for 30 hours)
"Mary Holyman"	Fortnightly	(for 12 hours)

It can be seen the use of these vessels for secondary surveillance is also marginal.

The North Coast of Tasmania, however, could be considered to have adequate secondary surveillance in view of the several merchant ships which regularly ply the waters of Bass Strait between Tasmania and Victoria.

The use of local fishing vessels for secondary surveillance is reasonably effective for inshore waters, say up to 10 miles from the coast. On the approach of inclement weather or during bad weather, however, it must be pointed out these boats normally seek shelter or remain in port. The same does not apply to the much larger sized foreign fishing vessels which not only can but do stay at sea in bad weather and continue to fish.

In summary, both the primary and secondary coastal surveillance systems implemented by the Federal Government for waters surrounding Tasmania are of a very low standard in terms of detection capability levels.

Because of this deficiency, there is a lack of data concerning transgressions taking place in waters around Tasmania.

The more notable known incursions of foreign fishermen in recent times have included the Japanese fishing trawler "Eikyu Maru" which was squid fishing off the North East Coast; a large Russian trawler fishing off Flinders Island and the sighting on two occasions of a Russian fishing fleet off King Island.

Nothing is known of what may be happening off Macquarie Island where no surveillance is undertaken. Macquarie Island lies some 800 miles to the south east of Hobart. A team of research scientists is based on the island. Infrequent visits are made by State National Park and Wildlife Service officers. The island has potential to become an important base in the event of any major development taking place in the Antarctic Region.

EXPERIMENTAL PROGRAMME

The State Government considers an experimental programme should be undertaken over a two year period to determine

i) the level of coastal surveillance that is necessary to protect resources within the 200 mile zone surrounding Tasmania, including Macquarie Island

ii) the most efficient means of undertaking future coastal surveillance

iii) the usage which could be made by Federal and State Government Departments etc. of any future coastal surveillance system

In order to carry out an experimental programme on the above basis the availability and use of facilities currently employed in the coastal surveillance of Tasmania need to be considerably upgraded.

There are several upgrading options for consideration in implementing the above programme, including:

a) increase the number of RAAF Orion monthly flights from 2 to 4

b) supplement the present Orion programme with chartered private aircraft undertaking a circumnavigation of the State each week

c) withdraw all Orion flights and provide aerial patrols with a suitable commercial aircraft to be used exclusively around the State twice each week

d) increase the RAN Attack Class patrols to undertake comprehensive policing of the West, South and East Coasts (including King and Flinders Islands) at least twice a month

e) supplement the present RAN programme with a Federal Government lighthouse vessel or a chartered vessel undertaking patrols of the West, South and East Coasts (including King and Flinders Islands) at least three times each month

f) re-position the RAN Attack Class Patrol Boat currently based in Westernport to Hobart and use it exclusively for patrols around Tasmania

The estimated monthly costs of the above six options may be compared with the estimated monthly costs of the current coastal surveillance system. Cost effectiveness comparisons are also presented based upon the effectiveness of current Orion aircraft and Attack Class Patrol Boat operations which in each case establish a unit base for estimation of ratios, as follows:

Option No.	Option Costs	Current Costs	Cost Effectiveness Ratio
a)	$34,920	$17,460	1::1
b)	25,140	17,460	1::2.1
c)	20,800	17,460	1::3.6
d)	66,288	33,144	1::1
e)	78,144	33,144	1::1.7
f)	99,432	33,144	1::1

Note: The above table is calculated using the following allocation of equipment to each option, as follows:

a) Orion $2,910 per hour (1)
b) Aero Commander $192 per hour (2)
c) Nomad $260 per hour (1)
d) Attack Class $5,524 per day (3)
e) Charter Vessel $2,500 per day

(1) Source: Government Members Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, May 1978

(2) Source: Report by P.C. Tanner, Tasair Pty. Ltd. August 1978

(3) Based on Navy 1978/79 total annual appropriation of $691.376 million or $106,121 per man per ships' complement. It is realised this could be over estimated but no other means of costing is available.

It could be argued that the costs of operating an Attack Class Patrol Boat would remain virtually the same whether the vessel is based in Victoria or Tasmania. For the purposes of this report, however, the costs of positioning a patrol boat in Hobart are shown as an additional cost. It must be realised that for practical purposes there is really no additional cost as the Defence Department must incur the expenditure involved irrespective of where the patrol boat is positioned.

In terms of expenditure, option c), aerial surveillance by a Nomad, is the most effective. In addition, this option provides the greatest coverage and thus the best means of surveillance data collection during the two year experimental programme.

While option e), the charter of a commercial vessel to supplement the RAN patrol boat, returns the best benefits in respect of surface surveillance specific matters such as armament, crewing and speed pose problems which would severely limit the apprehension/arrest role, a prime requirement for surface patrols.

Unlike aerial patrols, any vessel used in surface patrols must possess the capability to stop, board, search and, if necessary, arrest offending vessels whether they are illegal fishermen, smugglers or drug runners.

It is doubted whether any Australian commercial vessel manned solely by civilains, assuming it possessed adequate speed and is capable of being fitted with light armament, could undertake the apprehension/arrest role required of the surface patrol. It would be necessary to have on board several personnel vested with appropriate powers of arrest and trained to undertake para-military functions. Other than the State Police Force, only defence personnel could be considered suitable for this role.

So far as any experimental programme is concerned, therefore, it would be desirable to employ a combination of RAN personnel and State Police/Fisheries Inspectors to undertake these functions rather than civilians.

Dealing with option e), therefore, it would be desirable to man any commercial vessel mainly with RAN personnel.

Given that it is accepted RAN personnel should man the surface patrol boat, the question then arises as to the suitability of the commercial vessel. The charter costs of $2,500 daily for option e) are estimated for a 26.8 metre 10 Knot steel hull fishing vessel which has recently been used for marine research. Whereas the endurance and sea keeping ability of this vessel is satisfactory for marine research, its suitability for surface coastal surveillance would be in doubt because of its slow speed.

Any commercial or Government vessel to be used for surface coastal surveillance would need to be designed with the following principal characteristics:

- endurance 1500/2000 miles at 12 to 15 Knots
- capable of seakeeping in adverse conditions (Wind Force 5/Sea State 4 and above) for up to 7 to 8 days
- desired maximum (continuous running) speed 18 to 20 Knots
- crew complement and accommodation to be sufficient for continuous 24 hour watch-keeping throughout patrol
- capable of being fitted with light armament including magazine

It is doubtful if any Australian commercial vessel meets the above requirements. If such a vessel were available, however, the cost of operating it manned with RAN personnel could be expected to be at least equal to the $5,524 daily cost of operating a RAN patrol boat.

The Federal Department of Transport lighthouse vessels meet all the above requirements except speed. They are ideal vessels believed to be capable of handling helicopters but having a speed of only 11 Knots would not be suitable for the apprehension role.

Rather than charter an Australian commercial vessel or use a D.O.T. lighthouse vessel, it would be more logical to reposition the Westernport based RAN Patrol Boat in Hobart. As stated above, the costs of operating this boat within the Defence Department appropriation would not alter.

Recommendation

It is recommended, therefore, that to undertake the two year experimental programme options c) and f) be implemented, that is, a Nomad aircraft undertake all aerial surveillance of Tasmanian waters and waters within the 200 mile zone in conjunction with a RAN Attack Class Patrol Boat (to be positioned in Hobart) to undertake all surface patrols

CO-ORDINATION OF FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENT RESOURCES

To implement the experimental programme it will be necessary to co-ordinate the resources of the Federal and State Governments.

Recommendation

It is recommended the Federal Government should be responsible for undertaking the programme by making available:

- the Australian Coastal Surveillance Organisation
- one Nomad Searchmaster
- one RAN Patrol Boat

The State Government will co-operate by making available:

- the Director of the Cabinet Office for liaison
- personnel to operate the Nomad Searchmaster

- personnel, equipment and communications of the Tasmania Police
- personnel and equipment of the Tasmanian Fisheries Development Authority
- personnel from other Departments (such as Environment, State Emergency Services etc.)

It is recommended a Committee of Commonwealth/State officials be established to report how best use can be made of the above resources in implementing the experimental programme.

BENEFITS TO OTHER STATES

Because the experimental programme would involve a degree of surveillance of waters close to Victoria, South Australia and New South Wales, it is suggested these States be invited to participate in the programme. Indeed, the lessons learnt from the programme will undoubtedly be of benefit to all States and the Northern Territory.

* * * * *

APPENDIX A

AUSTRALIAN CIVIL COASTAL SURVEILLANCE
(Public Statement by Mr. Peter Nixon)

The Federal Government has decided on a major new program to upgrade Australia's civil coastal surveillance and enforcement capabilities. Announcing this today, the Minister for Transport, Mr. Peter Nixon, said the new program follows Government consideration of a detailed report on civil coastal surveillance needs, prepared by a special committee of permanent heads.

> "The changes reflect the Government's concern over increased evidence of smuggling, unauthorised landings, quarantine breaches and other illegal activities along Australia's northern coastline" Mr Nixon said.
>
> "They also take account of the need to enforce Australia's fishery laws when the 200 nautical mile Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ) is proclaimed.
>
> "The Government's approach to the surveillance problem seeks to achieve maximum practical effectiveness at reasonable cost"

Mr Nixon said the new program involved:

- Introduction of daily air searches of northern coastal areas between Geraldton and Cairns by civil aircraft on charter to the Commonwealth
- Extension of aerial surveillance by RAAF Long-Range Maritime Patrol aircraft to cover the 200 nautical mile fishing zone and to meet other special requirements.
- An increase from seven to nine in the number of RAN patrol boats directly available for civil surveillance and enforcement
- The use of three specialised radar-equipped aircraft to be chartered for special customs response and the re-deployment of two customs launches to Geraldton and Port Hedland with the retention of a third launch at Broome

- The appointment of the Minister for Transport as the Government spokesman on the nature and adequacy of civil coastal surveillance matters and the improvement of surveillance management

- Improvements in surveillance and intelligence collection which would improve and extend existing voluntary reporting systems and encourage wider general public reporting

- Continuation of existing surveillance activities specifically directed to the detection of Indo-Chinese refugee boats.

"The impact of the new program can be seen in the fact that there will be a total of about 27,000 military and civil aircraft flying hours dedicated to civil surveillance in 1978-79 compared with some 4,200 military and 400 civil charter hours flown in 1977-78" said Mr Nixon

"The program to be introduced will involve additional expenditure of about $5 million a year for chartering civil aircraft. As well as this, greater use will be made of existing Defence Force resources, the cost of which will be absorbed in the Defence budget.

"Moreover, the Government intends to consult with State Governments on ways in which they may be able to supplement the Commonwealth's program and co-operate in its implementation by providing equipment, facilities or other assistance which would effectively aid the total effort.

"The Government's objective has been to introduce a surveillance and enforcement capability which combines deterrence of breaches of customs, health, immigration, fisheries and other relevant laws with the highest practicable protection of national quarantine interests."

Mr Nixon said the Department of Transport would continue to co-ordinate civil surveillance operations in close consultation with other Commonwealth departments. In line with the upgraded surveillance program the Department of Transport's Marine Operations Centre - which co-ordinated surveillance activities in the past - would be strengthened and renamed the "Australian Coastal Surveillance Centre."

A special telephone service has been installed in the surveillance centre so members of the public can report free of charge matters of interest such as unusual or suspicious activities of aircraft or vessels. An easily remembered telephone number has been allocated for this purpose - Canberra 47 6666.

"The Government is aware that unauthorised landings pose a risk of introducing a wide range of exotic diseases, some of which could have grave economic consequences," Mr Nixon said.

"While effective quarantine controls are maintained at all established ports of entry, special quarantine measures are required for Australia's sparsely populated northern coastline where unauthorised landings may occur. Regular aerial surveillance for the area concerned is regarded as the most practical basis for an adequate system of quarantine control.

"From the point of view of narcotics and other forms of smuggling, the investigation of suspicious sightings and the arrest of offenders is a specialist activity handled by the Bureau of Customs. But the detection of smugglers in remote areas also requires the support of an effective surveillance system.

"The Government's program takes account of these needs by providing three specially-tasked charter aircraft for use by Customs and the repositioning of specialist Customs launches to high risk areas."

Mr Nixon said that with the introduction of the 200 nautical mile Fishing Zone, a new system of licensing would be introduced which would provide a significant level of control and at the same time hold physical surveillance effort at acceptable levels.

"Licensed foreign fishing vessels will have to report their position at specified intervals, display effective means of identification and call at Australian ports for inspection," he said.

"The main thrust of fisheries surveillance can thus be concentrated on the detection and apprehension of unlicensed foreign intruders."

The new program would allow for effective regular monitoring of the Australian Fishing Zone and would provide additional RAN patrol boats to carry out enforcement activities and spot checks for compliance by licensed foreign boats with Australian requirements.

"Special emphasis will be given to intelligence collection and analysis so that expensive surveillance vehicles can be used to the best possible effect," said Mr. Nixon.

"The new program is designed to be sufficiently flexible to allow surveillance and enforcement measures to be varied quickly to meet changing circumstances.

"In deciding on the present program the Government has taken into account the considerations raised in the "Report on Surveillance and Reaction" by the Government Members' Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee.

"The Government has reserved for the future the possible acquisition of any additional specialised surveillance equipment pending the accumulation of practical experience in the increased surveillance program. For this reason the measures adopted at this stage have been designed to provide a high degree of flexibility without commitments to capital expenditure."

Mr Nixon said that although the new program would be monitored continuously it would be subject to a major review by the Government within two years.

"Many submissions have been received by the Government relating to Australian surveillance needs. Most of these, however, have been based on assumptions of future needs which - in the light of experience - may prove to be invalid," he said.

"In addition most of these schemes would require large-scale capital investment. In this context the concept of a separate coast guard system has been examined and rejected for the time being as a costly duplication of existing and available resources.

"The package of measures I have outlined today represents a realistic and positive response to Australia's coastal surveillance needs in the light of recent experiences."

CANBERRA
Department of Transport
News Release 78/1088

APPENDIX B

LOCAL PROCESSING FACILITIES

1. BICHENO

Processors

2 Safcol and Blue Waters

Additional Facilities

2 Jetties - fresh water and fuel available
2 Slips for small to medium boats
2 Launching ramps

2. TRIABUNNA

Processors

1 Safcol (another will soon be operational)

Additional Facilities

2 Receivers - Boxall and Victorian Canning
3 Jetties - Two having shallow and one deep water. All jetties have fresh water and fuel available.

NOTE: 2 large jetties are also available but not operational at present.

3 Slips for medium to large boats
2 Launching ramps

3. DUNALLEY

Processors

2 Safcol and Victorian Canning

Additional Facilities

2 Jetties - fresh water and fuel available
2 Slips
1 Launching ramp

4. HOBART

Processors

2 Boxall and Watt

Additional Facilities

3 Receivers - Safcol, Dover Fisheries and Victorian Canning
2 Docks - Freshwater and fuel available
5 Slips - One with capacity for 60 metre length ship
Various launching ramps

5. SOUTHPORT

Processors

1 Safcol

Additional Facilities

2 Receivers - Dover Fisheries and Victorian Canning
1 Jetty - Fresh water and fuel available
1 Launching ramp

6. KETTERING

Processors

1 Safcol

Additional Facilities

3 Receivers - Dover Fisheries, Victorian Canning and Boxall
1 Jetty
1 Launching ramp

7. DOVER

Processors

2 Dover Fisheries and Victorian Canning

Additional Facilities

1 Receiver - Safcol
2 Jetties - Fresh water and fuel available
1 Slip
1 Launching ramp

8. MARGATE

Processors

1 Safcol

Additional Facilities

1 Receiver - Boxall
1 Jetty - Fresh water and fuel available
1 Launching ramp

9. STRAHAN

Processors

2 Blue Water and Victorian Canning

Additional Facilities

4 Receivers - Safcol, Boxall, Dover Fisheries and Stanley Fish
3 Jetties - Fresh water and fuel available
1 Slip
1 Launching ramp

10. SMITHTON

Processors

1 Tasmanian Seafoods

Additional Facilities

1 Receiver - Safcol
1 Jetty - Fresh water and fuel available
2 Slips
1 Launching ramp

11. STANLEY

Processors

1 Stanley Fish

Additional Facilities

1 Jetty - Plus wharf berths
2 Slips
1 Launching ramp

12. DEVONPORT

Processors

1 Richey Fish

Additional Facilities

1 Receiver - Safcol
2 Jetties - Plus wharf space, fresh water and fuel available
1 Slip - Large, plus several small slips
1 Launching ramp

13. TAMAR

Processors

2 Victorian Canning and J. Shea

Additional Facilities

2 Wharves
2 Slips
1 Launching ramp

14. BRIDPORT

1 Safcol

Additional Facilities

Various receivers when boats offload
1 Jetty - Freshwater and fuel available
1 Slip
1 Launching ramp

15. ST. HELENS

Processors

1 Safcol

Additional Facilities

2 Receivers - Dover Fisheries and Boxall
1 Jetty - Fresh water and fuel available
Several small jetties
1 Slip
1 Launching ramp

16. LADY BARRON

Processors

3 P.K. Oyster Supply, R. Aitken and Furneaux Fishing.
1 Jetty - Fresh water and fuel available
1 Wharf
1 Slip
1 Lauunhing ramp

* * * * *

OTHER FACILITIES

COLES BAY

3 Receivers
1 Jetty - Fresh water and fuel available
1 Slip
2 Launching ramps

PORT ARTHUR

4 Receivers - Safcol, Boxall, Victorian Canning and Blue Waters
1 Jetty - Fresh water and fuel available
1 Slip
1 Launching ramp

EAGLE HAWK NECK

4 Receivers - Safcol, Boxall, Victorian and Blue Waters
1 Jetty - Fresh water and fuel available
1 Launching ramp

NUBEENA

4 Receivers - Safcol, Boxall, Victorian Canning and Blue Waters
1 Jetty - Fresh water and fuel available
1 Slip
1 Launching ramp

WYNYARD

3 Receivers - Safcol, Boxall and Stanley Fish
1 Jetty - Fresh water and fuel available
2 Launching ramps

PORT SORELL

1 Receiver - Safcol
1 Jetty - Fresh water and fuel available
1 Slip

CURRIE

Receivers - Buyers fly fish out as required
1 Jetty - Fresh water and fuel available
1 Slip
1 Launching ramp

* * * * *



CHAIRMAN - Please feel free to comment on any matter that may arise. Would you now make some introductory remarks and give us a general rundown on the submission?

Mr McGaurr - Tasmania is the State which has least involvement in Defence matters, not by choice but through Commonwealth policies. Those policies are based on strategic realities. The fact that only about 250 Regular army personnel are based in Tasmania disadvantages the State in a number of respects. In terms of sheer economics the Callaghan report on the Tasmanian economy which was commissioned by the present Government in 1977 concluded that Tasmania suffered by comparison with other States in respect of direct Commonwealth employment in the State. It was estimated that were Tasmania to have the same Commonwealth direct employment as other States on a per capita basis there would be 5,000 more Commonwealth employees in Tasmania. This would have multiplier effects that would virtually eliminate unemployment in Tasmania. Particular attention was drawn to the fact that there are not any significant armed forces units in Tasmania. In the lead up to the last election campaign the Prime Minister spelt out a 10-point plan for Tasmania. This included a commitment to examining the possibility of locating regular defence units in Tasmania. The member for Bass who was then Minister for National Development indicated his belief that a Regular Army battalion should be located in Tasmania.

Since then the State Government has taken that up in correspondence with the Federal Government and the Prime Minister has advised that because of Tasmania's low strategic significance and its remoteness from other training areas it was not proposed to base a battalion in Tasmania. No hope has really been held out by the Commonwealth Government that regular units of any sort will be located there. The absence of regular units disadvantages the State, particularly in respect of civil emergencies. Mr Paltridge will be able to expand upon that point better than I. I am sure that members of the Sub-Committee are well aware of the great role that the armed forces have played during natural disasters in Queensland and all over the country. They did help considerably during the disastrous 1967 bushfire in Tasmania but it just happened that reserve forces were in camp at the time of the bushfire and were in fact put to work in a voluntary capacity. Strictly speaking, we understand that was against the Defence Act. There is no power to call out reservists for use in a civil emergency.

CHAIRMAN - That is an interesting point. We will look into that matter.

Mr McGaurr - When a State has no regular forces it is particularly important that reserves are able to be used. I believe it is important that reservists be properly trained to be able to provide assistance to the civil authorities in such defence emergencies.

Mr NEIL - I will have to check that but I thought it was all right to use the reserve in those circumstances, that is, if they were in fact in camp they could be directed. Be that as it may, what would have happened if they were not in camp?

Mr McGaurr - I am sure Mr Paltridge can answer that.

Mr ARMITAGE - Do you argue that the law does not allow for the reserve forces to be called up if they are not in camp at the time of the emergency?

Mr McGaurr - That is my understanding. We would go further than that and say it would not be sufficient simply for the law

to be changed. Army procedures would have to be established so that a callout could efficiently occur and so that these people could work in the same command and control setup as the State Emergency Service.

CHAIRMAN - Apparently there is some procedure available. Are the reserves not called out when a child is lost or something like that occurs?

Mr NEIL - I am sure you could outline the expense of that in Tasmania.

Senator BISHOP - You are going further, however. You are saying there should be an obligation on those enrolled in the reserve forces to respond to calls regarding natural disasters, bushfires and community things like that. I suppose you would agree that it might be contested whether, in doing that, they would advance their military experience. Is there a case for another force to do something like that, rather than the reservists?

Mr McGaurr - We do have a State Emergency Service which is very good. In every mainland State, however, there is a regular military unit of one sort or another available in the State, which is a disciplined body of men available at short notice.

CHAIRMAN - I think probably I am in error because if the reserves were in camp - it is highly likely - we would look to them if they were called up.

Mr ARMITAGE - We clarified that point earlier.

CHAIRMAN - I did not hear that.

Mr McGaurr - Also the State has approached the Commonwealth for assistance in relation to the provision of helicopters. I believe that in all other States military units have helicopters available, and they can be provided for use in search and rescue and other civilian emergency operations. The Tasmanian Government has to hire private helicopters to provide that service because none are available. Again the Commonwealth has been approached and asked to consider locating at least one service helicopter in Tasmania, but that request has not been successful.

The final area that I would like to mention is coastal surveillance. The recently announced expansion of the surveillance effort has concentrated largely on the northern approaches to the continent - that is understandable - but very little effort appears to be being devoted to surveillance in the Southern Ocean. The Tasmanian Government has created a fisheries development authority and has put much of its resources into developing the fishing potential that is provided by the 200-mile zone. It is worth drawing the Sub-Committee's attention to the fact that in respect to the 200-mile zone Tasmania includes Macquarie Island, which is 800 miles south of Hobart. No patrolling is done there at all.

