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The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia

# Advisory report on the Aviation Transport Security Amendment (Screening) Bill 2012

House of Representatives  
Standing Committee on Infrastructure and Communications

March 2012  
Canberra

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## Membership of the Committee

Chair	Ms Sharon Bird MP (to 14/03/12)	
	Mr Nick Champion MP (from 14/03/12)	
Deputy Chair	Mr Paul Neville MP	
Members	Mr Paul Fletcher MP	Mr Robert Oakeshott MP
	Mr Ed Husic MP	Mrs Jane Prentice MP
	Mr Stephen Jones MP	Mr Mike Symon MP
Supplementary Member	Mr Darren Chester MP	

## Committee Secretariat

Secretary	Ms Julia Morris
Inquiry Secretary	Dr Kilian Perrem
Research Officer	Ms Susan Dinon
Administrative Officer	Mr Peter Pullen





## Terms of reference

On 16 February 2012, in accordance with standing orders 143(b) and 222(a)(iii), the Selection Committee referred the *Aviation Transport Security Amendment (Screening) Bill 2012* to the Committee for an advisory report. Copies of the bill and explanatory memorandum are at Appendix A.



## List of abbreviations

APF	Australian Privacy Foundation
ARPANSA	Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency
AusALPA	Australian Airline Pilots' Association
DIT	Department of Infrastructure and Transport
OAIC	Office of the Australian Information Commissioner
PIA	Privacy impact assessment



# List of recommendations

## **Recommendation 1**

That the House of Representatives consider and pass the Aviation Transport Security Amendment (Screening) Bill 2012.



# Aviation Transport Security Amendment (Screening) Bill 2012

## Introduction

- 1.1 The Aviation Transport Security Amendment (Screening) Bill 2012 was introduced into the House of Representatives by the Minister for Infrastructure and Transport, the Hon. Anthony Albanese MP, on 16 February 2012 and referred to the House Standing Committee on Infrastructure and Communications for inquiry and report.<sup>1</sup> Copies of the bill and the explanatory memorandum (EM) are at Appendix A.
- 1.2 The bill proposes four amendments to the *Aviation Transport Security Act 2004* with the aim of enhancing aviation security at Australia's international airports. The need to enhance current security measures is in response to a passenger attempt to detonate an explosive on Northwest Airlines Flight 253, en route from Amsterdam to Detroit, on 25 December 2009. The explosive device contained no metallic components so could be carried through a walk-through metal detector without triggering an alarm. This event highlighted a significant vulnerability in global aviation security screening practices, including in Australia.<sup>2</sup>
- 1.3 The bill facilitates the upcoming introduction of body scanners at Australia's international airports, and forms part of the Australian

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1 House of Representatives, *Votes and Proceedings*, No. 90, 16 February 2012, p. 1243.

2 The Hon. Mr Anthony Albanese MP, Minister for Infrastructure and Transport, *House of Representatives Hansard*, 16 February 2012, p. 1571; Department of Infrastructure and Transport (DIT), *Submission 9*, p. 1.

Government's Strengthening Aviation Security Initiative, announced in February 2010. This initiative also includes the adoption of multi-view x-ray and bottled liquid scanners, additional explosive trace detection equipment, and cargo screening technologies.<sup>3</sup> The Committee notes that the bill will also bring Australian aviation security standards into line with those of the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.<sup>4</sup>

- 1.4 The submission prepared by the Department of Infrastructure and Transport (DIT) described a trial of the proposed body scanning equipment in Sydney and Melbourne in August and September 2011. This trial was conducted to measure the impact that the introduction of body scanners and multi-view x-ray equipment might have on passenger facilitation, and to assist the airports in preparing for this introduction. The submission noted that 23 577 body scans were conducted during the seven week period of the trial, that 'overall, public reaction to the trial was positive', and that most volunteers remarked that 'it was quick and easy.'<sup>5</sup> It was determined that a well-informed communications strategy will be an essential element to alleviate any community concerns.
- 1.5 The Committee is aware of media and community concerns about issues relating to aviation security, and the ongoing public discussion about safety, privacy and health aspects where the operation of any machines using scanning technology is being considered. The Committee therefore invited public submissions, to expand the existing and available information on these subjects. The Committee also attended a demonstration in Parliament House, Canberra, of an L-3 ProVision millimetre wave body scanning machine – the machine the Federal Government is intending to introduce into Australia's international airports later this year. The Committee also attended a briefing with representatives of the Department of Infrastructure and Transport.
- 1.6 This report considers the bill in the context of issues raised in written submissions and in the broader Australian community. The Committee is aware that the bill is under consideration by the Senate Rural and

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3 The Hon. Mr Anthony Albanese MP, Minister for Infrastructure and Transport, 'Strengthening Aviation Security', 9 February 2010, <[http://www.minister.infrastructure.gov.au/aa/releases/2010/February/AA024\\_2010.aspx](http://www.minister.infrastructure.gov.au/aa/releases/2010/February/AA024_2010.aspx)> viewed 14 March 2012. Information on the Strengthening Aviation Security Initiative is at <<http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/transport/security/aviation/strengthening.aspx>> viewed 14 March 2012.

