



**Homeland Security Asia/Pacific** Pty  
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**UNCLASSIFIED**

**15 January 2015**

**HOMELAND SECURITY ASIA/PACIFIC**

**SUBMISSION**

**2015 SENATE RURAL AND REGIONAL  
AFFAIRS AND TRANSPORT REFERENCES  
COMMITTEE INQUIRY INTO**

**AUSTRALIAN AIRPORT SECURITY**

**SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SOLUTIONS**

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## **2015 OVERVIEW – “More mass casualty attacks planned”**

The escalating, changed safety and security environment is the challenge for Australia and the nation's airport security!

The Government has responsibility for providing safety and security for its people.

Australia's current safety and security model suffers from the “Pike Syndrome” and does not address the new and changing safety and security environment for Australia. It is stovepipe, now outdated, does not pool and use all resources available; not fully inclusive or fully integrated.

The radicalisation of individuals or groups; enhanced use of online communications to radicalise individuals; online “fatwa to kill a disbelieving American, European or Australian” has changed the dynamics and security environment. Such fatwas have occurred in Melbourne and Sydney and in other western cities.

We need a different all-inclusive fully-integrated model, incorporating time critical human intelligence/information (‘HUMINT’). It should use all available resources, building on police, airport security, CCTV and the Terrorist Hotline public engagement principle, as all employees must have a role. This additional resource - an entire airport workforce - will greatly assist in mitigating the risk and provide early warning of any potential incident, suspect people or unusual activities. It means ‘more eyes and ears on the ground’, to detect, disrupt and provide early intelligence to save lives.

Our new measure must be resilient in the face of worldwide radicalization of individuals or groups and terrorist endeavours. These measures will address multinational crime or other illegal activities, which may also provide financial support or resources to satisfy various fatwas, create fear and threaten our lifestyle and beliefs. It is well known weapons and drugs transit airports.

We should keep in mind the PM's recent statement on 4 January 2015 - “the death cult in Iraq has declared war against the world”. Just as our ADF is totally engaged, we should apply the same fully integrated methodology and approach to our homeland, public places, ‘places of mass gathering’ and critical infrastructures such as airports. Just as the ‘stop the boats’ campaign was a success, airports need a new all-inclusive approach to security.

Our political system often acts as an enabler for those wishing to cause harm, disrupt, commit crime; and so we need *a new paradigm* and enhanced, focused total political/policy engagement approach for the environment.

Additional spending on national security will top \$1.3 billion over the next four years. Government has a responsibility to use these funds to provide maximum, safety and security for its people using all assets. Presently gaps exist in the safety and security model.

*Bold, decisive and different solutions are now required from Government. The case for change to our current methodology and approach to safety and security is overwhelming.*

Disruption caused by terrorism and the fear it creates must be prevented and stopped by putting enhanced measures in place.

### **SUMMARY OF HSAP RECOMMENDATIONS:**

- 1) Need to engage the entire workforce on an airport. Missing component – A1A ‘HUMINT’ system.
- 2) Legislate public safety and security training on airports.
- 3) Culvert, pits, water drains to secure airport perimeter fences.
- 4) Annual CT Exercises and auditing.
- 5) Legislate fines for failing to carry out CT exercises on airports.
- 6) Terrorist Hot Line number – front page of daily newspapers.
- 7) Review expenditure and need for new AFP command centres.
- 8) Identification, Control Orders and Insider Threat measures.
- 9) CCTV systems on airports – three months retention of recordings.
- 10) Failure of companies to provide adequate safety and security.
- 11) Issues regarding VIP lounges.
- 12) Taxi rank risk at terminals and driver vetting needs.
- 13) Random bag searches.
- 14) Pilot training applicants to undergo extensive checks.
- 15) IT Security on airports and for Air traffic.

**IMPORTANT:** The Inquiry panel should consider no public release of findings or recommendations from this inquiry which may be used by terrorists, extremists or others planning to target airports. This includes air cargo centres, or travel through airports where they may cause harm, disruption or conduct unlawful activities. The release of such new measures may prejudice the safety and security of others.

## 1. CURRENT SITUATION FOR AIRPORTS

Airports remain 'sitting ducks' for Australia's home-grown terrorists!

We can learn from the past. Sir Henry Parkes in 1889, declared at his Federation speech "One Nation - One People". In 2015 we need to be bold and have one inclusive approach for one application, one methodology.

An innovative new approach must replace existing dated measures to safeguard the nation. This is at a time when marginalised, radicalized Australians refuse to accept Australian law, try to divide; ignore compliance obligations and attack the social fabric of what Federation achieved – "One People - One Nation".

The urgent need is to unite and engage all Australians in protecting the total population, our way of life, belief in a fair go for all and protection of tax payer funded critical infrastructure worth billions of dollars. This is our Australia.

New Australian-developed public safety and security awareness methodology will provide prior warning by covering a total precinct, such as an airport.

Community engagement can be achieved rapidly and cost effectively, to put an end to reliance on the existing stovepipe security methodology and technology, which consists of tools - which never constitute a total solution.

Globally acclaimed, Australian counter insurgency expert and advisor to US President Obama, US DHS and the CIA, David Kilcullen, warned late in 2014; a terrorist attack on Australia was a 100 per cent certainty. This has now happened!

The recent, totally avoidable, ISIS-inspired, fatal Lindt café siege in Martin Place, which followed shortly after this blunt wakeup call, is likely to be a precursor to better organised, much more deadly and destructive 'lone wolf' attacks.

It is on the public record that Australia's intelligence agencies, AFP and State Police are attempting to monitor high risk people daily, with their limited resources. As well trained and professional as they are, they can never address the growing threat without workplace and public support.