Our Government thinks that if we are to get benefits from joint ventures or licensed foreign fishing in those remote waters there has to be some means of checking if unlicensed fishing boats are intruding. I looked at the last report from the Commonwealth surveillance organisation. In reporting reconnaissance flights during May, it did not even provide a report for the waters around Tasmania exclusively but bracketed that zone with three others and indicated that there had been three surveillance flights over that group of four zones during May. For all we know there may have been no flights at all around the waters of Tasmania. We have had excellent assistance from the Commonwealth whenever a ship has been lost, but the response sometimes is rather slow because aircraft and, particularly, vessels are not immediately available. On occasions foreign fishing boats have been found in Tasmanian waters, but it has been impossible to get a naval vessel into the area in a reasonable time. I think that covers the major points of this submission.

Mr Paltridge - I would like to mention particularly the assistance to the civil emergency situation. A peculiar situation faces Tasmania in terms of potential disaster relief. I think this matter is particularly important. We have a situation which is not quite matched by the rest of Australia because of a combination of different factors. One of these

factors is isolation. The mere fact that there is that strip of water to our north means that we have to be able to react to any situation and sustain our effort for a period in a first aid relief action while we are waiting for further help. If we seek help from the defence forces from the mainland there is this inevitable lead time before we can receive that help. It tends to gear the way in which we tackle the problems that arise.

The second thing that affects us is our limited resources. I am not speaking here purely of financial resources but of population and facilities generally. As a small State with limited resources we have to have low manpower levels in the various emergency services such as the police, the fire services and so on. We rely very heavily on volunteer input even for normal day to day emergencies. We rely on volunteers to a greater extent than do other Australian States. Yet if we have a major disaster such as a transport accident or an industrial accident then the scale is the same as it would be on the mainland. After the Granville train crash in Sydney they were able to send some 32 ambulances to the scene. If we had a similar situation in Hobart then we would be flat out sending between six and eight ambulances and certainly we would be short of instantly available permanent manpower to handle them, but the scale of the disaster might be the same. Of course, the need to involve volunteers regularly once again introduces a lead time problem, which I will mention again.

All of the problems we have to face tend to be problems involving lack of warning. In Western Australia, the Northern Territory and Queensland they have problems with cyclones. They get between 24 hours and 48 hours warning. During flooding in New South Wales and parts of Victoria they also have a warning. All of our existing, past or potential problems tend to involve an immediate impact. Our flooding is flash flooding. You can get 'nil' warning on the 7.30 p.m. newscast and by 9.30 that night you can have stock and property damaged by fast moving floods, particularly in the midlands and in the Launceston area. Our bushfires develop very, very quickly and move considerable distances in a couple of hours. The 1967 bushfires were a prime example of this. It is not a problem we can remove through fire prevention techniques. We share with the south of France and parts of California the worst bushfire problem in the world in the sense that our bushfires are fast moving. We have small tornadoes of the willy willy type which come without warning and tear off roofs and move houses and so on. Of course we

share with the rest of Australia this problem of potential transport accidents, industrial explosions and so on. So, having no warning we tend to have no lead times for community response.

This lack of lead time has resulted in a different approach in many ways, a different response to the problem. In Tasmania we have passed special legislation as they have in Queensland and New South Wales and the Northern Territory. This was the Emergency Services Act 1976. Through this we have organised our counter-disaster response. I mention this because it is significant that in that particular piece of legislation there is provision for the declaration by the Minister of a special emergency. We are very conscious of the short lead times. A Minister may declare a special emergency by word of mouth, over the telephone if necessary, on the advice of our State disaster executive. We exercise then the full powers of the state of disaster instantaneously while waiting for a full state of disaster to be declared. That has been geared to this problem of lack of time and response.

CHAIRMAN - Does that have to be done? Has it been done?

Mr Paltridge - It is not being done yet and I hope we do not have to. My personal belief is that declarations of states of disaster are, in one sense, an admission of failure. The better your organisation the less you should have to declare. But it is there for that reason. We have developed a fairly sophisticated counter-disaster co-ordination system with a full State disaster plan which involves the total range of government in all services and includes government, public, general and voluntary agencies. We have developed a unique interlocking communication system in Tasmania, and it has cost the Tasmanian Government money in introducing frequency changes and moving the private sector. We have a system whereby the police, the fire services, the ambulance services, the state emergency service - all local government - forestry services, which are important in bush fire and various other agencies

may inter-communicate with all others while operating on their own radio frequencies. We have done this by clearing a spectrum of frequencies in the VHF band. This is also significant in army input, as I will mention in a moment.

The lack of lead time has forced us into manning 24-hour duty rooms for all services - even the State Emergency Service. This is not done in other States but we must do it there. We have recently amalgamated all urban, rural, permanent and volunteer fire services into a single service to enable us to give a better co-ordinated response to emergency problems in the shortest possible time. It has necessitated, above all, State expenditure on counter-disaster planning, training and operational systems, which has cost us considerably more per capita than any other State. By way of illustration, on the figures which were taken out for 1978-79 for another Commonwealth inquiry, Queensland was looking at about 78c per head of population, New South Wales about 63c per head, Victoria about 25c per head but we were looking at $1.74 per head and that is not counting key operational buildings which, in that year, took us up to $2.89 per head of population. This was necessary because of the problem we had to face. If we look at that problem and the way we handle it, the input from the defence forces becomes fairly critical. We have, as Mr McGuirr has said, limited permanent manpower standing at less than 250. We have about 1,100 in the reserve forces, but they are deployed to have about 700 in the south, 300 in the north, 100 in the north-west in the Army, only about 100 in the Navy and a very minimal reserve in the Royal Australian Air Force. Being civilians, they are not available readily, unless they are in camp. Our instantaneous disaster call on the Army is less than 250 people who are spread mainly in administrative support and servicing the reserve units. The Army has its radio communications and it provides us with an excellent backup system to the mainland for calling on additional support if interstate communications go out. Within the State, I am afraid there

is not a lot that it can do to help us. It had a high frequence capability but the equipment was withdrawn to the mainland some time ago, and it has virtually nil in the high frequency range. Its VHF communications are incompatible with the State emergency service and disaster system which has been developed. They are not compatible in terms of switching to the frequency ranges.

Senator BISHOP - What happens elsewhere in Australia? Is that because of the Tasmanian Government's spectrum or is that because of the Department of Defence?

Mr Paltridge - In part it is both, but another reason would be the very limited capability range in the Defence force equipment which is available. A capability of overlapping exists in other States. The Army has transport available and trucks, stores and other equipment are on issue but then we run into a problem when there is a short lead time. It is there but in an emergency you cannot find anybody to drive it or to issue the stores, the blankets or whatever is needed because you have very low manpower complement permanently on tap. You have to wait until you draw in the reserves to have people to drive the trucks which are available or to issue the stores to deploy them and make them available. That situation is not faced on the mainland.

We have had considerable assistance in the past. The 1960 Derwent Valley flood is mentioned in the written evidence and help was provided during emergencies arising from bushfires and the Tasman Bridge. To amplify the point Mr McGaurr made, we have had in the past assistance from the Army Reserve in various lesser flooding situations and in some other circumstances on the basis of local commander decision. It has been subsequently discovered that this is illegal and that is the problem. You can ask for them while they are in camp but you cannot ask for them to be called out when they are not in camp. In a situation where almost all the total capability is the Reserve, there is a resource with its own logistics - it is not available to us readily.

Basically, the problems are the lack of available personnel and the maintenance of a helicopter. By way of illustration currently the Tasmanian Government maintains that helicopter by an agreement with a private operator. We pay a retainer of just under $80,000 a year to the private operator just for having the helicopter there and for him to make it available with an average daylight hour lift-off time of half an hour. We pay $368 per hour on top of that. When we began the system in

1978-79, it cost the Government overall $85,000 in that year. I have not the finalised figures for the financial year just ended, but significantly $11,000 has been spent in flying time alone in the first six months of this year and that is without the retainer.

One other odd problem which became evident occurred at the end of last year. We had an outbreak of an exotic disease at a pig farm at Legana in the north of the State. Fortunately it turned out not to be swine fever or foot and mouth but the Department of Agriculture moved very quickly and we were able to stamp out the infection, circumscribe the infected area and deal with it. We had to destroy the animals and we ran into a problem, which the Army could have solved for us immediately, in connection with the quality of weaponry and the trained personnel to use the weapons. While it was humorous to many members of the public, shooting pigs in the middle of the night was not humorous to the farmers because the pigs are very difficult to kill. The right weaponry was instantaneously available but we had no power to draw on it nor did we have the personnel to use it. If it had been foot and mouth disease and if it had been one farm further away, and not contained, the whole of Australia would still now be suffering severe economic losses as a result of restrictions on exports.

I could sum up by saying that this leads us to the two priorities which were mentioned in our submission. Priority should obviously be given, as I see it from my chair, to the stationing of a permanent unit in Tasmania because this would eliminate the lead time problem. Failing that, the need to be able to have the power to call out the Army Reserve to assist has to be met.

CHAIRMAN - Your remarks are quite timely. Had new circumstances not arisen internationally our next report was going to be the capacity of the three Services to participate with civilian authorities. So this evidence is quite valuable.

Mr ARMITAGE - Mr McGaurr, you mentioned the Prime Minister's reply to the request for a battalion to be established in

Tasmania. You stated that he said that Tasmania's low strategic significance would not warrant one. Were those his precise words and if so was more information given establishing why Tasmania had such a low strategic significance?

Mr McGaurr - I am not absolutely sure that the exact phrase was 'low strategic significance' but the adjectives 'low' and 'significant' were in a three-word phrase - I am not sure of the noun. It was coupled with its remoteness from established training areas as another reason. There was no elaboration.

Mr ARMITAGE - Mr Paltridge, about seven years or eight years ago there were quite a lot of suggestions moving around and quite a bit of inquiry in the Defence Department and in the various States on whether the State Emergency Services should be brought under the umbrella of the Defence Department and the defence forces. Have you any views on that? This in itself might assist the very case you are making about natural disasters.

Mr Paltridge - The situation is that the State Emergency Services are State funded for their basic operations, their manpower and so on but they do receive assistance and co-ordination from the Commonwealth through the Natural Disasters Organisation which is within the Department of Defence. I recall the lead up to that and Mr McGaurr was perhaps somewhat closer to the rationale behind that particular move at the time. I know that when the Natural Disasters Organisation developed from the earlier Directorate of Civil Defence, part of the reasoning behind its development within Defence was a desire to promote a closer rapport between the defence forces and the civilian disaster authorities. This was in order to provide more opportunity for defence training with civilian authorities so that they could be able to help and so on. I personally am not convinced and certainly as far as Tasmania is concerned I do not believe that particular aim has been achieved. I am not convinced that Defence is necessarily the right umbrella for the Natural Disasters Organisation except that the main thrust of Commonwealth support to a State, once there is a disaster situation, is made by the

defence forces. That is probably the most powerful argument for having the Natural Disasters Organisation within Defence. Certainly, I believe there should be closer rapport than has developed. Perhaps the aims have not been achieved.

Mr ARMITAGE - In the event that the SES were brought under the umbrella of the Defence Department, surely this in itself would achieve the very type of thing you are proposing, that is, a greater military presence in Tasmania, particularly by the Army. If your State Emergency Services were under that umbrella, surely that would mean more of those forces would be established in Tasmania for training purposes and so on.

Mr McGaurr - When the Natural Disasters Organisation was established it was hoped that by making the head of that Organisation a serving military officer the effect you are describing would be achieved, without at the same time subordinating the State organisations to a Commonwealth authority. None of the States would have agreed to that.

Mr ARMITAGE - I remember making representations on it myself. I turn now to the question of coastal surveillance and fisheries, and the activity which the State Government has undertaken recently. Has there been any evidence to date of many foreign poaching vessels moving into Tasmanian waters?

Mr McGaurr - Yes, there has been. It is not on the scale of some of the illegal prawning which has occurred in the Gulf of Carpentaria and so on, but there have been Russian, Taiwanese and other vessels discovered taking squid illegally from around Tasmania. There are frequent allegations by local fishermen that the Japanese are fishing for species for which they should not fish and of course we just do not know about the distant waters such as Macquarie Island and South Tasman Rise which are likely to be significant fisheries. Our fisheries authority, in negotiating with foreigners who wish to get access to those waters, finds itself trying to get information from those foreigners because they know more about the waters than we do.

Mr ARMITAGE - Have you any comments on the strategic situation of Tasmania in the event of Australia's becoming involved in a war, whether it be major or minor?

Mr McGaurr - I do not have access to intelligence information at present or to the official strategic assessments. I would have thought that in respect of potential enemy naval threats

the waters around Tasmania were as much a source of danger to Australia as any others. Bass Strait is a vital shipping lane and the oil installations are nearby. The southern part of Tasmania could not be said to be close to a major shipping lane and in that respect I am sure it is true that in the short run Tasmania is of less strategic importance in the foreseeable military environment than other States.

Mr ARMITAGE - But Bass Strait with the oil-----

Mr McGaurr - Bass Strait, of course, is vital and no doubt Tasmanians think that the defence of Tasmania is rather important.

Mr NEIL - What reasons have been given by the Commonwealth for the failure, so far anyway, to introduce legislation relating to call out of the reserve for disaster purposes?

Mr McGaurr - I am not aware of any.

Mr Paltridge - No, I am not aware that any reasons have been given.

Mr NEIL - Have they ever sent any reasons to you?

Mr Paltridge - I am certainly not aware of any.

Senator BISHOP - Has the issue been raised on a specific incident or do you just have a general feeling about it?

Mr Paltridge - I understand there has been considerable discussion at Commonwealth level regarding this aspect. I am given to understand from my own senior officers - all of whom tend to be senior Army Reserve officers as well on the island and the automatic thing tends to happen - that the difficulties lie with the required legislative changes. But that is all I have.

Mr NEIL - One of the arguments which sometimes is raised is that there could be difficult community liaison problems if, for example, a township is mobilised to build levee banks or fight bushfires and that town contains the people doing it voluntarily in their own time, yet there are from the same town Reserve soldiers being paid for it and receiving other forms of allowances or rights to compensation which the townsfolk do not have. Do you see this as a significant problem?

Mr Paltridge - It is a line of argument with which I am familiar and I have heard it raised in other States. I will give you an illustration of the type of problem we in Tasmania deal with daily. You raised the bushfire problem and the fire problem generally and I have mentioned volunteers. We now have a single fire service but all our country brigades consist of volunteers. It is not generally recognised that of all our urban brigades only two are permanently fully manned whilst two consist of one-third permanent members and two-thirds volunteers alongside each other and the other 30 urban brigades also consist of volunteers. In fires, particularly in fringe areas, as happened, for example, right through the last summer period you have permanents working alongside partly-paid volunteers alongside unpaid volunteers. You do get, it is true, the odd individual who looks sideways, but we have had no evidence at all - and this system has continued for a long while - that this has downgraded the volunteer effort.

Mr NEIL - Have you made any investigation as to what training areas might be made available to the Army as a quid pro quo for this battalion you want there? I say that because training areas are a problem for the Services - it is hard to get them, costs are involved and there are environmental questions. There is a lot of effort to obtain extra areas at Puckapunyal, for example, for shooting by tanks. Have you looked at this? Could you offer anything?

Mr Paltridge - My understanding subject to Mr McGaurr who has probably looked at this much more closely and again it is an understanding which I tend to get from my officers - is that the Army is not as short of its own current training areas in Tasmania as it may be in certain other States, in that it is reasonably well serviced by available training areas.

Mr McGaurr - I think that is true. We have not explicitly addressed the problem because we have never had a sufficiently positive response from the Commonwealth on its willingness to locate a unit in Tasmania. I do recall however that a Commonwealth response - and I cannot recall whether it was a Prime Minister's letter or a letter from officers - was that a battalion could not be located in Tasmania because of the problem of timber rights and training areas. We wrote back querying that assertion and afterwards the Prime Minister wrote and gave the reasons I advanced a short while ago regarding strategic value and proximity to other training areas.

Mr NEIL - Does the proximity relate to other training areas as you understand it - I understand they mean outside Tasmania - rather than to the lack of potential or actual training areas in Tasmania?

Mr McGaurr - That is my understanding.

Mr NEIL - Regarding the helicopter, I can see what you are asking for but I do not quite see why the Commonwealth should provide this. I can see why possibly there should be a helicopter there for military purposes and you might use it occasionally for emergency purposes, but I do not quite see why the Commonwealth should provide a helicopter which you would be using for a relatively extensive amount of hours for general purposes as you have just outlined. Can you justify that any further?

Mr Paltridge - My reference to the helicopter service was to illustrate one of those aspects in which we are disadvantaged in the range of defence force support available to us.

Senator BISHOP - You need a Service helicopter. That is your argument.

Mr Paltridge - Yes, and even if it were not readily available on site it would be much more readily available than it is to get one across Bass Strait.

CHAIRMAN - This has been a subject of tremendous importance to us in the far north in a similar way. I had proposed had I continued as Minister - and the people involved could not have

been more enthusiastic - that rather than have those helicopter crews constantly training in the same stereotyped area they should be taken across to your part of the world during the most vulnerable time at least. Then if they had had to go back there they would have had the training, they would know their refuelling points, they would be familiar with the type of thing that could happen and then when the cyclone season came, when we have big monsoonal rains, they would be sent to the far north for training. We were looking at it and getting prepared to try to do something about it, and knowing my discussions with Mr Lance Barnard he no doubt looked at the same thing, but always there were difficulties with your advisers. I am not reflecting on them in any way but they were a stereotyped group in those days. It was a very conservative and reactionary atmosphere. They talked about the amount of money involved and said it sounded simple to take helicopters up there but you have this and that and so on. I think we will be looking at this rather closely.

Mr NEIL - What do you think of the Chairman's suggestion?

Mr Paltridge - I think this is an excellent point of view. I will add by way of illustration that again being a very small State we are fortunate in use of helicopters in that they are within flying range whenever we need them. This is a big advantage and you need not to have staging posts for fuel and so on to get a helicopter where you need it. I think the best illustration I can give of the peculiarities of Tasmania and its requirement for helicopters arises out of the last summer season. I think the panel is aware of the peculiarities and vagaries of Tasmanian weather - we can develop blizzards in certain parts of the island at 20 minutes' notice and this does not have to be in winter. During one day in the fire season we used the one helicopter to move into the centre of the island to lift out two climbers in trouble because of the weather. We dropped them off in the midlands so that the helicopter could move east to pull out some fire fighters caught in the front of a very bad advancing fire front. The total range of movement from west to

east was probably 100 miles. They are the sort of conditions under which we have to operate. The greater availability of aircraft during certain seasons would be very much welcomed.

Mr NEIL - What facilities are available for visiting American ships? What is the attitude of the Tasmanian Government to visits by American ships. I remember going to see the 'Enterprise' when it was in Tasmania. Have you had any problem with nuclear powered ships, the weaponry on them or any of that sort of business?

Mr McGaurr - We had no problem with the 'Enterprise' being permitted into Hobart, which was at a time when it was not welcome elsewhere.

Mr NEIL - I had to go to Tasmania to see it. It did not go to Sydney. As far as you know, is it the Government's standing policy that the Americans are welcome?

Mr Paltridge - I am the chairman of the Nuclear Powered Warships Visits Committee for Tasmania. Its work is continuing so that it can stand ready should further visits be proposed.

Senator BISHOP - What is the greatest issue that you see in this question of the defence forces being ancillary to the emergency forces of the State? Is it the new economic zone or will that be a growing problem to the State and require determination by the Federal Government? Are you seeking relatively the same arrangements as apply in the other States whereby the State Government would have members of the defence forces made available to it if it called for them? If the Natural Disasters Organisation developed or expanded its activities, would your local problem be solved?

Mr McGaurr - I would prefer not to try to make a judgment on behalf of the Government as to the relative importance of improving coastal and long range maritime surveillance, compared with improving services after natural disasters. We see them as separate problems. Both of them cause us a good deal of concern. We feel that maritime reconnaissance poses a severe problem. We think that in the distant southern waters, those around Macquarie Island and the Tasman Rise, there is a real need for the physical

presence of vessels, rather than relying upon maritime reconnaissance. From time to time there are long range maritime patrol flights, but that is fairly rare. We had a recent illustration of that when we were negotiating with the Commonwealth Government over a proposal for a floating dock to be located in Tasmania to service vessels operating in the Antarctic area and the Southern Ocean. One of the problems with that service is that a good proportion of the fishing vessels operating in the Antarctic area and the Southern Ocean happen to be Russian. Our Department was advised by a Commonwealth source that the Commonwealth had been advised that the number of Russian vessels in the Antarctic waters approximate to Tasmania - the number that would find it better to be serviced in Hobart than in, say, Singapore - was 10. Estimates received from sources that we would respect more are that there would be 250 ships.

We eventually found what we thought was the origin of this figure of 10. There was a Qantas joy flight from Australia to Antarctica and back. The pilot reported that he had seen 10 Russian fishing vessels during the flight. So the state of Australian maritime reconnaissance of southern waters is laughable.

Senator BISHOP - In regard to the use of the defence services, is Tasmania in a worse position than other States because, as you said, it does not have a defence complement and it cannot use the reserve forces although they have been used in the past?

Mr McGaurr - Might I stress the economic consequences of this situation? The Commonwealth has recognised that Tasmania is a disadvantaged community economically and the Commonwealth has devoted considerable efforts to those problems. Tasmania is the envy of other States in that it gets a higher per capita share of Commonwealth tax revenues. One reason for this is that we get so little by way of the Commonwealth's expenditure. I think one has to recognise that taxation subtracts economic strength from any State economy, but much of that money is recycled in the States through Commonwealth expenditure of one sort or another, including defence expenditure. Tasmania get virtually none of that taxation coming back to it. So taxation is a drain on its economy. If the Commonwealth was able to locate any of its defence activities in Tasmania, at least part of that taxation money would be recycled. An example of the sort of thing that could be done is given by the food technology unit at Scottsdale. The Army has a very good food science establishment at Scottsdale although I could not say how many people it employs. It is fairly small.

CHAIRMAN - I have heard it is one of the best in the world.

Mr McGaurr - Yes, it is. It is a magnificent unit. It has spin-offs for local industry. Local food processing industries get to know what is going on at Scottsdale. The scientists who work there are quite open about their work and quite happy to see local companies benefit. It may be, in the whole range of

defence activities, that if we cannot justify the location of a battalion, there are other support activities which could be easily located in Tasmania as in any other State. I would welcome attention by the Federal Government to that possibility.

Mr NEIL - How often are military exercises carried out in Tasmania? Does any part of the Defence Force ever go to Tasmania to exercise? Does the 'Melbourne' or other such ships go to Tasmania every now and again? Do any Air Force aeroplanes ever turn up?