4 The Hon. Mr Anthony Albanese MP, Minister for Infrastructure and Transport, *House of Representatives Hansard*, 16 February 2012, p. 1571.

5 DIT, *Submission 9*, Attachment C, p. 3.

Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee, with a report anticipated by 9 May 2012.<sup>6</sup> It is expected that the Senate inquiry may also consider issues relating to privacy, health, effectiveness of the technology, and the details of the consultation processes surrounding the legislation.<sup>7</sup>

- 1.7 The Committee's report outlines the provisions of the bill and notes some of the issues which arose during the course of the inquiry. The Committee considers that its role in the review of this proposed legislation is to assess whether the bill will achieve its objective, and therefore does not propose to duplicate other investigations and consultations conducted to date about these and other aspects.

## Provisions of the bill

- 1.8 As noted above, the bill proposes amendments to the *Aviation Transport Security Act 2004*. The bill provides that a person is taken to consent to any screening procedure when that person is at a screening point, and must receive clearance in order to board an aircraft or to enter an area or zone of a security controlled airport.
- 1.9 The bill also provides for the introduction of body scanners at security screening points; scanners will operate alongside existing walk-through metal detection screens. The bill does not preclude other technologies from being adopted in the future. The bill will disallow airline passengers who are randomly selected for a body scan from opting for an alternative screening method, including a frisk search, unless there are physical or medical reasons. This 'no opt-out' policy is being proposed to prevent people selected for scanning from choosing a less effective form of screening.<sup>8</sup>
- 1.10 The bill provides that the images captured by the body scanners will be a generic human representation that is the same for all passengers.
- 1.11 The four provisions of the bill are as follows:

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6 Referred on 1 March 2012: Senate Selection of Bills Committee, *Report No. 2 of 2012*, 1 March 2012, p. [3].  
<[http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary\\_Business/Committees/Senate\\_Committees?url=selectionbills\\_ctte/reports/2012/](http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=selectionbills_ctte/reports/2012/)> viewed 1 March 2012.

7 Senate Selection of Bills Committee, *Report No. 2 of 2012*, 1 March 2012, Appendix 1.

8 The Hon. Mr Anthony Albanese MP, Minister for Infrastructure and Transport, *House of Representatives Hansard*, 16 February 2012, p. 1572.

- **Item 1** inserts a new section (41A) into the Act, which stipulates that if a person is at a screening point and the person must receive clearance to board an aircraft or enter certain areas or zones of a security controlled airport, the person is taken to consent to each screening procedure that may be conducted at the screening point. This implied consent does not apply if the procedure is a frisk search or if the person refuses to undergo the procedure. This section is intended to streamline the screening process and thereby minimise the potential impact that the introduction of body scanners and other future technology may have on passenger facilitation rates.<sup>9</sup>
- **Item 2** amends paragraph 44(2)(aa) of the Act, to read:
  - (2) Without limiting the matters that may be dealt with by regulations made under subsection (1), the regulations may deal with the following: ...
  - (aa) the persons or things that must not pass through a screening point...

Previously, paragraph 44(2)(aa) only referred to the things that must not pass through a screening point. The Minister stated that this amendment will allow the Aviation Transport Security Regulations 2005 to prescribe the persons that must not pass through a screening point, in addition to things that must not pass through a screening point. As noted in the Minister's second reading speech, a person who refuses to undergo a screening procedure for which they have been randomly selected will not be permitted to pass through a screening point.<sup>10</sup>

- **Item 3** inserts sub-sections 44(3A) and 44(3B) into the Act. Sub-section 44(3A) comprises an inexhaustive list of equipment that may be used for screening, including metal detection equipment, explosive trace detection equipment, and body scanning equipment such as an active millimetre wave body scanner. Sub-section 44(3B) states that if body scanning equipment is used for the screening of a person, and the equipment produces an image of the person, the image must only be a generic body image that is gender-neutral and from which the person cannot be identified.

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9 Aviation Transport Security Amendment (Screening) Bill 2012, Explanatory Memorandum (EM), p. 6.

10 The Hon. Mr Anthony Albanese MP, Minister for Infrastructure and Transport, *House of Representatives Hansard*, 16 February 2012, pp. 1-2.

- **Item 4** repeals section 95A of the Act, which currently allows a person to choose to undergo a frisk search as an alternative to another screening procedure.

## Issues arising during the inquiry

- 1.12 During the course of its inquiry, the Committee received submissions and reviewed debate in the wider community regarding aspects of aviation security. An overview of these views is provided, including those which relate to the technology used by the proposed body scanning units and its purported health impacts, the effectiveness of the scanners in providing greater aviation security, the inability to 'opt-out' of a scan, as well as concerns about privacy.

