



PARLIAMENT OF AUSTRALIA

DEPARTMENT OF PARLIAMENTARY SERVICES

Submission by the Department of Parliamentary Services to the Senate Finance and Public Administration Legislation Committee

29 April 2015

Section A: Overview

In September 2014 the Presiding Officers agreed that a review of the security arrangements at Parliament House would be undertaken.

The Department of Parliamentary Services (DPS) was advised by the Attorney-General's Department (AGD), on 5 September 2014, that the review of security at the Australian Parliament House (APH) was to begin immediately. AGD and the Australian Federal Police (AFP) conducted the 'Interim Review of Security at Australian Parliament House' on 9 September 2014, assisted by DPS security. The Interim Review made numerous recommendations, including the commissioning of an additional Targeted Security Review. That review was immediately initiated by AGD, who commissioned Aecom which undertook the work in mid-September 2014. At that time, penetration testing of the security measures in place was also conducted by an external security agency.

Recommendations stemming from the reviews can be categorised into four (4) main streams of activities including: process and efficiency reviews; training and recruitment; minor capital works; and major capital works which require significant engagement and multi departmental coordination. All recommendations contain, as a non-negotiable consideration, the need to ensure that the operations of the Parliament are not interrupted.

The Presiding Officers agreed with the Prime Minister's request that a Parliament House Security Taskforce (Taskforce) be established to be chaired by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The Taskforce comprises Madam Speaker, the President of the Senate and senior officials from AGD, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C), AFP, DPS, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), and the Department of Finance (DoF). AGD provides secretariat services to the Taskforce.

All recommendations from the reviews were endorsed by the Taskforce which then instructed that the recommendations of the reviews be translated into a Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP). The Taskforce oversees the planning, design and delivery of review recommendations guided by the SIP. Any proposed change to the recommendations, scope or risk treatments are considered by a subordinate Security Working Group comprising AFP, ASIO, AGD and DPS prior to seeking Taskforce endorsement of the change.

The recommendations formed the basis of funding submissions by DPS and AFP, that were considered by Government and funding allocated as part of the Portfolio Additional Estimates process.

DPS was assigned primary responsibility by the Presiding Officers to undertake key physical security hardening at APH including entry points, some components of the building fabric, personnel capability enhancements, and associated technical and physical security infrastructure.

DPS reviewed the recommendations and advised the Taskforce on packages of work that satisfied the requirements whilst considering design integrity and heritage factors, as well as packaging of some bodies of work to maximise efficiency, minimise cost and minimise disruption to the business of Parliament and other building occupants. On the instruction of the Presiding Officers, the focus and scheduling of the works is to ensure key vulnerabilities are addressed for the entire Parliamentary precinct rather than focussing on a specific area.

DPS reports to the Taskforce on matters relating to the security enhancements, project management, delivery, cost and scope amendments. In addition to reporting to the Taskforce, DPS is providing advice to the Security Management Board (SMB) on the progress of works.

Internal construction works commenced in March 2015 following extensive design consultation, Taskforce endorsement and Presiding Officer approval. These works address security vulnerabilities at a number of key interface points between the public and private areas of Parliament House. These works will be completed before the next sitting of Parliament.

On 23 March 2015, a motion was passed through both Houses of Parliament approving some external elements of the proposed security perimeter work. This motion contained details of the perimeter fence surrounding the Ministerial Wing, gate house facilities outside the entrance to the Ministerial Wing, vehicle bollards and glass replacement around the Ministerial Wing.

A range of further works around the precinct are scheduled between now and 2017.

Section B: Security and Safety Considerations

Under the direction of the Taskforce, DPS is consulting with AFP, ASIO, and AGD in implementing a range of security related enhancements to the physical, technical and personnel security arrangements of Parliament House. All proposed enhancements and designs are endorsed by the Taskforce and approved by the Presiding Officers.

