|
Indonesian Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia-TNI)
Bob Lowry
Consultant, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group
29 June 1999
Contents
Major
Issues Summary
Introduction
The Political Impact on Foreign
Policy
Continuing Themes in Defence Policy
TNI's Internal Security Role
The TNI's Stance on East Timor
Continuity of Policy on Irian Jaya
Handling Pressures for Regional Autonomy
The Armed Forces in Politics
Australia-Indonesia Defence Cooperation
Conclusion
Endnotes
Source: United States Central Intelligence Agency,
map no. (R02495)5-98
Major
Issues Summary
For several months after the fall of Suharto in May 1998
the Indonesian armed forces particularly the army, police and marines,
withstood a severe buffeting as democratic forces mobilised to demand
total reform of the political, economic and social structures of the state.
This was followed by the outbreak of communal violence across Indonesia
as various communities vented years of frustration at the failure of the
central government to satisfy regional aspirations and at the brutality
of the armed forces in suppressing regional dissent. The violence has
been prolonged as a consequence both of Indonesia having a caretaker government
whose legitimacy is contested and of a severely depressed economy.
This was the second major shock that the Indonesian armed
forces (TNI)(1) had suffered in less than a year. By then it was apparent
that the Asian financial crisis which had spread throughout Southeast
Asia in the last quarter of 1997 had become a severe economic depression.
It was a depression that hurt Indonesia more severely than most. Not only
did this crisis produce the social unrest that toppled the Suharto government
but it also crippled the capability and prospects of the TNI. Operations
and training had to be curtailed and plans for replacement and upgrading
of equipment were cancelled or deferred. Previously, official Australian
analysts had been pointing to the strategic consequences of regional armed
forces, including Indonesia's, possessing capabilities which might soon
rival Australia's.(2) Now, the focus turned to concern that the TNI and
police would be unable to maintain order and prevent inter-communal violence.
The primary determinant of these issues is essentially
political. Meanwhile, the TNI and police, guided by deep-seated conceptions
of their role as the guardians of the state, are struggling to keep their
own cohesion. At the same time they are trying to keep Indonesia together
until the popular elections of June and Presidential elections of November
1999 give birth to the first democratically elected government since 1957.
There are no guarantees that the new government will
have general public acceptance or that it will prove equal to the challenges
it will confront. Even if it has general initial public acceptance, and
is reasonably competent, public expectations might far exceed the capacity
of any government, producing ongoing social and political tensions, including
regional independence movements.
The TNI's position at the centre of Indonesian politics
is on the wain after 41 years of authoritarian rule. However, it will
continue to play a major role in Indonesia, despite its battered image,
for many years to come. It can make or break the democratic transition.
It can be part of the solution to regional independence movements or part
of the problem, as in the Suharto era. More specifically, it can provide
a firm base for East Timor's transition to independence or TNI actions
can destabilise it for years to come.
One of the first acts of the new democratic government
is likely to be a total review of defence and security policy and the
organisation and administration of the armed forces. The success of these
measures will also be determined by the ability of the new government
to satisfy the expectations of a long suppressed population. Failure to
at least give some hope that these aspirations will eventually be satisfied
could lead to another descent into authoritarianism.
Major changes in foreign and defence policy are unlikely
but foreign policy will be more politicised as a democratic government
responds to the predominantly Islamic nature of Indonesian society. Any
conflict in the Middle East, for example, is likely to raise calls for
Muslim solidarity with the parties involved, including calls for the restriction
of passage of military vessels through the archipelagic straits. Any attempt
to restrict maritime passage by commercial or military vessels through
archipelagic waters and straits would be of concern to the international
community
Although the first signs of the recovery of the Indonesian
economy are becoming visible, it will be some time before the TNI will
be re-equipped and modernised. For the next few years the main focus of
the TNI will continue to be internal security. However, other roles will
get increasing priority as Indonesia struggles to maintain control of
its borders and its maritime resources, such as the potential Natuna gas
fields on the fringes of waters in the South China Sea disputed with China.
Given Indonesia's resource limitations, the TNI is unlikely to increase
in size or capability for many years but there is scope for significant
qualitative improvement to better cope with the challenges ahead.
Australia and Indonesia signed an Agreement on Maintaining
Security (AMS) in December 1995. The AMS is an oddity of history that
might be of more practical use as Indonesia makes its transition to a
relatively open political system and the East Timor issue is settled.
Australia has spent about $7 million annually in the late 1990s on defence
cooperation with Indonesia, including military exercises, training, limited
material and logistic support, and reciprocal visits.
The fall of Suharto has opened up an opportunity to exchange
ideas on how the TNI might adapt to the new political reality. These activities
could prove valuable as the TNI adapts to more open political structures
and revamps its policy, strategy, force structure, training and administration.
However, if the East Timor issue deteriorates, the clash of 'interests'
versus 'values' in Australia's cooperation with the TNI is likely to intensify.
Whatever disruptions may be caused by the transition process in East Timor,
the prospects for greater cooperation between the forces of the two countries
will be greatly increased as democracy take hold in Indonesia.
Introduction
In 1998, the Indonesian armed forces
were subject to numerous pressures. The Asian financial crisis brought
severe depression and the consequent social unrest toppled the Suharto
government and crippled the capability and prospects of the armed forces.
Operations and training had to be curtailed and plans for replacement
and upgrading of equipment were cancelled or deferred. For several months
after the fall of Suharto in May 1998 the Indonesian armed forces, particularly
the army, police and marines, withstood a severe buffeting from democratic
forces. This was followed by the outbreak of communal violence across
Indonesia. The violence has been prolonged as a consequence of Indonesia
having a caretaker government whose legitimacy is contested, and a severely
depressed economy.
Under pressure to improve it public image, the armed
forces announced it own internal reform program, including separation
of the police from military command and the renaming of the armed forces.
The Indonesian Armed Forces, that is, the three Services (TNI) and police
(POLRI) were known collectively by the abbreviation ABRI. On 1 April 1999
the police force was separated from military command with the aim of reducing
its military image and refocussing on police functions. Consequently,
the term ABRI has been dropped and the armed forces are now known as the
TNI.