Mr McGaurr - I do not know of there ever having been a military exercise there. Naval vessels pay calls, but in the time I have lived in Tasmania there never has been a military exercise.

Mr NEIL - I have not spent much time down there, but I could understand that if we wanted our services to train in some of the roughest terrain, Tasmania has it. Is that right?

Mr Paltridge - Yes.

CHAIRMAN - I will get back to the possibility of a battalion strength in Tasmania. I will be quite frank. At the time this was suggested, a great enthusiast for it was Colonel Oxley, but there was not a convincing argument to station in Tasmania a battalion as part of the permanent Army. We were thinking in terms of building up a Citizens Military Forces unit. I do not know whether you could build one up to battalion strength, although you might under the present circumstances. What I found in Tasmania - I pay full credit to the people there - was an intense appreciation of the defence of this country. They seemed to be orientated to defence thinking. In retrospect, a lot of the people with whom I came into contact, were in the slightly older age group. As the two people who are probably best equipped to provide the information, can you tell me whether that great enthusiasm continues? Are they still defence conscious, generally speaking?

Mr McGaurr - Yes. Recruiting statistics would continue to demonstrate that.

CHAIRMAN - I think this Committee is going to be looking seriously at the reserve forces generally. It is going to form a very substantial part of our recommendations on the all embracing guideline we have been given, the monitoring of the implementation of defence policies. Do you think we could at least build up a nucleus of battalion strength there? I am thinking purely of reserves. I do not know whether the position has changed sufficiently over the last 10 years to enable you to get a little more encouragement for the establishment of permanent forces. Remember of course that if you establish a reserve of this nature you will have the structure and the quartermaster side of it in case of an emergency. If you want a truck within minutes, with blankets and all the other equipment you would need then a sufficiently large reserve strength would give you such a structure permanently. I would like to hear your comments on that.

Mr McGaurr - Most of Mr Paltridge's staff are CMF officers.

CHAIRMAN - Are they on the Army Reserve?

Mr Paltridge - Yes, indeed. One of my officers is the previous senior Army Reserve officer for the island, Colonel Patmore. This seems to be a pattern in Tasmania. I have found when recruiting officers into the emergency services over the past five years that our need for disciplined people who understand discipline, service and response, has resulted in our attracting Army Reserve officers anyway. While you were speaking of forming a core I was looking down the current listing of the permanent and reserve units in the State. We have a tremendous range as it is, apart from district support units and so on. We have the 16 Field Battery RAA, 12 Field Squadron RAE, 146 Signals Squadron, 12 Independent Rifle Company, 40 Independent Rifle Company, 6 Field Force Group Intelligence Unit, 44 Transport Squadron, 172 Transport Group commanded by one of our officers, 10 Field Ambulance, 6 Ordinance Platoon, 6 Electrical Mechanical Engineers Platoon, Detachment of 6 Royal Australian Pay Corps, Military Police Platoon, 6 Training Group headed recently by one

of my officers, 6 Supply Company, 6 Transport and Movement Group, Hobart Workshop Platoon and so on. We have a tremendous range of units which are popular, for which we do not have recruiting problems and which are well deployed throughout the community.

CHAIRMAN - It would be a disadvantage to have such a fragmented range.

Mr Paltridge - I think so. There is, if I may say so, a very strong parochialism in Tasmania.

CHAIRMAN - I think this is of sufficient importance for us to at least have a closer look at it. I am promising nothing of course. I cannot promise anything for the Committee, the members of which are heavily committed for the rest of the year. But if we could go down there for a day it may be well worth while your organising a group of people to come and discuss this possibility with us. Please do not think I am promising anything definite but the Committee will look at it, I give you that assurance. The occasion has been very impressive.

Mr NEIL - Bearing in mind the diversity of units, if you call them all out for an emergency what is the command and communication arrangement? How many fellows do you get out of that actually doing the job?

Mr Paltridge - If you pull them all out you will probably get about 1,000 or 1,100 throughout the State. If you wanted to use them intensively for fighting a fire you would have to task them as groups under existing fire commanders and emergency service personnel and so on and rely on civilian communications to tie it all together.

Mr NEIL - If you call every one of them up each one then becomes a fire beater or something. He becomes one of the manpower pool. This is directed to the relevant sub-area under the control of the local person in charge. The other option is to send people as units, under their own commanders, to link up and liaise and perform various tasks. Unless this is worked out properly there could be serious problems of co-ordination. I do not know whether you need a headquarters or one overall military command but I can see a lot of arguments arising between different blokes. Have you thought about solving these problems? Have you worked out with the forces what structure would be set up if the legislation were provided?

Mr Paltridge - Your point is very valid. This situation is parallel to the one within the civilian community anyway. Within Tasmania we have tried not to bring people into common groups. For example, the State Emergency Service as a body does not have its own first aid groups and welfare groups and so on. Instead it legally affiliates with those groups in the community that normally carry out those functions. So our problem in disaster operations is essentially one of co-ordination. We work across a much wider cross section than this, even in the pure welfare field. It is a matter to which we have addressed ourselves when working out standing operating procedures, communications and co-ordination for the State disaster plan. But that presupposes an existing legal base on which to do it and this we do not have at the moment with the Army Reserve. We do it on an ad hoc basis

at present. We know that if they are in camp we can use them but who is going to be in camp when we have a problem?

Mr NEIL - Under the Defence Act you would only have the power to call them out in aid of the civil power. They would still ultimately be subject to the control of the Minister for Defence and the Defence Act. It would have to be hammered out. The whole thing would have to be set up properly, would it not?

Mr Paltridge - There are existing arrangements which have been hammered out at Commonwealth and State level for aid to the civil power from the permanent forces. They work very, very well indeed.

Senator BISHOP - But if you got that power, the reserve forces themselves might think that was a burden which should be assumed by another organisation such as the Natural Disasters Organisation. Your main argument is that the Regular Army complement in Tasmania should be expanded, not that the whole thing should depend on the reserve forces.

Mr Paltridge - My indication was that the prime requirement was a permanent unit. If that was impossible, then the ability to call on the reserves was next.

Mr McGaurr - My recollection is that the Miller report sought how to call out the reserves in circumstances less than a defence emergency, although Dr Millar was not thinking of merely civil emergencies but of military situations short of defence emergencies. So the question we are raising leans into that other consideration as well.

Mr NEIL - The Government has specifically rejected that Millar recommendation. I do not know why it was rejected, but I imagine one of the reasons was that it included a calling out for broad purposes less than defence emergency or war, and it was not confined to natural disasters. At this stage the Government's policy has been set but, as far as natural disasters are concerned, we are certainly listening to your submission and you may want to take it up directly with the Federal Government.

Mr ARMITAGE - Going back to my question about bringing the State emergency services under the umbrella of the Department of

Defence, it seems to me that this is a logical way of getting the most effective State emergency services. You would have them under the umbrella; you would have the availability of Defence Department facilities; and you would have far greater automatic co-operation between the two. I know from experience that the SES men in the field see this as the most practical proposition but the opposition seems to come from the central bodies in each State. I cannot help but wonder whether this is the old issue of State rights, of wanting to keep control of these things themselves. Have you any comment on that? My personal experience with two State emergency services organisations which have to deal with some pretty serious problems such as floods, is that they see this as the most effective way, and they have comparatively recently even made approaches for the use of Army Reserve facilities.

Mr McGaurr - I think a valid fear expressed by State authorities is that the volunteerism on which the State emergency services rely may not be forthcoming if the service is seen to be part of a military organisation rather than as something that collaborates and works with the military organisation. I think the Natural Disasters Organisation originally recognised that. The NDO at a Commonwealth level was seen as a means of mobilising the great resources of the defence forces for use in civil emergencies in co-operation with the civil organisations. I cannot speak for the people in the field in Tasmania, but no doubt Mr Paltridge can.

Mr Paltridge - Do I understand that you propose the possibility of the State emergency services as bodies being part of the defence system. Is that the suggestion?

Mr ARMITAGE - I think the original proposition was that they would be brought under the Defence Department for provision of facilities and equipment and for the provision of troops in emergency to make it a much more effective organisation with much quicker action through having that necessary co-operation. The impression I gained was that this was what the troops in the field wanted. Those actually working in the SES did not fear that this would mean less voluntary effort on the part of individuals, but there was opposition to this from the central bodies of the State emergency services.

Mr Paltridge - That question opens up a somewhat new field. I do not see it as being directly germane to this inquiry, but you have made the point that there is this feeling at grass roots level. You have made a point that there seems to be some opposition perhaps at the centralised State level. I agree with that. I should perhaps stick my neck out and say that, as a result of 12 years in this game, I have a very definite view that the State emergency services - as distinct from police, fire, ambulance and so on - would have a better chance of being effective if instead they were organised, say, roughly parallel to the National Parks and Wildlife Service. In other words, it was a national emergency service, within Defence if you like, but that within each State it dealt with State bodies in exactly the same way as it does now. Certainly that approach would lead to much greater standardisation and interchange of expertise and, I think, a simplification of support. That is my personal view.

Mr ARMITAGE - Purely personal?

Mr Paltridge - Yes.

Mr ARMITAGE - That is my personal view too.

CHAIRMAN - Let us look at a scenario of a possible extreme situation in which your most vulnerable asset would be your hydro-electric installations. Imagine some discernible threat - in

either war or peace. What military or civil force would be available to rush in to protect those installations?

Mr Paltridge - There would be very little. I am particularly concerned with this aspect, firstly because I have a direct responsibility for civil defence in its proper sense; and secondly for certain other security situations we concern ourselves with. In terms of protection of vital points within the community we have, as I indicated earlier, a small police force and a very small Defence Force capability. I do not believe that we have the capability to provide security protection of vital points in Tasmania at present. That extends not only to situations such as the Hydro-Electric Commission installations but to such places as the Selfs Point Liquid Fuels Tank Farm in Hobart, the general area of the Bell Bay industrial area, the Electrolytic Zinc Co of A/Asia Ltd, which has a very important provisory role also in Hobart, et cetera. We have a number of areas which, either in terms of Commonwealth input industrially, or in terms of maintenance of community viability in Tasmania, if a perceivable threat were posed, then undoubtedly assistance would have to be provided from the mainland. We could not handle it.

Senator BISHOP - Do you consider that is the obligation of the national government, to so protect those facilities? Is it the prime duty of the Australian Government, the Australian Defence Force?

Mr Paltridge - There has been an argument for many years, as I recall, as to whether or not the protection of the civilian community from the effects of war is a Commonwealth or State responsibility. I believe it is a joint responsibility. Unlike some of my colleagues wearing hats similar to my own, I believe that the States have a very strong responsibility in this area. But there are certain areas that States cannot provide for, and that is where it comes back to Commonwealth support. In other words, I see the Commonwealth accepting a role when the State, as an entity, cannot protect its population.

Senator BISHOP - I take it that is a problem you raise within the terms of reference of our Committee, that is, the ability of the defence forces to respond.

Mr Paltridge - We must look after ourselves first, but beyond that point we have to turn elsewhere.

CHAIRMAN - Thank you very much indeed for a most interesting discussion. I am sure you have aroused the interest of the Committee in the possibility of expanding our forces down in your apple isle. We appreciate the effort you have made in getting across.

Luncheon adjournment

Mr Colin John NOBLE, Chairman, Australia Defence Association, P.O. Box 329, North Melbourne, Victoria, and

Mr Michael James O'CONNOR, Secretary, Australia Defence Association, P.O. Box 329, North Melbourne, Victoria,

were sworn and examined.

CHAIRMAN - Welcome, gentlemen. We are very pleased to have you along. I read your submission with a great deal of interest and we appreciate your interest. For the 'Hansard' record, would you please state your private addresses?

Mr Noble - I live at 4/29 Bell Street, Hawthorn, Victoria.

Mr O'Connor - My address is 32 Glenview Road, East Doncaster, Victoria.

CHAIRMAN - You may at any time request your evidence or part of your evidence, or answers to specific questions to be given in camera and if you do so the Committee will fully consider the request. The Committee has before it your submission which is our submission no. 19 titled 'The Implementation of the Australian Government's Announced Defence Programmes'. Are there any alterations or additions you would like to make to the document before we incorporate it in the transcript of evidence?

Mr Noble - Yes. I would like to make an additional sub-paragraph called 'Reserve Forces' which will follow paragraph 55 on page 7 of the submission. It reads:

RESERVE FORCES.

55(a). The reserve forces have been an area of major neglect in defence programs. Lack of defence money has resulted in very little being available to develop anything more than a token reserve force in spite of advertising et cetera to foster greater community involvement. Without properly constituted trained and involved reserve forces any announced defence deterrent posture, the 1976 White Paper and subsequent government statements, is meaningless. Unfortunately, the present emphasis on an Army Reserve is only a small part of the requirement.

55(b) The reserve force will provide a depth in deterrent capability and mainly through Naval and Air Force skilled reserves. There is an underlying belief fostered by the Government that because we have a permanent force, i.e. many in uniform all the time, we are defended adequately. This is far from the truth.

55(c). Our ability and capability to sustain long term operations in a deterrent role will be largely dependent on whether we are able to replace and/or supplement the permanent skilled forces with skilled reserve forces. 'Skilled' means those men and women who may take up to two to three years or longer to train. To have a deterrent defence, in depth, using only permanent forces would be too costly and quite unnecessary. It would tie down too many young men and women, many of whom could utilise their skills in a civilian capacity and contribute at the same time to the economic growth of the community.

55(d). An adequate skilled reserve capacity will take considerable time to build up. This capability can be achieved by reducing the post-training time of the majority of men and women in the permanent forces and instituting an active reserve period of service of, say, three to four years. Additionally, partially trained men and women in appropriate civilian skills can be accepted directly into the active reserve.

55(e). One of the major problems now is that the Services spend considerable time and resources in training men and women who then spend relatively long periods of time in the permanent Services. Some trade-off is needed: more training potential, less permanent service, greater throughput hence a greater deterrent capability. It must be remembered that personnel are as important as the hardware. Too much public emphasis has been focussed on the hardware.

CHAIRMAN - Were there any other additions or changes?

Mr Noble - No, that is correct.

CHAIRMAN - Is it the wish of the Committee that the submission in its revised form be incorporated in the transcript of evidence? There being no objection, it is so ordered.

(The document read as follows) -

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT'S ANNOUNCED DEFENCE PROGRAMMES.

Submission to the Defence Sub-committee of the Joint Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee

by

AUSTRALIA DEFENCE ASSOCIATION (VICTORIA)

INTRODUCTION.

1. In the interests of brevity, this submission will concentrate on a number of what the Association regards as key principles and will suggest solutions to some problems which have a bearing on the implementation of the defence programme. A summary of conclusions and recommendations is at paras.73-4. Comments on some specific projects are set out in Annexes.

2. We wish to draw attention to our submission made to the Sub-Committee on its previous reference, particularly in relation to the role of the Defence Force in coastal surveillance.

DEFENCE PHILOSOPHY.

3. The 1976 White Paper "Australian Defence" opened with the words "The first responsibility of government is to provide the nation with security from armed attack and from the constraints on independent national decisions imposed by the threat of such attack". (Emphasis added).

4. A.D.A. endorses this view and that of the Swedish Government, expressed in its various defence publications. Thus :

> "The aim of this (security) policy is to secure a national freedom of action in all aspects in a form decided by the people in order to maintain and develop the country politically, socially, culturally, etc. according to Swedish values".
>
> - The Swedish Naval Defence.

5. Given this philosophy, it is not sufficient to possess the capability to build a resistance to armed attack because the very threat of an attack may inhibit the development of the capability.

6. The capability must be displayed in the form of combat-ready forces supported by industry, government and the community to deter attack. Again, from the Swedish philosophy :

> "The prime purpose of defence is to keep the country out of war. Further, the defence has to be so strong that the cost to defeat Sweden is out of proportion to the strategic advantages which an aggressor might obtain".
>
> - The Defence of Sweden.

7. In the long run, a policy of defence by deterrence will be cheaper in money terms and incomparably cheaper in terms of preserving life and the welfare of the Australian community.

8. The current policy, said to be based on deterrence, of deploying minimal forces capable of no more than maintaining the state of the art and with a dubious capacity to expand to meet a threat, has no deterrent effect and may indeed invite attack by the very weakness it demonstrates.

9. A.D.A. perceives a fundamental flaw in the Australian Government's concept of deterrence. In evidence to your Sub-Committee on 25th July, 1979, the Defence Department indicated its view of deterrence as responding to a threat to attack so as to deter that attack.

10. The Association believes that an aggressor will threaten Australia not merely on the basis of forces-in-being but also on the basis of our mobilisation capability within the time-scale of the attack or the warning time. In our view, deterrence must deter the threat rather than the attack itself. This will only be achieved by having substantial forces in being, either as regular forces or rapidly mobiliseable reserves.

STRATEGIC POLICY.

11. The formulation of strategic policy in Australia has invariably been based on the identification of some threat to national security. Even in the more analytical literature, the discussion of putative threats underlies every consideration of Australia's vulnerability.

12. A.D.A. believes that such an approach to national security is impractical and indeed dangerous for three reasons. It is too vulnerable to inadequate information, misinterpretation of available information and wishful thinking. It is too dependent - against the evidence - on enjoying a longer warning time than mobilising time. Finally, it has no deterrent effect; on the contrary, it may hasten the emergence of threats because of the demonstrable weakness that it encourages.

13. A.D.A. is concerned at the attitude of the Department of Defence which, in evidence to your Committee, limited its consideration of threat to the threat of a large-scale invasion of the Australian mainland, then proceeded to demonstrate to its own satisfaction that the threat did not exist, that its emergence could be detected and that the country could mobilise in time to defeat it.

14. By concentrating on this certainly remote contingency, the Department ignores potential threats which could arise well within an acceptable warning time, relatively low or medium level threats which would nevertheless be catastrophic for an unprepared victim.

THE CHANGING STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT.

15. There are in fact a whole range of strategic developments which could easily take place in the next five years with adverse consequences for Australia's security. These include :

- the stabilisation of Kampuchea under Vietnamese control and the freeing of Vietnamese military resources for other adventures;
- the de-stabilisation of India, Pakistan and Iran following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan;
- the development of insurgent movements enjoying Vietnamese support in the Philippines, West Irian or the outer Indonesian islands.

16. These developments could lead directly to major threats to Thailand by regular Vietnamese forces or Vietnamese-supported guerilla movements or to the establishment of Soviet maritime forces at Bandar Abbas in Iran, Bombay and Madras in India and Cam Ranh in Vietnam.

17. Within ten years, the natural development of these moves could leave Australia completely isolated.

18. There is in addition a whole range of contingencies which could pose medium level threats to Australia in a period in which we would not be able to respond with the forces at our disposal, either now or in the next five to ten years, without a significant rearmament programme.

19. The following contingencies are, the Association submits, far from fanciful even if no public evidence for them exists at present :

- Australia could be faced with minor lodgements in areas such as the Pilbara or Darwin in support of aboriginal land rights or some other manufactured issue;

- we could be faced with harrassment of our trade in the Indonesian straits, the South China Sea or the Indian Ocean, the source of harrassment being either the Soviet Union, Indonesia, Vietnam or India;

- we could be faced with Vietnamese intervention in the region in support of national or rebel movements in Papua New Guinea, East Timor, West Irian, Philippines or Thailand;

- any threat such as harrassment of Japanese trade has immediate implications for Australia directly as well as Free World defence implications;

- any attempt to enforce the protection of Australia's Exclusive Economic Zone against the Soviet Union could easily lead to retaliation, even in the short term, from Soviet forces operating from Vietnamese bases. The size and nature of Soviet forces even now using Vietnamese bases has awesome implications for Australia.

20. While some of these developments would have global security implications and could therefore attract United States intervention in support of Australia, the present state of U.S. military power makes such intervention unlikely if similar or more intense threats to American interests are mounted simultaneously elsewhere.

21. It is perfectly conceivable that the United States would expect Australia to be responsible for maritime security in the region.

22. WHILE NO EVIDENCE FOR THE EXISTENCE OF THESE THREATS IS OBVIOUS NOW, NO ONE CAN CONFIDENTLY ASSERT THAT THEY COULD NOT OCCUR WITHIN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS.

23. Yet five years is the period covered by the Government's current and, in our view, inadequate defence plan. All the current plan does is to try to maintain the present level of defence capability. It will do nothing to enhance it.

VULNERABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE.

24. Contrary to the assertions of the policy-makers, the A.D.A. does not believe that Australia's trade is immune from harrassment in circumstances short of war.

25. It has been held that the immunity arises from the fact that such harrassment would constitute an act of either war or piracy which would attract retaliation from the second party to the trade as well as a third-party carrier. This assumption is first of all an abandonment of responsibility, implying as it does the traditional Australian view that we can rely on others to defend our interests. Secondly, the assumption presupposes that the second and third parties to the trading have both the capability and intention of intervening in support of Australia. Both are questionable, particularly the capability, given the run-down state of the navies of Australia's major trading partners.

26. Further, both the will to defend the trade and the fear of retaliation on the part of the aggressor can be questioned, given the failure of Israel's trading partners to resist the past blockades of trade through Bab-el-Mandeb, the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal.

27. Such assumptions by the policy makers fly in the face of historical reality, yet the failure to deter any harrassment of our trade offers a tempting target to any aggressor. (See Annex 'A').

The Factor of Uncertainty.

28. A.D.A. believes that the formulation of a strategic policy ought not to be based on the identification of threat for another reason, that changes in international relationships can be interpreted in so many ways that the resulting uncertainty leads to the paralysis of policy that is so evident in Australia today. Indeed, defence spokesmen have highlighted this uncertainty as a basis for deferral of decisions. A.D.A. believes that uncertainty in this field is one of the constant factors - a certainty in itself - and therefore strategic planning ought to recognise the persistence of uncertainty to the degree that it must be based on what your Committee called "threat insensitive criteria".

29. Threat insensitive criteria for strategic planning include the identification of those fundamental national interests that must be defended, together with a consideration of current and projected military technology.

30. Certainly, it ought also be possible to identify potential enemies to the degree that their stated policies indicate an intention to destabilise or build influence outside their areas of legitimate interest. The practice of making excuses for aggressors, as has been the case with the Fascist powers in the 'thirties and the Communist powers today, may be acceptable for their political allies in this country but is deplorable coming from diplomatic, defence and intelligence sources.

A National Interests Strategy.

31. Australia's national interests which must be defended have never been publicly identified even in general terms and, indeed, there is considerable doubt that they have ever been identified at the official level. Certainly the failure to involve Departments such as Trade, National Resources, Transport and Primary Industry as well as key State instrumentalities in the strategic planning process suggests that the public preoccupation with physical invasion of any part of the continent as the only defence threat has solid, if uncritical, support at the official and political level.