When fully implemented, the recommendations will provide enhanced capability across the physical and access controlled security treatments and improved vulnerability detection and risk mitigation. They will ensure more effective use of security resourcing by all agencies and departments providing such services to the Parliamentary precinct, and improved awareness and control mechanisms across the building and occupants.

A number of vulnerabilities identified through the reviews have already been dealt with to protect the security and safety of the building occupants. Some of these measures are interim whilst capital works programs are initiated, and some have been permanently established.

In September 2014, the Presiding Officers issued an Authorisation to the AFP under the Parliamentary Precincts Act which stated the AFP were in charge of operational security within and external to the building. The Authorisation led to an increased visible presence across all entrances and exits to APH, including through the posting of armed AFP personnel alongside additional DPS Parliamentary Security Staff. This provides additional assurance to the public and occupants of their safety whilst within the Parliamentary Precinct. The Authorisation was updated on 16 December 2014.

To ensure that this authorisation was reflected in command and control arrangements for day to day operations, a Memorandum of Understanding between DPS and AFP was established. The MoU provides clarity for the direction of Parliamentary Security Service Staff by the AFP.

A component of the planned permanent improvements to security arrangements are the capital works that being initiated across building entry points. These works will provide more segregation of visitors, reduced crowding and minimise the risk of entry without full screening. These works are planned to include additional new private screening rooms and improved layouts and controls within the screening areas. They will provide defence in depth through the provision of additional layers of security infrastructure.

The approved capital works program includes some changes to parts of the Parliament building and entry points, as well as some hardening of entry points and facades of the Ministerial Wing.

The review recommendations supported revisions to building security pass policy including that of escorted visitors. In addition to these revisions, pass

audits have been undertaken of some pass categories, with further audits now underway.

Technical security capability enhancements around the precinct are planned within the program of works. The electronic access control system is to be upgraded or replaced, perimeter detection capabilities are to be enhanced and analogue CCTV cameras are to be replaced with digital high definition cameras with thermal and supporting analytical capability. Such capability allows for automatic notification to the security personnel of unattended bags or items in the public areas and the intelligent monitoring of virtual perimeters with automatic alarms to alert security of access to external or private areas.

The need for heightened security awareness across the building has resulted in the scheduling of additional drills and exercises to increase occupant awareness of the lockdown and security processes in place within Parliament House. These are being scheduled by the AFP around the operations of Parliament to minimise disruption.

Section C: Project Management

DPS utilises common standards for Project Management. The methodology used to provide assurance around the successful delivery of the proposed works forms a critical part of the approach taken with these security programs. The overarching departmental project management framework that DPS utilises complies with PMBOK methods of project delivery, which complies with best practice approaches.

All work packages in the Building and Asset Management Division are managed in accordance with the Project Management framework for the purposes of Governance, Reporting and Assurance. In addition, external industry delivery and management capability is being utilised for the packages of work.

Following the approval of the SIP in October 2014, the Taskforce led by Madam Speaker assigned implementation responsibilities to DPS and other agencies.

DPS recognised that the extent of works required under the program was not able to be met using the existing DPS Project team staffing levels. To address the urgent nature of the work required and the sensitivities associated with the physical security fabric of the building, a separate branch and Assistant Secretary was established as a non-ongoing reportable entity within the DPS Executive structure. This branch has been resourced with skills and experience commensurate with the program of works including external consultants and seconded DoF officers.

An initial risk assessment against the proposed program was included in the SIP. As part of this assessment it was agreed by the Presiding Officers that program residual risks would be mitigated from high to at least medium rating. This is an important distinction when considering the schedule, scope and cost of works proposed.

A Program Management Plan (PMP) highlights the risk and constraints that are continually managed and identified in relation to the proposed works. As with any exercise in quality management of large projects, delivery timelines are important reportables that require constant refinement based on a number of factors. These factors include the availability of suitable contractors, lead time for materials and components related to the high quality physical structure of Parliament House, and various stakeholder approvals, including heritage and moral rights. In addition, access to areas to undertake work is being limited to avoid or minimise disruption to normal activities within the precinct.