This paper attempts to provide an overview of the TNI,
its role in current developments inside Indonesia and an insight into
its possible future. It begins by looking at the TNI's characteristics
as a conventional military force. This is placed in context by a discussion
of Indonesia's foreign and defence policies to provide an insight into
the TNI's strategic thinking. The impact upon the TNI of recent economic
events, and their consequences for the development of the TNI's military
capabilities is discussed.
Since the 1950s the TNI has had a 'Dwi fungsi' (dual
function) within Indonesia. As well as its role as a military service,
the TNI has carried responsibility for the economic, social and political
development of Indonesia. It is this role which has come under criticism
most heavily over the last two years and it is here that the TNI is under
most pressure to change. This paper studies these pressures and looks
at their consequences in areas such as the cohesion of the TNI, its role
in East Timor and other areas and its possible place in the future political
structure of Indonesia.
The paper also includes a brief discussion of the defence
links between Australia and Indonesia and the possible effects upon them
of the current period of turmoil.
The Political Impact
on Foreign Policy
Indonesia's general 'independent and active' foreign
policy is unlikely to be affected by the change of regime but substantive
change in its application and form is probable. As with other regional
nations, Indonesia will continue to be jealous of its sovereignty and
the challenges posed by emerging regional powers and globalising influences.
Its policy options, however, will be severely constrained by a weak economy
and a fractious population.
The re-emergence of Islam as a symbol and basis of political
mobilisation is likely to politicise foreign policy to a greater extent
than under Suharto. Any conflict in the Middle East, for example, is likely
to raise calls for Muslim solidarity with the parties involved, including
calls for the restriction of passage of military vessels through the archipelagic
straits.
This should not be seen as a manifestation of Huntington's
thesis of the 'clash of civilisations'. As with Christianity, there are
many cross currents within Indonesian Islam and most clashes in the Middle
East pit Moslems against Moslems. Almost inevitably different Moslem streams
and organisations will take different approaches to such problems. The
more radical elements accuse the USA and the IMF of compelling Habibie
to ban the formation of an explicitly Islamic political party.(3) However,
Islam in Indonesia, with minor exceptions, is of a much diluted form compared
to that found in Iran or Afghanistan.
The sense of 'frustrated regional entitlement' that characterised
Indonesian foreign policy through to the 1980s has been replaced by a
more sober assessment of Indonesia's place in the world.(4) There is a
consciousness, especially after the recent economic crash, that geographic
size, a large population, and great resource potential do not of themselves
equal power and influence. The opening of the economy to global influences
and the Indonesian liberalising of its political structures are also weakening
latent economic nationalism.
Nevertheless, democratic politics will ensure that economic
nationalist policies will continue to be promoted. The establishment of
Islamic Banks, the promotion of small and medium enterprises, and continued
faith in an antiquated network of cooperatives are, in some circles, considered
essential to promote indigenous business (that is, non-Chinese business)
and to provide a buffer to international capital.
The Policy Adjustments in Multilateralism and
East Timor
The commitment to regionalism through ASEAN and the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF) will remain strong but tempered by a much sharper
awareness of the weakness and limitations of these organisations. The
corollary of this will be continuing but muted support for a USA presence
in the region as a moderating influence until the political tensions in
Northeast Asia are resolved and the political directions of the regions'
emerging powers become clearer. In particular, Indonesia has hosted a
series of talks on the South China Sea dispute between China and several
Southeast Asian claimants to sovereignty over the Spratly Islands with
the aim of promoting a peaceful resolution of those disputes.
Indonesia will probably continue its membership of peripheral
organisations like the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Islamic Conference
Organisation (ICO) as a means of providing leeway in relations with the
dominant global powers and institutions and globalising ideologies.
The UN might also become a more important forum for the
expression of Indonesian aspirations. Indonesia has staked a claim to
a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and might
seek to use UN forums to blunt the hegemonic tendencies of the major powers
and globalising forces. Beginning in 1957 Indonesia has contributed units
and observers to several United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa,
Europe, the Middle East and Asia. This included playing a central role,
along with Australia, in bringing the Cambodian elections to fruition
in 1993.
Indonesia has an extant dispute with Malaysia over the
sovereignty of the islands of Ligitan and Sipadan off the East Kalimantan
border. After several failed attempts to settle the dispute bilaterally,
including some mutual close quarter shadowing of naval vessels from the
two countries patrolling the disputed area, both countries have agreed
to submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for
adjudication. Apart from this dispute, Indonesia' borders are settled
except for some uncertainty in relation to the maritime boundary with
China in the South China Sea.
If East Timor opts for independence the land and maritime
borders of the new state will also absorb some diplomatic effort. The
fate of the Occussi Enclave,(5) and the maritime boundaries between Indonesia
and the new state might present some difficulties but should be settled
by diplomatic means. Indonesia's promotion and ratification of the Law
of the Sea Convention (LOSC) should assist in the process.
In summary, Indonesian foreign policy will be influenced
much more by domestic political developments than during the Suharto era
but such change is unlikely to produce a drastic re-orientation.
Continuing Themes in
Defence Policy
Fading memories still linger of the latter years of President
Sukarno's tumultuous era in the early 1960s when Indonesia had acquired
large quantities of Soviet Bloc military equipment. That brief period
of bluster and potentially threatening military force, however, was an
exception to the general pattern of Indonesian defence policy before and
since. Indonesian defence policy has been defensive in nature. It has
consistently recognised the absence of an immediately menacing external
threat and its own geographic and economic vulnerabilities and weaknesses.(6)
Alliances with either side in the Cold War were not practicable
because of ideological cleavages in Indonesian society. Hence the pursuit
of an 'independent and active' foreign policy and a complementary policy
of self-reliance in defence, although in effect it benefited from US presence
in the region.
