The first step has been taken towards a resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis. However, the 2325 April trilateral negotiations held in Beijing, involving the United States, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and China may have raised as many questions as provided answers.

Why did Both Sides Agree to Talk?

The stalemated position on the framework of negotiations has ended. The US previously refused bilateral talks, insisting on a multilateral setting involving at least China, South Korea and Japan, and preferably Australia and the EU. The DPRK has previously steadfastly insisted on bilateral USDPRK talks. Talks 'hosted' by China were a compromise by both sides.

Factors bringing the DPRK to the table are likely to have included increased pressure by China and perhaps the sight of Iraq's rapid capitulation. The holding of the talks in Beijing at the height of the SARS outbreak would also have been warmly welcomed by China as it becomes increasingly isolated by the infectious outbreak. The US on the other hand sought negotiations to alleviate the strain placed on its regional alliances by refusing bilateral negotiations.

Has the DPRK Started Reprocessing Spent Fuel Rods?

On 18 April, just one week before the negotiations, the Korea Central News Agency, the official voice of the DPRK, published an English language statement by a Foreign Ministry spokesperson declaring the DPRK to be 'in progress' of reprocessing spent fuel rodsa process which would enable the production of adequate nuclear material for the production of 5 or 6 nuclear weapons in two to three months.

A subsequent correction of the English language version of the statement on 21 April shifted the emphasis to 'progress towards'. This is backed up by US scientific data that has not revealed any evidence of fuel rod reprocessing, which gives off distinct atmospheric and thermal signatures able to be readily detected remotely. However, the first statement, and even the second statement increased the level of 'nuclear ambiguity' created by the DPRK.⁽¹⁾ This 'ambiguity' has been reflected in the Bush administration's decision to order an intelligence review as to whether the DPRK could produce weapons grade plutonium undetected.

Does the DPRK have Nuclear Weapons?

Previous US intelligence estimates have cited the DPRK as being in possession of one or two nuclear devices. According to the US, during the three-day talks in Beijing the DPRK admitted to having nuclear weapons and being prepared to either use them or export them, depending on US behaviour.

Both China and the DPRK have refuted the claim, China stating that according to its information no such admission took place.⁽²⁾ The DPRK however has remained ambiguous in its denials, maintaining in its often flamboyant commentary that it holds a 'physical deterrent force strong enough to wipe out any aggressors at a single stroke'.⁽³⁾

What does the DPRK Really Want?

The intentions of the DPRK remain opaque. The ambiguity of both its actions and intentions make negotiations extremely difficult. Four scenarios are explored here:

Whereas during the 1994 nuclear crisis, in which under the Agreed Framework, it agreed to freeze and eventually dismantle its nuclear program in exchange for economic and political concessions, today the evidence of Iraq has negated the viability of this option. As stated by the Korea Central News Agency 'the Iraqi war proved that [UN or International Atomic Energy Agency] inspection is a prelude to a war'.⁽⁴⁾

Their key aims are the maintenance of regime security, which requires a comprehensive non-aggression pact, and economic security, which requires immediate and long-term energy assistance, the removal of trade restrictions, diplomatic recognition, and the removal from the terrorist list, thus allowing access to World Bank and IMF assistance.

However, China, the DPRK's strongest supporter and currently essential economic lifeline, has strongly opposed nuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, bringing with it the possible demons of Japanese rearmament, a US missile shield encompassing the region and possibly even US troops at its border.

While the image of Kim Jong-Il remains an obtrusive figurehead of the nation, his ascension to leadership as chairman of the National Defence Commission, the supreme commander of the people's army, with little formal military training may have caused resentment in the older military establishment, despite his eager pursuit of the 'military first' ideological movement. This could explain the often competing actions and statements regarding the nuclear crisis between those thought to be supporting a more bellicose stance and those supporting greater reform and openness.

How does this Affect NorthSouth Relations?

Despite the DPRK's reported nuclear admissions, NorthSouth relations are continuing in relative strength compared to what was imaginable before the June 2000 leader's summit between Kim Jong-Il and then South Korean president Kim Dae-Jung.

The 10th ministerial level talks between the DPRK and South Korea, (Republic of Korea, ROK), took place 2730 April. The talks resulted in agreements to hold:

In addition the two sides agreed to discuss the nuclear issue in the future. The ROK chief delegate at the meeting also stated that the DPRK 'did not object strongly' to the inclusion of the ROK in future multilateral talks on the nuclear issue.

However, a key failure of the meeting was the inability of the two sides to agree to make reference to the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula in any joint statement on the ministerial talks.

Conclusion

The first official meeting between the US and the DPRK since the start of the crisis in October 2002 is a momentous achievement in itself. While both sides have stated the impossibility of future talks without a change in position by the other, there is a firm desire by both sides to go forward, demonstrated by the US decision to ignore earlier DPRK statements on reprocessing, and the DPRK's commitment to maintaining its 'nuclear ambiguity', thus enhancing its bargaining power.

Endnotes