 |
Crisis in Papua New Guinea: Military Mutiny and the Threat to Civilian
Democratic Rule
Gary Brown
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group
3 April 2001
Recent unrest in the Papua New Guinea Defence Force
(PNGDF) is disturbing news for Australia not just because Australia is
the former colonial power, but because PNG's geographical location makes
its security an important issue in Canberra. As the recent defence White
Paper, Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, observed:
We share the Morauta government's assessment that a key aspect of defence
reform will be restructuring the PNGDF so that it can perform effectively
within the necessarily limited resources available to it. Recent events
elsewhere in the South Pacific have underlined the importance of a PNGDF
that is loyal and responsive to political control.(1)
This objective now seems far from realisation.
Background
The PNGDF began life under colonial rule as the Pacific Islands Regiment.
Following independence in 1975, a unified PNGDF (including land, maritime
and air components) was set up, but has suffered from underfunding and
neglect-a potential cause of future resentment.
Since independence the PNGDF has been an Australian defence aid recipient.
In 2000-2001, for instance, Australia has budgeted $18.8 million on direct
military assistance to PNG through the Defence Cooperation Program.(2)
Australia has also occasionally written off PNGDF debts for the supply
of stores and equipment, or even paid suppliers owed by the PNGDF.(3)
When the separatist insurgency on Bougainville broke out in 1989, it
became clear that the force was ill-equipped (in all senses of the word)
to deal with the stresses imposed by counter-insurgency (COIN) operations.
But COIN is a very demanding activity -as the Cold War superpowers learned
in Vietnam and Afghanistan. That the PNGDF could not defeat an insurgency,
even with logistic support from Australia, is therefore not particularly
surprising.
Some stresses evinced by the Bougainville campaign were nevertheless
particularly disturbing. There were signs of insubordination and indiscipline
in the field, with credible (though never strictly proven) allegations
of actions outside the accepted usages of warfare. Equally serious were
indications that important elements of the PNGDF officer corps were becoming
disaffected, with some senior officers openly disobeying Government orders.(4)
The Sandline Affair
It was the Bougainville insurgency which first brought serious military
instability to PNG. In 1997 the Chan Government engaged a firm of 'security
consultants', Sandline International, to train PNGDF members in COIN and
even, according to some reports, to fight the insurgents as de facto
mercenaries.(5) This development was significant in two ways.
First, it was a clear vote of no-confidence by the then PNG Government
in the PNGDF. It revealed that the Government believed the PNGDF incapable
of resolving the Bougainville insurgency and that, if a military solution
was to be found, external support was required. This judgement was in
all probability accurate.
Second, and of more significance, it provoked a near-mutiny by
senior PNGDF figures against the Government. There was a breakdown of
civilian control over the military, and for several days the country seemed
close to a collapse of civilian government and the possible institution
of military rule. The contretemps was resolved only when the Government
cancelled the Sandline deal. The Chan Government did not survive the affair,
being succeeded in July 1997 by the Skate Government, which was replaced
by that of Sir Mekere Morauta in 1999.
After Sandline it became clear to PNG and its major aid donors, including
Australia, that substantial reform of the military was required to restore
discipline, re-establish civilian control and again make the PNGDF a force
appropriate to PNG's circumstances.
Efforts at Reform
However, to identify a need for reform is one thing, to carry through
needed changes is another entirely. This disjunction has been made painfully
clear in PNG.
In November 2000 Prime Minister Morauta approached the British Commonwealth
for assistance with a review of PNG's defence and security needs. The
Commonwealth set up an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) chaired by Gerald Hensley
of New Zealand (former Secretary, NZ Defence Department), together with
Major General (ret) Philip Jeffrey of Australia, Mr Hugh Small QC of Jamaica
and Mr Charles Lepani, a noted PNG economist and former senior public
servant.(6)
Though the full EPG report has not been released, it reportedly proposed
as a central measure a substantial reduction-perhaps as much as fifty
per cent-in PNGDF numbers.(7) To be sure, the reduction did
not involve throwing soldiers out of barracks onto the streets: one of
the EPG members has stated publicly that the proposed downsizing was 'to
be achieved only through voluntary redundancy via an attractive release
scheme'(8) and pointed out that before preparing its report
the EPG visited every PNGDF unit, with the exception of those on Bougainville,
to solicit input.
Nevertheless, when the EPG proposals became known in PNG, there was a
strongly negative reaction from the PNGDF.