32. Australia's national interests, which are crucial to our survival, are :

- the concentration of population, industry and food production in the South-East of the continent;

- the major resource areas elsewhere, including off-shore areas, and predominantly in the North and North-West;

- the major trade routes with Japan and the Middle East;

- the major naval and air bases that must be constructed in the North and West to support such a policy.

33. Australia's defences must be built on the armed forces, infrastructure and industrial support needed to deter attack or to defeat attack if deterrence fails.

34. Beyond the defence of those interests, Australia has a vital interest in contributing to the defence of the region, particularly the A.S.E.A.N. nations and the island States of Papua New Guinea and the South West Pacific, if only because their fall to a hostile power would threaten our crucial interests. The same argument applies to the need to contribute to the defence of Free World interests in the Indian Ocean and South and West Pacific, particularly in the field of defence of communications.

35. A.D.A. rejects the concept of dependence on the United States not only because it is demeaning to an independent nation, but also because defence alliances such as ANZUS often change in value according to the changing perceptions and capabilities of the partners. A defence alliance to be of any value must be based on a mutuality of strategic interest. ANZUS will continue to be of value but it should be recognised that it may impose much greater obligations on Australia than in the past.

36. An alliance, even in informal terms, with ASEAN ought to be based on a major Australian defence industry to give strength to the alliance and security against its breakdown.

FORCE STRUCTURE.

37. A.D.A. believes that the underlying force structure concept - that of the "core force" - is not properly thought through and is no more than a rationalisation of an inadequacy forced on it by policy and financial restrictions.

38. In early evidence given to your Committee, Defence Department witnesses were unable to define the term, whereas subsequent witnesses suggested that the "core force" was a concept that provided for the acquisition of a range of capabilities which could then be built upon in the warning period of any conflict.

39. A.D.A. believes in fact that the term "core force" is used to describe a policy of acquiring the widest range of military equipment in such small quantities that the capability of the force to act against even quite low threats is severely constrained. THE POLICY IS A PRODUCT OF NOTHING ELSE BUT SEVERE FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY SUCCESSIVE GOVERNMENTS.

40. Excluding the concept of providing for a large conscript and expensive Army, which would be unnecessary (the armed-camp concept), A.D.A. sees two options open to a government. These are :

- the core force; or
- the reaction force-in-being.

Core Force.

41. The inadequacy of the core force concept lies ultimately in the inability to expand the force in terms of equipment and trained manpower within the warning period.

42. Five years provides a very short lead time to build the core force into a significant force to deter an attack which may already have been decided upon and which has taken into account the ability of the force to expand.

43. Within the five years, time must be allowed to warn the electorate. This may take two years, given the traditional lack of concern of the public. That time may have to be extended if a change of government were to occur during the period. Within that two or three year period, little could be done to build up the force without the political support being sought.

44. Expansion concepts are overly dependent on :

- the availability of funds, even if governments can be moved to accept the warnings. Economic constraints resulting from slow growth, 13% of GDP being committed at the Federal level to health, education and welfare and an adverse balance of payments are all factors which will limit expansion, especially that requiring the purchase of "off-the-shelf" equipment from overseas;
- the long warning time required for the procurement of equipment and the training of personnel, especially technical personnel, aircrews and junior leaders;
- a presumed ability to decide rapidly on priorities. The Defence Department has not in recent years demonstrated a capacity to agree on an appropriate force structure. In the absence of an agreed doctrine, the scope for internal conflict and indecision is magnified;

- the availability of equipment or technology "off-the-shelf" from overseas suppliers. Given the developing threats across the spectrum of Western interests, we must view the availability of such equipment from the U.S. and NATO as at best questionable.

45. The same question applies with even more force to the availability of spare parts and ammunition. The very high levels of consumption of these items expected in wartime mean that availability from overseas may well be severely restricted at the time of greatest need.

46. The practice of reducing war reserves of these items which has characterised recent defence administration in Australia's climate of economic stringency is a policy which is dangerous in the extreme.

The Reaction Force-in-Being.

47. In any assessment of the force structure necessary for the defence of Australia, it is implicit that combat-ready forces must be capable of deployment more rapidly than a threat can emerge. It follows that several significant capabilities must be maintained in existence at all times, not just as the core on which an expanded capability can be built but able to deal immediately with such threats as can plausibly be expected.

48. For example, we must be able to maintain a capability to keep our major ports free of mines. We must be able to not only maintain surveillance over the ocean approaches but be able to respond to any incidents.

49. Where capabilities are related to long lead time items of equipment, trained personnel or industrial infrastructure, the force has to be provided with a peacetime structure very close to that appropriate in all-out war. We point out that, during World War II, not one warship larger than 2,000 tons was built for the RAN. Even those acquired during the war were either smaller or were of pre-war construction.

50. Given the changing nature of warfare wherein the political dimension normally outweighs the military, we can expect military threats which will be accompanied by substantial internal political campaigns, threats which will test our political will and national unity as much or more than our military capability.

51. These threats can be met but only if we have substantially larger forces in being than we have today, forces which because of their existence will tend to deter the emergence of a threat because we are demonstrably able to deal with it and because governments will not have to urgently demand resources from an unstable electorate.

52. The 1976 White Paper "Australian Defence" (para.27) speaks of the need for a force in being capable of surveillance, a range of independent operations and a capacity for timely expansion. The White Paper emphasises the uncertainty of the future and the need to provide insurance against unforeseable contingencies.

53. A.D.A. believes that Australia's present and projected forces are too small and lack the support necessary to meet the requirements set out in the White Paper.

Current and Planned Force Structure.

54. In the Association's view, there are a number of serious gaps in the force structure as approved or apparently planned. The most satisfactory are :

- patrol boats for the Navy
- long-range maritime patrol aircraft

The least satisfactory are :

- naval air power (Annex 'B')
- the destroyer force (Annex 'C')
- the minewarfare force (Annex 'D')

- a tactical air-strike capability (Annex 'E')
- a strategic air strike capability (Annex 'E')
- tactical air transport, including rotary-wing aircraft (Annex 'E')
- armoured firepower and transport in the army (Annex 'F')
- medium and field artillery (Annex 'F')
- air defence artillery (Annex 'F')
- naval and air base facilities in the North and West

55. There are shortages in most other areas despite the existence of a capability. The implication of these shortages is an inability to sustain operations for any length of time, a serious limitation in the case of high cost capital equipment. (See also page 473-4).

INTELLIGENCE.

56. The first line of defence in peacetime is and always will be a capable professional intelligence community. It is common for operational branches and governments to ignore or reject the advice of the intelligence community in peace and in war but it must also be said that, so far as can be determined, Australia has not been well served by intelligence in peacetime.

57. It is an axiom of defence that an aggressor needs strong intelligence less than the defender who must - at least initially - surrender the initiative. Accepting this axiom, it would be reasonable to assume that Australia is a potential aggressor because of the poor performance and low status of the civil and military intelligence organisations in this country. A.D.A. points out that, in Israel, the military intelligence chief ranks as a Deputy Chief of Staff.

58. A.D.A. is concerned at the downgrading of military intelligence resulting from the 1970 formation of the Joint Intelligence Organisation, the failure to maintain high quality and experienced intelligence assessment staffs, too great a dependence on non-Australian sources and assessments, and the neglect of Australian interests as a valid input into intelligence assessments.

THE COMMAND STRUCTURE.

59. A.D.A. is concerned that the reorganisation of the Defence Department carried out in recent years has not led to an increase in efficiency.

60. The procedures of the Department demonstrate the worst effects of decision-making by committee, inter-Service rivalry (inherited from an earlier organisation) and the stultifying effects of unrealistically low financial delegations. Too much authority is concentrated in the higher echelons of the Department; not enough is delegated to subordinate groups within the overall organisation. We suggest that financial delegations should be reviewed and that the threshhold for Ministerial approval be raised to $10 million and for Cabinet $100 million with commensurate delegation to lower levels.

61. A.D.A. further believes that the command structure of the Defence Force itself inhibits the ability of the Force to fight under unified control. We welcome the appointment of a Chief of Defence Force Staff to command the Force but believe that he should create the necessary separate staffs to administer and command the Force in peace as well as in war.

62. It is not sufficient to develop a joint warfare doctrine in peacetime. Commands, staffs and units must be organised and practised as the basis of organisation. There is an argument for the proposition that single-Service operational commands are an anachronism in modern warfare and ought, therefore, to be abolished as a matter of peacetime practice.

63. A.D.A. believes that the unique roles of the Services justify the retention of their separate identity particularly in the training and support roles. At the operational level, we believe that all individual Service units should be allocated to joint service commands with combined headquarters staffs in being for all normal peacetime operations and higher unit and formation training.

64. Thus, the RAN's Fleet Command ought to be reformed as a Maritime Command with RAAF elements under command and integrated into the Command Headquarters.

65. The Army's Field Force Command should become a Continental Defence Command with RAAF and possibly naval elements incorporated, while an Air Defence Command would be formed from the RAAF Operational Command with Army air defence units not included in the combat divisions under command.

66. There may be a case for establishing an Amphibious Command incorporating elements of all the Services to deploy a continuing amphibious assault capability similar in concept to the U.S. Marine Corps organisation. (Annex 'G')

67. A.D.A. is of the opinion that the formation of a separate Coastguard force under independent command would not only relieve the Defence Force of the task of off-shore law enforcement, for which it is ill-equipped and trained, but would contribute to the surveillance function of defence in peacetime and minor maritime operations in war. (See Annex 'H').

THE COST.

68. A.D.A. notes the statements by the Prime Minister and Minister for Defence that Australia will spend $17.6 billion over the next five years. This suggests that the final year amount will be of the order of $4,100 million, of which $1,000 million will be spent on equipment.

69. At 3 per cent of Gross Domestic Product, this amount is proportionately less than was spent in the bad old days of 1963-64 when 3.3 per cent of an admittedly smaller real GDP was devoted to defence. (See Annex 'J').

A SYSTEMS APPROACH.

70. We are concerned that much of the discussion of individual programmes, particularly those initiated by the Government, do not approach re-equipment questions on a systems basis.

71. For example, all discussion of the Tactical Fighter Force project has dealt with the particular type of aircraft involved. There has been virtually no public attempt to integrate the aircraft into a system which includes such aspects as weapons, bases, control and reporting facilities, reconnaissance, strategic mobility or even role. In the absence of such a discussion, it is easy for the public to conclude that it is sufficient to merely graft a new aircraft into an existing air defence system in place ofthe Mirage. (Annex 'K').

TRAINING.

72. If the concept of a force-in-being is accepted, it follows that such a force must be capable of rapid deployment in combat. This presupposes a high level of training at all levels. The A.D.A. believes that this can only be achieved with an intensive - and expensive - exercise programme and the provision of substantial war stocks of fuel and ammunition which are regularly 'turned over' through the exercise programme.

CONCLUSIONS.

73. The following is a summary of our conclusions :

- the current philosophy of deterring attack is inadequate because of a limited capacity to expand the Defence Force to meet a threat (paras. 8-10);
- Defence planning seems to be based on an unwarranted assumption that the only threat to be concerned with is a threat of invasion with the underlying assumption that the existing force is capable of dealing with all lesser threats. (paras.11-14);

- current defence planning is based on maintaining existing defence capabilities, assuming that these are sufficient (paras. 15-23);
- Australia's security is heavily dependent on vulnerable trade routes (paras. 24-27 and Annex 'A');
- The concept of 'threat' is a too uncertain basis for the development of defence policy (paras. 28-36);
- the 'core force' concept is inadequate for the structuring of a defence force in peacetime (paras. 41-46);
- the present Defence Force is seriously deficient in a number of vital capabilities (paras. 53-58);
- the command structure of the Defence Force is inappropriate for modern conflict (paras. 59-67);
- purchase of equipments rather than systems is inefficient and costly (paras. 70-71 and Annex 'K').

74. The following is a summary of our recommendations which are not necessarily exhaustive at this stage :

- the philosophy of deterring attack should be modified to incorporate that of deterring the emergence of a threat (para.10);
- the development of strategic policy should be based on identifiable national interests (para.31-36);
- the Defence Force should be based on a force-in-being capable of immediate response to a wide range of low and medium level contingencies (paras. 47-52);
- greater attention should be paid to the development of a strong military intelligence organisation (paras. 56-58);
- financial delegations within the Defence Department and the Government should be reviewed and updated in line with modern management concepts and the changing value of money (para. 60);
- the command structure of the Defence Force should be changed to abolish single Service operational commands in favour of joint operational commands (paras. 62-66 and Annex 'G');
- an Australian Coastguard should be formed to relieve the Defence Force of off-shore law enforcement tasks and to provide a naval reserve in wartime (para. 67 and Annex 'H');
- all acquisition programmes should emphasise a systems approach, not only within Defence Department but in the public presentation and discussion (paras.70-71 and Annex 'K');
- a much higher level of operational training and ammunition expenditure should be authorised (para.72).

SUMMARY OF ANNEXES.

A. Trade and Australia's Defence.
B. Naval Air Power.
C. The Destroyer Force.
D. The Minewarfare Force
E. R.A.A.F. Capabilities
F. Army Firepower.
G. Command and Deployment.
H. An Australian Coastguard.
J. Resources for Australia's Defence.
K. A Systems Approach

TRADE AND AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE.

While occasional official references are made to the need to protect Australia's trade, very little publicity is given to the scope of the problem.

The following figures are drawn from Australian Bureau of Statistics publications on Australia's trade and are a little dated, dealing as they do with the 1975-76 financial year in terms of volume and the 1978-79 financial year for value.

The total value of overseas trade - exports plus imports - in 1978-79 was $27.5 billion or 27.2 per cent of GDP. There is no reason to suppose that this percentage will not be maintained in approximate terms in the foreseeable future. Indeed, given the growth of the mining sector and the rural recovery of recent years, the percentage may well grow.

At least 99 per cent of that trade by value is carried by sea.

In 1975-76, the total tonnage of exports and imports was 173.657 million tonnes carried in 12,175 ships, registered as individual sailings and arrivals. A further 8,442 sailings and arrivals were registered between Australian ports.

The following table shows the direction of overseas sailings and arrivals in terms of tonnages exported and imported -

Area	Export	Import
Japan/Far east	115990	4591
Africa/Europe (Cape Route)	46207	1518
Middle East/Europe (Suez Route)	13602	11533
North America	6660	4107
New Zealand/ South America	2671	303

(all figures are in thousands of tonnes)

The economic effects of the interdiction of this trade are speculative but are based on the proportion of GDP actually traded plus an assumption - which I cannot justify - that a roughly equal proportion of the economy, particularly in the service sector, derives from the wealth generated by that trade.

The effects outlined below are also based on an assumption that all trade can be interdicted and is, therefore, a worst possible case. Its value is plainly illustrative of the economic and, therefore, social and political pressures that would be brought to bear as a result of trade interdiction.

Roughly speaking then, the interdiction of Australian trade could lead in time to unemployment of the order of 3 million, given that there are approximately 6.5 million in the workforce today. This is 46 per cent of the workforce, a not unreasonable figure based on the loss of 27.2 per cent of the economy through trade loss and a further 18-20 per cent through the loss of derivative industries.

The loss of oil imports would result in the loss of currently 30-35 per cent of liquid fuels. In some specialised petroleum areas, such as heavy oils, we could lose the whole of our needs, with a further effect on the manufacturing sector especially. I have no specific information on this, although it may be available.

The large range of manufactured imports would be partially or totally lost. In some areas, such as machine tools, electronic components and so on, the loss could again have serious long term effects in manufacturing.

ANNEX 'A'

Associated economic phenomena would include extensive rationing of some goods and commodities, a serious drop in wages or hyper-inflation and a catastrophic fall in living standards.

Again in speculative vein, these effects could occur very quickly because of what I have been told is a very low level of normal stock-holdings in Australia.

Even if the interruption of trade were to be partial, there would still be a noticeable drop in economic activity with consequential political problems for an Australian government. Given that such an assault on our trade would not take place without some form of ultimatum or political pressure - perhaps internal as well as external - the position of a government without the means to neutralise the assault on our trade would be impossible.

Of course, there are other interested parties to an assault on trade with Australia, namely the partner to each trading transaction and the carrier - often a third party. The problem is that few countries have the capacity, much less the will to intervene, as Israel found with the Egyptian blockade of key waterways in the past two or three decades. Further, if the blockade was selective, the trading partners would simply go elsewhere under the pressure of rising insurance and freight rates.

ANNEX 'B'

NAVAL AIR POWER.

It was 1969 when the Maritime Air Power Study Group was set up in Navy Office to examine and recommend on the need if any for the deployment of air power at sea in support of surface forces. Clearly, the central issue of the study was whether the aircraft carrier HMAS MELBOURNE should be replaced and, if so, by what. At that time, it was 26 years since MELBOURNE had been laid down, 23 years since she was launched and 14 years since her completion. It was none too early to look to the future.

Eleven years later, the Navy clearly believes that some form of aircraft platform is needed at sea. However, neither the Defence Department nor the Government have made a decision, preferring to examine three types of ships which may be suitable and only then apparently deciding on the need. In A.D.A's view, this process encapsulates much of what is wrong with planning for defence in Australia. If the need for naval air power is established, then we should - must - acquire the capability. If it cannot be established, then we should not. What is certain is that the need is not dependent on what ships are available. Better a ship that is less than perfect than no ship at all - if there is a need.

A systems approach to the problem will take the question further. It is thus more than a question of the need for an aircraft carrier or carriers but, as well as the ship, the questions of suitable aircraft, weapons systems, deployment, dispersal, repair and general servicing facilities among others, are all an integral part of the problem of the deployment of air power at sea.

A.D.A. believes that the case for the deployment of a naval air capability rests on several grounds :

- air power is available immediately where the battle is located rather than at some distance in time as would be the case if shore-based air were relied upon.
- airpower is under the control of the local commander who is fighting the battle.
- integral air power vastly extends the strike range of a force at sea.
- a force with its own air power is highly flexible and can strike at a wide range of targets over a vast area. (In this context, the example of Admiral Nagumo's carrier force in 1941-42 is relevant if on a much larger scale than we would envisage)
- if a carrier force is looked at in the systems sense of a largely self-contained and mobile air force, it is less vulnerable than a force operating from fixed air bases either on or forward of the Australian mainland. In this context, it is worth pointing out that all fixed air bases on the Australian mainland are currently within range of long-range Soviet aircraft armed with nuclear air-to-surface missiles operating from Da Nang and Bien Hoa.
- the protection of Australia's seaborne trade calls for the availability of anti-submarine and anti-air defence of many thousands of miles of ocean. The role of the aircraft carrier must be to support any escort forces or to strike at long range against hostile forces or their bases either beyond the range of Australia-based air power or at a greater intensity of operations than is possible with air power deployed back in Australia.
- an aircraft carrier can be deployed in support of amphibious operations if these have to be carried out outside the range of shore-based air. The occasion may never arise but the concept is an example of the flexibility of such a ship.

A.D.A. agrees that one aircraft platform is less satisfactory than two or three, but we also insist that it is considerably more useful than none. The Association suggests that Australia should acquire three such ships. The cost, including aircraft and other components of the system, ought not exceed $2,000 million at current prices. While this sounds a horrendous sum, it would of course have to be spread over a period of up to 15 years so that the annual cost would be relatively modest.

ANNEX 'B'

Inherent in this concept is our belief that, since the days of Alfred Deakin and Andrew Fisher advised by Admiral Sir Reginald Henderson, no Australian Government or Defence authority has ever tried to acquire a navy. All we have ever done since buying our initial Fleet is buy individual ships, usually to replace their superannuated predecessors. Yet a navy whose ships have a relatively long life must be planned on a long-term basis. This dictum gains more force when it is remembered that, because of the long lead time involved in the acquisition of a capability, Australia will usually have to fight a war with the big ships it has at the outbreak of war.

It is also true that, if costs are to be saved, it is necessary to acquire ships in groups rather than singly because of the learning curve factor. This invalidates the core-force argument which is based on an alleged economic argument that we should maintain a range of limited capabilities. By the time we need to expand, the learning curve advantage in the shipyards has been lost and the cost of new ships is much greater than it would have been if we had built all the ships we need together at a single yard.

For example, the RAN is about to acquire a very useful amphibious ship built in a remarkably short time at a reasonable cost. It is quite unlikely that anyone would seriously claim that one such ship is all the navy needs. We need, in A.D.A's view, another two. If we proceeded to build them now, they would cost less than if we waited until ten or fifteen years hence.

It is worth drawing attention to the time involved in acquiring a particular capability. It was announced in 1963 that Australia was to acquire a submarine capability so presumably planning began perhaps as early as 1960. The modest capability we now have in the six Oberon class boats was not acquired in operational form until 1979, 19 years after planning began. The marginal amphibious capability we are acquiring has taken some 12 years already but is not yet deployed.

It follows from this that, if we were to abandon a naval air capability despite the powerful arguments against such a move, it would take many years to restore it. Yet because of the indecision which we believe to be attributable to the starvation of the Defence Department, we run the risk of losing a wide range of skills as the MELBOURNE gets older, more decrepit and increasingly dockyard-bound.

There is one further factor we believe should be ventilated because we believe it will be at least an unspoken consideration in the minds of the planners. The aircraft carrier is normally the Fleet flagship and command goes regularly to an officer who is marked for Flag rank. Since the introduction of the rank of Commodore in the RAN career structure, MELBOURNE has been commanded by an officer of this rank, leading to a number of ribald comments about the Ruritanian Navy.

We are concerned that this custom of the Service may lead to pressure for the acquisition of one large and prestigious ship rather than three smaller ships of lesser status. We do not say it will happen; indeed the likelihood in these days of high professionalism is that it will not. We merely sound a warning based on a recognition of perfectly human attributes.

ANNEX 'C'

THE DESTROYER FORCE.

The Navy's most important, flexible and useful component is the nine ship destroyer force. In parenthesis, we note that the Daring class ships are no longer part of the combat force and the first of the new FFG-7 ships is at least a year away from incorporation into the force. Despite the official protestations that the Daring class ships are still available, they are 21 and 22 years old so that their availability is seriously limited.

Even with the fourth FFG-7, the destroyer force will by 1985 amount to no more than 13 ships with an average age of 15 years. If we exclude the four FFG-7s, the average age of the other nine ships will be 20.3 years, at which time their operational availability will be very limited.

With the four FFG-7s, we will be able to deploy probably no more than seven destroyers, three of which will be FFG-7s.

An operational research study of some 13 years ago suggested that the RAN needed 23 destroyer type ships to fulfil its various tasks. That study may not be valid today but a very basic rule of thumb analysis suggests the following needs :

Escorts for two carriers deployed separately	-	4
Escorts for fleet oilers/tenders	-	3
Merchant shipping or amphibious force escorts	-	6
General purpose, e.g. NGS, ASW training, etc.	-	4
Allowance for maintenance, R & R (one third)	-	6
TOTAL:		23

Not all of these would need to be big destroyers such as the DDG or FFG-7 types. Medium size ships such as the River class or even smaller ships would have a part to play. But to seriously expect the RAN to meet a high degree of commitment, even in trade protection, with no more than seven ships at sea is beyond all credibility.