## Technology used by proposed body scanning units

- 1.13 Active millimetre wave scanners use non-ionising radiation in the form of millimetre waves, a kind of radiofrequency radiation similar to that emitted by mobile phones. According to the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA), non-ionising radiation has less energy than ionising radiation.<sup>11</sup>
- 1.14 Millimetre waves can pass through any clothing or organic material a person is wearing. The scanners transmit very low intensity millimetre waves from antennas that rotate around the person being scanned. The waves reflected from a person's body can be measured and a 3-D image of the person is reconstructed from them.<sup>12</sup>
- 1.15 The very low intensity of the millimetre waves and the short duration of the scan (approximately two seconds) means that the person being scanned is exposed to less electromagnetic energy than from a short mobile phone call.<sup>13</sup>

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11 Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA), Radiation Basics – Ionising and Non Ionising Radiation, January 2012, <[http://arpansa.gov.au/radiationprotection/basics/ion\\_nonion.cfm](http://arpansa.gov.au/radiationprotection/basics/ion_nonion.cfm)> viewed 21 February 2012.

12 ARPANSA, Airport Passenger Screening Technologies, February 2012, <[http://arpansa.gov.au/radiationprotection/Factsheets/is\\_AirportScreening.cfm](http://arpansa.gov.au/radiationprotection/Factsheets/is_AirportScreening.cfm)> viewed 21 February 2012.

13 ARPANSA, Airport Passenger Screening Technologies, February 2012, <[http://arpansa.gov.au/radiationprotection/Factsheets/is\\_AirportScreening.cfm](http://arpansa.gov.au/radiationprotection/Factsheets/is_AirportScreening.cfm)> viewed 21 February 2012; DIT, *Supplementary Submission 9.1*, p. [8].

- 1.16 The Committee understands that other types of body scanning units operate elsewhere in the world, including those which use ‘back-scatter x-ray’ technologies. According to government policy, only active millimetre wave body scanners will be used in Australia.

## Health impacts

- 1.17 The Committee is aware of concerns about the possible health effects from exposure to millimetre wave scanners, including that:
- long term studies on the safety of millimetre wave scanners are lacking and that the concerns over radio waves potentially being carcinogenic are not new;<sup>14</sup>
  - whilst it is generally accepted that millimetre wave scanners provide the lesser risk to health, there is no consensus on the level of risk produced by both the millimetre wave scanner and the backscatter x-ray scanner.<sup>15</sup>
- 1.18 The Queensland Council for Civil Liberties welcomed the fact that only millimetre wave scanners would be used by the Federal Government but recommended that further research be undertaken to ensure that queries as to the existence of a scientific consensus on the safety of the scanners could be addressed.<sup>16</sup>
- 1.19 Government agencies including ARPANSA, the Department of Health and Ageing, the Therapeutic Goods Administration, and state and territory radiation regulators, were asked by DIT to provide expert advice on the safety of the technology used by millimetre wave body scanners.<sup>17</sup> Following this consultation, a publicly available Health and Safety Information Sheet was developed, advising that ‘[t]here is no evidence to suggest that millimetre-wave body scanners, or other devices in this frequency and at the power density used by scanners, are a health risk for the travelling public or the operators.’ This evidence also states that there are no known safety concerns in relation to people with implanted medical devices, including pacemakers and defibrillators, resulting from undergoing a body scan.<sup>18</sup>

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14 Andrea and Michael Schafer, *Submission 5*, p. [1].

15 Australian Airline Pilots’ Association (AusALPA), *Submission 10*, p. [8].

16 Queensland Council for Civil Liberties, *Submission 8*, p. 3.

17 DIT, *Submission 9*, pp. 2-3.

18 DIT, *Submission 9*, Attachment B, pp. [1]-[2].

## Security effectiveness

- 1.20 The Committee acknowledges the views which question the benefit of introducing body scanning technology to aviation security, and which cast doubt on claims that millimetre wave body scanners would have detected the explosives of the type used by the Northwest Airlines Flight 253 bomber.<sup>19</sup> The Queensland Council for Civil Liberties, for example, took the view that if airport measures are to be pursued, '... greater use of explosive particle detectors would be in order [as they may] detect some of the explosives which these [body] scanner machines are in fact incapable of detecting.'<sup>20</sup> The Australian Airline Pilots' Association (AusALPA) cited evidence in its submission which stated, in relation to public concerns in the UK on the effectiveness of millimetre wave technology, that low density materials such as powders, liquid or thin plastic do not show up on screen.<sup>21</sup>
- 1.21 Some inquiry participants claimed that body scanners are ineffective and time-consuming due to excessive false-positive rates.<sup>22</sup> The Australian Privacy Foundation (APF) cited overseas criticisms of high false-positive rates of detection caused by layers of clothing, certain types of footwear and, in some cases, the posture of the person being scanned.<sup>23</sup>
- 1.22 One submitter stated that the proposed body scanners would not actually improve security from terrorist attacks, and also criticised the focus on physical security at airport checkpoints on the basis that it draws resources away from the proactive intelligence work used to counter terrorism.<sup>24</sup>
- 1.23 The Committee notes the view expressed by DIT that 'body scanners represent the most advanced passenger screening technology available and are capable of detecting a range of sophisticated threats that current screening technologies are not able to detect.'<sup>25</sup> The Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA), included with the DIT submission to the inquiry, noted that:

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19 Richard Preston, *Submission 2*; Amy Tomoe, *Submission 6*, p. [1].