All designated 'Places of Mass Gathering' requiring additional security remain vulnerable, including airports, seaports, bus and rail terminals, sporting arenas and Houses of Parliament

Airports are prime soft targets for terrorists. Documents recovered after the elimination of Osama bin Laden, in Pakistan, now in the possession of the CIA, include a hand written DIY manual on infiltrating and bombing airports. Osama spelt out how to identify, recruit, radicalise, train and deploy an airport employee as a suicide bomber (The insider threat is real). These documents are available to terrorists and others.

On 12 January 2015 AL-Qaeda magazine "Inspire" outlined how to make a bomb from household goods, without using metal components, which would allow it to show up in the airport security checks. The publication also shows where to place a bomb on a plane and how to detonate it, to cause maximum damage.

Australian airports are vulnerable to a mass-casualty terrorist attack, because they all rely on a response to incidents and lack proactive Human intelligence intervention ('HUMINT'). **'HUMINT' can dramatically enhance public safety and security on airports** and for other designated 'Places of Mass Gathering'. It was an alert woman who called in her concerns, about the 'Fake Sheikh' in Martin Place, to police. Her 'HUMINT' act saved lives! This factor is the missing application in the Government's measures addressing safety and security on all precincts.

Australia's lack of public safety preparedness and protocols was obvious during the Martin Place siege. Spectators were permitted to stand unprotected from bullets, shotgun pellets, splintered glass and the possibility of falling masonry, behind pedestrian barriers. The area should have been evacuated.

Hundreds could easily die unnecessarily in an undetectable suicide plastic, 'household', or 'toothpaste' bomb attack, on an Australian airport. The **300,000-strong national airport workforce remains untrained in public safety and security awareness**. This potential civilian workforce 'army' is vastly bigger than the combined AFP and ADF resources of much less than 100,000 uniformed, frontline personnel. Some Australian police forces have realised the benefits of engagement of the public and have volunteers helping at police stations. Why rely on a handful, when millions of Australians would like to know how to contribute to National Security; as we all have a role.

A paradigm shift is urgently required to provide forewarning of threats, at a time of high alert, to assist the AFP, ASIO and State police - particularly in identifying the **'intent and capability'** of known Islamic extremists.

According to the **9/11** inquiry, this mass casualty, multi-strike terrorist attack was avoidable and occurred due to an intelligence failure caused by a lack of interoperability and co-operation between US agencies.

Highly skilled Australian Federal and State agencies work as one, after years of preparation created an integrated approach to National Security, ahead of the 2000 Sydney Olympics. Hundreds of volunteers helped make the event safe and secure, with 'more eyes and ears on the ground'.

There is an urgent need to change parliamentary and public perception airports are safe havens, when in reality they are high risk precincts and designated 'places of mass gatherings' of thousands of people. No law enforcement agency in the world can guarantee to protect such numbers of people. A fresh strategic approach is now needed.

Everyone working on an airport and the travelling public has a role to play in identifying and mitigating risk.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Replace naivety with reality, by taking immediate steps to reduce reliance on restricted security methodology and technology. Unite, educate and engage the entire workforce population in a program to protect people, infrastructure and our way of life, especially for 'places of mass gatherings'. This approach can start with airport workers.

## 2. THE MISSING COMPONENT - A1A 'HUMINT' SYSTEM

United Nations ICAO-compliant AVSEC-1-ALERT™ (A1A) 'HUMINT' (Human Intelligence/Intervention) public safety and security awareness system, developed in Australia by HSAP is now available and can be used to train an entire airport workforce – 'airside' and 'landside'.

A1A is designed to transform a largely disparate workforce, into a trained, cohesive, public safety and security aware 'airport community'. This holistic, fully integrated system empowers anyone working on an airport precinct to act and immediately report anything unusual, suspicious, dangerous, or criminal. **More eyes and ears!**

Qualifications are a mandatory condition of employment, when candidates apply for most jobs, yet thousands work on airports with no idea how to report anything suspicious or unusual, let alone deal with an emergency, crisis or catastrophe.

Cost effective A1A training is available face-to-face for \$300 per ASIO-cleared ASIC holder, or \$250 securely online 24/7 in many languages, from Melbourne headquartered, award-winning national RTO, **Complex Institute of Education**. Discounts apply for volume bookings. Complex has national and international reach and more than 30 years security training experience, including thousands for the Melbourne Commonwealth Games.

The Office of Transport Security (OTS), within the Department of Infrastructure, has agreed to permit Complex Institute of Education, fold A1A into its new CERT 11, for airport staff, with designated airport security responsibilities. A1A is all inclusive and should not be confined to a handful of workers on an airport. A1A is deliberately simple, in complete contrast to OTS programs which are structured, formal and stovepipe. Cleaners see everything, but overlooked as sources of information

**A1A training would not be a burden on the Federal budget or airport owners although government may wish to allocate funds for training under the new CT initiatives, to enable early introduction of 'HUMINT' on airports.**

**A1A is a user-pay system, which enables any employer to commit existing, compulsory training budgets or EBA's, to train every airport worker.**

A1A was first deployed on LINFOX-owned Avalon Airport. Negotiations are underway on several Australian airports and in the USA



. (See attached A1A Youtube video clip outlining the training).

A1A Youtube clip.url

India has started training its massive airport workforce in public safety and security awareness. PRC negotiations will resume in the first quarter of 2015, with a J/V college established by Complex Institute of Education, in Beijing, capable of training 100,000 candidates at a time.

Homeland Security Asia/Pacific (HSAP) – is the only organization totally committed to changing the ‘security culture’ on airports and other designated ‘places of mass gathering!’

HSAP incorporated this Senate Inquiry information into the development of the A1A ‘HUMINT’ system and has trained the trainers. Distribution and A1A program delivery is the responsibility of Master Licensee and award winning Registered Training Organisation (RTO), Complex Institute of Education.

A1A enhanced measures must now be applied to ensure the safety and security of each airport workforce, airline crews, passengers and visitors. Everyone has a role.

