

**Inquiry into the planned acquisition of the F-35 Lightning ..
(Joint Strike Fighter)**

**Submission
on
Terms of Reference (ToR) Item f.
Other Related Matters:**

THE OBSOLESCENCE OF THE F-35 AS A STRIKE PLATFORM

ob·so·les·cence (ŏb'sə-lēs'əns')

noun.

1. The process of passing out of use or usefulness; becoming obsolete.
2. The process/condition of going out of date, surpassed or being no longer of use.
3. *Biology* Reduced during the course of evolution; made no longer useful; vestigial or nearly vestigial. Used of an organ or other part of an organism.

**Air Power Australia Submission to the
Senate Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade**

Structure of Submission: 4 Pages (incl Title Page + Endnotes) plus 36 Pages of Annexes
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The 2000 Defence White Paper stated in 8.69 “The strike capability grouping covers the forces that enable Australia to attack hostile forces in the territory of an adversary, in forward operating bases, and in transit to Australia. The Government believes that this capability is an important element of Australia's military posture because it provides us with the flexibility to destroy hostile forces before they are launched towards Australia and then they may be most vulnerable. Strike capability allows Australia more scope to determine the pace and location of hostilities, and would impose major defensive costs on an adversary contemplating hostile action against us. Strike forces can provide excellent support to Australian forces deployed abroad, and may also offer a valuable option for contributing to regional coalitions.” and in 3.42 “Over the last 10 to 15 years, a number of regional defence forces have begun to develop sophisticated air combat capabilities. They have introduced new-generation fighters with the weapons and sensor systems for Beyond Visual Range air combat - which means the ability to detect and attack hostile aircraft from ranges of up to 60 or 70 nautical miles.”

In the fifteen years since Hugh White and his team made these observations, regional and global air defence capabilities that Australia might have to defeat have grown beyond any expectations held during that period. Given the persistently inflated claims senior defence officials have made about the stealth, survivability and strike capabilities of the F-35, this related matter is of paramount importance, as it demonstrates the obsolescence of the F-35 design definition, and its unsuitability for contemporary and future strike operationsⁱ.

Growth in regional and global air defence capabilities reflects some profound and pervasive changes, some widely expected, and some less expected, in the global strategic environment. Russia, until recently the world's leading proliferator of high technology weapons and systems, has become in practical terms a rogue state, demolishing its previously stable relationships with most of its neighbours, and the West. The by-products of this deep shift in strategic focus include an overtly hostile relationship with NATO, the US and its allies, and a stated “*pivot to China*” that has seen both a Russian willingness to supply China with high technology weapons and systems previously built only for Russia's military; but also legislative changes permitting Chinese shareholding in Russia's strategic industries, including the defence sector. The consequence of this will be defacto unlimited access by China to the very best of what Russia can design and build.

This exacerbates the earlier problem seen with the proliferation of advanced Russian weapons, especially very long (250 km to 400 km) range advanced Surface to Air Missile systems, and supporting advanced radars and command and control systemsⁱⁱ.

While global proliferation of advanced Russian built weapons is transforming Australia's regional strategic environment, it further complicates any Australian participation in coalition operations on the global stage, as advanced Russian weapons may be encountered in any global contingency. The problem is now further compounded by direct expeditionary deployments of Russian forces, as observed in Syria, where Russia deployed some of its latest fighters and Surface to Air missile systemsⁱⁱⁱ.

China's ongoing disputes with its Asian neighbours mirror in many ways Russia's strategy of aggravating or antagonising its neighbourhood. China has not only deployed large numbers of imported Russian weapons, but has also cloned and evolved them, in addition to underwriting, licencing or procuring designs from Russia and Ukraine^{iv}.

Of no less concern is China's development of advanced indigenous military high technology, drawing on domestic, Russian and in many instances Western technologies^v.

The global changes we are now observing in the threat environment were anticipated, and APA repeatedly warned about them in evidence to the JSCFADT and other Committees between 2004 and 2010. Defence repeatedly opted to dispute this evidence, with no evidentiary basis other than prejudicial, poorly informed personal opinion of senior defence officials. The hubris behind proclaiming to be '*extremely confident*' and '*very comfortable*' in one's beliefs when based on hearsay and wilful blindness with nary a scrap of data or fact in sight is no substitute for critical thinking let alone subject matter expertise.

The pervasive changes in capabilities we are seeing both in the region and globally were not anticipated when the JSF program was defined during the 1990s. Claims by Defence and the prime contractor that the F-35 can be competitive and survivable against such capabilities have no basis in fact, and examination of such claims consistently shows reliance on unvalidated simulations, personal opinion, hearsay and logical fallacies.

The capabilities being deployed by Russia, China and their clients, are not unsophisticated Soviet era designs, built to compete with specific Western systems of that period – **including the same Tier 2 Western systems with which the F-35A JSF is required by its JORD^{vi} to be comparable!** Russia's technological strategists during the 1990s defined very specific and well-considered goals for Russia's post Cold War developments in air power which, as in China, have materialised in spades under the guidance and drive of some of the world's best new age capitalists.

These included the capability to deny "*offboard sensor data*" to Western fighters, by denying the use of, or shooting down, Western ISR (Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance) and Electronic Attack platforms. Russia developed very long range Surface to Air and Air to Air Missiles for this purpose, the former including the now operational 400 km range S-300V4/SA-23, and the S-400 Triumf / SA-21^{vii} (See Annex D).

Another key capability the Russians evolved were new short range gun and missile systems, optimised to shoot down Western PGMs (Precision Guided Munitions)^{viii}.

These capabilities are now supplemented by a range of new "*Counter-Stealth*" long-wave AESA radars, operating in frequency bands outside of those that the F-35's stealth capability was built to defeat, allowing the F-35 to be tracked at tactically useful ranges^{ix}. (Annex E).

APA's analysis of Russian strategy was summarised in a paper for the US *Joint Force Quarterly* journal, sponsored by the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Annex A)^x.

The specific conclusions of the APA analysis of Russian strategy have since been further validated in public disclosures by Boeing and the US Navy, and Senator John McCain, Chairman of the Congressional Senate Armed Services Committee (Annex B/C).

The unavoidable and irrefutable conclusion is that rapid evolution in Russian and Chinese built air defence systems has overtaken the capabilities of the F-35, by significant degrees, rendering it obsolete and non-viable as a strike aircraft before it has received approval to enter Full Rate Production (Defense Acquisition Board – DAB Milestone C).

Endnotes

ⁱ Kopp C., Assessing Joint Strike Fighter Defence Penetration Capabilities, *Air Power Australia Analyses*, vol VI, issue 1, Air Power Australia, Australia, pp. 1-30, URI: <http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-2009-01.html>

ⁱⁱ The Russian 250 km range S-300VM / SA-23A/B Surface to Air Missile system was exported to Venezuela, and more recently Egypt. Iran is currently being supplied with the 250 km range S-300PMU2 Favorit / SA-20B Surface to Air Missile system. Currently Russia has committed to supply the 400 km range S-400 / SA-21 to China, and is negotiating supply to India. China will be acquiring the super-maneuvrable supercruising Su-35S FLANKER, while negotiations continue with India on the co-production of the supercruising Su-50 / T-50 PAK-FA stealth fighter. Russian media reports indicate that Indonesia is discussing procurement of the Su-35S FLANKER, and possibly a variant of the S-300P or S-300V air defence system.

ⁱⁱⁱ Specifically, the new Su-30SM FLANKER H air superiority fighter, and advanced S-400 / SA-21 long range (400 km) Surface to Air Missile system.