Self-reliance through conventional defence, particularly
naval and air forces, was not affordable so a policy of 'total people's
defence' was adopted under which the whole population would be mobilised
to ward off any external threat to the sovereignty of the nation. There
is little likelihood that this general policy will change. Despite the
technological advances of the last half century, it is still a viable
policy especially given Indonesia's limited resources and its vast archipelagic
estate.
Although Indonesia toyed with the idea of nuclear weapons
in the early 1960s, the Suharto regime did not pursue that option. On
the contrary, it became a firm advocate of the Southeast Asian Nuclear
Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ). It has also ratified the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) and several other weapons limitation and control conventions.
Despite an emphasis on self-reliance, Indonesia has also
played a leading role in promoting the concept of 'regional resilience'.
This is a region in which the individual countries strive to achieve internal
cohesion and unite to resist incursions into regional affairs by outside
powers. The facts of geography mean that achieving this objective would
provide Indonesia with a strategic buffer to its north. ASEAN provides
the diplomatic expression of this concept and bi-lateral defence cooperation,
principally with Malaysia and Singapore, provides a nascent basis for
coordinated defence of the South China Sea approaches.
Indonesia's Regional Defence Relationships
The Agreement on Maintaining Security (AMS) signed between
Indonesia and Australia in 1995 is the only defence treaty Indonesia has.
However, it has yet to be given any operational relevance.
Indonesia also engages in defence cooperation with a
number of countries across the globe to obtain education and training
and to acquire and maintain equipment and systems. Many TNI officers and
other ranks have undergone education and training overseas in a number
of disciplines since the 1940s and foreign military officers have been
invited to participate in Indonesian armed forces command and staff college
courses since 1964. Training and technical support teams have also been
deployed to Indonesia for a variety of projects by several countries on
a regular basis. Regular combined exercises, most on a small scale, are
also conducted in Indonesia by various countries.
Historically, Indonesia has focussed its strategic outlook
to the north. The virulent anti-communism of the Suharto regime meant
that it paid particular attention to developments in China. The Cold War
in East Asia began to thaw soon after China began opening its market to
capitalism in 1978. Subsequently, doubts arose about USA commitment to
the region particularly after the announcement of its withdrawal from
the Philippines when questions were asked about who would fill the supposed
vacuum and what would China do with its growing wealth. Increasing tensions
over disputed islands in the South China Sea also unsettled the region.
Nevertheless, Indonesia has not assessed that there is any immediate threat
from China and has sought, since unfreezing relations in 1989, to enjoin
China to participate in building a cooperative and peaceful regional community.
Nevertheless, China's size, it nuclear capability, its
potential to develop large military forces, its uncompromising stance
on its ocean frontiers and its domestic political uncertainties combined
with its potential for internal chaos mean that Indonesia, along with
the rest of the region, pays close attention to developments there. None
of this is likely to change with Indonesia's transition to democracy.
Strategic Policy for Indonesian Defence
From a strategic perspective the bulk of Indonesia's
population is in the western half of the archipelago. Most of its economic
wealth is also found there. Its main defence and security concerns are
centred on the South China Sea approaches. And, being a medium regional
power like Australia, it has an interest in moulding a region dedicated
to cooperative relationships and a commitment to the peaceful resolution
of disputes.
Although Indonesia has no formal binding alliances, it
would seek the cooperation of regional countries and global powers in
the unlikely event that its sovereignty was threatened. Cooperation with
the countries of Southeast and Austral Asia would be sought to deter aggression
and multiply military capability if conflict ensued. Having no nuclear
capacity or missile defences Indonesia might also seek the support of
sympathetic regional and global powers.
Should such efforts fail to stop hostile forces reaching
Indonesia, its military strategy is based on deterring threats to its
sovereignty by demonstrating that it has the cohesion and determination
to resist external aggression on a sustained basis until the invader is
worn down and withdraws or is ejected by a counter offensive.
To achieve this it has developed a small conventional
military force including an embryonic air defence system, naval fleet
operations and mobile ground forces. They can be grouped into joint task
forces which can be deployed throughout the archipelago at short notice
to handle two trouble spots at once. This force marks the borders and
represents a visible public declaration that Indonesia will not take lightly
incursions on any scale.
These forces could not sustain intense combat operations
against a major regional power for any length of time, nor could they
protect the whole archipelago. Consequently, Indonesian defence against
a major invasion relies on territorial forces and coordinated conventional
and guerrilla operations to contain, wear down and evict invading forces.
Despite the rhetoric of self-sufficiency, continued access to external
logistic supply would be an essential element in the success of this strategy.
The likelihood of having to activate this strategy is
very low but it does provide a basis for defence planning, organisation,
doctrine, and training. In addition the armed forces share routine responsibility
with other state organs for guarding the land, air and sea borders and
protecting national resources from unauthorised exploitation by Indonesian
nationals and foreigners.
In particular, the navy and air force are responsible
for surveillance of the vast reaches of Indonesia's Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) and archipelagic waters and coordinating the activities of
the other agencies involved.
Organisation of the Indonesian Armed Forces
The armed forces are organised on conventional lines
with a separate army, navy and air force under the operational command
of a commander-in-chief (C-in-C). The army comprises 240 000 personnel
organised into two major components, central forces and territorial forces.
The primary central forces comprise of the Army Strategic Command (Kostrad)
with two light infantry divisions and supporting arms, and the Special
Forces command (Kopassus) with four operational groups, in all about 35
000 troops. Apart from centralised headquarters and agencies, most of
the remaining army forces are distributed between 11 territorial commands
covering the archipelago.
The navy comprises two operational fleets, Western Fleet
based in Jakarta and Eastern Fleet based in Surabaya. Western Fleet covers
the vital South China Sea approaches and the Malacca and Sunda Straits.
Eastern Fleet covers the Pacific Ocean approaches and the Lombok/Macassar
Straits and straits further east. Each fleet also has several bases scattered
throughout its area of operations to support deployed units and units
in transit.
The air force comprises around twenty squadrons, including
six fighter squadrons. The fighter squadrons are deployed to provide air
defence of Java and the major approaches to Java. It has virtually no
strategic strike capability and very limited maritime surveillance capacity.