**HSAP aims are to:**

- (a) Protect the lives of airport workforces/crews/ millions of passengers/visitors;
- (b) Protect around \$50 billion in critical infrastructure of vital importance to National Security, in Australia and aircraft.
- (c) Mitigate disruption and risk of closure of any major airport, which would cost the Australian economy \$1-billion-a-week (see attached Industry Impact Statement)
- (d) Expand ‘HUMINT’ awareness to save lives overseas
- (e) Grow train-the-trainer programs
- (f) Reduce fear of terrorism, by increasing public involvement in ‘HUMINT’.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Legislate mandatory, national, public safety and security awareness training at employer expense for anyone working on an Australian airport precinct (‘airside’ and ‘landside’) or a supporting industry.

### **3. TERMS OF REFERENCE**

#### **(a) Recent media reports on apparent breaches in airport and aviation security at Australia airports**

HSAP was the reluctant source of still shots taken of breaches at (1) Melbourne Tullamarine Airport - 2013 (2) Canberra Airport – 2013; (3) Video footage of easy airside access to Sydney Airport - 2014 (4) Video footage of 2014 UK toothpaste bomb experiments exposed on the Seven Network, by Bryan Seymour.

All evidence of breaches was emailed by HSAP direct to DPM and Minister for Infrastructure and Regional Development, Warren Truss, as it was discovered, since the election of the Abbott Coalition Government.



Mr Truss has never responded to this disturbing material, or rectified any of the breaches over a 14 month period - but sources within his Department of Infrastructure advised HSAP the still and video evidence 'caused a stir'.

Mr Truss received the video footage of UK tooth paste bomb experiments, three days before Intelligence agencies caught up with this essential R & D work.

HSAP has been a regular commentator on airport and airline security on the Seven Network and Sky's 'Paul Murray Live'; CNN, ABC, SBS TEN and Nine; numerous newspapers/magazines/online sites, including talk back shows, here and abroad.

**(b) Consideration of responses to those reports from the Government, regulators, airports and key stakeholders and the adequacy of those responses**

All direct emails to the DPM were ignored by Mr Truss and the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development. No follow up, or action was taken to rectify known breaches, indicating ignorance, indifference, a complete lack of concern for duty of care responsibilities and inability to respond or take action.

At the request of Foreign Minister, Julie Bishop; a letter on behalf of the Attorney General, George Brandis QC, dated 10 December 2014, was received by HSAP on 15 December 2014. This related to HSAP's G20 aviation security recommendations made on 20 January 2014 and copied to the AG! The letter, missed the point completely and merely listed Australia's security affiliations. It was totally inadequate. (HSAP took action to make its G20 submission available direct to US CT experts, prior to the Summit, after zero response from DPM Truss or AG Brandis).

No interest was expressed by the Australian Airports Association (AAA) whose members reportedly ceased reporting breaches, after Seven Network's Bryan Seymour revealed 300 security breaches in 2014, ahead of this Senate Inquiry. Airports can claim they do adhere to antiquated regulations which need updating. Some airport owners have said '**we'll only do what is compulsory**'. Compliance and auditing of measures is non-existent in many areas of the airport/airline industry, to the utter frustration of loyal, dedicated, hardworking Department of Infrastructure staff.

The last Labour Minister for Infrastructure, Anthony Albanese, burdened many smaller airports, owned by local councils with expensive scanners, but did not fund compliance visits by Office of Transport Security specialists. It is still possible to put an IED (Improvised Explosive Device) on an aircraft as air cargo, at a regional or rural airport, to be detonated on approach to/or over a capital city airport, or transhipped and uploaded to an international flight.

**(c) Whether there are further measures that ought to be taken to enhance airport security and safety of the travelling public**

Walk onto any Australian airport and it becomes immediately obvious all security is stovepipe and few know what to do in a crisis, let alone a disaster, yet a mitigation alternative is available and can make a massive, immediate difference.

Airports have been able to ignore duty of care obligations for decades and only do the bare minimum to conform to outdated perimeter fencing originally designed to keep kangaroos, horses and cattle – not terrorists – off runways.

**RECOMMENDATION:** culverts, gravel pits, water drains or thick bushes/plants should be installed, alongside perimeter fencing on major airports, to prevent a vehicle from crashing through fences onto the 'airside' of airports. CCTV should also cover the fence line using hot screen technology.

Former CEO of the Australian Airports Association, Ken Keech, had decades of airline operational experience, before he retired in 2010. He told HSAP, "We all walk past this stuff (risks) every day, because they are so familiar to us), when given a copy of the draft A1A system in 2010. His successor, a professional administrator, has simply resisted the opportunity to improve security.

**PRIORITY ACTION REQUIRED – CT EXERCISES**

The need for regular CT exercises is important to assess response and capabilities. It is vital to have regular reviews of security capabilities and measures; and for auditing of such to be undertaken on all airports each year; and especially after new builds or construction. This must include a review of perimeter fencing on all capital city and major regional airports. Legislate for everyone working on an airport to undergo mandatory public safety and security awareness training and custodial sentences for executives who fail to carry out Government regulations relating to terminal evacuation exercises.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Annual audits of airport safety and security measures to be conducted. Exercises to be held annually, regarding the evacuation of airport terminals and response capability and effectiveness of response forces. These exercises should be held in different stages; (1) hold *Desk Top* exercises to practice callout and management and communication lines; (2) *Response Exercise- partial evacuation* to monitor communications, coordination and time frames and availability of required resources and (3) a full, annual, counter terrorist exercise over two days including media roles and coronial requirements. Funding should be provided for these exercises.