^{iv} China's J-15 FLANKER D carrier based fighter was developed from two prototypes and documentation procured in Ukraine, which also supplied the partially completed aircraft carrier. China's Luoyang PL-10 advanced close combat missile is claimed to be based on the Ukrainian Luch Gran missile, itself modelled on the MBDA Iris T series missiles.

^v The J-20 and J-31 stealth fighters are modern sophisticated designs, combining advanced stealth shaping and modern sensors, such as indigenous modern AESA radars. China's J-16D "Wild Weasel" electronic attack fighter is modelled on the EA-16G Growler and built to defeat modern air defences. The "Patriot-like" HQ-9 air defence system is a direct derivative of the Russian S-300PS/PMU / SA-10B, but with more advanced features than later Russian missiles in this class.

^{vi} JSF Joint Operational Requirements Document (JORD) Amdt 2, dated 2002, containing some 453 requirements which the SDD Phase of the JSF Program was supposed to meet/satisfy. The body of the JORD is privacy marked FOUO (For Official Use Only) with a 'Classified' Annex on the RF Stealth requirements for a medium stealth fighter (MSF).

^{vii} Specifically, the E-3 AWACS, E-2C/D Hawkeye, E-7A Wedgetail, E-8 JSTARS, RC-135V/W Rivet Joint, U-2, RQ-4 Global Hawk, and the EA-6B Prowler, EA-18G Growler, and EC-130 COMPASS CALL.

^{viii} Specifically, Russian literature identifies the AGM-88 HARM/AARGM anti-radiation missiles, primary armament of the RAAF's EA-18G Growler Electronic Attack platform.

^{ix} Specifically, the VHF band 1L119 Nebo SVU, 55Zh6ME Nebo ME RLM-M, and 55Zh6UME. Refer Kopp C., *NNIIRT 1L119 Nebo SVU / RLM-M Nebo M*, Technical Report, APA-TR-2008-0402, Air Power Australia, April, 2008, and Kopp C., *Advances in Russian and Chinese active electronically steered arrays (AESAs)*, Phased Array Systems & Technology, 2013 IEEE International Symposium on (ARRAY-2013), 15-18 Oct. 2013, Waltham, MA, USA, doi: 10.1109/ARRAY.2013.6731796, pp. 29 - 42. [Invited, Plenary Paper], URI: <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?reload=true&arnumber=6731796>

^x Refer Kopp C., Evolving technological strategy in advanced air defense systems, *Joint Force Quarterly*, vol 57, National Defense University Press, Washington DC USA, pp. 86-93.

Annex A to APA Submission to SFADT Inquiry
Other Related Matters
The Obsolescence of the F-35 as a Strike Platform
Terms of Reference (ToR) Item f.
Dated 19 January 2016

ANNEX A

JFQ: EVOLVING TECHNOLOGICAL STRATEGY IN ADVANCED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS

Kopp C., Evolving technological strategy in advanced air defense systems, *Joint Force Quarterly*, vol 57, National Defense University Press, Washington DC USA, pp. 86-93, 2010.

Since this paper was published in 2010, numerous new Russian and Chinese capabilities have been disclosed. These include the Chinese J-20 and J-31 stealth fighters, the JY-26 Skywatch U UHF-band “Counter-Stealth” radar system, the 400 km range variant of the Russian 9M82ME missile in the S-300VM/V4 / SA-23 Surface to Air Missile system, the Russian S-350 Vityaz Surface to Air Missile system, and the dual band 55Zh6UME “Counter-Stealth” radar system.

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DOD's Energy Challenge

Russia's Arctic Strategy

JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY

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F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter lacks high-altitude and supersonic cruise capabilities of F-22A Raptor and is not agile enough to evade modern surface-to-air missiles

Since the end of the Cold War, America's conventional military might has been predicated on the ability to control the air. This style of warfare produced stunning results in Operation *Desert Storm* in 1991 and has been successful in subsequent military campaigns in 1999, 2001, and 2003. The ability of U.S. aircraft to penetrate hostile airspace and deny the use of friendly airspace to opposing air forces is now mostly assumed to be as immutable as a law of nature.

Central to U.S. dominance in modern airpower has been the exclusive possession of stealth technology, which has provided the U.S. Air Force with the ability to penetrate Cold War-era air defense systems with negligible and historically unprecedented low combat loss rates. The development of stealth during the 1970s and 1980s must be ranked as one of the most important technological outcomes of the Cold War arms race.

If one historical certainty can be extracted from the study of technological arms races over the last four millennia, it is that advances in military technology will elicit both symmetric and asymmetric responses. This cyclic evolutionary pattern of "measures versus countermeasures" is observed in military systems as it is observed in biological systems, and the notion that it will somehow cease to occur so as to accommodate the expectations of any nation is neither reasonable nor realistic.

By CARLO KOPP

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EVOLVING TECHNOLOGICAL STRATEGY

IN ADVANCED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS

U.S. Air Force (Julianne Showalter)

Post–Cold War Evolution

The U.S. investment in stealth during the last decade of the Cold War did not elicit serious concern in the Soviet Union. The deployment of the advanced and highly mobile S–300V/SA–12 Giant-Gladiator and S–300PM/SA–10B Grumble surface-to-air missile systems,¹ and the advanced MiG–29 Fulcrum and Su–27 Flanker fighter,² all supported by a range of then-modern radar designs, convinced Soviet planners that the pendulum in the technological arms race was swinging in their favor. The collapse of Saddam Hussein's air defense system in January of 1991—under a deluge of U.S. high-speed antiradiation missiles (HARMs) and British air-launched anti-radiation missiles, and airborne jamming by EF–111A Raven and EA–6B Prowler aircraft—was a major embarrassment for proponents of the Soviet model of dense, overlapping, and complex integrated air defense systems (IADS). Even more traumatic was the observation that stealthy F–117A Nighthawks were able to penetrate the strongest portions of the Iraqi air defense system with impunity night after night, with no losses suffered in combat.³

Stealth or very low observable technology, the large-scale use of precision-guided munitions (PGMs), and advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) technologies provide the United States with a pivotal advantage in the contest for control of the skies. The possession of these three key technologies has defined U.S. airpower and U.S. warfighting “style” in nation-state conflicts since the fall of the Soviet Union.

The end of the Cold War was a pivotal discontinuity for the expansive Soviet bloc defense industry, characterized then by central control, virtually unlimited access to taxpayer funding, and a secure long-term market comprising the Soviet armed services, their Warsaw Pact siblings, and a plethora of clients in the “nonaligned” and developing world. Within a matter of months, this secure environment collapsed, leaving this enormous military-industrial complex to fend for itself. Through the 1990s, the industry restructured around a model based on intensive technological and commercial competition, with a primary export market focus.

Large portions of the industry became joint stock companies, and many mergers occurred. Within the industry, a new generation of corporate managers emerged, mostly former engineers and technical professionals, rather than the loyal Communist Party cadres

of the Soviet era. In many respects, Russia's defense industry now resembles that of the United States in the 1950s and 1960s—smart, competitive, lean, aggressive, and prepared to take calculated risks, both technologically and commercially, but funded through export sales. Surviving on market demand means catering to the interests and preferences of client nations. The success of U.S.-led air campaigns since 1991 produced a high demand for products capable of deterring U.S. military action.

By the mid to late 1990s, technological strategists across the Russian industry defined the agenda for the next generation of products. The focus was placed in three areas, which were the defeat of U.S. PGMs, defeat of U.S. ISR capabilities, and most importantly, defeat of U.S. stealth technologies. Concurrently, symmetric responses to U.S. capabilities emerged, including the development of high-performance conventional fighters, such as the Su–35S and MiG–35, the MiG SKAT stealthy unmanned aerial vehicle and PAK–FA high-performance stealth fighter, a wide range of smart munitions that are direct analogues of U.S. designs, and many uniquely Russian supersonic weapons.