The SIP risk assessment identified a range of potential detrimental impacts that may arise from changes in the security arrangements within Parliament House. These include the quality of the public experience at APH being potentially diminished; privacy concerns that may be raised by visitors, occupants, Senators and Members; freedom of movement as well as restricted access of the public

and visitors; the impact on the image of APH as an open and safe culturally iconic building; and any parliamentary privilege implications of some possible measures.

DPS has clearly instructed the design architects that a fundamental requirement in all design and planning is to allow unfettered access and movement through Parliament House for Senators and Members.

The Presiding Officers provided concept design approval for an initial package of work in December 2014. This brief also highlighted the need to ensure that release of information specifically around these security works be limited to only those who require it so as not to identify the type of works or the areas in which they are being undertaken until absolutely necessary.

This initial package of work, known as Group One, included the hardening of some entry points, additional static bollards, guard houses and fencing around the Ministerial Wing. Significant further design development and consultation was undertaken in January 2015, and the final designs of the majority of Group One construction works were approved by the Presiding Officers in February 2015.

A high level summary of the planned activities across each grouping of activities includes:

- Group One – Secure hardening of several entry points and identified areas of potential vulnerability.
- Group Two – Major enhancements to security infrastructure, including the access control and CCTV systems, and external glass facade.
- Group Three – Further building infrastructure upgrades - subject to additional funding approvals.

Detailed schedules and implementation plans exist for the individual items within Group One, which can be provided through appropriately security controlled briefing sessions as the material is classified in nature.

AGD coordinates reporting for the Taskforce of all actions out of the SIP. DPS was assigned primary responsibility by the Presiding Officers for undertaking all technical, capital and associated Parliamentary Security Service personnel changes stemming from the recommendations.

DPS is reporting on progress to the Parliament House Security Taskforce. The Taskforce meets regularly during sitting periods to consider matters, monitor progress and to resolve any outstanding issues stemming from assigned activities.

The Parliament House Security Management Board (SMB) continues to meet and DPS provides advice on the progress of these works to the SMB.

DPS Submission to the Finance and Public Administration Legislation Committee – APH Security Upgrades

A Project Control Group (PCG), consisting of DPS Senior Executive representatives, is the primary body directly overseeing the program of works. The representation on the PCG includes DPS Heritage, Building Maintenance, Art Services, Parliamentary Experience, Contracts, Finance, and ICT. This meeting considers proposed designs from all of these perspectives, provides schematic and design suggestions and monitors the schedule, budget and progress of the capital works across the multiple streams of activities.

The Program Delivery Branch has engaged an independent assurer to independently review the Program Management Plan (PMP) and associated documentation. The DPS Internal Audit Committee has also approved a review using KPMG to provide assurance over the DPS program. Detailed risk management plans are developed for all planned or implemented works with ongoing independent assurance to the DPS Audit and Risk Committees.

The risk management plans, as part of the PMP, establish the context for managing the risks including the identification of internal and external stakeholders, and outline of the risk identification and rating process, provide general guidance on strategies to control risk, the frequency of reviews and how the reviews will be reported and mitigated.

The PMP continues to be revised and updated as required through the approved governance mechanisms. Consistent with standard practices, the PMP contains details around the communications and stakeholder engagement plans for internal and external engagement related to the APH Security enhancement projects. These plans will be iterative reflecting the changing APH environment.

The communications plan sets out the objectives, audiences, key messages, channels, communication mix, evaluation methods and a communications action plan. Further detail around this plan including communication audiences and messages is included in this submission under *Section H – impacts on building occupants and visitors*.

Section D: Value for Money

Consistent with the Commonwealth Procurement Rules and Departmental policy, all procurement or expenditure of Commonwealth funds are subject to value for money considerations.