## **MANDATORY AIRPORT EVACUATION EXERCISES**

Major airports have been able to ignore Federal Government requirements to perform total evacuation exercises at least once a year; in line with mandatory evacuation exercises undertaken at Government facilities.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Legislate under the Terrorism Act, heavy fines and custodial sentences for executives responsible for failing to carry out mandated full scale airport evacuation exercises, coupled with necessary audits of effectiveness and existing training compliance for safety and security.

## **TERRORIST HOT LINE EXPOSURE IN MEDIA- PUBLIC AWARENESS**

It is vital all Australians know and/or have access to this hotline number and for it to be displayed in work places. This is all part of public engagement in the reporting process of suspicious activities or unusual events. We all have a role in public safety and security. This is a recommendation in HSAP's A1A training package. This number is placed within newspapers irregularly, but not on front pages.

**RECOMMENDATION:** The National Security Hot Line Number 1800 123 400 to be placed on the front page of all daily newspapers, top right hand corner in a small 'scissor cut out box'. This will encourage readers to cut the number out and place it in a wallet, handbag, near a workplace telephone, on fridges and enter it into all mobile phones, ready for use.

## **AFP COMMAND CENTRES FUNDING**

The current Abbott Government policy of allocating hundreds of millions of dollars to buy more technology and finance additional AFP activity is a repeat of the Rudd/Gillard/Rudd 'big dollar' initiatives. This knee jerk spending is used as a fast political fix, aimed at convincing voters action has been taken, during a Government drought of new ideas/initiatives and to maximise 'positive' media coverage.

The Gillard Government established AFP command centres on Canberra airport, (which has limited flights) and Brisbane airport, at a cost of \$25 million each. Labor Minister for Infrastructure, Anthony Albanese planned to roll out more AFP centres at \$25 million each, on all other capital city airports, in the misguided belief more police and guns are the solution to terrorism.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Assistant Treasurer, Josh Freudenberg, revisit AFP funding and viability/justification for building more AFP airport command centres.

## **IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTATION, CONTROL ORDER, INSIDER THREAT**

To assist with identification confirmation of people at airports, including arriving and departing passengers, it is important not to rely on just one form of identification being used, e.g. passports. Other documentation is needed to avoid unlawful activity.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Police on airports, and/or airport security staff should be authorised to seek two forms of identification from people at airports. One a passport and the second a driver's licence or other photo ID. If this is impossible other documents could be used, which match the name and photo on the passport, with the face of the person being questioned. Police should be able to ask any person on an airport offering a driver's license as ID, for the registration number of the vehicle they arrived in and/or a description of the vehicle they travelled in. Signs should be installed at airports advising this action may occur randomly.

People passing through Customs and Immigration should be able to show two forms of photo identification.

Control Orders should include statements restricting unauthorised suspicious/persons of interest, from visiting defined places such as airports, making it obligatory for them to consult and advise police of their intentions.

The 'Insider Threat' is huge on airports! Police should be authorised to conduct random ASIC pass holder checks, to confirm the identity of anyone in possession of one, on any airport.at any time.

## **CCTV SYSTEMS AT AIRPORTS AND IN ADJOINING CAR PARKS**

History shows most terrorists, even a 'lone wolf' attacker, will conduct one or two reconnaissance missions, to assess a target, some time prior to an event or incident. This planning enables them to maximise the impact and disruption they intend to cause and may enable them to plan an exit route. It is known police seek and use CCTV footage to address prior activities leading up to an event and also in coronial investigations. This information often assists in identifying other persons who may also have been involved in the preplanning stage, of a terrorist attack.

**RECOMMENDATION:** The hard drive and recording capabilities of all major airport CCTV systems, (especially airside), be enlarged to enable three months storage of recorded history, before being over written.

## **EXPERT CONDEMNATION OF DEPENDENCE ON TECHNOLOGY**

More technology sounds good and acts as a placebo, providing the public with a false sense of security! However, technology only ever consists of a variety of tools dependent on humans to guide performance towards optimum capability.

Technology is most useful during a catastrophic event and/or for the ensuing coronial investigation – but is never a mitigation miracle.

Two of America's top counter terrorism experts, John Miller, ex NYPD, LAPD and US Office of National Security Intelligence (CIA) and Tomer Benito, ex Israeli Special Forces, are vocal critics of heavy dependence on technology.

Exclusive video interviews, undertaken by Australian security media guru, Chris Cubbage, with John Miller and Tomer Benito, can be accessed on his 'Australian Security News' website. Perth based, Chris Cubbage is highly respected in law enforcement and intelligence circles and previously with WA Police, the Australian Crime Commission and Edith Cowan University.

**HSAP** has financed and invested seven years into the R & D needed to deliver a world first system to help protect everyone. This includes those 'landside', from cleaners, to check-in staff, foreign exchange tellers, car rental clerks and fast food workers. Cleaners observe more happenings than anyone else on an airport!

All airport 'airside' workers, from ramp operators and baggage handlers, to refuelers, caterers, tug drivers, engineers and air traffic controllers are at high risk, because of the nature of their work. They are acutely aware ASIC pass abuse, is a daily occurrence, enabling unauthorised people access to the tarmac and maintenance facilities. They all need to be trained in how to identify risks. The HSAP A1A training package is ready to be rolled out Australia wide.

### **COMMENTS FROM AIRPORT STAFF - INTRODUCTION TO AVSEC-1-ALERT™**

Complex Institute of Education, the benchmark in airport public safety and security training, can demonstrate an introduction to the A1A system during this Senate Inquiry hearings, or at its Melbourne CBD headquarters.

Qantas and Virgin Airline candidates were shocked and angry when exposed during A1A system training, to risks they never knew existed at MEL/SYD airports. They asked "*how come we didn't know this information*"?

### **DEFINING RESPONSIBILITY FOR AIRPORT SECURITY**

Since privatisation, airport owners have relied on securing a Federal Government bailout, should a crisis or catastrophe occur on any Australian airport. A financial rescue may happen if disaster strikes, but airport owners will almost certainly be billed back, by the Federal Government for the cost of dealing with a major crisis.