Russian industry took the lead in the drive to overcome key U.S. capabilities, but was soon followed by the Chinese and numerous former Soviet republics, including Belarus and Ukraine.

An important factor enabling the introduction of advanced high-technology

capabilities, whether symmetric or asymmetric relative to U.S. capabilities, has been unhindered access to the globalized market for advanced basic technology, especially computer hardware and software, but also commercial Gallium arsenide⁴ radio frequency components and many other technologies. Both Russian and Chinese industries can now match most of the basic technology used in contemporary U.S. weapons manufacture. The United States currently maintains a robust lead only in stealth technologies and just incremental leads across most other military technologies, the strongest in radar and electro-optical equipment.

*the success of U.S.-led
air campaigns since 1991
produced a high demand for
products capable of deterring
U.S. military action*

The three-pronged technological strategy for the defeat of U.S. airpower is manifested in a wide range of programs, many of which are now well established, and is resulting in exported products. The approach adopted for the defeat of smart munitions is an application of three basic technologies. The first is point defense weapons specifically intended to kill smart weapons during the terminal endgame, as they near the target and become easily detected. The 9K332 Tor



U.S. Air Force (Larry E. Reid, Jr.)

M2E, evolved from the SA-15 Gauntlet,⁵ and the 96K6 Pantsir S1/SA-22, are both digital weapons systems equipped with phased array engagement radars derived from fighter radar technology and are specifically designed to kill the HARM/advanced antiradiation guided missile, Small Diameter Bomb, Paveway, Joint Direct Attack Munition smart bombs, and U.S. cruise missiles.⁶

Comprehensive threat warning and countermeasures packages are now supplied for a range of air defense radars, including missile approach warning systems, coherent and incoherent radar decoys, chaff mortars, flare dispensers, smoke generators, and Global Positioning System jammers of varying capabilities.

Finally, there has been a comprehensive shift away from Soviet-era semimobile deployment of air defense weapons and sensors. Part of this shift has also involved rehosting many Soviet and post-Soviet-era radar, surface-to-air (SAM), and antiaircraft artillery systems from tracked vehicles to wheeled vehicles. The benchmark for current Russian air defense equipment is a 5-minute “shoot and scoot” capability. The late model S-300PMU2

Favorit/SA-20, S-400 Triumf/SA-21, 9K332 Tor M2E, and 96K6 Pantsir S1/SA-22 all meet this benchmark on wheeled chassis. Intended programs include the wheeled S-300VMK/SA-X-23, and the latest wheeled variant of the Buk M2/SA-17 Grizzly. All of these systems are fitted with digital phased array radars and all use digital radio networks to connect batteries and supporting systems.

during the 1990s the Russians developed a number of “counter-ISR” weapons, most of which are now in production

In the present and near future, U.S. aircraft will have to confront highly mobile air defenses operating under a sniper-like “hide, shoot, and scoot” doctrine and deal with the reality that only a fraction of smart munitions launched will survive terminal short-range missile, gun, and countermeasures defenses to actually impact their intended targets, including key air defense assets.

The intent to defeat U.S. ISR capabilities has produced a range of new technologies, but

also further evolution of some late Soviet-era products, which remained in production. During the late Cold War, the Soviets maintained a large inventory of ground-based and airborne microwave-band high-power jammers, intended to defeat the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)/U.S. E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), U-2, and E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS). They also deployed a wide range of antiradiation missiles, mostly modeled on U.S. and European designs.

While the Soviet-era fleet of airborne jammers, comprising Yak-28PP Brewer E, Tu-16P Buket Badger J, and Tu-16PP Azaliya Badger L, respective analogues to the U.S. EF-111A Raven and EA-6B Prowler, collapsed during the early 1990s, ground-based jammers designed to disrupt U.S. airborne ISR radars not only remain in production, but also have been upgraded extensively with digital hardware and commercial off the shelf (COTS) computers. These include the Signal Topol E jammer built to defeat U.S. Navy E-2C variants, the Pelena 1 and 2 series built to defeat the E-3 AWACS radars, and the Kvant SPN-2/1RL248 series, which is sup-



Lockheed Martin representative demonstrates F-22 Raptor flight simulator

U.S. Air Force (Kristen Stanley)

plied in a range of X-band and K_u-band variants intended to blind U.S. high-resolution ground-mapping ISR radars carried by the E-8 JSTARS, U-2, RQ-4 Global Hawk, and various tactical fighters and smaller unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

While Russian “soft kill” measures against U.S. ISR have seen evolutionary growth, “hard kill” measures have seen revolutionary growth. During the Cold War, the only hard kill weapon specifically built to deny ISR access was the S-200 Dubna-Vega/SA-5 Gammon SAM system, some variants of which could hit high-altitude targets at ranges as great as 160 nautical miles. The Russians retired their inventory of SA-5s during the late 1990s and sold off their warstocks to numerous nations, including Iran.

More importantly, during the 1990s the Russians developed a number of “counter-ISR” weapons, most of which are now in production. The Vypel R-37/AA-13 Arrow, intended to be carried by the MiG-31 Foxhound and Su-27M Flanker fighters, can kill an ISR aircraft, airborne jammer, or tanker from 160 nautical miles of range, outperforming the now retired U.S. Navy AIM-54C Phoenix. The larger Novator R-172, in development for the Su-35S Flanker, is built to kill targets at 215 nautical miles.

Much more important, however, has been the development of advanced long-range SAMs for this purpose, using modern guidance algorithms. Experiments performed by Almaz during the 1990s showed that SAMs could be flown much farther if they were steered along a ballistic midcourse trajectory, akin to a theater ballistic missile, rather than conventional “climb-cruise-home” trajectories. This technique had the added advantage of improving SAM endgame lethality as the missile picks up speed diving on its target. The late model SA-20 and SA-21 48N6E2/3 missile variants, using this technique, can hit targets at 108 to 135 nautical miles of range. The new SA-21 40N6 missile has a maximum range of 215 nautical miles, providing a genuine capability to deny ISR coverage.

The increased range performance of these missiles has seen commensurate increases in radar transmitter power levels, incrementally increasing useful ranges against stealth aircraft. While the primary stated use of these weapons is to kill ISR platforms or deter their use, Russian literature indicates another intended application, which is to

kill or deter the use of high-power electronic warfare platforms such as the EA-6B Prowler, EA-18G Growler, and EC-130 Compass Call. The Chinese extended this model further and installed a wideband antiradiation seeker, analogous to that in the U.S. HARM, into the FT-2000 SAM, itself based on the FD-2000 airframe developed from the Russian SA-10 and SA-20. To date, the Russians have not announced any antiradiation seekers for SAMs, but could easily adapt the very precise Avtomatika L-112 series currently in production for Kh-31PD/AS-17 Krypton series antiradiation missiles.

the last borrowing in part from the Ukrainian Topaz Kolchuga M system.