20 Queensland Council for Civil Liberties, *Submission 8*, p. 3.

21 AusALPA, *Submission 10*, p. [6].

22 Andrea and Michael Schafer, *Submission 5*, p. [1]; Amy Tomoe, *Submission 6*, p. [1].

23 Australian Privacy Foundation (APF), *Submission 12*, Response to the PIA Report on Body Scanning, p. 5, and Appendix 3.

24 Dr. Justin Hastings, *Submission 7*, pp. [1] and [2].

25 DIT, *Submission 9*, p. 1.

Walk through metal detectors and the style of frisk search currently used at Australian airports simply cannot provide the same security outcome that a body scanner can. Body scanners offer the greatest chance of detection, owing to their ability to detect and pinpoint the location of both metallic and non-metallic items present within or underneath a person's clothing. The only alternative method of screening that would provide a similar level of assurance to that of a body scanner is an enhanced full body frisk search.<sup>26</sup>

- 1.24 DIT also states in its submission that it liaised extensively with partner agencies overseas to keep abreast of technological developments and ensure that Australia follows international best practice in relation to body scanners.<sup>27</sup>

## Removal of 'opt-out' provision

- 1.25 The 'no opt-out' policy stipulated by the bill has been a source of concern in media reports and in various submissions to the inquiry. The PIA noted that this was also a 'major stakeholder concern'.<sup>28</sup> The inability to opt out of a body scan is criticised in some submissions, which question the claim made in the EM that passengers would be unlikely to choose a frisk search over a body scan.<sup>29</sup> The APF, AusALPA, and Civil Liberties Australia all criticised the denial of an option to choose alternative screening measures under the bill.<sup>30</sup> The claim was also made that the European Union allows passengers to choose a frisk search over a body scan.<sup>31</sup>
- 1.26 As noted above, the DIT submission claimed that '[t]he only screening measure that would provide a similar level of assurance to that of a body scanner is an enhanced full body frisk search.'<sup>32</sup> The Committee understands that the Government has decided that such invasive body searches will not be introduced as part of Australia's airport security

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26 DIT, *Submission 9*, Attachment A, pp. 28-29.

27 DIT, *Submission 9*, p. 2.

28 DIT, *Submission 9*, Attachment A, p. 28.

29 Julie McKinnon, *Submission 3*; Dr. Josh McGuigan, *Submission 4*; Andrea and Michael Schafer, *Submission 5*, p.[2].

30 APF, *Submission 12*, p. 3; AusALPA, *Submission 10*, p. [15]; Civil Liberties Australia, *Submission 11*, p. [1].

31 Andrea and Michael Schafer, *Submission 5*, p. [1].

32 DIT, *Submission 9*, Attachment A, p. 35.

arrangements, and that 'passengers selected for body scanner screening will not be able to choose inferior or significantly intrusive alternatives.'<sup>33</sup>

- 1.27 The Committee notes that '[i]f a passenger refuses to undergo a body scan they will not be allowed to pass through the security point and therefore not be allowed to board their aircraft'; but that various special circumstances of individuals, including disabilities or other medical conditions, will mean that alternative screening procedures will be needed.<sup>34</sup> The Committee notes that further detail provided in the PIA may help to clarify issues of concern to the community.

## Privacy implications

- 1.28 The Committee is aware of long-standing concerns in the community over the use of digital images produced by body scanners.<sup>35</sup> The Queensland Council for Civil Liberties regarded body scanners as being, in effect, a 'virtual strip search' and suggested that other less invasive measures should be employed.<sup>36</sup> Civil Liberties Australia stated that the proposed scanners infringe the civil liberties of Australians.<sup>37</sup> The APF was concerned that 'the existence of an anomaly [on the screen] may be broadcast by voice, which on occasion will inevitably draw the attention of others in the vicinity.'<sup>38</sup> The Committee heard concerns about digital images being stored following a body scan.<sup>39</sup> As government policy states that these images will not be stored, the Committee believes there is no basis for these concerns.
- 1.29 As noted earlier, DIT in its submission described the development of the PIA, including the involvement of the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC), incorporating the Office of the Federal Privacy Commissioner. The OAIC confirmed its role in providing independent

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33 DIT, *Submission 9*, Attachment A, p. 35.