The US Government has statutory limitations on when financial assistance can be provided to facilities which experience major terrorist attacks. Airport owners need to be made aware they have responsibility to ensure best practice for safety and security on airports.

Australian airport critical infrastructure worth in the region of \$50-billion is unprotected from terrorist attack or malicious acts. The Federal Government is well aware closure of any capital city airport, following a serious or mass casualty event, would cost the economy **one billion dollars a week**.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Legislate heavy fines and mandatory custodial sentences for anyone or company failing to meet duty of care obligations on airports and/or responsible for providing adequate safety and security to protect people and airport critical infrastructure.

## **RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH SLACK 'SECURITY CULTURE'**

HSAP can demonstrate to the Inquiry video footage of airline staff 'piggy backing' into secure areas, which is rampant practice on Australian airports and an example of slack 'security culture' which is unmonitored; unaudited and requiring further ongoing workforce training. There are no threat level advisory boards for the national airport workforce to check before starting a shift.

## **CONCEALED WEAPONS**

HSAP can show this Senate Inquiry footage of a four-shot mobile phone, which bypasses security scanners. Other concealable items which can also make it into airports, Parliament House, Canberra and other designated 'Places of Mass Gathering' critical infrastructure sites, can be revealed.

## **PARLIAMENTARIANS AT HIGH RISK IN VIP AIRLINE LOUNGES**

Parliamentarians seem to be oblivious to the many risks associated with VIP invitation-only airline lounges, which are high value soft targets for terrorists, or the deranged and easily accessible facilities aka 'listening posts'. Politicians are isolated by red carpet treatment and are not exposed to normal, terminal activity. VIP lounges create the same false sense of security for Parliamentarians, as is the norm, on entering Parliament House Canberra. All guests should memorize the location of exits and develop an alternate evacuation strategy. AFP presence on airports is designed to establish a 'perception of security'; and will not deter a calm, suicide bomber. There is no immunity from terrorism, regardless of status.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Advise Federal and State Parliamentarians to exercise extreme caution when using VIP invitation-only airline lounges, which are not safe havens from terrorists or hostage takers.

## **TOOTHPASTE BOMBS**

Plastic explosives remain undetectable and can bypass airport scanners, or consigned as freight. Scientists are working non-stop to find a solution. HSAP can show the Inquiry footage of 'toothpaste' bomb experiments used to blow up a car in the UK, carried out by specialist bomb expert colleagues. IED's can be placed in aircraft holds, under seats of unattended aircraft, in air-cargo satchels or, carried on a flight by a passenger. The front page warning in the *Australian* on Monday 12 January 2015, "Europe braces for new wave of terror attacks", should garner the interest of Federal Cabinet Ministers

## **AIRPORT TERMINALS - TAXI SUICIDE BOMBS**

As many as 12-14 men rent and drive on one taxi authority. Most are from South Asian and African nations. During 9/11 Muslim taxi drivers on Sydney airport ranks, were videotaped punching the air and cheering. They are still here and with others constitute a serious risk, as it is simple to convert a taxi into a suicide bomb and drive it into a terminal.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Taxi ranks should be removed from the front of airport terminals and entrance doors. Install demountable bollards to prevent vehicle access to terminals. Introduce ASIC style ASIO vetting and ID cards to all capital city taxi drivers who frequent the main airports. . Undertake regular, random, joint Police/Centrelink/Transport Authority raids on airport taxi holding yards prior to peak flight arrivals. Strip licences and Centrelink cards from drivers illegally behind the wheel of a cab. Introduce tough mandatory penalties for offenders.

## **FLAWS IN ELECTRONIC PROFILING AT SYD/MEL AIRPORTS**

The appointment of a total of 80 Counter Terrorism Officers (Profilers) at SYD/MEL Airports, has resulted in the identification of a few high risk passengers. Some were prevented from flying out of Australia, to fight in Syria and Iraq. Twenty to forty Australians have already returned from this region.

Not all Islamic extremists fit the stereotype culling, used to single out bearded men of Middle Eastern appearance. The clean shaven, red haired, Western Sydney teenager, who ended up denouncing Australia in ISIS propaganda videos, uploaded on social media from Syria, would probably have been missed by profiling technology.

The total of 80 profilers, when broken down into two shifts a day at MEL/SYD, translates to a maximum of 20 on duty at a time on either airport and less, when rostered days off, sick days and holidays are factored in. This additional resource is a tool, not a solution. We must never forget people wishing to cause harm; plan and often conduct reconnaissance missions of an area, prior to an attack. Weapons are easily obtained on the streets for a fee. Resources are available to terrorists. The threat is real, as terrorists now have the intent and the capability to strike.

## **RANDOM BAG SEARCHES AND IDENTIFICATION AT AIRPORTS**

On 13 January 2015 the US Department of Homeland Security announced a review of new anti-terror measures in response to recent attacks in Paris. These include increased security at airports including random bag searches.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Police be empowered to conduct random bag searches on airports. Signs to be installed notifying passengers and visitors motorcycle helmets, balaclavas or facial covering are not permitted in airport terminals.

## **RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH VIRTUAL FLIGHT TRAINING PACKAGES**

Anyone can learn the basics of flying a commercial airliner, using a \$50 virtual flight training computer package. Thousands do this daily as a hobby to familiarise themselves with cockpit and flight procedures. HSAP can demonstrate to this Senate Inquiry a Dash-8 virtual dual attack on Sydney Tower and the Sydney Opera House. It takes just two minutes and 14 switches to get a fully refuelled Dash-8, rolling from a Qantas holding area, known as the pond, at Sydney Airport, onto a taxiway for take-off on a suicide mission, which would incinerate five city blocks.