These designs are capable of accurately identifying and geolocating emitting targets, tracking aircraft not only by high-power radar and electronic warfare equipment emissions, but also by lower power Joint Tactical Information Distribution System/Link-16 terminal and identification, friend or foe (IFF) transponder emissions. The recent U.S. Air Force decision to fit the directional Multifunction Advanced Data Link in preference to the Joint Tactical Radio System is primarily related to the proliferation of such systems.⁷



U.S. Air Force (Aron D. Allmon II)

Air Force F-117A Nighthawk stealth fighter penetrated best-defended portions of Iraqi air defense systems with no losses during Operation Desert Storm

in any near future conflict, U.S. forces will have to confront a complex spectrum of air defense systems

Targeting of these weapons is performed using two means. Fire control or engagement radars for these SAMs have been equipped specifically with passive angle tracking hardware to target airborne jammers directly. Concurrently, a range of advanced passive detection systems have been developed and a number integrated with advanced SAM systems. These evolved in part from the well-known Cold War-era KTRP-81 Ramona or Soft Ball, and later KTRP-86/91 Tamara or Trash Can. These include the 85V6 Orion/Vega series, the 1L222 Avtobaza, and the Chinese YLC-20,

Russia's technological effort to deny the use of U.S. ISR and smart weapons capabilities is directly related to its effort to defeat stealth technologies. Prior to the advent of stealth, the principal strategy for penetrating air defenses involved the use of ISR capabilities to map opposing air defenses, which were then subjected to a barrage of high-power jamming by airborne electronic warfare platforms and a deluge of smart munitions targeting the enemy's radars and SAM sites. By putting ISR platforms at serious risk, and by attriting smart munitions during the terminal phase of flight, this technological strategy blunts, if not wholly

defeats, U.S. legacy techniques for breaking opposing air defense systems, increasing U.S. strategic dependency on stealth.

Counterstealth Systems

When surveying and assessing counterstealth systems, it is necessary to place them into context. While they can be deployed as “add on accessories” to a legacy Soviet-era air defense system to increase its potency, many of these systems are being explicitly designed around the doctrine of high mobility and integration through radio networking with modern digital air defense weapons.

In any near future conflict, U.S. forces will have to confront a complex spectrum of air defense systems, ranging from legacy Soviet systems to newly built Russian and Chinese systems, with various hybrid mixes of Cold War and new systems possible and likely. Digital and solid-state radar upgrades to legacy Soviet-era S-125 Neva/SA-3 Goa, S-200 Vega/SA-5 Gammon, 2K12 Kvadrat/SA-6 Gainful, 9K33 Osa/SA-8 Gecko, 9K35/SA-13 Gopher, and 9K37 Buk/SA-11 Gadfly have proven popular in the market. Mobility upgrades using new self-propelled configurations for the S-125 Neva/SA-3 Goa and 9K33 Osa/SA-8 Gecko have proven especially popular. Russian and Belarus manufacturers have also reengineered all of their Cold War-era mobile IADS and battery command posts, and developed new derivatives, using modern digital COTS technology.

The Russians suffered the loss of several combat aircraft, including a Tupolev Tu-22M3 Backfire heavy bomber, to Georgian SAM defenses during their recent adventure. Covertly upgraded by Ukrainian contractors, the Georgian systems were not effectively countered by the electronic warfare self-protection systems on Russian aircraft.⁸

The mainstays of Russian counterstealth technology are VHF-band radars. This focus is for good engineering reasons. Stealth designs, such as Electronic Warfare Self Protection equipment, are characteristically built to defeat specific classes and categories of radar equipment. Two strategies have been used to date. Aircraft intended to penetrate complex and deep air defenses are designed with “wideband” stealth, intended to defeat as wide a range of radar types as possible. Aircraft intended to defeat shallow defenses or scattered battlefield air defenses are built with “narrow band” stealth, designed to “break the

kill chain” by defeating fire control or engagement radars only.

Stealth designers have two principal technologies available for reducing the radar signature of an aircraft. These are shaping of airframe features and materials technology applied in coatings or absorbent structures.⁹ Typically, the first 100- to 1,000-fold reduction in signature is produced by shaping, with further 10- to 30-fold reductions produced by materials. The smart application of these techniques reduces the signature of a B-52-sized B-2A Spirit down to that of a small bird, from key aspects.

The effectiveness of both shaping and materials technologies varies strongly with the wavelength or frequency of the threat radar in question. Shaping features must be physically larger than the wavelength of the radar to be truly effective. A shaping feature with a negligible signature in the centimeter X-band or K_u-band may have a signature that is 10-fold or greater in the much lower decimeter and meter radar bands.¹⁰

Russian effort to provide counterstealth capabilities is not confined to conventional VHF-band radar

Materials are also characteristically less effective as radar wavelength is increased, due not only to the physics of energy loss, but also to the “skin effect” whereby the electromagnetic waves impinging on the surface of an aircraft penetrate into or through the coating materials. A material that is highly effective in the centimeter X-band or K_u-band may have a 10-fold or less useful effect in the lower decimeter and meter radar bands.¹¹

Russian counterstealth radar designers have publicly reiterated that their focus on VHF-band radars is based on the much reduced effectiveness of shaping and materials designed to defeat upper band radars, when confronting VHF-band radars. In the West, VHF-band search radar was largely abandoned during the 1950s in favor of magnetron and traveling wave tube-based radars operating in the higher L-band and S-band. The Soviets persisted with this technology until the end of the Cold War, primarily as VHF-band radars were much cheaper to manufacture, using antenna and transmitter technology similar to that used

in television transmitters. The best known Soviet VHF-band radars were the P-8/P-10 Delfin or Knife Rest, and later the P-12/P-18 Spoon Rest, built by the thousands and exported as search and acquisition radars for the S-75 or SA-2 Guideline SAM system. Less common was the much larger P-14 Tall King, used most often as a search radar for S-200/SA-5 Gammon batteries. These cumbersome designs were slow to deploy and stow, were very inaccurate in measuring target positions, lacked height-finding capability, and performed poorly against low-flying targets and jamming. In the West, Russian VHF radar is typically identified with the Spoon Rest and Tall King generation of technology.

Post-Cold War VHF-band radars are fundamentally different in design and make use of the latest solid-state radar techniques and advanced COTS computing and software technologies. At least two are active electronically steered array (AESA) designs, with agile beam-steering capabilities within a sector comparable to the U.S. Navy SPY-1 Aegis radar, and miniaturized solid-state transmitters and receivers in each antenna element. Advanced clutter suppression technologies, such as Space Time Adaptive Processing¹² recently introduced into the U.S. Navy E-2C/D, are a known feature of at least two recent Russian VHF-band designs.

Advanced processing aside, the use of AESA technology is a critical advance in these radars, as it not only provides for fast and accurate target angle measurement using monopulse techniques, but also permits the use of powerful nulling techniques for suppressing hostile jamming. The cited accuracy of some new VHF-band radars is similar to that of established Russian L-band and S-band radars used for SAM targeting.

Unlike Cold War-era designs, many of the current VHF-band designs are highly mobile self-propelled systems, and two qualify as genuine “shoot and scoot” designs. The largest and longest ranging VHF-band radar now in production is the NNIIRT 55Zh6 Nebo U or Tall Rack, which has been integrated with the SA-21 and is now being deployed around Moscow. The sheer size of this radar denies it mobility. It has a characteristic inverted T antenna system and provides very accurate height finding capability.

Comparable in performance is the VHF-band Rezonans N/NE, which is explicitly

marketed as “Stealth Air Target Early Warning Radar.” Like the Nebo U/UE series, it takes 24 hours to deploy and is intended for static long-range air defense applications. Production quantities remain unknown at this time. Unlike the Nebo U/UE, it uses electronic beam steering techniques. Much more interesting are the newer NNIIRT-designed 1L119 Nebo SVU and Nebo M RLM-M radars, which are self-propelled and designed from the outset to support SAM batteries in the field.

The earlier Nebo SVU is a modern AESA design carried by semitrailer and capable of stowing and deploying in 20 minutes, significantly less time than observed with legacy Soviet air defense radars. The 84-element folding AESA combines mechanical steering in azimuth and tilt, like a conventional radar, and provides electronic beam steering. This is used during conventional circular sweeps to provide highly accurate angle measurement, with errors claimed by NNIIRT to be similar to the S-band 64N6E Big Bird series phased array used for SA-20 target acquisition. In sector search mode, the Nebo SVU is mechanically

rotated to point at the threat sector, and then performs agile electronic beam steering through a claimed $\sim 50^\circ$ arc, not unlike the Patriot’s MPQ-53 phased array radar. The primary cited application for the Nebo SVU is target acquisition for SAM batteries.