Again, we repeat the charge made in Annex 'B' that we in Australia have failed to build a navy; all we do is acquire ships.

The Follow On Destroyer programme, insofar as the public is told anything about it, seems to be designed to supply replacements for the River class destroyers of which the first four have an average age of 18 years. There is not only no apparent commitment to increasing the size of the force but statements in the 1976 White Paper (para.42) and by the Chief of Defence Force Staff to this Sub-Committee on 25th July, 1979 suggest that there is at least satisfaction in public with the overall size of the force.

It may well be argued that the modern ships and weapons systems so increase the capability of the force that fewer ships are required. Our belief is that the capabilities are matched by those of potentially hostile forces but, further, our maritime responsibilities are spread over such a vast area that we need a relatively large number of units to meet them.

Clearly, what is needed is a commitment to a much larger destroyer force, one that will require a new ship to be delivered each year. This suggests that one or two shipyards would need to do little more than build destroyers for the RAN. It further suggests that every annual defence budget would include around $250 million at current prices for destroyer construction alone. In fact, because of the learning curve economies and the availability of continuous work, it ought to be possible to reduce unit costs over a period.

There is a great urgency about this programme, given its fundamental character, the serious threat of obsolescence in the current force and the long lead time involved in destroyer design and construction.

ANNEX 'D'.

THE MINEWARFARE FORCE.

Minewarfare is the poor relation of naval defence but in the present generation of advanced minewarfare and our heavy dependence on free movement of trade, Australia is enormously vulnerable to a mining attack.

Mining is cheap and can be carried out in clandestine fashion. It may be difficult to establish the primary source of a mining attack which lends itself to proxy warfare, or it may arise as a result of some nation's determination to effect a blockade in archipelagic waters through which international trade passes.

In these circumstances - and because minewarfare represents a relatively low level of violence or even only a threat of violence - a response which escalates the threat is not appropriate. In particular, a response which assaults another country's territory would extend the conflict when the proper response would be to limit it.

The most important capability Australia should have as a defence against a minewarfare threat would be an ability to clear mines already laid. Such a capability would be the simplest deterrent to the development of the threat; it would raise the price of extracting concessions from Australia to a higher level and this should be our aim.

At the moment, our minewarfare capability is severely limited with three very elderly ships with no support ship to deal with a possible threat involving 18 major and 17 minor commercial ports trading overseas.

The MHCAT programme offers an enhanced capability but it is still experimental and there is no provision for the creation of a substantial capability. What is needed in our view is a force of at least 12 MHCAT vessels plus a minesweeper support ship comparable in function if not capability to the destroyer tender HMAS STALWART.

Because this force must respond to a threat which has virtually no warning time, the core force concept is even more inappropriate in this case than most.

On the other hand, A.D.A. can see a case for a mixed regular/reserve minewarfare force with a number of MHCAT ships crewed by the RAMR. Such a scheme would enhance the attractiveness of the RAMR and not tie up too large a proportion of the regular force in minewarfare ships.

We wish to draw attention to an article on this topic in "The Bulletin" of 6th May, 1980. In general, we endorse the conclusions expressed in that article.

ANNEX 'E'

R.A.A.F. CAPABILITIES

GENERAL

It is not a simple matter of assessing whether a funded programme has been carried through expeditiously or not. Many programme plans have undoubtedly been curtailed in response to a reduced funds allocation for defence.

Consequently, many requirements have not reached a "programme" stage of development. This is particularly relevant in the strike aircraft capability area. In spite of a need, a separate tactical strike aircraft programme has never come to fruition, nor has any proper strategic weapons purchase programme for the F111C been satisfactorily implemented.

TACTICAL AIR STRIKE CAPABILITY

This is an area of operations requiring specialised aircraft, systems and training. A compromise aircraft is invariably neither suitable nor cost-effective.

Because of cost requirements, the RAAF has purchased basically air defence aircraft, sometimes modified them slightly and then used them in the dual role of air defence and tactical strike. None have been very successful in the specialised role of tactical strike and to some extent have suffered some degradation in the air defence role.

It is not only the aircraft which must be considered. Aircrew and ground crew training and expertise is also relevant.

There has been and will continue to be a separate requirement for a tactical air strike capability. Experience in conflicts Australia has been involved in clearly demonstrated this requirement. Our present Mirage aircraft could not be properly expected to fill the role either efficiently or expertly.

The Phantom F4E on lease in 1970-71 should have been kept as a means of building up tactical strike capability.

Tactical strike capability requires close liaison with the Army and, to a lesser extent, the Navy. Specialised, coordinating structures to reflect this need are required. A dual purpose aircraft with associated dual purpose crewing does not have the built-in motivation towards the close coordination and cooperation needed.

STRATEGIC AIR STRIKE CAPABILITY

We have a very effective aircraft for the Strategic air strike capability but lack the weapons and an up to date computer to provide adequate capability. As a continuing programme, the F111C purchase has been far from successful. We still neither have the proper weapons nor have we up-dated the computer from analog to digital.

Recent naval exercises with the F111C showed dramatically that it is ineffective without stand-off weapons.

It is a sad commentary that we are not prepared to follow through with what has been a potentially effective aircraft with a suitable weapons purchase.

Deterrence is the key to Australia's survivability. Not deterrence against a direct threat but deterrence against any nation contemplating a threat. For this reason, the F111C must be seen to be more than a faster version of a Canberra. It must have the demonstrated

capability of showing other nations we can be militarily effective and programme to ensure that cannot be pushed to one side.

TACTICAL AIR TRANSPORT

This is an area where requirement and programme implementation have generally been good.

The Vietnam War assisted. However, the RAAF still has half its Chinook aircraft mothballed through lack of funds. and crews. This is, in effect, a non-implementation of a programme.

Although it would take little time to bring these aircraft up to operational standards, air and ground crews would not be available.

Again, there is a strong need for a coordinating command structure under which the tactical air transport would function.

AIRCRAFT INVENTORY

Even where programmes have been implemented in the above specialised areas, we do not believe that the numbers of aircraft in the RAAF inventory are sufficient.

Given that in time of expansion the demands on the aircraft manufacturer from other countries as well as Australia are likely to be severe, it is important that the forces deployed by Australia in peacetime be backed up by reserves of aircraft so that either more squadrons can be formed or, more likely, aircraft lost through attrition can be replaced.

The provision of reserves which can replace aircraft in use for refurbishment will extend the life of the whole force and reduce the recurrent cost as well as the long term capital cost.

FIREPOWER FOR THE ARMY. ANNEX 'F'

Under the policy of Forward Defence, the Army developed as a relatively lightly equipped infantry force with only small amounts of long range and mobile firepower. According to the Order of Battle published in the 1979 Defence Report, Regular and Reserve firepower is concentrated in one tank regiment with 50 plus Leopard tanks and another 50 in reserve, 48 Scorpion 76mm Fire Support Vehicles, two medium artillery regiments nominally with 34 World War II 5.5 in. gun howitzers, six field regiments with 254 105mm. howitzers and one air defence regiment which is slowly acquiring 20 Rapier SAM units.

The state of this equipment varies from brand new tanks, FSVs and Rapier to medium artillery which is 35 years old and more, and most of which is both unserviceable and short of ammunition. The 10th Medium Regiment (A Res) is reported to have five guns out of 16 operational.

Under the policy of Continental Defence, it is envisaged that the Army will fight if it has to on the Australian mainland. If so, and if the enemy is organised anything like a Soviet force, it will need to be much stronger in armour and artillery. Further, because the battlefield is likely to be dominated by artillery, conventional, missile and airborne, troops will need a high degree of protection. It is highly likely that any transport other than armoured personnel carriers will be too vulnerable for troop survival.

A.D.A. suggests that, in spite of the experimental organisation announced by the Minister, there is an overwhelming case for mechanising the greater part of the Army, particularly the regular Army and the existing Reserve units which will have to bear the brunt of any assault.

There is a strong case for structuring the Army as an armoured or mechanised division with motorised infantry divisions strong in armoured transport and field and air defence artillery in support.

A.D.A. is not prepared to be dogmatic about the structure or equipment establishment of such a force. We do believe that the present force structure is governed by financial constraints and by the core force concept which we believe to be a rationalisation of those constraints.

We envisage that the armoured fighting vehicle strength of the Army would be closer to 1,000 tanks and Fire Support Vehicles instead of the 150 currently authorised. It ought to be possible to refurbish the superseded Centurion tanks with kits available from the manufacturers and reissue to Reserve units. A much higher establishment of armoured personnel carriers, both wheeled and tracked, would be necessary. Allowing for 130 per cent capacity for 50 per cent of the infantry battalions and other combat units (engineers, signals, etc.), some 1100 APC would be required, plus assorted command and communications vehicles.

Artillery units should be equipped with a significant percentage of armoured gun tractors and supply vehicles to ensure a high degree of survivability. More air defence units would be required, particularly in Reserve formations.

Naturally, the cost will not be cheap. But if we are to deter attack and to ensure survivability of our very limited forces, they must demonstrate that they have firepower, protection and mobility. Not to provide this scale of equipment is akin to equipping the fire brigade with watering cans. In any case, an orderly sustained programme of development will reduce costs as will the availability of refurbishment technology.

ANNEX 'G'. 28 July 1980

COMMAND AND DEPLOYMENT.

In paras. 61-66 of our submission, we suggested the formation of a number of functional commands to replace the single Service operational commands. As an example of what we have in mind, we suggest the following on the understanding that it is recognised as flexible according to the needs of the moment and can be expanded to handle an expanded force.

Maritime Command

Commander (***) Navy

Deputy (Air) (*) and as Commander Maritime Wing

Commander - East (**)	Commander - Support (*)	Commander - West (*)
1 aircraft carrier 2 destroyer squadrons 1 submarine squadron 1 LRMP sqn. RAAF Fleet support ships	Amphibious ships Minewarfare ships Patrol forces	1 destroyer squadron det. submarine sqn. 1 LRMP sqn. RAAF

NOTE: Commander Support Force could double as an Amphibious Commander (desig.)

Continental Defence Command

Commander (***) Army

Deputy (Air) (**)

1 Div (Regular) (**)	2 Div (ARes) (**)	3 Div (ARes) (**)

Air Tpt Wing	Helo Wing
35 Sqn RAAF	5 Sqn RAAF
36 Sqn RAAF	9 Sqn RAAF
38 Sqn RAAF	12 Sqn RAAF
Air Movements Unit	

Air Defence Command

Commander (***) RAAF

Air Defence Group (*)	Support Group (*)	Strike Group (*)
Mirage Sqns. (3, 75, 77) Air defence radar	37 Tpt. Sqn. 34 VIP Sqn. OCU	F-111 Sqns. (1 and 6) Canberra PRU 2 Sqn.

The structure of all of these Commands suggests a Commander at Chief of Staff level and it is for consideration that under such an organisation the post of Chief of Staff of an individual Service MAY be redundant. If not, the Commanders could be established at two star level with the exception of the Continental Defence Commander.

ANNEX 'H' 28 July 1980

AN AUSTRALIAN COASTGUARD.

INTRODUCTION.

Recent events involving refugee boats, drug smugglers and their arrival detected or otherwise has focussed public attention on the role of the Defence Force in enforcing what could be termed off-shore Commonwealth law.

For mainly historical reasons, Governments and the community assume that this law enforcement is a proper function of the Defence Force. Indeed, far too much comment has suggested that the Defence Force should ignore its defence role and concentrate on law enforcement even though this would generate a serious imbalance in the force structure.

DEFENCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT.

The Defence Force currently deploys seven 'Attack' class PTF, two to three S2 aircraft and an occasional P3 and C47 in the law enforcement role. Including civilian as well as uniformed personnel, this is estimated by A.D.A. to involve some 2,000 personnel in active and support operations and to cost around $40 million in the current financial year. Effectively, something less than 2% of Australia's defence effort is directed to off-shore law enforcement at an admittedly inadequate level.

The task involves the detection and arrest of air-and-surface borne smugglers, illegal immigrants and poachers on behalf of the Commonwealth Departments of Health, Immigration, Business and Consumer Affairs and Primary Industry. Naturally, if the job is being done effectively, the force involved will also have a deterrent effect.

The task calls for air and surface operations at a fairly intense level with relatively unsophisticated craft providing adequate vehicles. High performance military aircraft are virtually useless, at least in the arrest function. In the detection function, they are inordinately expensive as the Defence Minister recently made clear in answer to a question in the House of Representatives.

What is less obvious in the figures is the misuse of trained manpower in the law enforcement role. Personnel trained to operate and maintain sophisticated equipment are not putting that training to full use in a PTF or an ASW aircraft.

More important, the training philosophies for law enforcement and warlike operations are completely different, the one calling for the minimum use of force and the other the maximum. An excessive concentration on law enforcement would seriously inhibit the effectiveness of the Defence Force in time of war.

This situation arises, as it does with disaster relief or security operations because there is no other suitable organisation in the field. Other justifications - usually from outside Defence - include "it will give them something to do", "it's good training" and "we must get our money's worth from this huge tax-consuming organisation".

There is no doubt that the Defence Force is capable of responding to emergencies in a 'last resort' situation. It is not proper to use it for routine, non-defence tasks.

The obvious model for an alternative organisation is the U.S. Coastguard, although similar paramilitary organisations exist in Canada, India and the Soviet Union as well as other countries.

The U.S. Coastguard was formed in 1795 to carry out such duties as the President directs. It has evolved into a highly professional, well equipped force responsible for maritime safety as well as off-shore law enforcement. In wartime or defence emergency, it can be placed under naval command for a range of military functions, including port control, some convoy escort work, rescue of survivors and other duties under Defence Command.

In addition to these duties, an Australian Coastguard could be given responsibility for hydrography and oceanography (currently under Navy control), maritime safety including search and rescue, maritime navigational aids (currently under the Transport Department) and such off-shore law enforcement functions as might be referred by Customs, Fisheries, Health, Immigration, Environment and National Resources. The aim ought to be to create a professional organisation in the field of law enforcement, properly manned, equipped and funded for its task.

A FORCE STRUCTURE.

Such a force could be given any sort of shape and size depending on requirements but the following paragraphs suggest something that could do the job at a reasonable cost.

Role.

A paramilitary force, not quite military but something more than a constabulary, is essential. Inevitably, it must have the capability and the authority to use force to apprehend an offender. When dealing with ships and aircraft, that force may have to be exercised by something heavier than small arms and it follows that the users must be trained in their use and disciplined to use the correct amount of force.

The dual roles of detection and arrest as well as the different types of offenders presupposes a force equipped with surface vessels as well as aircraft. A patrolling aircraft may detect an offender but cannot have him examined or arrested by other than surface forces.

Equipment.

In A.D.A's opinion, some 50 surface craft of all types would be required. These would be a mix of small craft similar to the De Havilland Marine 16 metre patrol boat unarmed or with .50 cal. or 20 mm. weapons through the range to the PCF420 currently on order for the RAN.

Included in the 50 surface vessels would be hydrographic and oceanographic ships, lighthouse and buoy tenders and so on.

In the air, a Coastguard ought to be able to deploy some 50 fixed and rotary winged aircraft. A mix of Nomad Searchmaster and a general purpose helo would provide range and flexibility. There is no requirement for the aircraft to be armed although a limited pursuit and intercept capacity to deal with illegal intruder aircraft would be a requirement. Preference should be given to equipment manufactured in Australia unless the operational penalties are excessive.

Bases.

Base facilities would have to be provided but these could be relatively unsophisticated if all but first line maintenance were carried out by contractors. Requirements would be for access to an airfield and wharfage plus office and personnel accommodation, limited stores and relatively simple communications facilities.

To give full coverage, one Headquarters base and up to ten operational bases should be sufficient. Inevitably, all sorts of reasons can be given for concentrating the latter in existing areas of government activity but, in the interests of decentralisation, possibly greater efficiency and certainly good community relations, close consideration ought to be given to the use of minor ports.

The Headquarters must have access to good communications, accommodation for a large number of personnel and training facilities. It ought not to be in Canberra or Sydney but Brisbane could provide all that is required as could Perth. Candidates for minor bases include Cairns, Cove, Darwin, Broome, Port Hedland, Geraldton, Albany, Port Lincoln, Portland and Port Kembla. All these fulfil the criteria for an operational base.

Organisation (Appendix 1).

Manpower including crews, staffs, personnel under training and civil staff should not need to exceed 4,000. The force would be headed by an officer at two-star level with an operations, personnel and logistics staff.

On the operations side, three intermediate headquarters are suggested, two regional headquarters and one maritime services headquarters to take responsibility for hydrography and maritime safety. The Marine Operations Centre could be placed at the Force Headquarters. A typical base would operate three patrol boats and four aircraft, both fixed wing and helos but the precise deployment would always be determined by current priorities.

The Commandant would have to be responsible to a Minister who would normally exercise control through his Department. It is relatively immaterial which Minister would best exercise control except that it ought not be the Defence Minister, the aim being not to increase the already substantial confusion over the role of Defence caused by the placing of the National Disaster Organisation under Defence. Transport or Attorney-General's would be the logical contenders for the task.

However, because the force would have to respond to a number of Departments, the Commandant must have authority to deal directly with all those Departments and the freedom to determine operational priorities subject to policy laid down by the Government. His Minister would, in effect, be the channel of communication from Cabinet to the Coastguard and vice-versa on policy matters. The Department would concern itself with basic administration rather than control of policy. The relationship would be similar to that by which ASIO and the Commonwealth Police are governed.

Finance.

Inevitably, the question of costs arise.

Equipment for the force proposed is estimated to cost some $400 million at current prices. However, the 'Attack' class PTFs, some Trackers and Wessex helos and the survey and oceanographic ships, if transferred to the Coastguard, would have a replacement value of around $120 million while other craft could become available from the Bureau of Customs and the Department of Transport.

The annual cost, including provision for replacement equipment, would amount to around $120 million. Some $30 million of this is estimated to be spent by other Departments on those law enforcement functions which would be transferred to a Coastguard.

The $40 million, saved by Defence in shedding its law enforcement role ought to be retained to make up some of the current deficiencies in the Defence Force.

Presuming that the development of the force would be spread over five years, the annual amount for those years over and above current costs would average $146 million, after which it would stabilise at $120 million, all figures being in constant 1977 dollars.

For no more than 0.6% of total annual Federal spending, the Australian community would get adequate off-shore law enforcement and a marginally more effective defence force. The question is then not whether a Coastguard, but why not?

THE OBJECTIONS.

A.D.A.can perceive two main objections. In a time of financial stringency, the case for creating yet another government agency must be strong in philosophical and economic terms if it is to be successful.

The second is the more practical matter of whether the manpower for such an organisation is available and, related to this, whether the demand for the manpower will be met at the expense of an already undermanned Defence Force.

Other relatively minor problems relate to the loss to the Navy of the junior officer training facilities provided by patrol boat operations and the inevitable bureaucratic infighting which will arise with the creation of an agency responsible to several masters. It is worth looking at each in turn.

Another Agency.

In principle, the creation of yet another agency is bad. A case could be made for the expansion of the Commonwealth Police in manpower and equipment terms to carry out this additional law enforcement function.

In practice, this would present organisational and philosophical problems, organisational because of the need to graft a relatively large function on to a small force, philosophically because of the objection to the creation of large law enforcement agencies under the control of a single head.

In economic terms, the argument is blurred by the impossibility of comparing an organisation (Defence) which is not doing the job with one (Coastguard) which will have to do the job. Given this and the assumption that more people will be required for the Coastguard task than Defence can spare, the estimated cost of a Coastguard per man deployed is, at $30,000 p.a., some 57% more than the estimated per capita cost of Defence personnel deployed in this role. This is not excessive if the result is an improvement in detection and deterrence.

Manpower.

Whether the manpower could be found for an admittedly strenuous task can only be determined by experience. Any estimates could only be made from detailed studies beyond the scope or competence of this submission.

The value of patrol boat operations for junior officer training in the RAN is undeniable and has been the basis of Navy objections to a Coastguard in the past. Compared with the importance of the work to be done, however, the objection borders on the frivolous. If the Navy so badly wants small craft for junior officer training, it ought to be investing in the mine-warfare vessels in which it is so seriously deficient.

"Too Many Cooks".

A Coastguard has been proposed in the past but was not approved at a time when the threat was much lower. Also relevant, we believe, was the natural reluctance of departments to surrender some of their responsibilities.

A Coastguard would involve the transfer of functions from Navy, Air Force, Transport, Customs, Health and Primary Industries and Immigration at least. Presumably, some will be pleased to be rid of an embarrassing and impossible (with current resources) task. Equally, others will be reluctant to surrender functions such as the Navy's Hydrographic Service and the Transport Department's Coastal Services Division.

If any proposal for a Coastguard were referred to an Inter-Departmental Committee, the terms of reference ought to be based on the assumption that a Coastguard will be set up and that the I.D.C. should merely propose a range of options giving functions, costs and assessed effectiveness compared with the current situation. In other words, the decision must lie with the Government rather than an I.D.C.

CONCLUSION.

The traditional view that the Defence Force should be responsible for off-shore law enforcement has not stood the test of increased assaults on the relevant laws. Calls for the diversion of Defence Force resources to this role will only reduce its ability to perform its proper role.

There is a strong case for establishing a specialised law enforcement agency in the form of a well manned, equipped and funded Australian Coastguard to carry out law enforcement, maritime safety and hydrographic/oceanographic duties as well as be available as a wartime auxiliary force.

A.D.A. supports the concept as a contribution to more effective defence and urges the Government to create such a force.

A PROPOSED COASTGUARD ORGANISATION



RESOURCES FOR AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE.

Australia currently spends 2.6 per cent of Gross Domestic Product on defence and has done so since 1975-76. In earlier years, we spent up to 4.4 per cent at the height of our involvement in the Vietnam War.

Whether such a proportion of national wealth is enough is not the point; it is merely a statement of the priority we give to defence compared with other demands on national resources.

Nevertheless, the question has been asked whether we can afford a greater proportion and at what cost to other calls on our wealth.

It is worth noting in this context that 46 countries out of the 74 listed in the authoritative publication - The Military Balance 1979-80 - routinely spend a greater proportion of national resources than does Australia. That does not say that we spend too little, only that we could spend more if we wished.

However, it appears that we could spend more if we wished to do so without cutting back on other public or private sector programmes. In considering the argument, it is relevant to note that any increase would have to be progressive rather than immediate so that the planning and administrative machine could absorb the increases.