34 DIT, *Submission 9*, Attachment A, p. 29.

35 When scanners were introduced in the US, privacy concerns were raised about the way that 3D 'nude scans' were made, and potentially retained, contrary to policy dictates. See, for example, J Johnson, 'One hundred naked citizens: one hundred leaked body scans', 16 November 2010, <<http://gizmodo.com/5690749/>> viewed 23 February 2012. These concerns were echoed in early debate about the introduction of scanners in Australia.

36 D Jopson, 'Almost half set off alarms in airport body scanner trial', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 5 March 2012, <<http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/political-news/almost-half-set-off-alarms-in-airport-body-scanner-trial-20120304-1ub3t.html>> viewed 5 March 2012; Queensland Council for Civil Liberties, *Submission 8*, p. 2.

37 Civil Liberties Australia, *Submission 11*, p. [1].

38 APF, *Submission 12*, Response to the PIA Report on Body Scanning, p. 6.

39 Andreas Markauskas, *Submission 1*.


advice during the PIA consultation phase,<sup>40</sup> and both DIT and the OAIC provided details on the conduct of these consultative processes. The Committee notes the recognition in the PIA that there must be 'a balance between achieving security outcomes and protecting the individual's privacy', and that the Federal Government 'is working to ensure that the new technology and associated processes achieve that balance.'<sup>41</sup>

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40 Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, *Submission 13*, pp. 2-3.

41 DIT, *Submission 9*, Attachment A, p. 17.

Figure A sample image generated by a body scan



Source Taken from a Frequently Asked Questions website, managed by the Department of Infrastructure and Transport, <[http://travelsecure.infrastructure.gov.au/international/faq/faq\\_body\\_scanner.aspx](http://travelsecure.infrastructure.gov.au/international/faq/faq_body_scanner.aspx)>, viewed 23 March 2012, and also included in supplementary submission 9.1 to the Committee's inquiry.

- 1.30 The Committee notes the following conclusions made in the PIA:
- that an assessment against the National Privacy Principles<sup>42</sup> 'has determined that no personal or identifying information will be collected, used, stored or disclosed as a result of body scanning screening'; and
  - the 'comprehensive stakeholder consultation process undertaken by the Department' identified that 'the greatest privacy concern ... was the potential for misuse of revealing images, such as those produced by first generation body scanners.' Legislation being introduced 'only permits body scanners that produce a generic, gender-neutral body image from which the person cannot be identified', and that there is a requirement that body scanners used for aviation security screening 'will not be capable of storing, transmitting or printing any data produced from a body scan of a person'.<sup>43</sup>

## Committee observation

- 1.31 After consideration, the Committee noted that there are some positive consequences of the use of body scanning technologies in airports. The Committee has observed that there are likely to be many Australians, particularly those with medical conditions (including medical implants such as pacemakers) who will now be able to avoid a frisk search and instead be able to comply with security measures by undertaking a body scan.

## Conclusion

- 1.32 The Committee is aware of concerns regarding aviation security, and the manner in which screening procedures are conducted. The Committee has taken into consideration submissions made in relation to this bill. The Committee has determined that its task in considering legislation referred to it is to consider the effectiveness of the legislation in achieving its stated

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42 Office of Australian Information Commissioner, 'Information Sheet (Private Sector) 1A: National Privacy Principles', February 2008, <<http://www.privacy.gov.au/materials/types/infosheets/view/6583>> viewed 14 March 2012.

43 DIT, *Submission 9*, Attachment A, pp. 34-35.

object, not to revise or repeat the processes which led to its introduction. The Committee considers that the bill will achieve its stated purpose, and recommends that the bill be passed.

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
**Recommendation 1**

**That the House of Representatives consider and pass the Aviation Transport Security Amendment (Screening) Bill 2012.**

Nick Champion MP

Chair





Appendix A – Aviation Transport Security  
Amendment (Screening) Bill 2012 and  
Explanatory Memorandum



2010-2011-2012

The Parliament of the  
Commonwealth of Australia

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Presented and read a first time*

**Aviation Transport Security Amendment  
(Screening) Bill 2012**

**No.     , 2012**

*(Infrastructure and Transport)*

**A Bill for an Act to amend the *Aviation Transport  
Security Act 2004*, and for related purposes**



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	<i>Aviation Transport Security Act 2004</i>	3



1     **A Bill for an Act to amend the *Aviation Transport***  
2     ***Security Act 2004*, and for related purposes**

3     The Parliament of Australia enacts:

4     **1 Short title**

5                     This Act may be cited as the *Aviation Transport Security*  
6                     *Amendment (Screening) Act 2012*.