Threats have been made in the past to fly a Dash-8 into the MCG on Grand Final day. Refuelled Dash-8 and other commuter aircraft sit, often unlocked and unguarded overnight on regional airports Australia-wide. These include Wide Bay, Queensland, local airport for DPM Warren Truss; and Tamworth, NSW, home airport for fellow Minister, Barnaby Joyce.

**RECOMMENDATION:** All applicants for pilot training in Australia be required to undergo annual Police, ASIO, mental health checks, submit a medical report and provide the Police with two signed character references.

## **IT SECURITY ON AIRPORTS AND FOR AIRTRAFFIC**

As we are well aware, denial of service attacks do occur on major infrastructure facilities. It is important computer security on all critical control and communications systems, used with regard to aircraft management on all airports - especially Australia's main airports - must be audited annually.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Updating of all firewalls on airport and air traffic systems. Annual change of all passwords including access doors. When staff resign or leave - all relevant passwords need to be changed and building keys, swipe cards returned on departure.

## **INSURANCE LIABILITY**

Prevention is far more cost effective than incident response. It covers all impacts – loss of life, political, economic/GDP, social, replacements, investigations and Royal Commissions.

If the Martin Place fatal siege, in December 2014, is designated an act of terrorism, insurers will need to address responsibility, liability and compensation, with the Federal Government, which can treat terrorism differently to other claims.

When a major incident, catastrophe or mass casualty attack occurs on an airport, liability will be the responsibility of the private owners/operators - not the Federal Government, as widely misunderstood by most in the airport/aviation sector.

The immediate priority of an insurer will be to establish blame/responsibility and whether or not **all 'known'** security measures were in place, on an airport.



Currently, airports face the possibility of insurance policies being negated, if they have not done all possible to mitigate risk to lives, infrastructure and airline fleets, as first advised to the Australian Airports Association in 2010.

HSAP is a field operations and strategic planning organisation. Its five key Australian decision makers have accrued more than 120 years of collective experience in the security/intelligence, law enforcement, crisis management/CRISISCOM, public safety, aviation and security training sectors. They are frequently called upon for comment as experts in their fields, by the Australian media, CNN and other credible news services.

#### **(d) Findings of, and responses to, reports undertaken into airport security issues since 2000**

##### **2005 WHEELER INQUIRY**

Many of the three-year Wheeler Inquiry recommendations were never implemented by the Howard/Rudd/Gillard/Rudd/Abbott Governments and are now nine years old. When HSAP Director of Strategic Alliances, Michael Roach, introduced himself to DPM Warren Truss, on the Sunshine Coast in 2014 to explain the benefits of A1A, Mr Truss switched the conversation to his role in the 2005 Wheeler Inquiry.

The DPM did not grasp the difference between physical security recommendations made in the Wheeler Inquiry and 'HUMINT' capabilities.

##### **2012 SENATE RURAL & REGIONAL AFFAIRS & TRANSPORT LEGISLATION COMMITTEE - AVIATION TRANSPORT SECURITY (SCREENING) BILL 2012 PROVISIONS**

A number of HSAP security recommendations submitted to this earlier Senate Inquiry were adopted in the Report, but not implemented on airports. (See copy attached with recommendations).

##### **CONCLUSION**

The Federal Government is virtually out of time to legislate to provide hefty penalties for airports/airlines, which fail to adhere to public safety and security requirements and breaches of duty of care responsibilities.

Australia's counter-insurgency expert and advisor to US President Barack Obama, US DHS and CIA, David Kilcullen, recently warned on the Seven Network, a terrorist attack on Australian soil, was a 100 per cent certainty. This has occurred.

Sadly, the Lindt chocolate café tragedy is likely to be a precursor to something far better planned and likely to be much more deadly and destructive. A raid by gun men as occurred in Paris on 7 January 2015, is just one example, of what the West can expect. The fact, stated in the Australia on 12 January 2015, Police are now monitoring 15 people of interest, just in Sydney, is sobering.

Australia's hefty reliance on technology and a tactical response capability is not enough to mitigate risk on airports and other designated 'Places of Mass Gathering'. **One missing component is 'HUMINT', engagement of all who work on airports.** The window of opportunity to plug major holes in airport security, train and engage the national airport workforce, is almost over.

Our Founder of the Federation's catchcry needs to be reapplied; One Nation One People - to create one fully engaged strategy, using all existing resources, for one total effective solution to protect the public.

Threat is defined as **intent and capability**. Those wishing to cause us fear, harm, or disrupt our way of life now have the commitment and resources to succeed. The Government must increase its resolve and capability to enhance safety and security for its people.

Yours faithfully,

Roger Henning  
CEO - Director Global Operations  
Security Systems Developer

Michael Roach  
Director- Strategic Alliances  
Security Systems Developer.

**See attached:**

- 1) A1A Training course outline.
- 2) Detailed Incident Report issued.
- 3) Copy of Staff key telephone contact sheet for use at place of work.
- 4) Aviation Industry Impact Statement.



COMPLEX INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION™

# Student Training Resource

<i>Student Name</i>	
<i>Course Date/s</i>	

AVSEC-1-ALERT™ training is only available exclusively through Complex Institute of Education and can be contacted on 1800 441 677. This Airport Public safety and Security training course for Airport staff can be delivered Face to Face and or via e-learning in 161 languages.

**Outline of HSAP A1A HUMINT employee Training Course for Airports.**



“The public can place a high level of trust knowing the entire work force is committed to providing safety and security”.



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This work is copyrighted. Apart from any use permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part may be reproduced by any process without prior written permission from Complex Institute of Education. Complex Institute of Education nor the developers of the AVSEC-1-ALERT™ program give warranty nor accept any liability in relation to the content of this work.