Russia’s development of counterstealth radars will reshape, over the coming decade, the character of the air defense systems the United States will confront in future expeditionary operations

The Nebo M RLM-M is the much more powerful and accurate self-propelled offspring of the Nebo SVU. Using a similar but much larger hydraulically deployed and stowed AESA design with 168 active elements, this system is carried on the same 8x8 all-terrain BAZ-690915 chassis as SA-21 SAM system launchers. It provides around 40 percent more range and much more accurate

angle measurement than the Nebo SVU, retaining the electronic beam steering agility of its predecessor.

The RLM-M is a formidable modern radar in its own right. It is intended for use as part of the Nebo M multiband counterstealth radar system, which employs the VHF-band RLM-M, the L-band RLM-D, and the S-band RLM-S AESA radars, all networked together via the RLM-KU command post. What is not stated in the Russian-language PowerPoint slides is that by default, this system must incorporate a radar track fusion capability similar to that in the recently introduced U.S. Navy Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) system.¹³ Proper deployment of the Nebo M would see the VHF-band radar painting incoming stealth aircraft head on and the flanking L-band and S-band components painting the target from the often less stealthy sides. Also unstated is that with an operational networked “CEC-like” track fusion system resident in the RLM-KU command post, other more potent configurations with multiple radars are feasible—for instance, networking and fusing tracks from several RLM-M or RLM-D systems.

U.S. F-22 Raptor stealth fighter



U.S. Air Force (Michael B. Keller)

Another interesting recent development is the Belarus-designed KBR Vostok E VHF-band solid-state radar, capable of hydraulic stow and deploy in a mere 6 minutes, approaching the “shoot and scoot” capability of the SAM batteries it is designed to support. Intended to replace the Spoon Rest, KBR recently claimed their first export to an undisclosed client. First displayed in 2007, this design uses an entirely new and much more compact antenna element scheme. KBR claims this radar will track an F-117A Nighthawk class stealth target at 40 nautical miles of range.

The Russian effort to provide counterstealth capabilities is not confined to conventional VHF-band radar. The NNIIRT 52E6MU Struna-1MU/Barrier E is a multistatic, low-power tripwire system, using a passive coherent location (PCL) technology similar to the U.S. LM Silent Sentry design.¹⁴ Like the Silent Sentry, the Barrier E is limited in effect to low- and medium-altitude targets. What is often unstated about PCL systems is that the “transmitters of opportunity” such designs rely upon (for example, VHF- and UHF-band television and radio stations) use antenna designs specifically built to transmit almost all of their power near the ground—power transmitted upward is considered wasted in such applications. The result is that the effectiveness of such systems is very limited at high altitudes.

While VHF-band is the focal area for Russian counterstealth development, high-power L-band radars at 24 to 30 centimeters are an area of active development because stealth designs strongly optimized for the centimeter bands suffer appreciable radar signature increases in the L-band, even if not as pronounced as in the VHF-band.

The VNIIRT 67N6E Gamma DE is a good example of such, as it is a high-power mobile L-band AESA design intended for air defense and ballistic missile defense applications. Like the Nebo SVU and Nebo M RLM-D radars, it can be mechanically rotated, or locked to a sector to perform Aegis-like electronic beam steering sector searches. Similar advanced digital processing is employed. VNIIRT claims the ability to acquire and track a 0.01-square-meter target at 70 nautical miles range.

The shift to lower band operation has not been confined to ground-based radar. The new Chinese KJ-2000 and KJ-200 AWACS aircraft appear to be L-band AESA designs, in part because the solid-state

transmitters are easier to build for L-band compared to the S-band used by the U.S. APY-1 and -2 AWACS radars. The Chinese KJ-2000 is modeled on the Israeli Phalcon, the sale of which to China was blocked by the Clinton administration.

An important development is Tikhomirov NIIP's new L-band AESA intended for installation in the leading edges of the wings of fighter aircraft, with the demonstrator sized for the Russian Flanker fighter. With considerable growth potential in power and antenna size, this radar has the potential to be effective against stealth designs, which have been strongly optimized against centimeter band threats. This author performed extensive performance modeling on this design. Growth configurations will be capable of tracking a 0.01-square-meter L-band target at 20 nautical miles, a tactically useful distance.

the survivability of the F-35 depends wholly on its stealth performance

In summary, Russia's technological effort in the development of counterstealth radars is broad and deep and will reshape, over the coming decade, the character of the air defense systems the United States will confront in future expeditionary operations. The common argument of “Why should new Russian SAMs perform any better than in 1991?” overlooks the fundamental reality that all of the pivotal technological limitations exploited in 1991 have been engineered out of current technology SAM systems, many of which now approach, match, or exceed the sophistication of U.S. and European Union designs.

Stealth Aircraft versus Counterstealth Systems

The idea that stealth is an expired technology, no longer worth investing in, has become quite popular, yet it is also fundamentally wrong. The lethality and survivability of the new generation of air defense systems now appearing in the market are so high that conventional defense penetration techniques predating stealth will be almost completely ineffective. Very-long-range “ballistic” SAMs will make life interesting—and often short—for crews flying ISR and stand-off jamming missions.

As extensive as the Russian investment in the development of VHF-band counterstealth systems may be, these will be almost completely ineffective against the B-2A Spirit, as its physical size yields effective shaping in the VHF-band, and the depth of its leading-edge absorbent structures is sufficient to remain effective in the meter wavelength bands. The same would also be true of the New Generation Bomber, should it eventually be developed.

Russian VHF-band counterstealth radars will become a major operational issue for the future U.S. fighter fleet as the size of these aircraft precludes effective shaping in the VHF-band. Many VHF radars will be able to track stealthy fighters at tactically useful distances, albeit much smaller compared to legacy fighters. A fighter's ability to survive is then determined by its ability to deny launch opportunities through speed and altitude, evade any launched SAMs through high turn rate maneuvering, and compromise terminal SAM seeker guidance by stealth and electronic countermeasures.

The F-22A Raptor is in a strong position because its high penetration altitude and supersonic cruise capability place it out of reach of all but the best long-range SAMs. Its stealth is effective from all key aspects, and its shaping is well designed to defeat threat radars from the K_a-band down to the L-band, negating all but the VHF-band radars. The aircraft's high supersonic turn rate maneuver capability will provide it with an excellent ability to spoil SAM endgame maneuvers. The aircraft is large enough to accommodate internal electronic countermeasures equipment for endgame self-defense.

The same cannot be said of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, intended to equip Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps squadrons over the coming decade. Lacking the high altitude and supersonic cruise capabilities of the F-22A Raptor, the F-35 operates well inside the kinematic engagement envelopes of most modern medium- and long-range SAM systems. This aircraft is therefore wholly dependent on stealth and supporting electronic countermeasures to survive, in a more challenging portion of the flight envelope, where it is within reach of a much larger number of SAM types, and where SAM endgame maneuver performance is better due to higher air density. The F-35 will not deliver the agility required to effectively evade modern SAMs by maneuver.