7     **2 Commencement**

8                     (1) Each provision of this Act specified in column 1 of the table  
9                     commences, or is taken to have commenced, in accordance with  
10                    column 2 of the table. Any other statement in column 2 has effect  
11                    according to its terms.  
12

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**Commencement information**


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<b>Column 1</b>	<b>Column 2</b>	<b>Column 3</b>
<b>Provision(s)</b>	<b>Commencement</b>	<b>Date/Details</b>
1. Sections 1 to 3 and anything in this Act not elsewhere covered by this table	The day this Act receives the Royal Assent.	
2. Schedule 1	A single day to be fixed by Proclamation. However, if the provision(s) do not commence within the period of 6 months beginning on the day this Act receives the Royal Assent, they commence on the day after the end of that period.	

1 Note: This table relates only to the provisions of this Act as originally  
2 enacted. It will not be amended to deal with any later amendments of  
3 this Act.

4 (2) Any information in column 3 of the table is not part of this Act.  
5 Information may be inserted in this column, or information in it  
6 may be edited, in any published version of this Act.

7 **3 Schedule(s)**

8 Each Act that is specified in a Schedule to this Act is amended or  
9 repealed as set out in the applicable items in the Schedule  
10 concerned, and any other item in a Schedule to this Act has effect  
11 according to its terms.  
12

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## Schedule 1—Amendments

### *Aviation Transport Security Act 2004*

#### **1 After section 41**

Insert:

##### **41A Consent to screening procedures**

(1) If:

- (a) a person is at a screening point; and
- (b) the person must receive clearance in order:
  - (i) to board an aircraft; or
  - (ii) to enter an area or zone of a security controlled airport that is referred to in Division 2 of Part 3;

the person is taken, for all purposes, to consent to each screening procedure that may be conducted at the screening point in accordance with regulations made under section 44.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a screening procedure if:

- (a) the procedure is a frisk search; or
- (b) the person refuses to undergo the procedure.

#### **2 Paragraph 44(2)(aa)**

Omit “things”, substitute “the persons or things”.

#### **3 After subsection 44(3)**

Insert:

(3A) Without limiting paragraph (2)(j), the equipment to be used for screening may include the following:

- (a) metal detection equipment;
- (b) explosive trace detection equipment;
- (c) body scanning equipment such as an active millimetre wave body scanner.

(3B) If:

- (a) body scanning equipment is to be used for the screening of a person; and

- 1 (b) the equipment produces an image of the person;  
2 the image must only be a generic body image that is gender-neutral  
3 and from which the person cannot be identified.

4 **4 Section 95A**

- 5 Repeal the section.

2010-2011-2012

THE PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

**AVIATION TRANSPORT SECURITY AMENDMENT (SCREENING) BILL 2012**

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

(Circulated by authority of the Minister for Infrastructure and Transport,  
the Hon Anthony Albanese, MP)

## **AVIATION TRANSPORT SECURITY AMENDMENT (SCREENING) BILL 2012**

### **OUTLINE**

The Aviation Transport Security Amendment (Screening) Bill 2012 will amend the *Aviation Transport Security Act 2004* (the Act).

The Bill:

1. States that a person is taken to consent to any screening procedure when that person is at a screening point and must receive clearance in order to board an aircraft or to enter an area or zone of a security controlled airport.
2. Makes provision for the Aviation Transport Security Regulations 2005 to deal with persons that must not pass through a screening point.
3. Lists, but does not limit, the types of equipment that may be used for aviation security screening purposes, including metal detection, explosive trace detection and active millimetre wave body scanning equipment. Where a body scanner is used for the screening of a person, the image produced of that person must only be a generic body image that is gender-neutral and from which the person cannot be identified.
4. Repeals Section 95A of the Act.

### **FINANCIAL IMPACT STATEMENT**

Nil.

## Statement of Compatibility with Human Rights

*Prepared in accordance with Part 3 of the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011*

### **Aviation Transport Security Amendment (Screening) Bill 2012**

This Bill is compatible with the human rights and freedoms recognised or declared in the international instruments listed in section 3 of the *Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011*.

#### **Overview of the Bill**

The amendments contained in the Bill will support the upcoming introduction of body scanners at Australian international airports. This will ensure that Australian travellers are afforded the highest level of protection against aviation terrorism, bringing Australia into line with countries such as the United States of America, Canada, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. The Bill will provide flexibility in the future for the Government to introduce new screening tools as improvements are made to existing technologies. It will also ensure that these technologies are used in such a way that achieves both a maximum security outcome and minimal impact on passenger facilitation.

#### **Human rights implications**

The Bill engages the following human rights:

##### *Right to freedom of movement*

The right to freedom of movement is protected by Articles 12 and 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). These articles protect a person's right to move freely within a country for those who are lawfully within the country, the right to leave any country and the right to enter a country of which they are a citizen. The ability of a screening officer to refuse an individual clearance if they refuse to undergo a body scan may restrict a person's right to leave Australia. The requirement to undergo screening in order to be cleared and board an aircraft is already established in the Act, however, the removal of Section 95A of the Act will mean that an individual will no longer be able to choose a frisk search over another screening procedure.