The March 2001 mutiny
On 16 March troops at Murray Barracks in Port Moresby seized weapons
from the armoury there and demanded a halt to the EPG reforms. Over the
next few days troops at other locations also seized weapons and made the
same demand. Despite claims that the weapons would soon be handed back,
the troops retained them. By 19 March Prime Minister Morauta had announced
that the EPG report would not be implemented, thus conceding the mutineers'
principal demand.
This concession did not, however, end the crisis, because the troops
were now demanding a face-to-face meeting with the Prime Minister to obtain
his personal assurances that the EPG reforms were dead and that there
would be an amnesty for all involved in the mutiny. Initially Sir Mekere
refused to meet the troops, but under pressure of a 72 hour ultimatum
eventually agreed to see a delegation.
This delegation demanded not only confirmation of the withdrawal of the
EPG reforms and of an amnesty, but also the withdrawal of all 'international
advisors' complicit (in the troops' view) in developing the initial reform
package. This, apparently, included the expulsion of 'unnecessary' Australian
and New Zealand military advisers and economic advisors from Australia,
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.(9)
The Government accepted the mutineers' demands, with the sole qualification
that the precise nature of expulsions of 'unnecessary' advisors is to
be determined later. The mutineers surrendered their weapons on Tuesday
27 March, one-Corporal Ben Wafia-being quoted as saying that the soldiers
had decided to hand back their weapons before Cabinet met 'because we
don't want to be seen demanding an amnesty under the barrel of a gun.
We want democracy to work.'(10)
Comment: Global Anti-Globalisation
The mutiny over the EPG proposals clearly has in it some elements of
the anti-globalisation trend which is, ironically enough, itself becoming
a global phenomenon. It is reflected in different ways in different states:
in PNG, it has taken the form of a mutiny by soldiers no doubt fearing
for their jobs and blaming the EPG proposals on their concept of 'globalisation',
influenced by PNG's recent heavy dependence on the World Bank.
From an external viewpoint the salient fact, however, is that-Corporal
Wafia's words notwithstanding-the PNG the Government has capitulated to
a military mutiny, abandoning reforms which, rightly or wrongly, it considered
necessary. It is particularly disturbing that this is the second time
in four years-Sandline being the first-in which a PNG Government has had
to drop proposals due to illegal actions by the armed forces. The Chan
Government's decision to hire Sandline was widely questioned (including
by Australia), but the fact remains that it was reversed not by due political
process but through extra-legal action by senior military figures.
Abandonment under duress of the EPG reforms leaves PNG's status as an
effective democracy open to question. The military remains over-staffed,
under-equipped, poorly resourced and above all seriously indisciplined.
This cannot change without significant reform, which now seems improbable.
The recent mutiny is the second occasion on which the PNGDF has illegally
coerced government into taking actions desired by the former. Each time
the perpetrators have remained apparently unscathed. An obvious conclusion
to draw is that, in PNG, the military can now overturn major government
decisions which it dislikes. This bodes ill for its future as a stable
civilian-led democracy and reduces its chances of effectively addressing
its wide range of socioeconomic and security problems.
Endnotes
- Department of Defence, Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force,
para 5.53.
- Portfolio Additional Estimates Statements: Defence 2000-01, p.
85.
- 'PNG army 'foraging' for food', Australian Financial Review, 17
November 2000.
- In 1991 a Colonel Nuia went to Bougainville expressly against government
orders, and there were rumours of plans for a military coup if Brigadier
Ted Diro was dismissed from his position. N. Raath, 'Moral Support?
Australia's Response to Papua New Guinea's Internal Security Problems,
Background Paper, Department of the Parliamentary Library, 19
December 1991, pp. 22-3.
- House of Representatives, Hansard, 25 February 1997, p. 1163,
Answer to question without notice.
- 'Commonwealth Secretary-General agrees to support Papua New Guinea's
Defence Review' Commonwealth News Release 00/96, 7 November
2000.
- 'Verdict delivered on military: retrain troops and cut costs', Sydney
Morning Herald, 27 January 2001.
- Michael Jeffrey, 'Criticism of EPG's role in PNG a bit unfair', Letter
to the Editor, Canberra Times, 23 March 2001.
- Kevin Ricketts, 'PNG soldiers end mutiny, hand back weapons' AAP Wire
Service, 26 March 2001, Story No. 8928.
- loc.cit.
|
 |