There are over 40 bases around the country capable of supporting limited
air operations as necessary.
Plans are in progress to increase the number of territorial
commands (Kodam) from 10 to 17 with the aim of intensifying the army's
capacity to maintain internal security across the archipelago.(7) There
are also proposals to interpose joint operational commands (that is, a
single headquarters commanding units of all services in a given operational
area) between the C-in-C and the existing primarily single service commands
(that is, army, navy and air force commands).(8) This would allow the
C-in-C to concentrate on strategic functions and his interactions with
government. Ideally, such changes should flow from an overall government
review of defence and security arrangements by the new government rather
than being implemented on an ad hoc basis.
Pressures for Change
Some of the problems experienced since the fall of Suharto
stem from General Wiranto's decision to retain the positions of both Minister
for Defence and Security and C-in-C. He has done this for political reasons,
that is, to limit the scope for President Habibie to impose policy on
the military, to promote and appoint senior officers, or to generally
subordinate the TNI to the presidency.(9) It also gives Wiranto the power
base from which to seek the presidential or vice presidential nomination
in November 1999 if other factors allow. Furthermore, it gives him the
independence to foil the UN process in East Timor if that is deemed necessary.
Apart from the proposals mentioned above, the general
structure of the armed forces will probably remain largely unchanged but
comprehensive qualitative reforms are needed at all levels. Some superficial
changes have been made since May 1998. The police were separated from
the armed forces on 1 April 1999 and placed under the Minister for Defence
and Security pending the election of a new government and their decision
on administrative arrangements for the police.
The social-political role has also been adjusted by demanding
that all armed forces personnel seconded to non-military roles be retired
from the service. The 'social-political staff' of armed forces headquarters
was also retitled 'territorial staff' but retained a social-political
sub-section to manage armed forces political representation in parliament
and in cabinet.
Some people have called for the abolition of the army's
territorial chain of command because it was the means by which the armed
forces suppressed the people in the past and that its continued existence
is a latent threat to a democratic transition. There is some basis for
these fears but other means of constraining the latent political menace
of the command arrangements will have to be found if the territorial structure
remains appropriate to Indonesia's defence and security policy and strategy.
These measures could include legislation to define and
restrict the military's role, separating the position of minister and
C-in-C, a major reduction in personnel deployed in territorial commands
and units, oversight of the intelligence system, improvements in conditions
of service, enforcement of supervision of the role and functions of the
territorial commands, enforcement of restrictions on business activities
by serving personnel, and the impartial application of the law against
all offenders, including those from the military.
Limited Prospects for TNI's Capability Development
The current organisation of the armed forces has been
outlined above. Prior to the fall of Suharto there was a 25 year plan
for the development of armed forces. These included expanding the army
to 330 000 men and strengthening conventional defences provided by the
navy and air force. These plans have been set back by the economic depression
Indonesia has suffered and will probably be reviewed by the new government.
The scale of the challenge can be glimpsed from the fact
that Indonesia's GNP before the economic crash was about half that of
Australia's but Indonesia has over ten times Australia's population and
a fraction of its infrastructure. Its official defence budget was a little
less than 10 per cent of the government budget or less than one third
of Australian's defence budget. Although the armed forces were able to
draw on other official and unofficial sources of funding these were mainly
expended on personnel and operating costs rather than capital equipment
purchases.
The dollar value of the defence budget has also collapsed
causing the cancellation of the purchase of German submarines and Russian
fighters and helicopters. The TNI has also cancelled contracts for the
local production of French artillery and all orders for transport and
maritime patrol aircraft and helicopters from the Indonesian aircraft
manufacturer IPTN.
Although capital expenditure has been drastically reduced
from an already low level Indonesia will proceed with the purchase of
an additional squadron of Hawk multi-role aircraft, bringing the total
to 40. The squadron will be based at Pontianak (West Kalimantan) and,
along with the squadron based at Pekan Baru (Sumatra), provide air defence,
close air support and maritime strike on the South China Sea approaches
including the Natuna Islands.
The navy is in the most desperate condition with a fleet
of ageing surface combatants and support vessels mostly overdue for replacement.
It is also left with a submarine force of only two vessels after the cancellation
of the order for five German vessels. The navy is also responsible for
coordinating, and much of the conduct of, maritime surveillance but it
is inadequately equipped and funded for the task and poor conditions of
service detract from effective implementation.
Given the state of Indonesia's defence and security challenges
and the state of its armed forces there is scope for a total review and
some imaginative thinking on the whole gamut of Indonesian defence and
security from the highest levels of policy down to conditions of service
for the private soldier before any further major capital expenditure is
contemplated.
TNI's Internal Security Role
Internal security has been the principal employment of
the armed forces since 1949, increasingly so since 1957 when martial law
was declared and Indonesia descended into a long period of authoritarian
rule. Although regional revolts and insurgencies were overcome or contained,
the failure to address the underlying political causes of those movements
left a growing list of grievances and frustration that erupted when Suharto
was deposed.
Compounding these grievances were the racial, ethnic,
religious and social cleavages that have bedevilled Indonesian politics
since the rise of nationalism early in the 20th Century. In 1945, the
founding fathers adopted the formula of a God fearing but secular state
which, with the promotion of Indonesian nationalism, was designed to unite
this diverse community. Unfortunately, these policies were undone by other
policies like favouritism of the politically neutered Chinese in business,
unfair land acquisition for politically sensitive projects like transmigration,
golf courses, forestry and dam building, and the exploitation of religion
for political purposes, especially in Suharto's later years.
The armed forces were both the agents of many of these
dysfunctional policies and the repressers when discontent arose. It must
be acknowledged that the armed forces became very sophisticated at managing
discontent with minimum force during the Suharto era. Suharto's political
adroitness and a prolonged period of economic growth were also crucial
factors in the regime's longevity. The exceptions to this were on the
periphery of the state, particularly Aceh, Irian Jaya and East Timor,
where grievances were deeply entrenched and the brutality of the military
response only served to deepen the resentment of Jakarta.