Proponents of the F-35 have argued that the aircraft's stealth performance, and the intended capability of its Northrop Grumman APG-81 AESA radar to jam X-band and some S-band threat radars, will be sufficient to permit the F-35 to penetrate deep into air defense systems equipped with modern SAMs, with the superceded SA-20 often cited as an example. Unfortunately, such air defense systems will use passive angle tracking facilities on fire control radars, and emitter locating systems, to exploit any AESA jamming emissions to target and guide SAM shots. The use of the AESA as an electronic warfare self-protection device presents risks that may often exceed its utility in this role. Moreover, the use of the AESA as a directed energy weapon to disable the electronics of inbound missiles is an equally questionable tactic, as measures to harden missiles against this mode of attack are cheap and easy to implement.

The survivability of the F-35 thus depends wholly on its stealth performance. The stated X-band radar cross section of 0.001 square meters for this design¹⁵ in its forward sector is respectable but degrades with increasing threat radar wavelength. Some design choices in the shaping of the F-35, such as the sculpted lower fuselage and axi-symmetric exhaust nozzle, are simply not compatible with the deep penetration of advanced air defense systems where high-power threat radars in the L-band through to the X-band may illuminate the aircraft from any aspect, and some at steep elevation angles. This is why these design "features" were not used on the F-117A Nighthawk, B-2A Spirit, cancelled A-12A Avenger II, and F-22A Raptor.

The reasoning behind the compromises in the stealth design of the F-35 was that the threat systems that could put it at risk would be preemptively destroyed by the F-22A Raptor force in the opening phase of an air campaign, using the Small Diameter Bomb and the potent internal ALR-94 Emitter Locating System. This was feasible for the type of air defense threats seen a decade ago, but is not true for the highly mobile, networked modern systems we now see, designed around a "hide, shoot, and scoot" doctrine. The defeat of such air defense systems will inevitably be a slow process of grinding attrition. It is worth observing that the "hide, shoot, and scoot" doctrine presented a genuine challenge during the 1999 Operation *Allied Force* air campaign—and most of the

obsolescent SA-6 Gainful batteries deployed actually survived the conflict.¹⁶

U.S. Options

High-power standoff jamming of VHF-band radars is technically feasible, but the advent of very long range "ballistic" SAMs will present survivability problems for jamming platforms, be they crewed or robotic. Fighter-sized aircraft and UAVs intended to survive advanced air defenses need to be built around either of two design strategies. One is the "stealth + speed + altitude + agility" model employed in the F-22A Raptor, and the other is the "very wide band stealth shaping" model employed in the cancelled A-12A Avenger II and the proposed X-47 unmanned combat aerial vehicle.

The strategic challenge the United States now faces is that neither of the viable technological strategies capable of defeating modern counterstealth systems are politically compatible with the absolute commitment that has been made to manufacturing large numbers of F-35 Joint Strike Fighters. **JFQ**

NOTES

¹ David K. Barton, "Design of the S-300P and S-300V Surface-to-Air Missile Systems," excerpted from *Microwave Journal*, May 1994, available at <www.ausairpower.net/APA-Russian-SAM-Radars-DKB.html>.

² "Su-27SK: Single Seat Fighter," KnAAPO, available at <www.knaapo.ru/eng/products/military/su-27sk.wbp>.

³ Ben R. Rich and Leo Janos, *Skunk Works: A Personal Memoir of My Years of Lockheed* (New York: Back Bay Publishing, 1994).

⁴ Gallium arsenide is a compound of the elements gallium and arsenic. It is an important III/V semiconductor, and is used in the manufacture of devices such as microwave frequency integrated circuits (for example, monolithic microwave integrated circuits, infrared light-emitting diodes, laser diodes, solar cells, and optical windows).

⁵ Iosif Drize and Alexandr Luzan, "TOR-M1 SAM System: Protecting Ground Installations against High-Precision Weapons," available at <www.aviation.ru/PVO/Tor-M1/>.

⁶ See "Pantsir-S1 Air Defense Missile/Gun System," available at <www.kbptula.ru/eng/zencom/panz.htm>.

⁷ Stephen Trimble, "USAF selects datalink to bridge communications gap between F-22 and F-35," *Flight International*, April 15, 2009, available at <www.flightglobal.com/articles/2009/04/15/325156/>.

usaf-selects-datalink-to-bridge-communications-gap-between-f-22-and.html>.

⁸ David A. Fulghum and Douglas Barrie, "Georgia Strikes Back with Air Defenses," *Aviation Week*, August 11, 2008, available at <www.military.com/features/0,15240,173602,00.html>.

⁹ Eugene F. Knott, John F. Schaeffer, and Michael T. Tuley, *Radar Cross Section*, 1st ed. (London: Artech House, 1986), chapter 1; and Eugene F. Knott, John F. Schaeffer, and Michael T. Tuley, *Radar Cross Section*, 2^d ed. (London: Artech House, 1993).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 2E, table 14.1.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 2E, chapter 8 contains numerous examples.

¹² Yuri I. Abramovich, ed., *Military Application of Space-Time Adaptive Processing*, RTO-EN-027 (Ottawa: Research and Technology Organisation/North Atlantic Treaty Organization, April 2003), available at <www.rta.nato.int/Pubs/RDP.asp?RDP=RTO-EN-027>.

¹³ William D. O'Neil, *The Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC): Transforming Naval Anti-air Warfare*, Case Studies in National Security Transformation No. 11 (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, August 2007), available at <www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/Case%20Studies/Case%2011%20%20CEC%20Transforming%20Naval%20Anti-Warfare.pdf>.

¹⁴ Miroslav Gyürösi, "NNIIRT 52E6MU Struna-1MU/Barrier E Bistatic Radar," Technical Report APA-TR-2009-1101, available at <www.ausairpower.net/APA-52E6MU-Struna.html>; and Lockheed-Martin, "Silent Sentry," available at <www.lockheedmartin.com/products/silent-sentry/index.html>.

¹⁵ David A. Fulghum, "F-22 Design Shows More Than Expected," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, February 8, 2009, available at <www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=awst&id=news/aw020909p2.xml>.

¹⁶ Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Kosovo and the Continuing SEAD Challenge," *Aerospace Power Journal* (Summer 2002), available at <www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj02/sum02/lambeth.html>.

Annex B to APA Submission to SFADT Inquiry
Other Related Matters
The Obsolescence of the F-35 as a Strike Platform
Terms of Reference (ToR) Item f.
Dated 19 January 2016

ANNEX B

**SELECTED SLIDES, BOEING/GIBBONS
BRIEFING, APRIL 7, 2014
+
APA ANALYSIS SLIDE**

Gibbons M., *The Emerging Battlespace of Joint Warfare: Controlling the Electromagnetic Spectrum*, Briefing by Vice President, F/A-18 and EA-18G Programs, NAVAIR Public Release SPR-2014-189, April 7, 2014.

This briefing is notable as it spells out the narrowband performance limitations of the F-35's stealth capability, and thus the susceptibility of the F-35 to detection and tracking by Russian and Chinese built long range search radars operating in the VHF and UHF frequency bands. This validates earlier public claims by the Russian MoD, and analytical modelling by APA between 2004 and 2010. Subsequent RCS modelling of the J-20 and T-50 by APA has shown that Russian claims relating to the RCS of the F-35 in the VHF and UHF bands are credible. The Gibbon's briefing also points out that the Electronic Attack capability of the F-35's APG-81 radar is limited to the X-band it operates in, and thus shows that the inflated claims for this capability made by Australian senior defence officials in past years lack substance.

APA has included a calibration chart and analysis of Gibbons' p5 slide, based on multi source, peer reviewed Russian data.



Gibbons 2014 Brief

The Emerging Battlespace of Joint Warfare

Controlling the Electromagnetic Spectrum

Mike Gibbons

Vice President, F/A-18 and EA-18G Programs

April 7, 2014

NAVAIR Public Release SPR-2014-189
Distribution A, approved for public release, distribution is unlimited.

