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The Independence of the Speaker
Margaret Healy
Politics and Public Administration Group
30 March 1998
The resignation of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Hon Mr
Bob Halverson MP, on 3 March 1998 has raised again the issue of the independence
of the Speaker. Throughout the history of the Commonwealth Parliament
there have been many occasions when the House has debated the best means
of ensuring that the Speaker can conduct the proceedings of the House
of Representatives impartially and with decorum. While these debates often
feature accusations of bias and partiality and stringent denials and counter-accusations,
this is part of the cut and thrust of Australian politics. Generally,
successive Speakers have striven to preside over parliamentary proceedings
impartially, irrespective of their political affiliations, although there
have been some exceptions.
Frequently the independence of the Speaker is seen as a matter to be
determined in a structural or institutional way. Separating the Speaker
from party is seen as enhancing the capacity to be impartial. But structure
is not the only factor. Australia's political history and culture, and
constitutional development, have profoundly affected the past and present
operation of the office, and also influence and constrain options for
change.
Speaker Halverson took office in the wake of election promises by the
Coalition parties to improve the standing of the Parliament. In his first
Headland Speech on 6 June 1995 Mr Howard said:
The Coalition will seek to invest the Speaker of the next parliament
with greater independence similar to his or her counterpart at Westminster.(1)
British Practice
The model against which the independence of the office of Speaker is
generally measured is that of the House of Commons of Great Britain. There
the Speaker inherits the mantle of spokesperson for and defender of the
House of Commons in its historic struggle for parliamentary supremacy
against the monarchy. British practice is that once elected, the Speaker
continues in office unopposed for as long as he or she remains a Member
of Parliament. The Speaker is impartial in the Chair, withdraws from party
meetings and does not debate party issues. Furthermore, the Speaker is
not opposed at general elections. These practices are regarded as fundamental
to the maintenance of the Speaker's independence. Former British Speaker
George Thomas wrote:
For the past two centuries the House has expected the Speaker to abandon
all party loyalties and to be outside the battle in the Chamber. If
he is to bring complete impartiality and fairness to his work, this
requirement is an absolute necessity...Our democracy owes more than
words can say to the clash of ideas and the rough and tumble of party
political debate, but it also owes an enormous amount to the fact that
the Speaker is completely impartial in the political controversies.(2)
The Australian Experience
However the role of Speaker in Australian Parliaments has had a different
history. Geoffrey Bolton explains Australian divergence from British traditions
as arising from the fact that many of the British usages were scarcely
established at the time when five of the six Australian colonies achieved
self-government. He argued that the small numbers in colonial parliaments
and fluctuating allegiances meant that every member's vote was crucial,
including the casting vote of the Speaker. Colonial Speakers needed to
participate in debate: to not have participated or shared in the allocation
of funds for public works would have disenfranchised their constituencies.(3)
This situation continued after federation. In the Commonwealth Parliament,
the Cook Liberal Government (1913-14) relied on the Speaker's casting
vote, and Speaker Sir Elliott Johnson's casting vote saved the Nationalist
Government in 1921 on several occasions. Even more notable was Speaker
Sir Littleton Groom's failure to use his casting vote in 1929: his abstention
(following his usual practice of not voting in committee(4)) caused the
defeat of the Bruce-Page Government. Both Bruce and Groom lost their seats
at the ensuing election.
At federation, party affiliations were fluid, with no one party able
to govern in its own right. Standing Order 1 of the House of Representatives
stated (and still states) that unless otherwise provided, the practice
of the House of Commons would apply. The first Speaker of the House of
Representative, Sir Frederick Holder, held himself aloof from party politics.
Elected unopposed in 1901, and again in 1904 and 1907, he held office
until he collapsed on the floor of the House in 1909, in the midst of
acrimonious proceedings. He died shortly afterwards. But the 1909 Fusion
uniting the non-Labor parties solidified the two-party system. Since Holder's
death, the Speaker has always been a member of the party holding government.
After the 1913 election the ALP held 37 seats and the Liberals 38. The
previous ALP Speaker Charles McDonald declined a Liberal Party invitation
to continue in office: it made the offer to avoid having to supply the
Speaker and be dependent on his casting vote.
