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Research Note no. 19 2003-04
Australia's New Main Battle
Tanks
Peter Rixon
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group
24 November 2003
The Australian Army is in the process of acquiring a new main battle
tank (MBT). This acquisition is contrary to the policy announced in the
2000 defence white paper when the Government said it had 'decided against
the development of heavy armoured forces suitable for contributions to
coalition forces in high intensity conflicts'.(1)
So why buy tanks now when military interventions like those in East Timor,
Afghanistan and the Solomon Islands
have seen only one Special Forces soldier killed? Why buy new tanks when
there are calls for budget surpluses to be spent on education or health?
This Research Note seeks to determine what factors have prompted the need
for Australia to replace its
current tank fleet. Analysed are some of the strengths and questions arising
from the decision to buy new MBTs.
The Argument for Tanks
Advanced MBTs allow military forces better chances
of winning in battle and possession of them substantially improves crew
protection. Alan Duponta
highly respected strategic commentatorhas been advised by defence that
'new tanks will increase the chance of mission success by 30 per cent
and reduce Australian casualties by a factor of six'.(2) Whilst
around a dozen US and UK MBTs have been damaged in Iraq
by mines and anti-armour weapons, less than a handful of tank crew have
died. This degree of protection is highly appealing in any conflict, not
just for the combat troops, but for decision makers who have to send troops
into combat whilst worrying about the impact of casualties.
Australia
acquired 103 Leopard AS1 MBT variants in 1977. The Australian Leopard
AS1 MBT is a vehicle from an era when heavy armour was sacrificed for
speed. The choice of the Leopard AS1 made sense in continental defence
scenarios which foresaw the Army defending Australia
from enemies unlikely to land MBT themselves. Unfortunately, in its current
state, the Leopard AS1 is vulnerable to mines and hand-held anti-armoured
weapons and its frame is not suited to being upgraded.
Most areas where the Australian Army is likely
to deployeither in war or on peacekeeping missionsare located in regions
dominated by what the military refer to as 'complex terrain'. Broadly,
this includes areas that are either heavily urbanised, or have a mix of
heavy scrub or jungle, sometimes mountains or swamp, often in proximity
to urban areas. Much of the fighting in Iraq
was in proximity to urban terrain. When guerrillas fight among the civilian
population, modern military operations become more complex. Friendly forces
must obviously take the greatest care to avoid civilian casualties and
unwarranted destruction whilst still managing to win the battle and keep
the peace.
Tanks form an integral part of any combined arms
team, the loss of any one element of which exposes the rest. Without tanks,
the infantry are exposed, and without ground elements, helicopters are
extremely limited during the close-quarter battle. The protection offered
by modern MBTs is extended to the infantry and other dismounted soldiers
carrying out operations, not just the tank crew. The presence of tanks
provides a significant boost to the effectiveness and security of other
force elements, even during peacekeeping operations.
Questions for Consideration
Are tanks the right weapons? Canada
has decided to dispose of its Leopard tank fleet and replace its tanks
with US developed 18-tonne Stryker armoured gun systems armed with 105mm
guns. The Stryker is a wheeled armoured vehicle, very similar in appearance
to the Australian Light Armoured Vehicle (ASLAV). Australia
has several hundred ASLAVs, but none armed with 105mm guns. Would a more
sensible acquisition be 105mm gun-armed ASLAVs rather than tanks?(3)
The purchase would be around $200 million cheaper, though these vehicles
are not as well protected as an MBT.
Are there enough tanks already? In its
2003 campaign in Iraq the US
Army used only 25 per cent of its available MBT inventory to conquer the
country. Furthermore, whilst the 3rd Mechanised Division, 3rd Armoured
Cavalry Regiment and three Marine battalions had MBTs (around 10 battalions),
the remaining 42 battalions of combat troops (25 US Army and 17 US Marine)
were predominantly light infantry or light armoured battalions similar
to Australian soldiers garrisoned in Townsville, Brisbane and Holsworthy
(the bulk of the Australian Army).(4) If the US
is the likely coalition partner, why does Australia
need tanks?