The concept is based on the fact that Gross Domestic Product increases by around 3 per cent per annum in real terms. The Federal Government currently spends around 28 per cent of Gross Domestic Product. So the annual growth in Government revenue is around 0.85 per cent of GDP in real terms. Even presuming a Government determination to reduce spending to 25 per cent of GDP, it can still count on an extra 0.75 per cent of GDP in real terms.

At today's values, that growth amounts to between $855 million and $970 million each year and in real terms. If only half this growth were devoted to defence, the Defence Department could count on an increase in real resources of around $450 million each year. In four years, defence spending would grow to around $4800 million in 1980 dollars. This would amount to 4.2 per cent of today's GDP but only 3.3 per cent of estimated GDP in 1983-84, the same percentage of national wealth spent in the 1963-64 financial year, when defence capability was at perhaps its lowest ebb since the post-Depression era.

ANNEX 'K'

A SYSTEMS APPROACH.

(This is an extract from a paper given at an A.D.A. Seminar on 1st July, 1979, by Michael O'Connor).

If defence planning begins with, relates to, and is expressed in terms of a strategic assessment, strategic doctrine and the notion of aggressor profitability, then equipment procurement proposals such as the TFF will necessarily involve an examination of low and high technology solutions.

To adopt that approach is to reject the view, implicit in too many defence decisions, that 'old' weapons should be 'replaced' by higher technology versions of the same genetic type, fighter by fighter, tank by tank and so on. Blind allegiance to such a philosophy is illogical, potentially wasteful of scarce resources and inevitably degrades defence effectiveness.

Commitment to what is more aptly described as a "replacement syndrome" suggests there is no need to monitor the strategic environment. Consequently, the 'strategic basis' document, its concomitant strategic doctrine and the notion of deterrence are downgraded to the point of irrelevance. Adherents of that approach see planning as absurdly simple; i.e. planning becomes an inexorable movement up the technology ladder. In that case, the planner needs only to start with "enough of everything" and subsequently buy new models as the old wear out. The most sophisticated proponents of this approach couch their arguments in terms of the plausible, emotive but nevertheless unsupported objective of "maintaining" the state of the art". The question is, whose "art"?

The fact is that many of our recent and not so recent defence purchases have not been justified in any other terms. There is a quite credible argument that the Mirage aircraft was never and was never likely to be a suitable aircraft for Australia's defence needs because it was a short-range platform designed for use against manned bomber aircraft capable of attacking high value targets. The fact that we had no such targets within range of any high performance bomber aircraft seems not to have been considered by the planners.

In the same way, the purchase of highly sophisticated Leopard tanks which cannot operate in close country, which are quite vulnerable to modern anti-tank weapons, which cannot be readily transported around Australia and in numbers which virtually guarantee our inability to sustain a conflict does nothing to deter anyone. Indeed, by committing the bulk of the Army to relatively unprotected operations, that purchase, while it no doubt pleases the Armoured Corps, may well encourage the emergence of a threat.

It is usually at this stage that the veterans of the Bren gun carrier and the Wirraway raise the cry of 'Our boys deserve the best'.

It is worth mentioning in passing that the cry of 'our boys deserve the best' is closely related to what I have called a "technological bias". 'Our boys deserve the best' is nonsense; what our boys deserve, and must have, is not the best, but the most effective - there is a difference.

The Vietnam War has clearly illustrated that high technology does not always provide the right solution to the problem. There were too many cases of the bow and arrow being more effective than the rifle, and of the World War II aircraft being more effective than the modern jet, for planners to persist in not looking lower down the technology ladder for solutions to defence needs.

Closely related to the problem of "technological bias" is the problem of "operational bias". Here, weapons, particularly aircraft, are selected on the basis of operational ability, weapon-load, radius of action, etc. with little or no consideration being given to the support resources that are absolutely essential to the achievement of that operational performance.

It may be trite, but it's worth repeating, that an operational resource such as the Mirage becomes effective only when it is augmented by support resources. Too often in our aircraft purchases the very factors (early warning system for example) that led aircraft 'A' to be purchased instead of aircraft 'B', are never purchased or come into service as the aircraft is being phased out.

The F-111 is another example. I accept that it is a very fine aircraft because I have been told so. What it is not is a very fine weapon system because it lacks most of the components which go into constructing a weapons system. As a result, when it is used in exercises against seaborne targets under optimum conditions, it demonstrates an embarrassing vulnerability to relatively modern AAW systems. Yet the most likely use for the F-111 is in attacks on an enemy's seaborne forces. What we should have built or purchased, if it fitted in without strategic needs, was a long-range airborne strike system. What we got was nothing - and it cost an embarrassing amount of money and political credibility.

Because of the planners' bias towards the ultimate in high technology, our capacity to produce weapons systems has been virtually non-existent. The planners argue that the lack of resources precludes the acquisition of systems, that it is better to acquire the best vehicle, regardless of the strategic context or the effectiveness of the vehicle itself in any rational scenario.



EACH COMPONENT HAS MAJOR VALUE IN THE SYSTEM.

FIG.

ANNEX 'K'

Figure 1 suggests a range of components which must be incorporated in any defence system, be it an air defence system, an armoured warfare system or any other. I suggest we would be hard put to demonstrate that the Defence Force has a complete system in any field whatever, that is, however efficient our personnel may be in operating their vehicles (and they are extremely efficient), the effectiveness of their weapons systems in a strategic context may even be a negative quantity because a demonstrated lack of effectiveness increases the likelihood that a threat will emerge.

While the perfect system will never be achieved, I submit that past procurement decisions reflect an operational bias, even to the level of choosing the most technically excellent vehicle or platform and disregarding other operational factors and most logistic factors.

Of course, as these new vehicles become more complex - and more expensive - the other components are increasingly ignored, to the detriment of system effectiveness.

The operational bias has repeatedly committed the Defence Force to a high technology solution to its problems when consideration of all the system components may well lead to a low technology but more effective solution. Put crudely, an effective TFF solution may well be to acquire a slower aircraft capable of sophisticated ordnance delivery which can be built and maintained by the Australian aerospace industry, which can be operated from and dispersed to a large number of bases and which can be tropicalised without unacceptable degradation in performance. The solution that is being offered is a very high performance aircraft which will lack industrial support, which can be operated from at best one or two bases with adequate facilities, and which, on the F-111 experience, will be armed with inappropriate ordnance. Further, the high cost of the F-16/F-18 solution will ensure that the number of vehicles is very small, may not be able to be increased from an embattled supplier and may well be destroyed or crippled very early in any conflict. In other words, we will get very good aircraft but we will not get an air defence system.

I am not prepared to argue that the high technology solution is not sometimes appropriate. Nor will I go to the other extreme and support those who argue for the motor launch, motor bike and Cessna solution with lots of conscription to make men out of boys. It may be that a high technology solution is the correct solution in the strategic circumstances that we face. In that case, we must be prepared to pay for a total system, not a small part of a system.

What I do ask is that the planners be given proper and complete strategic guidance and, in the light of that guidance, at least examine available low technology solutions to a systems problem.

NOTE: The terminology used in Figure 1 warrants some explanation :

Vehicle/Platform.	The aircraft, ship or vehicle which launches ordnance.
Ordnance.	The gun, missile, bomb, etc. to be delivered against the target.
Weapon Delivery System	The combination of sensors, processors and guidance systems which direct ordnance to the target.
Operational Bases.	Bases from which the vehicle can operate and which can provide refuelling, rearming, minor repairs, tactical control.
Mobility.	The ability to deploy the vehicle rapidly to any likely operational area.

Dispersal	The ability to move key components of the system away from a threatened area.
Tactical Deployment Factors	Systems for reconnaissance, command, control, damage assessment, communications, etc.
Industrial Support.	The capacity to produce and maintain components of the system with a substantial guarantee of availability.
Environment.	The ability to operate effectively in a wide range of geographic and climatic conditions.

CHAIRMAN - Would you tell me something about the Australia Defence Association. I am not sure about other members of the Committee, but I am not familiar with its operation in all States and how it came into existence.

Mr O'Connor - From memory, the organisation was formed in Western Australia in 1976. Subsequently a number of people here, including myself, were invited to consider forming a Victorian branch. That branch came into being in August 1977. Since then I understand that a number of meetings have been held in Queensland to form a Queensland branch. We are in contact with some people in New South Wales who have stated an intention to form a New South Wales branch. The only active branches so far are the Victorian and Western Australian branches. There is no national governing body at the moment.

CHAIRMAN - Do you usually look for people who are retired from the forces or who are still in the Citizen Military Forces?

Mr Noble - No, we are trying to look for a public involvement in defence. In fact we play down any Service involvement. We look for a wide range of people from all walks of life - trade unions, academics, housewives, people in business - because we think that defence is not just an issue for the Services; it is very much a public issue.

CHAIRMAN - I think I can safely say on behalf of the members of the Committee - knowing them so well as we have worked together now for some years - that apart from our formal terms of reference we have an overall objective. That objective is Australian industry participation, which is always foremost in our minds, and to get the people of Australia really interested and involved in the whole defence concept. So your organisation is very acceptable. Would you now address us on the general context of your submission.

Mr O'Connor - The general thrust of our submission, as distinct from particular remarks on aspects of the Government's defence program, is that the Defence Force simply is not big enough to achieve the strategic objective of deterring attack. For a relatively small force to deter attack it must be able to respond

to a threat faster than the threat can be developed. In conditions in which other nations have developed a capability without as yet any sign of an intention to threaten Australia's interests that response time is too short to build a force from the very small base that we have. The general tenor of official statements both to this Committee and elsewhere is that the nature of a threat must be identified before a force can be created to meet it. This is a very inflexible doctrine when flexibility of response ought to be our objective. The management of the Defence Force reminds me of children playing with a lump of Plasticine. All sorts of shapes - thin or thick, long or short - can be made from that lump, but the lump never gets any bigger. This is no reflection on the management of the Defence Force, but it is a reflection on the provision of resources for defence and the absence of a sound, conceptual basis for a national strategic policy. We are repeatedly told, and can presume from other statements, that the basic constraints on defence are financial and are thus a product of government rather than departmental decision. We believe that government direction of defence at the political level should be far more extensive and provide a surer basis for long term planning.

CHAIRMAN - Would you enlarge on that comment.

Mr O'Connor - Yes. It is not enough to provide a force which may be needed or may be useful at some future time. We have to have a clearer concept of it. That means that government must give directions to its defence planners along the lines of what that force must be capable of doing in support of government and its objectives. It must set a number of guidelines as to how and when the Defence Force may be used. For example, the defence planners need to know from government the sorts of circumstances - in broad because it can never be detailed - in which the Defence Force may be required in support of government, say, to intervene in Papua New Guinea, the Pacific islands or wherever.

They need to have a clear idea from government as to the degree of involvement of the Defence Force in internal security matters, for example, on aid to the civil power. They need to have an understanding from government of what sort of commitment government expects the Defence Force to be able to make in defence of trade and similar areas. Obviously, it is a two-way exchange between government and its defence advisers, but our belief is that this exchange is not taking place to a sufficient degree to allow the defence planners to have a clear idea, which they need, of the demands that could be made on their force. Finally, unless Australia is provided with a substantially larger force manned by more regular and Reserve personnel, we cannot be said to be deterring attack or guaranteeing peace.

CHAIRMAN - Mr Noble, have you any comments to add before we ask questions?

Mr Noble - Yes, I wish to reinforce briefly the fact that whilst the Government says that it will respond only to threats or no-threat situations, it is placing itself continually in a very dubious position for the security of this country because the time involved in being able to respond is far greater than the time that the threat will take to develop. So the Government cannot say that we have a deterrent force, on the one hand, whilst it adopts a philosophy, on the other hand, that we will only respond when a threat develops.

Mr NEIL - Without indicating concluded views, I preface my questions by saying that I think your submission is valuable in that it locks horns on some very basic policy matters. This Committee will have to consider these matters. I believe the Government's economic policy is right, but some people say it is wrong. Let us try to clarify the matter. Are you saying that the Australian defence policy based upon the core force is wrong for this country to adopt?

Mr O'Connor - Yes, certainly.

Mr NEIL - Are you saying that it is wrong by conscious, deliberate act of government or by act of government forced upon it by various-----

Senator BISHOP - Intelligence advisers?

Mr NEIL - No, I was going to say various restraints, such as financial restraints, primarily.

Mr O'Connor - I think it is forced on it by restraints. Some of those restraints are financial and economic. Some of them are what I would term more traditional and customary in relation to Senator Bishop's question. Since Andrew Fisher's Government and before, we in Australia have been locked into a defence planning process at both the political and management level, which has tended to look outwards for our source of defence, which has tended not to look a long way ahead and which has tended to consider the state of the world as it is today. Those traditions make it relatively easy to shunt defence down the list of Government priorities and I hasten to add, down the list of any government. We are in that situation until we get to a clear and immediate threat - as at the beginning of World War II - by which time it is too late to build on your core force to meet that particular threat with any degree of deterrent capability. In fact, for two years or three years you are fighting with your backs to the wall and you count yourself rather lucky to survive.

Mr NEIL - If we take the other side of the coin, our forces, as they now stand, are a core force with some degree of force-in-being capability. In view of that and recent announcements which have been made about the Army, what is your assessment of this force as to its capabilities to handle contingencies which might arise? In other words, what types of emergency and contingencies do you think the present force is good enough to handle? Where is the dividing line between what you reckon this force is good enough for and what it is not good enough for?

Mr O'Connor - Paragraph 54 of the submission headed: 'Current and Planned Force Structure' indicates within the force structure a couple of areas which are at a satisfactory level of equipment or else decisions made have foreshadowed a satisfactory level of equipment. However, in a number of areas we simply lack numbers

in terms of both equipment and manpower. I have listed them subsequently in that paragraph 54. The lack of a serious minewarfare capability disturbs me most because the warning time for the application of a mine threat to our ports and harbours is so very short. Minewarfare is far too sophisticated nowadays to rely on a number of fishing trawlers with a few wires towed along behind. You need to have a fairly substantial force-in-being of ships and trained people so that you can respond immediately. Otherwise you put yourself at quite serious risk to that form of attack.

CHAIRMAN - Is it your view that we should be out laying mines immediately ourselves?

Mr O'Connor - I do not think that is so much of a problem. I am not sure that you can retaliate against a nation which relies less on sea-borne trade than Australia does by a mine-laying warfare.

CHAIRMAN - I mean to protect our lines of support.

Mr O'Connor - There would be a case for that but I would like to see priority given to minesweeping.

CHAIRMAN - It was just a point of view.

Mr NEIL - I put to the witness who presented the Army submission a scenario of a force of about 500 lightly-armed combatants somehow getting into Gove. I forget the expanded form of the question but they were supposed to have sneaked in on a merchant ship. The evidence had been given that you live off the resources in that town for six months to eight months. Could we get them out quickly before any United Nations agitation was organised? The answer was that the ready reaction force we are now putting together is designed for just that task.

What would be your comment on that somewhat remote but possible scenario and our force-in-being capabilities to deal with it, without any great degree of civilian casualties?

Mr Noble - Could I preface this remark by saying that you could have all sorts of scenarios. Why invite a person or an organisation or a country in the first place to go about doing that sort of thing? That is our point. We should really have the capability of a deterrent force which ensures that countries look at that option and say that the cost to them will be greater than they can afford and therefore they will not undertake it. That is a fairly low level scenario and I would think that perhaps we have a force-in-being to counter that, to stop it or to dislodge it, if necessary. I am not in the military at the moment. My knowledge is that air and ground force, and even some naval force, can be available to stop that occurring. If you had three or four, and not just one, of those occurring around the coastline, as is quite likely, then I think we would be stretched thin. A deterrent capability to stop one may be there but there may not be a capability to stop more.

Mr O'Connor - The ready reaction force itself seems to be designed to produce that capability. When you are talking about a force of 500 men, as in your scenario, and you respond to that, you are starting to draw in a very large logistics support and, if you do not have access to airfields and ports in the immediate vicinity, you will need a substantial amphibious capability to move in the firepower to support your ready reaction force. I am not sure if a two battalion force of infantry would be a very suitable force. You would need a fairly substantial logistic support which would draw a lot of resources and I am not sure that we have them.

Mr Noble - You would need continuing resources - not just the first placement, but also the backup.

Mr NEIL - If the other side controlled the area of Gove from where does our side develop a logistic springboard?

Mr O'Connor - It would have to be Darwin.

Mr NEIL - You say in your submission that Government

strategic policy is too dependent on enjoying a longer warning time than mobilising time. We have had constantly before this Committee - it has also been stated in print many times - that, as far as high level threats are concerned, this country simply relies on an assessment that the warning time will be longer than the response time. Evidence is usually adduced along the lines of statements to the effect that there is intelligence information on intentions and capabilities and that there is no nation in the region with the capability to threaten Australia with invasion. They produce some evidence. What is your evidence - as against historical concern? One can put up historical examples. We always must be aware of the possibility of the unpredictable. What is your evidence that the warning time will be less than the mobilising time?

Mr O'Connor - The classic case in recent years was the movement by the Soviet Union of Cuban troops to Angola in very large numbers for a specific purpose. This was simply not predicted by any Western intelligence agency before the event - at least no agency admits doing so. About 20,000 troops were moved in a very short time. Clearly there are a number of new features in that. There was the use of proxy troops and the development of a strategic troop lift capability by the Soviet Union.

CHAIRMAN - What do you mean by proxy troops?

Mr O'Connor - The use of another country's troops by the Soviet Union to fight its own battles. The availability of such proxy troops in our region - in Vietnam - and the Soviet strategic lift capability make that sort of thing possible within our region. What we do not know is whether there is such an intention. In dealing with nations like those, no intelligence service is in a position to predict intention within mobilising time. The mobilising time for us would be quite long. The Army's submission to this Committee mentioned five years for raising and training 150,000 troops. There is a whole range of mobilising problems in terms of manpower. Yet the time needed for nations such as the Soviet Union and Vietnam to translate their capability into reality - that is to formulate

and implement the intention - can be very short; it can be a matter of weeks.

Mr NEIL - Is it correct, proper or responsible for a government to proclaim openly that its policy is based on a judgment that warning time will exceed response time? What demonstrations of the validity of that judgment do you believe the Government ought to put before the public? If it cannot do that would you say it would be forced to change its policy?

Mr Noble - First of all, I do not think the Government can validly put that point.

Mr NEIL - That is being done.

Mr Noble - That is right. You are well aware of Commander Speedy's analysis of the threat - from the time the threat emerges to the time the first shot is fired. Since the Second World War the figure is somewhere between 15 months and 18 months. That is on the low side. So there is ample evidence around the world that threats can emerge far more quickly than our capability to respond. In our submission we talk about the Oberon class submarine. It took some 19 years to get the last of the submarines, which have a deterrent capability. That would not be unusual if we went ahead with those weapon systems. But there is ample evidence that the response far exceeds the ability to assess the threat.

Mr NEIL - What should we have? You speak of a Force structure that is a rationalisation of the various inadequacies. Your paragraph 54 is particularly relevant. But in terms of the types of aggregates a government can look at, what level of expenditure ought we be considering?

Mr Noble - We do not believe you should start off with a level of expenditure. We are not saying you will need to spend 4 per cent or 5 per cent of gross domestic product. It may turn out that once you analyse the situation you will arrive at those figures. We are proposing an entirely new look at what defence is about. Before you can talk about Force structure you must come back to our national interests. You must define those in the public arena. Having defined them you then look at the Force structure which will defend those national interests. At the moment we do not do that. There may be a threat somewhere in five years or 10 years - we do not know. To base our forces on whether or not there is a threat is tantamount to abrogating the defence of the country. We cannot really talk about money until we go back to a fundamental redefining of the basis for our Defence Force.

Mr NEIL - Is it quite right to say that is being done? At present the Government talks of contingencies or potential problems. We are not preparing against any specific threat. To some extent, albeit within restraint, is not the policy presently directed to contingencies rather than nominating and responding to threats?

Mr O'Connor - That is true in principle as stated in the White Paper. When a contingency arises there is a tendency to say that there is no threat. Coming into the public consciousness are repeated statements not that there are contingencies we have to face but that there is no threat. The way in which words are used constitute the problem. Discussion of the nature of the threat tends to revolve around the threat of invasion. Quite frankly, that is the remotest possible contingency. There is no threat of that kind; the Government is quite right. But I can see a whole range of possibilities far short of invasion which

would be quite crippling for Australia. We have not, at least in the public arena - and it should be in public - canvassed some of those contingencies or areas in which Australia could be enormously vulnerable. So the defence debate in public tends to take on this rather unreal air of a debate about whether or not somebody is going to invade Australia.

Mr NEIL - What are the threats to those interests which you have set out in paragraph 32? What are those contingencies you foresee in addition to any not included already in the threats to the interests in paragraph 32?

Mr O'Connor - The concentration of population, industry and food production in the south-east of the continent certainly implies a problem of invasion and I believe one of Australia's great assets is that such a large concentration of our interests lies so far away from any potential threat. When we talk about the resource areas we must include one major resource area in the south-east, the Bass Strait oilfields. When you get outside the resource locations what we are talking about is exactly what you canvassed earlier, namely, a small force taking control of one of the major mining or other resources. This would not only pose a threat to Australia in the sense that it could open up a base facility, but it would also deprive us as a nation of the income which derived from that particular resource. We must also consider our trade routes. This nation trades 27.5 per cent of its gross domestic product. The loss of all or even part of that could place very severe constraints on political decision making, which, after all, is what the use of military force is all about. It is not necessary to take over the country but simply to have us make the decisions which other people want us to make.

Mr NEIL - I can see the potential threat but what is the threat now or within, say, five years to the major trade routes?

Mr O'Connor - There is a range of threats. There is the positioning of Soviet long range aircraft and Soviet warships in Vietnamese bases. There is the mere geographic advantage which the Indonesians have of sitting astride our major trade routes to the north. About 52 per cent of our trade passes through straits

controlled or potentially controlled by Indonesia. One of the significant factors in the problems in Iran and the invasion of Afghanistan is the potential they create for destabilisation in that area, particularly as a source of our imported oil, and for the opening up of naval facilities on the northern reaches of the Indian Ocean, particularly in India and the Gulf states. Many of those things have happened; some of them have not happened but they are foreshadowable within a very short period relative to our ability to build up a defence force beyond what it is today.

Mr NEIL - What about the final one, the area in which the naval and air bases should go?

Mr O'Connor - Because of the existence of those other defence interests, it is virtually essential to create substantial base facilities in the north and in the west from which you can deploy your forces to protect those interests. Those base facilities will become so significant that they become defence interests in themselves. Admiral Sir Reginald Henderson recommended in 1911 that we build a naval base in Western Australia and in 1979 we opened stage two of it. Earl Jellicoe recommended in 1919 that we build a naval base in the north near Darwin and it has been suggested that the reason for the very heavy Japanese attack on Darwin in 1942 was simply the development of naval and air facilities in Darwin which threatened Japanese control of Indonesia.

