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Research Note no. 47 2001-02
US and Iraq: Immediate Options
Alex Tewes
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade
18 June 2002
Recent events suggest that the US is moving towards
military action against Iraq.
Background
Since the start of the so-called 'War on Terror' the US
President has been unwavering in the description of his chosen strategy
as an 'Afghanistan
first' rather than an 'Afghanistan only' policy.
The suggestions that Iraq would be the next country to be targeted in
this war started soon after the events of September 11. Deputy Defence
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz argued for an early focus on Iraq. President
Bush and Vice President Cheney later rejected this approach. This latter
position has been reinforced by US allies who have argued against using
the attack on New York as an excuse to deal with the Iraqi ruler.
Nevertheless, American rhetoric on the subject has been consistently
bellicose, as evidenced by the President's State of the Union Address
in which he claimed Iraq belonged to an Axis of Evil, along with Iran
and North Korea.
A visit by US Vice President Cheney to the Middle East in March found
little regional support for military action against Iraq and an insistence
that the US focus first on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The vehemence
of the negative reactions suggested that neither Kuwait nor Saudi Arabia
would be available as launching points for a US military action against
Iraq.
More recent events, including the alleged plot to detonate a radiological
weapon or 'dirty bomb' in Washington DC have led to an apparent reformulation
of US strategy. The previous focus on deterrence and containment, has
given way to advocacy of pre-emptive strike as the primary tool for global
security.
This new strategic approach may be behind the recent signature by President
Bush of an intelligence order which directs the CIA to undertake a covert
program within Iraq in preparation for a military strike. Specifically,
the order will increase CIA support to the divided Iraqi opposition groups,
for intelligence collection within the Iraqi armed forces and government,
and allow for the use of CIA and special forces teams within the country.
A Strategic Opportunity
The proponents of military action against Iraq no longer argue a linkage
to the events of September 11, but put such action in a larger context
of pre-emptive self-defence against the potential wielders of Weapons
of Mass Destruction (WMD). Indeed, in his State-of-the-Union address,
President Bush warned the so-called Axis of Evil that their WMD programs
presented a clear and present danger to the security of the US. Broader
strategic considerations make strikes against Pyongyang or Teheran unlikely.
This, however, is not the case in regards to Baghdad.
For the US, the current situation presents a tempting strategic opportunity.
The successful removal of Saddam Hussein's regime from power in Baghdad
would remove a thorn in the US side which has remained as the 'unfinished
business' of the 1991 Gulf War, and provide a demonstrable success for
the 'War on Terror'.
Options
The diagram above outlines the spectrum of options open to the US regarding
Iraq at present.
At this stage the two most likely courses of action for the US appear
to be either 'Smoke and Mirrors' or unilateral joint military operations.
The first of these would entail maintenance of the public attention on
Iraq, whilst the real anti-terrorist work is done elsewhere, such as South
East Asia. Recent US commitments of troops to the Philippines for operations
against the Abu Sayaff terrorists and the warming of relations between
the US and the Indonesian military may represent evidence of such an approach.
The second course of action is the more likely of the two. At present,
countries bordering Iraq, such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Turkey do not
appear disposed to allow an invasion of Iraq from its territory. This
suggests that the US may seek to launch its attack on Iraq from the sea.
This could be achieved through an attack on the city of al-Basra. The
port would then become the launching pad for an invasion of the rest of
the country and the removal from office of Saddam Hussein.
A takeover of al-Basra by seaborne assault appears to be consistent with
the US doctrine of 'Operational Manoeuvre from the Sea'. The need to bring
together the logistic underpinnings for an invasion of the whole country
would require an operational pause for the US during which Saddam Hussein
could be tempted into offensive action. Any attempt to deploy the elite
Republican Guards would render them vulnerable to air attack by the US,
as the Iraqi integrated air defence system is largely static in nature.
It should be noted that an US attack on al-Basra would raise the possibility
of Saddam Hussein responding with chemical or bacteriological weapons.
Such an attack would have a negative effect in the region and would, of
course, be the proof that the US is seeking to justify its continued focus
on ridding Iraq of Saddam Hussein's regime.
Issues
- How would the current rifts between Secretary of State Powell and
the remainder of the Administration affect their decision-making in
this regard?
- Who will do the "nation building" after Saddam Hussein is removed
from power?
- What are the implications for regional stability of a diminished or
dismembered Iraq?
- What forces, if any, could Australia commit in the short-term to any
invasion of Iraq, when such forces would likely be operating in conditions
of chemical or bacteriological threat?
- How would our region view any Australian involvement in an invasion
of Iraq?
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