Utilising the established DPS Architects Panel (DPS 130111 – Austender SON2050341) Guida Moseley Brown Architects (GMB) have been engaged and continue to consult on architectural design and options for Group One. GMB has had extensive previous experience managing the complex design, heritage and moral rights issues associated with significant structural changes being considered across the precinct. GMB, in conjunction with GML Heritage Pty Ltd, utilised historical sources and reference material in the preparation and consideration of works submitted to the Parliament and the National Capital Authority (NCA) for development approvals.

The construction work packages specifically associated with Group One activities were approved by the Presiding Officers to concept design in December 2014. Based upon the urgent implementation timeframes, Manteena Security Australia Pty Ltd (Manteena) was engaged through the established Australian Federal Police Construction Management Services Panel (Austender SON-2652312).

The purpose of engaging Manteena was to provide pre-construction and construction management services across Group One activities. The estimated cost for the provision of the construction management services is \$1.374 million (inc GST).

The estimated total value of all Group One activities is \$19.5 million (inc GST) which encapsulates all materials and goods required to deliver the enhanced security services.

The evaluation undertaken prior to engaging Manteena considered their understanding of the requirements, scope and capability to deliver the work in the required timeframes as part of the value for money justification. Additionally, Manteena had previously delivered high quality construction management services to Parliament House and was also recommended by the appointed Design Architects (GMB).

A procurement probity risk assessment has been undertaken and inherent risks have been mitigated resulting in residual risks of Low rating. DPS continues to assess and comply with all Commonwealth Procurement Rules including the continual assessment of value for money.

This procurement is being reviewed by KPMG as part of a DPS internal audit of the project management governance and delivery. Project cost estimates have been reviewed by Quantity Surveyors, and actual costs for construction activities are benchmarked against market rates for services and materials.

Section E: Design Integrity

DPS supports the operation of Parliament into the future while preserving the design integrity of the architecture, engineering systems, art and landscape that make up Parliament House. Additionally DPS has responsibility for the maintenance and building improvement services across the building.

For the purposes of definition, 'Design Integrity' in the context of DPS management is the measure of wholeness and intactness of the original design of Parliament House and its attributes. The Design Integrity Index (DII) measures the current condition of the integrity of the design, and expresses this as a percentage of the original built form. In particular, it measures the extent to which change within the Parliament and the Precincts impacts upon the original design. In context of the current activities, the assessment index will be generated as part of the DPS Annual report.

In some instances after significant security events, DPS has been required to initiate increased physical security measures that have directly impacted on the design and appearance of Parliament House. For example, following a vehicle incursion across the public forecourt in 2002, static bollards were considered necessary and installed across the footpaths, and entry point into the main doors of Parliament House. Similarly, upgrades to physical security including operations rooms and enhanced screening capabilities, along with the installation of fencing along the roofline and grass access verges, was completed following similar security reviews in 2009.

DPS has engaged a consultant architect, Mr Harold Guida of Guida Moseley Brown Architects (GMB), to prepare architectural documentation for all packages of design work associated with the Group One security upgrades. Mr Guida, was a member of the original design team for Parliament House and has first-hand knowledge of its design intent, architectural language and construction.

DPS has consulted with GMB to ensure the scope of all functional design briefs and architectural plans, services and finishes conform wherever possible to the design principles for the building and the Parliamentary precincts, in order to maintain the integrity of the design to the greatest extent.

For each group of work a functional design brief is prepared that covers a minimum of the following:

- Project specific requirements;
- Design outcomes;
- Specific operational requirements;
- Heritage at Parliament House;
- Moral Rights;
- Works within the Parliamentary precincts;
- Quality requirements;

- Design Certification;
- Environment requirements;
- Blast and Ballistic Treatments; and
- Occupational Health and Safety Requirements.

The functional design briefs are endorsed by the Project Control Group. On completion and acceptance of the design briefs by PCG, the finalised design (including the architectural, services, security components and finishes) are endorsed by the Taskforce. The Presiding Officers then consider the proposal and, if approved, construction is initiated.