John Haseman, a former US military attache to Jakarta
with several postings in Indonesia, has declared that: 'There is still
no substitute to the territorial structure of the army for effective local
government in rural Indonesia. The volatile Indonesian society needs the
firm hand of the security forces to maintain domestic stability both nationally
and locally.'(10) However, as mentioned above, some Indonesians have called
for the dismantling of the territorial command system because its primary
purpose has been to maintain authoritarian rule.
Options for a New Stance in the Internal Security
Role
There is some truth in both arguments but much of the
volatility Haseman refers to has arisen from the failure to develop legitimate
political structures and norms and address the political grievances and
aspirations of the people. Moreover, no amount of military rule, no matter
how well intentioned, is a substitute for responsive local and regional
government within an appropriate national structure.
The armed forces can provide a firm base on which the
democratic transition can take root, assuming that an effective government
emerges from the 1999 electoral process. It also assumes that the creative
and productive forces of the regions are unlocked by genuine decentralisation
of political authority and appropriate economic incentives. These are
sensitive matters in a multi-ethnic empire with an understandable history
of suspicion and antipathy toward the central government and its regional
agents. Inappropriate actions by the military could easily foil reform
efforts.
The turmoil in Indonesia during the caretaker period
of the Habibie government and the prominent role of the military in containing
the violence is indicative of both years of pent-up tensions and the absence
of legitimate government in the interregnum between the fall of Suharto
in May 1998 and the formation of democratically elected national and regional
governments at the end of 1999. This has put the military in the difficult
position of having to maintain internal security without, in many cases,
effective political leadership to formulate and coordinate community responses
to unrest and violence. Such leadership is essential if military operations
are to complement the search for political solutions to such problems
rather than aggravate them as has often happened in the past.
If any progress is to be made, the military will have
to step back as the new government takes control and the police are given
the appropriate authority, organisation, doctrine, training and conditions
of service essential to their gaining the respect of the public. The military
might still be required to assist the government and police in prescribed
circumstances but under the general direction of the civil authority.
The military's internal security doctrine is well developed
but its application often deviated from doctrine. Correcting that shortcoming
requires a review of doctrine, the implementation of appropriate governmental
and military oversight, the effective application of civil and military
law, appropriate training, and appropriate conditions of service.
Even in the latter years of Suharto's reign the military
had been influenced by calls for respect for human rights in the performance
of its duties. Human rights considerations were incorporated in some training
programs and some local commanders issued aide memoirs to guide their
troops. However, without appropriate political oversight and enforcement,
infringements continued. In the current environment, and probably even
more so under the new government, the military will need to pay greater
attention to this aspect of doctrine and training.
Current signs are not encouraging. The military has shown
contempt for the rule of law in its handling of the case of politically
motivated kidnappings involving the disappearance of thirteen activists
and the kidnapping of another nine in the last months of the Suharto era.
Lieutenant General Prabowo, Suharto's son-in-law, and the officer responsible
for many of these crimes, was given an honourable discharge and told to
remain overseas until the dust had settled(11). Eleven of his subordinates
were then tried for the kidnapping offences and given light sentences(12)
for which they will undoubtedly be compensated later.
Some of the leniency shown towards Prabowo stems from
a fear that his more radical Islamic support base might have caused trouble
within and outside the armed forces had justice been allowed to prevail.
Prabowo had cultivated the more radical elements of Islam who also backed
Habibie's rise to power and supported him against those elements of the
reform movement which sought to unseat Habibie in late 1998. Along with
others, they opposed calls for Habibie's replacement by a collective leadership
at the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) meeting held in November 1998
and helped mobilise counter-demonstrations and auxilary units to assist
police protect the MPR session from disruption by demonstrators demanding
Habibie's dismissal.
A Prabowo trial might also have uncovered dubious actions
by other senior military officers and Suhartos involvement in the case.
This would have created difficulties for the military's undertaking to
preserve the honour and dignity of Suharto and his family after he resigned.
The case will be left to haunt the new government along with the more
general question of what to do about past abuses of power.
Problems of Cohesion Within the TNI
Discipline within the military has also deteriorated
as the economic crisis has lowered their standard of living and welfare,
and the intensity of employment has increased with the rise in political
unrest. In April 1999 the C-in-C's chief of general staff said that some
groups in society were trying to weaken the military's cohesion and solidarity
by destroying respect for law, discipline, and good order among soldiers.
He said breaches of law, discipline and traffic regulations by servicemen,
the police and defence bureaucrats was still high and could affect the
achievement of the military's tasks.(13)
The dispersion of the military's loyalties contributes
to the problem of declining morale as reflected by the decline in disciple.
Although members of the armed forces cannot vote they live in a very plural
society where mono-loyalty to the governing party and the figure of Suharto
has disappeared overnight leaving many disoriented. In these circumstances
loyalty to family, ethnic group and region can at times transcend their
over-arching duty to the armed forces as an instrument of the state. The
accusations of bias by some troops deployed to trouble spots around the
archipelago is indicative of this as is fighting among members of different
military units and between members of the armed forces and the police(14).
Nevertheless, the military still maintains a high level
of cohesion relative to the rest of the nation and is still capable of
providing a firm base for the democratic transition. But, could this base
be used to bridle political reform or even reassert military rule? The
answer depends on the election results and the inclinations and capacity
of the new government.
The
TNI's Stance on East Timor
From a strategic perspective it does not matter whether
the East Timorese vote for autonomy within Indonesia or for independence
in the de facto referendum being conducted under UN auspices in August.
With the demise of the communist threat, with Indonesia's transition to
democracy and, in the absence of any military threat from Australia or
Papua New Guinea, an independent East Timor would be no loss to Indonesia.
A poor East Timor might pose non-military security concerns
but these are law and order problems which arise from a host of other
sources. One more source will not overwhelm any neighbouring state. Moreover,
an independent East Timor would be forced by geography and economic reality
to establish comprehensive relations with its immediate neighbours.