The National Terrorism Public Alert Level is currently at MEDIUM which means that the Government's security agencies have assessed that a terrorist attack could occur in Australia. It has been at this level since September 2001 and is expected to remain so for the foreseeable future. The aviation security environment has significantly evolved over this period and it will continue to do so. The aviation screening regime in Australia is primarily designed to detect metallic weapons; however the risk to aviation security is no longer derived primarily from this type of threat. The sector now faces a range of sophisticated threats that our screening regime must be capable of detecting in order to ensure the safety of the travelling public. Existing screening technologies used in Australia are incapable of detecting many of these new generation threats. Body scanners offer the greatest chance of detection, owing to their ability to detect and pinpoint the location of both metallic and non-metallic items concealed within or underneath a person's clothing. There is no alternative method of passenger screening available today that can deliver an equivalent security outcome to a body scanner.

An enhanced full body frisk search may achieve a similar outcome but such a procedure would necessarily involve a thorough frisk of the entire body, including sensitive areas, as well as the possible loosening and/or removing of some clothing. It is unlikely that any passenger who fully understands the procedures and the technology would opt for an enhanced full body frisk in preference to a body scan. Therefore, the Government's policy intention is that a passenger who is randomly selected to undergo a body scan will not be allowed to choose or be offered an alternative method of screening. If the passenger refuses to submit to a body scan they will not be allowed to pass through the screening point. Where a foreign national refuses a body scan and is subsequently denied clearance through the screening point, the Department of Infrastructure and Transport will work closely with the Department of Immigration and Citizenship to facilitate legitimate travel.

### *Privacy and reputation*

The protection of an individual's privacy engages Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Government has carefully considered the introduction of body scanners and how it will impact on the privacy of the travelling public and hence, is committed to only introducing body scanners that have a range of privacy enhancements. The most important of these is automatic threat recognition technology which displays areas of concern on a generic human representation that is the same for all passengers. This technology removes the need for a human operator to look at raw or detailed images, and therefore maintains the privacy and modesty of all individuals.

The Department of Infrastructure and Transport has worked closely with the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) in order to ensure that the introduction of body scanning technology does not infringe upon a traveller's right to privacy. Consultation with the OAIC has also involved the development of a comprehensive privacy impact assessment about the introduction of body scanners. As discussed, body scanners are less intrusive than the only alternative that could provide a similar outcome – the full body frisk search. Furthermore, the introduction of body scanners will reduce the number of frisk searches that currently occur at aviation screening points, further protecting the privacy and modesty of individuals. In addition, body scanners that are introduced in Australia will not be capable of storing or transmitting any information or data.

### *Right to Health*

The right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health is protected by Article 12(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The Government has carefully considered the technology options available in regards to potential health effects for both the general public and airport workers. This has involved extensive consultation with the Department of Health and Ageing, the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA), the Therapeutic Goods Administration and overseas authorities to ensure that body scanners meet health and safety requirements. Subsequent to this consultation the Government has decided that millimetre-wave body scanners will be introduced.

The power density that a person could be exposed to within the L-3 Communications ProVision millimetre-wave body scanner, the only body scanner that currently meets the Government's requirements, is thousands of times less than the maximum permissible exposure levels for the public specified in ARPANSA's Radiation Protection Standard: *Maximum Exposure Levels to Radiofrequency Fields – 3 kHz – 300 GHz*. The waves emitted

during a scan are directed towards the interior of the body scanner. Outside the scanner, the exposure of aviation security screeners responsible for operating millimetre-wave body scanners working everyday in close proximity to these machines can be considered to be insignificant. Information on health and safety will be made available to the public on the Department of Infrastructure and Transport's website before body scanners are implemented at Australia's international airports.

#### *Right to enjoy and benefit from Culture*

The right to enjoy and benefit from culture engages both Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 15 of International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The introduction of body scanners will not interfere with the rights of persons to wear traditional religious or cultural attire, as with current procedures, passengers will not be required to remove any religious items or clothing. The Department of Infrastructure and Transport has engaged with religious groups through the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner to ensure that the processes and procedures are culturally sensitive.

Body scanners will not limit the observance of religious practices such as maintaining modesty as the technology has a range of privacy enhancements, including automatic threat recognition, to maintain the modesty of travellers. The body scanner technology is less intrusive than a frisk search and will reduce the number of full body frisk searches that occur at aviation security screening points. In cases where a frisk search is necessary, for example to resolve an alarm, the individual may request that procedure to occur in a private room. A frisk search will always be undertaken by someone of the same gender as the person being searched.

#### *Rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion or belief*

The rights to freedom of religion or belief are protected by Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As mentioned previously, the introduction of body scanners will not affect a person's ability to adhere to his or her religion or belief. As per current circumstances, passengers will not be required to remove religious dress when undertaking screening. In addition, a passenger's modesty will be protected through the requirement for body scanners to be equipped with automatic threat recognition. The Department has worked with stakeholders through the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner to ensure that security screening is undertaken in a culturally appropriate and sensitive manner.