As with all construction projects that affect the exterior of APH, DPS engages with the NCA for the necessary works approval and supports the Presiding Officers in seeking approval from the Parliament (as occurred in the last sitting week of March 2015).

In normal practice, DPS design and construction activities conform to the Building Code of Australia and relevant standards. The quality certification plans for the design and construction activities requires that all major consultants and contractors submit evidence of quality certification in line with the Joint Accreditation System of Australia and New Zealand (JAS-ANZ).

DPS, in conjunction with GMB has proposed a range of design options that seek to maintain the integrity of the design of the building and the Parliamentary Precincts whilst still meeting the security outcomes being sought.

Any works that potentially impact on the design integrity of the building or the precinct will continue to be assessed and, where possible, options will be put forward to minimise impact.

An example would be the proposed fence around the Ministerial Wing. Security agencies sought to have the fence across the entire southern façade including the adjacent grass ramps. The heritage assessment indicated that this would have an adverse impact. DPS Heritage did not support a physical fence of any type. However, security agency advice was unequivocal that a fence for that part of the precinct was absolutely vital to provide an appropriate security layer. DPS negotiated a position where the fence is to be located in the original designed position (from the building concept diagrams) rather than across the entirety of the southern facade, satisfying the security requirements and minimising, but not completely removing, design and heritage impacts.

Section F: Heritage impact

GMB has engaged GML Heritage Pty Ltd (GML) to prepare Heritage Impact Assessments (HIA) for the Group One activities using the functional design briefs.

DPS, however, retains accountability and obligations for the conservation, presentation and interpretation of the heritage values of Parliament House. DPS has an internal Heritage team with relevant expertise that assesses proposals and provides advice about changes to the building, its contents and surrounds. The internal DPS heritage team also consults with the NCA, and the moral rights holder about proposed changes within the Parliamentary Precincts.

It is important to note that currently there are no statutory requirements or guidelines for the assessment of heritage impacts on Parliament House. DPS and GML draw on heritage best practice contained in *The Burra Charter: The Australian ICOMOS Charter for Places of Cultural Significance, 2013* as the accepted approach to the conservation and management of heritage values.

DPS directs significant resources to maintaining heritage values at Parliament House and has commissioned the preparation of a Conservation Management Plan (CMP). A CMP is the recognised best practice tool for managing heritage places and provides policies to protect heritage values.

Currently, the internal DPS heritage team refers to three key sources of information in the determination of heritage impacts. The Australian Heritage Database, Parliament House and Surrounds (Place ID 105740), National Heritage List (NHL) assessment by the Australian Heritage Council (2005) that identifies heritage significance and particular heritage values, along with Pamille Berg – The Architects Design Intent for Parliament House; Canberra, Central Reference Document (CRD) August 2004 and the JPW –Parliament House Design Principles, Second Draft, October 2014.

The Brief for Parliament House Canberra. Attachment 1- Functional Requirements (PHCA, August 1980) states:

“The philosophy which the building expresses, and its popular success, will depend in part on the extent to which public access and involvement is encouraged by the design. Parliament House should not appear remote and inaccessible. Access to both the site and the building should be facilitated. Within the building, connotations of a ‘people’s Parliament’ and ‘open government’ will be established if people can penetrate the building and observe its operation. Functional and security requirements must not be compromised however...”

DPS acknowledges that in some instances compromises involving heritage values may be required to meet the heightened security demands. The security imperative does not always afford the extended period of time necessary to

explore all possible external treatments. The Taskforce is guiding decisions on treatments and endorsing changes to the security envelope of the Parliament as a whole. DPS will continue to manage this as an ongoing risk with appropriate mitigations.

In addition, DPS will continue to identify mutually agreed solutions that address the tension and balance of heritage considerations and the security requirements. An example where alternative solutions have been found and agreed is the proposed changes to entry points from the Marble Foyer. The security review design incorporated turnstiles in a public visible area leading to the side passageways off the foyer, with consequential irreversible damage to the marble floor. An alternative option has been designed and agreed with security agencies as providing appropriate treatment to address the risks, utilising security air locks to control foot access into the private areas of the building on the ground floor.