Will we use these new tanks? Australia
has not used tanks in East Timor, Afghanistan or the Solomon
Islands. They were, however, crucial to operations
once introduced in Vietnam in
1968. So are new MBT needed now? If Australia
is going to supply armoured units for coalition operations overseas, then
these tanks also need infantrymost commonly mechanised infantryto accompany
them. Australia's current mechanised
infantry vehicles do not have comparable mobility or protection to these
tanks. Force numbers may also be a problem. A rule of thumb is that for
each tank unit, two mechanised infantry units are needed. Australia
has one mechanised infantry unitat less than full strength. Does Australia
need a second mechanised battalion, how will it be raised, how much will
it cost, and will Australia use
that battalion if the cost is paid?
Can these tanks be moved? Armies fight
in formationsfor example brigadesand they need to be moved as formations.
The British Army needed 15 ships to get its 7th Armoured Brigade
to war in Iraq in 2003.(5)
The Government has indicated that Australia
is acquiring new amphibious ships, but they will arrive after 2010. The
question could be asked why buy tanks in 2004? The Australian Navy currently
has three old amphibious ships, but they would have significant problems
putting tanks ashore, for example, in the South West Pacific. Contracting
civilian transport ships may not be possible in a crisis now that global
merchant fleets have shrunk and become much more specialised. None of
the transport aircraft of the RAAF can lift a Leopard AS1, so there is
no hope of moving new MBTs with the air force.
International reaction? Acquiring
advanced MBTs could send mixed messages to countries in our near neighbourhood.
Although Malaysia is acquiring equivalent T80 MBTs, within the region
questions may still arise as to why the Australian Army is acquiring a
heavy armoured capability at a time when the government has just stated
that 'the threat of direct military attack on Australia is less than it
was in 2000'.(6)
What is the threat? Domestically, even
given of the threat of terrorism, questions could be asked about the rationale
for a shift away from an Army that is light infantry in nature (troops
operating from helicopters, on foot or from lightly armoured air transportable
vehicles) suitable for rapid deployment. In the public mind the threat
is a terrorist with a car-bomb, not someone driving another MBT. Would
more police officers be better for countering terrorists? Internally the
Australian Army has always identified a need to retain heavier capabilities,
but the public has not always heard the message.(7)
Logistic support? A purchase price of
$600 million has been floated for the new MBT.(8) However,
does this price include operating costs and logistic support arrangements
for the new tanks? Will they use more fuel, are their component parts
more expensive, are these costs reflected in the acquisition price and
so on?
Conclusion
New advanced MBTs of the kind currently proposed
could offer Australian troops more protection in certain combat situations.
They would also make Australian troops more capable in some conflict scenario
against an identifiable enemy. Apart from the costs (financial and political)
it is arguable that Australia
already has light forces suitable for coalition operations and interventions
to support regional neighbours. It could also be argued that the issue
of whether these tanks are appropriate or necessary in the Australian
strategic environment is, therefore, a matter requiring further public
assessment.
- Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, Commonwealth of Australia,
2000, p. 79.
- The Australian, 14 November 2003.
- Australia/NZ Defence Industry & Aerospace Report, No. 42, 3 Nov
2003.
- Numbers from www.orbat.com. 7 US Army battalions had
Bradley IFV.
- Forbes, ed., The Strategic Importance of Seaborne Trade
and Shipping, RAN Seapower Centre, 2003.
- Australia's National
Security: A Defence Update 2003, AGPS, p. 9.
- See Land Warfare Doctrine 1; the Fundamentals of Land Warfare,
Australian Army Doctrine Centre, 1998, and Complex Warfighting: Hardening
the Army to Fight the New Warfare, Australian Army HQ, 2003.
- he Age, 20 November 2003.
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