Mr NEIL - How do we interest the public more in developing policies and sustaining government expenditures in the absence of the spur of a threat, or how do we more adequately explain to the public the types of threats you have just outlined?

Mr Noble - You could support the Australia Defence Association.

Mr NEIL - No doubt you are very active but how do we get people to support the Government more?

Mr Noble - It is a difficult task. The problem is a case of the timing of defence expenditures. The Government has recently announced it is going to spend more on defence following the Afghanistan situation. I think that was something of a catalyst rather than a rationale for it. But the actual spending of moneys may be two to three years hence. For example, if we went to war in two to three years time we would fundamentally still have the same equipments as we have now, with a few minor additions. In health, social welfare and education if the Government announces it is going to spend money, that money is available and can be spent virtually in the following financial year. If there is a public outcry for spending in those areas there can be an immediate response. There is quite a problem when it comes to what the public perceives in defence and what it perceives in many other areas of spending because of a considerable time lag.

This brings us back to why we believe you have to get away from the threat/no-threat situation. If you educate your public on that dictum only you will never build up a deterrent force because you cannot allocate money quickly enough into the defence area. It was about 1944 before we were really spending money properly for the Second World War and that was in a nation geared completely to war production at that stage. We are in peacetime now and it will take a great deal longer to do that. The Government has to 'come clean'. I use that phrase guardedly but it has to start to educate the public in the understanding that the spending of moneys is going to be a slow process. It

cannot be immediate but we cannot afford to rationalise our spending on this threat/no-threat basis because we will never end up spending the money.

Mr NEIL - What is the cost of your shopping list in paragraph 54 and the annexes?

Mr O'Connor - Overall, and taking into account other related factors such as operational expenditures, manpower expenditures and so on, it would come to about five and a half thousand million dollars a year at today's prices as an ongoing program. By the time it was implemented, which would be in 1984-85 at the earliest, it would be about 3.8 per cent to 4 per cent of gross domestic product.

Mr NEIL - Would that be the total defence bill or the extra?

Mr O'Connor - The total defence bill would be that.

Mr SCHOLES - You have set out a fair shopping list and you have in your paper virtually all the things which are currently under debate as being desirable or are otherwise considered to be desirable. What do you see as the prime items for government action? I note you say we should have a carrier and we should disband the Navy's responsibilities for surveillance. I assume the tactical fighter force program goes ahead and you list an expanded destroyer force. What do you see as the actual priorities in a 10-year program?

Mr O'Connor - I would make the first priority a mine warfare force then have more aircraft in the tactical fighter force.

Mr SCHOLES - Mine warfare is a mine defence proposition.

Mr O'Connor - Yes, mine defence. Then I would build up the destroyer force. I think you have to give some priority at least to a decision on a carrier so that you can start to make the consequential decision either to wind down your fleet air arm or to maintain it. You have to think about continuing to recruit air crews and to train them. So that decision is important but I would see the provision of a mine warfare force as having greatest priority, followed by a commitment to increase the number of aircraft in the TFF.

Mr Noble - I would like to add to this. We have never set ourselves up as experts to tell people what force structure is

needed. We feel that the Department of Defence has a lot of expertise in this area. We have personal opinions and we are happy to present them. Once we have established our priorities their experts are available and we should use them. I would like to add to that. I feel priority should be given to strengthening our air deterrent capability. The F111 has a high priority. It should be updated and missiles should be procured for it.

Mr SCHOLES - A carrier is obviously a major shopping item. Can a carrier be defended outside the range of shore-based aircraft without using up an inordinate amount of our other naval capacity?

Mr O'Connor - Most certainly. An aircraft carrier has its own defensive system built in, particularly an aircraft like the Harrier which has a combat air protection capability. It will certainly need an escort force with at least a short range anti-air capability and anti-submarine capability but the primary defensive capability of a carrier and a carrier force is its mobility. It is far more mobile than something like Amberley. The vulnerability of Amberley is not so much connected with the thickness of the concrete in the runways but with the openness to attack of the workshops which are scattered around the place. I am not arguing for one against the other. I am arguing for both.

Mr SCHOLES - I doubt the flexibility of a carrier. It does not move very quickly. In their submission to this Committee the Navy representatives said they were quite confident they could protect an Australian carrier. They also said they were 90 per cent certain they could destroy an enemy carrier. Are you confident that a carrier can be protected if we place it where the Navy's submission places it, in the Indian Ocean outside the range of shore-based aircraft in an area dense with high capacity missile submarines which can utilise their missiles from well outside the range of carrier aircraft or helicopters?

Mr O'Connor - Quite frankly that is an area I would not like to get into. I am not going to argue with that. Admiral Loosli has more stripes than I have.

Mr SCHOLES - You have suggested in your submission that we should develop a coastguard with independent capacities. I notice you mention certain items of equipment. Given the need to develop a substantial and continuing Defence Force, do you consider that this would retard that need because of the obvious diversion of resources? I think it is estimated that it would cost $400m per year to maintain a separate coastguard.

Mr Noble - We feel very strongly about the need for a separate coastguard. We feel that basically it is a civilian requirement. It is for protection against drug running and illegal immigrants and so on. In time of war it provides a very substantial paramilitary organisation which can be utilised but its requirements should not be met from the Defence vote as such. The types of equipment needed for a deterrent force are of levels far higher than those needed for a coastguard capacity. It would be a marked overkill to use Orions and a large destroyer for coastguard protection. We should use less sophisticated equipment in a coastguard which should be funded separately, although it could be used in war. It would provide a skilled reserve. It is an excellent example of what I said in my additional submission about building up a skilled reserve which could be used for higher levels of operation if necessary.

Mr SCHOLES - What legal basis would you give the coastguard operation for its operations? The Americans have a quite different system. They have a quite different set of laws and constitutional provisions.

Mr Noble - Do you mean legal in the sense of having the power to apprehend people on the high seas and that type of thing?

Mr SCHOLES - To operate as a coastguard.

Mr Noble - Frankly I have not looked at that question.

Mr O'Connor - I would say it would require similar legal provisions to those applying to the Federal Police. I want to take up this point about the $400m cost of the coastguard. That is not an annual cost. That is the cost of the total outlay

of equipment, which would be spread over a number of years. The annual cost of a coastguard on our estimate would be about $120m. This is certainly more than is being spent in that area at the moment but I think there would be a fair amount of agreement that what is being spent now is not enough. I see a good case for a coastguard to carry out this off-shore policing function while having a substantial reserve capability for war.

Mr SCHOLES - We will not argue about that. I think you are trying to spend money twice, but that is another matter. You put in a subsequent section about the Reserve, the Reserve equipment and the manner of expansion. Do you see it as relevant to expand the Reserve under its existing structure and with its existing operational and functional lines? Do you think it is relevant to just add manpower to the Reserve without first dealing with the basic problems of converting it or ensuring that it does in fact provide a supplement to the armed forces?

Mr Noble - I am not quite certain that I have understood your question.

Mr SCHOLES - Do you think we should tackle the problem of making the reserves effective before we start tackling the problem of more manpower?

Mr Noble - I see. I think mostly they go hand in hand. In fact the reserves that I am talking about will take a long time to train. Either they would go through normal military training in a short time and spend a longer time in the reserves or skilled people would be brought in from outside. We are talking about quite long lead times. I think the emphasis at the moment is on, say, the Army Reserve in which skills are involved, but not at a high level. The buildup in manpower with the long lead times and the buildup in the skilled reserves would have to go hand in hand. It would have to be done over a considerable period. There is no quick answer to that question.

Mr O'Connor - I think a conceptual change is needed to move the dependence that we understand from regular forces to the

reserves - not entirely, but to a much greater degree than it is at the moment.

Mr Noble - The defence of Australia is not provided only by the men in uniform. The defence of Australia will be the capacity as a nation, including those people who are not in uniform, to respond at the appropriate time. The Australian public has to be aware of that need. A skilled reserve capacity is one way of doing it.

Mr SCHOLES - Should the prime development of the Australian Defence Force be based on an assumption that the Defence Force should be an integral unit capable of operating on its own and at least expected in the worst circumstances to operate on its own as a defence unit, or should we take into consideration in developing the Defence Force the likelihood of operating with allies?

Mr Noble - Overall I believe we need to develop the capabilities of operating on our own. We need to develop our own strategic philosophies. Historically Australia has very much been under the wing of another country, such as the United Kingdom or the United States of America. All our major engagements have been in the capacity of a force supporting, or being under the overall strategic command of another country. This has influenced detrimentally the attitude of our major military commanders and their historical development. We now need to consider our operations in the future, and develop that philosophy, as being under our own strategic control. Maybe we will not use that philosophy, but it has to be developed.

Mr SCHOLES - You have said the core defence operation is not satisfactory. I do not think there will be any argument with that idea outside the defence area where the alternative has become rather difficult technically. You have set out a structure for a maritime command. What other functional units would you see as operating to make a total and comprehensive command structure for the Defence Force?

Mr O'Connor - As well as a maritime command, which is different from a coastguard, we envisage a continental defence

command - most of the Army would be under this command - which would include air force units, particularly transport units and helicopter units, and an air defence command which would include largely air force but which may include ground-based army air defence units which would not be used by the field force but which we do not have at the moment anyway. We think these functional commands are much more relevant today than are single service operational commands.

Mr SCHOLES - Do you see any significant problems in the existing arrangements during hostilities?

Mr O'Connor - Yes, certainly. Let us take an example that we were discussing of naval vessels operating, say, as an escort force within the range of shore-based aircraft, leaving aside the long range maritime patrol aircraft. If we wanted a strike force to come from the Air Force the time that it would take at the moment to get such aircraft quickly, quite apart from the transit time, would be enormous. By the time there was agreement to get the aircraft through the various structures of two separate services the battle might be over.

Mr SCHOLES - For what time do you think it is necessary to have persons in the Services in peacetime in order that they are efficient and well trained?

Mr Noble - It depends on their roles. With flying about two years' training is necessary, so within three years the person would be operational, or perhaps four or five years at the most. Then there would be a period of active reserve. I think too much emphasis is placed on people staying in the permanent forces as a career. Admittedly some people have to stay for continuity, but I would shorten the time in the permanent forces to the absolute minimum to ensure that benefit is obtained from the training but that more people are trained.

Mr SCHOLES - The United States is using a system of short term full time service - up to 18 months, I think, in the case of fighter pilots - and then active reserve with the National Guard or similar organisations. Is such a system appropriate to Australia? Could we develop the basic system for that type of training?

Mr Noble - I have not considered that proposal.

Mr O'Connor - I think the period would need to be longer than is taken in the American services. My familiarity is more with the United States Navy. I think its terms of engagement are far too short. I think that applies to the all-volunteer force of the Army, too. They are finding the costs of-----

Mr SCHOLES - I was thinking more of the reserves where a person does his basic training in a consolidated lump rather than over 20 years.

Mr O'Connor - We have to overcome the problem of making the reserves attractive. Generally speaking, I suggest a short period - a very short period, if at all - of full time training with the rest of the time spent in part time training. Provided we have the equipment for that system to operate, I do not see any real problem.

Senator BISHOP - Is your Association's view that the Government presently has adopted the wrong strategic assessment

based on faulty intelligence or to Department of Defence budgetary planning?

Mr O'Connor - I do not know if we can identify either of those matters as the problem area. I believe that intelligence assessments are not so much faulty as incomplete. By their nature they cannot be complete. I do not believe one can put too much reliance on that sort of intelligence. As I suggested earlier, the underlying problem is political. Because it takes so long to translate a decision into effective hardware to be deployed in the Defence Force and because defence planning necessarily must always look a fair way into the future, I think it is quite natural that defence will tend to slide down a list of government priorities, particularly when there are many more immediate demands being made upon it.

Senator BISHOP - Suppose that as in the present circumstance - you have read the documents and this Committee has received the advice - the Government thinks there is no foreseeable threat. If that is a valuable and reliable assessment, should a government do what you propose and advance a very heavy expenditure on defence when it may not be necessary?

Mr O'Connor - Firstly I do not think that sort of assessment can be relied upon. I am reminded of the formal advice given by the Department of External Affairs to the Government on 30 November 1941 that Japan was unlikely to go to war. That sort of assessment does not really mean anything. When you ask is there then justification for the Government to embark on a heavy expenditure program, by comparison with other countries I do not believe it is necessarily a too heavy program for a country of Australia's resources.

Secondly, the uncertainty that is created by our inability to predict what is going to happen in five or 10 years' time really compels us to make that provision.

Senator BISHOP - You have no doubt read the recommendations of this Committee with respect to Australia's internal industrial capability. Does it seem logical to you, as it does to the Committee, that to the maximum extent possible our country should

be manufacturing whatever capability is needed, rather than to rely on foreign sources?

Mr O'Connor - Yes. I would go further. I would hope that the Government would set down far more specific objectives than it has in terms of the degree of self-reliance, and be prepared to accept cost penalties arising from that. I go further and say the Government ought to be actively seeking to be the supplier of defence equipment to regional countries which could then be buttoned into Australia in an informal alliance, which would enhance our security without necessarily threatening it, and would reduce some of those cost penalties.

Mr Noble - I think we have a tremendous capability in this area. The Second World War was a classic example of that. We are finding that nations such as the United States and Germany will attempt to sell us equipment without having to provide the offset work by saying it is too costly. I believe that exercise is going on now with the TFF. Australia was cut out of the offset work for the Leopard tank entirely because the Germans said we could not do it. I congratulate your Committee on opening up this field. I think it needs quite a lot of further work.

CHAIRMAN - I refer to paragraphs 12, 13 and 14. I am anxious to know how you arrive at those conclusions. I particularly mention paragraph 14 because my experience with very well informed members of the Defence Department indicates that they do recognise various levels of threats. Perhaps I am misinterpreting the intention of your remarks. I rather gather that you are suggesting that the Defence Department, in concentrating on an all-out invasion - that sort of threat - is inclined to overlook the lower level threats. I do not think that has been the evidence at a very high level that the Committee received from the Defence Department. I would like your comments on how you arrived at those conclusions.

Mr O'Connor - It tends to be more in the area of public presentation, the public debate and the participation of the

Defence Department in the public debate. For example, my recollection of the papers being presented to the current series of Defence Department seminars is that they do tend to look very much in that area of major contingencies, major threats, and play down the other. I do not say they are divorced from their appraisal, but the public presentation tends to be on the basis of major threat. Further I do not think - and this has been my experience - that there is sufficient input to Defence Department thinking on the political and economic and other effects within Australia of some of these lower level contingencies.

For example I do not know of any assessments having been done on the effects of interdiction of part or all of our trade or of incidents which might lead to, if not the actual stopping of trade, at least the diversion of shipping into longer routes with increased insurance and cost penalties and so on. It just seems that not enough work has been done in that field. There seems to be an assessment that certainly there are lesser contingencies, but those are ones with which we can cope.

Mr Noble - I should emphasise this public versus private factor. We do not have access to what is being said in those areas, but publicly all that really comes out is this question of the invasion or the larger threat. This goes back to our argument that this is being put publicly and it is said it will not occur. Then it becomes a rationale for the Government to decrease defence spending. It provides a reason economically to say 'We will only allocate that amount of resources to defence', or decrease it. I believe that all these scenarios are being discussed and debated. And a question was asked earlier about whether our core force could cope with some of those and we said that we doubt whether they could anyway. So it is at the public area that we are responding without privy to that information in the Defence area.

CHAIRMAN - You have stated one very profound and valid truth. When you talk about the warning time and so on you find it has no deterrent effect and you say that on the contrary it may hasten the emergence of threats because of the demonstrable weakness that it encourages. I think that is a very profound truth. You seem to represent a group that would help us achieve one of our objectives, which is to get the rank and file of the nation to have a forum through which they can avoid the highly formal processes that would be involved if you wanted to approach the Department of Defence or even this Committee, whereas they could use your Association as a mouth piece. I think this is good. Some of your statements in the submission are extremely well done, and I rather wonder, when you say you do not have any association

with the Services themselves, why you are doing so well, because we might get a clue.

Mr O'Connor - The fact is that our organisation does include a number of people who are trained in this area and whose knowledge and talents we can and do tap into. These are people who are trained in the defence world. We also have a number of people in the commercial world, the economic world, to whom we can put a set of facts, for example, relating to the interdiction of trade and ask: 'What would be the economic effects of this?' It is really a case of being able to ask the right people the right questions and getting answers that as a result we have some trust in. On a personal basis, I myself was employed for a number of years in the Navy intelligence area.

CHAIRMAN - We have the worst of all defence worlds in Australia. If we look at the core force concept or even the force-in-being, both are dependent on two things: The enthusiasm of the nation, particularly those men and women who could serve in war; and the availability of funds from something fewer than 14 million people. That puts us at a serious disadvantage, particularly with the communist world or the USSR where they just tell people where they are going and what they are to do. Secondly, because of that, they have huge resources - the obvious things. You people have stated here what is wrong and we acknowledge that, but how do we overcome that? How will we have the capacity to expand our core force or our force-in-being? We have these two great limitations: One, we depend entirely on the voluntary desire of people to serve their country. The other thing is - and I do not know how flexible this is - the availability of the billions of dollars which would be necessary. If you fire one harpoon missile these days you have spent $500,000.

Mr Noble - It is fundamentally a political question. I am not a politician but members of the Committee are. It will require the politician to, I believe, lead somewhat rather than be responsive. I do not want to sound critical here in a sense, but there is a belief that governments tend to react

and respond to what they feel their electorate wants rather than to lead it.

CHAIRMAN - We want frankness here. Every Western country in the world avoids the term 'compulsory military service'.

Mr Noble - We are saying that defence, with the tremendously long lead times involved, is one field where a government cannot afford to be responsive. If, as an analogy, the nation wanted more spent on health, social welfare and education that would come through very clearly from the electorate to the politician. Defence is a field in which there has to be quite an amount of leadership and understanding. The politician has to make up his mind in this field. If he will 'delude' the electorate into believing there is no threat and therefore we do not have to spend money we will go along as we are. There is a time now for that to change, for the leadership to make the electorate aware. We are trying to do it from the public point of view - through what we do, such as our seminars and our public statements - but ultimately it will be the politician who will have to provide this leadership.

Mr O'Connor - I will say something on the financial side, which is related to annex J of our submission. Because of the real growth in the economy each year, the Government, without increasing taxes and charges in any way, comes into almost an extra billion dollars every year in real terms. That provides a basis for very substantial growth in defence if government were prepared to divert it to that field. In post peacetime years Australian governments have spent up to 17 per cent of total government outlays on defence, compared with 9 per cent at present. The program we are talking about would call for little more than the expenditure of 13 per cent of government outlays as they are at present. So the potential is there - it is a matter for government decision. Concurrently with that government decision I think there needs to be a substantial re-education of the Australian people as to the reality of their

defence problem, that it is not something you can say you can be satisfied with today - it is something you must plan for five years or 10 years ahead and you must start spending the money. You will not have to spend the money this year if you start planning now, but you may have to spend it in three or four years' time and then build it up to a level at which you could probably keep it unless hostilities break out. It needs to be sold as an insurance policy, which is a term people understand. They know very well that they pay their premiums and very rarely get anything back for them.

Mr ARMITAGE - As you probably know, the Committee has been subject to criticism - you have probably seen it in the Press, certainly in 'Hansard' by the Minister - alleging that we have received evidence from non-authoritative sources, that we have not been sufficiently critical, in the sense of cross-examination and so on. I think therefore it is important to establish the bona fides of the criticism, and you have put forward here a document which is very critical of the Government and of Defence departmental policy. As such I do come back to what the Chairman raised, what I term the sources. I want to make this clear: It is a document which is very well put together and there is no doubt on that score. It places its viewpoint quite forcibly. How broad is the membership of the organisation? What types of people are in it? I am referring here particularly to your sources of expertise as a backup for your criticisms of the Department and government policy.

Mr Noble - Briefly our membership in Victoria is about 170 at present. It broadly covers a wide range of people and I stated these earlier - public servants, people in industry, commerce and trade unions, academics and housewives - practically the whole spectrum of society, because we have tried to do that. We have the odd serving officer in it, but that is only for interest, not for expertise or advice.

Mr ARMITAGE - Do you have a serving officer?

Mr Noble - I think there are one or two, yes. Certainly we do not use them in getting evidence which is critical of government. I make the point - yes, we are critical of the direction of government but I do not believe we are, in this article, critical of the Defence Department. We have indicated that the Defence Department has given evidence with which we may not agree but our premise on this point is that the Defence Department has its own problems, being a public service department. It may add to the cost of defence by being inefficient et cetera, but that is not necessarily the basic problem of defence.

CHAIRMAN - I am amazed that you produce a document so good.

Mr Noble - I do not agree with you, Mr Armitage. We have not in this article been highly critical of the Defence Department. We may have been so just in various points.

Mr NEIL - Paragraphs 59 and 60 are critical.

Mr O'Connor - Paragraph 60 is very clearly a reflection on the Treasury regulations, which are ultimately applied by Parliament. It is a question of financial delegation which I believe inhibits the Defence Department.

Mr NEIL - That is only part of it. You say in paragraph 59 that the reorganisation has not led to an increase in efficiency and it was supposed to. Presumably the old system was inefficient, so it is still inefficient.

Mr Noble - I did make the point there that yes, we do agree it may be inefficient. But that is not to say it is not giving good advice or that all it is doing is adding to the cost of defence.

Mr NEIL - You say the procedures of the Department demonstrate the worst effects of decision making by committee?

Mr Noble - That is an efficiency question.

Mr NEIL - I would have thought that if it were true, one of the worst effects of decision making by committee is the potential for poor advice to go to the Government.

Mr Noble - We make the point that there should be more direction from the politician back to the Defence Department.

CHAIRMAN - It seems as though I have disturbed Mr Armitage's line of questioning.

Mr ARMITAGE - Can we return to the source of expertise?

Mr Noble - My view on that is that you have to be expert in defence per se in the technological side to be able then to discuss what you feel is a problem overall in defence. The Chairman feels it is a good paper because we argue from quite fundamental bases that there is a need for a change in strategic thinking. We argue that there is a need for a force structure to be based on that and there is a need for industry to support the force structure. If you have that fundmental thesis which we

always have supported since our formation, the argument flows on from that and we try to avoid the very technical arguments. We offer suggestions only as annexes in what we consider as a force structure. They are only supported by our arguments not by our necessary knowledge of what is going on in the Department of Defence at the moment.

CHAIRMAN - I must clarify my verbal bouquets which I have thrown your way today. I believe the submission has been prepared with great care. I believe you make your points extremely well and I do refer to one or two matters that I think are of fundamental importance. But in order to make my position clear, I must say that I am worried about some of the things you say. For instance, concerning paragraph 58 on page 7 of your submission I have written a comment in the margin asking for greater detail to support this paragraph. When you say you are not critical, I would say paragraph 58 is very critical. It says your Association is concerned at the downgrading of military intelligence resulting from the 1970 formation of the Joint Intelligence Organisation. We thought the JIO was just great. In fact we would like to hear more from you. I think, all in all, it is one of the best prepared submissions I have seen although I do not agree with all it says. Back to you Mr Armitage, I am sorry.