For the external works, specifically the external fence, guardhouses and bollards around the Ministerial Wing, GML undertook a heritage impact assessment (HIA) that ranks impacts as severe, moderate or minor.

The HIA concludes that the initial proposal for the Ministerial Wing fence that included the grass ramps, option 1, would have a severe impact, and the revised design fence that aligned with the original design intent, option 2, a moderate impact on heritage values.

The proposal for guardhouses would have a moderate impact on heritage values despite being sighted on the in-situ paved areas from the original plans. The proposed bollard locations at the base of the Ministerial Wing at the stairs from Parliament Drive would have a minor impact on heritage values.

DPS recommended that the original design, option 2, be implemented as a mechanism of reducing the visual and design impact to the surrounding area while providing an acceptable level of risk mitigation.

GML consultants note within their assessment that the 'notion of public accessibility, an open Parliament and the importance of the Executive Entrance ... would not be impacted severely by the introduction of the guardhouses and bollards'. GML acknowledge however that the 'proposed fences will create a visual and physical barrier which will impact on the ability to experience unimpeded the relationship between the building and the landscape form'. GML have noted in their assessment that the landscaping contours in the area were originally designed to accommodate a fence in the proposed (approximate) location.

The internal DPS heritage team continues to work along with GML in assessing any design impacts on proposed further activities across the capital works. Heritage Impact Assessments will continue to be produced against each of the designed packages of work.

The summary Heritage Impact Statement against the external security improvements around the Ministerial Wing is as follows:

5.2 Heritage Impact Assessment (GML Heritage - March 2015 pg.28)

This HIA establishes that a careful balance of maintaining and conserving the heritage values of Parliament House, while allowing for the introduction of security measures is required. New work should be sensitive and not distort, obscure or irreversibly change the heritage values of Parliament House or detract from its public appreciation.

The heritage impact assessment for each of the proposed security points is as follows:

- *Point 9, Option 1: the proposed security fence will have a significant impact on the heritage values of Parliament House including its original design intent as a building in the landscape. The fence would not detract from the ability for future expansion of the Ministerial Wing;*
- *Point 9, Option 2: the proposed security fence would have a lesser degree of impact than Option 1, at a moderate level as it is less visually intrusive. Furthermore it is acknowledged that the landscaping contours in this area were originally designed to accommodate a fence in the proposed (approximate) location. The fence would not detract from the ability for future expansion of the Ministerial Wing;*
- *Point 10, the guardhouses, will be moderate and not significantly or permanently impact the landscape setting, design intent or ability for future expansion of the building; and*
- *Point 11, the inclusion of bollards at the pedestrian's stair on Parliament Drive, will be minor; they will have a minimal impact on the heritage values of Parliament House.*

Please note that the Presiding Officers did not put option 1 to Parliament for consideration, as it had a severe heritage impact. Upon the advice of AFP and ASIO, the Presiding Officers presented option 2, aligned to the original design intent, to Parliament in the last sitting week of March 2015.

Section G: Moral Rights

DPS is cognisant of its obligations under the *Copyright Act 1968* and as such has advised the Australian Parliament House moral rights holder, Mr Romaldo Giurgola AO about the proposed works in December 2014. A response was received in January 2015 containing recommended actions to record design and heritage impacts. These actions have been and continue to be undertaken in the form of Heritage Impact Assessments.

For works across the Parliamentary precincts, DPS continues to inform, consult and receive comments and suggestions from Mr Giurgola or his legal personal representatives.

The involvement of Mr Guida in the design of the proposed works provides a sensible conduit to ensure any designs already consider the requirements of the moral rights nominees.