Moreover, with the weight of Indonesia's strategic interests
being at the other end the archipelago why is the Indonesian National
Army (TNI) wasting its soldiers lives and its limited resources on trying
to keep a strategic, political and economic backwater? Why is it defying
its own government's commitment to the letter and spirit of the UN process?
And, why does it enjoy independence from government direction in this
matter?
Although East Timor is a drain on the Indonesian economy,
individuals have benefited from exploiting its resources and the contracts
awarded for public works. George Aditjondro has written of the land holdings
and business interests of the Suharto family, members of the East Timorese
elite and past and present members of the TNI leadership in East Timor.(15)
He also asserts that there are untapped oil resources in East Timor that
the Suhartos want to retain. Evidence of oil in East Timor has been known
for decades but there is no evidence that the resources are prolific or
that they are economically exploitable. Material interests are a factor
but not a deciding factor.
Military pride and an unwillingness to admit defeat is
a factor, especially when one of the military's doctrinal slogans, inherited
from its Japanese army antecedents, is that it does not accept surrender,
it does not give up. In some cases strong bonds of comradeship have also
grown up between TNI officers and men who have served for long periods
of time in the province and their East Timorese comrades, subordinates
and agents. Some have also married local women further cementing these
emotional linkages.
Another factor is the continuing influence of former
President Suharto and the army officers whose reputations will be diminished
by a vote for independence in East Timor. Suharto was reluctant to take
East Timor by force but having done so he was implacable in keeping it.
He refused to accept concessions or proposals for autonomy, even those
suggested by his son-in-law, Prabowo, a special forces officer who took
a personal interest in operations in the province. Ironically this issue
unites many formerly estranged parties in trying to foil the UN process.
The Attitude of General Wiranto
General Wiranto has been deeply influenced by the aura
of Suharto and his way of thinking and problem solving. Wiranto owes his
worldly success not only to his own undoubted abilities but also to the
patronage of Suharto. Despite Suharto's fall from power Wiranto still
has culturally ingrained obligations to him that continue to influence
policy. These cultural obligations are compounded by the legacy that authoritarian
regimes do not encourage independent conceptual thinking about fundamental
political questions by their military officers. With few exceptions, the
TNI's senior officers are still trapped in the dogmatic formulas of the
past.
It has also been suggested that the TNI does not want
to encourage a snow-balling of demands for independence that might follow
East Timor's independence. However, the Irianese and the Acehnese would
press their respective political demands regardless of what happens in
East Timor. They will certainly use whatever political leverage they can,
including that of East Timorese independence when it comes, but the fate
of these other movements will not be determined by what happens in East
Timor. This argument carries little weight but has historically been effective
in dampening criticism from foreign governments. Nevertheless, the combination
of all the factors mentioned above confounds the formulation of sensible
policy by the TNI leadership.
Wiranto has the freedom to ignore the injunctions of
President Habibie because of the way he came to power in May last year.
Habibie had never been a favourite of the military, with some important
exceptions. He owes his elevation to the vice presidency to Suharto. When
Suharto fell the military agreed to Habibie's succession on the understanding
that he would not interfere in what the military considered its internal
affairs. In particular, Habibie does not have the political clout to dismiss
Wiranto or to curtail his authority by leaving him as Minister for Defence
and Security but appointing another officer to command the armed forces.
Wiranto has been careful not to openly flout government
policy but actions on the ground in East Timor leave no doubt about TNI
policy. Some observers suggest that Wiranto has no control over his subordinate
commanders. But how can that be when he personally appointed them in mid-1998
and has the authority to dismiss them at will? Nevertheless, although
a change of policy would have to be carefully managed to neutralise the
influence of some senior officers who would oppose it and to preserve
morale in the army generally, most of the TNI would be glad to be done
with East Timor.
The fact that Wiranto has set the policy does not mean
that he authorises every act of violence undertaken but the general strategic
direction comes from Jakarta. The TNI strategy indicates that they do
not believe that they can win a vote for autonomy without resort to intimidation.
At some point they will have to decide whether intimidation will secure
the desired result and let the vote go ahead; or accept the possibility
of a vote for independence; or drive the UN back to New York before the
vote is taken.
A rigged result or the foiling of UN process will only
lead to renewal of the insurgency and leave an unnecessary legacy for
the new Indonesian government to grapple with. It is to be hoped that
the TNI leadership will see the wisdom of supporting the UN process before
it is too late.
Continuity of Policy
on Irian Jaya
Gaining the allegiance of the Irianese will be a challenging
endeavour for the new regime. Irianese society, like that in neighbouring
PNG, is highly fragmented and diverse reflecting the provinces' size and
difficult geography. Indonesia has been able to play on this diversity
to forestall or stunt the creation of Irianese identity while trying to
superimpose Indonesian identity. A recent, hastily announced intention
to divide Irian into three provinces this year is also underpinned by
a desire to further fragment Irianese identity. With only two million
people it is doubtful that Irian needs more government, despite its size.
What it does need is greater participation by the Irianese
in government and greater opportunities for them to gain higher education
and equality, if not priority, of employment in Irian. Fears for security,
low levels of education, and patronage flowing to non-Irianese has kept
Irianese participation in government and state agencies low. The brutality
and duplicity of the armed forces in dealing with dissent has also left
a legacy of bitterness that will not be easily forgotten.
Although Indonesia might be convinced to let the East
Timorese determine their own fate they will not countenance the same fate
for the Irianese. Irian was part of the Netherlands East Indies and so
falls within the boundaries of Indonesia's colonial legacy. The fact that
it took twelve years for the Dutch to relinquish sovereignty to Indonesia
and that it entailed a fraudulent face saving plebiscite, for the benefit
of the Dutch, does not diminish Indonesia's claim to Irian under international
law. Moreover, Indonesia would be very reluctant to forgo the resource
potential of Irian.
Consequently, although Irianese nationalism might grow,
Indonesia will vigorously resist calls for independence. To avoid a more
muscular insurgency the Indonesian government will have to find ways of
channelling Irianese aspirations into building their own province for
their own benefit while at the same time offering them equality of access
to the privileges of membership of the wider nation. Critically, the political
leadership in conjunction with the military and police will have to find
ways of dealing with armed separatists in ways which do not alienate the
general population or close legitimate channels of political expression.