Annex B

Electronic Warfare Capabilities



Only the Growler can adapt and counter evolving threats across the electromagnetic spectrum

The only tactical aircraft platform that will employ the Next Generation Jammer

The Growler protects the entire fleet in current and future environments

Stealth is perishable: ~~Only~~ a Growler provides full spectrum protection

2028 High Threat A2AD Environment Demands Growler

Growler

Ingress

All aspect / full spectrum capability



Egress

All aspect / full spectrum capability



Strike Fighter

Ingress

X-band only on Ingress



Egress

No spectrum capability



Stealth in the Electromagnetic Environment (EME)

Chubb 2014 Brief

- All aircraft operate in the EME where stealth cannot guarantee survivability or superiority
- Stealth technologies are optimized for a limited band within the electromagnetic spectrum
 - Modern threats are expanding across the EM spectrum making stealth aircraft detectable and vulnerable
- Increasing computing power, advanced sensors and evolving aircraft detection methods are degrading the benefits of stealth
- The Growler / EM support is required for successful offensive and defensive military operations

“We appear to be reaching the limits of how much a platform’s inherent stealth can affordably get it close enough to survey or attack adversaries.”

“It is time to consider shifting our focus from platforms that rely solely on stealth...”

- **Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Greenert**

“For any aircraft, however capable, however stealthy, to have a chance, it needs electronic warfare, ... “You can’t do all of that on board.”

- **Deputy Defense Secretary Ashton Carter**






“ ...potential adversaries will look to take away our inherent military advantages, to include the use of electronic warfare and other countermeasures. Capabilities that can overcome these threats represent critical enablers that we neglect at our peril.”

“ ...the Growler is going to play a very important role in our force for a long time to come.”

- **Acting Deputy Secretary Christine Fox**



Modern threats are multi-spectral ~~and~~ **all** fighters require full-spectrum protection

2028 High Threat A2AD Environment Demands Growler Current Growler Defeats Growler ... and F-35 JSF



Data MBARI
Data SIO, NOAA, U.S. Navy, NGA, GEBCO
Image Landsat
Data LDEO-Columbia, NSF, NOAA

55Zh6M Nebo M



55Zh6M Nebo M RLM-M VHF-Band Component (Photo by Vitaliy Kuzmin)

Annex C to APA Submission to SFADT Inquiry
Other Related Matters
The Obsolescence of the F-35 as a Strike Platform
Terms of Reference (ToR) Item f.
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ANNEX C

SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN LETTER ON UCLASS PROGRAM

Senator McCain unequivocally states that “*broadband, all-aspect radar cross-section reduction sufficient to find and engage defended targets*” is required for “*to operate effectively in medium- to high-level threat environments*”, as APA observed in the 2010 JFQ paper.

Senior defence officials in Australia clearly believe otherwise in promoting the use of the F-35 as a strike platform in medium to high level threat environments.

JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA, CHAIRMAN

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

CHRISTIAN D. BROSE, STAFF DIRECTOR
ELIZABETH L. KING, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

March 24, 2015

The Honorable Ashton Carter
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Secretary Carter:

I am writing regarding my interest in the requirements and acquisition strategy for the Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance-Strike (UCLASS) program. I strongly believe that the Navy's first operational unmanned combat aircraft must be capable of performing a broad range of missions in contested environments as part of the carrier air wing, including precision strike as well as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR).

This program will have far-reaching implications for the future of naval power-projection. Given both its warfighting importance and the reality of a constrained fiscal environment, it is essential that we prioritize the right set of requirements today to prepare our Navy and the joint force for the future. While the Navy needs an unmanned combat aircraft as soon as possible, rushing to start the wrong program will only delay—and could prevent—fielding of the right system. Therefore, I strongly support the decision to assess the UCLASS program as part of the Department's ongoing ISR review, and I look forward to working with you and the Navy to ensure that this program is optimized for the demands of future operating environments.

At the same time, I am concerned that the current requirements proposed for the UCLASS program place a disproportionate emphasis on unrefueled endurance to enable sustained ISR support to the carrier strike group, which would result in an aircraft design with serious deficiencies in both long-term survivability and its internal weapons payload capacity. I would encourage you to ensure that the Navy's first unmanned combat aircraft is capable of both providing persistent ISR *and* conducting strike missions from the carrier at standoff distances in contested environments. Developing a new carrier-based unmanned aircraft that is primarily an ISR platform and **unable to operate effectively in medium- to high-level threat environments would be operationally and strategically misguided.**

More specifically, I would encourage you to consider what attributes could enable the UCLASS program to perform strike, as well as ISR, missions—including an unrefueled endurance several times that of manned fighters; a refueled mission endurance measured in days; **broadband, all-aspect radar cross-section reduction sufficient to find and engage defended targets;** and the ability to carry internally a flexible mix of up to 4,000 pounds of strike payload. This would expand the strike range and lethality of the carrier strike group, thereby ensuring its role as the preeminent tool of naval power projection.

Additionally, while this review is underway and until a restructured UCLASS program yields flying prototypes, I would encourage you to maximize the use of the Unmanned Combat Air System Demonstration (UCAS-D) program in order to gain technological and other insights that could help increase the effectiveness of the UCLASS program. Our nation has made a sizable investment in this demonstration program to date, and both air vehicles have consumed only a small fraction of their approved flying hours. Under current plans, starting this April, there will be no unmanned air vehicles operating from carrier decks for several years. I think this would be a lost learning opportunity in what promises to be a critical area for sustaining the long-term operational and strategic relevance of the aircraft carrier.

I look forward to working with you and the Navy to explore near-term options for sustaining momentum behind unmanned carrier aviation and ensuring that we use our limited defense dollars on programs that will strengthen the American military's technological advantage.

Sincerely,

John McCain
Chairman

Annex D to APA Submission to SFADT Inquiry
Other Related Matters
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Dated 19 January 2016

ANNEX D

S-300VM/V4 / SA-23A/B LONG RANGE (250 KM – 400 KM) SAM SYSTEM

Annex D: S-300VM/V4 / SA-23A/B Long Range SAM System




Hypersonic 9M82 / SA-12B GIANT missile, modelled on the Martin-Marietta Sprint missile. The Russian MoD has stated that the improved 9M82M variant has destroyed targets at 400 km range (M. Gyurosi).




S-300VM/V4 / SA-23A/B Long Range SAM System battery components (Almaz-Antey).


Inquiry into the planned acquisition of the F-35 Lightning II



Inquiry into the planned acquisition of the F-35 Lightning II



Annex D: S-400 Triumph / SA-21 Long Range SAM System



S-400 Battery composition. The system is specifically built to accept digital data inputs from offboard sensors, such as passive radiofrequency surveillance systems.

Inquiry into the planned acquisition of the F-35 Lightning II



5P85TE2 towed and 5P90S self-propelled launchers, and 92N6 GRAVE STONE engagement radar components of S-400 batteries.