## About this course – Its a Culture change on Airports!

Through a complete *cultural change*, AVSEC -1-ALERT™ (A1A )will;

- Provide airport owners, operators and contractors with the first low cost totally integrated approach to airport safety and security.
- Enhance safety and security across the entire airport precinct.
- Help protect the wellbeing and lives of all airport workforce, visitors and passengers.
- Enable rapid identification and early reporting of all risks on the total precinct.
- Reduce theft, malicious damage, criminal activities.
- Empower the entire workforce giving them a role in making the workplace safer and secure.
- Increase “eyes and ears” capability and provide greater vigilance by making safety and security No #1.

7

## TODAYS AIRPORTS HAVE CHANGED

Airports today are:

- Infrastructure, Freight, Cargo, Mining hubs.
- Places of mass gatherings.
- Financial, employment, Transport Centres.
- Main asset centres, over \$2 Billion in assets.
- Support the Countries GDP and economy.  
Close one for one week could cripple the Economy, huge impact on jobs, Country and reputation.



**PUBLIC SAFETY and SECURITY Awareness for all Airport Employees; A new Security Culture in the workplaces, making Safety and Security No#1. AVSEC-1-ALERT™**

<b>INCIDENT REPORT – IMMEDIATE or URGENT</b>		
Name and location of person reporting:		
<b>TAKE ACTION NOW – ALERT KEY PEOPLE – POLICE- OPERATIONS ROOM – SUPERVISOR- KEY CONTACTS!</b>		
Your Signature:	Time	Location of incident:
Date: _____ & Time _____		you filled in this report.
Who you advised, when & time and how (phone, spoke with, passed report?):		
Description of Person(s) & Vehicle, type of vehicle, colour plus Rego:		

✓ Type of Incident OR concern: (tick below one or more)				
<input type="checkbox"/> Riot	<input type="checkbox"/> Security	<input type="checkbox"/> Fumes	<input type="checkbox"/> Signage	<input type="checkbox"/> Fire
<input type="checkbox"/> Bomb	<input type="checkbox"/> Suspicious person	<input type="checkbox"/> Suspicious vehicle	<input type="checkbox"/> Suspicious parcel	<input type="checkbox"/> Suspicious cargo
<input type="checkbox"/> White powder	<input type="checkbox"/> Equipment not working	<input type="checkbox"/> Phone threat (do not hang up leave line open)	<input type="checkbox"/> Email \ Text threat (don't delete)	<input type="checkbox"/> Unusual activity
<input type="checkbox"/> Workplace issue	<input type="checkbox"/> Shooting	<input type="checkbox"/> Injury	<input type="checkbox"/> Construction /building damage	<input type="checkbox"/> Answering service threat (don't delete)
Brief description -of issue OR what happened?				
Your Suggested Action:				
Your Comments:				
# Copy made for and passed to: ATTENTION:				

Air Cargo – Freight – Unaccompanied Baggage – Mail. .... Suggested acceptance criteria for each KEY INDICATORS - tick.	
<input type="checkbox"/>	Government Declaration attached.
<input type="checkbox"/>	Has item been x-rayed and or tested for drugs, illegal, prohibited items, eg animals or birds. Did the item contain suspect substance/material/white powder?
<input type="checkbox"/>	Description stated; must have correct spellings and address.
<input type="checkbox"/>	Wrapping, too much too little, unusual?
<input type="checkbox"/>	Destination details clear-forwarding address.
<input type="checkbox"/>	Person leaving item – declare originating Company, address and names with telephone contact.
<input type="checkbox"/>	Delivery person must sign a dispatch receipt with contact details.
<input type="checkbox"/>	Description unusual when item could be purchased at destination?
<input type="checkbox"/>	Weight too much too little for description.
<input type="checkbox"/>	Person appearing nervous / any suspicious vehicles
<input type="checkbox"/>	Details:
<b>ADVISE YOUR SUPERVISOR NOW!</b>	
<small>©For AIA Airports</small>	

This Course is available Face to Face or On-Line via E-Learning.  
Contact Complex Training Academy Phone: 1800 441 677 Email: info@complextraining.com.au  
**CHANGE THE SECURITY CULTURE AT AIRPORTS – MAKING A SAFER PLACE FOR ALL. ©For AIA Airports**



## National Security Hotline

Police Numbers:

- 1. ....
- 2. ....

**ACT EARLY**



Airport Control Crisis  
Room/ Ops Manager:

- 1. ....
- 2. ....
- 3. ....

KEEP AUSTRALIA SAFE.  
KEEP THE INFORMATION FLOWING.

**NATIONAL SECURITY HOTLINE**  
**1800 123 400**

Trained operators take every call seriously.  
You can remain anonymous.

15



## National Security Hotline

Police Numbers:

- 1. ....
- 2. ....

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Airport Control Crisis  
Room/ Ops Manager:

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You can remain anonymous.

15

## INDUSTRY IMPACT STATEMENT

### Employment, State Economy and GDP

The Five Main Australian Airports have an asset value of around \$21 billion \*.  
Consequences in closing a Major Airport for one week, crippling of Economy!

IMPACT OF AIRPORTS ON EACH STATE GDP	Full time staff	Airport provides or <u>generate</u> <u>s jobs.</u>	Direct \$ to State	Average flow \$ to State GDP.	\$ to Aust. Economy	Airport freight value. Import then Export	PAX. People.	Aircraft movements (2007-08)
<b>SYDNEY</b> (has curfew time)	16,000. (2009)  job ratio of 1: 4 used when figures not available	75,000 & indirectly 131,000 total around total 206,000	\$8 billion	\$16 billion	2%	\$26-\$7 billion.	32.2 million people	298,322
<b>MELBOURNE</b>	10,965 (2008)	12,542 (2008) & thousands more off site, 40,000 (approx)	\$6 billion (approx)	\$10 billion (approx)	1-2% (approx)	\$10-\$3 billion	24.5 million	193,826
<b>BRISBANE</b>	7,000 (approx)	Indirectly 28,000 (approx)	-	2.6 (billion by 2029)	-	\$3-\$1 billion	16 Million (2007/08)	177,028
<b>ADELAIDE</b> (has curfew time)	5,200	Indirectly 20,000 (approx)	-	-	-	\$0.7-\$3 billion	6.8 million	105,878
<b>PERTH</b>	5,960 (in 03)	16,800 (in 03)	-	-	-	-	9.4 million	114,492
<b>DARWIN</b>	1000 (2003)	2,300	160 million (2004)	88 million (2004)	-	-	2 million	87,000 (6,400 military )

Sources.