Handling Pressures for
Regional Autonomy
The success and speed of democratisation and economic
recovery will in large measure be determined by the way regional autonomy
is designed and implemented. It will also determine whether separatist
movements flourish or disappear. Obviously, those people benefiting from
centralisation will resist such moves, including some within the military.
Nevertheless, there are genuine security concerns with establishing regional
autonomy.
A prime issue is to what level autonomy should be delegated-to
existing administrative divisions, that is, province or district; or according
to ethnicity, or geography. The prime security concern is to avoid forming
political entities which might develop separatist ambitions. Consequently,
Indonesia has chosen to delegate autonomy to district level, of which
there are 327, with supposedly limited coordinating functions being performed
by the 27 provincial governments. There are doubts about the economic
rationality of having such a large number of autonomous units and whether
Indonesia has the human and other resources to make it work. Previous
studies had examined the idea of reducing the number of districts to about
60 but trying to restructure provincial government at a time of political
and economic uncertainty would only add to the current turmoil.
If decentralisation to district level fails, Indonesia
will have to switch rapidly to some other form of political and economic
devolution if it is to avoid centrifugal pressures. The police and military
could come under extreme pressure in the political foment which will accompany
these adjustments. Firm control from the centre combined with responsiveness
to local conditions will be essential to maintaining control and respect
for law and order during these turbulent times. Consequently, the risk
of the military using force against political movements with possible
violations of human rights will continue.
The Armed Forces in Politics
To use Harold Crouch's term, it was a 'disguised coup'
in 1966 which put Suharto in power and it was the armed forces which kept
him there until the very end.(16) To maintain the support of the armed
forces Suharto, among other measures, allocated a percentage of seats
in regional and national parliaments to military officers. He also allowed
them to occupy civil posts from village chief to cabinet minister both
as a means of purchasing loyalty and to balance the power of the bureaucracy.
Military participation in all aspects of government,
which came to be known as the dual function of the armed forces (Dwi fungsi
ABRI), grew out of dissatisfaction with the inability of the governments
of the 1950s to address fundamental political questions due to the alleged
priority accorded to personal and sectoral interests over national interests.
Military participation was supposed to instil some discipline and concern
for national interest into the political process and executive agencies.
Implementation of the concept sprouted under Sukarno and bloomed under
Suharto.
Since Suharto's fall TNI participation in national policy
making and the placement of officers in executive agencies has come under
political pressure. The TNI allocation of parliamentary seats has been
retained for the coming parliamentary term (1999-2004) but the percentage
of seats in the national parliament has been reduced from 15 to 8 per
cent. This might still provide the TNI with a decisive influence if, as
expected, no one party or combination of aligned parties wins an absolute
majority.
Shifting parliamentary coalitions need not destabilise
government in Indonesia's presidential system of government. Consequently,
the critical issue will be the presidential elections in November following
the parliamentary elections of June. The president is elected by the Supreme
Consultative Assembly (MPR) which is a combination of the parliament plus
two hundred members elected/appointed on a regional and functional basis,
some according to proportions of votes won by successful parties in the
June elections and others as appointed representatives of professional
groups (farmers, professions, etc). This arrangement allows scope for
conservative forces to manipulate the voting patterns of the additional
two hundred members thus subverting the majority established in the parliament
and perhaps giving the armed forces a decisive directed vote in the presidential
elections.
Retention of parliamentary seats by the armed forces
allows them some influence on the direction and pace of democratic reforms
but it also has some disadvantages. According to doctrine the armed forces
stand above all Indonesia's diverse social, ideological, racial and ethnic
cleavages. It thus declared its neutrality in the June parliamentary elections.
However, when it comes to some issues in parliament, and, in particular,
the presidential elections it will have to declare its hand and this will
inevitably establish a pattern that will align the TNI with certain political
forces and undermine its non-partisan proclamations.
It could also create a situation in which the C-in-C,
who is also an ex officio member of cabinet-unless the new president changes
the cabinet structure-could direct his faction to lobby and vote against
government legislation. Given the president's prerogative to appoint and
dismiss the C-in-C, the armed forces faction could equally become a mere
cipher of the president. In either case the armed forces doctrinal position
and rationale for involvement in politics is undermined.
Options for the TNI's Political Role
Amien Rais, leader of the Partai Amanat Nasional (National
Mandate Party) has suggested that the armed forces faction could avoid
this dilemma by giving up their voting rights. This would allow their
views to be represented in parliament, giving the national perspective
they fear many parties and politicians lack, while allowing some distance
from partisan politics. This solution also has some dangers. It might,
for example, allow the armed forces to represent themselves as the only
true moral force in the nation above the fray of day-to-day politics and
provide some justification for a coup should 'authoritarian nostalgia'
emerge in the wake of the elections and the massive challenges the new
government will face.
The TNI has reformed the system of seconding officers
and other ranks to government, the bureaucracy and government business
enterprises by giving incumbents the choice of resigning or returning
to the armed forces. It has also severed its political direction of seconded
personnel, and directed that in future they will only be seconded in competition
with appropriately qualified civilians. It is too much to expect that
nepotism will disappear overnight but the measures adopted will gradually
reduce the influence of the TNI in non-military posts.
The compromises that will be needed in forming the new
government in late 1999 will give the military some scope for bargaining
but the military's political role will fade away; the only question is
how fast and under what conditions. General Wiranto forecast the political
debate to come when he said that three extreme tendencies had to be prevented:
the military over-reaching its authority, the isolation of the military
from the people, and excessive civilian interference in the internal management
of the military.(17)
Australia-Indonesia Defence
Cooperation
Australia and Indonesia signed an Agreement on Maintaining
Security (AMS) in December 1995. The AMS is an oddity of history which
might be of more practical use as Indonesia makes its transition to a
relatively open political system and the East Timor issue is settled.