Mr ARMITAGE - So your source of expertise is basically amongst the membership of your organisation?

Senator BISHOP - We would like to know who wrote the documents.

Mr O'Connor - I wrote most of them.

CHAIRMAN - You have to take all the credit.

Mr O'Connor - I will take all the blame too. Can I say that in relation to factual information there is nothing in that which has not come from a published source, nothing whatsoever. Most of it comes from the Australian Bureau of Statistics releases and it is the conclusions that have been derived from that information which I believe are somewhat unique. In relation to the question about the Joint Intelligence Organisation, again,

that is my own assessment and it is based on personal knowledge to a degree. I was serving in the naval intelligence division at the time of the formation of the JIO. I do know that a substantial number of very highly expert intelligence officers in the services at that time, but particularly in the Navy, were allowed to retire because of old age but were not replaced.

Mr ARMITAGE - Because of age, not necessarily old age.

Mr SCHOLES - It is not the retirements, it is the replacements.

Mr O'Connor - Generally speaking, they were Reserve officers who had qualified in specific areas and built up expertise during many years. They were allowed to leave without ever having been understudied. They spent years in a particular post at a particular desk, and built up expertise, whereas their successors tended to be people who would fill that desk on a short-term basis and as a break from more regular duties. One of the effects of the formation of the Joint Intelligence Organisation was to take responsibility for all intelligence gathering and assessment - except operational intelligence - away from the individual services. In the military area I believe they were very largely swamped once they got to defence, that is, the military intelligence area. But related to that and also to paragraph 57, is the problem that I believe - and it is an assessment, nothing that you can put your finger on as fact - that intelligence does not stand very high in the estimation of the Defence hierarchy, both civilian and uniformed. Intelligence provides an opinion rather than something on which you base concrete plans, but the general reaction tends to be to try to knock over what intelligence people say rather than support it. Also I think that Intelligence has a problem in that it claims too much of a capability, more of a capability than any Intelligence organisation can ever possess. As a result it makes itself very vulnerable.

Mr Noble - In reply to a prior question from Mr Armitage, we do not get anyone else to ghost write for us from the Services or anything like this. We do it ourselves.

Mr ARMITAGE - Of course, one of your objects is to provoke and effect discussion so you might even possibly exaggerate sometimes, in order to provoke. If I want to provoke discussion on anything I usually exaggerate. I assume you do the same thing.

Senator BISHOP - You did this morning.

Mr Noble - I do not think there is an exaggeration in this at all.

Mr ARMITAGE - There is another question. We have had pretty authoritative evidence or very authoritative evidence given to

this Committee. There are only two countries today capable of invading Australia which is surrounded by sea. These are the United States and the Soviet Union. Firstly, do you agree with that?

Mr O'Connor - I agree with it. I do not know that it leads us anywhere.

Mr ARMITAGE - In what way?

Mr O'Connor - There is an inherent presumption that invasion is either the only or the worst threat we can face.

Mr ARMITAGE - I agree. Consider trade routes, et cetera.

Mr O'Connor - Yes.

Mr ARMITAGE - Do you know of any country anywhere in our region which would have superior naval and air forces to the extent that it could mount an attack upon Australia, excluding once again the Soviet Union and the United States?

Mr Noble - Do you define capability and intention or just capability?

Mr ARMITAGE - Capability.

Mr O'Connor - You would certainly have to include the Soviet Union.

Mr ARMITAGE - No, I am excluding the Soviet Union and the United States.

Mr O'Connor - When you come to the question of an attack on Australia, I would read that as an attack on Australia's interests, which goes a bit further. Yes, I would see a number of countries - the major ones being Indonesia and India - which have a capacity to attack Australia's interests. That does not necessarily mean their forces are superior to ours on an all out, face to face basis. It is simply that they have a capacity to apply power which threatens Australia's interest. However, we must deploy our power on a much larger scale and at a much greater distance from our bases than they have to.

Mr Noble - The present use of Cam Ranh Bay by the Russians is in our region and provides a capability for attacking Australia.

Mr SCHOLES - My question has a lot to do with your philosophy and other statements. Everyone pays service to Australian

Industry Participation. I support the proposition but it is not a free ride; in fact it is rather an expensive ride. To what extent do you consider the commitment of defence funds to Australian participation is justifiable? In the case of the TFF program on current estimates the cost of AIP would be the equivalent of between 10 and 15 additional aircraft.

Mr Noble - Bought off the shelf?

Mr SCHOLES - Yes.

Mr Noble - It is a very necessary cost. Unfortunately the Defence Department gets lumbered with that cost. It could come out of the defence vote. For example if we want to build a new trainer in Australia, it is said that it is a Defence Department cost. It is not really - industry as a whole benefits from this. Therefore it is wrong to impose it on the Defence Department. One of the unfortunate aspects of Treasury funding is that it has to be broken down in that way. Australia needs to build up this higher technology and expertise - not high, but higher technology - such as the five access computers which are being bought for the TFF project in order to stay up with the technological level. The cost is acceptable, but it should not be a Defence Department cost. It should somehow be spread into another department or into industry so that all industry picks it up.

Mr O'Connor - If the cost is 10 to 15 extra aircraft in my judgment that is perfectly acceptable. It depends on the benefits obtained from it.

Mr SCHOLES - A mere transfer of technology is involved.

Mr O'Connor - It is a very advantageous deal.

Senator BISHOP - You contend that the country should buy technology just for the sake of technology. In that statement you refer to the issue of the Leopard tank, the F111 and so on. Are you saying that in some respects the country could use and manufacture simpler systems than we do today? Are you saying that we should be using technologies within our own capacity?

Mr Noble - Yes, very much so. We should be striving all the time for more. Certainly there are levels of technology in which we have the capacity to lead.

Senator BISHOP - Have you been influenced by Israeli productivity and use of their systems?

Mr O'Connor - To a degree - and by the Swedes. We believe there must be a much longer planning cycle and production cycle in defence so that industry is involved at a much earlier stage - at the stage of research and development. Plans should be made now to introduce new equipment in 10 years time and involve industry at that time, so that industry can then fit that in with its own plans. Perhaps some common use will be found which will not be at ultimate cost to defence.

Senator BISHOP - That is what our Committee is trying to do.

Mr Noble - I understand this is now occurring. For the first time we have heard evidence that industry is now involved in projects such as the Waler project and the basic trainer for the Air Force. If your Committee prompted that to happen, it is to be congratulated. More of that should go on.

CHAIRMAN - Thank you. This has been a very interesting session. I hope you prove to be a pipeline through to people like ourselves.

Mr Max Edwin TEICHMANN, 12 Darbyshire Road, Mount Waverley, Victoria, made an affirmation and was examined.

CHAIRMAN - I welcome Mr Teichmann. In what capacity do you appear before the Committee?

Mr Teichmann - I am a senior lecturer in politics at Monash University but I am appearing here as a private citizen.

CHAIRMAN - This is a public hearing but you may at any time during our proceedings ask that your evidence, part of your evidence or answers to specific questions be given in camera and the Committee will consider any such request. The Committee has before it your submission. Regrettably we have not had a chance to go through it. Would you like to make any alterations or additions to the document?

Mr Teichmann - No.

CHAIRMAN - Is it the wish of the Committee that this document be incorporated in the transcript of evidence? There being no objection, it is so ordered.

(The document read as follows) -

Armed neutrality, like neutrality itself, may be a tactic, a strategy, a moral-political stance, or a hybrid. If employed as a tactic or a strategy, a posture of armed neutrality bases itself upon judgements of present and envisaged future calculations about the international system, in toto or with respect to those areas and actors likely to impinge upon the interests of the armed neutral. The judgement, basically speaking, is that present or future threats to the political independence and territorial viability of the nation are of a sufficiently low order of magnitude to be adequately met from the capabilities of the armed neutral, without needing to call upon other nations for assistance. Alternatively, it is considered that the likelihood of such outside assistance is too problematic to be a reliable basis for planning and executing foreign and military policies. Or, again, the disutilities of outside assistance, in the form of a Treaty or an Alliance, outweigh the utilities of entering into such arrangements.

A nation may decide to be neutral simply with respect to particular conflicts, or particular groups of nations; practicing alignment or being prepared to enter into alignments with respect to other conflicts or nations. That is, it picks and chooses the issues upon which it takes a militant stand, and the nations with whom it would be associated in joint planning or action. This is neutrality at its most attenuated and episodic, and probably the way many, even most nations really conduct their relations. When a nation picks and chooses the issues upon which it will support other members of an Alliance to which it is a party, the question can be asked whether it is a de jure aligned country, and a de facto neutral. This question is especially pertinent when the State habitually reserves unto itself the decision to cooperate, and appears unwilling to cooperate except under very special circumstances. There were times when critics accused France under de Gaulle of such behaviour.

There may be an increasing number of nations who approximate to this posture of ambiguity, or opportunism, in the coming years. Armed neutrality as a strategy cannot be accused of such inconsistency, for it eschews all formal alignments and commitments with other nations of a military or political/ideological kind. An armed neutral is not a member of any Alliance, and it signals that such a posture will be maintained in the foreseeable future. That is, unless the global system, and/or its regional environment undergoes a drastic change, of a kind which would constitute a changed dimension of threat. In such a case, an armed neutral would presumably seek alliances, or else signal that it was prepared to abandon its hitherto neutralist stance, if the new threats did not quickly abate. This is the kind of armed neutrality which I envisage for Australia in the future.

A nation may take up neutrality because of strong moral objections to alliances, or because it believes that alliances always make the likelihood of involvement in conflict more likely than does neutrality; because the population is too politically polarized to underpin alliance with one or other Great Power or regional grouping, and would only agree around some middle ground of neutrality. This quasi ideolo-

gical position does not allow for the flexibility of the position I favour, i.e. armed neutrality as a pure strategy, unencumbered by considerations of international morality.

It has been observed by earlier contributors to these Hearings that bipartisanship is hard to come by in the planning and execution of foreign and military policies in this country. A lot of the disagreements stem from Party warfare, with the Opposition of the day very frequently occupying the box seat; they can accuse the Government of being too provocative or threat-mongering, or alternatively too complacent, too trusting; of spending too much, or too little; of wasting whatever they do spend. Or of taking on alignments with morally detestable allies, thereby showing gross cynicism; or of allowing woollyminded moralism to deflect them from attending to the only really important question, viz. what policies are most conducive to our security? And so on. There are also the extra parliamentary pressures from groups favouring this outside nation or another, this ideology rather than that. Our governments, generally speaking, can rarely count upon freedom from persistent structured criticism, or on general and enthusiastic support for their policies. Some of these policies might in fact require widespread and committed public backing for them to succeed. The Vietnam War was one example; while some future implications of a closer, highly activated American Alliance would almost certainly produce substantial divisions within Parliament and the electorate.

Armed neutrality does appear to enjoy advantages over alliance policies and interventionist scenarios, with respect to securing bipartisanship in policymaking and discussion, and electoral satisfaction.

It should be admitted, however, that the measure of controversy and division likely, indeed certain, to occur in this society attendant upon serious moves to renounce or wind up treaty commitments and international alignments (in particular the U.S. Alliance), and the proclamation of a new, permanent policy of armed neutrality, would be very great. Such a change would at present almost certainly split our society far more than did the Vietnam War; possibly more than the W.W.I Conscription debates. Our political parties would not be expected to relish such a prospect, nor the rest of us. A necessary pre-condition of armed neutrality becoming a real option here would be a widespread disillusionment with the fruits of the Alliance, increasing doubts of the wisdom, consistency, and prudence of American global and regional policies; and a rising fear that the reactivated Alliance could involve us in a serious major conflict, one neither of our making nor in our interests; or else in a series of regional disputes which, again, were either unnecessary or not of concern to our national interests. There may also arise resentment about the way our freedom of international movement is inhibited, and the choice of policy options truncated, by virtue of our uncomfortably close embrace with the United States.

At the same time a feeling of national potency and confidence in our own

judgements; abilities and capacities, which appears to have deserted us at present, would have to manifest itself before Australians seriously considered armed neutrality. Finally, in so far as the level of international, violence, instability and arming rises (irrespective of whether these developments really increase our personal danger), the less likely it is that our population or its leaders would be prepared to move from the familiar to the unfamiliar, to exchange even mounting inconveniences, reservations and anxieties about our present policy set for the unknown.

There are a number of questions which an advocate of armed neutrality for Australia must try to answer, so as to provide any real credibility for his advocacy, and I shall attempt some of these now. Doubtless the Committee will think of other objections to such a drastic reorientation of our policies.

1) Is there a foreseeable threat to Australia from outside?
No, there is not. I do not see any prospect of attack from the Soviet Union, China or Japan - nor do I think that previous witnesses would disagree.
There is one important caveat. The existence of important U.S. bases here, and proposals to upgrade, even dramatically extend this base infrastructure, could invite Soviet attacks in the by no means unimaginable eventuality of a major U.S.-Soviet conflict, involving nuclear weapons. The removal or winding down of these bases, or even decisions to halt further upgrading and proliferatory processes, would, it seems to me, reduce if not eliminate the chances of Russian attack upon this country. That we would suffer in the event of a global U.S.-Soviet war, along with most other countries, seems plain, but there are some factors which might reduce our sufferings compared with many others. Certainly render them less than if we were an integral part of the American nuclear deterrent system, or even, meshed into American Indian Ocean policies of an expanded, and expansive kind.
In fact, the dangers and penalties of a major nuclear war are so unacceptable that we should be exercising all our influence to help head off such developments. I am not convinced that we can do this with any great effect while a member of the U.S. Alliance, especially given our uncritical and suggestible approach to American perceptions of reality. As an armed neutral we might exercise greater influence. In this matter at least we would not wish to operate alone, but rather seek to cooperate with the less excitable members of the international system.

2) Is there a foreseeable threat to Australia from within our Region? a) It has periodically seemed to me that Indonesia could at least harass us, and that her acquisition of nuclear weapons (still somewhat unlikely) would great increase her general nuisance value. As things stand, the only likely cause of conflict would flow from a major Indonesian incursion into Papua New Guinea. In such an event, we could scarcely count upon help from other nations in the region, or

from the United States. We will almost certainly have to deal with Indonesian hostility, or expansionism, off our own bat. I am confident we could do this, and, furthermore, that unmistakeable signals to Jakarta, as against our present placatory muddling, would have the required effect.

b) There are a number of unstable regimes in the Asian area - Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines being leading candidates. It is not unthinkable that radical nationalist regimes, of the Right or Left, probably anti-Western at the inception of their careers, may not replace the present regimes. None of them seem a match for us, nor can one see a ground for conflict with them, unless we were associated in some American project to maintain or restore a previous status quo. A period of regional turmoil is, however, always an invitation for Great Power meddling, and the United States apart, I would consider China or Japan far more likely to seek, and obtain, an important position in the region than the Soviet Union. There is very little that we could do about this - in the end it depends upon the countries concerned running regimes of sufficient general local acceptability to ensure stability and a readiness by the inhabitants to struggle to protect their independence. This, I take it, was one of the points of the Nixon Doctrine, and it has been honoured in the breech.

3) Is there a possibility of major war between the U.S. (and allies), and the Soviet Union (and allies)? There is, and I am prepared to say that the newer American policies are making this more likely rather than less. What could or should we do in such an eventuality? I have already mentioned this - but shall repeat that we would stand a greater chance of surviving if we kept out i.e. were already recognized as neutral. As to helping to make such a conflict less likely, I disagree with some previous evidence that we help to make War less likely by contributing to American global plans and military/political readiness. I feel our geographical, political and cultural distance from Russia limits quite drastically our influence upon Soviet policies; on the other hand our political, economic, and cultural affinities with the U.S. could cast us in the role of friendly but impartial critic - prepared to join in the condemnation of something like the invasion of Afghanistan, as Muslim states have done - but reserving the right to dissociate ourselves from American mistakes, even provocations e.g. the vindictive and short-sighted isolation of Vietnam; the shameful support of Pol Pot; the nerveless or else mischievous tagging along with blatant Chinese attempts to embroil Russia and the West in major conflict for Peking's own ends; the pusillanimous attitude towards Indonesian excesses (East Timor seems to me to be far worse than Afghanistan so far); the worsening conduct of American-sponsored regimes in Latin America; the launching of a new, ruinously expensive and in some ways uniquely dangerous stage of the arms race. As opponents and critics of such

ongoing American follies we are virtual non starters so long as we stay in the U.S. Alliance; as neutrals we could either put in an improved performance as opponents of the drift to War, or else dissociate ourselves from the follies and fallacies of the major actors.

4) Has the American Alliance served as a shield or a protector since WW.II? There have been no threats to Australia since WW.II. Neither the Korean nor Vietnam War were related to our security; anymore than Afghanistan or Kampuchea are now. Confrontation was conducted without American help, as would a repetition of this process. One serious military drawback of this Alliance has been the comparative neglect of our indiginous military structure or resources. A similar atrophy of innovative and mature foreign policies have also flowed from our basically parasitic relationship to the U.S.; while our intelligence services have barely come of age, because of their self-indulgent dependence upon American information, perceptions, goals and working assumptions.

5) What effect has the continuing American Alliance had upon our post Vietnam war policies?
They have led us to support the isolation of Vietnam; the appeasement of Indonesia; the support of Pol Pot and the complacency towards provocative Thai and Chinese policies towards Vietnam and Kampuchea; our unreadiness to resolutely oppose Western reluctance to deal fairly with the Developing Nations (although Mr Peacock has made many forthright statements); an alacrity to accept the rearming of China and Japan, if either are so disposed; an instantaneous agreement with elements in the U.S. favouring the winding down of detente, a resumption of the arms race, and, more seriously, an apparently full-blooded attempt to restore American hegemony over the global system, whether it be military, diplomatic or political. In other words, to turn the clock back to the 60's, if not the 50's. This new American resolve, in the making for some time, but triggered off by Iran, Opec policies, and Afghanistan, is bound to fail. It is a highly dangerous enterprise, and more likely to split the Western Alliance asunder, than to achieve the contextually inflated American aspirations. Our Alliance relationship has dragged us along in the American wake in all of these undesirable developments.

6) What attitudes should an armed neutral Australia take towards nuclear weapons? Here I must depart from the strict adherence to armed neutrality as a strategy, pure and simple, for this posture would support the possession and if necessary the use, or threatened use of nuclear weapons if the situation called for them. I am personally opposed to the use of nuclear weapons, and the stationing of such horrific devices on one soil, whether they be ours or someone else's. This moral objection to nuclear weapons could turn out to the serious disadvantage of a credible advocacy of armed neutrality for Australia; thus, were one of our neighbours, e.g. Indonesia, to acquire nuclear weapons, and to possess

an unstable, expansionist and adventurous government, it would seem to be simple prudence to either possess a nuclear armed ally who could (and would) call the offender to order; or else become a nuclear power oneself. Sweden and Switzerland are in this situation but their dilemma is in a way less serious than ours could be, for few people expect the Soviet Union to initiate nuclear warfare or blackmail for such insubstantial gains. A nuclear armed regional neighbour would be far less likely to possess a similar circumspection, or to possess the extensive range of higher order priorities that the Soviet Union enjoys.

I think this would be a case for a neutralist Australia to resume a search for a reliable nuclear backer (Sweden and Switzerland have always indicated that they would be quite prepared to alter their international posture if the perceived threat made it necessary, and so should we.) We would incidentally have a fair lead time to try and head off the development of a neighbouring nuclear capacity, and further time to alter our policies. Furthermore, the motives behind the aggressive intent of a nuclear neighbour would be difficult to reasonably unpack.

Nevertheless, nuclear matters pose a difficult conundrum for armed neutralists.

7) What attitude should a neutral Australia take up towards events in, and threats to, Papua New Guinea and the Pacific Islands?

Here again, there are serious problems for an armed neutralist who insists upon being a purist. If Papua New Guinea and the neighbouring island chain are of strategic importance to us, then presumably we should be concerned with their future viability. This in practice means seeing that no outside nation gets control of these territories. The nation which most easily comes to mind is Indonesia, and the question is, what should an armed neutralist do about such a situation, especially where, as in this case, most outside countries and the territories themselves appear to see us having special obligations to help and protect one small neighbours, and friends. Whether these obligations include taking on Indonesia is another matter.

This sort of case produces the need for a theory of the right to protect one's maritime approaches, by making various politico/strategic arrangements with those territories occupying part of one's defensive space. Without wishing to slight the small island nations immediately around us, I think they could be fairly described as coming within our basic sphere of interest, our continental sub-region. There are occasions when these territories are pleased to regard themselves in the same way.

How we would mesh in with these territories from an armed neutralist stance invites a number of scenario: thus the way a neutral U.S.A. worked with Great Britain in the two years before Pearl Harbour, or the definite albeit publicly opaque understandings Sweden has with the Northern tier of NATO. I imagine some doctrine could be conceived which would not conflict with the basic neutralist stance of Australia, and yet help attend to our small neighbours' security needs..

8) Could Australia defend itself if necessary?

I am content for the present to quote from Robert O'Neill's earlier evidence to this Committee. On page 83 he says 'once the program [our ongoing defence development] that is under way comes into effect and if we continue to build in that direction I think we will have a formidable capacity. We will make someone think twice and three times about having a go at us or not'.

Again Dr O'Neill, on the same page says that 'if a large force were sent in this direction - I think most of us would agree that is not a likely prospect - we would be very hard pressed'. The witness thought that 'we would be very dependent upon our allies to cope', but went on to observe that a large force would not be attacking Australia in a one one situation, but that it would be the result of a general breakdown in world order and our allies would be involved anyway.

Having said that Dr O'Neill then suggests that our allies may be drawn off to other parts of the world.

So we look like having to defend <u>ourselves</u>, i.e. perform as an armed neutral, but under the guise of member of an alliance - surely the worst of all worlds. In fact a general breakdown in world order, involving the involvements of the major Powers could scarcely avoid sliding into nuclear war, and then the full disadvantages of our being an important link in American nuclear strategy, and base for possibly major operations in the Indian Ocean and Gulf areas, would hit us with full force. And in the eventuality of such a general breakdown, and the involvement on opposite sides of Great Powers, the sending of a large force from somewhere to invade Australia would be a fairly low order priority. If such a general breakdown in world order ended as I surmise, there would not be time for this semi mythical armada to get off the mark.

So in practice we have the task which Dr O'Neill sets us - 'we have to think seriously about how we would stand up to threats - either of a regional nature or from outside the region - which do not involve the full force of a super power'. I agree that that is our task, and I agree that we can do it.