Inquiry into the planned acquisition of the F-35 Lightning II

Annex E to APA Submission to SFADT Inquiry
Other Related Matters
The Obsolescence of the F-35 as a Strike Platform
Terms of Reference (ToR) Item f.
Dated 19 January 2016

ANNEX E

REPRESENTATIVE COUNTER-STEALTH RADAR SYSTEMS

- (a) *Slides extracted from Kopp C., Advances in Russian and Chinese active electronically steered arrays (AESAs), Phased Array Systems & Technology, 2013 IEEE International Symposium on (ARRAY-2013), 15-18 Oct. 2013, Waltham, MA, USA, doi: 10.1109/ARRAY.2013.6731796, pp. 29 - 42. [Invited, Plenary Paper].*
- (b) *JY-26 "SKYWATCH-U" 3D Long Range Air Surveillance Radar, Tech Brochure, East China Research Institute of Electronic Engineering, 199, Xiangzhang Avenue, H .. Tech Zone. Hefei, Anhui. P.R. China, 2014.*

Almaz-Antey/NNIIRT 55Zh6M/ME Nebo M/ME



- ▶ Nebo M Multiband CVLO Radar with Track Fusion;
- ▶ VHF-Band, L-Band and S/C-Band Components;



Almaz-Antey/NNIIRT 55Zh6M/ME Nebo M/ME




- ▶ Triple band “Counter-stealth” system using three AESA radars, and central track fusion system, networked by Luch series K_a-Band datalinks;
- ▶ No substantial technical disclosures, earlier Nebo SVU design known to include STAP capability;
- ▶ RLM-M is 168 element VHF-Band AESA, using $3/8 \lambda$ dipole YAGI radiators, and ~ 2 kW TR modules;
- ▶ RLM-D is 1824 element L-Band AESA, using dipole radiators;
- ▶ RLM-S is S/C-band AESA, using 156 subarrays; KU-RLK command post hosts track fusion and IFF interrogator;
- ▶ Derivative 55Zh6UME is a VHF-band 132 element AESA integrated with a Janus faced L-Band heightfinder.

Almaz-Antey/NNIIRT 55Zh6M Nebo M RLM-M



VHF-BAND 168 ELEMENT AESA



$3/8 \lambda$ DIPOLE YAGI

RLM-M
Nebo M

1L119
Nebo SVU

Aperture Area

Nebo SVU

Nebo M

Detection Range

Nebo SVU

Nebo M

Azimuth Error

Nebo SVU

Nebo M

Elevation Error



ALMAZ + ANTEY



Almaz-Antey/NNIIRT 55Zh6M Nebo M RLM-D



L-BAND AESA 1824 ELEMENTS



NK ORIENTIR GNSS EQPT



Almaz-Antey/NNIIRT 55Zh6M Nebo M RLM-S



S/C-BAND AESA DEPLOYED



S/C-BAND AESA STOWED



ALMAZ-ANTEY



KU-RLK
COMMAND POST


MAKS-2013: Almaz-Antey/NNIIRT 55Zh6UME



VHF-BAND CVLO RADAR – 55Zh6UME RLM-M DERIVATIVE



VHF-BAND 132 ELEMENT AESA / JANUS FACED L-BAND HEIGHTFINDER



**Трёхкоординатная РЛС
средних и больших высот
дежурного режима**

55Ж6УМЕ

НАЗНАЧЕНИЕ

Радиолокационная станция предназначена для обнаружения, измерения трёх координат, сопровождения, определения государственной принадлежности воздушных объектов (ВО), пеленгации источников излучения радиолокаторов и выдачи радиолокационной информации потребителям.

СТАНЦИЯ ОБЕСПЕЧИВАЕТ:

- обнаружение и сопровождение ВО в том числе, созданных по технологии СТЕЛС, в различных помеховых условиях;
- измерение дальности, азимута и угла места (высоты) ВО;
- пеленгацию источников излучения радиолокаторов;
- определение государственной принадлежности ВО;
- обмен радиолокационной информацией с КСА (комплексами средств автоматизации).

СОСТАВ СТАНЦИИ:

- антенно-аппаратный комплекс;
- кабина управления;
- система электроснабжения

ОСНОВНЫЕ ХАРАКТЕРИСТИКИ

	метровый дециметровый
■ Диапазон частот: канал дальномёра	
■ Пределы работы:	
— по дальности, км	10 – 600
— по азимуту, град.	360
— по углу места, град.	0 – 30
— по углу места (при доопределении), град.	до 50
— по высоте, км	30
— по скорости, км/час.	8000
■ Дальность обнаружения ВО с ЭПР = 1м² при высоте полёта 3000 м. км	430
■ Среднеквадратичные ошибки измерения координат цели с ЭПР = 1м²:	
— по дальности, м	80
— по азимуту, милл.	16
— по углу места, милл.	15
— по высоте, м	
— на дальности до 200 км	600
— на дальности 200 – 300 км	800
■ Разрешающая способность:	
— по дальности, м	500
— по азимуту, град.	3,4
— по углу места, град.	200
■ Погрешность измерения скорости, град/сек.	10
■ Погрешность измерения ускорения, м/сек²	5

JY-26 "SKYWATCH-U" 3D Long Range Air Surveillance Radar

JY-26 "SKYWATCH-U" radar is developed to be a mainstay radar in a national air defense system for long range surveillance and tactical missile defense (TMD). Being a highly complex digital AESA (Active Electronic Scanning Array) radar system, JY-26 is able to provide accurate 3-dimensional detection (range, azimuth, height), tracking and classification of air breathing and TBM targets. The radar is characterized by large detection coverage, accurate detection accuracy, stealth target detection, TBM detection, powerful ECCM, good mobility, high-speed and highly-maneuvering target detection, etc. The radar is designed to meet the air defence needs for decades to come.

Features:

- Multiple missions oriented: The digital AESA radar, capable of electronic scanning in both horizontal and vertical planes, provides multiple operational modes to fulfill different combat missions.
- Large detection volume: The radar provides a detection range of 650km for 2m² air breathing targets and a continuous coverage for targets flying below 30,000m.
- Desirable stealth target detection capability: The radar boasts double stealth target detection virtues thanks to operation in UHF band and owning of large power-aperture product.
- Powerful ECCM capability: The radar counters both natural and man-made interference effectively by incorporation of wide variety of technologies, such as, digital AESA, JATS, jamming strobe, adaptive beam nulling, SLB, jamming plot filtering, CFAR, adaptive clutter mapping, etc.
- Superior reliability and environmental adaptability: All solid state fail-soft design, highly integrated digital array modules, fiberoptic connection between radar operational elements, extensive BITE, and secured sealing for antenna elements, transmit/receive modules and connectors enable the radar to work reliably even in most adverse environmental conditions.
- Track and search (TAS) capability enables the radar to quickly and stably track highly maneuvering targets in high data refresh rate.
- Quick deployment, minimum site preparation cost.

Roles:

- Long range air surveillance and ground-control intercept
- TBM detection, launch and impact points estimation
- Stealth target detection
- Target recognition/classification and IFF
- Multi-radar tracking
- Various data report modes




Parameters:

- Operating frequency: UHF band
- Detection coverage
 - Instrumented range:
 - 600km (all azimuthal surveillance)
 - 700km (critical azimuthal sector surveillance)
 - 800km (TMD)
 - Azimuth: 360° (mechanical rotation)
± 45° (electronic scanning)
 - Elevation: 25° (against air breathing target)
70° (TBD)
- Data processing capacity: 500 tracks/scan
- Sub-clutter visibility: 50dB
- Reliability
 - MTBCF: ≥ 1000 hours
 - MTTR: ≤ 0.5 hour
- Power consumption: ≤ 175kW
- Teardown/Setup time: 1 hour by 10 men
- Transportation units: 5
- Transportability: by road, rail, sea and air



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Tel: +86-551-65391150 Fax: +86-551-65391154 Http://www.ecrie.cn



JY-26雷达

用途：主要担负远程防空警戒引导任务。

特点：以伊尔库茨克号驱逐舰为平台，采用先进的二波面平面阵列天线结构，作用距离远，测高精度高，抗干扰能力和机动性强。

用途：主要担负远程防空警戒引导任务。

Features: The JY-26 radar is mounted on the Irkutsk-class destroyer, featuring an advanced two-wave surface planar array antenna structure, with a long operating range, high accuracy of detection, powerful anti-jamming capability and mobility.