Meanwhile, for Indonesia it is largely irrelevant, while for Australia
it provides a bureaucratic umbrella for cooperation which would have proceeded
regardless of whether the AMS existed or not.(18)
Australia's Department of Defence (DOD) has spent about
$7 million annually in the late 1990s on defence cooperation with Indonesia.
Cooperation includes low level combined exercises with all three services,
training in Australia and Indonesia, limited material and logistic support,
and reciprocal visits between senior officers and officials.
Training with the special forces has been suspended because
of political sensitivities and the scale of other exercises reduced. There
have been accusations, like those aired on the Channel 9 Sunday program
on 30 May 1999, that Special Air Service Regiment's (SASR) training with
their Indonesian counterpart, Kopassus, included ambush techniques taught
by Falintil prisoners. By implication, counter-measures to these techniques
were then applied against Falintil (the military arm of the Timorese independence
movement) in East Timor. This assumes that Kopassus could not have discovered
such techniques for themselves and that the SASR made a contribution to
the development of minor tactics applied by Kopassus in East Timor. Both
assumptions are questionable. Nevertheless, the moral question of whether
the SASR should have been involved in such training with a unit renowned
for it callousness in East Timor and other areas of operations remains
a matter for political judgment.
The fall of Suharto has opened up an opportunity to exchange
ideas on how the TNI might adapt to the new political reality. In March
1999 senior officers and officials met in Jakarta to explore the nature
of conflict; relations between civil and military institutions; roles
that governments expect militaries to play in promoting security; and
reform and organisational change. They also agreed to establish working
groups on a number areas of mutual interest. These activities could prove
valuable as the TNI adapts to more open political structures and revamps
its policy, strategy, force structure, training and administration.
However, if the East Timor issue deteriorates, the clash
of 'interests' versus 'values' in Australia's cooperation with the TNI
is likely to intensify. In the absence of other pressing interests the
government might have to accept a temporary souring of relations with
the TNI to force it to reconsider its strategy in East Timor. If successful
it would be in the long term interests of all the parties concerned. Whatever
disruptions may be caused by the transition process in East Timor the
prospects for greater cooperation between the forces of the two countries
will be greatly increased should democracy take hold in Indonesia.
Conclusion
The TNI's position at the centre of Indonesian politics
is on the wain after 41 years of authoritarian rule. The political structure
is still in transition but the forthcoming elections will probably produce
a fledging democracy. It will take some years to consolidate democratic
institutions and norms and the TNI could play an important role in maintaining
national cohesion during that time.
To be effective, however, the new government will have
to order a total review of defence policy and ensure the subordination
of the TNI to executive government at national and lower levels. The success
of these measures will also be determined by the ability of the new government
to satisfy the expectations of a long suppressed population. Failure to
at least give some hope that these aspirations will eventually be satisfied
could lead to another descent into authoritarianism.
Major changes in foreign and defence policy are unlikely
but foreign policy will be more politicised. For the next few years the
main focus of the TNI will continue to be internal security. However,
other roles will get increasing priority as Indonesia struggles to maintain
control of is borders and its maritime resources.
Given Indonesia's resource limitations, the TNI is unlikely
to increase in size or capability for many years but there is scope for
significant qualitative improvement to better cope with the challenges
ahead.
Endnotes
- The Indonesian Armed Forces, that is, the three Services (TNI) and
police (POLRI) were known collectively by the abbreviation ABRI until
1 April 1999 when the police force was separated from military command
and the term ABRI was dropped.
- See, for instance, Department of Defence, Defending Australia,
Defence White Paper 1994, Canberra, 1984, p. 9ff and Department
of Defence, Australia's Strategic Policy, Canberra 1997, p. 10.
- Ahmad Sumargono, 'Islam Yes, Partai Islam Yes!', Media Dakwah,
June 1998, p. 47.
- The best analysis of Indonesian foreign policy up to the early 1980s
is provide by Michael Leifer, Indonesia's Foreign Policy, George
Allen & Unwin, London, 1983.
- East Timor is less than one quarter the size of Tasmania or more than
twice the size of Singapore. The Occussi enclave is a small pocket of
land in West Timor about 120 kilometres west of the East Timor/West
Timor border. Prior to 1975 it was part of Portuguese Timor.
- Full coverage of Indonesian defence policy and strategy and its armed
forces can be found in Robert Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia,
Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1996.
- 'Pemekaran 17 Kodam Pertimbangan Teritorial', Suara Pembaruan,
22 May 1999.
- 'Mana Yang Efektif, 17 Kodam Atau 13 Kodam Plus 2 Kowilhan?, Suara
Pembaruan, 24 March 1999.
- For a description of the power play between Habibie and Wiranto in
the months after May 1998 see Marcus Mietzner, 'From Suharto to Habibie:
the Indonesian Armed Forces and Political Islam during the transition',
in Geoff Forrester, Post-Suharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos,
Crawford House Publishing, Bathurst, 1999, pp. 65-102.
- John Haseman, Southeast Asian Affairs 1999, Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies, Singapore, 1999, forthcoming.
- 'HOT NEWS: Prabowo Dipecat', Suara Pembaruan, 24 August 1998.
- 'Delapan Anggota Tim Mawar Naik Banding', Suara Pembaruan,
7 April 1999.
- 'Kasum ABRI: Ada Yang Inginkan Anggota TNI Dan Polri Tidak Kompak',
Suara Pembaruan, 8 April 1998.
- 'Polisi Dikeroyok Puluhan Lelaki Berbadan Tegap', Suara Pembaruan,
7 April 1999.
- George Aditjondro, Is Oil Thicker Than Blood? A Study of Oil
Companies Interests and Western Complicity in Indonesia's Annexation
of East Timor, Nova Science, 1999.
- Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Cornell
University Press, Ithaca, 1988, p. 179.
- 'Wiranto: Cegah Kewenangan Terlalu Jauh Bagi Militer', Suara Pembaruan,
24 May 1999.
- Robert Lowry, Australia-Indonesia Security Cooperation: For Better
or Worse?, Working Paper No. 299, SDSC, ANU, 1996.
|