DPS has also written to the landscape moral rights owner, Mr Peter Rolland, around the external activities being undertaken near the Ministerial wing inviting him to comment on any specific aspects of the proposed designs. DPS has also commissioned comprehensive archive quality photography of all areas being worked upon.

DPS acknowledges that the urgency of some of the implementation activities may be perceived as not allowing sufficient time for moral rights responses and consultation. DPS will continue to undertake engagement and consultation throughout the works.

Section H: Impacts on building occupants and visitors

As a component of the design approach, spatial analysis has been conducted to highlight foot traffic paths throughout the public/private interfaces of the building in the context of providing the enhanced security and maximising efficient access, whilst minimising entry delays and impact on visitor and occupant movement.

As the various construction activities progress, DPS is actively limiting the impact on Senators, Members and occupants by scheduling works around non-sitting periods where availability of contractors and materials permits. DPS is ensuring that activities do not impede Senators and Members access to conduct business within Parliament House.

Recognising that an increase in physical security is going to be highly visible to the public and building occupants, DPS continues to communicate and engage with stakeholders to release as much information as quickly as possible about changes occurring within the building.

A dynamic stakeholder engagement and communications plan detailing key messages, the methods of communication and engagement aligned to the Group One building works has been developed that assists in the specific communications for building occupants and stakeholders.

The main element covered within the communications plan is to increase and improve the awareness of components of the security enhancement projects across the main occupants and stakeholders of the building without drawing undue attention to the program or risking the undermining of the security aims of the works.

For the duration of the planned works, DPS has prepared a consistent communication approach that includes:

- DPS is strengthening security at Parliament House;
- The work is the result of a Review of Security at Parliament House by Security Taskforce comprising DPS and a number of security agencies;
- The work will result in increased safety and security for Parliament House occupants and visitors;
- The work may result in disruptions to traffic flow and parking at Parliament House;
- The work may result in disruption to normal circulation at Parliament House. Areas may need to be closed during construction; and
- DPS will manage these disruptions to minimise inconvenience to building occupants and visitors.

Depending on the activity, DPS will utilise a range of communication channels to ensure these messages are received. These include information circulars, letters, parliamentary Intranets, DPS spokespersons, briefings and so on.

A range of communication products will be developed dependant on the nature of the activity being undertaken. These may include frequently asked questions for staff and occupants, media releases, scripts for Visitor Services Officers and Parliamentary Security Officers and special signage.

As part of the assessments made against the proposed changes to entry points and the static bollards, GMB have taken careful consideration to limit the visual impact to the public, whilst satisfying the security integrity requirements. GML Heritage has indicated that the main components of Group One construction work packages will not permanently impact the normal activities of building occupants or visitors regardless of the security threat level.

DPS, through the functional design briefs, will continue to explore all possible practical alternatives to mitigate the security measures required whilst considering impact minimisation on Senators, Members, the public and other occupants.

It is, however, to be expected that with construction activities there will be an impact to occupants and visitors from time to time.

DPS will continue to attempt, wherever possible, to schedule high impact activities during non-peak periods of parliamentary attendance.

Summary

DPS submits that the level of governance, planning and scheduling of the proposed Security Enhancement Projects at Parliament House is well considered and closely overseen by the Presiding Officers ensuring that all works are being undertaken in a consultative, comprehensive and diligent manner.

DPS will continue to engage broadly with all stakeholders and authorities, where it is possible, given the sensitivities of the recommendations to ensure the public and the occupants are impacted as little as practical whilst ensuring that the safety and the security of all visitors, occupants and stakeholders are not compromised.

DPS also acknowledges that the above submission to the committee contains information that is of a generic nature. DPS in preparing this submission has attempted to provide accurate information pertaining to activities and timelines associated with the security works that has not compromised the integrity of the security measures being put in place.

DPS has sought clarification from the Committee Secretariat for the purposes of this submission in the context of the security classification of the material involved, and has been advised that the submission should retain an unclassified rating. DPS would be pleased to brief the committee further on matters that might be classified in an appropriate forum.