Sir Billy Snedden, Speaker from 1976 to 1983, was a major advocate of
independence through adoption of the British model. He argued that the
Parliament could ensure that a Speaker remained in office under a change
of Government, and that the party organisations could agree not to contest
the seat held by the Speaker. He proposed that a Speaker should hold office
for five to seven years, and should then resign from Parliament and not
hold any further public office.(5) The Fraser Government did not adopt
his proposals. Believing that a former Speaker should not remain in the
House, Sir Billy resigned from Parliament after the election of the Hawke
Government in 1983.
Impediments to the Adoption of the British System
It is unlikely that the British practice of not contesting the Speaker's
seat could be adopted in Australia. The size of the respective parliaments
is an important factor. With 659 members of the House of Commons, the
government can generally dispense with one seat. The House of Representatives,
with 148 members, is much smaller, and so therefore are government majorities.
All seats are regarded as essential. Reserving a seat could affect an
election result and the viability of a government.
A fundamental objection to making the Speaker's electorate non-contestable
is seen to be the fact that this would deprive the people of that electorate
of the choice of member. Should the incumbent Speaker be the only candidate,
under sub-section 179 (2) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918,
he or she would be declared duly elected on nomination day. Thus there
would be no opportunity or requirement for electors to cast their votes.
This would be a serious breach of democratic rights, and inimical to Australian
democratic principles.(6) It would be difficult to enforce such a practice.
Parties might agree not to contest the electorate, but such agreements
could scarcely bind other citizens wishing to stand as independent candidates.
Should the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 be amended so as to
provide a reserved and non-contestable seat, it is likely that the High
Court would rule that this was unconstitutional.(7)
If the House of Representatives were to adopt this practice, the position
of the President of the Senate would also be questioned. It would be difficult
to argue that a State should in effect lose a Senate position. Section
23 of the Constitution gives the President a deliberative but not a casting
vote: this is to ensure that the equality of the states is maintained
when the Senate votes.
Section 35 of the Constitution requires that each Parliament must choose
one of its members to be the Speaker. While there is nothing to prevent
members of the House of Representatives from choosing the Speaker from
the previous Parliament, it is a choice that must be made after each election.
As a general principle one Parliament should not seek to bind the choice
of a later Parliament. In addition, adoption of the British practices
of unlimited tenure would not address the problem of how to remove a poor
or ineffective Speaker.
What is to be Done?
While the NSW Constitution (after amendments in 1991 and 1992) now recognises
its presiding officers as 'the independent and impartial' representatives
of each House, there is no such provision in the Commonwealth Constitution,
or in other relevant legislation.
With major impediments to the sort of changes that would see Australia
adopt the British model of a non-party Speaker, how then can the House
ensure that the Speaker can act with independence and impartiality, and
not appear a partisan servant of the government? It seems that unless
the Australian Parliament legislates on the issue, or modifies Standing
Orders to this purpose, it must continue to approach the goal of an independent
Speaker through the qualities, experience and efforts of the person holding
the position, and through the co-operation of other members. This involves
potential costs and benefits: the costs might be occasional loss of immediate
partisan advantage, but the benefits are likely to accrue to the standing
of the House. But as House of Representatives Practice argues:
Members are entitled to expect that, even though politically affiliated,
the Speaker will carry out his or her functions impartially. Likewise,
a Speaker is entitled to expect support from all Members, regardless of
their party.(8)
- John Howard MP. Headland Speech 1. The Role of Government:
a Liberal Approach. The Menzies Research Centre 1995 national lecture
series, 6 June 1995.
- George Thomas. The Speakership, House of Commons, Westminster.
The Parliamentarian, vol. 59, no. 1, January 1978: 2-3.
- Geoffrey Bolton. The Choice of the Speaker in Australian Parliaments.
Parliamentary affairs, vol. 15, no. 3, Summer, 1962.
- House of Representative Practice. Edited by L M Barlin. 3rd
edition. Canberra, AGPS, 1997:324-5.
- Sir Billy Snedden. Impartiality of the Speaker: the Westminster
Convention in Relation to the Speaker. 21 May 1979. Published in
The Parliamentarian, vol. 60, no. 3, July 1979: 129-132.
- Australian commitment to democratic electoral practices has been strong
in such matters as the extension of the franchise, equality of electorates,
frequency of redistributions and in its voting systems. However voters
of the mainland Territories were denied full representative rights in
the House of Representatives because of their territorial status and
this was not fully remedied until 1968.
- See Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 68 AJLR
713; 124 ALR 1.
- House of Representatives Practice. op. cit: 180. See also Appendix
2. Speakers of the House of Representatives: 748-56.
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