1. Source\* AAA August 2010
2. Sydney Airport FACT SHEET June 2009 and, [www.ntairports.com.au](http://www.ntairports.com.au)
3. Australian Government- Dept of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government- Aviation Research Report 117 of April 2010 Dept B.I.R.E Research Report 117 – April 2010
4. Melbourne Airport Economics Impact Study 2008 and Brisbane Airports 2009 Master Plan
5. [www.Adelaideairport.com.au](http://www.Adelaideairport.com.au)
6. [www.wikipedia](http://www.wikipedia)

<p><b>Sydney Airport Employment Inventory (Example)</b> (SACL 2006 Airport Ground Travel Plan)</p> <p>Types of employment. Airport Terminal Staff/volunteers 11.28% Security / Border Agency 14.84%</p>	<table style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr><td>Retail / Food and Beverage</td><td style="text-align: right;">3.90%</td></tr> <tr><td>Airlines – Maintenance and Engineering</td><td style="text-align: right;">21.57%</td></tr> <tr><td>Airlines – Flight Crew</td><td style="text-align: right;">14.32%</td></tr> <tr><td>Office / Corporate</td><td style="text-align: right;">17.86%</td></tr> <tr><td>Freight / logistics</td><td style="text-align: right;">8.37%</td></tr> <tr><td>Car Rental / Valet Parking / Parking</td><td style="text-align: right;">4.01%</td></tr> <tr><td>Other Staff</td><td style="text-align: right;"><u>3.85%</u></td></tr> </table>	Retail / Food and Beverage	3.90%	Airlines – Maintenance and Engineering	21.57%	Airlines – Flight Crew	14.32%	Office / Corporate	17.86%	Freight / logistics	8.37%	Car Rental / Valet Parking / Parking	4.01%	Other Staff	<u>3.85%</u>
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Other Staff	<u>3.85%</u>														



# Transport Workers' Union National Office

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www.twu.com.au • twu@twu.com.au • ABN: 18 559 030 246

**Tony Sheldon** National Secretary

## **Changing Airport Security & Safety Culture**

*To Whom it May Concern:*

AVSEC – 1 – ALERT™ is a new, totally integrated airport security awareness training package designed to change any airport workforce into a totally 'security aware community'.

Making our airports safer, security aware communities focused on ensuring the safer of everyone involved in aviation and the long term future our industry is an agenda fully endorsed by the Transport Workers Union of Australia (TWU).

The AVSEC – 1 – ALERT™ integrated training package works to achieve this objective. It is now available to all airport owners and operators in Australia, NZ and Fiji.

This half day holistic course addresses all aspects of security and safety, to eliminate stovepipe security on all airports and ensure each member of an airport workforce receives the same training. The program works to enable the workforce to detect, identify, and report any emerging/developing security safety issues or risks. Its goal is to create a fully integrated workforce able to report any suspicious matters.

The TWU considers properly trained aviation workers as a key component on the front line of our defence and security mechanism to protect the workforce, travelling public and critical infrastructure worth billions and has strong, long held views in respect to the safety and security of its members.

The TWU believes security awareness training is essential to ensure all who work in the aviation industry are fully trained and aware of the principles of security and safety, included in the AVSEC – 1 – ALERT™ training initiatives.

In addition, the TWU believes that this training package will improve the security and safety of millions of members of the travelling public as well as tens of thousands of aviation workers and recognises the key role airports contribute to National Security and GDP.

By training airport workers to become more alert, we are providing thousands more 'eyes and ears' to observe, monitor and report security concerns.

The TWU supports AVSEC – 1 – ALERT™ as the preferred training package to achieve a fully integrated 'security aware community' on Australian airports.

Yours faithfully,



NSW State Secretary  
Wayne Forno

Vic/Tas State Secretary  
Wayne Mader

Qld State Secretary  
Peter Biagini

WA State Secretary  
Jim McGivern

SANT State Secretary  
Ray Wyatt



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23 April 2013

**By Electronic Transfer**

To whom it may concern,

**Re: Pilots Confirm: "Safety and Security is the #1 Priority!"**

**Safety and security is always the #1 priority for all members of the Australian Airline Pilots' Association (AusALPA)!**

The new, AVSEC-1-ALERT™ security awareness training package, designed to enhance the safety of the travelling public; each airport workforce and all airline crews, will also help protect Australian airport infrastructure worth \$44-billion.

**AusALPA welcomes the A1A innovation aimed at 'changing airport security culture', across the nation.**

The totally integrated, Australian-developed, AVSEC-1-ALERT™ training package involves a half-day face-to-face course, which addresses all aspects of security and safety on airport precincts. A1A will also be available online, especially for the benefit of rural and regional airport workers, owners and operators.

The A1A package aims to eliminate existing 'stovepipe security' at Australian airports and ensure each member of an airport workforce receives the same training. It will enable workers to detect, identify, and report any emerging/developing security and safety issues or risks.

Airports are now major aviation and financial hubs, vital to the prosperity of the nation. Closure of a large airport would impact on the community and Australia's GDP! Everything possible needs to be done to mitigate risk.

**AusALPA believes 'security alert' airport workers, will enthusiastically provide thousands more 'eyes and ears' to observe, monitor and report security concerns, making airports a safer environment for all.**