#### *Rights of people with disability*

The rights of people with disability are protected by the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The Government understands that some screening technologies, including body scanners, may not be suitable for all individuals due to special circumstances, including disabilities or other medical conditions. These circumstances may prevent an individual from undertaking a screening procedure including a body scan, and as such, the Government is making appropriate modifications to ensure that individuals who cannot undergo a certain screening procedure due to a physical or medical condition will be screened by alternative methods that are more suitable to their circumstances.

The Department of Infrastructure and Transport, through the Aviation Access Working Group, works closely with representatives from the aviation industry, disability stakeholders and the Australian Human Rights Commission to ensure that people with a disability can access and utilise aviation services. In the context of aviation security, this forum focuses on ensuring that people with a disability are catered for and where they are unable to undergo a screening procedure, appropriate alternatives are put in place. Preparation for the introduction of body scanners has led to an increased focus on the training of aviation security screening officers to ensure that people with a disability are treated in a compassionate manner.

#### *Rights of Equality and Non-discrimination*

The right of equality and non-discrimination is protected by Articles 2, 16, 26 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. All people have the right to be treated equally and in keeping with Australia's egalitarian screening regime, selection of individuals to undertake a body scan will be conducted on a purely random basis. Individuals will not be selected on the basis of their race, religion or gender.

#### **Conclusion**

The Bill is compatible with human rights because it provides measures to further strengthen Australia's aviation security and where they may be limits to human rights, those limitations are reasonable, necessary and proportionate.

**Minister for Infrastructure and Transport, the Hon Anthony Albanese**

## NOTES ON CLAUSES

### **Clause 1: Short Title**

This clause provides that the Bill will be called the Aviation Transport Security Amendment (Screening) Act 2012 once enacted.

### **Clause 2: Commencement**

This clause provides that Sections 1 – 3 of the Bill will commence on the day after Royal Assent.

Schedule 1 will commence on a single day to be fixed by Proclamation or six months from the date of Royal Assent.

### **Clause 3: Schedule(s)**

This clause provides that each Act that is specified in a Schedule to this Act is amended or repealed as set out in the applicable items in the Schedule concerned. Any other item in a Schedule to this Act has effect according to its terms.

## **SCHEDULE 1 – AMENDMENTS**

Schedule 1 amends the *Aviation Transport Security Act 2012* (the Act)

### **Item 1 - Section 41A Consent to screening procedures**

A person will be taken to have consented to each screening procedure that may be conducted at a screening point where screening is necessary in order to board an aircraft or to enter an area or zone of a security controlled airport. This section does not apply to a frisk search or where a person expressly refuses to undergo a procedure.

The affect of this amendment will be to simplify the current consent requirements, and expedite the screening process for passengers, thereby minimising the potential impact the introduction of body scanners and other future technology may have on passenger facilitation. In practice this will mean that screening officers will not be required to obtain express consent from a passenger before they undergo a body scan. This provision will also apply to the use of hand held metal detectors and explosive trace detection equipment.

### **Item 2 - Section 44(2AA)**

This amendment omits “things” and replaces it with “persons or things”. This amendment will allow the Aviation Transport Security Regulations 2005 to prescribe the persons that must not pass through a screening point in addition to things that must not pass through a screening point.


**Item 3 - Sections 44(3A) and 44(3B)**

The first part of this clause lists, but does not limit, the types of equipment that can be used for screening, including metal detection, explosive trace detection and active millimetre wave body scanning equipment. This clause makes it clear that body scanning technology can be used for aviation security screening at Australia's airports.

The second part of this clause stipulates that where a body scanner is used for the screening of a person, any image produced by the equipment of that person must be a gender-neutral, generic image such that the person is not identifiable and no anatomical or physical attributes of that person are revealed.

**Item 4 –Section 95A**

The clause repeals Section 95A of the Act. Section 95A allows a person to choose a frisk search over another screening procedure. This section has been repealed to enable the introduction of a policy whereby a person who is selected to pass through a body scanner at an aviation screening point may not choose, or be offered, an alternative method of screening. Allowances will be made where there is a physical or medical reason that would prevent a person being screened by a body scanner. This policy will ensure that the strongest security outcome is achieved from the technology.



## Appendix B – List of Submissions

- 1 Andreas Markauskas
- 2 Richard Preston
- 3 Julie McKinnon
- 4 Dr Josh McGuigan
- 5 Andrea & Michael Schafer
- 5.1 Andrea Schafer (SUPPLEMENTARY)
- 6 Amy Tomoe
- 7 Dr Justin Hastings
- 8 Queensland Council for Civil Liberties
- 9 Department of Infrastructure and Transport
- 9.1 Department of Infrastructure and Transport (SUPPLEMENTARY)
- 10 Australian Airline Pilots' Association
- 11 Civil Liberties Australia
- 12 Australian Privacy Foundation
- 13 Office of the Australian Information Commissioner

